# Imperialism K — Compiled

# Negative

## 1NC

### 1NC — K: Core

#### NATO security cooperation sustains itself through a cycle of false flag operations and psychological war scares — the Atlantic Project forms the central pillar of fascist militarization and colonial imperialism of the international system, making global war structurally inevitable.

Campbell ’19 — Horace; Professor of African American Studies and Political Science, Syracuse University. He is the author of Global NATO and the Catastrophic Failure in Libya. April 9, 2019; “Global NATO: A 70-Year Alliance of Oppressors in Crisis”; *CounterPunch*; <https://www.counterpunch.org/2019/04/09/global-nato-a-70-year-alliance-of-oppressors-in-crisis/>; //CYang

The celebration of NATO’s 70 years of existence provides another opportunity to unearth the real history of the ideas, practices and destruction wrought by this military alliance. Even with the clear exposure of the cooperation between NATO, the CIA and the British MI6 to spread terror and psychological warfare in Europe immediately after the formation of this military alliance, the mainstream media, academics and policy makers remain silent on activities of the ‘stay behind armies’ and ‘false flag’ operations that distorted the real causes of insecurity in the world after 1945. The evidence of the manipulations of the peoples of the world to ensure the continued survival of NATO has been well documented in the fraudulent interventions and bombings in the Balkans right up the present multiple wars against the peoples of Iran.

Vijay Prashad had identified NATO as the prime defender of the Atlantic project. This Atlantic project, he noted was, “a fairly straightforward campaign by the propertied classes to maintain or restore their position of dominance.” This Atlantic Project was anchored in the military alliance called NATO with its principal work, that of reversing the South Project; the struggles for peace bread and justice by the poorer citizens of the planet, especially those who had emerged on the world stage after the decolonization of Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean.

The ostensive reason for the founding of NATO was to ‘thwart’ Soviet aggression, but in practice the organization was a prop for western capital and after the fall of the Berlin Wall, became the core prop for Wall Street. In this year, there will be many commentaries on the fact that the existence of NATO reflects a Cold War relic, that NATO is obsolete and lost its mandate, but very few will link the expansion of NATO to the military management of the international system. Prior to 1991, the planners of NATO could justify the existence of NATO on ideological and political grounds, but with the threat of a multi polar world and the diminution of the dollar, NATO expanded to the point where this author joined with others in labelling this organization Global NATO to reflect its current imperial mandate. The Global thrust of NATO now comprises 29 members from Europe and North America along with 41 ‘partners’ that had started off under the banner of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991. Since that time, NATO has launched a lengthy war without end in Afghanistan, colluded in the destruction of Iraq and conspired with militarists to forge ‘Partnership for Peace’ (with most members of the former Warsaw Pact states). The core 29 members are now enmeshed with treaties and undertakings from states involved in the Mediterranean Dialog and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates. There are also the ‘partners’ from across the globe: Afghanistan, Australia, Colombia, Iraq, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand and Pakistan. This enlargement served the military purposes of encircling China and Russia who military planners in the West targeted.

There is no shortage of literature on NATO and its milestones, but very few have documented the real crimes of this global network of anticommunist operatives who precipitated real terror and psychological warfare against the citizens of Europe and North America while supporting mass atrocities from Algeria to Indonesia, and South Africa. Books such as that of NATO’s Secret Armies: Operation GLADIO and Terrorism in Western Europe by Danielle Ganser and The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Their Secret World War, by Stephen Kinzer used rigorous research techniques to uncover the dark history of NATO. These two books can be distinguished from the bland international relations texts that discusses NATO inside the old calculations of ‘strategy,’ ‘concert of democracies’, ‘security cooperation’ and the balance of power,’ and spheres of influence. Most recently, this IR rendering of the history of NATO has been served up in a document entitled, NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis. Published by Harvard University with one of the coauthors being a former US ambassador to NATO. This document spelt out ten challenges.[1] However, in a testimony before Congress, Nicolas Burns boiled down the challenge of NATO to one objective; that the current role of NATO must be to contain Russia and China.[2] On the day before the actual 70thanniversary, on April 3, the Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg delivered an address to a joint session of the US Congress advocating an expansion of the alliance while promoting a military buildup against Russia. [3] European progressives will have to reflect deeply on whether the current sanctions regime and the special propose vehicle called the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX), is ushering in another round of inter imperialist rivalry reminiscent of the currency wars of 1929-1939. Then, the shifting alliances yielded confusion among working peoples who ultimately went to fight against each other in Europe, spreading barbarism throughout the world, from Auschwitz to Hiroshima.

The continued struggles for bread, peace and justice ensure that it is only the authoritarian leaders from the Global South who are compromised on the real meaning of the existence of NATO. In the present era, there is a new capitalist competition while North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) serves as an integral part of the Pentagon’s world command structure. Recent experiences have demonstrated in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya that the moguls of Wall Street are willing to wage as many wars, to destroy as many countries and to kill as many people as necessary to achieve the dominance of US capitalism. The destruction of Libya was a classic example of the convergence of finance as warfare, the weaponization of information and incessant bombing to destroy a society. Where at the start of NATO the war scare was the propaganda method, In the current digital age, brain hacking and the engineering of smart phones have placed the giant technology firms of Apple , Google, Amazon, Microsoft, Facebook at the forefront of the new weapons platform of NATO and Wall Street. This analysis is in three parts spelling out the rationale for the call for all progressive forces to join together to concentrate their energies in the dismantling of NATO.

#### Extinction.

John Bellamy Foster 19, professor of sociology at the University of Oregon and editor of the Monthly Review, 7-1-2019, "Late Imperialism," https://monthlyreview.org/2019/07/01/late-imperialism/, jy

End Times

Imperialism today is more aggressive and boundless in its objectives than ever.61 In the present period of declining U.S. hegemony, as well as economic and ecological decline, the dollar-oil-Pentagon regime, backed by the entire triad of the United States/Canada, Europe, and Japan, is exerting all of its military and financial power to gain geopolitical and geoeconomic advantages.62 The goal is to subordinate still further those countries at the bottom of the world hierarchy, while putting obstacles in the way of emerging economies, and overthrowing all states that violate the rules of the dominant order. Intercore conflicts within the triad continue to exist but are currently suppressed, not only due to the overwhelming force of U.S. power, but also as a result of the perceived need in the core to contain China and Russia, which are seen as constituting grave threats to the prevailing imperial order. In China and in Russia, for different but related historical reasons, global monopoly-finance capital lacks the dominant combination with the national capitalists within their political economies that is present in the other BRICS countries. Meanwhile, the European Union is in disarray, experiencing centrifugal, as opposed to centripetal tendencies, arising out of economic stagnation and the instability generated by imperial blowback emanating from adjacent regions, particularly the Middle East and North Africa.

Under these circumstances, global value/supply chains, along with energy, resources, and finance, are more and more viewed in military-strategic terms. At the center of this interlocked, globalized world order is the unstable hegemony exercised by Fortress America over both Europe and Japan. The United States today is pursuing a strategy of full-spectrum dominance, aimed at not only military, but also technological, financial, and even global “energy dominance”—against a backdrop of impending planetary catastrophe and economic and political disarray.63

In these deteriorating conditions, neofascist tendencies have reemerged once again, constituting monopoly-finance capital’s final class-based recourse—an alliance between big capital and a newly mobilized reactionary lower-middle class.64 More and more, neoliberalism is merging into neofascism, unleashing racism and revanchist nationalism. Anti-imperialist peace movements have waned in most of the capitalist core, even in the context of a revival of the left, raising once again the question of social imperialism.65

There is a sense, of course, in which much of this is familiar. As Magdoff noted,

centrifugal and centripetal forces have always coexisted at the core of the capitalist process, with sometimes one and sometimes the other predominating. As a result, periods of peace and harmony have alternated with periods of discord and violence. Generally the mechanism of this alternation involves both economic and military forms of struggle, with the strongest power emerging victorious and enforcing acquiescence on the losers. But uneven development soon takes over, and a period of renewed struggle for hegemony emerges.66

Late imperialism, however, represents a historical end point for the capitalist world order, presaging either planetary catastrophe or a new revolutionary beginning. Today’s Earth System emergency gives new urgency to the age-old collective struggle for “freedom in general.”67 The wider human struggle must build on the continuing revolutionary resistance of the workers and peoples in the global South, aimed first and foremost at overthrowing imperialism, as the global manifestation of capitalism. Labor in core nations cannot be free until labor in periphery nations is free and imperialism is abolished.68 What Marx called socialism, a society of sustainable human development, can only be constructed on a universal basis. All narrow, invidious, exploitative relations must go, and humanity must at last confront with sober senses its relations with its kind and its unity with the earth.69

#### The alternative is an anti-imperial international.

Amin ’19 — Samir; Egyptian-French Marxian economist, political scientist and world-systems analyst. He is noted for his introduction of the term Eurocentrism in 1988 and considered a pioneer of Dependency Theory. 2019; “The Long Revolution of the Global South”; *Monthly Review Press*; Accessed Online via University of Michigan Libraries; //CYang

8. Reconstructing a “front of countries and peoples of the South” is one of the fundamental conditions for the emergence of “another world” not founded on imperialist domination.

Without underestimating the importance of all kinds of transformations originating in the societies of the North in the past and present, it should be emphasized that they have remained, up to now, tied to imperialism. It should not be surprising, then, that the great transformations on the world scale originated in the revolt of peoples in the peripheries, from the Russian Revolution (the weak link of that time) to the Chinese Revolution and the Non-Aligned Movement (Bandung) that, for a time, forced imperialism to “adjust” to demands that conflicted with the logic of its expansion. The page of the Bandung Conference and the Tricontinental (1955–1980), of a globalization that was multipolar, has turned.

The conditions of existing globalization prohibit a remake of the Bandung Conference. The current ruling classes in the countries of the South are attempting to be part of this globalization, which they sometimes hope to bend in their favor, but which they do not fight. These can be divided into two groups: those who have a “national” project, the nature of which — mainly capitalist, but nuanced by concessions (or not) to the working classes, yet in open or muted conflict with imperialism — should be discussed on a case-by-case basis, such as China or the emergent countries of Asia and Latin America; and those who do not have such a project and accept having to adjust unilaterally to imperialist requirements (these, then, are comprador ruling classes).

Various kinds of alliances are emerging between states (governments), some of which can be seen within the WTO. We should not spurn the possibilities that such alliances might open for movements of the working classes (without, of course, having any illusions).

Is a front of the peoples of the South possible, one that goes beyond the rapprochements between the ruling classes? The construction of such a front is difficult since it is set back by the “culturalist” deviations mentioned above, and results in confrontations between peoples of the South (on pseudo-religious or pseudo-ethnic bases). It will be less problematic if and insofar as the states that have a project could — under pressure from their peoples — move in a more resolutely anti-imperialist direction. But that implies that their projects set aside any illusions that “national capitalist” governments are resolutely and exclusively able to modify imperialist globalization in their favor and become active agents in that globalization, participating in forming the world system (and not unilaterally adjusting to it). These illusions are still widespread and reinforced by the rhetoric that flatters the “emergent countries,” on the way to “catching up,” developed by institutions in the service of imperialism. But insofar as facts come to contradict these illusions, national popular and anti-imperialist blocs might once again pave the way to an internationalism of peoples. We can only hope that progressive forces in the North will understand and support this.

## Framework

### FW — Gani

#### That requires critical epistemologies

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Looking forward: academic and practitioner pushback against colonialism, and cautionary tales

Given the historical and ongoing mutual complicity between knowledge producers and policy-makers in upholding imperial and racial orders, we now consider the responsibilities, possibilities and challenges faced in altering the nature of that nexus. Doing so requires turning to what Danso and Aning call an ‘episteme of alternativity’;41 and the primary way for academics to enact this would be to draw on anti-colonial practice and legacies, rather than imperial competition, as the foundation of their theorizing.

Thus, in his article, Sizwe Mpofu-Walsh forefronts global South policy-makers and focuses on the nuclear order (a topic that is typically associated with realist IR) to demonstrate how it can be approached through an alternative, critical epistemology.42 Disrupting the ‘Great Power gaze’, Mpofu-Walsh asks what the politics of non-proliferation looks like from the perspective of the global South, especially the African continent as the sole nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ). There, denuclearization is fundamentally linked to decolonization. Thus anti-colonial goals, rather than hegemonic/imperialist competition, are at the root of both policy and theorizing. How different would IR knowledge and theories on nuclear weapons be if African praxis and the importance of NWFZs were taken seriously? Turning to the Middle East, Gani similarly argues in her article that the inclusion of non-western history and voices—from policy-makers to activists and scholars—in think-tank discussions can mitigate the latent colonialism that shapes western policy.43

Nevertheless, even with an incorporation of non-western practice and knowledge in policy making and scholarly theorizing, multiple perspectives that are marginalized even in the local context, owing to class or gender, may continue to go unheard.44 One crucial way in which both academics and practitioners can challenge such patterns is by adopting a more expansive reading of what constitutes ‘knowledge’ and indeed ‘practice’. In doing so, we can dismantle some of the constructed and false hierarchies between elite ‘knowledge’ and ‘research’ on one hand, and local ‘tradition’ on the other.45 The former is assumed to be objective, reliable and associated with western (and western-validated) universities; while the latter is viewed as subjective, unscientific and commonly associated with Indigenous, racialized, grassroots communities. Assumptions about who counts as a true knowledge producer or ‘expert’ is not only elitist but heavily racialized and gendered. Definitions of who counts as a ‘practitioner’ are equally narrow, so that scholars or policy-makers may place much weight on the views and actions of state, global governance and corporate practitioners, but do not view as equal practitioners those involved in everyday practice in their communities—those who in fact sustain their ecology, livelihoods, security and identities, all while having to navigate the impact of top-down policies.46

Both the articles by Jan Wilkens and Alvine Datchoua-Tirvaudey on climate justice, and by Althea Rivas and Mariam Safi on the organizing and practices of Afghan women, share knowledge from non-elite local communities and challenge the above binaries and hierarchies. In their article on climate justice in the Arctic and the Mediterranean, Wilkens and Datchoua-Tirvaudey explain that academic–practitioner knowledge exchange has often been a contributing factor in continued climate injustice.47 The existing patterns of this knowledge exchange on climate governance are dependent on hierarchies of knowledge, namely, the valorization of western/‘scientific’ knowledge production at the expense of the needs and knowledges of the Indigenous and local communities most affected by climate change (i.e. the community-based practitioners, rather than the institutional/state ones). Moreover, the spaces where such knowledge exchange takes place are often exclusionary (in who is invited, in the parameters of discourse and/or in the extortionate costs of participating), producing an intra-elite debate.48 Having identified these racialized patterns, they offer a corrective decolonial strategy for ethical climate governance, founded on practice-based knowledge and diverse ways of knowing that bring in those excluded insights.

The article by Rivas and Safi also provides an example of how the academic–practitioner nexus can be ‘decolonized’, one in which everyday knowledges of Afghan women, in all their diversity and complexity, are centred in peacebuilding efforts.49 Their article, co-written by an academic and a local practitioner, offers a methodology of how to take into account the internal hierarchies of positionality, interests and knowledges that are always present when engaging with grassroots communities for the sake of ‘research’. Rivas and Safi also demonstrate the importance of registering and valuing the unlooked-for, atypical knowledges from below, such as the subtle observations offered by Afghan women in rural areas that, contrary to wider assumptions, reflect their political engagement and interest.

Caution against extractivism in the search for such local knowledge exchange is at the forefront of both the above contributions.50 Thus academics should remain reflexive in what the purpose of their research is, and who really benefits. Moreover, a praxis of decolonizing such research necessarily entails taking time in a way that is at odds with the current culture of speedy and multitudinous productivity in academia: the rapid churning out of articles from ‘the field’ should raise appropriate questions about how, why and for whom that research is being conducted.

Of course, at issue is not just whom but also what we consider as worthy of scholarly and policy attention, and how inclusive we are of alternative methodologies. Dependence on state and official archives, ‘canonical’ theorists, written records and English-language sources all reproduce the racialized hierarchies inherent in the prioritization of certain types of knowledge and transmission.51 These factors also close the door on appreciating the power—both practical and ideational—generated by collective social action, whose impact cannot (and should not) be individualized to one or a few visible and often romanticized protagonists. Recognizing all this and reading into the silences of the archives should encourage greater attention to non-hegemonic record-keeping, story-telling and witnessing beyond elitist and prohibitive barriers—from oral histories, to poetry, art and independent publishing on paper and online. As anti-colonial and anti-racist thinkers and activists have long argued, these are the ways in which those who are dispossessed and marginalized, but also, consequently, autonomous, have kept their identities, cultures and memories alive, and sought to prevent their experiences from being suppressed and erased.52 In the face of systematic racism and the colonial dismantling of their histories, those who are marginalized are not, in fact, silent but continue to cultivate and share knowledge, even if they may lack the resources and type of support received by hegemonic knowledges (and people).53 Recognizing the equal validity of marginalized forms of knowledges in both academic and policy realms pushes back against the de-representation in knowledge exchanges within elite spaces and formats.

However, it would be erroneous to assume from these arguments that knowledge produced by so-called elite communities is always bad, and that knowledge or cultural production from the bottom up is always more authentic and supports the cause of justice. Srdjan Vucetic's article unsettles multiple binaries, between the elite and the ‘masses’, as well as between academics and practitioners.54 Drawing on the work of Stuart Hall, he complicates what we read as knowledge production and who we see as its progenitors, challenging the notion of purely top-down (and imperialist) identity construction. Exploring the role (and popularity) of nationalistic films and novels as signifiers of this consensus between policy-makers and wider society, Vucetic demonstrates that it is not enough to hold accountable only those deemed to possess political capital, be they policy-makers or academics. Rather, it is necessary also to challenge the broader pressures and expectations of the public that produce a collusion between elite and mass discourse, and help to foreclose the adoption of more critical, justice-oriented policies. Thus, if we focus solely on academics and practitioners in any anti-racist work, we miss the uncomfortable reality that narrow, exclusionary nationalism that foments such racism and imperialist foreign policies actually enjoys substantial ‘buy-in’ from people and may be an accepted part of a local (in this case British) identity.

This observation reinforces the need outlined above for a more expansive approach to defining knowledges, but this time when interrogating the generators of coloniality. This in turn allows us to bring into equal focus other facilitating institutions and mediums of knowledge dissemination, many of which play a pivotal role in making colonial tropes and erasures more palatable, accessible, even culturally and economically valuable. This theme runs through several of the articles in this special issue. As noted above, Vucetic's article focuses on cultural output; Antweiler looks at museums and schools; Baji considers the instrumentalization of local folklore for imperialist ideologies in Japan; Plonski and Manchanda examine the power of racial capitalism via Israel's surveillance industry and marketing; and Gani scrutinizes the impact of journalistic discourse and think tanks.

Thus far, a lot of responsibility for challenging the racial and colonial dynamics of the academic–practitioner nexus has been placed with knowledge producers, whether within or outside academia. But it is necessary to emphasize that efforts have already been under way, not only to ‘decolonize’ our academic disciplines, but to bring that discourse into the public realm. At that point practitioners need to carry their share of responsibility in listening to and applying the expertise (whether academic or community-based) that can foster more just policies. Instead, the attention policy-makers give to expertise is often selective and politicized, based not on what can actually improve people's lives but on what helps to justify the existing approaches adopted by governments. The current denigration and growing securitization of critical race theory, especially in the United States but increasingly elsewhere, is an example of attacks on emancipatory knowledges that challenge power and oppression. Offering another stark example of this, Amal Abu-Bakare explores in her article the lack of any serious attempts to confront Islamophobia in society, despite the wealth of research and expert advice from scholars and community-based practitioners available to policy-makers.55 Focusing on the cases of the UK and Canada, she highlights the way in which practitioner intervention, in this case that of security and police officials, has actively prevented the adoption of expert guidelines on tackling Islamophobia on the grounds that they might interfere with their counterterrorism strategies. In many ways this is a blatant acknowledgement from policy-makers that their counterterrorism strategy is inherently built upon racial tropes and discrimination. In contrast, so-called ‘neutral’ research on terrorism and/or counterterrorism is embraced by practitioners, precisely because such research might not ask uncomfortable questions about the racial foundations or assumptions that are necessary to enact their policies.

Abu-Bakare's article offers an example of the limitations of academic–practitioner knowledge exchange. Exhorting scholars to make their research policy relevant does not address the unequal receptivity towards critical research that may challenge policy. Nor does it sufficiently take into account the implicit disciplining that can take place in that process of knowledge exchange. Those very spaces or channels that are created to facilitate sharing, listening and negotiation between knowledge producers and practitioners (through all the blurred boundaries between them) may reproduce and reify hierarchies through unequal interactions. Is real dialogue possible if power dynamics render the interlocutors unequal?56 Or, in their efforts to be heard, taken seriously, and make their presence worthwhile, academics and other knowledge producers may find themselves being subtly socialized into the very modes of speech and thought that they sought to criticize. This can also happen in reverse when grassroots practitioners share spaces with scholars and elite institutions. The path-breaking and radical ideas needed to initiate change on some of the most deep-seated problems in politics and society may be diluted in such spaces for the sake of pragmatism and communication, undermining the ability to imagine real alternatives to the status quo. This is not to say that knowledge producers, whether academic or community-based, should not engage with policy-makers, but rather that they should be clear in what they seek to achieve—if, for example, constructive dialogue or receptivity to expertise is unlikely, it is at times necessary and an ethical responsibility simply to register alternative ideas or contestation. Returning to the point made at the start of this piece, this cautions us in how we champion ‘impact’ and knowledge–policy engagement, especially if we only recognize engagements that supplement and are ‘useful’ to systems of power rather than those that hold them to account.

Conclusion

This special issue introduces the readers of International Affairs to the relatively undertheorized and underhistoricized relationship between race, knowledge production and policy-making. The articles demonstrate the ways in which practitioners have historically relied on research produced within the academy to inform policy, initiating the establishment of departments and disciplines for this purpose, but they also show the reverse to be equally true: that policy, both foreign and multilateral, influences the possibilities and parameters of research, funding and recruitment practices, and retention of jobs.57 A key goal of this special issue has been to foster reflection on the ways in which knowledge production (in its multifaceted forms) contributes to or challenges the practice of racism and coloniality; and the ways in which policy and practice shape, validate, limit or ignore knowledge production—in ways that either perpetuate or interrogate coloniality. As the three categories delineated above show, the academic–practitioner nexus is best captured as a series of foreclosures that actively work to uphold narrowly espoused evolutionary myths of the discipline and entrench a naturalization of white-racialized subject positions in academic discourse on the ‘international’, while sidelining scholars and activists, notably women and people of colour, who have made undeniable contributions to analysis of the contemporary world.58 All this brings into view, as one scholar puts it, ‘the fundamental ways in which IR already is, and always has been, complicit in ordering politics’.59

As we have argued in this introductory piece, the exposure in this special issue of the deep academic–practitioner nexus confronts and challenges the ‘gaps’ discourse advanced at the expense of making visible the existing reciprocity that disciplines the boundaries of acceptable enquiry. The outcome of this disciplining at the theoretical level can be seen in the construction of paradigms that normalize Eurocentric presuppositions on ‘how the world is’. But such outcomes are also made manifest through material implications generated by narrow policy responses and policy instruments.

The special issue is not just an exposure, though; it is also a call for repair. To embark on a project of repair, those involved in knowledge production, dissemination and application—within academia, think tanks, museums, schools, cultural production and policy—first and foremost need to recognize that their work is not detached from the real world, even if they seek to make it so. If the articles in this special issue have shown anything, it is that there can be no realistic and honest demarcation between political and apolitical knowledge: to assert neutrality is like offering a blank slate that will inevitably be written over. It is worth knowing that even with the best intentions, a scholar's work is likely to be co-opted for political ends; and that one's erasures and blind spots regarding injustice, even if innocently produced, will be taken as justification for inaction and marginalization of these injustices in the real world.

Sincerity in seeking to prevent racist or imperialist co-optation necessitates more open interrogations of power and commitments to justice: and without doubt IR, whether ‘analytical’ or ‘critical’, and academia more broadly, are filled with sincere and honourable scholars who care about the world they live in and have the capacity to enact positive change. Questioning and challenging accepted and expected modes of academic enquiry requires courage and creativity, both of which are aided through collective effort. This special issue, then, is an invitation to adopt that courage and creativity in how we cultivate knowledge, in questioning the purpose and the ends of that knowledge, and to be discerning in how we try to put it into practice.

### FW — Asia Discourse

#### Discourse shapes reality — their generalizations present real and physical dangers to Asian bodies.

Sehnal 21, New Mexico State University: Doctor of Philosophy — PhD, Rhetoric and Composition/Writing Studies, (Tyler, 80 YEARS OF “THE ORIENT”: RE-MAPPING THE TRAJECTORY OF AMERICAN ORIENTALISM IN THE WAKE OF COVID-19, <https://thescholarship.ecu.edu/handle/10342/9707>) //CHC-DS

X Censored for trigger words

The problematization inherent in Orientalism in the wake of both WWII and Vietnam is clear: such appropriative violence, generalizations, and adaptations of the “Oriental” present significant dangers to Asian and Asian American populations. When reduced to either faceless notions of fear and death or to singularized caricatures of spies and warmongers, such dehumanization can be (and is) used as a tool for encouraging collective action against these apparent “threats.” Such is evident in the wake of the bombing of Pearl Harbor, when white American officials imprisoned innocent Japanese Americans not unlike Picture Bride’s Hana and Taro in domestic internment camps. Twenty years later, Americans waged similar collective actions against Vietnamese soldiers, civilians, and the conflict’s survivors over the course of the Vietnam war and in its aftermath. These Orientalist-inspired actions presented severe physical and historical implications for Vietnamese men, women, and children. During the war, emboldened by notions that they were fighting a collectively deserving and essentially soulless enemy, American troops routinely brutalized and sexually victimized Vietnamese women and civilians. Ninh’s novel details several instances of American soldiers’ savagery in Vietnam, including the rape of a young North Vietnamese soldier named Hoa by a troupe of American soldiers. During the war, American troops indiscriminately assaulted Vietnam and Vietnamese men, women, and children with an endless barrage of physical and sexual violence on a massive scale. Additionally, however, during and in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, popular American media was also working to deface images of men like The Sorrow of War’s Kien and Vuong to justify the U.S.’ involvement in Vietnam and American soldiers’ subsequent brutality overseas. The release of propaganda and films like The Green Berets and The Deer Hunter perpetuated images of men like Kien and Vuong as unfeeling and apathetic warmongering monsters and indirectly promoted the idea that Vietnamese women were merely necessary casualties or deserved conquests of the war. These generalizations and reactions not only encouraged anti-Asian violence overseas and presented an immediate physical danger to Asians and Asian Americans, but also entailed the near complete erasure of accounts like Uchida and Ninh’s from—ultimately—what Western powers perpetuate as the universal lexicon of knowledge concerning the planet’s eastern hemisphere. Therefore, The Sorrow of War is so critical as, without accounts like Ninh’s, narratives dismissive of Vietnamese autonomy would, historically, have been better able to dominate Western perceptions of a supposedly “deserving” population of Vietnamese men, women, and children. Almost thirty years after American troops withdrew from Vietnam’s jungles, leaving behind a myriad of destruction—a mark ultimately symbolic of white America’s racial apathy and endless imperialist quest to maintain its own preeminence—American Orientalism would again reconfigure itself and result in the manifestation of yet another new adaptation of Lee’s “Oriental” figure. Decades after Vietnam, the U.S.’ next adaptation of the “Oriental” would need to be outlandish and encompassing enough to justify white officials’ imperialist assaults on the freedoms of Asian and Asian American populations at home and abroad. Therefore, while adaptations of the Oriental in the early 1940s and mid-to-late 1960s—perpetuated to justify the mass incarceration of Japanese Americans and as grounds for American interventionism in Vietnam—were already ludicrously grand, white America’s next readaptation of the Oriental figure in the early twentyfirst century would prove to be white America’s most dramatic assault on Asian individualism— and, subsequently, its deadliest call to arms—yet.

### FW — Censorship

#### CENSORSHIP. Anti-NATO discourse is silenced by the imperial panopticon. The aff is of no value without critical reflection.

Glenn Greenwald 22, JD at NYU, helped Edward Snowden expose widespread illegal surveillance, 4-13-2022, "Glenn Greenwald: The Censorship Campaign Against Western Criticism of NATO’s Ukraine Policy Is Extreme," https://scheerpost.com/2022/04/13/glenn-greenwald-the-censorship-campaign-against-western-criticism-of-natos-ukraine-policy-is-extreme/, jy <3 BB

If one wishes to be exposed to news, information or perspective that contravenes the prevailing US/NATO view on the war in Ukraine, a rigorous search is required. And there is no guarantee that search will succeed. That is because the state/corporate censorship regime that has been imposed in the West with regard to this war is stunningly aggressive, rapid and comprehensive.

On a virtually daily basis, any off-key news agency, independent platform or individual citizen is liable to be banished from the internet. In early March, barely a week after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the twenty-seven nation European Union — citing “disinformation” and “public order and security” — officially banned the Russian state-news outlets RT and Sputnik from being heard anywhere in Europe. In what Reuters called “an unprecedented move,” all television and online platforms were barred by force of law from airing content from those two outlets. Even prior to that censorship order from the state, Facebook and Google were already banning those outlets, and Twitter immediately announced they would as well, in compliance with the new EU law.

But what was “unprecedented” just six weeks ago has now become commonplace, even normalized. Any platform devoted to offering inconvenient-to-NATO news or alternative perspectives is guaranteed a very short lifespan. Less than two weeks after the EU’s decree, Google announced that it was voluntarily banning all Russian-affiliated media worldwide, meaning Americans and all other non-Europeans were now blocked from viewing those channels on YouTube if they wished to. As so often happens with Big Tech censorship, much of the pressure on Google to more aggressively censor content about the war in Ukraine came from its own workforce: “Workers across Google had been urging YouTube to take additional punitive measures against Russian channels.”

So prolific and fast-moving is this censorship regime that it is virtually impossible to count how many platforms, agencies and individuals have been banished for the crime of expressing views deemed “pro-Russian.” On Tuesday, Twitter, with no explanation as usual, suddenly banned one of the most informative, reliable and careful dissident accounts, named “Russians With Attitude.” Created in late 2020 by two English-speaking Russians, the account exploded in popularity since the start of the war, from roughly 20,000 followers before the invasion to more than 125,000 followers at the time Twitter banned it. An accompanying podcast with the same name also exploded in popularity and, at least as of now, can still be heard on Patreon.

What makes this outburst of Western censorship so notable — and what is at least partially driving it — is that there is a clear, demonstrable hunger in the West for news and information that is banished by Western news sources, ones which loyally and unquestioningly mimic claims from the U.S. government, NATO, and Ukrainian officials. As The Washington Post acknowledged when reporting Big Tech’s “unprecedented” banning of RT, Sputnik and other Russian sources of news: “In the first four days of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, viewership of more than a dozen Russian state-backed propaganda channels on YouTube spiked to unusually high levels.”

Note that this censorship regime is completely one-sided and, as usual, entirely aligned with U.S. foreign policy. Western news outlets and social media platforms have been flooded with pro-Ukrainian propaganda and outright lies from the start of the war. A New York Times article from early March put it very delicately in its headline: “Fact and Mythmaking Blend in Ukraine’s Information War.” Axios was similarly understated in recognizing this fact: “Ukraine misinformation is spreading — and not just from Russia.” Members of the U.S. Congress have gleefully spread fabrications that went viral to millions of people, with no action from censorship-happy Silicon Valley corporations. That is not a surprise: all participants in war use disinformation and propaganda to manipulate public opinion in their favor, and that certainly includes all direct and proxy-war belligerents in the war in Ukraine.

Yet there is little to no censorship — either by Western states or by Silicon Valley monopolies — of pro-Ukrainian disinformation, propaganda and lies. The censorship goes only in one direction: to silence any voices deemed “pro-Russian,” regardless of whether they spread disinformation. The “Russians With Attitude” Twitter account became popular in part because they sometimes criticized Russia, in part because they were more careful with facts and viral claims that most U.S. corporate media outlets, and in part because there is such a paucity of outlets that are willing to offer any information that undercuts what the U.S. Government and NATO want you to believe about the war.

Their crime, like the crime of so many other banished accounts, was not disinformation but skepticism about the US/NATO propaganda campaign. Put another way, it is not “disinformation” but rather viewpoint-error that is targeted for silencing. One can spread as many lies and as much disinformation as one wants provided that it is designed to advance the NATO agenda in Ukraine (just as one is free to spread disinformation provided that its purpose is to strengthen the Democratic Party, which wields its majoritarian power in Washington to demand greater censorship and commands the support of most of Silicon Valley). But what one cannot do is question the NATO/Ukrainian propaganda framework without running a very substantial risk of banishment.

It is unsurprising that Silicon Valley monopolies exercise their censorship power in full alignment with the foreign policy interests of the U.S. Government. Many of the key tech monopolies — such as Google and Amazon — routinely seek and obtain highly lucrative contracts with the U.S. security state, including both the CIA and NSA. Their top executives enjoy very close relationships with top Democratic Party officials. And Congressional Democrats have repeatedly hauled tech executives before their various Committees to explicitly threaten them with legal and regulatory reprisals if they do not censor more in accordance with the policy goals and political interests of that party.

But one question lingers: why is there so much urgency about silencing the small pockets of dissenting voices about the war in Ukraine? This war has united the establishment wings of both parties and virtually the entire corporate media with a lockstep consensus not seen since the days and weeks after the 9/11 attack. One can count on both hands the number of prominent political and media figures who have been willing to dissent even minimally from that bipartisan Washington consensus — dissent that instantly provokes vilification in the form of attacks on one’s patriotism and loyalties. Why is there such fear of allowing these isolated and demonized voices to be heard at all?

The answer seems clear. The benefits from this war for multiple key Washington power centers cannot be overstated. The billions of dollars in aid and weapons being sent by the U.S. to Ukraine are flying so fast and with such seeming randomness that it is difficult to track. “Biden approves $350 million in military aid for Ukraine,” Reuters said on February 26; “Biden announces $800 million in military aid for Ukraine,” announced The New York Times on March 16; on March 30, NBC’s headline read: “Ukraine to receive additional $500 million in aid from U.S., Biden announces”; on Tuesday, Reuters announced: “U.S. to announce $750 million more in weapons for Ukraine, officials say.” By design, these gigantic numbers have long ago lost any meaning and provoke barely a peep of questioning let alone objection.

It is not a mystery who is benefiting from this orgy of military spending. On Tuesday, Reuters reported that “the Pentagon will host leaders from the top eight U.S. weapons manufacturers on Wednesday to discuss the industry’s capacity to meet Ukraine’s weapons needs if the war with Russia lasts years.” Among those participating in this meeting about the need to increase weapons manufacturing to feed the proxy war in Ukraine is Raytheon, which is fortunate to have retired General Lloyd Austin as Defense Secretary, a position to which he ascended from the Raytheon Board of Directors. It is virtually impossible to imagine an event more favorable to the weapons manufacturer industry than this war in Ukraine:

Demand for weapons has shot up after Russia’s invasion on Feb. 24 spurred U.S. and allied weapons transfers to Ukraine. Resupplying as well as planning for a longer war is expected to be discussed at the meeting, the sources told Reuters on condition of anonymity. . .

Resupplying as well as planning for a longer war is expected to be discussed at the meeting. . . . The White House said last week that it has provided more than $1.7 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since the invasion, including over 5,000 Javelins and more than 1,400 Stingers.

This permanent power faction is far from the only one to be reaping benefits from the war in Ukraine and to have its fortunes depend upon prolonging the war as long as possible. The union of the U.S. security state, Democratic Party neocons, and their media allies has not been riding this high since the glory days of 2002. One of MSNBC’s most vocal DNC boosters, Chris Hayes, gushed that the war in Ukraine has revitalized faith and trust in the CIA and intelligence community more than any event in recent memory — deservedly so, he said: “The last few weeks have been like the Iraq War in reverse for US intelligence.” One can barely read a mainstream newspaper or watch a corporate news outlet without seeing the nation’s most bloodthirsty warmongering band of neocons — David Frum, Bill Kristol, Liz Cheney, Wesley Clark, Anne Applebaum, Adam Kinzinger — being celebrated as wise experts and heroic warriors for freedom.

This war has been very good indeed for the permanent Washington political and media class. And although it was taboo for weeks to say so, it is now beyond clear that the only goal that the U.S. and its allies have when it comes to the war in Ukraine is to keep it dragging on for as long as possible. Not only are there no serious American diplomatic efforts to end the war, but the goal is to ensure that does not happen. They are now saying that explicitly, and it is not hard to understand why.

The benefits from endless quagmire in Ukraine are as immense as they are obvious. The military budget skyrockets. Punishment is imposed on the arch-nemesis of the Democratic Party — Russia and Putin — while they are bogged down in a war from which Ukrainians suffer most. The citizenry unites behind their leaders and is distracted from their collective deprivations. The emotions provoked by the horrors of this war — unprecedentedly shown to the public by the Western media which typically ignores carnage and victims of wars waged by Western countries and their allies — is a very potent tool to maintain unity and demonize domestic adversaries. The pundit class finds strength, purpose and resolve, able to feign a Churchillian posture without any of the risks. Prior sins and crimes of American elites are absolved and forgotten at the altar of maximalist claims about Putin’s unprecedented evils — just as they were absolved and forgotten through the script which maintained that the U.S. had never encountered a threat as grave or malignant as Trump. After all, if Putin and Trump are Hitler or even worse, then anyone who opposes them is heroic and noble regardless of all their prior malignant acts.

And that is why even small pockets of dissent cannot be tolerated. It is vital that Americans and Europeans remain entrapped inside a completely closed system of propaganda about the war, just as Russians are kept entrapped inside their own. Keeping these populations united in support of fighting a proxy war against Russia is far too valuable on too many levels to permit any questioning or alternative perspectives. Preventing people from asking who this war benefits, and who is paying the price for it, is paramount.

Big Tech has long proven to be a reliable instrument of censorship and dissent-quashing for the U.S. Government (much to the chagrin of corporate media employees, Russian outlets still remain available on free speech alternatives such as Rumble and Telegram, which is why so much ire is now directed at them). A rapid series of ostensible “crises” — Russiagate, 1/6, the COVID pandemic — were all exploited to condition Westerners to believe that censorship was not only justified but necessary for their own good. In the West, censorship now provokes not anger but gratitude. All of that laid the perfect foundation for this new escalation of a censorship regime in which dissent, on a virtually daily basis, is increasingly more difficult to locate.

No matter one’s views on Russia, Ukraine, the U.S. and the war, it should be deeply alarming to watch such a concerted, united campaign on the part of the most powerful public and private entities to stomp out any and all dissent, while so aggressively demonizing what little manages to slip by. No matter how smart or critically minded or sophisticated we fancy ourselves to be, none of us is immune to official propaganda campaigns, studied and perfected over decades. Nor is any of us immune to the pressures of group-think and herd behavior and hive minds: these are embedded in our psyches and thus easily exploitable.

That is precisely the objective of restricting and closing the information system available to us. It makes it extremely difficult to remain skeptical or critical of the bombardment of approved messaging we receive every day from every direction in every form. And that is precisely the reason to oppose such censorship regimes. An opinion or belief adopted due to propaganda and reflex rather than autonomy and critical evaluation has no value.

### FW — Deliberative Democracy

#### Deliberative democracy isn’t worth seeking. Can never acutalize ideal forms and it’s intrinsically exclusionary

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The Contents and Discontents of Deliberative Democracy The year 2019 will be remembered as the year of protest with millions of people taking to the streets in Africa, Asia, the Americas and Europe to express their frustration with their political leaders. We appear to be in the middle of a democratic recession: approval ratings for most politicians and political parties across the world are abysmal, there are deep divisions in most Western democracies, and public trust in democratic institutions are at record lows (Fishkin & Mansbridge, 2017). The democratic boom following the wave of political decolonization in the 1950s and the end of the Cold War appears to be well and truly over with the rise of authoritarianism, social unrest, state repression of dissent, increasing human rights violations, government crackdown on free speech, violent conficts over natural resource extraction and an increase in modern slavery, all of which are happening in ‘democratic’ countries (Amnesty International, 2019). Democracy, or at least the model of dominant party system representative democracy in Europe and the United States appears to be under threat. The recognition that in modern liberal Western democracies formal democracy through majority rule precluded genuine participation of citizens led to a ‘deliberative turn’ in democratic theory in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The deliberative turn, pioneered by the philosophies of Habermas and Rawls and further elaborated by political theorists like Cohen, Dryzek, Fishkin, Gutmann, Mansbridge, and Thompson among others, began as a normative project that focused on deliberation as an ideal rational discourse where consensus was reached freely and without coercion. Political legitimacy was thus established through deliberative processes that refected the discursive quality of decision making rather than representation through voting. Rationality of a democracy according to Habermas (1975, p. 32) was less about majority rule, which could not represent the interests of all citizens, but should be based on the ‘genuine participation of citizens in political will formation.’ Thus, more participatory forms of democracy required a deliberative ideal involving a discursive process where citizens could freely communicate as equals to arrive at a rational consensus on decisions afecting their lives. Merely acknowledging diferences and inequalities does not make them disappear. Rather than seek an authoritarian consensus, a truly deliberative framework would need to accommodate confict and dissent as well. Moufe (1999) argues that a preoccupation with procedural issues relating to consensus depoliticizes the public sphere and that a robust and vibrant public sphere needs to embrace confict and dissent. A more radical and progressive democratic politics would transform antagonism into ‘agonistic pluralism’ where political contestations refect not ‘antagonism between enemies but agonism between adversaries’ (Moufe, 1999, p. 754). The aim is to ‘domesticate’ destructive antagonism into a constructive agonism where democratic decisions may or may not be fully consensual but can also respectfully accept unresolvable disagreements’ (Hillier, 2003, p. 42). Or as Foucault (1984, p. 379) puts it ‘one must not be for consensuality, but one must be against nonconsensuality.’ Deliberative democrats have acknowledged these critiques and attempted to broaden the scope of deliberative democracy to accommodate exclusions and inequalities. For instance, consensus—the desired outcome of deliberation—was seen as not always desirable even when possible (Gutmann & Thompson, 2018). Habermas’s later work also adopted a more fexible approach, acknowledging that ‘in the case of controversial existential questions arising from diferent worldviews even the most rationally conducted discursive engagement will not lead to consensus’ (Habermas, 2001, p. 43). The task then of a successful deliberative politics is to institutionalize appropriate procedures that can enable rational discourse among informed publics. This ‘public sphere’ is the institutionalized discursive space where ordinary citizens could deliberate about politics, the economy, and other issues that afected their lives. Habermas’s notion of a public sphere was based on a historical analysis of the emergence of new forms of public interaction that took place in cofee houses, salons, and public squares during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. However, feminist and postcolonial scholars have critiqued Habermas’s notion of public sphere as being exclusionary and lacking in open access, participation and social equality that are key to democratic deliberation. If the public sphere was the space where consensus was being manufactured it becomes a new site of hegemonic domination (Fraser, 1990). The merchants and intellectuals who deliberated in cafes and salons about the weighty political and social issues of their time would in all probability have not appreciated the fact that the cofee they consumed was produced by slave labor in the colonies (Eze, 1997). Moreover, as Fraser (1990) points out, opinion forming in the public sphere does not translate into actual decision-making in the political sphere, and even if such an extension were possible it would entrench existing hegemonies and reinforce existing structural inequalities and exclusions. While ideal conditions of deliberative discourse may exist and enable rational consensus among wealthy residents of suburban Frankfurt or Princeton deliberating about the installation of additional streetlights in their neighborhood, it is difcult to imagine how Indigenous communities in the Brazilian Amazon can engage in deliberative discourse as equal citizens with powerful market and state actors intent on expanding mining and logging on Indigenous lands. Even in urban contexts it would be naïve to expect that citizens can participate as equals, respectfully, and exercise their reason freely given the realities of structural inequalities and discriminations based on race, class, gender and sexual orientation. Another signifcant shortcoming in deliberative theories is its lack of a sophisticated analysis of power, which seems to be treated almost like an exogenous variable. The liberal quest for legitimacy seemingly elides notions of power and authority because a key assumption of the deliberative ideal is the absence of coercive power. Legitimacy of a consensus produced by communicative rationality can also be hegemonic because one cannot assume that legitimacy always exists without domination (Clegg, & Haugaard, 2009; Moufe, 1999). Some scholars argue that deliberative democracy has a ‘nuanced view of power’ because it acknowledges that coercive power can exist in deliberative practice (Curato et al., 2017, p. 31). However, they claim it is possible to limit coercive power through good ‘procedural design’ involving selection of ‘less partisan’ participants, using independent facilitators or making deliberations public. Such an approach to power is patently unsatisfactory because it elides relationships between power, legitimacy and authority. How does ‘procedural design’ handle dissent or confict? And if there is no dissent or confict in deliberations then has there been an elite capture of the process by excluding or marginalizing dissenting stakeholders? Deliberative democrats also assume that power, and sometimes coercion, is needed in a deliberative process, especially when implementing decisions contested by certain groups even if the deliberative process was fair and reasoned (Curato et al., 2017). So the assumption is that the state, the only ‘legitimate’ source of coercive power, can and should use coercion to implement decisions arrived at in deliberative forums. As we shall see later when we discuss conficts over natural resources, this is clearly an untenable argument because it legitimizes the use of state violence to implement decisions made in deliberative forums characterized by vastly structurally unequal conditions that disempower marginalized populations. Debates about deliberative democracy elide power dynamics in the broader political economy in which deliberative processes are embedded (Dryzek, 2016). In cases where there are signifcant power asymmetries and where actions can have serious economic, social and environmental impacts on communities as is the case with extractive industries, procedural design, however carefully designed, cannot accommodate divergent and sometimes incommensurable views on land use. Rather institutional, material, and discursive power that constitute the global political economy determine governance structures and processes of natural resource extraction. These forms of power somehow remain ‘outside’ of deliberative discourse but create particular forms of legitimacy that deny pluralism of values and rationalities thus marginalizing the legitimate struggles of populations whose values do not conform to the ‘norm’ (Banerjee, 2018, p. 804). To summarize: despite its shortcomings there appears to be consensus among scholars in the feld that a deliberative process can ‘help revive democratic legitimacy, provide for more authentic public will formation, provide a middle ground between widely mistrusted elites and the angry voices of populism, and help fulfll some of our common normative expectations about democracy’ (Fishkin & Mansbridge, 2017, p. 6). But is this optimism unfounded? What are the silences and erasures in deliberative democracy? Are there limits to ‘authentic public will formation’ and ‘democratic legitimacy’ that marginalize segments of the citizenry? These are some questions I explore in the next section. Postcolonial and Decolonial Deliberations What is remarkable about the various debates in deliberative democracy is the silence about Western colonialism, especially in Habermas’s universalizing notion of communicative rationality. Similar silences can be seen in the work of some Enlightenment thinkers whose concession (and complicity) to slavery and colonialism is paradoxical and puzzling given their proclamations of universal freedom (Dhawan, 2014; Eze, 1997). Enlightenment reasoning and philosophies of history provided an intellectual justifcation of more than two hundred years of colonialism. There was little awareness that the much-celebrated use of reason also creates new forms of domination, even more insidious than coercive power because these forms of domination are justifed by reason itself (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1972). Liberal ideas of freedom, progress, development, and democracy are deeply embedded in the idea of Empire, whose mission involved political subjugation of those it sought to empower and civilize without a critical refexivity of the impact of European colonialism on European philosophy (Banerjee & Arjaliès, 2021). Even the Frankfurt School, despite its infuential work on domination in modern society and critiques of the Enlightenment, is as Said (1993, p. 278) points out ‘stunningly silent on racist theory, anti-imperialist resistance, and oppositional practice in the empire’. It is important we engage with these critiques to arrive at a more nuanced understanding of the complex historical relationships between colonialism and democracy and more importantly identify what traces continue to exist in contemporary political thought. As Fabian (2002, p. 33) points out, good or bad intentions do not alone invalidate knowledge: for that to happen ‘it takes bad epistemology which advances cognitive interests without regard for its ideological presuppositions.’ And certainly one could argue there is an epistemological closure in EuroAmerican representations of democracy that does not recognize attempts by postcolonial countries to create their own forms of governance consistent with their own conceptions of freedom and rights because they may not conform to ‘ideal’ standards (Koelble & Lipuma, 2008). If Enlightenment inspired ideas of democracy elides historical facts about slavery and colonialism then it becomes imperative to reimagine democracy while maintaining the Enlightenment’s spirit of critique, or as Marx puts it ‘the weapon of the criticism cannot replace criticism of the weapon.’

### FW — Epistemic Disobedience

#### Confrontation with colonialism necessitates epistemic disobedience – refusal to conform to the rules of the game calls into question the assumptions that sustain racialized violence within debate.

Mignolo ’09 -- (Walter D. Mignolo, 2009, “Epistemic Disobedience, Independent Thought and Decolonial Freedom,” Theory, Culture & Society 26.7-8 (2009): 159–181, <https://www.academia.edu/3763158/Epistemic_Disobedience_Independent_Thought_and_Decolonial_Freedom?auto=citations&from=cover_page>, accessed 7-3-2022) -- nikki

The introduction of geo-historical and bio-graphical configurations in processes of knowing and understanding allows for a radical re-framing (e.g. de-colonization) of the original formal apparatus of enunciation.2 I have been supporting in the past those who maintain that it is not enough to change the content of the conversation, that it is of the essence to change the terms of the conversation. Changing the terms of the conversation implies going beyond disciplinary or interdisciplinary controversies and the conflict of interpretations. As far as controversies and interpretations remain within the same rules of the game (terms of the conversation), the control of knowledge is not called into question. And in order to call into question the modern/colonial foundation of the control of knowledge, it is necessary to focus on the knower rather than on the known. It means to go to the very assumptions that sustain locus enunciations. In what follows I revisit the formal apparatus of enunciation from the perspective of geo- and bio-graphic politics of knowledge. My revisiting is epistemic rather than linguistic, although focusing on the enunciation is unavoidable if we aim at changing the terms and not only the content of the conversation. The basic assumption is that the knower is always implicated, geo- and body-politically, in the known, although modern epistemology (e.g. the hubris of the zero point) managed to conceal both and created the figure of the detached observer, a neutral seeker of truth and objectivity who at the same time controls the disciplinary rules and puts [themself] in a privileged position to evaluate and dictate. The argument is structured as follows. Sections I and II lay out the ground for the politics of knowledge geo-historically and bio-graphically, contesting the hegemony of zero point epistemology. In Section III, I explore three cases in which geo- and body-politics of knowledge comes forcefully to the fore: one from Africa, one from India and the third from New Zealand. These three cases are complemented by a fourth from Latin America: my argument is here. It is not the report of a detached observer but the intervention of a de-colonial project that ‘comes’ from South America, the Caribbean 4 Theory, Culture & Society 26(7–8) and Latinidad in the US. Understanding the argument implies that the reader will shift its geography of reasoning and of evaluating arguments. In Section IV, I come back to geo- and body-politics of knowledge and their epistemic, ethical and political consequences. In Section V, I attempt to pull the strings together and weave my argument with the three cases explored, hoping that what I say will not be taken as the report of a detached observed but as the intervention of a de-colonial thinker. In semiotics, a basic distinction has been made (Emile Benveniste) between the enunciation and the enunciated. The distinction was necessary, for Benveniste, to ground the floating sign central to Ferdinand de Saussure’s semiology and its development in French structuralism. Benveniste turned to the enunciation and, by doing so, to the subject producing and manipulating signs, rather than the structure of the sign itself (the enunciated). With this distinction in mind, I would venture to say that the interrelated spheres of the colonial matrix of power (economy, authority, gender and sexuality, and knowledge/subjectivity) operate at the level of the enunciated while patriarchy and racism are grounded in the enunciation. Let’s explore it in more detail (Benveniste, 1970; Todorov, 1970).

### FW — Fringe DA

#### FRINGE DA — the assumptions that ground our debates predetermine the scope of alt solvency. Imagining fringe possibilities enables debaters to question basic assumptions that enable social transformation.

David Graeber 13, former Prof at the London School of Economics, April 2013, “A Practical Utopian’s Guide to the Coming Collapse,” <https://thebaffler.com/salvos/a-practical-utopians-guide-to-the-coming-collapse>, jy

What is a revolution? We used to think we knew. Revolutions were seizures of power by popular forces aiming to transform the very nature of the political, social, and economic system in the country in which the revolution took place, usually according to some visionary dream of a just society. Nowadays, we live in an age when, if rebel armies do come sweeping into a city, or mass uprisings overthrow a dictator, it’s unlikely to have any such implications; when profound social transformation does occur—as with, say, the rise of feminism—it’s likely to take an entirely different form. It’s not that revolutionary dreams aren’t out there. But contemporary revolutionaries rarely think they can bring them into being by some modern-day equivalent of storming the Bastille.

At moments like this, it generally pays to go back to the history one already knows and ask: Were revolutions ever really what we thought them to be? For me, the person who has asked this most effectively is the great world historian Immanuel Wallerstein. He argues that for the last quarter millennium or so, revolutions have consisted above all of planetwide transformations of political common sense.

Already by the time of the French Revolution, Wallerstein notes, there was a single world market, and increasingly a single world political system as well, dominated by the huge colonial empires. As a result, the storming of the Bastille in Paris could well end up having effects on Denmark, or even Egypt, just as profound as on France itself—in some cases, even more so. Hence he speaks of the “world revolution of 1789,” followed by the “world revolution of 1848,” which saw revolutions break out almost simultaneously in fifty countries, from Wallachia to Brazil. In no case did the revolutionaries succeed in taking power, but afterward, institutions inspired by the French Revolution—notably, universal systems of primary education—were put in place pretty much everywhere. Similarly, the Russian Revolution of 1917 was a world revolution ultimately responsible for the New Deal and European welfare states as much as for Soviet communism. The last in the series was the world revolution of 1968—which, much like 1848, broke out almost everywhere, from China to Mexico, seized power nowhere, but nonetheless changed everything. This was a revolution against state bureaucracies, and for the inseparability of personal and political liberation, whose most lasting legacy will likely be the birth of modern feminism.

Revolutions are thus planetary phenomena. But there is more. What they really do is transform basic assumptions about what politics is ultimately about. In the wake of a revolution, ideas that had been considered veritably lunatic fringe quickly become the accepted currency of debate. Before the French Revolution, the ideas that change is good, that government policy is the proper way to manage it, and that governments derive their authority from an entity called “the people” were considered the sorts of things one might hear from crackpots and demagogues, or at best a handful of freethinking intellectuals who spend their time debating in cafés. A generation later, even the stuffiest magistrates, priests, and headmasters had to at least pay lip service to these ideas. Before long, we had reached the situation we are in today: that it’s necessary to lay out the terms for anyone to even notice they are there. They’ve become common sense, the very grounds of political discussion.

A quarter of the American population is now engaged in “guard labor”—defending property, supervising work, or otherwise keeping their fellow Americans in line.

Until 1968, most world revolutions really just introduced practical refinements: an expanded franchise, universal primary education, the welfare state. The world revolution of 1968, in contrast—whether it took the form it did in China, of a revolt by students and young cadres supporting Mao’s call for a Cultural Revolution; or in Berkeley and New York, where it marked an alliance of students, dropouts, and cultural rebels; or even in Paris, where it was an alliance of students and workers—was a rebellion against bureaucracy, conformity, or anything that fettered the human imagination, a project for the revolutionizing of not just political or economic life, but every aspect of human existence. As a result, in most cases, the rebels didn’t even try to take over the apparatus of state; they saw that apparatus as itself the problem.

It’s fashionable nowadays to view the social movements of the late sixties as an embarrassing failure. A case can be made for that view. It’s certainly true that in the political sphere, the immediate beneficiary of any widespread change in political common sense—a prioritizing of ideals of individual liberty, imagination, and desire; a hatred of bureaucracy; and suspicions about the role of government—was the political Right. Above all, the movements of the sixties allowed for the mass revival of free market doctrines that had largely been abandoned since the nineteenth century. It’s no coincidence that the same generation who, as teenagers, made the Cultural Revolution in China was the one who, as forty-year-olds, presided over the introduction of capitalism. Since the eighties, “freedom” has come to mean “the market,” and “the market” has come to be seen as identical with capitalism—even, ironically, in places like China, which had known sophisticated markets for thousands of years, but rarely anything that could be described as capitalism.

The ironies are endless. While the new free market ideology has framed itself above all as a rejection of bureaucracy, it has, in fact, been responsible for the first administrative system that has operated on a planetary scale, with its endless layering of public and private bureaucracies: the IMF, World Bank, WTO, trade organizations, financial institutions, transnational corporations, NGOs. This is precisely the system that has imposed free market orthodoxy, and opened the world to financial pillage, under the watchful aegis of American arms. It only made sense that the first attempt to recreate a global revolutionary movement, the Global Justice Movement that peaked between 1998 and 2003, was effectively a rebellion against the rule of that very planetary bureaucracy.

Future Stop

In retrospect, though, I think that later historians will conclude that the legacy of the sixties revolution was deeper than we now imagine, and that the triumph of capitalist markets and their various planetary administrators and enforcers—which seemed so epochal and permanent in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991—was, in fact, far shallower.

#### Try-or-die neg — protests are far more useful than you think and prevent imperialism.

David Graeber 13, former Prof at the London School of Economics, April 2013, “A Practical Utopian’s Guide to the Coming Collapse,” <https://thebaffler.com/salvos/a-practical-utopians-guide-to-the-coming-collapse>, jy

I’ll take an obvious example. One often hears that antiwar protests in the late sixties and early seventies were ultimately failures, since they did not appreciably speed up the U.S. withdrawal from Indochina. But afterward, those controlling U.S. foreign policy were so anxious about being met with similar popular unrest—and even more, with unrest within the military itself, which was genuinely falling apart by the early seventies—that they refused to commit U.S. forces to any major ground conflict for almost thirty years. It took 9/11, an attack that led to thousands of civilian deaths on U.S. soil, to fully overcome the notorious “Vietnam syndrome”—and even then, the war planners made an almost obsessive effort to ensure the wars were effectively protest-proof. Propaganda was incessant, the media was brought on board, experts provided exact calculations on body bag counts (how many U.S. casualties it would take to stir mass opposition), and the rules of engagement were carefully written to keep the count below that.

The problem was that since those rules of engagement ensured that thousands of women, children, and old people would end up “collateral damage” in order to minimize deaths and injuries to U.S. soldiers, this meant that in Iraq and Afghanistan, intense hatred for the occupying forces would pretty much guarantee that the United States couldn’t obtain its military objectives. And remarkably, the war planners seemed to be aware of this. It didn’t matter. They considered it far more important to prevent effective opposition at home than to actually win the war. It’s as if American forces in Iraq were ultimately defeated by the ghost of Abbie Hoffman.

Clearly, an antiwar movement in the sixties that is still tying the hands of U.S. military planners in 2012 can hardly be considered a failure. But it raises an intriguing question: What happens when the creation of that sense of failure, of the complete ineffectiveness of political action against the system, becomes the chief objective of those in power?

Is it possible that this preemptive attitude toward social movements, the designing of wars and trade summits in such a way that preventing effective opposition is considered more of a priority than the success of the war or summit itself, really reflects a more general principle? What if those currently running the system, most of whom witnessed the unrest of the sixties firsthand as impressionable youngsters, are—consciously or unconsciously (and I suspect it’s more conscious than not)—obsessed by the prospect of revolutionary social movements once again challenging prevailing common sense? The thought first occurred to me when participating in the IMF actions in Washington, D.C., in 2002. Coming on the heels of 9/11, we were relatively few and ineffective, the number of police overwhelming. There was no sense that we could succeed in shutting down the meetings. Most of us left feeling vaguely depressed. It was only a few days later, when I talked to someone who had friends attending the meetings, that I learned we had in fact shut them down: the police had introduced such stringent security measures, canceling half the events, that most of the actual meetings had been carried out online. In other words, the government had decided it was more important for protesters to walk away feeling like failures than for the IMF meetings to take place. If you think about it, they afforded protesters extraordinary importance.

It would explain a lot. In most of the world, the last thirty years has come to be known as the age of neoliberalism—one dominated by a revival of the long-since-abandoned nineteenth-century creed that held that free markets and human freedom in general were ultimately the same thing. Neoliberalism has always been wracked by a central paradox. It declares that economic imperatives are to take priority over all others. Politics itself is just a matter of creating the conditions for growing the economy by allowing the magic of the marketplace to do its work. All other hopes and dreams—of equality, of security—are to be sacrificed for the primary goal of economic productivity. But global economic performance over the last thirty years has been decidedly mediocre. With one or two spectacular exceptions (notably China, which significantly ignored most neoliberal prescriptions), growth rates have been far below what they were in the days of the old-fashioned, state-directed, welfare-state-oriented capitalism of the fifties, sixties, and even seventies. By its own standards, then, the project was already a colossal failure even before the 2008 collapse.

If, on the other hand, we stop taking world leaders at their word and instead think of neoliberalism as a political project, it suddenly looks spectacularly effective. The politicians, CEOs, trade bureaucrats, and so forth who regularly meet at summits like Davos or the G20 may have done a miserable job in creating a world capitalist economy that meets the needs of a majority of the world’s inhabitants (let alone produces hope, happiness, security, or meaning), but they have succeeded magnificently in convincing the world that capitalism—and not just capitalism, but exactly the financialized, semifeudal capitalism we happen to have right now—is the only viable economic system. If you think about it, this is a remarkable accomplishment.

Debt cancellation would make the perfect revolutionary demand.

How did they pull it off? The preemptive attitude toward social movements is clearly a part of it; under no conditions can alternatives, or anyone proposing alternatives, be seen to experience success. This helps explain the almost unimaginable investment in “security systems” of one sort or another: the fact that the United States, which lacks any major rival, spends more on its military and intelligence than it did during the Cold War, along with the almost dazzling accumulation of private security agencies, intelligence agencies, militarized police, guards, and mercenaries. Then there are the propaganda organs, including a massive media industry that did not even exist before the sixties, celebrating police. Mostly these systems do not so much attack dissidents directly as contribute to a pervasive climate of fear, jingoistic conformity, life insecurity, and simple despair that makes any thought of changing the world seem an idle fantasy. Yet these security systems are also extremely expensive. Some economists estimate that a quarter of the American population is now engaged in “guard labor” of one sort or another—defending property, supervising work, or otherwise keeping their fellow Americans in line. Economically, most of this disciplinary apparatus is pure deadweight.

In fact, most of the economic innovations of the last thirty years make more sense politically than economically. Eliminating guaranteed life employment for precarious contracts doesn’t really create a more effective workforce, but it is extraordinarily effective in destroying unions and otherwise depoliticizing labor. The same can be said of endlessly increasing working hours. No one has much time for political activity if they’re working sixty-hour weeks.

It does often seem that, whenever there is a choice between one option that makes capitalism seem the only possible economic system, and another that would actually make capitalism a more viable economic system, neoliberalism means always choosing the former. The combined result is a relentless campaign against the human imagination. Or, to be more precise: imagination, desire, individual creativity, all those things that were to be liberated in the last great world revolution, were to be contained strictly in the domain of consumerism, or perhaps in the virtual realities of the Internet. In all other realms they were to be strictly banished. We are talking about the murdering of dreams, the imposition of an apparatus of hopelessness, designed to squelch any sense of an alternative future. Yet as a result of putting virtually all their efforts in one political basket, we are left in the bizarre situation of watching the capitalist system crumbling before our very eyes, at just the moment everyone had finally concluded no other system would be possible.

### FW — Grove

#### “Plan focus” is a model of consensus reality — instead, prefer a model of research that circulates wilder genres of critique.

Grove 19 [Jairus Victor Grove is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Hawai'i Research Center for Future Studies at the University of Hawai'i at Mānoa; “Savage Ecology: war and geopolitics at the end of the world”; August 16, 2019]//eleanor

Please do not mistake my love of ideas for an escapist retreat into idealism. Quite the contrary: I think the task of theorizing is to invent modes of experiencing the world, even if the route is a circuitous journey that does not lead from fiction to nonfiction but instead from truth to falsity. Fiction in our age of continuous-real-time-captured-by-iPhone news updates is so much more frequently true. The world is real but not easily apparent. There is a world as such but no way of encountering it that is not, as Stanley Cavell says, an interpretation. All encounters are a sensuous process of labor with the world and not before the world or after it. Therefore, the fight to see, think, and feel things as they are requires an affirmative sense of genre; cnn is a genre, security reports are a genre, terror alert levels are a genre, and Chomsky-esque truth-telling is a genre, although all of these we are inured to or primed for as a common sense of reality.25 Sometimes we need wilder genres like horror or sci-fi or speculation so that we have the capability to see past what Rudy Rucker calls “consensus reality” into the weird worlds of brain implant experiments, detailed in chapter 6, that have been going on since the 1960s or the emerging freaks of science—explored in chapter 9—that could, if we pay attention, challenge our restrictive normative boundaries of the human.26 I take inspiration in Sayak Valencia’s work on gore or splatter cinema as an analytic category for contemporary capitalism to expand the attention of empiricism to include the gore of the real world.27 Like Valencia finds in the genre of gore, the practices of torture, disappearing, and spectacular violence that suture together the political economy of bodies in the border region between Mexico and the United States are no longer exceptional events but increasingly global practices. The choice of genre is not haphazard. Valencia further distinguishes the sadistic erotics of snuff from the specific necro-practices of gore, which produce spectacular forms of extra-state narco violence, the smooth flow of goods and labor necessary for globalization, and the persistence of state sovereign violence all in one stroke.28 For Valencia, the genre of gore as opposed to other genres of horror and snuff captures these “processes of doubling” and invisibility that characterize the narco-statecapital-death-body machine.29 Like horror and science fiction more generally, Valencia, like Rucker, describes the “irreal” character of social relations and their reproduction correspondingly requiring a contrarealist genre to make visible what is meant to be ignored or normalized. Rucker and Valencia practice a kind of transrealism as an art form that “deal[s] with the world the way it actually is”30 because mere description is insufficient to pierce the veil of consensus reality. The endurance of consensus reality as a genre of naïve realism is indebted to an aesthetic but also a corresponding anesthetic that foregrounds a “common sense” in place of an openness to experience of what has not previously been experienced.31 Consensus or commonsense reality shields us from a world that would otherwise be too real, creating a feeling of the irreal. According to Rucker, as long as the evening news feels real, the consensus can continue despite unbelievable contradictions. This is a fact tested well beyond what I thought was darkly possible by the first year of the Donald Trump presidency. As a collective— what Félix Guattari called a machinic unconscious—we tune in and tune out simultaneously.32 Valencia similarly highlights the degree to which gore capitalism can engage in labor practices and new forms of violence markedly dystopian by any public consensus of a moral life without somehow calling into question the state or globalization.33 Even catastrophic material contradictions fail to create a legitimacy crisis, and frequently outright fictions mobilize whole nations. There is no better proof of this than the public consensus aided and abetted by thousands of scholars that the greatest threat to humanity is a handful of people called terrorists. Without these new genre- inspired tools for investigation, how else do you make sense of autonomous killer robots and the savage biopolitics of conquistadors, and equally find inspiration in Go-playing ai platforms and nearly annihilated cosmologies resurging against any “realistic” odds? How do we get from horror to critique? Rucker recommends that we can “turn off the tv (or now ubiquitous internet), eat something, and go for a walk, with infinitely many thoughts and perceptions mingling with infinitely many inputs.”34 Furthermore, artists of all sorts, scholars included, can refuse to allow this “severely limited and reactionary mode condition all of our writing.”35 We can instead employ the tricks of other aesthetic genres and conceptual speculation to expand the sensory capabilities to see the world beyond consensus reality. In this sense, theory can be a kind of dark magic, a destroyer of worlds, an art of sensual experience. We can craft concepts like spells. We can conjure ideas from the virtual in hopes of altering the experience of reality. What comes after that is beyond our control. To this end, what if the primary goal of studying global politics was not to explain things like laws, rules, and predictions but was rather to broaden how much of the world we could experience and be part of? What if international relations was an empiricism infused with what Cavell calls imagination, such that we can “take the facts in, realize the significance of what is going on, make the behavior real for [ourselves], make a connection”?36 Cavell says this process of imagination is what Wittgenstein called “interpretation” or “seeing something as something.”37 The failure to see so many things and others as “something” is a plague of much greater significance than any research problem that can be saved by the next methodological breakthrough. And the “seeing something as something” problem is as equally unlikely to be solved by any scientific breakthrough, in the narrow sense. Instead we have to find tactics for making sense of “what is fantastic in our ordinary lives.”38

### FW — Knowing Subject

#### Their model of debate is premised on the “knowing subject” of colonial modernity that operates untouched by racial configurations of power – vote affirmative to decenter their epistemology of scholarly detachment.

Mignolo ’09 -- (Walter D. Mignolo, 2009, “Epistemic Disobedience, Independent Thought and Decolonial Freedom,” Theory, Culture & Society 26.7-8 (2009): 159–181, <https://www.academia.edu/3763158/Epistemic_Disobedience_Independent_Thought_and_Decolonial_Freedom?auto=citations&from=cover_page>, accessed 7-3-2022) -- nikki

ONCE UPON a time scholars assumed that the knowing subject in the disciplines is transparent, disincorporated from the known and untouched by the geo-political configuration of the world in which people are racially ranked and regions are racially configured. From a detached and neutral point of observation (that Colombian philosopher Santiago Castro-Gómez (2007) describes as the hubris of the zero point), the knowing subject maps the world and its problems, classifies people and projects into what is good for them. Today that assumption is no longer tenable, although there are still many believers. At stake is indeed the question of racism and epistemology (Chukwudi Eze, 1997; Mignolo, forthcoming). And once upon a time scholars assumed that if you ‘come’ from Latin America you have to ‘talk about’ Latin America; that in such a case you have to be a token of your culture. Such expectation will not arise if the author ‘comes’ from Germany, France, England or the US. In such cases it is not assumed that you have to be talking about your culture but can function as a theoretically minded person. As we know: the first world has knowledge, the third world has culture; Native Americans have wisdom, Anglo Americans have science. The need for political and epistemic delinking here comes to the fore, as well as decolonializing and de-colonial knowledges, necessary steps for imagining and building democratic, just, and non-imperial/colonial societies. Geo-politics of knowledge goes hand in hand with geo-politics of knowing. Who and when, why and where is knowledge generated (rather than produced, like cars or cell phones)? Asking these questions means to shift the attention from the enunciated to the enunciation. And by so doing, turning Descartes’s dictum inside out: rather than assuming that thinking comes before being, one assumes instead that it is a racially marked body in a geo-historical marked space that feels the urge or get the call to speak, to articulate, in whatever semiotic system, the urge that makes of living organisms ‘human’ beings. By setting the scenario in terms of geo- and body-politics I am starting and departing from already familiar notions of ‘situated knowledges’. Sure, all knowledges are situated and every knowledge is constructed. But that is just the beginning. The question is: who, when, why is constructing knowledges (Mignolo, 1999, 2005 [1995])? Why eurocentered epistemology carefully hidden (in the social sciences, in the humanities, in the natural sciences and professional schools, in think tanks of the financial sector and the G8 or G20), its own geo-historical and bio-graphical locations? The shift I am indicating is the anchor (constructed of course, located of course, not just anchored by nature or by God) of the argument that follows. It is the beginning of any epistemic de-colonial de-linking with all its historical, political and ethical consequences. Why? Because geo- historical and bio-graphic loci of enunciation have been located by and through the making and transformation of the colonial matrix of power: a racial system of social classification that invented Occidentalism (e.g. Indias Occidentales), that created the conditions for Orientalism; distinguished the South of Europe from its center (Hegel) and, on that long history, remapped the world as first, second and third during the Cold War. Places of nonthought (of myth, non-western religions, folklore, underdevelopment involving regions and people) today have been waking up from the long process of westernization. The anthropos inhabiting non-European places discovered that [they] had been invented, as anthropos, by a locus of enunciations self-defined as humanitas.

### FW — Ontology

#### ONTOLOGY. Their framework forces debate to turn production towards destruction, creating a condition of permanent war.

Maurizio Lazzarato 22, PhD Philosophy from the Université de Paris VIII, 4-3-2022, "War, Capitalism, Ecology • Ill Will," https://illwill.com/war-capitalism-ecology, jy

Postscript: a crisis of ontology

The identity of production and destruction points to a crisis in the conception of being whose productive power philosophy has sought to affirm (being as creation, a continuous process of expansion, a construction of the world and of man). This long history of being is overturned by the First World War, after which the self-production of being coincides with its self-destruction. The philosophies of the 1960s and 1970s failed to recognize this new situation in any way. On the contrary, they doubled down on being’s power of invention, proliferation, and differentiation. The negative of destruction was expelled from thought right at the moment that being, under the regime of total production, became comparable to a “geological” force capable of modifying the earth’s morphology, while destroying the conditions of its habitability. The critique of the negative focused on the Hegelian dialectic, but it failed to problematize the absolute negation that the new face of capitalism harbored within it. At the moment that being seemed to be enriched by the continuous production of new singularities, it is consumed, exhausted, and even threatened with extinction. Such is the unprecedented situation that philosophy avoids like the plague.

The identity of production and destruction obliges us to reconsider not only the category of work, but all those productive forces that might seek to inherit the power of being. Total war and the conjoined acceleration of Capital, of the State, of science/technology, and of work have rendered the Marxian opposition between forces of production and relations of production inoperative, because productive forces are at the same time destructive forces. In the 19th century, work and its partners, science and technology, seemed to constitute a power of creation imprisoned in relations of production (specifically, private property and the State that secured it). They needed to be freed from the grip of the latter so that they could develop those productive powers heretofore constrained by profit, private property, and class hierarchies. Under post-total war conditions of capitalism, it is undecidable if work is production or destruction, since it is both at the same time. For this reason, there can be no ontology of work: the modalities of political action must be rethought.

Battles, refusal, revolts, cooperation, “reparative” activities, solidarities, and revolutions are always on the table, and the break with capitalism is more necessary today than ever, since what is at stake is the very life of the species; but all this appears within a framework radically modified by the existence of destruction, which production casts alongside it like a shadow.

### FW — Policy Debate

#### Policy debate is invested in a false assumption of subjective citizenship and sovereignty that is *rooted in settler colonial consciousness* – Rhetorical spaces, like debate, layer ideological structures of settler reproduction which create the conditions for settler colonialism to reproduce itself.

* WSG=White Settler Governance

Lechuga 20 (Dr. Michael Lechuga researches and teaches Latina/o/x Studies Communication Studies, Rhetoric, Migration and Settler Colonialism Studies, and Affect Studies; “An anticolonial future: reassembling the way we do rhetoric”; Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies; December 4, 2020; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14791420.2020.1829659)//LASA-ERB

To answer the first claim—that US rhetoric is the communication practice of organizing people and materials to serve the needs of the colonial settlement—I begin by looking at the Aristotelian tradition’s ongoing influence on the field. Aristotle’s rhetoric is a publicfacing procedure for persuasion within a subjected citizenry. Its objective: to find all means that might convince an audience, not because dialectic deliberation will not work, but because “affecting the decisions of juries and assemblies is a matter of persuasiveness, not of knowledge.” 1 Rhetoricians in the US still invested in Aristotle must account for this colonial carryover from Britain’s Aristotelian tradition. It represents particular forms of rhetorical criticism and pedagogical practices—like public speaking, debate, and oral defenses—that rely on a notion of subjective citizenship and sovereignty rooted in a colonial (then settler colonial) consciousness.2 Lauer argues, for example, that classical rhetoric was essential in propulsion of the Roman Republic into the Roman Empire. As a result of Augustus’s shift from deliberative to epideictic rhetoric, the Roman Empire was able to sustain the spread of Roman ideology onto lands that would have otherwise exceeded its authority.3 Augustus knew that the legitimacy of the Roman Empire was contingent upon the ability to shape public memory so that Roman law would be seen as morally virtuous. Thus, the rhetorical authority of sovereignty was used to justify the expansion of the Roman Empire as a function of the persuasive power of its leaders. Mary E. Stucky and John M. Murphy describe the way rhetorical authority is used, much like the Romans, to also remove native peoples from their stewarded lands for economic exploitation in the US.4 In both cases, rhetorical subjection and claims to sovereignty are communicated onto bodies and lands, exerting a discursive force that commits colonial violence. The practice of issuing rhetorical authority is intrinsically connected to colonial modernity. From Aristotelian thought to the middle of the twentieth century, “rhetorical criticism” focused almost exclusively on studying a speaker’s capacity to persuade publics through oratory.5 This meant that a training in rhetoric required studying “the texts of speeches delivered by the common and uncommon men who attempted to crystallize and mold public thinking about the issues of their day.” 6 The purpose of this training was not to disrupt existing systems of domination but, rather, to replicate them: as important as public address [is] itself in understanding [US] American culture is the character of the training in rhetoric provided by the nation’s colleges and universities. Rhetoric and rhetorical training … reflect to some extent the demands and expectations of the environment; the public image of the orator inevitably influences the collegiate training of future orators.7 Raymie McKerrow suggests that this tradition of training orators was reflected in the field up until the critical turn in the 1970s where scholars then begin to turn to rhetorical criticism of social justice movements and scholars like Maurice Charland and Michael Calvin McGee begin to rethink rhetorical subjectivity. McKerrow also credits Walter Fisher for work on narrative rhetoric, which McKerrow argues gave the field a language to study a “rational world paradigm” through narrative fidelity—though this “world paradigm” was certainly not inclusive of the indigenous narrative epistemologies already circulating for centuries before the arrival of European rhetoric.8 While McKerrow argues that the 1970s moved US rhetoric past its European colonial roots and into a postmodern scholarly practice, much of the field continues to be entangled with processes of settler colonial modes of production: invoking political subjectivities, authorizing sovereignty, and narrating the settler colonial consciousness.9 Notably, the “the rhetoric of modernity” is a structural process driven by the production of colonial subjects (i.e., Christian, white) and capitalist practices of production which originated in Europe and were spread throughout the Americas via genocide, occupation, enslavement, and war.10 Ultimately, the rhetoric of modernity is about the sovereignty constructed through a European ideological paradigm that was deduced from the rhetorical authority invented by monarchs, trade companies, and churches. Furthermore, that sovereignty exerted over colonial subjects relies on a distribution of settler colonial narratives that exist on a trajectory that has not quite finished the settler colonial project; settling for rhetorics of liberal modernity simply “crucially contributes to blocking out indigenous peoples’ struggles for a post-settler colonial future.” 11 Thus, it is not enough to say that rhetoric is “the study” of how settler colonial ideology is communicated. Rather, it is a specific public-facing communication practice that organizes people and materials (especially land) to serve the needs of a settlement through claims of political sovereignty. Furthermore, rhetoric produces and circulates narrative forms that foreclose a postsettler future by reproducing the same sets of relationships between bodies, lands, and power both in our research practices (as I will describe below) and in our pedagogies (like debate, public speaking, etc). Claim #2: assemblage theory frames rhetoric as an organizing logic Embedded within the theory of assemblages is a way to consider how communication moves ideological power onto bodies and throughout territories. Research on White Settler Governance (WSG) emerging from Canadian Cultural Studies reverberates Walter Mignolo and Lorenzo Veracini’s sentiment on the importance of studying the mechanisms of production behind settler colonialism. Scott Lauria Morgensen relies on a framework rooted in Foucault’s biopolitics and settler colonial studies to describe how WSG is founded by apparatuses of power that persist in producing populations and institutions that can reproduce settler logics: the biopolitics of settler colonialism will explain that the colonial era never ended … . Theories of the biopolitical state, regimes of global governance, and the war on terror will be insufficient unless they critically theorise settler colonialism as a historical and present condition and method of all such power.12 Settler colonialism, thus, is not simply a condition that afflicts native peoples and lands, but is a method settler states undertake in order to layer ideological structures of settler production like universities, hospitals, and courts onto yet settler-occupied territories. I argue that this is a communicable method. Patrick Wolfe suggests WSG organizes and endures through material mechanisms of ideological replacement, those that eliminate native peoples from lands and then occupy those lands indefinitely: “settler colonizers come to stay: invasion is a structure not an event … elimination is an organizing principal of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superseded) occurrence … . Settler colonialism destroys to replace.” 13 What settler colonialism replaces, though, is the order of how sets of relations between lands, peoples, and ideologies are mapped out onto invaded territories. As a structure of settler ideological power—or what I refer to as an assemblage—WSG persist in territorializing native lands and eliminating native peoples through organizing logics of subjectivity and sovereignty circulated through narratives of settler logic. Conventional rhetoric’s “agonistic” emphasis on evaluating the efficacy of a given presidential address, congressional debate, or other communicative practice is inherently conservative, and thus settler colonial, for it positions the WSG status quo as a given; that is, when the organizing logics of settler colonialism are communicated effectively, this is “effective” rhetoric. Therefore, to frame rhetoric as the communicable organizing logics of WSG, a study of assemblages is warranted. For Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, assemblages are an “ad hoc logic” about the ways social formations rely on a combination of heterogeneous, material and human parts to create change.14 Assemblages are like self-replicating, overdetermined political machines where many seemingly random materials are arranged in a self-reinforcing fashion to produce and sustain a particular outcome. While Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of political desire is ultimately framed in the context of late capitalism, thinking through their conception of assemblage as it is moved by a settler colonial desire—a desire Mignolo asserts is dually capitalistic and genocidally white supremacist—warrants a discussion of how political ideologies of domination are assembled by rhetorical logics. For one, assemblages are not things, and they do not produce things; they are arrangements of things.15 Assemblages, though, do territorialize and code particular annunciations with an organizing logic. In this case, materials and bodies are arranged and mobilized on territories according to the logics of settler desire (resource extraction, labor extraction, and genocide), which has the dual effect of creating the conditions for settler logic to reproduce. For DeLanda, this point is particularly important: what one feels as an effect (or affect) from assemblages is the sense that territories are being reshaped and bodies recoded to be more conducive to the reproduction of the assemblage.16 This facet of assemblages intersects with the biopolitical study of WSG by explaining the ways ideological structures of power arrange racial and economic hierarchies in the service of producing the conditions by which settler colonialism can reproduce. The other facet of assemblage, and the one that pertains most to the study of rhetoric, is Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the abstract machine. An assemblage comprises the abstract machine, the concrete (material) components, and the personae (bodies). The abstract machine is the organizing logic of an assemblage: “the condition of an assemblage is abstract because it is not a thing or object that exists in the world, but rather something that lays out a set of relations wherein concrete elements and agencies appear.” 17 Thus, the abstract machine of an assemblage organizes the materials (including and especially land) and personae of the assemblage in a way that their sets of relationships affect the flows of power toward a particular desire. In the case of WSG, the capacity to call settler colonial subjects into being, the capacity to make sovereignty claims over native lands, and the capacity to normalize this invasive process through religious or grand global political narrative is organized by the abstract machine of settler logic—or what I described earlier as rhetoric. The abstract machine layers power over bodies and lands in a way that reshapes them to reproduce structures of settler power. In other words, settler colonial governance is an assemblage of ideological power in North America that territorializes the lands stewarded by native peoples, codes the bodies of native, Mestizx, and black peoples as Other, and shapes rhetorical/communicable landscapes into spaces conducive to the reproduction of the settlement. Rhetoric is the organizing logic of this white settler assemblage that is continuously communicated (discursively and affectively) to arrange the relationships between settler bodies, native bodies, occupied lands, and technologies of occupation. These tenets of rhetoric are articulated in the organizational logic of settler colonialism. We cannot undo settler colonialism unless we confront the normalization of these logics and begin to rearticulate an anticolonial praxis-driven method for studying rhetoric. This work—if it assumes that conventional rhetoric is, in fact, the organizing logic of the settler colonial assemblage in North America—can undo our complicity as rhetoricians to reproduce settler colonialism.

### FW — Radical Epistemology

#### Radical epistemology is key – decolonizing deliberative frameworks by engaging subaltern thought that forms alternative rationalities within the sphere of discourse

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Towards a Decolonial Imaginary Scholarship on decoloniality offers a critical perspective where subaltern difference becomes the basis for decolonizing deliberative democracy involving a critical engagement with knowledges and cultural practices that were delegitimized by colonialism (Faria et al., 2010). Decoloniality recognizes the failure of the postcolonial state to live up to the promise of decolonization and ‘interrogates the postcolonial nation state as a colonizing entity in the context of struggles over Indigenous sovereignty’ (Banerjee, 2021, p.4). Emerging from Latin America, decolonial scholarship followed a different but related trajectory than postcolonial studies, which was dominated by the work of diasporic South Asian scholars trained in the English literary canons and whose inaccessible writing had little to offer to non-English speaking scholars (Misoczky, 2019). Settler colonialism in the Americas, as we have discussed earlier, differed in significant ways from the predominantly British colonialism in India, the Middle East and Africa, which was the focus of postcolonial studies (Harding, 2017). The fundamental critique of European colonialism by decolonial scholars was similar to what was articulated earlier by postcolonial scholars: the fixing of difference based on a privileged Eurocentric position, racial hierarchies, and the binary categorizations of primitive/modern, developed/underdeveloped, and civilized/barbaric. However, there is a temporal difference: while postcolonial scholarship refers mainly to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries decoloniality begins from the moment of European invasion of the Americas in the fifteenth century (Bhambra, 2014). Postcolonial scholarship’s obsession with culture and the fetishization of difference also diverted criticism of capitalism and its associated inequalities and forms of oppression, which are central to decolonial thinking (Dirlik, 1994). Latin American scholars like Aníbal Quijano, María Lugones, Gloria Anzaldúa, Maldonado-Torres and Walter Mignolo among others pioneered scholarship with a decolonial epistemic perspective that takes into account diverse worldviews, particularly of subaltern racial and ethnic populations from the Global South, to produce alternate epistemologies that transcend the Western canon. Colonial difference becomes the basis of the production of these subaltern knowledges resulting in a decolonized epistemology from the perspective of marginalized populations (Mignolo, 2000). The notion of coloniality is inextricably linked with modernity—coloniality is constitutive of modernity and hence ‘there is no modernity without coloniality and no coloniality without modernity’ (Mignolo & Walsh, 2018, p. 4). This critical ‘border thinking’ (Anzaldúa, 1987) is the decolonial response to Habermas’s Eurocentric ‘unfinished project of modernity’ from the perspective of the oppressed and exploited side of the colonial difference (Grosfoguel, 2013, p. 26). Quijano’s (2000, 2007) concept of the coloniality of power, which constitutes the global capitalist system in liberal democracies, is central to decolonial thought. Coloniality of power reflects forms of domination that continued in democratic postcolonial countries after the end of direct colonialism, reinforcing historical structural inequalities of the colonial era (Ballestrin, 2015). Coloniality of power is based on a Eurocentric racialized classification of societies that was imposed on Latin America after European invasion: the modernity that was designed to break the shackles of the primitive past of postcolonial countries also embedded them in racial and ethnic hierarchies that constitute the international division of labor (Grosfoguel, 2007; Quijano, 2007). Feminist philosophers have extended decolonial scholarship by drawing attention to the coloniality of gender, which was neglected in initial formulations of decoloniality (Harding, 2017; Lugones, 2010; Manning, 2018). Decolonial feminism requires overturning the coloniality of gender by a critical analysis of the racialized and capitalist forms of gender oppression (Lugones, 2010). Knowledge production has generally been a one way street where theories that are produced in the ‘global North’ are imposed on the ‘global South’ (Alcadipani et al., 2012). Producers of theories, including democratic theories, have generally ignored postcolonial critiques and subaltern theories. This epistemic coloniality infects theories of democracy in two ways requiring new modes of understanding: first, there is a need to understand how coloniality in democracy produces inequality and injustice, conditions that will always hinder the democratic project. Second, democracy in coloniality requires an understanding of how democracy is used to sustain coloniality (Ballestrin, 2015). This is the essence of the decolonial project. Such a perspective can provide deeper insights into understanding why and how democracies in postcolonial countries ‘deviate’ from the norm while also understanding how the norm itself is constituted by colonial relations of power. Western powers, to protect their own interests, have exported democracy to non-European sites through soft power using international aid, trade deals, human rights regimes and cultural exchange programs, backed up by military power when these forms of persuasion fail or as Ballestrin (2015, p. 221) puts it, ‘when the platforms of democracy and human rights serve to justify contemporary imperial expansion, coloniality is imposed.’ Decoloniality is also rooted in praxis whereas much of postcolonial scholarship is preoccupied with the cultural domain. The starting point for a decolonial praxis is to imagine radically different perspectives that can dislodge Western rationality as the only basis of reality (Mignolo & Walsh, 2018). This does not mean an outright rejection of Western notions of progress, democracy and development but involves a critical reflexivity that can ‘liberate the production of knowledge, refection, and communication from the pitfalls of European rationality/modernity’ (Quijano, 2007, p. 177). Rather than lapse into fundamentalist thinking, a critique of Eurocentric modernity is a project of transmodernity (Dussel, 2012), which involves imagining multiple worlds and forms of democratic alterity as opposed to the global imposition of a single modernity and liberal form of democracy centered in Europe (Grosfoguel, 2013). Transmodern forms of democracy entails decolonizing the racial and capitalist bases of liberal democracy. This epistemological decolonization is a difficult task involving new forms of intercultural understanding that could form the basis of alternate rationalities. Merely bringing in non-Western perspectives into the canon is not sufficient—for example describing an African ‘ubuntu’ ethics in a European academic journal may qualify as an alternative moral theory but it still fails as a decolonization project because this knowledge is interpellated in Western rules of validation of knowledge and a coloniality of power (Naude, 2019). Perhaps understanding decolonial sites of dissent, resistance, and protest and the multitude of livelihood struggles arising from a politics of difference may enable us to imagine other worlds that are not defined by Eurocentric modernity (Escobar, 2004). Many of these struggles are about a praxis of living and communal organizing that is delinked from the modern capitalist nation state (Mignolo & Walsh, 2018).

#### Centering the colonial state-form of NATO as the locus of discussion cements racialized power relations as a fixture of academic dialogue and precludes generating revolutionary energy towards indigenous political praxis – framing out the sovereign state in debate is key.

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Decoloniality is not the same as political decolonization that occurred during the 1800s in Latin America and the mid twentieth century in Africa and Asia when former colonies gained independence and became new nation states. The transition from colonialism to nationalism while marking a postcolonial moment for the nation state excluded large segments of its populations who were now governed by the same rationality and coloniality of knowledge that inscribed the colonial project. Recognition of ethnic minorities among postcolonial nations does not challenge existing power relations or the dominant state model of development. For instance, while the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples guaranteed their economic, cultural and religious rights and the right to strengthen their social and political institutions, it not clear how Indigenous peoples can actually exercise these rights, because as Article 46 of the Declaration states: ‘Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the United Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States’. However, a decolonial imaginary requires delinking from the ‘political unity of sovereign and independent states’ because it is this unity that fixes colonial difference within global power structures, disallowing other modes of existence. Any alternative framework must take into account ‘the epistemic force of local histories and to think theory through the political praxis of subaltern groups, where the Other becomes the original source of an ethical discourse’ (Escobar, 2004, p. 217). In rejecting the universalizing and totalizing claims of Western modernity, a decolonial imaginary does not privilege the nation state as a site for struggle because coloniality ensures that the state cannot be decolonized or democratized (Mignolo & Walsh, 2018). Instead, the decolonial project is a search for multiple local and regional forms of governance that avoids the pitfalls of undemocratic and repressive regimes which characterize contemporary liberal democracies. Scholarship on Indigenous sovereignty in Australia, the Americas and New Zealand has challenged dominant narratives about the founding of these nation states and documented how a false political authority was claimed through land that was ‘acquired’ forcibly or fraudulently and by unilateral extinguishment of native title (Hendrix, 2010). The triumphalist narratives of settler colonial states never pose the key question: ‘Where does the force of one law to extinguish the laws of the other draw its legitimacy from’? (Watson, 2006, p. 29). This denial of the original violence of state sovereignty and colonial histories along with an affirmation of Indigenous cultures becomes the basis of Indigenous claims to sovereignty and self-determination (Volmert, 2010). Whether in settler colonies or post-colonial countries, Indigenous groups with distinct preferences and cultures remain marginalized minorities despite being bestowed with ‘citizen rights.’ Rather than participate in public will formation Indigenous peoples have the will of non-Indigenous citizens imposed on them and only a shift in political authority can change their current situation. While some advocates of deliberative democracy may be ‘greatly skeptical about the chances of survival’ of Indigenous communities (Benhabib, 2002, p. 185) their ongoing struggles to protect their lands indicate that resistance is fertile (Banerjee et al., 2021). These communities have been fighting to preserve their way of life since the colonial era began and their struggles continue in the postcolonial era. Colonial sovereignties of the modern nation state supersede Indigenous sovereignty and where there is conflict and dissent in deliberative procedures of public will formation the (post) colonial state exercises coercive power to impose the will of ‘the people’, as I discuss in the next section.

#### Radical imagination of alternative political realities within forums of discourse is a core part of shaping lived reality – institutions of colonialism are held in place through the imaginative capacities of social actors.

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The Radical Imagination The preceding section examines how colonial ideologies and discourses were reinforced and challenged in financial literacy texts targeting Indigenous people. I have undertaken such an analysis not in the name of improving Indigenous financial literacy education or making any suggestions regarding alternatives: as a settler subject in Canada, I don’t believe that is my place. Rather, I wish to ask what we, as settlers (and those who, more broadly, benefit from settler colonialism), can learn from the foregoing discussion as it relates to the radical transformation of settler culture, society, economics, and politics. How Indigenous people organize and strategize to survive and rebel against colonialist neoliberal extractive capitalism is vitally important, but not my jurisdiction (see Lowman and Barker 2015). I am interested in how settlers, the beneficiaries of colonialist neoliberal extractive capitalism (to different extents, based on class, race, gender, and other forms of oppression; see, e.g., Day 2016), can better rebel from within, in part by learning from (and taking risky action in solidarity with) Indigenous struggles. For me, the notion of the radical imagination is crucial. The radical imagination in this sense implies the ability to recognize that the present social order is neither inevitable nor necessary; there have been, there are, and there could yet be other modes for organizing social life (see Graeber 2007). Here, the example of Indigenous social, political, and economic systems in the past and in the present can be vital, though we are wise to recognize that gazing at them can also invite the colonial maneuver of romanticization and appropriation. The radical imagination is not a normative category and does not map neatly onto any one ideological, political, or identitarian approach. Rather, as Cornelius Castoriadis (1997a) argues, the radical imagination is a constant force of disruption, questioning, and creativity working at the very core of the individual and of society. Castoriadis (1997b) posed the radical imagination as the elemental protean substance of the human subject, but also of social institutions writ large. The institutions of marriage, the police, and the education system, all social power formations, even when concretely or brutally material, are held in place and reproduced through the imaginative work of social actors. Castoriadis likens it to magma, a substance that is at times fluid but at other times solidifies, only to become liquid again at the next tectonic eruption. Following Castoriadis, Alex Khasnabish and I have approached the radical imagination not as a private possession located in the mind of the individual but as a collective process that emerges from dialogue, debate, and peoples’ often fraught and difficult solidarity in the face of social power relations (Haiven and Khasnabish 2014). From Robin D. G. Kelley’s (2002) study of the traditions of the Black radical imagination we have learned about the way the radical imagination echoes between social movements, cultural producers, and intellectuals, not only within particular struggles and locales but globally in an interconnected age. This approach affirms Marcel Stoetzler and Nira YuvalDavis’s (2002) argument that the imagination is not some transcendental universal force but a situated one, contingent on how it is diversely expressed and articulated in bodies intersected by the forces of racialization, gender expression, sexuality, citizenship, ability, and so on.

### FW — US EDTs

#### Centering the US as the only option reifies its hegemony — only shifting the debate to holistic discussions of inequalities, identity, and culture can address the violent technical architecture of the North.

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Yet these issues are missing from public debate. In the North, critics focus on the problems of algorithmic discrimination, fake news, and the need for regulation to temper the power of Big Tech. However, loose privacy and anti-trust regulations that keep technical architecture intact will not rein in Big Tech, nor will they sufficiently constrain its global reach. With respect to Big Data, the collection of the data — not the use — is the problem. Allowing platforms to amass a richly detailed database about billions of people is a bad idea, even if it is done by five or ten Facebooks and Googles with select limitations on data practices. Regulation can reduce the excesses, but it will not fix the issue: a regulated surveillance state is still a surveillance state, and an economy with a few corporations per product is still an economy ruled by oligarchs. Technology is not neutral. Its design is not neutral. Current conversations miss that domination of the ecosystem by Big Tech is directly linked to architectural design which itself constitutes structural inequality. US elites exercise hegemony by convincing everyone that their technologies and way of building the digital society is the only one possible. New technologies are often viewed as something that “comes out” on the market rather than designed with particular values and power relations embedded into them. From an engineering perspective, it does not have to be this way. The present way of “doing digital technology” — especially Big Data, cloud computing, and proprietary software — is rooted in authoritarianism, but it could be otherwise. Technology is part and parcel of power relations, and who controls technology matters to both elites and the popular classes. Discussions around tech should be holistic and address structural inequality, identity, culture, and politics.62 Yet most critical digital studies scholarship fails to link these concerns to the core authoritarian (often surveillance-based) technologies designed for domination. Moreover, it is not enough to focus on US and European experiences when thinking about the digital world, as most discussions do in the North. Many countries in the Global South are rapidly digitizing their societies, and the ecosystem must be viewed from a global perspective. A paradigm shift is needed to change focus from outcomes on the surface for Westerners (in domains like privacy and discrimination) to structural power at the technical architectural level within a global context.63

### FW — AT: Scenario Planning

#### Scenario planning is bad – its results in the discursive colonization of future worlds and bolsters the hegemonic governance of militaristic imperial powers.

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Colonization and the closing of futures Scenario planning is meant to be a dialectical quest for open futures, whereby alternative worlds are envisioned and judgement as to the most desirable world is suspended. Such a dialogical process, associated with democratic politics of world making, typically implies the critique, negation and transcendence of the established power constellation, which is by its very nature conservative. Hence, power holders are tempted to believe that their rule is indefinite and that history has ended – since all activities are directed towards the maintenance of the current order. Conversely, action, which ‘has an inherent tendency to force open all limitations and cut across all boundaries’ is discouraged (Arendt 1958: 190). Hannah Arendt therefore went so far as claiming that ‘action, seen from the viewpoint of the automatic processes which seem to determine the course of the world, looks like a miracle’ (Arendt 1958: 246). Established power elites may have an interest in scenario planning, but the future with which they are fascinated is the prolongation of their current worlds. In other words, scenario planning is used for colonizing the future. In a colonized ‘scenario planning’, predominant or currently powerful stakeholders do not search for alternative futures, but, instead, enact their own ideological discourses, imaginaries and frames. The current power constellation is left unquestioned, and taken for granted in the scenario planning, as if established power factions will perdure in the future. The negation of wellestablished biases and prejudices is held in check, in order to safeguard the status quo. Such conservativism is legitimized by referring to current trends that are endowed with the aura of necessity or inevitability (natural and eternal laws). A colonized ‘scenario planning’ therefore masks unequal and often illegitimate power relationships. Historically, it appears that scenario planning has more often than not been a tool for colonization, designed to secure the future rule of the established power complex. In the 1940s, Herman Kahn and the RAND Corporation developed scenario planning to enable US military rulers to forecast the moves of potential opponents and to accordingly develop counteroffensives in the nuclear arms race (Tevis 2010). In the 1970s, Pierre Wack and Royal Dutch/Shell established scenario planning activities as an integral part of strategic management, to secure oil interests in the context of ecological crisis and the oil crisis (Wack 1985; Chermack and Coons 2015). The stimulus for scenario planning in these cases was the perceived rise of uncertainties in a world that had become more unpredictable and potentially apocalyptic. Horror scenarios of nuclear wars and a Third World War had become commonplace in the 1950s. Stories of ecological catastrophe, with a vision of large tracts of the earth rendered uninhabitable, the collapse of global food production, the acidification of the oceans, sea-level rise and storms, and droughts of growing intensity, became common since the publication of the Club of Rome report in 1972 (Wright et al 2013). In the hands of ruling military, governmental and corporate powers, ‘scenario planning’ became a method for ensuring strategic victory in a context of uncertainties and complexities. Since such scenario planning aimed at predictability, ambiguities were undesirable factors that were better eliminated, both in theory and practice (Amer, Daim and Jetter 2013). Computer simulations, game theoretic tools, forecasting methods, trend research, horizon scanning, and visual imageries filtered out all that which could not be mapped (O’Brien 2016). Pierre Wack, who introduced scenario planning at Royal Dutch/Shell, emphasizes that the future is only half closed. He made a plea for the incorporation of both literary and technical methods in scenario planning, to facilitate both the imagination and calculation of probable futures (Chermack and Coons 2015). According to Wack, the future is partly determined by trends that cannot but persist (Van‘t Klooster and Van Asselt 2006). Population growth and ageing are examples of such trends; and the corresponding implications for food demand, transport, housing, and other kinds of infrastructure clearly have to be reckoned with in any scenario planning. At the same time, for Wack, the future cannot be fully outlined based on these data and graphics. The partial openness of the future lies in the unpredictability of future generations’ actions in reaction to these trends. Robotic warfare is one possible future; large-scale euthanasia is another. But it is also imaginable that ecological disasters may wipe off entire populations. These futures are imaginable and yet not simply fictive because the ‘material’ for their ‘creation’ is already available here and now. For instance, it is highly probable that white Americans will no longer be the majority population in the United States by 2050, but the question as to how white Americans will cope with living as a minority in the US invites different answers (Martín Alcoff 2015: 24; 26). Colonization aims at ruling out openness, with the aim of shaping a future (preferably one that seems to be the product of predetermined trends that cannot be altered by human decisions) in which the current status quo is preserved. O’Brien (2016) explains that Royal Dutch/Shell’s interest in scenario planning is motivated by its will to shape a future in which remains a dominant key actor that moulds the world in its own interest: its scenario planning practices and its wish to maintain its hegemony are interconnected. ‘Shell’s scenario plans,’ O’Brien (2016: 334) notes, ‘are credited with the company’s success in outwitting the thugs, and thereby contributing to the larger project of securing Western interests amidst the turmoil of globalization.’ Such a hegemonic project has its prices in terms of human rights abuses, oil pollution and corporate crimes (Holzer 2007; Hennchen 2015). The organized fossilfuel industry is powerful enough to protect its vested interests and to promote a strategy of inaction (no reduction of fossil-fuel emissions), so that nothing really changes. Michael Mann, a leading climate scientist, explains that to safeguard the current status quo, the fossil-fuel industry, including Royal Dutch/Shell, funds a ‘climate change denial campaign’ to discredit climate science – which advocates radical change now – and prevent dialogues. In this campaign, a significant part of the established power elites, including the Koch Brothers, and influential politicians like John McCain and Joe Lieberman, makes a mockery of climatology, and of particular scientists (Wright and Mann 2013). The pertinent question that ought to be raised, O’Brien (2016: 341) therefore concludes is: ‘whose future is being planned, by whom, for whom and to what ultimate end?’ When scenario planning is a tool for colonization, the future is planned by and for the established power constellation, even if ‘larger’ entities such as national, European or Western interests are invoked. Such scenario planning is legitimized by discrediting ‘doom scenarios’, through discourses on the liberating potential of technology (which should be able to solve the problems that it creates) and (correspondingly) on the inevitable course of history.

## Links

### Link — Top Level

#### NATO security cooperation sustains itself through a cycle of false flag operations and psychological war scares — the Atlantic Project forms the central pillar of fascist militarization and colonial imperialism of the international system, making global war structurally inevitable.

Campbell ’19 — Horace; Professor of African American Studies and Political Science, Syracuse University. He is the author of Global NATO and the Catastrophic Failure in Libya. April 9, 2019; “Global NATO: A 70-Year Alliance of Oppressors in Crisis”; *CounterPunch*; <https://www.counterpunch.org/2019/04/09/global-nato-a-70-year-alliance-of-oppressors-in-crisis/>; //CYang

The celebration of NATO’s 70 years of existence provides another opportunity to unearth the real history of the ideas, practices and destruction wrought by this military alliance. Even with the clear exposure of the cooperation between NATO, the CIA and the British MI6 to spread terror and psychological warfare in Europe immediately after the formation of this military alliance, the mainstream media, academics and policy makers remain silent on activities of the ‘stay behind armies’ and ‘false flag’ operations that distorted the real causes of insecurity in the world after 1945. The evidence of the manipulations of the peoples of the world to ensure the continued survival of NATO has been well documented in the fraudulent interventions and bombings in the Balkans right up the present multiple wars against the peoples of Iran.

Vijay Prashad had identified NATO as the prime defender of the Atlantic project. This Atlantic project, he noted was, “a fairly straightforward campaign by the propertied classes to maintain or restore their position of dominance.” This Atlantic Project was anchored in the military alliance called NATO with its principal work, that of reversing the South Project; the struggles for peace bread and justice by the poorer citizens of the planet, especially those who had emerged on the world stage after the decolonization of Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean.

The ostensive reason for the founding of NATO was to ‘thwart’ Soviet aggression, but in practice the organization was a prop for western capital and after the fall of the Berlin Wall, became the core prop for Wall Street. In this year, there will be many commentaries on the fact that the existence of NATO reflects a Cold War relic, that NATO is obsolete and lost its mandate, but very few will link the expansion of NATO to the military management of the international system. Prior to 1991, the planners of NATO could justify the existence of NATO on ideological and political grounds, but with the threat of a multi polar world and the diminution of the dollar, NATO expanded to the point where this author joined with others in labelling this organization Global NATO to reflect its current imperial mandate. The Global thrust of NATO now comprises 29 members from Europe and North America along with 41 ‘partners’ that had started off under the banner of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991. Since that time, NATO has launched a lengthy war without end in Afghanistan, colluded in the destruction of Iraq and conspired with militarists to forge ‘Partnership for Peace’ (with most members of the former Warsaw Pact states). The core 29 members are now enmeshed with treaties and undertakings from states involved in the Mediterranean Dialog and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates. There are also the ‘partners’ from across the globe: Afghanistan, Australia, Colombia, Iraq, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand and Pakistan. This enlargement served the military purposes of encircling China and Russia who military planners in the West targeted.

There is no shortage of literature on NATO and its milestones, but very few have documented the real crimes of this global network of anticommunist operatives who precipitated real terror and psychological warfare against the citizens of Europe and North America while supporting mass atrocities from Algeria to Indonesia, and South Africa. Books such as that of NATO’s Secret Armies: Operation GLADIO and Terrorism in Western Europe by Danielle Ganser and The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Their Secret World War, by Stephen Kinzer used rigorous research techniques to uncover the dark history of NATO. These two books can be distinguished from the bland international relations texts that discusses NATO inside the old calculations of ‘strategy,’ ‘concert of democracies’, ‘security cooperation’ and the balance of power,’ and spheres of influence. Most recently, this IR rendering of the history of NATO has been served up in a document entitled, NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis. Published by Harvard University with one of the coauthors being a former US ambassador to NATO. This document spelt out ten challenges.[1] However, in a testimony before Congress, Nicolas Burns boiled down the challenge of NATO to one objective; that the current role of NATO must be to contain Russia and China.[2] On the day before the actual 70thanniversary, on April 3, the Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg delivered an address to a joint session of the US Congress advocating an expansion of the alliance while promoting a military buildup against Russia. [3] European progressives will have to reflect deeply on whether the current sanctions regime and the special propose vehicle called the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX), is ushering in another round of inter imperialist rivalry reminiscent of the currency wars of 1929-1939. Then, the shifting alliances yielded confusion among working peoples who ultimately went to fight against each other in Europe, spreading barbarism throughout the world, from Auschwitz to Hiroshima.

The continued struggles for bread, peace and justice ensure that it is only the authoritarian leaders from the Global South who are compromised on the real meaning of the existence of NATO. In the present era, there is a new capitalist competition while North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) serves as an integral part of the Pentagon’s world command structure. Recent experiences have demonstrated in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya that the moguls of Wall Street are willing to wage as many wars, to destroy as many countries and to kill as many people as necessary to achieve the dominance of US capitalism. The destruction of Libya was a classic example of the convergence of finance as warfare, the weaponization of information and incessant bombing to destroy a society. Where at the start of NATO the war scare was the propaganda method, In the current digital age, brain hacking and the engineering of smart phones have placed the giant technology firms of Apple , Google, Amazon, Microsoft, Facebook at the forefront of the new weapons platform of NATO and Wall Street. This analysis is in three parts spelling out the rationale for the call for all progressive forces to join together to concentrate their energies in the dismantling of NATO.

#### **Operation Gladio and a slew of other examples prove our thesis — NATO will fund the creation of threats and engage in domestic terror against its own civilians, manipulating them into supporting the Atlantic agenda.**

Campbell ’19 — Horace; Professor of African American Studies and Political Science, Syracuse University. He is the author of Global NATO and the Catastrophic Failure in Libya. April 9, 2019; “Global NATO: A 70-Year Alliance of Oppressors in Crisis”; *CounterPunch*; <https://www.counterpunch.org/2019/04/09/global-nato-a-70-year-alliance-of-oppressors-in-crisis/>; //CYang

NATO at Birth: Stay behind armies, directed terrorist organizations and psychological warfare against Europeans.

In the period after the fall of the Berlin Wall there were major press reports on the role of NATO’s stay behind armies that had been operating inside Western Europe since 1949.Ten years earlier, when the kidnapping and killing of the former Italian Prime Minister, Aldo Moro rocked western Europe, it emerged that his demise had been authored byclandestine paramilitary network code-named “Operation Gladio” that was a false flag operation of NATO. Danielle Ganser’s book, NATO’s Secret Armies: Operation GLADIO and Terrorism in Western Europe had meticulously documented how NATO funded and often even directed terrorist organizations throughout Europe in what was termed a “strategy of tension” with the aim of preventing a rise of the left in Western European politics. NATO’s “secret armies” engaged in subversive and criminal activities in several countries.

In the specific case of Italy, Aldo Moro had committed the unforgivable crime of contemplating a government that included Italians who belonged to the Italian Communist Party Right from the start of the Cold war, the CIA and MI6 had worked closely with former fascists to oppose citizens and organizations in Western Europe that were anti-capitalists. Under the leadership of US planners such as Allen Dulles, William Colby, Frank Wisner and later James Angleton, these operatives weaned and nursed a network of agents and secret arms dumps across Europe, a network that would remain secret but active throughout the Cold War. [4] Ganser elaborated on the extensive operations of Operation Gladio all across Europe with the explicit aim of subverting the democratic wishes of European citizens who were opposed to oppression. It is worth quoting at length the role of the secret armies.

“NATO’s “secret armies” engaged in subversive and criminal activities in several countries. In Turkey in 1960, the stay behind army, working with the army, staged a coup d’état and killed Prime Minister Adnan Menderes; in Algeria in 1961, the French stay-behind army staged a coup with the CIA against the French government of Algiers, which ultimately failed; in 1967, the Greek stay-behind army staged a coup and imposed a military dictatorship; in 1971 in Turkey, after a military coup, the stay-behind army engaged in “domestic terror” and killed hundreds; in 1977 in Spain, the stay behind army carried out a massacre in Madrid; in 1980 in Turkey, the head of the stay behind army staged a coup and took power; in 1985 in Belgium, the stay behind attacked and shot shoppers randomly in supermarkets, killing 28; in Switzerland in 1990, the former head of the Swiss stay behind wrote the US Defense Department he would reveal “the whole truth,” and was found the next day stabbed to death with his own bayonet; and in 1995, England revealed that the MI6 and SAS helped set up stay behind armies across Western Europe.”[5]

The mainstream media and University commentaries have not been able to confront this history in so far as the manipulation and deception that gave rise to the birth of NATO is still at work against the citizens of Europe and the United States.

#### **This propaganda war scare is directly funded by US defense industries — the only real “impending threats” are threats to their profits.**

Campbell ’19 — Horace; Professor of African American Studies and Political Science, Syracuse University. He is the author of Global NATO and the Catastrophic Failure in Libya. April 9, 2019; “Global NATO: A 70-Year Alliance of Oppressors in Crisis”; *CounterPunch*; <https://www.counterpunch.org/2019/04/09/global-nato-a-70-year-alliance-of-oppressors-in-crisis/>; //CYang

War Scare, NATO and psychological warfare against the citizens of Europe and North America.

At the end of World War II, the defense Industries in the USA had been faced with the choice of conversion and retooling the factories that made weapons or continue the massive subsidies for the industries vested in military and armaments production. The choice was eventually made to embark on a propaganda war scare to justify the need for an expanded army and it was in this context when NATO was conceived. To sustain the WW II armaments enterprise, there needed to be a cycle of war scare and the fabrication and inflation of threats and enemies. It was in this context that Lawrence D. Bell, President of Bell Aircraft Corporation, in a statement to the U.S. Air Policy Commission Finletter Commission) on September 29, 1947, stated that “as soon as there is a war scare, there is a lot of money available.” [6] According to Andrew Cockburn,

“The aircraft corporations that had garnered enormous profits during the war on the back of government contracts had discovered by 1947 that peace was ruinous. Despite initial high hopes, the commercial marketplace was proving a far harsher and less accommodating environment than that of wartime, especially as there were far more companies than required by the peacetime economy. Orders from the civilian airline industry never lived up to expectations, while efforts to diversify into other products, including dishwashers and stainless steel coffins, proved disappointing and costly.” [7]

In the spring of 1948, the U.S. Secretary of Defense James Forrestal and top officials of the Harry Truman administration began to sound alarm about a looming Soviet attack against Western Europe. It is now known, from declassified documents, that the officials were aware that there was no credible evidence to back up their war scare. Some analysts have argued that the war scare of 1948 was devised to save the aircraft manufacturing industry from plunging into bankruptcy. And this goal was achieved. In the book Harry S. Truman and the War Scare of 1948, Frank Kofsky states that within 2 months of the emergence of the scare, the Truman administration revamped the aircraft industry by embarking on a 57% increase in purchase of military aircraft, and the total budget of the Pentagon was increased by 30%.

NATO was born on April 4, 1949 out of this propaganda war to deceive the US citizens about a pending attack of the Soviet Union on Western Europe. The task of organizing the deception of the citizens of the West was assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency. There are now so many books and articles on the role of the CIA in deception, propaganda and psychological warfare that we will not spend a great deal of time on the role of the Covert agencies in giving legitimacy to the idea of a Soviet threat. Stephen Kinzer and David Talbot are two writers who have documented extensively how the Dulles brothers ensnared every major profession in the USA in this deception. [8] It was especially chilling how Universities were suborned to be surrogates for this psychological warfare. Noam Chomsky has dealt with this aspect of the period of the birth of NATO in the work on the Universities and the Cold War.[9]

#### Operations are designed by neo-Nazis, solidifying capitalism under the ruse of “freedom” and protection from the working class — this cements a colonial hierarchy of violence.

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Racists and anticommunists in the propaganda war

It was not by accident that the thinkers and planners of these secret operations were known racists and Nazi sympathizers. Frank Wisner who hailed from Mississippi in the USA was a good example of the upright US citizen who was an architect of the false flag operations and the deception associated with NATO and western intelligence agencies. After the War, in 1948 Frank Wisner was appointed director of the Office of Special Projects. Soon afterwards under the direction of Allen Dulles, this Office of Special Projects was renamed the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC). This became the espionage and counter-intelligence branch of the Central Intelligence Agency. Later James Jesus Angleton was to take this brand of counter intelligence work to the highest levels of state assassinations. Wisner had been mandated told to create an organization that concentrated on “propaganda, economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance groups, and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world.” It was from this opaque sounding name of Office of Policy Coordination where the brainwashing and virulent anti-communism of the Cold War era was refined. Evan Thomas reported in The Very Best Men: the Daring Early Days of the CIA, the OPC’s charter gave it responsibility for “propaganda, economic warfare; preventative direct action, including sabotage, antisabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance groups, and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world.”

NATO as the principal prop for international capitalism today.

In the celebratory events to memorialize the founding of NATO in 1949, it is usually forgotten that when the North American Treaty was signed in April 1949 most of the founding members were colonial overlords. Colonialism and imperialism took a new form under the leadership of US capitalists defending the dollar and Wall Street. At that historical moment in 1949, the justification for starting this organization was that it constituted a system of collective defense whereby its member states agreed to mutual defense in response to an attack by any external party. The external party in question at that time was the USSR; insofar as NATO had been formed as an alliance ostensibly to defend Western Europe against ‘communist expansion’. In the Treaty’s renowned Article 5, the new Allies agreed “an armed attack against one or more of them… shall be considered an attack against them all.”

The US military and industrial leaders studied the terror and propaganda tactics of the Nazis in order to learn the lessons of how to develop an efficient military machine. James Whitman in the book, Hitler’s American Model: The United States and the Making of Nazi Race Law, outlined what the fascists had learnt from the eugenics movement in the United States.[10] Although many anti-fascist scientists from Germany had found a place in the US academy, the top planners of the Cold War linked the US primacy to the global history of racism to the efficient, bureaucratic and professionalism of conservative Germany.

One of the unspoken aspects of the first years of NATO was the question of containing the possible revolutionary impulses of the German working peoples. To forestall such a possibility, the thinkers and planners of NATO collaborated with the former fascists to learn their skills. The details of this alliance have been spelt out in the book on the CIA by David Talbot in the book, The Devil’s Chessboard: Allen Dulles, the CIA, and the Rise of America’s Secret Government. The merging of fascist ideas with the ideas of Jim Crow in the United States were refined in the secret operation called, Operation Paperclip. Anne Jacobsen, Operation Paperclip: The Secret Intelligence Program to Bring Nazi Scientists to America, [11] elaborated in great detail the secret program of the Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency (JIOA) largely carried out by Special Agents of Army Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC), in which more than 1,600 German scientists, engineers, and technicians, such as Wernher von Braun and his V-2 rocket team, were taken from Germany to America for U.S. government employment, primarily between 1945 and 1959. Many were former members, and some were former leaders, of the Nazi Party. These elements were the foundation of a military program that has brought us the weaponization of space.

The creators of NATO simultaneously mobilized the colonial and fascist elements in Belgium, Spain, Italy and France. Of the twelve founding members, six were outright colonial powers and at that moment, countries such as France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Britain and Portugal looked to the USA to support their plunder of colonial societies. In the specific case of France, in order to assist French colonialism, Algeria was named as a territory of NATO. Sixty years later when the President of France, Macron, apologized for the crimes of killing more than one million Algerians, there is no reflection inside western academic institutions on this role of NATO in Africa. Currently, the French have been the most aggressive in promoting the fiction that the defense radius of Europe stretches 4000 kilometers out from Brussels, up to the arctic, well across the Russian frontier and down into central Africa.

It is not widely known that, initially, the Portuguese fascists were some of the principal beneficiaries of the membership of NATO, with major deployment of nuclear weapons in the Azores as reward for the NATO support for colonialism in Angola, Mozambique, Guinea and other Portuguese outposts of colonial domination. Prior to the formation of NATO in 1949, the 1947 document of the State Department on Cooperative Development of Africa had stipulated that colonialism would assist the recovery of European capitalism. [12]The State Department had been explicit in outlining how cheap foodstuffs and raw materials from Africa would assist Europe’s recovery and create the basis for unity and economic regeneration.

The USA set about creating a number of international institutions to guarantee the survival of Europe and of capitalism, the IMF, IBRD (World Bank), the NATO, GATT, to guarantee the strength of the USA in international trade and finance.

By the time NATO was formed in 1949, the US planners had already made their plans with Britain and France to extend their military control over Africa. France was bequeathed the task of maintaining order in western Africa while the British sought to maintain naval power incorporating the British facilities from the Suez Canal down through Aden (Yemen), to Mombasa (Kenya), Simons town South Africa across to Malaysia. [13] The racist apartheid regime had persuaded NATO that it was necessary to integrate the South African military into the western defense planning in order to protect the ‘Cape route.’ After the Suez crises of 1956 and the 1967 war this alliance with the racist regime deepened. Throughout its existence NATO assisted in the refinement of the racial status hierarchy in which whites are dominant and people of color are subordinate. [14]

This incorporation of racist ideas into western defense continued a long tradition that shaped the outlook of NATO and reinforced the outlook of Frantz Fanon: “Colonialism is violence in its natural state.” France and Britain excelled in this violence with the Belgians cementing their communications and logistics coordination to kill Patrice Lumumba and later support the killing of the Secretary General of the United Nation, Dag Hammarskjold. [15]

Britain, France, Belgium and Portugal deepened their links to NATO but in 1956, Dwight Eisenhower halted the planned offensive of the British and the French in the Suez war. After this war, both the currencies of Britain and France suffered sharp declines with France seeking cover inside the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), while the British pound accepted its place as a prop to the US dollar in the global economy. Within a year after the Suez debacle, France had pushed for the Treaty of Rome that paved the way for the European Economic Community to be a competitive force with US capitalists.

Within the context of the competition between European capitalists and US capitalists, Charles De Gaulle exhibited pique at the organization of NATO that supported the armaments culture of US capital. Charles De Gaulle partially pulled France out of this alliance in 1966 after it became clear that this military organization was dominated by the United States and Britain (supporting their military industries). De Gaulle argued for an independent nuclear arsenal while remaining a signatory to North Atlantic Treaty and participating in the North Atlantic Council. Nicholas Sarkozy ended the farce when France returned to the fold of the NATO military structures in 2009.

The duplicitous actions on the part of the French leadership were always based on calculations meant to preserve the dominance of French capital in Africa. When the US devalued the dollar in 1971 and broke the agreements of the Bretton Woods Treaty, it was the French who complained about the Exorbitant Privilege of the Dollar. For a short period, both the President of France and the Chancellor of West Germany had chafed under the privilege and had worked hard to bring into being the Maastricht Treaty and the Europe Union to end the dominance of the dollar in the international capitalist system. It was known than the one necessary aspect of this emerging common currency in Europe would be the dismantling of the military occupation of Europe by US military personnel. Hence, both Giscard de Estaing and Helmut Schmidt had linked the common currency, the European Central Bank and common foreign and security policy (CFSP), with the expectation that ultimately Europe will break from the traditions of NATO. It was in the face of this threat and the fall of the centrally planned economy that the forward planners expanded NATO.

#### NATO’s humanitarian missions are nothing more than the new cover story for imperial interventions.

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Emergence of Global NATO and the myth of ‘humanitarian intervention’

Usually, when an alliance is formed for a specific purpose such as halting the spread of communism, that alliance is folded when the mission is complete. Hence, after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, it was expected by those seeking the ‘peace dividend’ that the mission of NATO would be scaled down. Instead, NATO expanded, seeking to encircle Russia by extending its membership to include former members of the Warsaw Pact countries. Progressive scholars have documented the cynicism of the US military planners who orchestrated the ‘humanitarian intervention’ in the Balkans in order to advance the hegemony of US capitalism after the fall of the Soviet Union. The scholarship on this manipulation of the European working peoples to entrench NATO is rich and needs to be revisited at this moment of the celebration of the 70thanniversary of the founding of NATO. Richard Aldrich in the book, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence’ brought out evidence to expose how the massacres in the Balkans, helped give a new impetus to US hegemony.’ [16] David Gibbs had argued, “How the Srebrenica Massacre Redefined US Foreign Policy.” It is worth quoting at length how the Balkans war was used to manipulate public opinion in Europe,

“Perhaps most importantly, the massacre helped give a new impetus to US hegemony, contributing to its post-Cold War legitimacy. In bolstering America’s hegemonic position, the significance of the Srebrenica massacre cannot be overstated: The massacre helped trigger a NATO bombing campaign that is widely credited with ending the Bosnian war, along with the associated atrocities, and this campaign gave NATO a new purpose for the post-Soviet era. Since that time, the Srebrenica precedent has been continuously invoked as a justification for military force. The perceived need to prevent massacres and oppression helped justify later interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, as well as the ongoing fight against ISIS. The recent UN doctrine of Responsibility to Protect, which contains a strongly interventionist tone, was inspired in part by the memory of Srebrenica.” [17]

The more nefarious aspect of this manipulation of humanitarianism was the ways in which elements such as Bernard Kouchner used their credentials as former members of the left and progressive forces to give cover to US imperialism. Since the war in the Balkans it is now accepted by the military planners that humanitarian intervention acts as a force multiplier. [18] This position was explicitly stated by General Colin Powell who noted, “Just as surely as our diplomats and military, American NGOs are out there serving and sacrificing on the front lines of freedom NGOs are such a force multiplier for us, such an important part of our combat team.” These observations can shed light on the relationship between NGOs such as Doctors without Borders and the International Rescue Committee in global militarism.

#### Here's the whole article.

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The celebration of NATO’s 70 years of existence provides another opportunity to unearth the real history of the ideas, practices and destruction wrought by this military alliance. Even with the clear exposure of the cooperation between NATO, the CIA and the British MI6 to spread terror and psychological warfare in Europe immediately after the formation of this military alliance, the mainstream media, academics and policy makers remain silent on activities of the ‘stay behind armies’ and ‘false flag’ operations that distorted the real causes of insecurity in the world after 1945. The evidence of the manipulations of the peoples of the world to ensure the continued survival of NATO has been well documented in the fraudulent interventions and bombings in the Balkans right up the present multiple wars against the peoples of Iran.

Vijay Prashad had identified NATO as the prime defender of the Atlantic project. This Atlantic project, he noted was, “a fairly straightforward campaign by the propertied classes to maintain or restore their position of dominance.” This Atlantic Project was anchored in the military alliance called NATO with its principal work, that of reversing the South Project; the struggles for peace bread and justice by the poorer citizens of the planet, especially those who had emerged on the world stage after the decolonization of Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean.

The ostensive reason for the founding of NATO was to ‘thwart’ Soviet aggression, but in practice the organization was a prop for western capital and after the fall of the Berlin Wall, became the core prop for Wall Street. In this year, there will be many commentaries on the fact that the existence of NATO reflects a Cold War relic, that NATO is obsolete and lost its mandate, but very few will link the expansion of NATO to the military management of the international system. Prior to 1991, the planners of NATO could justify the existence of NATO on ideological and political grounds, but with the threat of a multi polar world and the diminution of the dollar, NATO expanded to the point where this author joined with others in labelling this organization Global NATO to reflect its current imperial mandate. The Global thrust of NATO now comprises 29 members from Europe and North America along with 41 ‘partners’ that had started off under the banner of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991. Since that time, NATO has launched a lengthy war without end in Afghanistan, colluded in the destruction of Iraq and conspired with militarists to forge ‘Partnership for Peace’ (with most members of the former Warsaw Pact states). The core 29 members are now enmeshed with treaties and undertakings from states involved in the Mediterranean Dialog and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates. There are also the ‘partners’ from across the globe: Afghanistan, Australia, Colombia, Iraq, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand and Pakistan. This enlargement served the military purposes of encircling China and Russia who military planners in the West targeted.

There is no shortage of literature on NATO and its milestones, but very few have documented the real crimes of this global network of anticommunist operatives who precipitated real terror and psychological warfare against the citizens of Europe and North America while supporting mass atrocities from Algeria to Indonesia, and South Africa. Books such as that of NATO’s Secret Armies: Operation GLADIO and Terrorism in Western Europe by Danielle Ganser and The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Their Secret World War, by Stephen Kinzer used rigorous research techniques to uncover the dark history of NATO. These two books can be distinguished from the bland international relations texts that discusses NATO inside the old calculations of ‘strategy,’ ‘concert of democracies’, ‘security cooperation’ and the balance of power,’ and spheres of influence. Most recently, this IR rendering of the history of NATO has been served up in a document entitled, NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis. Published by Harvard University with one of the coauthors being a former US ambassador to NATO. This document spelt out ten challenges.[1] However, in a testimony before Congress, Nicolas Burns boiled down the challenge of NATO to one objective; that the current role of NATO must be to contain Russia and China.[2] On the day before the actual 70thanniversary, on April 3, the Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg delivered an address to a joint session of the US Congress advocating an expansion of the alliance while promoting a military buildup against Russia. [3] European progressives will have to reflect deeply on whether the current sanctions regime and the special propose vehicle called the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX), is ushering in another round of inter imperialist rivalry reminiscent of the currency wars of 1929-1939. Then, the shifting alliances yielded confusion among working peoples who ultimately went to fight against each other in Europe, spreading barbarism throughout the world, from Auschwitz to Hiroshima.

The continued struggles for bread, peace and justice ensure that it is only the authoritarian leaders from the Global South who are compromised on the real meaning of the existence of NATO. In the present era, there is a new capitalist competition while North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) serves as an integral part of the Pentagon’s world command structure. Recent experiences have demonstrated in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya that the moguls of Wall Street are willing to wage as many wars, to destroy as many countries and to kill as many people as necessary to achieve the dominance of US capitalism. The destruction of Libya was a classic example of the convergence of finance as warfare, the weaponization of information and incessant bombing to destroy a society. Where at the start of NATO the war scare was the propaganda method, In the current digital age, brain hacking and the engineering of smart phones have placed the giant technology firms of Apple , Google, Amazon, Microsoft, Facebook at the forefront of the new weapons platform of NATO and Wall Street. This analysis is in three parts spelling out the rationale for the call for all progressive forces to join together to concentrate their energies in the dismantling of NATO.

NATO at Birth: Stay behind armies, directed terrorist organizations and psychological warfare against Europeans.

In the period after the fall of the Berlin Wall there were major press reports on the role of NATO’s stay behind armies that had been operating inside Western Europe since 1949.Ten years earlier, when the kidnapping and killing of the former Italian Prime Minister, Aldo Moro rocked western Europe, it emerged that his demise had been authored byclandestine paramilitary network code-named “Operation Gladio” that was a false flag operation of NATO. Danielle Ganser’s book, NATO’s Secret Armies: Operation GLADIO and Terrorism in Western Europe had meticulously documented how NATO funded and often even directed terrorist organizations throughout Europe in what was termed a “strategy of tension” with the aim of preventing a rise of the left in Western European politics. NATO’s “secret armies” engaged in subversive and criminal activities in several countries.

In the specific case of Italy, Aldo Moro had committed the unforgivable crime of contemplating a government that included Italians who belonged to the Italian Communist Party Right from the start of the Cold war, the CIA and MI6 had worked closely with former fascists to oppose citizens and organizations in Western Europe that were anti-capitalists. Under the leadership of US planners such as Allen Dulles, William Colby, Frank Wisner and later James Angleton, these operatives weaned and nursed a network of agents and secret arms dumps across Europe, a network that would remain secret but active throughout the Cold War. [4] Ganser elaborated on the extensive operations of Operation Gladio all across Europe with the explicit aim of subverting the democratic wishes of European citizens who were opposed to oppression. It is worth quoting at length the role of the secret armies.

“NATO’s “secret armies” engaged in subversive and criminal activities in several countries. In Turkey in 1960, the stay behind army, working with the army, staged a coup d’état and killed Prime Minister Adnan Menderes; in Algeria in 1961, the French stay-behind army staged a coup with the CIA against the French government of Algiers, which ultimately failed; in 1967, the Greek stay-behind army staged a coup and imposed a military dictatorship; in 1971 in Turkey, after a military coup, the stay-behind army engaged in “domestic terror” and killed hundreds; in 1977 in Spain, the stay behind army carried out a massacre in Madrid; in 1980 in Turkey, the head of the stay behind army staged a coup and took power; in 1985 in Belgium, the stay behind attacked and shot shoppers randomly in supermarkets, killing 28; in Switzerland in 1990, the former head of the Swiss stay behind wrote the US Defense Department he would reveal “the whole truth,” and was found the next day stabbed to death with his own bayonet; and in 1995, England revealed that the MI6 and SAS helped set up stay behind armies across Western Europe.”[5]

The mainstream media and University commentaries have not been able to confront this history in so far as the manipulation and deception that gave rise to the birth of NATO is still at work against the citizens of Europe and the United States.

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At the end of World War II, the defense Industries in the USA had been faced with the choice of conversion and retooling the factories that made weapons or continue the massive subsidies for the industries vested in military and armaments production. The choice was eventually made to embark on a propaganda war scare to justify the need for an expanded army and it was in this context when NATO was conceived. To sustain the WW II armaments enterprise, there needed to be a cycle of war scare and the fabrication and inflation of threats and enemies. It was in this context that Lawrence D. Bell, President of Bell Aircraft Corporation, in a statement to the U.S. Air Policy Commission Finletter Commission) on September 29, 1947, stated that “as soon as there is a war scare, there is a lot of money available.” [6] According to Andrew Cockburn,

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Britain, France, Belgium and Portugal deepened their links to NATO but in 1956, Dwight Eisenhower halted the planned offensive of the British and the French in the Suez war. After this war, both the currencies of Britain and France suffered sharp declines with France seeking cover inside the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), while the British pound accepted its place as a prop to the US dollar in the global economy. Within a year after the Suez debacle, France had pushed for the Treaty of Rome that paved the way for the European Economic Community to be a competitive force with US capitalists.

Within the context of the competition between European capitalists and US capitalists, Charles De Gaulle exhibited pique at the organization of NATO that supported the armaments culture of US capital. Charles De Gaulle partially pulled France out of this alliance in 1966 after it became clear that this military organization was dominated by the United States and Britain (supporting their military industries). De Gaulle argued for an independent nuclear arsenal while remaining a signatory to North Atlantic Treaty and participating in the North Atlantic Council. Nicholas Sarkozy ended the farce when France returned to the fold of the NATO military structures in 2009.

The duplicitous actions on the part of the French leadership were always based on calculations meant to preserve the dominance of French capital in Africa. When the US devalued the dollar in 1971 and broke the agreements of the Bretton Woods Treaty, it was the French who complained about the Exorbitant Privilege of the Dollar. For a short period, both the President of France and the Chancellor of West Germany had chafed under the privilege and had worked hard to bring into being the Maastricht Treaty and the Europe Union to end the dominance of the dollar in the international capitalist system. It was known than the one necessary aspect of this emerging common currency in Europe would be the dismantling of the military occupation of Europe by US military personnel. Hence, both Giscard de Estaing and Helmut Schmidt had linked the common currency, the European Central Bank and common foreign and security policy (CFSP), with the expectation that ultimately Europe will break from the traditions of NATO. It was in the face of this threat and the fall of the centrally planned economy that the forward planners expanded NATO.

Emergence of Global NATO and the myth of ‘humanitarian intervention’

Usually, when an alliance is formed for a specific purpose such as halting the spread of communism, that alliance is folded when the mission is complete. Hence, after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, it was expected by those seeking the ‘peace dividend’ that the mission of NATO would be scaled down. Instead, NATO expanded, seeking to encircle Russia by extending its membership to include former members of the Warsaw Pact countries. Progressive scholars have documented the cynicism of the US military planners who orchestrated the ‘humanitarian intervention’ in the Balkans in order to advance the hegemony of US capitalism after the fall of the Soviet Union. The scholarship on this manipulation of the European working peoples to entrench NATO is rich and needs to be revisited at this moment of the celebration of the 70thanniversary of the founding of NATO. Richard Aldrich in the book, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence’ brought out evidence to expose how the massacres in the Balkans, helped give a new impetus to US hegemony.’ [16] David Gibbs had argued, “How the Srebrenica Massacre Redefined US Foreign Policy.” It is worth quoting at length how the Balkans war was used to manipulate public opinion in Europe,

“Perhaps most importantly, the massacre helped give a new impetus to US hegemony, contributing to its post-Cold War legitimacy. In bolstering America’s hegemonic position, the significance of the Srebrenica massacre cannot be overstated: The massacre helped trigger a NATO bombing campaign that is widely credited with ending the Bosnian war, along with the associated atrocities, and this campaign gave NATO a new purpose for the post-Soviet era. Since that time, the Srebrenica precedent has been continuously invoked as a justification for military force. The perceived need to prevent massacres and oppression helped justify later interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, as well as the ongoing fight against ISIS. The recent UN doctrine of Responsibility to Protect, which contains a strongly interventionist tone, was inspired in part by the memory of Srebrenica.” [17]

The more nefarious aspect of this manipulation of humanitarianism was the ways in which elements such as Bernard Kouchner used their credentials as former members of the left and progressive forces to give cover to US imperialism. Since the war in the Balkans it is now accepted by the military planners that humanitarian intervention acts as a force multiplier. [18] This position was explicitly stated by General Colin Powell who noted, “Just as surely as our diplomats and military, American NGOs are out there serving and sacrificing on the front lines of freedom NGOs are such a force multiplier for us, such an important part of our combat team.” These observations can shed light on the relationship between NGOs such as Doctors without Borders and the International Rescue Committee in global militarism.

### — America —

### Link — American Exceptionalism

#### The delusion that the US is necessary to further positive international developments perpetuates American exceptionalism — foreign policy becomes ineffective as a result of unchallenged self-congratulation.

Walt ’11 — Stephen; columnist at Foreign Policy and the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. October 11, 2011; “The Myth of American Exceptionalism”; *Foreign Policy*; <https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/the-myth-of-american-exceptionalism/>; //CYang

Over the last two centuries, prominent Americans have described the United States as an "empire of liberty," a "shining city on a hill," the "last best hope of Earth," the "leader of the free world," and the "indispensable nation." These enduring tropes explain why all presidential candidates feel compelled to offer ritualistic paeans to America’s greatness and why President Barack Obama landed in hot water — most recently, from Mitt Romney — for saying that while he believed in "American exceptionalism," it was no different from "British exceptionalism," "Greek exceptionalism," or any other country’s brand of patriotic chest-thumping.

Most statements of "American exceptionalism" presume that America’s values, political system, and history are unique and worthy of universal admiration. They also imply that the United States is both destined and entitled to play a distinct and positive role on the world stage.

The only thing wrong with this self-congratulatory portrait of America’s global role is that it is mostly a myth. Although the United States possesses certain unique qualities — from high levels of religiosity to a political culture that privileges individual freedom — the conduct of U.S. foreign policy has been determined primarily by its relative power and by the inherently competitive nature of international politics. By focusing on their supposedly exceptional qualities, Americans ~~blind~~ [deceive] themselves to the ways that they are a lot like everyone else.

This unchallenged faith in American exceptionalism makes it harder for Americans to understand why others are less enthusiastic about U.S. dominance, often alarmed by U.S. policies, and frequently irritated by what they see as U.S. hypocrisy, whether the subject is possession of nuclear weapons, conformity with international law, or America’s tendency to condemn the conduct of others while ignoring its own failings. Ironically, U.S. foreign policy would probably be more effective if Americans were less convinced of their own unique virtues and less eager to proclaim them.

Myth 1

There Is Something Exceptional About American Exceptionalism.

Whenever American leaders refer to the "unique" responsibilities of the United States, they are saying that it is different from other powers and that these differences require them to take on special burdens.

Yet there is nothing unusual about such lofty declarations; indeed, those who make them are treading a well-worn path. Most great powers have considered themselves superior to their rivals and have believed that they were advancing some greater good when they imposed their preferences on others. The British thought they were bearing the "white man’s burden," while French colonialists invoked la mission civilisatrice to justify their empire. Portugal, whose imperial activities were hardly distinguished, believed it was promoting a certain missão civilizadora. Even many of the officials of the former Soviet Union genuinely believed they were leading the world toward a socialist utopia despite the many cruelties that communist rule inflicted. Of course, the United States has by far the better claim to virtue than Stalin or his successors, but Obama was right to remind us that all countries prize their own particular qualities.

So when Americans proclaim they are exceptional and indispensable, they are simply the latest nation to sing a familiar old song. Among great powers, thinking you’re special is the norm, not the exception.

Myth 2

The United States Behaves Better Than Other Nations Do.

Declarations of American exceptionalism rest on the belief that the United States is a uniquely virtuous nation, one that loves peace, nurtures liberty, respects human rights, and embraces the rule of law. Americans like to think their country behaves much better than other states do, and certainly better than other great powers.

If only it were true. The United States may not have been as brutal as the worst states in world history, but a dispassionate look at the historical record belies most claims about America’s moral superiority.

For starters, the United States has been one of the most expansionist powers in modern history. It began as 13 small colonies clinging to the Eastern Seaboard, but eventually expanded across North America, seizing Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, and California from Mexico in 1846. Along the way, it eliminated most of the native population and confined the survivors to impoverished reservations. By the mid-19th century, it had pushed Britain out of the Pacific Northwest and consolidated its hegemony over the Western Hemisphere.

The United States has fought numerous wars since then — starting several of them — and its wartime conduct has hardly been a model of restraint. The 1899-1902 conquest of the Philippines killed some 200,000 to 400,000 Filipinos, most of them civilians, and the United States and its allies did not hesitate to dispatch some 305,000 German and 330,000 Japanese civilians through aerial bombing during World War II, mostly through deliberate campaigns against enemy cities. No wonder Gen. Curtis LeMay, who directed the bombing campaign against Japan, told an aide, "If the U.S. lost the war, we would be prosecuted as war criminals." The United States dropped more than 6 million tons of bombs during the Indochina war, including tons of napalm and lethal defoliants like Agent Orange, and it is directly responsible for the deaths of many of the roughly 1 million civilians who died in that war.

More recently, the U.S.-backed Contra war in Nicaragua killed some 30,000 Nicaraguans, a percentage of their population equivalent to 2 million dead Americans. U.S. military action has led directly or indirectly to the deaths of 250,000 Muslims over the past three decades (and that’s a low-end estimate, not counting the deaths resulting from the sanctions against Iraq in the 1990s), including the more than 100,000 people who died following the invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003. U.S. drones and Special Forces are going after suspected terrorists in at least five countries at present and have killed an unknown number of innocent civilians in the process. Some of these actions may have been necessary to make Americans more prosperous and secure. But while Americans would undoubtedly regard such acts as indefensible if some foreign country were doing them to us, hardly any U.S. politicians have questioned these policies. Instead, Americans still wonder, "Why do they hate us?"

The United States talks a good game on human rights and international law, but it has refused to sign most human rights treaties, is not a party to the International Criminal Court, and has been all too willing to cozy up to dictators — remember our friend Hosni Mubarak? — with abysmal human rights records. If that were not enough, the abuses at Abu Ghraib and the George W. Bush administration’s reliance on waterboarding, extraordinary rendition, and preventive detention should shake America’s belief that it consistently acts in a morally superior fashion. Obama’s decision to retain many of these policies suggests they were not a temporary aberration.

The United States never conquered a vast overseas empire or caused millions to die through tyrannical blunders like China’s Great Leap Forward or Stalin’s forced collectivization. And given the vast power at its disposal for much of the past century, Washington could certainly have done much worse. But the record is clear: U.S. leaders have done what they thought they had to do when confronted by external dangers, and they paid scant attention to moral principles along the way. The idea that the United States is uniquely virtuous may be comforting to Americans; too bad it’s not true.

Myth 3

America’s Success Is Due to Its Special Genius.

The United States has enjoyed remarkable success, and Americans tend to portray their rise to world power as a direct result of the political foresight of the Founding Fathers, the virtues of the U.S. Constitution, the priority placed on individual liberty, and the creativity and hard work of the American people. In this narrative, the United States enjoys an exceptional global position today because it is, well, exceptional.

There is more than a grain of truth to this version of American history. It’s not an accident that immigrants came to America in droves in search of economic opportunity, and the "melting pot" myth facilitated the assimilation of each wave of new Americans. America’s scientific and technological achievements are fully deserving of praise and owe something to the openness and vitality of the American political order.

But America’s past success is due as much to good luck as to any uniquely American virtues. The new nation was lucky that the continent was lavishly endowed with natural resources and traversed by navigable rivers. It was lucky to have been founded far from the other great powers and even luckier that the native population was less advanced and highly susceptible to European diseases. Americans were fortunate that the European great powers were at war for much of the republic’s early history, which greatly facilitated its expansion across the continent, and its global primacy was ensured after the other great powers fought two devastating world wars. This account of America’s rise does not deny that the United States did many things right, but it also acknowledges that America’s present position owes as much to good fortune as to any special genius or "manifest destiny."

Myth 4

The United States Is Responsible for Most of the Good in the World.

Americans are fond of giving themselves credit for positive international developments. President Bill Clinton believed the United States was "indispensable to the forging of stable political relations," and the late Harvard University political scientist Samuel P. Huntington thought U.S. primacy was central "to the future of freedom, democracy, open economies, and international order in the world." Journalist Michael Hirsh has gone even further, writing in his book At War With Ourselves that America’s global role is "the greatest gift the world has received in many, many centuries, possibly all of recorded history." Scholarly works such as Tony Smith’s America’s Mission and G. John Ikenberry’s Liberal Leviathan emphasize America’s contribution to the spread of democracy and its promotion of a supposedly liberal world order. Given all the high-fives American leaders have given themselves, it is hardly surprising that most Americans see their country as an overwhelmingly positive force in world affairs.

Once again, there is something to this line of argument, just not enough to make it entirely accurate. The United States has made undeniable contributions to peace and stability in the world over the past century, including the Marshall Plan, the creation and management of the Bretton Woods system, its rhetorical support for the core principles of democracy and human rights, and its mostly stabilizing military presence in Europe and the Far East. But the belief that all good things flow from Washington’s wisdom overstates the U.S. contribution by a wide margin.

For starters, though Americans watching Saving Private Ryan or Patton may conclude that the United States played the central role in vanquishing Nazi Germany, most of the fighting was in Eastern Europe and the main burden of defeating Hitler’s war machine was borne by the Soviet Union. Similarly, though the Marshall Plan and NATO played important roles in Europe’s post-World War II success, Europeans deserve at least as much credit for rebuilding their economies, constructing a novel economic and political union, and moving beyond four centuries of sometimes bitter rivalry. Americans also tend to think they won the Cold War all by themselves, a view that ignores the contributions of other anti-Soviet adversaries and the courageous dissidents whose resistance to communist rule produced the "velvet revolutions" of 1989.

Moreover, as Godfrey Hodgson recently noted in his sympathetic but clear-eyed book, The Myth of American Exceptionalism, the spread of liberal ideals is a global phenomenon with roots in the Enlightenment, and European philosophers and political leaders did much to advance the democratic ideal. Similarly, the abolition of slavery and the long effort to improve the status of women owe more to Britain and other democracies than to the United States, where progress in both areas trailed many other countries. Nor can the United States claim a global leadership role today on gay rights, criminal justice, or economic equality — Europe’s got those areas covered.

Finally, any honest accounting of the past half-century must acknowledge the downside of American primacy. The United States has been the major producer of greenhouse gases for most of the last hundred years and thus a principal cause of the adverse changes that are altering the global environment. The United States stood on the wrong side of the long struggle against apartheid in South Africa and backed plenty of unsavory dictatorships — including Saddam Hussein’s — when short-term strategic interests dictated. Americans may be justly proud of their role in creating and defending Israel and in combating global anti-Semitism, but its one-sided policies have also prolonged Palestinian statelessness and sustained Israel’s brutal occupation.

Bottom line: Americans take too much credit for global progress and accept too little blame for areas where U.S. policy has in fact been counterproductive. Americans are blind [deceived] to their weak spots, and in ways that have real-world consequences. Remember when Pentagon planners thought U.S. troops would be greeted in Baghdad with flowers and parades? They mostly got RPGs and IEDs instead.

#### IR is the epitome of American Exceptionalism — only a critical genealogy can unmask the hierarchy of US-Other relations.

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First, the views of American political leaders from Alexander Hamilton to George W. Bush fit within a discursive history of the United States, which lies at the ideological core of American Exceptionalism. American Exceptionalism does not consist of one unified body of thought; it spans many different academic disciplines and has been used by various scholars to explain everything from the uniqueness of American political thought to the peculiar motivations behind US foreign policy. But scholars in the fields of US History, European History, Ameri- can Studies, American Politics and Public Policy, and IR (specifically diplomatic history) accord with what Adas (2001) identifies as the "essence" of American Exceptionalism: an unwavering belief in the uniqueness of the United States and a commitment to a providential mission to transform the rest of the world in the image of the United States (Hietala 1985; Lipset 1996; McEvoy-Levy 2001; Streeby 2001; Glaser and Wellenreuther 2002; Henry 2003; Ignatieff 2005). As Anatol Lieven notes, "anyone" can be American, but "America" is simultaneously unattainable. Thus, one can adopt the allegedly unique qualities, including liberty, constitutionalism, law, democracy, individualism, and separation of church and state that are ostensibly defined and possessed by Americans, but "America" must also be bounded and protected from encroachment, danger, and oppositional values that could destroy its Anglo-Saxon core (Lieven 2005). The United States, on account of its special values, has a superiority that is "self- evident" and beyond reproach; at the same time, the United States is divinely ordained to serve as the only political, cultural, and economic model for the rest of the world. A critical genealogy of Exceptionalism, provided below, reveals the interplay of the providential mission, justification for expansionism based on the superiority of American values and the inability of others to govern themselves, and a racial hierarchy with Anglo-Saxons on top (McDougall 1997; Hoff 2007). As noted in the Introduction, herein is our claim that American Exceptionalism provides a specific context to the Orientalist ideology in the "making" of America. All nations have a "myth" of origin, but there is a particular ambivalence that haunts the idea of the nation... it is an ambivalence that emerges from a growing awareness that, despite the certainty with which his- torians speak of the "origin" of nation as a sign of the "modernity" of society, the cultural temporality of the nation inscribes a much more transitional social reality. (Bhabha 1990:1) Thus, the nation's "coming into being" taps into and relies upon particular narratives that must be constantly and creatively naturalized. The "we-ness" of the nation is predicated upon the Other against which the "we" is constituted. American Exceptionalism is a foundational fiction of "America's" coming into being, involving a "disavowal, displacement, exclusion, and cultural contesta- tion" in the colonial encounters between America and its Others (whether indig- enous Americans, Filipinos, Latinos, Arabs, African slaves, etc.) (Bhabha 1990:5). But, and as American political thought demonstrates, this myth of origin is also decidedly about a distinction from European (particularly British) nation- states. A few critical IR scholars have examined the issue of Exceptionalism, thus providing a point of departure to integrate studies of Othering, nationalism, and imperialism, with studies of how the American nation distinguished itself from Europe in order to surpass it (Campbell 1998b; Cox 2005). Campbell points out the irony of the American revolutionaries' insistence that they were not like the Europeans, given the fundamental assumption that "they possessed the qualities of European civilization in contrast to the barbarity of the Indian way of life" (Campbell 1998b:123). Thus, "America" came into being with an ever present fragility; how could the United States establish itself as more humane and more successfully liberal than Europe yet subdue and conquer Amerindians and even- tually others in the name of Western civilization? This anxious desire to be both a beneficiary of centuries of Western civilization but to set a separate, unique course in the world has continued since the American Revol the endurance of the need of the United States, even recent administration, to continuously assert Exceptionalism and Orientalism. Accordingly, the second reason for understanding Excepti talism is in order to make sense of the differences and distinctions between the United States and Europe pointed out by political leaders and scholars. In effect, if critical IR scholars are more attentive to Exceptionalism, they will find that, the similarities to Orientalism notwithstanding, there are key insights about the relationship between the United States and Europe that are worth exploring. This is particularly important given that mainstream analysis of Exceptionalism is committed to a particular political agenda that ultimately supports American hegemony or, at least, fails to be sufficiently critical of pre-9/1 1 American bellig- erence or post-9/1 1 American military actions. For instance, Kagan (2003) argues that the United States must forge ahead with its own course; with Europe moving toward the changes the European Union engenders, the United States is the only country to provide the military force, order, and stability the world needs. As Kagan warns, "[i]t is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world" (3). And, Charles Kupchan notes: "[t]he next clash of civilizations will not be between the West and the rest but between the United States and Europe - and Americans remain largely oblivi- ous." (Kupchan 2002). Kupchan predicts an intense transatlantic rivalry between the US Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank over the control of the international monetary system, sturdy competition in terms of internet communi- cations technological advances, corporate international acquisitions and invest- ments, and the strength of the euro vis-à-vis the dollar, as well as tension over EU plans for increasing military capabilities to support European security, which would challenge NATO's relevance and create competition for diplomatic influence in the Middle East. Mainstream IR scholars and commentators have attempted to wrap their minds around the so-called "crisis" of the transatlantic divide (Reid 2004; McCormick 2005). Are Europe and the United States strong allies in counter- terrorism intelligence, or do European countries and publics really view, as per sporadic polls, the United States as the biggest threat to world peace (Guitta 2006)? Are European attitudes toward the United States still open and friendly or increasingly punctuated with ambivalence, apprehension, and even hostility, particularly regarding the US claims to "promote democracy" (Kopstein 2006)? Has US hegemony reached its limit in the face of the way the European Union has stitched together various nation states to marshal collective and unified strength, to respond adequately to the new digital age, and to carefully address thorny issues of trade integration and collective security? (Kupchan 2003). Do Europe and the United States still need or even want to be a part of the same collective security agreement, given European resentment of its heavy reli- ance on the United States during the intervention in Kosovo, divisiveness as to how to address terrorism after 9/11, Europe's resistance to the US desire to pro- vide military aid to Turkey on the eve of the invasion of Iraq, and European criti- cism over the US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (Croci and Verdun 2006)? Or, are the fears that "developing" countries are sponsoring Islamic fundamental- ism, proliferating nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons for their security, or offering fierce economic competition substantial enough to warrant continued yet apprehensive transatlantic cooperation? While Europeans are said to view international law as a primary tool of diplomacy, the United States has defended its sovereign right to put forth a national security strategy without consulting with others. The 2005 EU Counterterrorism Strategy focused on political responses inclusive of prevention, understanding, and justice; the White House 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism emphasized defeat of the enemy and an offensive militaristic approach. Some scholars even make distinctions between "old terrorism" in Europe, or political violence exercising some measure of restraint with clear political goals, versus the "new" terrorism the United States primarily faces by unseen enemies who are decentralized and without clear political goals (Stevenson 2003). Inter- estingly, Judt (2005:11) discusses Europe's direct experience of the "worst" - civil war, genocide, anarchy, whereas the United States supposedly had "no direct experience of the worst of the twentieth century-and is thus regrettably immune to its lessons." George W. Bush noted soon after 9/11: On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country. Americans have known wars - but for the past 136 years, they have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941. Americans have known the casualties of war - but not at the center of a great city on a peaceful morn- ing. Americans have known surprise attacks - but never before on thousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a single day - and night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack. (Bush 2001) These contemporary tensions and questions should be understood in the context of American Exceptionalism, which reveals a long-standing ambivalence by the United States about Europe. Orientalism does not make these distinctions between Western countries, and we implore critical IR to think through the implications of the aforementioned questions. We argue that the tension within the so-called Atlantic Alliance is not simply about changes rendered by globaliza- tion or by the Bush Doctrine, or even a potential rethinking about transatlantic values, as mainstream scholars might maintain. Rather, it is indicative of how and why Western powers differ in the way they perform sovereignty. A critical analysis of the clashes would bring to light how European power is not necessar- ily "better" than or more inclusive than American hegemony but is perhaps tak- ing advantage of the backlash against American Exceptionalism in its most recent form. This brings us to the next point. Our third reason for examining Exceptionalism in tandem with Orientalism is to understand the different logics at work in US foreign policy and the cre- ation of its identity. If identity is fundamentally understood through other identities, who are the "others" and what kinds of others are there? As Diez (2004:4) notes in the context of understanding whether the European Union offers a different type of identity formation in international politics, there are different kinds of difference with different kinds of purposes and implica- tions.

### Link — LIO

#### The liberal international order sustains itself through exclusion — it condemns the world to permanent second-class status as pawns of the imperial project. This makes solving any transnational concern impossible.

French ’22 — Howard; columnist at Foreign Policy, a professor at the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism, and a longtime foreign correspondent. His latest book is Born in Blackness: Africa, Africans and the Making of the Modern World, 1471 to the Second World War. April 19, 2022; “Why the World Isn’t Really United Against Russia”; *Foreign Policy*; <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/19/russia-ukraine-war-un-international-condemnation/>; //CYang

Instead of mere coincidences, what if these two issues were connected — deeply, in fact? An examination of the history of the institutions at the heart of what we casually refer to as the “international community” provides powerful but broadly overlooked reasons to believe just that.

This is a history that far predates the alienating contests of the Cold War, which consumed so much of humanity’s collective wealth and energy and produced huge casualties in proxy warfare around the world. And what it reveals is an international political infrastructure that from its very inception in the early 20th century consigned the nations of what were long known as the “third world” to all but permanent second-class status — or what the Indian historian Dipesh Chakrabarty has called “the imaginary waiting room of history.”

The proximate birth of the international civil society we are familiar with today should probably be situated in the period at the closing of World War I when the Treaty of Versailles was signed, eventually leading to the formation of the League of Nations amid much high-flying rhetoric.

The League of Nations failed for many reasons, not least that the United States, an early proponent of a new system of international governance, never joined the organization. Much less famous though are the many ways that the progressive-sounding diplomacy begun at Versailles failed a vast majority of the world’s people by not making their interests a priority — or even taking them into consideration. China’s nationalist government, to take one example, was surprised to learn that as a result of a kind of horse-trading at the organization’s high table among Britain, France, and Italy, the league granted legitimacy to Japan’s takeover of its territories that had been controlled by Germany before World War I. As a result, China refused to sign the treaty.

Japan, for its part, was disgusted by the league’s failure to address notions of racial hierarchy then so dear to the West. As scholar G. John Ikenberry noted in his recent book, A World Safe for Democracy: Liberal Internationalism and the Crises of Global Order, former U.S. President Woodrow Wilson “projected a vision of universalism in rights and values, but quickly compromised when it was expedient.” When the Japanese put forward a resolution affirming equality among nations with no distinctions based on race or nationality, Washington backed down in deference to Britain, which saw an idea like this as a threat to the legitimacy of its settler colony project then underway in Australia. This may have been the operative rationale in this diplomacy, but it should also not be forgotten that the United States at the time was itself a country that practiced legally enforced white supremacy and separatism. Wilson, himself, praised the Ku Klux Klan and oversaw the segregation of the federal work force.

China and Japan both had obvious reasons to feel disserved by the era’s international diplomacy, but as bad as they were, the humiliations they suffered were of a categorically smaller nature than the insults delivered to a large host of then-still-colonized lands. The League of Nations gave powerful endorsements to Western imperialism, granting European countries the authority to extend their control over broad stretches of territory under the guise of the league’s so-called mandates.

The continent of Africa was especially targeted by these arrangements. African colonies had just supplied hundreds of thousands of troops and invaluable economic support to their European masters during World War I, and returning African veterans clamored for independence. In response, European powers argued that Africans had not yet reached a level of civilization required to even begin contemplating self-rule. The irony was lost on the Europeans that they themselves had just emerged from what was arguably the most barbarous war in history.

This was not the end of the insults though. To impose their authority on the few independent African states, the league — at European direction — challenged self-rule in Liberia and Ethiopia, claiming a humanitarian obligation to do so because of alleged enslavement in those states. As political scientist Adom Getachew wrote in her recent book, Worldmaking After Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination, “That the charge of slavery became the idiom through which black self-government would be undermined should strike us as deeply perverse not only because of Europe’s central role in the trans-atlantic slave trade and slavery in the Americas but also because of the labor practices that characterized colonial Africa in the twentieth century.” Yet at the time, and for decades to come, European powers brutally imposed forced labor on their African colonies to ensure high production rates of coveted raw materials, such as rubber and cotton.

The next big opportunity for a Western-led international community to introduce more democracy and equity in global governance came after the next world war. Similar lofty rhetoric ensued, as did similar compromises at the expense of the world’s colonized people. After even greater sacrifices — measured in the lives of colonial soldiers fighting in European wars — and greater extractions of wealth were made to keep the economies of the imperial powers afloat, expectations were even higher this time, especially among Africans, that great powers would willingly pave the way for their independence.

Amid new rounds of high-flying progressive rhetoric about freedom, accountability, and timetables for self-rule, the discussions that produced the Atlantic Charter fueled this optimism. But as much as Wilson had done with regard to Japanese expectations of an enshrined equality among nations, former U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who was principally concerned with the emerging great-power rivalry against the Soviet Union, bowed to the interests of Great Britain and other European imperialist nations in deferring talk of universal self-government and independence. As Harvard University professor Caroline Elkins points out in her new work, Legacy of Violence: A History of the British Empire, Roosevelt wasted no time in the aftermath of the charter, saying that the promises made to the colonized were aspirational, merely “pronouncements” that would have to wait.

A sense of the spirit in the halls of Western power in this moment when a new global order was being designed can be felt through the words of one of its most important architects: economist John Maynard Keynes. As delegates from 44 nations gathered in New Hampshire to design a new international monetary system, Keynes bemoaned the presence of representatives from what would soon become known as the third world. As historian Vijay Prashad notes in his book The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World, Keynes denounced the composition of the delegates as “the most monstrous monkey-house assembled for years” and said the representatives of the poorer and weaker nations “clearly have nothing to contribute and will merely encumber the ground.”

Within a few years, the two-track nature of the world being built would become fully evident. The United States famously devoted billions of dollars to rebuilding European economies after the devastation of World War II. Left unaddressed though — both at the time and indeed ever since — was the West’s unacknowledged obligations toward the world’s newly decolonized countries. As I have argued in my own book, Born in Blackness: Africa, Africans, and the Making of the Modern World, 1471 to the Second World War, the extraction of wealth and labor from Africa alone over a period of centuries played a central yet still largely unacknowledged role in European prosperity in the modern age.

Indeed, the pillaging of Africa of human beings created what we call “the West.” Although few stop to define it these days, this of course means the condominium between Atlantic-facing Europe and that continent’s colonies and, later, allies in the Americas. As I have written, until the year 1820, four times as many people were brought to the New World from Africa than from Europe, and it was the labor of these enslaved millions of people — producing commodities like sugar and cotton on a vast scale, clearing lands, and performing all kinds of other unpaid labor — that made the American colonies profitable for Europe and made the so-called Old World new and rich.

This may feel like ancient history to some, but the subordination of justice for the colonized — and especially for peoples and lands subjected to slavery — is of a piece with every other chapter of history discussed here, and this topic won’t magically go away because people wish to ignore it or find it intractable or bothersome.

In fact, the current structure of the United Nations, whose impotence in the face of a moral horror like Ukraine some bemoan today, is lodged in the special rights of a select few through the U.N. Security Council. This arrangement is little different from the arguments in the Wilsonian era that the colonized were inadequately civilized to be granted full rights.

The U.N. Security Council was democratized to some extent by China’s entry as a permanent member in 1971. Other than China though, whose size made it difficult to deny, the U.N. Security Council is composed of predominantly white nations whose history is bound up in imperial rule. The United States is the only one with a very large population, currently third in the world. Russia, whose economy is roughly the size of Italy’s, will soon drop out of the top 10 most populous countries. France and Britain trail far behind. Where is India? Where is Africa, whose Nigeria is projected to have more citizens than the United States by the middle of this century and will likely trail only India and China by 2100. Where is Brazil or Mexico or Indonesia?

In his book The World That FDR Built: Vision and Reality, historian Edward Mortimer wrote, “A world war is like a furnace, it melts the world down and makes it malleable,” leading to major changes in the subsequent order. Many people have begun to speak of the invasion of Ukraine in these terms — as a portal to a new, if as-yet undefined, global order. Few, however, have begun to address with any seriousness of purpose or urgency the unfinished business of the major re-orderings of the 20th century, which left the people of the third world completely out of the picture. Can this be justified on the basis of civilization or race? Or is it a matter of raw wealth or sheer power in which might is allowed to make right?

Putting morality aside, few of the big problems facing human life in this century are amenable to being managed well on the basis of exclusion on a scale like this — not prosperity and inequality, not global warming, not migration, not even war and peace.

### Link — Western Anxiety

#### Representations shape reality — their threat construction is an image of Western anxiety seeking to construct its own self-identity, paving slavery, colonialism, and genocide along the way.

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American Orientalism: The Discourse on "The West and the Rest"

Edward Said (1979) shatters the taken-for-granted status of colonial and post colonial knowledge about the developing world with his analysis of Orientalis As he notes, European intellectual, artistic, archeological, and literary examin tions of - and claims about - the bodies and borders conquered and mapp justified the necessity and endurance of colonial European empires. Furth there is an internal consistency of the Orientalist discourse, despite any lack correspondence with a ''real" Orient, in order to confer an objective and inno cent status to the knowledge production that both prompted and rationalized the brutality of imperialism (Said 1979:5-7). However, this does not mean tha Orientalism is just a play of meanings and ideas, for, as constructivist IR scho argue, the more we act toward an entity as if it has a particular representation meaning, the more that entity can take on that representation (Wendt 19 Doty 1996). For example, the more European colonialists perceived colonial territories as incapable of self-governing, the more Europeans treated the territories as in need of governing. Indeed, Orientalism is a "Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient" (Said 1979 acting "dynamically along with brute political, economic, and military rationales" (Said 1979:12). Said (1979:12) also claims that Orientalism has much less to do with the "Orient" and much more to do with the making of "our" world. Knowledge claims about the Other (the Orient/the East) actually cement way the Self (Europe/the West) sees and constructs itself. The "Orient" - a mysterious, erotic, dark, dangerous mass of Muslim, Hindu, Jewish, Arab, So Asian, East Asian natives - is a deep and recurring image in Western identity making. The impact of Said's work, particularly Orientalism, on critical IR is threefold. First, it creates space for critical IR scholars to examine representational prac- tices and international hierarchy in international politics, in dialogue with schol- ars in other fields, such as literary criticism, anthropology, postcolonial thought, feminist studies, political geography, and others. Said's contrapuntal analyses of culture, colonial discourses, nationalism, power, and representational practices in his body of work opens the way to explore the nuances, contradictions, and shifting and hybrid contexts of Othering (Chowdhry 2007). The Other is that through which the subject is represented as privileged and superior, with the Other being devalued, feared, reviled, even desired, in some way. The Other stands as a potential disruption of the Self, but at the same time, as critical IR theorist Campbell (1998b) points out, the Self cannot fully contain or "resolve" the anxiety over the difference from or the encounter with the Other; without the production of this anxiety, insecurity, and danger, statecraft and nation- making would have nothing against which to assert themselves. Indeed, for the West, the encounters of slavery, colonialism, and genocide have to be represented as trysts with danger, backwardness, and ever-threatening barbarism - anything but illegitimate violence - in order to naturalize Western superiority. Second, the various debates about Said's work have inspired and fortified cri- tiques of rationalist methodology of mainstream IR scholars and of how their ontological presumptions about and methodological studies of the "West" and the "rest" obscure more than they explain (Allain 2004; Chowdhry 2007). Third, the American variant of Orientalism allows for an analysis of the discursive deployments in which (1) the United States assumes and relie ical distinction between the United States and Others (Weldes ter-Montpetit 2007); (2) the United States employs authoritative claims and representations about Others' bodies, habits, be political sensibilities, thereby justifying interventions, sanction within, across, and outside of its borders (Persaud 2002); and (3) US foreign policy relies on a rationalist methodology consisting of finding “evidence”, such as reports and fact-finding missions, of foregone conclusions about the Other the United States need to assert its position (Tetreault 2006).

### — NATO —

### Link — NATO

#### Lining up behind imperialist powers ruins anti-capitalist organizing and paves the way for world war.

Okuyan 22 [Kemal Okuyan, Communist Party of Turkey General Secretary; 3-1-2022; "Who Will Stop NATO?"; TKP; https://www.tkp.org.tr/en/agenda/who-will-stop-nato/; KL]

“NATO is not an organization, a force, or an alliance system that can be defeated militarily.” We have been stating this since the Russian armies entered Ukraine.

The world’s plunge into ever increasing darkness and the fact that the international working class movement has for a long time been in retreat undoubtedly leads people to despair and the tendency to fall for the first “remedy” they come across.

However the surrender of societies to primitive motives of defense or survival often leads to great disasters.

Today the humanity is divided between those who are waiting for the “civilized NATO” to deliver a salvation from the “Russian barbarity” and those who hope that Russia under the leadership of the brave and clever Putin will put an end to the US and NATO aggression and this is a bigger problem than one might think.

This division is spread almost equally among all strata of the people across all continents, in other words, the working people and the poor are attached to the recipes of salvation that have nothing in common with their interests.

An abstract opposition to war has never prevented wars, but we have to say that the division we have pointed out is paving the way for war, even a comprehensive imperialist war, or let’s just call it what it is, a new world war.

Some of those who took to the streets saying “No to War” today demand that NATO take more effective steps against Russia. However, the Western imperialist countries are already just one step away from an extensive war effort.

Those who have been watching the events of the last few days unfold with the mind-numbing glasses of the “division” I mentioned earlier may not be aware of it, but NATO is organizing an incredibly intense attack, perhaps with a psychological superiority it has never had since its establishment.

German militarism, which had been kept in check to a certain extent by the Soviet Union and which began to recover rapidly with the collapse of the USSR, completely abandoned its meticulous and “cowardly” way of acting that it had for decades. Many US companies, which have fattened up in the climate of war, started the week with cries of joy. The Polish ruling class, driven by a historical determination to serve NATO, have gained more this past week than in the last 30 years. Even the Ukrainian administration under the control of a fascist gang sees in itself the right to act as the representative of the oppressed.

The “European project”, which had lost credibility in the eyes of the broad masses due to the economic crisis, the terrible handling of the corona pandemic at the hands of the incapable politicians, suddenly regained credibility.

Europe is the homeland of class struggles; the ideological and political balances of the world are determined there. Pointing out the importance of this geography, where the two world wars broke out, does not mean surrendering to a European-centric point of view. On the contrary, it indicates the need for a period of struggles that will radically change the current status quo in Europe. Our side in this struggle is the workers of the continent.

The working masses in Europe, including Turkey, have an obligation to wage a more effective struggle against NATO aggression, which is getting more intense.

As some people think, this obligation cannot be fulfilled as taking one of the sides in that “division”. NATO aggression cannot be repelled either, by attributing a special intellect and depth to the Putin leadership, which is looking for ways to defend the interests of capitalist Russia. In any case, at no point in today’s world order can rational thought prevail. As assessing US imperialism by looking at Biden’s pathetic image means assessing only a part of the reality, assigning great meanings to Putin’s strong leader image would equally take us down the path of grave mistakes.

Today, the peoples of the world cannot have an “active” role in a NATO versus Russia polarization. It is of course absurd to equalize the sides in this confrontation; despite all their internal contradictions, the US, NATO and the European Union bloc are the primary threat to humanity. But the critically important point is that almost all of Europe, including Turkey, is under the yoke of a pro-NATO class domination.

It is necessary to determine priorities based on the conditions in each country. Contrary to the claims of the NATO supporters who have now started to make a lot of noise in Turkey, it is the US imperialism and NATO that threaten our people.

Against NATO aggression, which will become more critical in Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy with the latest moves, the only effective and legitimate struggle is one that is waged on a class basis.

It would be a historical defeat for the workers of the world to line up behind the struggle for hegemony, which is obscured by great power chauvinism, militarism, lies, occupation and which divides the capitalists into the powerful and the downtrodden.

Communists come from a tradition that opposes race- and nation-based conflicts, and that stands for class-based conflicts. This tradition has hitherto used the truth, sense of justice and righteousness as its most important weapons; adopted the sovereignty and independence of countries and opposition to changing of borders by brute force as the most important principles of the struggle against imperialism.

Today, in the face of increasing NATO aggression, only by acting on this basis can we make the masses support the demand for Turkey’s immediate exit from NATO.

US imperialism and NATO cannot be defeated by a confrontation where peoples are held down as they line up behind their own ruling class, or where deep social inequalities in individual countries are lost in the primitive language of geostrategy.

Let’s not forget that Yanukovych government, which was overthrown by the Maydan Incidents of 2014 and fled to Russia after the last “color revolution” that made Ukraine a fanatical militant of US imperialism and NATO, with its policies that impoverished the people, with its rotten structure that was deep in corruption, deserved to be overthrown long time ago not by the neo-Nazis or pro-Europe fascists but by a revolutionary working class movement.

The ominous “color revolutions” that shaped Ukraine ten years apart are the result of the division of people on the basis of being pro-Russia or pro-Western. In Ukraine and Russia, however, the population is divided into exploiters and exploited, as in the United States, Poland, Turkey, and elsewhere.

The day is the day to push forward the organized power of the working people against NATO and the NATO members. This is the only force against which the most advanced weapons, including nuclear ones, will be rendered futile.

There is no difference between hoping for help from the struggle for hegemony in the capitalist world and placing hope in the 6 parties that came together against the AKP government.

Both are projects of destruction for the people. While there is still time, the people must rise up for the emergence of an organized popular struggle.

#### NATO was founded on a legacy of imperialism that shapes its engagement with the contemporary world – the institutional war machine thrives on the production of endless conflicts to sustain its existence.

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The war in the Balkans is not about the plight of refugees but is part of Nato’s expansion. It wants to dominate the Balkans and eastern Europe as well as control the oil rich areas of the Caspian Sea. John Rees explains why. There are currently over 20 wars raging around the globe. So why is Nato so concerned with the one in the Balkans? The plight of the refugees is the stock pro-war answer. Yet there were 15.3 million refugees made homeless by war in 1995 alone. So why does the war in Kosovo, where US military might alone is 99 percent greater than the arms spending of the state it is fighting, command the attention of the world’s great powers? The causes of Nato’s Balkan War cannot be found in the Balkans alone. Neither can they be found in the events of the last few months. The origins of the war are much wider and go back much further than Serbia’s relations with Kosovo. To see the whole picture we have to go back to the fundamental fact of European history in the last decade, the fall of the Stalinist states in 1989. The end of these regimes, and German unification soon after, gave all the institutions of international capitalism an unrivalled opportunity to expand into central and eastern Europe. International capital began to “cherry pick” those sites and markets which were most profitable. Investment quickly followed, which, though large in comparison to the capitals which made it, was not large enough to sustain a turnaround in most of the east European economies. The European Community also talked of eastward expansion. But, in a Brussels bureaucracy which still regards Greek membership of the EU as a mistake because the economy is insufficiently prosperous, the integration of east European states was always more of a carrot to encourage pro-market reform than an immediate policy goal. So it was that the fastest expansion into eastern Europe came from Nato. “Nato”, reports the International Institute for Strategic Studies, “has confidently extended its collective defence provisions to three new members of the former Warsaw Pact ... while the EU’s enlargement process remains mired in bickering over fundamental issues such as reform of the Common Agricultural Policy.” Historians of the 1999 Balkan War will no doubt marvel at the fact that so little comment has been made about the fact that, in the very month that the war broke out, Nato integrated Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary into the alliance. The southern flank of Nato between Hungary and Greece is now pierced by the states of the former Yugoslavia. This alone gives Nato a considerable strategic interest in controlling the Balkans. But there is more at stake. The effect of Nato enlargement is to swing the Iron Curtain to the east. Where once it used to divide Germany, it now runs down the eastern borders of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. It ends at the borders of the former Yugoslavia. The next three states to be considered for Nato membership are a former republic of Yugoslavia itself, Slovenia, and Serbia’s neighbours, Romania and Bulgaria. Thus the whole ten year long process of Nato’s eastward push is now caught up with the fate of the Balkans in general and the former Yugoslav states in particular. The new Iron Curtain between western and eastern Europe is not the end of the Balkans’ strategic importance for Nato. If we look along the southern flank of Nato, through Greece and Turkey, we see how closely the fate of this region is tied to another crucial area of post Cold War instablity - the arc of oil states running up from the traditional spheres of western interest in Iran and Iraq to the Caspian Sea and the newly independent states on Russia’s southern rim. Just as Nato expansion into eastern Europe was being celebrated at the alliance’s 50th birthday party in Washington a few weeks ago, another pro-Nato alliance was being constructed in the wings of that summit. At the Washington meeting Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova joined with Uzbekistan to form Guuam, a new alliance aimed at strengthening the member states’ economic and political ties with the west. Three of these states - Georgia, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan - only pulled out of the Russian dominated Confederation of Independent States’ collective security pact this spring. Guuam has agreed low level military cooperation but claims it is not a military alliance aimed against Russia. But Guuam’s formation comes hot on the heels of the Ukrainian parliament’s decision to rescind its previous order to get rid of nuclear weapons, a direct result of the Balkan War. So it is not surprising to find Russia’s foreign minister asking, “How should we understand the fact that this new regional organisation has been created in Washington during a Nato summit?” An answer to this question was provided by Eduard Shevardnadze, president of Georgia, who said, “When I met Javier Solana [Nato secretary-general], I asked him, ‘When will you finally admit Georgia to Nato?’ He whispered in my ear, but I can’t reveal what he told me.” In all likelihood what Solana told Shevardnadze was that Nato won’t be signing Georgia up in the very near future. This is because the main significance of the Guuam area for the western powers is more economic than military at the moment. Guuam’s main task, according to the Financial Times, “is to develop the area’s rich oil and gas deposits to the exclusion of Russia”. To this end, “aligning with Guuam from the outside are Turkey, Britain and the US - nations that have proved far more able than Russia to invest in and trade with the region.” There is indeed a rich prize at stake in the Caspian Sea region. Its proven oil reserves are estimated at between 16 and 32 billion barrels, comparable to the US’s reserves of 22 billion barrels and more than the North Sea’s 17 billion barrels. Total reserves could be as high as 179 to 195 billion barrels, according to the US Energy Information Administration. These reserves are all a long way from the Balkans, but the routes by which the oil must come west are not. In April a new pipeline was opened carrying Caspian Sea oil through Azerbaijan and Georgia. The oil will continue its journey by tanker through the Black Sea, the Bosphorus and on past the Turkish and Greek coast. Other possible western pipeline routes lie through Turkey to the coast near Cyprus or through the Ukraine, Bulgaria and Greece - which are, respectively, a Guuam member, an aspiring member of Nato and an existing Nato member. All these routes give the necessity of security in the Balkans an additional direct economic importance to add to the primary strategic concerns which stand behind Nato’s war in the Balkans. As US energy secretary Bill Richardson explained last November, “This is about America’s energy security ... It’s also about preventing strategic inroads by those who don’t share our values. We are trying to move these newly independent countries toward the west. We would like to see them reliant on western commercial and political interests ... We’ve made a substantial political investment in the Caspian and it’s important that both the pipeline map and the politics come out right.” It is the “pipeline map” to which Richardson refers that connects the Caspian Sea oil reserves to the security of the area between Turkey, Greece and the other Balkan states. There are, as the International Herald Tribune points out, “profound economic and geopolitical consequences” stemming from the decisions about the routes by which the oil will come west: “Rivalries played out here will have a decisive impact in shaping the post-Communist world, and in determining how much influence the United States will have over its development.” The pipeline map Geographical expansion is not the only way that Nato has altered in the 1990s. It has now explicitly redefined its “strategic concepts” so that it is no longer simply a defensive alliance, as it claimed throughout the Cold War. All the old Cold War Nato practices remain - including its commitment to “first use” of nuclear weapons if it deems such use to be necessary. But immediately after the fall of the Stalinist states in 1991, Nato redefined its aims so that “out of area” operations became part of a new “strategic concept”. At first this was seen as primarily a “peacekeeping” role. But, reports the International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Nato’s exclusive command of the Implementation Force (IFOR) operations in Bosnia completely changed this view.” Thus the collapse of the east European regimes and Nato’s expansionism fuelled its concern with the Balkans; and its experience in the Balkans fuelled its determination to use military weight beyond its borders. At the Washington Summit, a Combined Joint Task Force for rapid force deployment in “areas of crisis” was grafted onto a revised Nato military structure. The results of these decade long trends are enormous. The Cold War structure which underpinned the nuclear stalemate between the West and the Eastern bloc has disappeared. This means that “hot wars” are no longer pushed to the colonial and former colonial periphery of the system in the way that they were during the Cold War. These conflicts continue, though they are fought less between national liberation movements and colonial or neo-colonial regimes and more frequently between politically independent states which can quickly move from clients of the major powers to “rogue” or “terrorist” states if their interests and those of the major powers diverge. Iran, Iraq and Serbia are just the most prominent examples of the last ten years. This pattern is going to continue, if only because 75 percent of US arms sales in the past five years have been to countries whose citizens have no right to choose their own government. Even more importantly, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact has created a zone of imperialist conflict stretching from Nato’s new eastern border through the Baltic states, eastern Europe and the Balkans, through to the southern rim of Russia and the Guuam states. This economically weak and unstable region is now a major zone of rival imperial claims. The Balkans have become a contested area once again because the tectonic plates of the major powers now grind against each other in this area, just as they did before the accident of Cold War imperial geography and the long postwar boom gave them temporary respite. The New World Order promised ten years ago will not be delivered. The imbalance between US military power and that of every other state in the world, once touted as the guarantee of a more peaceful world, now stands exposed as a source of greater instability. US military spending is greater than all the military spending of the next 13 countries ranked beneath it. Yet the US share of world trade and world manufacturing is substantially less than it was during the Cold War. This is one central reason why military might is so often the policy of choice for the US ruling class. The other reason is the economic enfeeblement of Russia. But the policy of using this weakness to carry Russia reluctantly along with Nato objectives has its limits, as the course of the Balkan War so far shows. Moreover, as Nato encroachment comes ever closer to Russia’s borders, the still enormous military machine of the Russian state may once again begin to look to the country’s leaders like its one real asset in a threatening situation. When we see the Balkan War in context it is no surprise to find that the 1990s have already been one of the bloodiest since the Second World War in terms of war deaths. Most of those killed have been civilians. Fifty years ago half of war deaths were civilian. In the 1960s civilians accounted for 63 percent of war deaths, in the 1980s that figure rose to 74 percent, and in the 1990s the figure is higher still. Only the destruction of the imperialist system will stop this carnage.

#### The imperial construction of NATO takes shape through the discourse of instability, protectionism, and inevitability that sustains their militarized geopolitical hegemony – resistance on the level of rhetorical rearticulation is necessary.

\*\*Card is specific to Balkan states and discourse employed to describe them – specific link ?

\*\*Also makes the inevitability arg !

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Discursive colonisation 1: NATO as perpetual peace In their well-known book Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (2001) influenced by the fundamental concepts of Lacanian psychoanalysis, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe argue that discursive structures, including metaphors, do not only, or even primarily, have cognitive or reflexive value. They are first and foremost ‘articulatory practice[s] which constitute and organize social relations’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, 96).4 In other words, what we say and how we say it shapes what we are and how we live. This is a crucial insight in approaching the way in which NATO membership has been presented by the political elites to the Montenegrin population. Prototypical in this respect is the speech given by the speaker of the Montenegrin Parliament Ranko Krivokapic´ on February 25, 2014 at the conference devoted to the discussion of the role of the Parliament in the so-called Euro-Atlantic integrations ("Krivokapic´", 2014). It is indicative that this conference was organised by a pro-NATO nongovernmental organisation Center for Democratic Transition (CDT), which has, at least since the early 2000s, been a recipient of USAID funding (USAID 2002 SEED Report). The conference was sponsored by the German Embassy in Montenegro, which, in addition to the US Embassy, has provided the most vocal diplomatic support for Montenegro’s NATO membership. In fact, the arrogantly pro-NATO worded statements by various German and US ambassadors in the 10-year period since Montenegrin independence have been widely interpreted as serious meddling into the internal affairs of a sovereign state prohibited by both international and consular/diplomatic law ("Milacˇic´" 2013; "Dajkovic´", 2015; "Vucˇurovic´", 2016). They represent yet another aspect of the neocolonial practices normalised by the pro-NATO government of Montenegro. Krivokapic´’s speech contains all the main elements constantly repeated in the pro-NATO discursive interventions in Montenegro. The first is the notion of the supposedly inherent inability of the Balkan peoples, including Montenegrins, to resolve their differences peacefully. In other words, since they are not capable of making peace by themselves, they need the permanent (military) presence of an external force of restraint, that is, NATO. Krivokapic´ is very explicit about this. In fact, in his speech, he refers to NATO metaphorically as ‘the messenger of peace’ in the Balkans. Apart from the fact that Krivokapic’s depiction of the Balkans as a ‘wild and deadly’ place of instability is a commonplace in the Western European stereotyping of the Balkans since the early nineteenth century (as Vesna Goldsworthy has shown in her book Inventing Ruritania [1998]), it is also a sign of paternalistic contempt for the Montenegrin population. Even though Krivokapic holds the second highest political office in the state, he has identified not with the people who elected him, but with the NATO outsiders whose own geopolitical and economic interests he is advocating. In this respect, the second important element of Krivokapic´’s speech is his use of the metaphor of the ‘umbrella’. Having an umbrella, or being under an umbrella, signifies the necessity of being protected from the elements: rain, hail, snow, etc. In the geopolitical sense, being under the NATO umbrella, according to Krivokapic´, means that Montenegro will be protected from all external threats and risks. However, as in many other pro-NATO government statements, these threats or risks are not enumerated or even named. The public is not told who intends to harm Montenegro, when, or how. This is done intentionally in order to create a general atmosphere of insecurity and fear which makes it easier to push through NATO’s militaristic geopolitical agenda. In addition, Krivokapic´ is eager to convey to his audience a sense of inevitability about NATO membership in order to convince them that there is no alternative to NATO and that all resistance is futile. This is the third element present in almost all pro-NATO discourse in Montenegro. Specifically, Krivokapic´ claims that Montenegro is the ‘last piece [sic] of the coast from Portugal to Istanbul without the NATO umbrella, there exists no piece of land on the coast of the Mediterranean, from this side [sic], that does not have the NATO umbrella. That puzzle must be complete’. Here once again Krivokapic´ approaches Montenegro not from the viewpoint of an elected Montenegrin official, but through the eyes of a NATO military strategist who is interested in securing the territories and resources of the Mediterranean for the control of the alliance and its power projection toward the East. For Krivokapic´, Montenegro is no longer a homeland, having a value in and of itself, but becomes a mere pawn in the geopolitical chess game by the antagonistic colonial powers which NATO must win at any price, i.e. ‘the puzzle must be complete’. What the urgency of completing this ‘puzzle’ has to do with the lives of the ordinary citizens of Montenegro, apart from putting them in danger, Krivokapic´ does not care to explain. So far, then, we have extracted three key elements of the proNATO discursive structures: the stress on internal and external political instability, the metaphor of the ‘umbrella’ (which sometimes also appears as the metaphor of the ‘family’), and the sense of inevitability. In this way, pro-NATO political figures attempt to shape all aspects of mainstream political discourse in the country. When this attempt is coupled with the financial and logistical support coming into Montenegro from NATO member states in both overt and covert manner, the immensity of the challenge for resistance becomes readily apparent.

#### The 1AC locates NATO as the pinnacle of civilization while characterizing adversaries of the West with divergent modes of thinking and being as “barbaric” and “irrational” – the epistemological foundations of their scholarship are in conquest and colonization.

\*\*AT: PDB

Kovacevic ’17 -- adjunct professor in the Departments of Politics and International Studies at the University of San Francisco (Filip Kovacevic, 4-1-2017, "NATO’s Neocolonial Discourse and its Resisters: The Case of Montenegro," Taylor & Francis, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08854300.2016.1256583?scroll=top&needAccess=true, accessed 6-30-2022) -- nikki

Discursive colonisation 2: NATO as civilisation Moreover, pro-NATO discourse has been able to appropriate the so-called modernity paradigm for its purposes and present NATO membership as the ultimate proof of Montenegro’s political and economic ‘development’ and ‘maturity’. This is most visible in the public statements of Milo Djukanovic´, the long-time Montenegrin authoritarian leader who is currently serving his 7th term as prime minister ("CG na pravilnom kolosjeku", 2016). Since coming to power in 1989 on the wave of the nationalist revolts against the Yugoslav Communist apparatus, Djukanovic´ has proven to be the ultimate political ’chameleon’ of the Balkans. While in power, he amassed an immense personal fortune by being involved in a whole series of illegal activities (Kovacevic 2014; Nutall, 2016). It is only his diplomatic immunity as the head of government that has blocked criminal court proceedings in Italy in which there are allegations of the existence of a secretive organised crime network under his personal control. However, ever since the heavy involvement in the Balkans by the Clinton Administration in the mid-1990s, Djukanovic´ has acquired many high-level political friends in Washington. They include US vice-president Joe Biden with whom Djukanovic´ meets and consults regularly ("Readout of VP’s Meeting", 2015). The same goes for the EU leadership, as shown by Djukanovic´’s April 2016 press conference with the president of the EU Council Donald Tusk in Brussels where Tusk referred to him as ‘dear Milo’ ("President Tusk and PM of Montenegro", 2016).5 No wonder then that Djukanovic has completely identified with the geopolitical agenda of the Western colonialist elites and their neoliberal economic vision for the Balkans. He has incorporated their most cynical, corrupt schemes in the running of the Montenegrin economy. At the special gathering celebrating the 10th anniversary of Montenegro’s independence referendum on May 21, 2016, Djukanovic stated that in Montenegro, the divisions are not ‘for NATO or against NATO, but are civilizational and cultural’ ("Zaustaviti podjele", 2016, emphasis added). This statement encapsulates the most fundamental claim of pro-NATO discourse. It goes something like this: NATO represents the West, the West represents ‘civilisation’, therefore NATO represents ‘civilisation’. And, by extension, whoever advocates NATO is ‘civilised’ and whoever is critical of NATO is ‘primitive’ and ‘barbarian’. It is worth noting that, as explained in detail by Larry Wolfe’s seminal study Inventing Eastern Europe (1994), the representation of the West as ‘civilised’ and the non-West as ‘barbarian’ goes back to the eighteenth century and the period of the Enlightenment in Europe. It can be traced back to the writings and activities of the leading intellectual and political figures of the times. These diplomats such the Count de Se´gur, the French ambassador to Russia in the 1780s, and philosophers such as Voltaire and Rousseau, saw so-called Eastern (generally Slavic) Europe as the West’s ‘inferior’ other half, which they strategically used as the measuring stick of what they considered their own educational and cultural advancement. These claims had severe geopolitical consequences. Just as, in his path-breaking 1978 book Orientalism, Edward Said argued was the case in the Middle East with regard to British and French scholars and politicians, the claims by the intellectuals of the Enlightenment were used to morally justify the military attack and conquest of Eastern Europe by the West. Two notable historical periods in which the discourse of Western ‘superiority’ reached the highest pitch were those preceding Napoleon’s invasion of Russia in 1814 and Hitler’s invasion of Russia in 1941. It is ominous that contemporary NATO discourse uses similar discursive structures directed against the same target. That hardly bodes well for the future. In fact, Djukanovic´ portrays himself as being in the forefront of the NATO struggle against the East (meaning Russia). He has repeatedly and directly accused Russia of meddling in the internal affairs of Montenegro with the aim of stopping NATO integration ("Djukanovic´ optuzˇuje", 2015). The Russian government has denied the charges ("Moskva", 2015). Further evidence that Djukanovic´ is rehashing centuries-old Western prejudices against other cultures and ways of living and thinking is his cynical claim that his opponents base their claims on ‘ignorance’ ("Zaustaviti podjele", 2016). With a clear intent to demean and humiliate the opposition, he says that they need to be ‘properly educated’, which will supposedly make them come to the realisation of just how much they have been mistaken and how great NATO is in promoting democracy and the rule of law. In the same way as the leading lights of the Enlightenment, Djukanovic´ appropriates for himself and his point of view the bully pulpit of apodictic knowledge and uses it to intimidate everybody else. His ultimate intention is to destroy any alternative, non-colonialist political and geopolitical vision for Montenegro by discrediting its epistemological foundations. Djukanovic´’s discourse is a stark example of the operation of arrogant political power as hegemonic knowledge.

#### NATO is not a defense alliance but instead a social construction oriented towards the preservation of Western imperial order – the technocratic rhetoric of deterrence is a guise for the political architecture of Western security that sustains its hegemony through the management of threats.

\*\*Describes rhetorical construction of Russia ?

Klein ’90 -- Bradley S. Klein holds a doctorate in political science and was a university professor for 14 years in international relations and political theory before leaving academia in 1999 to devote himself fulltime to golf writing. (Bradley S. Klein, 1990, " How the West was One: Representational Politics of NATO," International Studies Quarterly , Sep., 1990, Vol. 34, No. 3, Special Issue: Speaking the Language of Exile: Dissidence in International Studies (Sep., 1990), pp. 311-325, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2600572.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A701409b23f8b2f68890516448f972a45&ab\_segments=&origin=&acceptTC=1, accessed 6-30-2022) -- nikki

In a recent essay devoted to the symbolic character of nuclear politics, Robert Jervis argues that Western strategy in Europe after 1945 was not primarily interested in the instrumental purposes to which Soviet force might be applied. The concerns, rather, had more to do with allaying fears of vulnerability which attended the uncertainties of the postwar order. "Indeed, when NATO was formed, the American decision makers were preoccupied not with the danger of Soviet invasion but with the need for and difficulties of European economic and political reconstruction." (Jervis, 1989:206). This suggests that strategic debates derive their power from their affinity with widely circulated representations of cultural and political life (Shapiro, 1989). Western military strategy, despite its focus on weapons and technology, is no exception. It draws its capital from its ability to provide a sense of order and rational- ity to the world. Classical strategists like Hedley Bull (1977), Michael Howard (1984), Henry Kissinger (1954, 1965) and Hans Morgenthau (1976) have continually argued that alliances in general, and NATO in particular, must articulate a specific form of cultural life and preserve certain historical achievements. In this conservative tradi- tion, the processes through which inter-state "order" and the "society" of states are established are inherently problematic. The conservatism consists in assuming that such "order" and "structure" are available and normatively worthy as pursuits and that they are not to be achieved through narrowly instrumental, weapons-techno- cratic approaches to security. A genealogical account of alliance defense policy explores the practices by which certain boundaries of political space became demarcated across Central Europe. It explores, as well, the forms of identity which came to prevail over other possible forms that Western politics-and global security practices-could have assumed. Such an analysis does not result in a singular master narrative, but rather in an open, internally differentiated set of practices in which elements of power are always in the process of being contestated and rearticulated (Foucault, 1977; Der Derian, 1987; Ashley, 1987, 1988, 1989). NATO as a political practice constructed a particular architecture of global space (Dillon, 1989). But that design was never according to a master plan, and it did not emanate from some sovereign source of power. NATO's success was due not to having deterred Soviet aggression, nor to having successfully managed repeated crises among its allies, but to having produced those various allies in the first place. The account that follows is somewhat at odds with those critical studies of NATO and Western strategy that focus on armaments and the postwar world military order (Senghaas, 1972; Kaldor, 1978, 1981; Luckham, 1987). In examining the links be- tween the domestic armaments base and international relations, these studies argue that NATO occupies a hegemonic place among world alliance systems and that its combined economic, military, and political resources have endowed it with the privi- lege to disseminate transnational infrastructures of rule throughout the postwar multilateral system of Western-oriented trade. Such a perspective on Western policy offers a more critical and globalist interpretation than traditionally realist, state- centered views that have enjoyed widespread circulation among more conventional political-military strategists (Gilpin, 1981; Kennedy, 1988). Yet both of these ap- proaches, the one radical, the other more traditional, emphasize structural dimen- sions of global power and impose a greater order and logic on world politics than can be substantiated through a detailed examination' of how an actual alliance system functions.

#### NATO is built on a foundation of colonial exploitation and eliminatory violence – only the radical dismantling of the imperial regime can solve.

Teba ’22 -- Indigenous organizer for The Red Nation (Justine Teba, 3-9-2022, "No War With Russia! Dismantle NATO! U.S. Out of Everywhere! ," Red Nation, http://therednation.org/no-war-with-russia-dismantle-nato-u-s-out-of-everywhere/, accessed 7-1-2022) -- nikki

NATO is a relic of the cold war, it was initially formed as an alliance of anti-communist countries. NATO has actively undermined the sovereignty of many nations looking to delink themselves from global capitalism and imperialism through military force and invasion. The U.S. and NATO have been inserting themselves into Ukrainian affairs for decades. One recent declassified CIA document dated July 13, 1953 described project AERODYNAMIC, stating “The purpose of Project AERODYNAMIC is to provide for the exploitation and expansion of the anti-Soviet Ukrainian resistance for cold war and hot war purposes.” Project AERODYNAMIC funded, and provided equipment to multiple organizations who sympathized with the Ukrainian Nazi leader Stepan Bandera. Today Bandera sympathizers sit in political office at all levels of government throughout Ukraine. After the fall of the Soviet Union, NATO encouraged former Soviet territories to join them and created division amongst those who still believed their quality of life was better with ties to Russia and those interested in joining NATO. This resulted in civil wars throughout the region, specifically in the Donbass region, a region in east Ukraine that rejected the government installed by a U.S. coup in 2014. This coup would lead to the resurfacing of many far right militias openly holding neo-nazi values, such as the Azov Brigade who is the primary militia fighting in the civil war against partisans in the Donbass region and all who oppose the puppet government. The Ukrainian government has since formally incorporated such militias into its military. Presently, U.S. media is doing a great job of manufacturing consent. U.S. propaganda is extremely effective at shifting public opinion to favor going to war, by purposely misleading and deceiving the public. In the case of Ukraine, U.S. media is overlooking the far-right and blatant neo-Nazi tendencies of popular movements that the U.S. installed government has allowed to flourish. A U.S. war with Russia will not benefit the masses of innocent Ukrainian people who will suffer in wartime. U.S. and NATO are instigating a war that ultimately only benefits those who financially invest in war and will expand the reach of NATO’s imperialist projects. Biden announced that the U.S. and its NATO allies put “the mother of all sanctions” on Russia which will choke out their economy and result in the suffering of millions of people not only in Russia but throughout the world. Special advisor to Joe Biden, John Gonzalez stated “the [sanctions] are so robust that they will have an impact on those governments that have economic affiliations with Russia, and that is by design… Venezuela will begin to feel that pressure, Nicaragua will feel that pressure, as will Cuba.” Economic sanctions are as brutal and violent as guns and bombs, and some who have lived through both say the sanctions were worse. These sanctions will directly result in the expansion of gas and oil infrastructure on Native lands here in the U.S. because the U.S. is now offering domestic oil to replace Russian oil that European countries were dependent on. Land permits have already been increased under Biden, and multinational oil corporations have their sights set on expanding their infrastructure in North America, to support sanctions in Russia is to support further destruction of Native lands here. Once again the U.S. proposes a war for profit, rising defense stocks have the richest investors eager to promote yet another brutal war. This comes back home in the form of predatory military recruitment practices which have always disproportionately targeted Native youth. Today Native people remain overrepresented in the U.S. military while remaining one of the smallest populations. When Indigenous people are the first to go to war for imperialist powers, we must demand an end to imperial expansion everywhere. We invite anti-war and anti-imperialist coalitions to form and join upcoming calls for international action. We say, NO WAR, NO SANCTIONS, NO ENLISTMENT & RECRUITMENT, U.S. OUT OF EVERYWHERE, DISMANTLE NATO! These are our demands! It’s not enough to be anti-war, we must also be anti-Imperialists!

#### The 1AC weaponizes the logic of linear temporality to locate an “effective” and “expanded” NATO as the utopian endpoint of history – non-Western nations are demarcated as sacrifices at the altar of a “prosperous future.”

Kovacevic ’17 -- adjunct professor in the Departments of Politics and International Studies at the University of San Francisco (Filip Kovacevic, 4-1-2017, "NATO’s Neocolonial Discourse and its Resisters: The Case of Montenegro," Taylor & Francis, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08854300.2016.1256583?scroll=top&needAccess=true, accessed 6-30-2022) -- nikki

Discursive colonisation 3: NATO as future In addition to the pro-NATO discursive structures that perpetuate the spatial and cultural aspects of the colonisation of Montenegro, there are also those that underscore the temporal dimension. For instance, another high-level member of the NATO lobby in Montenegro, the president Filip Vujanovic´, frequently emphasises that NATO stands for the ’prosperous future’ of Montenegro ("Vujanovic´", 2014; "NATO" 2011). NATO membership will mean that Montenegro can leave behind its ’past’, which, just like Krivokapic´ and Djukanovic´, Vujanovic´ portrays as full of conflicts, and decisively enter the age of political stability, rapid economic growth, and high standard of living. In other words, Vujanovic´ presents NATO as the midwife of post-history. Once in NATO, the citizens of Montenegro will live happily ever after. It is no doubt laughable to attempt to present a brutal military alliance, known to violate the basic principles of international law, as some kind of a utopian panacea. However, Vujanovic´’s statement closely follows the conventional conceptualisation of progress founded on the notion of linear time. This notion underwrites all major political ideologies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and so there is both the Marxist and NATO version of the end of history. The propagandists of the Marxist period in the recent Montenegrin past saw the end of history as the global triumph of the working class, whereas the NATO propagandists of today see it as the establishment of a global NATO. In both cases, Montenegro is seen as having a duty to contribute its territory and resources to the realisation of these ‘messianic’ projects. What is problematic, however, is that nobody is asking the ordinary Montenegrin citizens their opinion. Both the top-down Marxist and NATO projects deny them the agency of making political decisions which will greatly impact their daily lives.

### Link — NATO Cohesion/Diplomacy

#### ‘Relations’ with our NATO are not mutually beneficial, but rather just used as a manipulation tactic for America — it forces our allies to play as our pawns and erodes their sovereignty in service of an imperialist agenda.

Catalinotto ’21 — John; retired Lecturer at Bronx Community College and John Jay College. June 22, 2021; “American’ imperialism is back"; *Workers World*; https://www.workers.org/2021/06/57162/; //CYang

Biden’s diplomatic/military initiative in Europe this June was thus aimed at reestablishing relations disrupted by Trump. His Departments of State and Defense, along with the CIA, aim to use the G7 and NATO alliances against Russia and China and to extend imperialist control over Africa, Asia and — if the U.S. can’t do it itself — Latin America.

NATO, imperialist tool

In the post-World War II Cold War, the U.S. promoted and established NATO as a weapon. Its major task was to prevent worker uprisings in Western European countries like France, Italy and Greece, where there were strong, pro-socialist, working-class movements. Its other task was to confront the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies.

At the time, the U.S. was the preeminent imperialist power and built command structures into NATO that guaranteed U.S. leadership of any actions. Those structures remain.

In 1967 NATO provided the plans for a coup by Greek colonels that kept a military dictatorship in that country for seven years.

The corporate media and the NATO powers describe NATO’s history as “defensive” against the Soviet Union. Truth is, the Soviet-led alliance, the Warsaw Pact was established only in 1955 and was dissolved in 1991, as was the Soviet Union itself. The U.S. set up NATO in 1949 and has expanded NATO since the 1990s.

In 1999, as it was approaching its 50th anniversary, a U.S.-NATO bomb and rocket campaign hit Yugoslavia for over two months, destroying schools as well as chemical factories and eventually tearing Yugoslavia apart.

NATO forces are still in Afghanistan. NATO helped the U.S. occupy Iraq in the years after the 2003 invasion. NATO carried out the bombing and destruction of Libya and played a role in the war against Syria.

While Biden was visiting Europe, NATO’s “Defender Europe” war exercises moved toward the Russian borders, and the “African Lion” exercises scoured northern and western Africa. NATO’s original 12 have now grown to 30, most new members from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Far from being for defense, NATO aims at conquest.

Blinken, Burns and Austin

Biden’s cabinet members running the imperialist state apparatus are Antony Blinken at the State Department, William Burns at the CIA and Lloyd Austin III at the Defense Department. Blinken and Burns are career diplomats, and Austin a 41-year career officer who was a four-star general when he retired, quite recently. All are trained in a Cold War mentality — which morphs easily into anti-Russia, anti-China policies.

Normal imperialist diplomacy is based on lies and hypocrisy, flattery and bribes, backed by force. Trump publicly demanded more military spending from the European NATO leaders and then insulted them. As reported, Biden spoke softly and sweetly, which likely means Biden assured U.S. allies they would get their share of the loot stolen from the world’s working class. No gang leader could do less.

Biden urged the Europeans to back him against Putin and join with U.S. initiatives blocking Chinese economic successes in the world market. Reports are that Biden offered Putin some concessions. Even if true, these would be aimed at preventing Russia and China from allying against the imperialist offensive.

While Biden and his team speak diplomacy, never forget that the dollar, the Euro, the Japanese yen and the imperialist war machine are lurking nearby to destroy the sovereignty of any existing independent nations and threaten another Cold War against China and/or Russia that could explode in a hot war.

#### ‘Confidence Building’ is the equivalent of copy-and-pasting the South into the void of NATO’s reconstituted Other left by the Soviet Union.

Behnke 2k, Associate Professor in International Political Theory, University of Reading, UK., (Andreas, “INSCRIPTIONS OF IMPERIAL ORDER: NATO's MEDITERRANEAN INITIATIVE” in The International Journal of Peace Studies, Volume 5, Number 2, <https://www3.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol5_1/behnke.htm>) //CHC-DS

'Dialogue, Confidence, Understanding'

Some critical comments on Claes's interpretation of 'Islamism' were less concerned with the content than with the diplomatic effects of the statement. NATO was at the time already attempting to set up some diplomatic relations known as the 'Mediterranean Initiative' which led to the invitation of five Southern countries (Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia) to participate in a 'Mediterranean dialogue'. In November 1995, this invitation was also extended to Jordan (Nordam, 1997).8 The choice of countries already constitutes a forceful definition of Self and Other: "Each of the six countries realizes that is was chosen largely because it is perceived to be a moderate, Western-looking, constructive (as defined by the West) participant in regional affairs" (RAND 1998:57). The deck is already stacked before the dialogue begins: the participant countries have to comply with Western standards, their 'constructive' nature assured. At this moment the encounter involved its first imperial gesture: NATO reserves the right to grant audience to a sympathetic public in attendance only. One might then surmise that NATO's policy towards the six chosen nations might be characterized by a more amicable and dialogical attitude than Claes's equation of 'Islamism' and 'Communism' suggests. NATO's official language might even be interpreted as saying that the countries south or east of the Mediterranean Sea are part of the 'European security community'. Thus, the Final Communiqué of the 1996 NATO Brussels Meeting states, "We reaffirm our conviction that security in Europe is closely linked with security and stability in the Mediterranean, and that the Mediterranean dimension is consequently one of the various components of the European security architecture" (NATO, 1997b:33).

A slightly different language had been employed in the previous year, when the North Atlantic Council expressed its 'conviction that security in Europe is greatly affected by security and stability in the Mediterranean' (NATO, 1996:25). In order to promote that stability, NATO pursues a "dialogue, with the aim of fostering transparency and achieving a better mutual understanding with the countries to our South" (NATO, 1996:25; emphasis added). And finally, NATO's Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation from July 1997 states that the Mediterranean region merits great attention since security in the whole of Europe is closely linked with security and stability in the Mediterranean. The dialogue we have established with a number of Mediterranean countries ... contributes to confidence-building and cooperation in the region, and complements other international efforts (NATO, 1997a:2; emphasis added). Despite the less bellicose language, even within this formulaic diplomatic vocabulary we can still discern the same discursive rules applying as in Claes's more blatant statement. In both versions, NATO 'pastes' the South into the void left by the demise of the Soviet Union as its constitutive Other, reasserting a Western identity against a re-constituted antagonist. To support this contention, we do not need to surmise what NATO 'really' wants to say here, although the barren vocabulary certainly entices the critical reader to search for further elaboration. Our critical hermeneutics may well stay on the surface of the above statements, inquiring instead into what is presupposed in them. Thus, our question should simply be: what is to be assumed if confidence has to be built, transparency to be created, a better mutual understanding to be achieved? Obviously, these goals are only meaningful if we assume the current lack of confidence and understanding, if we assume the relations between the partners to be characterized by the absence of sociality. NATO's attempt to mediate the encounter between the West and the South is based on an interpretation of this encounter as one between aliens, between cultures that are completely external to each other. Mediation, after all, presupposes a prior alienation. 'Southern' identity in its different expressions is thus externalized from the West, and rendered as otherness. The 'Mediterranean' becomes the defining line of division through which these cultures are alienated and across which their encounter is mediated.

Yet another angle is available for this critical reading. To refer to the vocabulary of 'confidence building measures' connects the situation in the Mediterranean with the logic of the cold war in Europe and a central diplomatic enterprise in the management of the East-West antagonism. Confidence-building (and later confidence and security building) measures were a central element in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process in the 1970s and 1980s and the attempt to create structures of political and diplomatic control over the strategic antagonism between East and West.9 With the East taken out of this context, NATO conducts what amounts to a 'cut-and-paste' of the South into its place. While sticking to our critical hermeneutics, we might nonetheless flesh out the 'identification' of the South as a constitutive Other. In November 1997, the RAND Corporation presented an 'authoritative study' on NATO's Mediterranean Initiative to the Alliance's top political and military authorities. Its institutionalized intertextual relationship with NATO's discourse was established through the Opening Speech by Secretary General Solana at the RAND conference at which the report was submitted (Solana 1997c), and a summary by the NATO Office of Information and Press in NATO Review (de Santis, 1998:32). Among the many issues and topics of the report, three aspects will receive particular attention here. Firstly, the report constitutes a paradigmatic case of 'securitization' by rendering a particular region 'accessible' to the strategic gaze of a military alliance.10 Secondly, the RAND study's 'problematization' of the 'proliferation' of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) draws on and reproduces a specific mode of differentiation between the West and the South which is deeply indebted to 'orientalist' clichés. Thirdly, the resulting mode of exchange (of information, trust, and knowledge) is implicitly conceived as a hierarchical and monological one. Overall, the report emulates and reinforces NATO's imperial gesture in the Mediterranean Initiative.

### Link — NATO Securitization

#### The NATO security agenda is a discursive practice that alienates the extractable South from the naturalized and surveilling West.

Behnke 2k, Associate Professor in International Political Theory, University of Reading, UK., (Andreas, “INSCRIPTIONS OF IMPERIAL ORDER: NATO's MEDITERRANEAN INITIATIVE” in The International Journal of Peace Studies, Volume 5, Number 2, <https://www3.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol5_1/behnke.htm>) //CHC-DS

Securitization, Proliferation, Information

The starting point for the RAND report is the growing importance of the Mediterranean region for NATO and Europe after the end of the cold war. Since the 'Eastern Front' will most likely be stabilized and pacified through the enlargement process, the Alliance's primary concern in terms of 'security problems' will have to be its Southern periphery -- the Balkans, the Mediterranean, and the Caucasus (RAND, 1998:xi). The site vacated by the East, in other words, is now occupied by 'the South'. In a second move, the RAND authors qualify this apparent isomorphism between the East and the South, pointing to the different phenomena underlying the 'security problems' in these areas. Here, political, economic, and social instability are the main concerns of local politicians, while migration, energy issues and cultural issues extend beyond individual countries (RAND, 1998:3-5). Yet in a third and final rhetorical move, RAND's narrative renders these different and diverse problems relevant for the strategic gaze of a military alliance.11 That is to say, NATO 'securitizes' the different social, political, economic, and cultural issues by framing them within a discursive context of danger and threat, by processing them through a conceptual structure that renders them relevant for the strategic and diplomatic practices of a security political agent like NATO. This is above all accomplished by designating the social, political, economic and cultural issues as 'soft security' problems.12 "Indeed, the expansion of the security agenda beyond narrowly defined defense questions has been a leading feature of the post-Cold War scene everywhere, and the Mediterranean is an example of this trend" (RAND, 1998:3). And as the NATO summary presentation elaborates, "the socio-economic developments referred to above may lead to the Alliance's definition of security being subject to further refinement for some years to come" (de Santis, 1998:33).

A closer look at the RAND study actually reveals that the 'Mediterranean' as a region itself is constructed through this discursive securitization. The region is identified by reference to such purported commonalities as lack of political legitimacy, relentless urbanization, and religious radicalism. Moreover, the expanded reach of modern military and information systems links these issues into one 'gray area of problems' with the Mediterranean at its center. Read as straight-forward indicators of danger and taken out of their respective socio-political and cultural context, these issues constitute defining markers of the 'Mediterranean' region as a field of strategic knowledge. Securitization in the NATO/RAND discourse accomplishes two related objects. Firstly, it alienates the identities of West and South only to mediate them in terms of danger and insecurity. It replaces the temporal differentiation that was implied in the 'development/underdevelopment' discourse with a spatial, geostrategic constellation. Consequently, it suggests 'arms control' and 'confidence building' measures as the appropriate means to mediate the divide. Secondly, the NATO/RAND narrative makes the region cognitively accessible and geostrategically available for the Alliance. Whatever goes on in the region is rendered a matter of concern for an alliance that can muster an unequaled amount of strategic violence in order to inscribe its own design onto the map of global politics. The re-conceptualization of security to encompass 'soft issues' does not mean that NATO cannot identify 'hard' security problems. Above all the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) features prominently with the NATO/RAND discourse (NATO 1991; NATO 1998d; Solana 1997b; Solana 1997c).

David Mutimer (1997) has argued that the use of the metaphor 'proliferation' carries certain entailments. That is to say, it structures our understanding and handling of the problem. In particular, he refers to the "image of a spread outward from a point or source", and the "technological bias" introduced in the discourse (Mutimer 1997:201-2). As concerns the first point, 'proliferation' presupposes a center at which WMD are to be held and controlled, and from which these weapons disseminate into the body of the international society. To the extent that this process gets out of the center's control, certain measures have to be taken to 'suffocate', limit, or curb the 'spread' of these weapons. As concerns the second point, Mutimer (1997:203) points out the peculiar agency implied in the concept: "Notice that the weapons themselves spread; they are not spread by an external agent of some form - say, a human being or political institution". The fact that a large number of these weapons were actually 'spread' by Western states is consequently hidden through this discursive structure. These points are also relevant for the Mediterranean Initiative. We can add a third entailment to the list which appears through a critical reading of the NATO/RAND narrative. As the RAND authors (1998:15) observe, "The mere existence of ballistic missile technology with ranges in excess of 1,000 km on world markets and available to proliferators around the Mediterranean basin would not necessarily pose serious strategic dilemmas for Europe." In fact, we might even agree with the neorealist proposition that 'more might be better', above all in terms of nuclear weapons. This is certainly the preferred solution of John Mearsheimer (1990) for the stabilization of European political order after the end of the cold war. After all, conventional wisdom has it that nuclear weapons and the threat of mutually assured destruction preserved stability and peace during the Cold War. The RAND authors, however, fail to grasp the irony in their identification of WMD proliferation, which ends up denying this central tenet of cold war strategy. According to them, "the WMD and ballistic missile threat will acquire more serious dimensions where it is coupled with a proliferator's revolutionary orientation. Today, this is the case with regard to Iran, Iraq, Libya, and arguably Syria" (RAND, 1998:16).

What preserved the peace during the cold war -- mutual deterrence -- is now re-written as a strategic problem: As a result of proliferation trends, Europe will be increasingly exposed to the retaliatory consequences of U.S. and European actions around the Middle East and the Mediterranean basin, including the Balkans. ... As a political threat and a weapon of terror capable of influencing the NATO decisionmaking during a crisis, their significance [of conventionally armed ballistic missiles] could be considerable (RAND, 1998:16). Two implications of these arguments deserve elaboration. First, there is the reversal of the traditional relationship between WMD and rationality. For what makes the presence of WMD in the South so worrisome is the absence of the requirements of reason and rationality. Within NATO's discourse on the South, 'revolutionary orientation' accounts for the undesirability of distributing these weapons to such unfit hands. In order to qualify for their possession, reason and rationality must be present -- as they are obviously assumed to be in the West. The discourse of proliferation consequently produces a third entailment by constructing the relationship between West and South in 'orientalist' terms. In this rendition, the South becomes the quintessential antithesis of the West, the site of irrationality, passion, and terror (Said, 1995). Within this site, different rules apply, which are not necessarily subject to Western ideals of enlightened reason. 'Proliferation' articulates a hierarchical structure in global politics, with the West as the privileged site of from which to surveil, control, and engage the rest of the world. This privilege is further dramatized in the above complaint about the possibility of retaliation. For the South to achieve the possibility of influencing NATO decisionmaking is to violate the epistemic sovereignty of the West. 'U.S. and European actions' and interventions have to be unrestrained in order to constitute proper crisis management. NATO demands a docile subjectivity and accessible territory from the South, the latter's identity cannot be ascertained against the West. Its arms have to be surrendered, its retaliatory capabilities to be revoked.

'Information' is the third mode besides 'Securitization' and 'Proliferation' within which we can discern the subjugation of the South to the strategic Western gaze. A central purpose of the Mediterranean Initiative/Dialogue is to improve 'mutual understanding' and to 'dispel some of the misperceptions and apprehensions that exist, on both sides of the Mediterranean' (Solana, 1997a:5). And both the RAND Corporation and NATO put some emphasis on public information and perception. Yet the structure of this relationship proves to be unbalanced and virtually unilateral. As mentioned above, for NATO, the prime task is above all the "further refinement of its definition of security" (de Santis, 1998). The general identity of the South as a site of danger and insecurity is consequently never in question. Western perceptions are never problematized. Knowledge of the South is, it appears, a matter of matching more and better information with proper conceptual tools.

On the other hand, (mis)perceptions take the place of knowledge in the South. NATO is perceived widely as a Cold War institution searching for a new enemy. That is why the best course to change the perception of NATO in these countries is to focus more on "soft" security, building mutual understanding and confidence before engaging in "hard" military cooperation. Measures should be developed with the aim of promoting transparency and defusing threat perceptions, and promoting a better understanding of NATO's policies and objectives (de Santis, 1998:34). To interpret political misgivings about NATO and its post-cold war diplomacy as 'misperceptions' which can be put straight by "educat[ing] opinion-makers in the dialogue-countries"(RAND, 1998:75) tends to naturalize and objectify the Western rendition of NATO's identity. The possibility that from the perspective of the 'Southern' countries NATO's political and strategic design might look quite different is lost in this narrative. NATO's identity is decontextualized and objectified, the productive role of different cultural and strategic settings in the establishment of identities and formulation of interests denied. To maintain such a lofty position becomes more difficult if we let the Mediterranean participants voice their concerns openly. Far from being 'misperceptions and misunderstandings', these countries' less than enthusiastic attitudes towards NATO are based on, for instance, the establishment of powerful Western military intervention capabilities off their beaches. Also, NATO's attempts to institutionalize a military cooperation is interpreted as an attempt to gain a strategic foothold in the region in order to monitor the flow of missile technology and the possession of WMD (Selim 1998:12-14). In other words, we encounter rather rational and reasonable security political and strategic concerns. The fact that NATO is unwilling or unable to acknowledge their concerns once again demonstrates the 'imperial' nature of the purported dialogue.

#### NATO securitization reproduces the West as a metaphysical grounds to expand its strategic gaze over the South.

Behnke 2k, Associate Professor in International Political Theory, University of Reading, UK., (Andreas, “INSCRIPTIONS OF IMPERIAL ORDER: NATO's MEDITERRANEAN INITIATIVE” in The International Journal of Peace Studies, Volume 5, Number 2, <https://www3.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol5_1/behnke.htm>) //CHC-DS

In her exploration of Western representations of the South, Roxanne Doty (1996:3) describes the relationship between these two subjectivities as an "imperial encounter" which is meant "to convey the idea of asymmetrical encounters in which one entity has been able to construct 'realities' that were taken seriously and acted upon and the other entity has been denied equal degrees or kinds of agency". Her focus is on an aspect of power which has received increasing treatment within critical International Relations (IR) theory during the last years, that is, the power to define and articulate identities and to determine the relations between them. As was argued above, the Western invention of the South during the cold war can be interpreted as an imperial gesture. The South was rendered into a West-in-the-making, with its own distinguished historical, cultural, and social features reduced to indicators of 'underdevelopment'. Ultimately, the narrative proclaimed, the South would become part of the Western 'Empire', the latter would be able to expand into 'barbaric' areas of the world -- provided it could win the war against Communism. The end of the cold war saw this 'expansionist' logic give way to a exclusive posture. The relations between the West and the South are no longer mediated through time. Instead, a spatial differentiation now structures the imperial encounter, the South is no longer to be 'developed' and 'Westernized'. It is to be surveilled, controlled and disciplined, its 'spillage' of crisis and instability to be contained.

NATO's Mediterranean Initiative is a cornerstone in this new rendition. For while we so far cannot observe any direct military intervention by the Alliance in the Mediterranean region, NATO's discourse on the South in general, and the Initiative in particular render it accessible and available for such action. Strategic knowledge is produced as an expression of, and in anticipation of, strategic power. The 'self-determination' of NATO as a continuously capable and competent military agent is effected through a discourse that inscribes a particular, securitizing, strategic order upon the South, positing it as a site of danger, irrationality and insecurity against the West. In this context it is interesting to observe the exclusion of states from the Mediterranean Initiative that are not considered to be 'moderate, Western-looking [and] constructivist' (RAND 1998:57). This differentiation between insiders and outsiders appears to be based on the degree to which the respective countries are willing to subject themselves to the imperial encounter with the West, and to open themselves to the strategic gaze and control of NATO. The imperial encounter is then made possible and supported by what one may call the Emperor's two bodies. On one hand, the West appears as a cultural identity among others, located in space (North of the Mediterranean) and time (in the post-cold war era). In this sense, the West is the entity that needs to be protected from the dangers and threats which 'spill over' from the South through adequate strategic means. On the other hand, the West is presented as a 'site of knowledge', as the source or author of the proper and objective 'world-picture' that depicts the realities of post-cold war global politics. In this sense, the West becomes the metaphysical grounds from which knowledge can be gathered and disseminated. And in its different versions -- securitization, proliferation, and information -- this knowledge draws on and reproduces this metaphysics. There are consequently reasons to be skeptical about NATO's ability to conduct a 'dialogue' with an other it is unwilling to listen to.

### Link — NATO Threat-Con

#### Be skeptical of the 1AC’s underlying assumptions of security ‘realities’ — threat narratives are inventions holding up the Western identity, legitimizing violence as a necessary process to cleanse the Self of impurities.

Behnke 2k, Associate Professor in International Political Theory, University of Reading, UK., (Andreas, “INSCRIPTIONS OF IMPERIAL ORDER: NATO's MEDITERRANEAN INITIATIVE” in The International Journal of Peace Studies, Volume 5, Number 2, <https://www3.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol5_1/behnke.htm>) //CHC-DS

Discussions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) role after the end of the cold war predominantly focus on its adaptation to the new security environment, the redefinition of its mission and the transformation of its military and political structures (Gordon, 1997; Kay, 1998; Yost, 1998). While this kind of literature is valuable in its own right, its underlying assumption about the adaptive logic of NATO's post-cold war policies tends to underrate the ability of the Alliance to actively shape the security environment through its discursive construction of security political 'realities' and the re-presentation of its institutional identity. At the same time, this literature arguably underestimates the task confronting NATO. The collapse of the cold war order does not only pose a problem to NATO in terms of adapting to a new reality, the features of which are are supposedly as clearly discernable as the ones of the cold war itself. Rather, its demise challenges NATO (and other international actors and institutions) to articulate new and stable 'structures of meaning' which can render "the unfamilar in the terms of the familiar" (Campbell, 1992:4) and which make it possible to re-assume political and military-strategic agency. The purpose of this essay is to analyze the way in which NATO is responding to these challenges. More specifically, it addresses the problem of the Alliance's 'Western' identity and the strategies of inclusion and exclusion through which this identity is re-defined and re-asserted after the disappearence of the constitutive Other of the cold war, that is, the Communist 'East'. At the same time, the essay deals with NATO's search for new adversaries and threats. These two issues, while often treated separately in the literature, are in fact closely related. As Owen Harries (1993:42) pointed out some years ago,

The political 'West' is not a natural construct but a highly artificial one. It took the presence of a life-threatening, overtly hostile 'East' to bring it into existence and to maintain its unity. It is extremely doubtful whether it can now survive the disappearance of that enemy. We need not take Harries' skepticism at face value in order to appreciate the problematization of what the West actually is. Suffice it to state that matters of identity are intrinsically related to the problem of difference and adversity. The articulation of a Western identity, Harries' argument suggests, was made possible, and depended upon the presence of a hostile 'East'. As Bradley Klein (1994:120-21) has argued, this presence has allowed NATO to prevail and survive the many crises and internal conflicts amongst its member-states. Already in the 1960s, Henry Kissinger analyzed the effects of détente on alliance cohesion in terms that anticipate to some extent the troubles NATO would face some 30 years later after the demise of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. As the détente develops, the need to transform the Alliance from its present defensive concept into a political arrangement defining itself by some positive goals will grow ever more urgent. Defense against a military threat will soon lose its force as a political bond. Negotiations with the East will prove corrosive unless they go hand in hand with the creation of common political purposes and the institutions to embody them (Kissinger, 1965:10).

In other words, in the absence of a 'life-threatening' adversary, the West runs the danger of disintegrating and dissolving. That NATO was able to avoid this fate for forty years supports Klein's (1994:121) contention that the alliance strength rested on its ability to wed itself "to the defense of a distinctly modern, Western, Atlantocentric cultural project" which made it possible to deflect and externalize its internal contradictions and conflicts. If we acknowledge this internal relationship between (stable) identity and (hostile) difference, we can appreciate the paradox that the end of the cold war presented a much more serious threat to NATO than the East-West confrontation ever did. For the end of the cold war also means that the unraveling of Cold War representations has raised for the first time the fundamental issue of Western identity. It is no longer clear who is to be legitimately incorporated within the space of modern Western culture. ... Simply put the world under NATO's guidance is no longer subject to containment. It's boundaries have now been eroded... (Klein, 1994:133). Consequently, the West faces the problem of 'self-determination', of defining its identity and its borders against the rest of the world. Self-determination is usually assumed to contribute to peace in the international system. Thus, the United Nations (UN) Charter states in Article 1, paragraph 2 as one of its purposes, To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. As this citation demonstrates, violence is conventionally understood as violation of an existing (national) identity by an external other (Vries and Weber, 1997:1). Self-determination as "the right of a people to constitute itself in a state" (Encyclopædia Britannica Online) presupposes that the identity of these people is already established and that conflict is a external and secondary to such identity. But as the events in the former Yugoslavia have demonstrated, it is difficult to maintain this assumption when conflict appears as an inherent part of the very determination and assertion of identity. "Determination of the Self now reveals itself to be what it probably always has been: determination of the Other" (Vries and Weber, 1997:1). This is most dramatically demonstrated in those cases in which the Self has to be 'cleansed' of ethnic and other 'impurities'. Violence is thus not necessarily solely attributable to the other, but is rather part and parcel of the process through which identities, collective or individual, are constituted and maintained (Vries and Weber, 1997:2). The case of Bosnia in this sense only demonstrates the relationship between violence and identity in its most dramatic and disturbing expression. Yet as such, it is simply the manifestation of a more general, ontological proposition. Any "operation of inclusion/exclusion is an act of violence perpetrated upon the world and requires the support of a certain amount of coercion" (Bauman, 1991:2). If collectives such as nations, or 'the West' are indeed 'imagined communities' without any grounding in primordial, quasi-natural identities, than their continued existence depends on a constant effort to keep alive that imagination (Sloterdijk, 1998). Order has to be inscribed into the world as a process of creative violence which eliminates and overcomes the ambiguity and contingency that constantly works to undermine such efforts.

### — IR —

### Link — IR

#### International Relations’ explanation for the international order relies on an outdated and deterministic understanding of culture — this view of ‘cultural unity’ being essential to a strong society is #MAGA.

Reus-Smit ‘19 — Christian; Professor of International Relations at the University of Queensland, in Brisbane Australia. March 21, 2019; "International Relations Theory Doesn’t Understand Culture"; *Foreign Policy*; [edited for ableist language] <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/21/international-relations-theory-doesnt-understand-culture/>; //CYang

Conventional wisdom holds that IR theory has little to say about culture. After all, the argument goes, its dominant schools of thought focus on struggles for material power and treat actors as self-interested egoists. In fact, IR scholars talk about culture all the time. It permeates their arguments about the Western foundations of the modern international order, about China as a civilizational state, and about the fate of the Arab Spring. And if discussions of the Western nature of human rights aren’t about culture, then what are they about at all?

The real problem is that IR scholars cling stubbornly to a view of culture that anthropologists and sociologists last took seriously between the 1930s and 1950s. Indeed, when discussing culture, IR looks like a conservation zoo for concepts long dead in their natural habitats.

The outdated view sees cultures as coherent things: as tightly integrated, neatly bounded, and clearly differentiated. They are causally powerful. Culture makes individuals who they are and defines what they want and how they think. And it is culture that undergirds social institutions. Cultural unity makes strong societies; cultural diversity is corrosive. For evidence of such views, look no further than Brexit, U.S. President Donald Trump’s “Make America Great Again” campaign, Russian irredentism, and Confucian nationalism in China.

Such views have long been rejected in specialist fields. Cultures are now seen as heterogeneous and contradictory, highly porous, and deeply entwined and interrelated. In her celebrated 1986 article “Culture in Action,” Ann Swidler, the eminent Berkeley sociologist, put it this way: “all real cultures contain diverse, often conflicting symbols, rituals, stories, and guides to action.”

Decades of empirical research sustains such understandings of culture. Anthropologists have demonstrated it at very local levels. Lila Abu-Lughod’s work on Bedouin women is a fine example. And historians have demonstrated it at the level of empires and international orders. Karen Barkey, Jane Burbank, Frederick Cooper, Pamela Kyle Crossley, and many others have revealed the heterogeneous cultural contexts in which such orders evolve.

Yet the old, discredited view of culture is still alive in IR. And not just in little pockets. It is IR’s default conception across the discipline’s rival schools.

#### Decades of empirical research prove.

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Yet the old, discredited view of culture is still alive in IR. And not just in little pockets. It is IR’s default conception across the discipline’s rival schools.

Realists are materialists at heart, yet they frequently make arguments that rest on cultural assumptions. They describe themselves as studying conflict groups, and when we probe the nature of these groups, they commonly appear as cultural units: nation-states with national characters, identities, and interests. The anarchic international system gives states certain primary interests — principally survival — but national culture is commonly seen as a key source of other interests.

Many realists admit that today’s international order rests on legitimacy as much as material might. And when explaining such legitimacy, they join others in emphasizing Western civilization, which is said to provide the norms and values that inform and sustain modern institutions. For former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and others, the erosion of this cultural foundation poses a fundamental threat. How can “regions with such divergent cultures, histories, and traditional theories of order vindicate the legitimacy of any common system?” Kissinger asked in his book World Order.

On the surface, it might seem like rational choice theory would have even less to say about culture than realism. Yet culture enters rationalist arguments, too, in three ways: when adherents explain the rational choice of norms, when they accommodate cultural preferences, and in their argument that common knowledge is essential to solving coordination problems. The last of these is particularly interesting, as it is here that rationalists express a version of IR’s default conception of culture. Coordination problems exist when actors have common interests but can only realize as much if they coordinate their choices, usually without direct communication.

To overcome such problems, actors rely on mutual expectations, and such expectations come from common knowledge: things I know, and you know, and we both know that we both know. Rationalists see cultural norms, values, and practices as a major source of such knowledge, and thus common culture is important to solving the variety of coordination problems actors navigate every day. Most rationalists focus on specific collaboration problems and localized common knowledge, but others make larger claims about social order. Here the claim is a familiar one: Culturally homogeneous societies, which they take as their baseline, are more conducive to the solution of coordination problems than diverse societies.

It may seem unfair to expect realism and rational choice to be abreast of current thinking on culture: It is not their game, after all. Yet constructivism and the English School, both of which see culture as core business, fare no better.

Constructivism’s core insight is that shared meanings — ideas, norms, and values — make the social and natural worlds knowable. Constructivists frequently describe such meanings as “cultural.” In principle, that tendency is entirely compatible with current understandings of culture as heterogeneous and contradictory. Yet the two main strands of constructivist research have been largely deaf to such understandings.

The first strand focuses on international norms: how they emerge and how they shape the identities, interests, and behavior of states and other actors. This work disaggregates culture, breaking it up into individual norms and then studying their causal effects. But while culture is not treated as a coherent, bounded whole, the complexity in which individual norms are embedded is neglected.

The second strand of research focuses on the institutional foundations of international relations, most notably the origins of modern sovereignty. It is here that the default conception of culture is most clear. Constructivists identify deep, system-wide cultural meanings and use these to explain key institutional developments. They see international orders as founded, in part, on what they call collective mentalities — and when these change, so do basic institutions. For example, my own early research attributes variations in the basic institutional practices of different societies to their different cultural understandings of the moral purpose of the state.

The English School is noted for its trademark claim that states can form international societies, not just international systems. That is, states can come together over shared common interests to agree on common rules and create institutions to uphold those rules. When asked what sustains such a society, English School theorists offer two main answers. One is pragmatic: States share basic interests in physical security, stable territorial rights, and the keeping of agreements, and international society is the best means to these ends. This is overlaid, however, by an argument about the cultural prerequisites for international society.

Far from seeing culture as complex and contradictory, Martin Wight, one of the school’s founders, held in Systems of States that an international society “will not come into being without a degree of cultural unity among its members.” Modern international society, he argued, had its origins in European civilization, and when decolonization admitted a host of non-Western states, international society had “outrun cultural and moral community.” The idea that pragmatism could only ever sustain a thin social order — and that a common culture was needed to undergird robust bonds, institutions, and practices — focused much of the school’s post-decolonization research on the possibility of international society in a culturally diverse world.

IR’s failure to integrate contemporary conceptions of culture is more than an academic curiosity — it has far-reaching implications for how we understand today’s global politics of culture. Take one critical issue: the impact of rising non-Western powers on the modern international order. At present, debate is dominated by culturalists, who think that the order will collapse as its Western cultural foundations erode, and liberals, who deny that cultural differences matter, holding that liberal institutions can accommodate states and peoples of diverse cultural complexions.

But what if we take seriously the insight that there is no such thing as a unified culture, that all culture is complex and contradictory? We would have to assume, first of all, that the modern order arose under conditions of cultural diversity, not unity. And we would then have to ask how these heterogeneous conditions shaped the order’s evolution and, in turn, how the order’s institutions were constructed to govern and order that diversity.

Doing so would bring the conquest of the Americas, the Protestant Reformation, the post-Versailles division of Europe into ethnically defined nation-states, and decolonization into new focus. Most importantly, it would lead us to ask not whether sudden onset diversity will destroy a formerly Western order, but whether post-decolonization practices for governing global diversity can accommodate new arrangements of power and expressions of cultural difference.

#### Being IR scholar is a reverse qualification.

Menand ‘05 — Louis; contributed to The New Yorker since 1991 and has been a staff writer since 2001. His book “The Metaphysical Club” was awarded the 2002 Pulitzer Prize for history and the Francis Parkman Prize from the Society of American Historians. He was an associate editor at The New Republic from 1986 to 1987, an editor at The New Yorker from 1992 to 1993, and a contributing editor at The New York Review of Books from 1994 to 2001. He is the Lee Simpkins Family Professor of Arts and Sciences and the Anne T. and Robert M. Bass Professor of English at Harvard University. In 2016, he was awarded the National Humanities Medal by President Obama, November 28th. December 5, 2005; "Everybody’S an Expert"; *New Yorker*; <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2005/12/05/everybodys-an-expert>; //CYang

It is the somewhat gratifying lesson of Philip Tetlock’s new book, “Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know?” (Princeton; $35), that people who make prediction their business — people who appear as experts on television, get quoted in newspaper articles, advise governments and businesses, and participate in punditry roundtables — are no better than the rest of us. When they’re wrong, they’re rarely held accountable, and they rarely admit it, either. They insist that they were just off on timing, or blindsided by an improbable event, or almost right, or wrong for the right reasons. They have the same repertoire of self-justifications that everyone has, and are no more inclined than anyone else to revise their beliefs about the way the world works, or ought to work, just because they made a mistake. No one is paying you for your gratuitous opinions about other people, but the experts are being paid, and Tetlock claims that the better known and more frequently quoted they are, the less reliable their guesses about the future are likely to be. The accuracy of an expert’s predictions actually has an inverse relationship to ~~his or her~~ [their] self-confidence, renown, and, beyond a certain point, depth of knowledge. People who follow current events by reading the papers and newsmagazines regularly can guess what is likely to happen about as accurately as the specialists whom the papers quote. Our system of expertise is completely inside out: it rewards bad judgments over good ones.

“Expert Political Judgment” is not a work of media criticism. Tetlock is a psychologist — he teaches at Berkeley — and his conclusions are based on a long-term study that he began twenty years ago. He picked two hundred and eighty-four people who made their living “commenting or offering advice on political and economic trends,” and he started asking them to assess the probability that various things would or would not come to pass, both in the areas of the world in which they specialized and in areas about which they were not expert. Would there be a nonviolent end to apartheid in South Africa? Would Gorbachev be ousted in a coup? Would the United States go to war in the Persian Gulf? Would Canada disintegrate? (Many experts believed that it would, on the ground that Quebec would succeed in seceding.) And so on. By the end of the study, in 2003, the experts had made 82,361 forecasts. Tetlock also asked questions designed to determine how they reached their judgments, how they reacted when their predictions proved to be wrong, how they evaluated new information that did not support their views, and how they assessed the probability that rival theories and predictions were accurate.

Tetlock got a statistical handle on his task by putting most of the forecasting questions into a “three possible futures” form. The respondents were asked to rate the probability of three alternative outcomes: the persistence of the status quo, more of something (political freedom, economic growth), or less of something (repression, recession). And he measured his experts on two dimensions: how good they were at guessing probabilities (did all the things they said had an x per cent chance of happening happen x per cent of the time?), and how accurate they were at predicting specific outcomes. The results were unimpressive. On the first scale, the experts performed worse than they would have if they had simply assigned an equal probability to all three outcomes — if they had given each possible future a thirty-three-per-cent chance of occurring. Human beings who spend their lives studying the state of the world, in other words, are poorer forecasters than dart-throwing monkeys, who would have distributed their picks evenly over the three choices.

Tetlock also found that specialists are not significantly more reliable than non-specialists in guessing what is going to happen in the region they study. Knowing a little might make someone a more reliable forecaster, but Tetlock found that knowing a lot can actually make a person less reliable. “We reach the point of diminishing marginal predictive returns for knowledge disconcertingly quickly,” he reports. “In this age of academic hyperspecialization, there is no reason for supposing that contributors to top journals — distinguished political scientists, area study specialists, economists, and so on — are any better than journalists or attentive readers of the New York Times in ‘reading’ emerging situations.” And the more famous the forecaster the more overblown the forecasts. “Experts in demand,” Tetlock says, “were more overconfident than their colleagues who eked out existences far from the limelight.”

People who are not experts in the psychology of expertise are likely (I predict) to find Tetlock’s results a surprise and a matter for concern. For psychologists, though, nothing could be less surprising. “Expert Political Judgment” is just one of more than a hundred studies that have pitted experts against statistical or actuarial formulas, and in almost all of those studies the people either do no better than the formulas or do worse. In one study, college counsellors were given information about a group of high-school students and asked to predict their freshman grades in college. The counsellors had access to test scores, grades, the results of personality and vocational tests, and personal statements from the students, whom they were also permitted to interview. Predictions that were produced by a formula using just test scores and grades were more accurate. There are also many studies showing that expertise and experience do not make someone a better reader of the evidence. In one, data from a test used to diagnose brain damage were given to a group of clinical psychologists and their secretaries. The psychologists’ diagnoses were no better than the secretaries’.

The experts’ trouble in Tetlock’s study is exactly the trouble that all human beings have: we fall in love with our hunches, and we really, really hate to be wrong. Tetlock describes an experiment that he witnessed thirty years ago in a Yale classroom. A rat was put in a T-shaped maze. Food was placed in either the right or the left transept of the T in a random sequence such that, over the long run, the food was on the left sixty per cent of the time and on the right forty per cent. Neither the students nor (needless to say) the rat was told these frequencies. The students were asked to predict on which side of the T the food would appear each time. The rat eventually figured out that the food was on the left side more often than the right, and it therefore nearly always went to the left, scoring roughly sixty per cent — D, but a passing grade. The students looked for patterns of left-right placement, and ended up scoring only fifty-two per cent, an F. The rat, having no reputation to begin with, was not embarrassed about being wrong two out of every five tries. But Yale students, who do have reputations, searched for a hidden order in the sequence. They couldn’t deal with forty-per-cent error, so they ended up with almost fifty-per-cent error.

The expert-prediction game is not much different. When television pundits make predictions, the more ingenious their forecasts the greater their cachet. An arresting new prediction means that the expert has discovered a set of interlocking causes that no one else has spotted, and that could lead to an outcome that the conventional wisdom is ignoring. On shows like “The McLaughlin Group,” these experts never lose their reputations, or their jobs, because long shots are their business. More serious commentators differ from the pundits only in the degree of showmanship. These serious experts — the think tankers and area-studies professors — are not entirely out to entertain, but they are a little out to entertain, and both their status as experts and their appeal as performers require them to predict futures that are not obvious to the viewer. The producer of the show does not want you and me to sit there listening to an expert and thinking, I could have said that. The expert also suffers from knowing too much: the more facts an expert has, the more information is available to be enlisted in support of his or her [their] pet theories, and the more chains of causation he or she [they] can find beguiling. This helps explain why specialists fail to outguess non-specialists. The odds tend to be with the obvious.

Tetlock’s experts were also no different from the rest of us when it came to learning from their mistakes. Most people tend to dismiss new information that doesn’t fit with what they already believe. Tetlock found that his experts used a double standard: they were much tougher in assessing the validity of information that undercut their theory than they were in crediting information that supported it. The same deficiency leads liberals to read only The Nation and conservatives to read only National Review. We are not natural falsificationists: we would rather find more reasons for believing what we already believe than look for reasons that we might be wrong. In the terms of Karl Popper’s famous example, to verify our intuition that all swans are white we look for lots more white swans, when what we should really be looking for is one black swan.

Also, people tend to see the future as indeterminate and the past as inevitable. If you look backward, the dots that lead up to Hitler or the fall of the Soviet Union or the attacks on September 11th all connect. If you look forward, it’s just a random scatter of dots, many potential chains of causation leading to many possible outcomes. We have no idea today how tomorrow’s invasion of a foreign land is going to go; after the invasion, we can actually persuade ourselves that we knew all along. The result seems inevitable, and therefore predictable. Tetlock found that, consistent with this asymmetry, experts routinely misremembered the degree of probability they had assigned to an event after it came to pass. They claimed to have predicted what happened with a higher degree of certainty than, according to the record, they really did. When this was pointed out to them, by Tetlock’s researchers, they sometimes became defensive.

And, like most of us, experts violate a fundamental rule of probabilities by tending to find scenarios with more variables more likely. If a prediction needs two independent things to happen in order for it to be true, its probability is the product of the probability of each of the things it depends on. If there is a one-in-three chance of x and a one-in-four chance of y, the probability of both x and y occurring is one in twelve. But we often feel instinctively that if the two events “fit together” in some scenario the chance of both is greater, not less. The classic “Linda problem” is an analogous case. In this experiment, subjects are told, “Linda is thirty-one years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice and also participated in antinuclear demonstrations.” They are then asked to rank the probability of several possible descriptions of Linda today. Two of them are “bank teller” and “bank teller and active in the feminist movement.” People rank the second description higher than the first, even though, logically, its likelihood is smaller, because it requires two things to be true — that Linda is a bank teller and that Linda is an active feminist — rather than one.

Plausible detail makes us believers. When subjects were given a choice between an insurance policy that covered hospitalization for any reason and a policy that covered hospitalization for all accidents and diseases, they were willing to pay a higher premium for the second policy, because the added detail gave them a more vivid picture of the circumstances in which it might be needed. In 1982, an experiment was done with professional forecasters and planners. One group was asked to assess the probability of “a complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983,” and another group was asked to assess the probability of “a Russian invasion of Poland, and a complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983.” The experts judged the second scenario more likely than the first, even though it required two separate events to occur. They were seduced by the detail.

#### IR studies is intrinsically tied to hegemonic institutions, dictating the roles of war and security despite its lack of explanatory power — the denial of imperialism, climate change, racism, gendered violence, and nuclear war is only made possible through corrosive nihilism that engineers new terrains to make US imperialism more insidious and lethal.

\*\*\* CONTENT WARNING: Mention of rape.

Grove 19 [Jairus Victor Grove is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Hawai'i Research Center for Future Studies at the University of Hawai'i at Mānoa; “Savage Ecology: war and geopolitics at the end of the world”; August 16, 2019]//eleanor

Because I wanted this book to inspire curiosity beyond the boundaries of international relations (ir), I considered ignoring the field altogether, removing all mentions of ir or ir theory. However, upon closer reflection, I have decided to keep these references as I think they are relevant for those outside the discipline and for those who, like myself, often feel alienated within its disciplinary boundaries. In the former case, it is important to know that, unlike some more humble fields, ir has always held itself to be a kind of royal science. Scholarship in ir, particularly in the United States, is half research, and half biding time until you have the prince’s ear. The hallowed names in the mainstream of the field are still known because they somehow changed the behavior of their intended clients—those being states, militaries, and international organizations. Therefore, some attention to ir is necessary because it has an all-too-casual relationship with institutional power that directly impacts the lives of real people, and ir is all too often lethal theory.39 As an American discipline, the political economy of the field is impossible without Department of Defense money, and its semiotic economy would be equally dwarfed without contributory figures like Woodrow Wilson, Henry Kissinger, and Samuel Huntington. The ubiquity of Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis and Kissinger’s particular brand of realpolitik are undeniable throughout the field, as well as the world.40 Each, in their own way, has saturated the watchwords and nomenclature of geopolitics from an American perspective so thoroughly that both political parties in the United States fight over who gets to claim the heritage of each. Although many other fields such as anthropology and even comparative literature have found themselves in the gravitational pull of geopolitics, international relations is meant to be scholarship as statecraft by other means.41 That is, ir was meant to improve the global order and ensure the place of its guarantor, the United States of America.42 Having spent the better part of a decade listening to national security analysts and diplomats from the United States, South Korea, Japan, Europe, China, Brazil, and Russia, as well as military strategists around the planet, I found their vocabulary and worldview strikingly homogeneous. If this seems too general a claim, one should take a peek at John Mearsheimer’s essay “Benign Hegemony,” which defends the Americanness of the ir field.43 What is most telling in this essay is not a defense of the U.S. as a benign hegemonic power, which Mearsheimer has done at length elsewhere. Rather, it is his vigorous defense that as a field, ir theory has done well by the world in setting the intellectual agenda for global challenges, and for creating useful theoretical approaches to addressing those problems. For Mearsheimer, the proof that American scholarly hegemony has been benign is that there is nothing important that has been left out. A quick scan of the last ten or twenty International Studies Association conferences would suggest otherwise. That issues like rape as a weapon of war, postcolonial violence, global racism, and climate change are not squarely in the main of ir demonstrates just how benign American scholarly hegemony is not. As one prominent anthropologist said to me at dinner after touring the isa conference in 2014, “it was surreal, like a tour through the Cold War. People were giving papers and arguing as if nothing had ever changed.” These same provincial scholars aspire and succeed at filling the advisory roles of each successive American presidency. One cannot help but see a connection between the history of the ir field, and the catastrophes of U.S. foreign policy during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. One could repeat the words of the anthropologist I mentioned to describe the 2016 presidential campaign debates over the future of U.S. foreign policy: it is as if “nothing had ever changed.” And yet these old white men still strut around the halls of America’s “best” institutions as if they saved us from the Cold War, even as the planet crumbles under the weight of their failed imperial dreams. If international relations was meant to be the science of making the world something other than what it would be if we were all left to our own worst devices, then it has failed monumentally. The United States is once again in fierce nuclear competition with Russia. We are no closer to any significant action on climate change. We have not met any of the Millennium Development Goals determined by the United Nations on eradicating poverty. War and security are the most significant financial, creative, social, cultural, technological, and political investments of almost every nation-state on Earth. The general intellect is a martial intellect. Despite all this failure, pessimism does not exist in international relations, at least not on paper. The seething doom of our current predicament thrives at the conference bar and in hushed office conversations but not in our research. In public, the darkness disavowed possesses and inflames the petty cynicisms and hatreds that are often turned outward at tired and predictable scapegoats. After the fury of three decades of critique, most ir scholars still camp out either on the hill of liberal internationalism or in the dark woods of political realism. Neither offers much that is new by way of answers or even explanations, and each dominant school has failed to account for our current apocalyptic condition. One is left wondering what it is exactly that they think they do. Despite the seeming opposition between the two, one idealistic about the future of international order (liberals) and the other self-satisfied with the tragedy of cycles of war and dominance (realists), both positions are optimists of the positivist variety. For both warring parties, ir optimism is expressed through a romantic empiricism. For all those who toil away looking for the next theory of international politics, order is out there somewhere, and dutifully recording reality will find it—or at least bring us closer to its discovery. For liberal internationalism, this will bring the long-heralded maturity of Immanuel Kant’s perpetual peace. For second-order sociopaths known as offensive realists, crumbs of “useful strategic insight” and the endless details that amplify their epistemophilia for force projection and violence capability represent a potential “advantage,” that is, the possibility to move one step forward on the global political board game of snakes and ladders. Still, the cynicism of ir always creeps back in because the world never quite lives up to the empirical findings it is commanded to obey. Disappointment here is not without reason, but we cynically continue to make the same policy recommendations, catastrophe after catastrophe. I have an idea about where ir’s recent malaise comes from. I think it is a moment, just before the awareness of the Anthropocene, after the Cold War and before September 11, when the end of everything was only a hypothetical problem for those of a certain coddled and privileged modern form of life. The catastrophe of the human predicament was that there was no catastrophe, no reason, no generation-defining challenge or war. Now the fate of this form of life is actually imperiled, and it is too much to bear. The weird denial of sexism, racism, climate change, the sixth extinction, and loose nukes, all by a field of scholars tasked with studying geopolitics, is more than irrationalism or ignorance.44 This animosity toward reality is a deep and corrosive nihilism, a denial of the world. Thus ir as a strategic field is demonstrative of a civilization with nothing left to do, nothing left to destroy. All that is left is to make meaning out of being incapable of undoing the world that EuroAmerican geopolitics created. Emo geopolitics is not pretty, but it is real. The letdown, the failure, the apocalypse-that-was-not finally arrived, and we are too late. Still, the United States of America continues to follow the advice of “the best and the brightest,” testing the imperial waters, not quite ready to commit out loud to empire but completely unwilling to abandon it. Stuck in between, contemporary geopolitics—as curated by the United States—is in a permanent beta phase. Neuro-torture, algorithmic warfare, drone strikes, and cybernetic nation-building are not means or ends but rather are tests. Can a polis be engineered? Can the human operating system be reformatted? Can violence be modulated until legally invisible while all the more lethal? Each incursion, each new actor or actant, and new terrains from brains to transatlantic cables—all find themselves part of a grand experiment to see if a benign or at least sustainable empire is possible. There is no seeming regard for the fact that each experiment directly competes with Thomas Jefferson’s democratic experiment. One wonders if freedom can even exist anywhere other than temporarily on the fringe of some neglected order. Is this some metaphysical condition of freedom, or is the world so supersaturated with martial orders that the ragged edges between imperial orders are all that we have left? It feels like freedom’s remains persist only in the ruins of everything else. No space is left that can be truly indifferent to the law, security, or economy. Such is the new life of a human in debt. The social contract has been refinanced as what is owed and nothing more: politics without equity. Inequity without equality. What about the impending collapse of the post–World War II order, the self-destruction of the United States, the rise of China and a new world order? If humanity lasts long enough for China to put its stamp on the human apocalypse, I will write a new introduction. Until then, we live in the death rattle of Pax Americana. While I think the totality of this claim is true, I do not want to rule out that many of us throughout the world still make lives otherwise. Many of us even thrive in spite of it all. And yet, no form of life can be made that escapes the fact that everything can come to a sudden and arbitrary end thanks to the whim of an American drone operator, nuclear catastrophe, or macroeconomic manipulation like sanctions. There are other ways to die and other organized forms of killing outside the control of the United States; however, no other single apparatus can make everyone or anyone die irrespective of citizenship or geographic location. For me, this is the most inescapable philosophical provocation of our moment in time. The haphazard and seemingly limitless nature of U.S. violence means that even the core principles of the great political realist concepts like order and national interest are being displaced by subterranean violence entrepreneurs that populate transversal battlefields, security corridors, and border zones.45 Mercenaries, drug lords, chief executive officers, presidents, and sports commissioners are more alike than ever.46 Doomsayers like Paul Virilio, Lewis Mumford, and Martin Heidegger foretold a kind of terminal and selfannihilating velocity for geopolitics’ technological saturation, but even their lack of imagination appears optimistic. American geopolitics does not know totality or finality; it bleeds, mutates, and reforms. Furthermore, the peril of biopolitics seems now almost romantic. To make life live? Perchance to dream. The care and concern for life’s productivity is increasingly subsumed by plasticity—forming and reforming without regard to the telos of productivity, division, or normative order. There are, of course, still orders in our geoplastic age, but they are almost unrecognizable as such. When so many citizens and states are directly invested in sabotaging publicly stated strategic ends, then concepts like national interest seem equally quaint. We are witnessing creative and horrifying experiments in the affirmative production of dying, which also deprive those targeted and in some cases whole populations from the relief of death. To follow Rucker, I want to try to see the world for what it is. We can only say that tragedy is no longer a genre of geopolitics. Tragedy redeems. The occluded character of contemporary geopolitics shoehorned into experience produces the feeling that there is no relief, no reason, no victory, no defeats, and no exit within the confines of national security’s constricted world. This is not tragedy: it is horror. We live in an age of horror that, like the victims of gore movies who never quite die so that they can be tortured more, furthers our practice of collective violence and goes on for decades as a kind of sustainable warfare.

#### IR theory is a colonialist epistemic approach masked under the “objectivity” of science and “universality” of truth, created only to support the global Western empire.

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Global coloniality privileges a Euro-North American-centric form of humanity, at the expense of diminishing, dismissing and obliterating anything else other than the Euro-North American-centric civilisation, in the process making Euro-North American-centric modernity a global empire. The politics of empire are problematic because they set precedence and justify and perpetuate global coloniality. This is the conundrum that confronted and enveloped Libya in 2011 with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)-led invasion and which continues to entangle and disenfranchise the Libyan polity today (2019), hence the need for a decolonial epistemic approach that seeks to re-humanise and affirm all forms of humanity. This chapter seeks to disentangle and strips bare the asymmetrical global power structural configurations that the current world order rests upon and which are camouflaged in the so-called objectivity of science and the skewed universality of knowledge. The current socio-economic-politico world order is a creation and direct result of modern European thought and civilisation (modernity). It was scattered across the world through the violence of colonialism. In turn, colonialism produced global coloniality. The turning point is that global coloniality entraps humanity to a predetermined reality modelled on Euro-North American-centric modernity. Thus, coloniality is limiting to and eliminates ‘other’ epistemological creativities; it hinders ‘other’ ontological expressions of what humanity is and could be ‘other’ than the predetermined Euro-North American-centric form of being and knowledge. This logic results in the social, political, economic and epistemic creation and definition of the human and the non-human by ‘other’ human beings. Modernity negates, forcibly condemns forms of humanity found in the peripheries of EuroNorth American civilisation, to non-humanity. Non-human beings are considered beings of a lesser ontological value than humans of Euro-North American ancestry. Because there is no humanity in the peripheries of the Euro-North American-centric world, any enterprise or innovation from the zone of non-being cannot be good enough (Fanon). Libya could have not been successful, it could not have been an example of a decolonial state, hence it had to fail because it threatened the established Eurocentric world order.

Coloniality of Power and the Global Power Structural Configuration: Unmasking the Politics and Philosophy of Empire

Epistemologically, this chapter seeks to unmask the fault lines of the philosophy of the European-centric empire as implicated in the generation of problems epitomised by the invasion of Libya in 2011 by NATO forces. It seeks to do so, by exposing some myths that informed, fueled and continue to precipitate global coloniality in the absence of physical colonialism. Current international relations (IR) theories have proven to be limited and unable to solve and eradicate this epistemic challenge, partly because dominant and traditional IR theories are located in the very European modernity that they disguise and camouflage in the purported objectivity of science. The philosophy of the Eurocentric empire universalised these particular theories of IR by force (violence of colonialism) as they are part of the modernity project of colonisation (Howe 1990: 677). The chapter further aims to demonstrate the deficiency and bankruptcy that foregrounds traditional IR theories’ assumptions, assertions and proclamations particularly that Western-centric IR theories are scientific, objective and universally applicable or replicable. Such proclamations overlook the fact that these IR theories are located in particular ecologies of Europe and therefore, are subjective. All knowledge is particular and subjective to its ecology or locality. Since 1919, the official initial academic inquiry of IR as a discipline, IR theories have not adequately addressed what the discipline initially set out to do—to curb and liquidate international conflict. This suggests that the epistemologies (particular epistemic ecologies and localities) that have informed IR theories to date are inadequate and have reached some sort of cul-de-sac, or a dead-end. These epistemologies beg the question and engage in circular reasoning. This necessitates an alternative frame of reference. Contingent upon Albert Einstein’s idea that insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result each time, this chapter opts to engage a non-conventional theory in the discipline of IR. As such, this work advances the decolonial perspective as a possible solution to problems caused by epistemologies located in the ecologies and localities of Western, Euro-North American-centric modernity that purport themselves as objective, scientific and universal. The chapter will unmask the inadequacies of Euro-North American-centric modernity in the face of mounting and current global problems, particularly those played out in the field of international relations. IR as an academic discipline started in 1919 at Aberystwyth, University of Wales (now Aberystwyth University), a year after the end of World War I (Ziegler 1987). This, however, as Nyere (2014: 18) argues, “does not mean that intellectual origins of political realism and liberalism only started in 1919”. The main objective and aim of IR theorising was solely to find peaceful solutions to international disputes and therefore avert a similar conflict to World War I. IR failed in that regard because just barely after a decade, World War II started. Like the predecessor of the United Nations, the League of Nations, IR as an academic discipline has failed in achieving what it set out to do in the first place. Since 1945, the end of World War II and the signing of the United Nations Charter in San Francisco, USA, there has not been a single decade that the world has not witnessed an international conflict or war (Bennet 1998: 7). Rational theories in the discipline of IR, such as realism, liberalism, feminism, Marxism and constructivism, are expressive of ideas, concepts and views located in modernity. The ideas expressed in IR rational theories are embodied by scholars that are mainly located in modernity, particularly from the Global North and reflect the rationale of European modernity. The major problem of modernity is the inexplicable discrepancy and inconsistency between its rhetoric and its lived reality, its illusion vis-à-vis its essence, particularly from the experience of people of the Global South in general, but by Africans in particular. As such, this chapter intends to unmask the inadequacy of mainstream theories and lenses in explaining the ghosts and blindspots of empire because these ghosts and blind-spots are born within the empire. The European-centric empire is not sufficiently able to be reflexive on its theories and to see beyond its assumptions and assertions. As such, this chapter suggests the need to explore outside the lenses of established theory.

#### IR and international institutions are the onset of colonialism meant to circumscribe the Eurocentric world order.

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The very idea of theory is Eurocentric and compels some attention. Theorising and epistemic enterprises that emanated from the European civilisation regarded themselves as the standard and measure with which every other theorising or epistemic enterprising ought to refer to. This further entrenched Eurocentrism. Consequently, Eurocentrism justified and gave rise to European colonisation. If Europe was the standard with which all being and knowledge was to be modelled on, this then justified, and suggested to Europeans, that they ought to control and order the whole world. This was the onset of colonialism. Kissinger notes that the contemporary world order, which is Eurocentric and a creation of modernity, has attempted to circumscribe the anarchical structure in which international relations are conducted. It does so through international relations theories and international legal networks (international law), international organisational structures (chief among them is the United Nations), international financial systems such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank Group (WBG), these two endorse and sustain capitalism, and through establishing conflict/dispute-resolution mechanisms as well as codifying the conduct in war of warring parties, should war occur (Kissinger 2014: 7). In other words, there is an acceptance of the status quo in relation to the current world order, such that it is codified, legislated and institutionalised. But, why not abolish wars in the first place or stop the domination of one civilisation by another civilisation? The paradigm that presents war as an acceptable means of dispute-resolution is problematic because the solution to this paradigm is violence. One wonders therefore that, is the UN perpetuating coloniality of power in itself, or is the UN used as an instrument to perpetuate coloniality of power by the Euro-North American-centric modernity that has captured this institution for its own agenda of domination? Worse still, was there ever a time when the UN was not captured by the Euro-North American-centric modernity?

#### International relations erases the history of violence and exploitation which informed the making for the global order.

Sen 22 [Somdeep Sen is Associate Professor in International Development Studies at Roskilde University, Denmark, 1-28-2022, Race, Racism, and the Teaching of International Relations, https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666] Eric

International relations tends to valorize and fetishize abstraction—in terms of both research and teaching. As the disciplinary discourse goes, international relations prioritizes “theory-building” over “descriptive or historical analysis” (Krishna, [2001](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0058), p. 401). As noted previously, this manner of abstract theorization erases the history of violence and exploitation that has informed the makings of the global order. It also creates a hierarchy among the various methodological and theoretical approaches within international relations. Herein, those that propose “easily quantifiable” and generalizable frames of understanding the world are considered to be more scientific (Sen, [2021](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0073)). In comparison, approaches that refrain from notions of grand truths and instead point to the multiplicity of lived experiences of politics and society are seen as less capable of replicating the theoretical and methodological veracity of the natural sciences (Jackson, [2011](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0055), pp. 2–3; see also Flyvbjerg, [2001](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0040); Steinmetz, [2005](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0079)). This disciplinary hierarchy then explains why realism and liberalism—approaches considered best suited to formulate grand theory—live upstairs in Agathangelou and Ling’s ([2004](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0013)) “House of IR [international relations]” or occupy prime real estate in Weber’s ([2015](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0092)) visualization of a gentrified discipline. It also explains why discussions of race, gender, sexuality, and class are compelled to live outside the house or relegated to poorer neighborhoods in a gentrified international relations. This is not to say that those outside the house or in poor neighborhoods do not aspire to “theorize grandly about the world.” On the contrary—and much like Weber’s claim with regard to queer international relations—they too are concerned with “classic IR themes such as war, security, sovereignty, intervention, hegemony, nationalism, empire, colonialism, and the general practice of foreign policy” (Weber, [2015](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0092), p. 28). Yet, their intellectual “starting point” is the particular positioned histories and experiences of international politics.

However, this disciplinary antagonism toward “the issue of positionality” does not mean we can simply ignore its role in international relations. Anthropologists have long argued that a discussion on positionality is integral to any critical scholarly engagement with the process of knowledge production. In fact, they would question the very possibility of achieving (natural) scientific objectivity in the social sciences (Abu-Lughod, [1991](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0009); Geertz, [1959](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0041); Gupta & Ferguson, [1997](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0045); Hage, [2009](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0046); Powdermaker, [1966](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0065)). Within international relations, feminist scholars have been at the forefront of discussions on positionality. This concern with the positioned and gendered nature of knowledge production in international relations is evident, for instance, in the claim by Christine Sylvester ([1994](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0080)) that “the trouble with IR” is that even though the discipline claims to be “gender blind” and “a realm of objective human knowledge,” it is largely a subjective retelling of men’s perspectives on politics. This is not to say women are absent. They appear as “visitors” of the discipline and as companions of men. However, men have a secure home in the discipline, whereas women are viewed as “suited for other places” (Sylvester, [1994](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0080), p. 4). V. Spike Peterson ([2004](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0064)) argues that the discipline has an overwhelming focus on “masculinist constructs such as sovereignty, national security, and military strength.” Although “the main story” is often concerned with “what men do,” she proposes a shift in the disciplinary focus toward the positioned histories and lived experiences of women as a way of broadening the (overly masculine) conception of the global order (Peterson, [2004](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0064), p. 37). It is then in this sense that, in their introduction to Feminist Methodologies of International Relations, Ackerly et al. ([2010](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0012)) underline that “feminist ontologies” lead to a much self-reflective approach to the discipline. They make us rethink our theoretical and methodological assumptions and include “personal and previously invisible spheres” as locations rife with knowledge on international relations (Ackerly et al., [2010](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0012), p. 7).

Evidently, an effort to formulate a feminist retelling of the main story motivated Carol Cohn ([2006](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0030)) as she explored the deeply gendered U.S. national security discourses with regard to “nuclear weaponry and strategy.” And, while describing the encounter between her particular positioned perspective as a feminist international relations scholar and these discourses, she wrote,

The manufacture and stockpiling of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, the quest for more “useable nukes” and more “survivable” weapons delivery systems—all of it seemed so wildly irrational to me that I was consumed by the questions: “How can they do this? How can they even think this way?” Initially, those questions were more expressions of moral anguish and political despair than anything I might have ever thought of as “a good research question.” However, the intensity of my concern led me to take an opportunity to learn about nuclear weapons from some of the men who make their living thinking about nuclear weaponry and strategy. (p. 91)

The urge to broaden the conception of the global order through the positioned realities of women was equally visible in Cynthia Enloe’s ([1989](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0036)) iconic Bananas, Beaches and Bases as the very purpose of the text—that is, to articulate a feminist view of international relations. Here, Enloe reveals the varied positioned presence/absence of women as she deliberates the implications of a European woman holidaying in Jamaica, the reality that “governments look like men’s clubs,” and the absence of women in the congressional hearings on the Iran-Contra Affair (p. 8).

The introduction of race in the teaching of international relations is also elaborative of the positioned nature of knowledge production in the discipline. Undoubtedly, the writings of the (White) founding members were rooted in the perspectives of the White nations and were explicit in their support for (White) imperial domination in international relations. It was then as a critique of this positioned (i.e., White) character of the discipline’s intellectual foundations that the revisionist founders of international relations sought to reconsider the rationale of imperial domination and reveal the impact of imperially formed racialized hierarchies on the lives of the darker races. In this sense, they sought to elucidate the darker races’ experiences of and perspectives on a hierarchical international relations—perspectives that are otherwise missing in the discipline’s conception of the world. The color line plays an equally pertinent role in the present-day workings of international relations, determining the (racialized) positionality of knowledge production. Siba N. Grovogui ([2001](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0044)) argues this is most visible in the discipline’s internalization of certain discourses regarding the hierarchies that exist among “civilizations, cultures and races.” While elaborating this existing hierarchy, in view of the West’s relation with Africa, he then asks, How did the “‘West’ become ‘white’” and, with it, a personification of “cultural adaptability, political competency, and ethical versatility”? Similarly, how did “‘Africa’ become ‘black’ and the symbol of international dysfunction”? As an answer, Grovogui elaborates that this distinction functions as a means to position African as a “counterpoint to the European trajectory” and, in doing so, justify Western authority in determining the rules and norms of international politics (p. 427). Meera Sabaratnam ([2020](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0070)) was thus right to argue that the positionality of international relations was that of a White discipline, premised on a “set of epistemological tropes, locations, assumptions, and commitments that naturalise racialised accounts” of the global order (p. 3).

Of course, in any discussion of racialized positionalities in international relations, it seems instinctive to treat disciplinary Whiteness as an outgrowth of individual identities and a reflection of an author’s “skin colour, conscious intentions or places of origin.” But although the individual is not irrelevant in this discussion, the concern here is rather the way in which the individual is embedded in the racialized “hierarchies of the human” and embodies an intellectual “‘standpoint’ rooted in structural power” (Sabaratnam, [2020](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0070), p. 3). David Lake ([2016](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0059)) further elaborates this correlation between the hierarchies of humans and one’s racialized intellectual standpoint in view his own positionality—namely as a White man, implicated in the development of a White discipline. He argues that all theories are based on an implicit expectation “about how the universe, social life, or politics ‘works’” (p. 1113). As Lake then goes on to explain, this intuitive understanding of the world is based on lived experiences. But because the overwhelming majority of the international relations scholars are White men, the discipline’s mainstream includes theoretical approaches that primarily encapsulate the White, male lived experience (pp. 1113–1114). Of course, in effect, this also excludes approaches that illuminate the non-White lived experience of the ways in which race and racism continue to order the discipline and global politics. Bringing this discussion to the classroom then, Vitalis ([2015](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0090)) proposes that this White, male-ness of the discipline’s core has become codified as international relations’ “origin story,” which is then passed on to (White) graduate students as they are socialized into the discipline through the various “rituals of PhD programs.” Afterwards, as “freshly minted PhDs and new assistant professors,” they are keen on remaining within the bounds of the discipline’s mainstream. So, they too pass on the same “story”—along with a White, male intuitive understanding of how the world works—to “generations of undergraduates who will become public intellectuals, politicians, and policymakers” (p. 6).

With such a display of disciplinary Whiteness in view—rooted not least in a particular understanding of hierarchies of human—it is not surprising that, for example, the Howard School is missing in international relations’ origin story. It is for the same reasons that international relations has entirely ignored Native American perspectives on politics and Indigenous communities’ critique of settler colonial conceptions of democracy, sovereignty, “rule of law,” and “American exceptionalism” (Ferguson, [2016](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0039), p. 1029); or that even when discussions of race and racism were momentarily revived in international relations in the 1970s, they appeared in the works of African American and Afro-Caribbean scholars rather those of their White counterparts (Vitalis, [2015](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0090), p. 13). Who we are, and how we are positioned in racialized hierarchies that order global politics and society, evidently positions that nature of the knowledge that we produce. And, for the teaching of the field, this discussion of positionality reveals that the foundational scholarly norms and assumptions in international relations are hardly a given; they are deeply contested (Isaac, [2016](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0054), pp. 943-948).

#### Realism, constructivism etc all are extremely racist and built on an imperialist history – this card is HEAT

Hobson 22 [Professor Hobson gained his PhD from the LSE (1991), joined the Department in 2004 as Reader and became Professor of Politics and International Relations in 2005. Previously he taught at La Trobe University, Melbourne (1991–97) and the University of Sydney (1997–2004). The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article, 02-16-2022, Unmasking the racism of orthodox international relations/international political economy theory, SAGE Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/09670106211061084] Eric

The giveaway concerning the racist foundations of modern international relations theory lies not simply in what it does say but as much in what it does not. Thus, to postcolonialism’s rhetorical question as to whether racism has played an important role in structuring world politics past and present, the orthodox reply is simply ‘nothing to see here’. This first racist move, which evacuates and whitewashes the presence of racism in world politics past and present, is complemented by the second, in which international relations theory advances a racist analysis of world politics/global political economy but in subliminal cultural language that appears as value-free and ‘racially neutral’. To illustrate this double move, I shall draw on examples from my current research ([Hobson and Odijie, forthcoming](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211061084)) and from elsewhere.

The neorealist vision of the Cold War comprises a Western zone of relative peace and stability that ensues from bipolarity or US hegemony or the logic of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). But such ‘peace and stability’ was only rendered possible because of the racist decision by the superpowers to outsource war to the ‘inferior’ and expendable ‘wastelands’ of the Global South, which constituted a safety valve that could prevent direct nuclear conflict from erupting between the USA and the USSR. Thus, ‘it appears that cold war history has a concentric conceptual organization, consisting of a “formal” history of relative peace in the center and “informal” violence in the periphery’ ([Kwon, 2010](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211061084): 155; see also [Persaud, 2016](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211061084)). Moreover, ‘in a historical sense – and especially when seen from the South – the Cold War was a continuation of colonialism through slightly different means. . . For the Third World, the continuum of which the Cold War forms a part did not start in 1945, or even 1917, but in 1878 – with the [Congress] of Berlin that divided Africa between European imperialist powers’ ([Westad, 2007](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211061084): 396). This Western neo-imperialism also takes us back to the future of America’s racist-colonial drive in the 19th and early 20th centuries (see [Go, 2011](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211061084); [Hunt, 1987](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211061084)). But all of this necessarily flies under neorealism’s ontological radar scanner given its evacuation of social process through its reification of the structural logic of anarchy that is coupled with the deployment of the Eurocentric/racist method of ‘analytical bifurcation’, wherein racist-imperial processes are bracketed out and silenced in favour of focusing solely on intra-Western white activities ([Go, 2016](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211061084): 89–92, 104–110).

This first move is complemented by neorealism’s second, wherein a subliminal cultural-racist theory is applied to analysing world politics. Notable here is that European empires constituted subsystems hierarchies in which the dominant hyper-sovereign colonial power stood atop of the colonies that were denied sovereignty. But Waltz’s reification of international anarchy is triply problematic, first because this conception replicates the old scientific-racist conception of ‘tropical anarchy’ ([Henderson, 2013](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211061084); [Sampson, 2002](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211061084); compare [Lynch, 2019](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211061084): 277); second, because Waltz sanitizes or evacuates hierarchy from world politics, thereby conjuring Western colonialism and its practices of genocide, the Atlantic slave trade, land appropriation and labour exploitation together with its neo-imperialist successor into thin air ([Hobson, 2012](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211061084): 203–208; [Sabaratnam, 2020](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211061084)); and, third, Waltz’s claim that sovereign states are the dominant form of polity under modern anarchy is undermined by the presence of colonial hierarchy before the very recent era of decolonization wherein the only sovereign states that existed were Western. Accordingly, Waltz’s move serves to let Western imperialism off the moral hook, thereby reflecting an ‘epistemology of ignorance’ ([Sabaratnam, 2020](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211061084): 20–21; see also [Mills, 2007](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211061084)). Interestingly, we find an evacuation and naturalization of Western empire in the classical realist work of Hans Morgenthau ([Hobson, 2012](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211061084): 188–190; [Salter, 2002](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211061084): 117) and other realists, which leads Nicolas [Guilhot (2014)](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211061084) to talk of ‘imperial realism’.

By contrast, Robert Gilpin’s neorealist hegemonic stability theory embraces a normative (direct) imperialism that is dressed up in terms that dare not speak its name ([Hobson, 2012](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211061084): 193–203). [Gilpin (1987)](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211061084) differentiates hegemons from empires, where the latter exploit non-Western states while the former help them through the hegemon’s self-sacrificial provision of global public goods. But the paternalist sign of US hierarchical hegemony is that it supposedly uplifts states around the world, with East Asian states singled out as the most egregious and ungrateful free riders that benefit most from hegemonic largesse. Thus, what Gilpin misses is that the conception of uplift reconvenes Britain’s paternalist-imperial civilizing mission of the 19th century, though this elision is inevitable given that he re-visions the British Empire as a benign liberal hegemon. Significantly, Niall [Ferguson (2004)](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211061084) effectively reconvenes Gilpin’s argument, though he talks explicitly about the benign liberal imperialism of Britain and America. Moreover, this benign conception that reflects an epistemology of ignorance effectively boils off the coercive side of empire in the subliminal cultural-racist distillation process, thereby providing an apologia for Anglo-Saxon imperialism.

Similar cultural racist logics play out in liberalism (see [Hobson, 2012](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211061084): 216–222, 285–310). While the normative (direct) imperialist posture that is found in John [Rawls’s (1999)](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211061084) The Law of Peoples is a very obvious example ([Hobson, 2012](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211061084): 292–295), nevertheless the hard test-case here is that of neoliberal institutionalism. The received wisdom is that neoliberal institutionalism presents a genuinely ‘universal’ picture or flattened ontology of all states learning to cooperate in order to enhance their gains. But it turns out that, in After Hegemony, [Keohane (1984)](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211061084) confines this process to Western states (as did Norman Angell before him). Moreover, absent here is a historical-sociological analysis that would reveal the hierarchical-imperial contexts that have driven both Western unity ([Sabaratnam, 2020](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211061084): 25) and the global process by which unequal gains accrue to the West at the expense of the non-West. Paradoxically, constructivists critique neoliberal institutionalism for its rational actor model by asserting that interests are not a priori but are formed through socialization. However, a close reading of Keohane’s book reveals that it is Western norms and identity that socialize Western states into cooperating ([Keohane, 1984](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211061084): 5–7, 43, 182). Accordingly, Keohane not only looks specifically at Western states as the successful actors, but argues that they take specifically Western cultural values such as democracy and liberal capitalism to the table before they enter iterated prisoner’s dilemma games ([Keohane, 1984](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211061084): 182).

One of several (direct) neo-imperialist cues in Keohane’s work emerges from his approval of US hegemonic intervention and intervention by international financial institutions in the Global South as a means of extending complex interdependence across the world. But here the international financial institutions act as paternalist neo-imperial vehicles for the cultural conversion of non-Western states along Western neoliberal capitalist lines via the imposition of neoliberal conditionality and structural adjustment programmes. Moreover, the notorious resentment that these programmes have invoked in many non-Western states, all of which disappears in Keohane’s analysis, takes us back to the future of the ‘unequal treaties’ that emerged under Britain’s informal imperialism in the 19th century, much as the paternalist role of the international financial institutions finds its historical parallel with the League of Nations Mandate System ([Anghie, 2005](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211061084): 245–272). And, finally, Keohane’s approval of Anglo-Saxon hegemony in the 19th and 20th centuries returns us to the problems that I discussed above vis-a-vis hegemonic stability theory (see also [Sabaratnam, 2020](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211061084): 18–19).

A notable example of an indirect imperialist approach is found in the neoliberal theory of globalization, which rehabilitates the classical liberalism of Adam Smith and his aversion to empire (e.g. [Friedman, 2000](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211061084)). But there are three subliminal neo-imperialist cues here, the first comprising [Friedman’s (2000](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211061084): 101–111) argument that non-Western states have no choice but to ‘don the golden straitjacket’, which requires them to adopt Western neoliberal-capitalist architectures. Having to become Western means that the theory smuggles informal imperialism in through the backdoor of its Western universalism. Second, by subscribing to the ontological proposition that ‘the world is flat’ ([Friedman, 2007](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211061084)), the neoliberal theory of globalization conjures Western imperial/neo-imperial hierarchy and racial capitalism into thin air, thereby naturalizing rather than problematizing these phenomena via the epistemology of white ignorance. And, third, because Friedman focuses on rational individuals whose interests are a priori and whose social identity is irrelevant to individual behaviour, racism and racialized capitalism are whitewashed from the global economy.

Surely constructivism fares much better given its ability to highlight international racial norms? Not only has much of it ignored racism in world politics but the few constructivists who have considered it argue that racism was left behind in world politics after 1945 ([Finnemore, 2003](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211061084); [Klotz, 1995](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211061084)), much as imperialism was supposedly outlawed by the UN in 1960. This whitewashing of racism and imperialism from modern world politics not only reflects the illusion that subliminal cultural racism projects but is also a vital move because it allows liberal constructivists to portray Western humanitarian interventionism and liberal peacebuilding/state-building as a non-racist/non-imperial project that saves oppressed non-Western peoples. It is here that we encounter a subliminal cultural-racist paternalism that presents the West as the white saviour of the inferior non-Western societies – thereby rehabilitating the 19th-century conception of the white man’s burden and the civilizing mission – and where the West is (re)presented as the altruistic paternalist father of the non-West ([Hobson, 2012](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211061084): 302–305). Moreover, in this liberal imaginary of ignorance, the notion that peacebuilding/state-building is initiated as a means of eradicating the threat of the deviant non-Western Other disappears from view, as does the legacy of Western empire that created some of the core problems in non-Western states that prompted intervention in the first place (for further postcolonial critiques of liberal constructivism, see [Sabaratnam, 2020](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211061084); [Sampson, 2002](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211061084); [Vitalis, 2000](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211061084)).

### Link — Binarism

#### Binarism is the cause of external conflict.

Chengxin Pan 20, Faculty of Arts and Education, Deakin University, Australia, 2020, “Enfolding wholes in parts: quantum holography and International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations 2020, Vol. 26(S1) 14–38

This article situates itself between the relational turn in IR and the quantum turn in the social sciences (and lately in IR as well). Between the two turns, there has been a mutual neglect at the expense of a better defined and more operationalizable relational approach to IR. To address the gap, this article has outlined a quantum holographic ontology, which stipulates that parts are more than just parts in the conventional sense of the word, but are specifically enfolded wholes. Drawing on Bohm’s insights into wholeness and the implicate order, the article has introduced a set of new conceptual tools to IR in general and to the relational debate in particular, such as whole-part duality, enfoldment, unfoldment, implicate order, and explicate order. These tools help us rethink IR and many dominant IR concepts in some ontologically innovative ways, including the need to take wholeness in IR more seriously, a new emphasis on the holographic nature of the state, and the promises of this approach for explaining and mitigating difference and conflict in IR theory and practice. By way of conclusion, the article now briefly considers two ethical implications of quantum holography for IR. First, the holographic being/becoming for “parts” is immensely empowering, because it reveals that the parts, or previously assumed individual “selves,” are never alone in a frightening state of nature; rather, they are inescapably linked to and sustained by the whole/world: indeed, their holographicity means that they are the whole/world, merely on smaller scales. This should transform the way we think about our identity, interest, and security in a fundamentally relational and positive way, because in a holographically related world, there can be no inherent “Others” or “external” threats out there unless we consciously or subconsciously divide the world in binary terms and act accordingly. Second, holographic being/becoming entails holographic responsibility, which is an ethical commitment to the notion and practice of responsibility for all. By all we mean the whole and its various “parts,” including the smallest “components,” such as corals and insects. To the extent that they all ultimately share the same whole, all parts, large or small, are real or potential enfoldments of the whole. Their well-being, as an indicator of the well-being of the whole, matters to the whole and to each of its parts. Thus, responsibility for all means “care for all and do no harm.” In a holographically connected world, harm to “others” (even the smallest “others”) means inevitably harm to the whole, including the “self,” who necessarily enfolds the whole: here the example of the microplastics problem comes to mind. Cosmopolitanism has long held the idea that “harm to individuals [is] a moral problem for the world as a whole” (Linklater, 2002: 320), and quantum holography can enrich the relational ontology of cosmopolitanism and at the same time help it move beyond its narrow humanist focus.

### Link — Constructivism

#### Constructivism is no better — it relies on collective cultural mentalities to explain the world.

Reus-Smit ‘19 — Christian; Professor of International Relations at the University of Queensland, in Brisbane Australia. March 21, 2019; "International Relations Theory Doesn’t Understand Culture"; *Foreign Policy*; [edited for ableist language] <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/21/international-relations-theory-doesnt-understand-culture/>; //CYang

It may seem unfair to expect realism and rational choice to be abreast of current thinking on culture: It is not their game, after all. Yet constructivism and the English School, both of which see culture as core business, fare no better.

Constructivism’s core insight is that shared meanings — ideas, norms, and values — make the social and natural worlds knowable. Constructivists frequently describe such meanings as “cultural.” In principle, that tendency is entirely compatible with current understandings of culture as heterogeneous and contradictory. Yet the two main strands of constructivist research have been largely deaf to such understandings.

The first strand focuses on international norms: how they emerge and how they shape the identities, interests, and behavior of states and other actors. This work disaggregates culture, breaking it up into individual norms and then studying their causal effects. But while culture is not treated as a coherent, bounded whole, the complexity in which individual norms are embedded is neglected.

The second strand of research focuses on the institutional foundations of international relations, most notably the origins of modern sovereignty. It is here that the default conception of culture is most clear. Constructivists identify deep, system-wide cultural meanings and use these to explain key institutional developments. They see international orders as founded, in part, on what they call collective mentalities — and when these change, so do basic institutions. For example, my own early research attributes variations in the basic institutional practices of different societies to their different cultural understandings of the moral purpose of the state.

The English School is noted for its trademark claim that states can form international societies, not just international systems. That is, states can come together over shared common interests to agree on common rules and create institutions to uphold those rules. When asked what sustains such a society, English School theorists offer two main answers. One is pragmatic: States share basic interests in physical security, stable territorial rights, and the keeping of agreements, and international society is the best means to these ends. This is overlaid, however, by an argument about the cultural prerequisites for international society.

### Link — Deterrence

#### The 1AC is nuclear fetishism – the logic of nuclear deterrence subjugates the global periphery.

Harrington 18 [Dr Anne Harrington, Senior Lecturer in International Relations; “Reconceptualizing the “power” of nuclear weapons”; The Nonproliferation Review; June 8, 2018; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10736700.2018.1480682?journalCode=rnpr20]//eleanor

There is no solution to the nuclear dilemma. There is only a series of tradeoffs characterized by different forms of cost and risk. Would you rather accept the toll of nuclear deterrence, including not only the risk of accidents but also the financial, human, and environmental costs of maintaining a nuclear arsenal? Or would you prefer to abolish nuclear weapons and live with an increased risk of great-power war and “nuclear breakout”? Both sides of this debate claim to have the best solution to prevent nuclear war. Advocates of deterrence maintain that a securely stored second-strike capability profoundly reduces the possibility that global conflict will go nuclear. Disarmers disagree. They argue that maintaining large nuclear arsenals greatly enhances the chances of an intentional or unintentional nuclear attack; eliminating nuclear weapons extends the timeline to a nuclear war, making it less likely. Your own preference is probably linked to your perception of these different costs and risks. As with most things in life, nuclear-related costs are not allocated evenly across the global population. Although nuclear weapons are often thought of as the great equalizer—no one is invulnerable to nuclear attack—the effects of maintaining a robust nuclear deterrent fall differently on those at the core of the global nuclear order than on those who live at the periphery. Those at the periphery tend to absorb many more of the costs associated with fabricating nuclear weapons. Yet the nuclear order is largely designed (and enforced) by those at its center. In Nuclear Desire, Shampa Biswas asks what it would it mean to listen to these voices from the periphery—those economically dispossessed populations that postcolonial scholar Gayatri Spivak conceptualized as the “subaltern” in her paradigm-shifting essay, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” 1 According to Biswas, the subaltern are speaking, and what they are saying is that nuclear weapons not only divert resources from “life-preserving and life-enhancing goals” but have “left the planet littered with radioactive waste” (p. 26). Within the state-based international system, however, subaltern voices are not being heard. National-security priorities too often trump the human-security concerns of vulnerable populations. Done in the name of the state, the manufacture and testing of nuclear weapons—from uranium mines on Navajo Nation lands to nuclear tests in the South Pacific and Kazakhstan—too often come at the expense of local populations (p. 128). Listening to subaltern claims to justice, Biswas concludes, is the path to peace (p. 198). Although Biswas places listening to the subaltern at the center of her argument, little space in the book is dedicated to outlining their claims to justice or highlighting their voices. Instead, her book is a critical analysis of the structures that prevent their claims from being heard. The arc of Biswas’s argument will be familiar to anyone experienced with “defetishizing” critique—a method by which what is taken for granted as timeless and natural is revealed as historically contingent and socially constructed.2 This form of critique starts by questioning the underlying assumptions that make power relations appear natural and inevitable. In the case of nuclear weapons, defetishizing critique reveals how an apolitical, technocratic approach to reducing nuclear danger masks the economic and political interests that drive the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Instead of advancing a disarmament agenda, Biswas argues, nuclear nonproliferation serves the purposes of powerful states by maintaining a global hierarchy of nuclear “haves” and “have-nots” (p. 73). The presumption that nuclear weapons are necessary to maintain security through deterrence precludes serious engagement with what it would mean to abolish the current two-tiered structure of the nuclear order. This is because technocratic experts “fetishize” nuclear weapons by ascribing their power to their physical characteristics, most importantly their explosive yield, as though they would have the same power as a deterrent irrespective of the social context in which they are embedded. Properly understood, however, these physical characteristics are what make nuclear weapons destructive but not necessarily powerful. It is the social process of nuclear deterrence through which nuclear weapons accrue their power, as well as their status as a special type of “luxury good” the possession of which confers prestige. By revealing the social basis of their power, defetishizing critique recovers space for political agency within the debate about nuclear weapons by recasting nuclear deterrence as a political choice that privileges the interests of some over others. If instead of accepting the fetishized security logic that drives the desire for nuclear weapons, one follows defetishizing critique to its logical conclusion, the recommendation it yields is for nuclear disarmament advocates to unmask the “larger social, political, and economic relations that sustain the pursuit of nuclear weaponry” (p. 133). Biswas argues that, for a couple of reasons, international relations (IR) scholars and policy experts overlook these connections between the security interests at work in the global nuclear order and the broader economic interests that drive proliferation. First, there is a strong division of labor between realist theories of international politics, which focus on national security, and liberal institutionalist approaches, which tend to take questions of economic cooperation as their central concern. Despite the early promise of norms-based constructivist scholarship to fill the gap, scholars still treat questions of international security and international political economy separately, leaving multilateral, security-oriented institutions, such as those that comprise the nonproliferation regime, relatively understudied and poorly understood (pp. 27–36). Second, policy experts often take the regime at face value. They assess the effectiveness of the nuclear nonproliferation regime according to how successful it is at stopping (and eventually rolling back) the spread of nuclear weapons, rather than asking broader questions about the underlying interests it perpetuates (pp. 63–74). In contrast, Biswas brings the connection between security interests and economic interests into view by arguing that focusing on stated intentions obscures the nonproliferation regimes’ greatest effect: the perpetuation of global economic inequalities (Chapter 1). Her critical approach is grounded in Foucauldian studies of governmentality and conceives of power as “productive” as opposed to “disciplinary.” 3 Productive power shapes people’s conduct by enlisting their participation in their own governance. Biswas argues that, while the stated intention of the nonproliferation regime is to halt the spread of nuclear weapons to additional states, with the eventual goal of abolishing their existence, the effect of this regime is to extend the power and reach of those states at the top of the global nuclear order at the expense of those at the periphery.4 To put it bluntly, Biswas maintains that powerful states invoke the urgency of reducing the danger of nuclear proliferation to diminish the salience of arguments about the political and economic inequalities embedded in the nonproliferation regime. When faced with the urgency of averting nuclear catastrophe, she observes, economic inequality appears trivial in comparison (p. 108). The result of Biswas’s critique is a profoundly different approach to disarmament than arguments for eliminating nuclear weapons which highlight the dangers of nuclear war. The disarmament movement’s focus on the unspeakable or unimaginable dangers of nuclear war too often has the perverse effect of invigorating the perceived need for an effective nuclear deterrent (p. 131).5 In contrast, a defetishizing critique of the desire for nuclear weapons reveals how the fear of future costs of nuclear war obscures and devalues the current costs and risks born by those most vulnerable. Nuclear Desire is one of the most comprehensive applications of a critical methodology to the topic of nuclear weapons, and a welcome contribution to the growing field of critical nuclear studies from a postcolonial perspective. It is also an important contribution to the wider debate about nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, and critical intervention within the IR paradigm wars. Yet, Biswas’s application of the tools of defetishizing critique to questions of nuclear politics does raise questions about what is new or different about her argument relative to what has come before. Is the claim that nuclear weapons are a fetish object anything more than an elaborate way of saying that the Bomb is a status symbol? Is there anything novel about describing prestige as a motivation for acquiring or retaining nuclear weapons? While the idea that nuclear weapons function as a symbol of status and prestige is not new, Biswas’s engagement with the idea that nuclear weapons are fetish objects tells us something not only about their function as a symbol of prestige, but also provides insight into the mechanism by which they accrue their value. Moreover, her identification of nuclear weapons as fetish objects goes beyond arguments about prestige because it brings with it theoretical and methodological tools that yield specific recommendations for reforming the current nuclear order and open up new avenues of research. Nuclear weapons, like all fetish objects, are desirable above and beyond a straightforward assessment of their physical characteristics. A defetishizing critique interprets this “excess” value as a symptom of an underlying confusion about the source of their power. As Biswas puts it, “A fetish [emphasis in original] is an object to which is ascribed certain powers that are seen to emerge from its essential qualities rather than the social relations and networks that bestow power on that object” (p. 123). It is this distinctive form of misattribution, whereby what is properly understood as a structural effect appears as to stem immediately from one element of that structure, that is the essence of fetishism. Nuclear fetishism is characterized by a confusion between the social value of the weapons’ physical characteristics (their use-value) and the value that arises from the system of shared meanings rooted in the practice of nuclear deterrence (their “threat” or “exchange-value”). A defetishizing critique of nuclear weapons reveals their physical characteristics as essential to the process of communicating a threat, yet ultimately irrelevant to ensuring security. Nuclear deterrence is nothing more than an economy of signs, or system of shared communication. It is underwritten by reference to the materiality of nuclear weapons—their use-value—but it is their ultimate unusability that the system of deterrence is designed to preserve. It is only their role within the semiotic system of signs, and not their physical use, that delivers value, i.e., security. Yet we act as though this value were an immediate feature of the weapons themselves (Chapter 3). On Biswas’s reading, this process of fetishization transforms nuclear weapons into a luxury good. Quoting the sociologist Arjun Appadurai, Biswas explains that luxury goods are “goods whose principal use is rhetorical [emphasis in original] and social [emphasis in original]” (p. 127). As with other luxury goods, the possession of nuclear weapons is highly restricted, the social message they communicate about security, status, and modernity is complex, and their appropriate use as a deterrent requires specialized knowledge. As luxury goods, nuclear weapons are national monuments of the modern nation state and a symbol of status and prestige. Yet, at the same time that Biswas’s analysis adds depth to the idea that nuclear weapons are a symbol of prestige, in emphasizing this as the apex of her analysis she underplays what a defetishizing critique can achieve. Biswas recognizes that nuclear weapons as fetish objects are not merely symbols in the same sense that a flag is, since their meaning is not derived through an association with something else.6 As Biswas, quoting W.J.T. Mitchell explains, “ they are magical objects that contain within them their own principle of value” (p. 130). Thus, although fetish objects can also function as symbols or idols of modernity, arguably, that is not the only, or perhaps even primary, pay-off of understanding their role as fetish objects (129–32). Once we accept that nuclear weapons are fetishized, a range of questions opens about how states have drawn on or manipulated the value of nuclear weapons beyond questions of international standing and prestige. For instance, nuclear fetishism not only obscures the costs of developing and maintaining nuclear arsenals, but also focuses attention on some aspects of their materiality at the expense of others. The attribution of their power to their explosive capacity distracts from the characteristics that make them an appropriate carrier of social value—namely, that, like money, they are scarce, durable, and divisible. These aspects are what make them useful as bargaining chips in international negotiations.7 A second possibility would be to argue that the interpretation of deterrence as a system of signs—in which the material presence of nuclear weapons plays a communicative role—could provide the foundation for a different vision of disarmament, one predicated on “weaponless” deterrence.8

#### Discourses are bout nuclear deterrence and security are part of a legacy of techno-orientalist tropes that perpetuate neocolonialism.

Mathur 18 [Dr. Ritu Mathur is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Texas at San Antonio, USA. Her research and teaching interests are in the field of International Relations with specialization in Security Studies.; “Postcolonial perspectives on weapons control”; Asian Journal of Political Science; October 15, 2018; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02185377.2018.1526694]//eleanor

This undertaking is critical especially at a time when the field of International Relations is being critiqued for its Eurocentrism and there is a resurgence of populist civilizational discourses juxtaposing the West and the Rest. This appears as an opportune moment in history to accept the challenge of decolonizing practices of arms control and disarmament. It is not simply a cliché that the field of arms control and disarmament has long been defined and dominated by the West’s military superiority in arms. The struggle against this dominance has been launched by critical security studies scholars that question practices of Orientalism in warfare but refrain from probing more specifically into the problem of weapons. Postcolonial interventions are an exercise in responsibility as they engage with civilizational discourses of difference articulated in terms of race, technology, law and culture. A study of the performative power of these civilizational discourses of difference is critical to cultivate understandings of not only how differences reinforce hierarchies but also to generate reflexivity on the struggles for power, justice and emancipation waged continuously by the subaltern. This Special Issue of the Asian Journal of Political Science is an effort to make more visible the engagement of postcolonial scholars with the problem of arms control and disarmament. It is an effort to resist a resurgent tide of dominant discourses seeking to constitute and reconstitute the field of arms control and disarmament representing the interests of the West to address problems of nuclear proliferation, counterproliferation and nuclear terrorism. While these efforts have their own niche in the field of security studies they cannot be guided by assumptions representing the West as the vanguard of maintaining order and stability in the international system. These dominant representations of the West as the guardian and custodian of the field of arms control and disarmament have often blighted and marginalized contributions of the Global South to weapons control. These efforts have been further stymied and marginalized as some actors from the Global South have striven to join the nuclear club and their practices have been typologized as co-optation or imitation of the behaviour of great powers in the international system. It is under these circumstances that we invited scholars to not only acknowledge and build upon the postcolonial legacies of Bandung and the Non-Aligned movement but also further investigate and explore discourses on identity, power, hierarchy, marginalization and interventions in an effort to decolonize arms control and disarmament. We invited scholars to specifically engage and reflect on the following questions: How do we as postcolonial scholars make interventions in the field of security studies? What are the postcolonial experiences in undertaking practices of arms control and disarmament? How have these experiences contributed to neocolonialism or decolonization of the field of weapons control? My paper on Techno-Racial Dynamics of Denial and Difference in Weapons Control initiates this dialogue. It encourages scholars and policymakers to critically reflect on the intersecting ‘dynamics of difference’ and ‘dynamics of denial’ at play within the field of weapons control. The paper explores at length the persistent dynamic of difference between the Orient and the Occident that encourages proliferation of discourses on modernity and stereotyping the Other. It also questions spiralling dynamics of denial that vests its faith in practices of nuclearism and refuses to acknowledge the historical practices that contributed to the marginalization of the Global South. It insists that the rhetorical deployment of nuclear apartheid within the field of arms control and disarmament is no longer enough. It is imperative that attention be focused on practices of ‘techno-racism’ that are now more explicit, resurgent and circulating with their emphasis on racial reductionism and technological determinism in weapons control. This consideration is imperative as the memory of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as victims of nuclear holocaust recedes and the techno-racial line regulated by managerial practices of arms control and disarmament is increasingly under duress. It questions whether only as sacrificial victims of techno-racial violence can the voices of subalterns make a claim and find resonance in the field of arms control? Joining this conversation is Itty Abraham’s paper, Decolonizing Arms Control: The AfroAsian Legal Consultative Committee and the Legality of Nuclear Testing 1960-64. This paper offers a revisionist view of the history of the Cold War. Abraham insists that it is no longer acceptable to view the complexities of decolonization as a ‘sideshow’ to the Cold War between the two superpower protagonists. On the contrary he is emphatic in his assertions that decolonization needs to be conceptualized as a moment in history during which the developing countries struggled for progressive change to constitute a pacific and post-imperial world order. To substantiate these claims, Abraham, demonstrates how the postcolonial states resorted to deploying international law as an interpretive tool that could help them to collectively participate, modify and incorporate their needs in the existing international order without exposing their material weakness. He focuses on the legal maneuvers deployed by the Asian African Legal Consultative Committee (AALCC) during the time frame when the Partial Test Ban Treaty was being negotiated. The 1964 Report of the AALCC documents how the Global South articulated two key principles to oppose nuclear testing. The first principle is the principle of abuse of rights and the second principle is one of absolute liability. These principles were articulated as the countries of the Global South debated the conditions under which nuclear testing could be considered a ‘nuclear wrong.’ These powerful interventions from the Global South could not be ignored as they served as forces of resistance and also as allies of the superpowers shaping the discourse on nuclear testing. It is important to acknowledge today how these interventions made by the diverse grouping of the AALCC helps to balance the dominant views on negotiating the PTBT and offers an insight into the decolonizing practices pursued by the postcolonial states during the Cold War era of arms control and disarmament. This is then followed by Shampa Biswas and Chacko and Davis’s articles exploring the positionality of Iran and India respectively as representative postcolonial states negotiating a nuclear order dominated by the West. Shampa Biswas’s paper, Iran vs ‘The International Community’: A Postcolonial Analysis on the Iranian Nuclear Program undertakes a postcolonial analysis of the hypervisibility of Iran in the media coverage of the West from 2013-14. This was the time when a nuclear deal was being negotiated between Iran and the international community led by the US. In this article, Biswas raises some key questions: What made it possible for the West led by the US to speak so expansively about it being representative of the international community? What made it possible for the US to hear the Iranians on their nuclear weapons programme? What are the possibilities and limitations of nurturing relationships of trust between Iran and the West? In addressing these concerns Biswas’s paper makes visible the Orientalist presuppositions and civilizational terms of difference deployed during these negotiations. She demonstrates how a series of Orientalist tropes carefully sowed the seeds of deep suspicion and fear in the West against an inscrutable Iran. She questions the trappings of dialogue that appears to take place among sovereign equals but in which Iran appears to be the supplicant striving to join the international community of civilized states. This paper evokes a deep sense of pathos as it engages with a contemporary civilizational narrative that obscures existing asymmetrical relationships of global power and hierarchy. But Priya Chacko and Alexander E. Davis are not content with demonstrating how mainstream literature perpetuates Orientalist discourses. In their paper, Resignifying ‘Responsibility’: Indian, exceptionalism and nuclear non-proliferation, they insist on exploring the agency of India in challenging and perpetuating these discourses. In this endeavour they take recourse to Judith Butler’s conceptualization of ‘subversive resignification’ and deploy it to explore how India has successively resignified the idea of state responsibility especially when it comes to nuclear weapons. In a very interesting exercise, Chacko and Davis articulate how the concept of state responsibility gets bifurcated by two types of civilizational discourses. On the one hand discourses on standards of civilization emphasize state responsibility in terms of compliance but on the other hand discourses on civilizational exceptionalism emphasize state responsibility only in terms of state propensity for moral behaviour. This important distinction makes it feasible for a postcolonial state like India to emphasize and differentiate its own exceptional civilizational status that is then ironically acknowledged by the exceptional superpower, the US, to willingly negotiate the India-US Civil Nuclear Agreement (2005). Chacko and Davis further argue that while India’s subversive civilizational mantra might help it to climb the ladder of nuclear hierarchy it is achieved at the cost of a compromise with the dominant meanings associated with understanding of power, nuclear deterrence, and marginalized postcolonial considerations of ethics and morality. These compromises and subversive acts of resignification cannot be easily copied and reproduced but are very particular in terms of cultural inheritances, political histories and contemporary needs. Similarly, Matthew Bolton’s paper, The‘-Pacific’ Part of the ‘Asia-Pacific’: Oceanic Diplomacy in the 2017 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, is a call for an engaged analysis of Pacific peoples’ agency in addressing the problem of nuclear weapons. It is sensitive in its portrayal of racial and technological considerations and carefully introduces the concept of ‘resistance diplomacy.’ This paper emphasizes the humanitarian impact of nuclear testing in the Pacific and makes visible how political considerations of race and technology served as important criteria for nuclear testing in these trust territories. Bolton shares archival records of how imperial powers such as the US, UK and France exercised colonial control and did not hesitate to conduct nuclear tests. Bolton’s purpose is then to go further and demonstrate the struggle of the Oceanic people to organize themselves against ‘nuclear racism’, offer themselves as a more humane civilizational standard to be emulated, and insist that positive obligations be included in the final text of the TPNW. This paper provides critical insights into the particular role of Oceanic people and their colonial legacy in negotiating the recently concluded Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 2017. These five scholarly contributions to the Special Issue provide us with significant postcolonial insights in addressing the problem of arms control and disarmament. They articulate different intellectual and conceptual frameworks and engage with problems of positionality in arms control and disarmament. Both chronologically and thematically they cover the period from 1945 to 2017 and address issues pertaining to use of nuclear weapons, nuclear testing and negotiations of arms control and disarmament agreements. In this undertaking they are acutely conscious of the need for more historical engagement focusing on the agency of actors from the Global South. They problematize discourses on technology, race, law, civilization and suggest how meanings associated with these concepts have been deployed and re-deployed to craft strategies of resistance and emancipation by the Global South. These papers astutely acknowledge the asymmetrical relationships of power and recognize power as performativity. They encourage scholars to think about the intersecting dynamics of difference and dynamics of denial that are woven together by civilizational considerations of race and technology. These papers are not content to view subalterns as victims and supplicants but as thoughtful agents that are articulating discourses on rights, liability, morality and legal obligations that can help reconstitute contemporary practices of weapons control. Such reflexivity is imperative to constitute a post-imperial and pacific international society. These postcolonial efforts are only preliminary efforts to decolonize the practices of arms control and disarmament. This Special Issue of the Asian Journal of Political Science seeks to only re-ignite the dormant potential of postcolonial studies to give a new life and meaning to moribund practices of arms control and disarmament. In such a challenging undertaking the invitation, support and coordination from the editorial board of the Asian Journal of Political Science is to be much appreciated. A special note of thanks to Runa Das for her support and to all the contributors for their enriching and provocative contributions without which this collective postcolonial effort at decolonizing practices of arms control and disarmament would not have been possible.

#### Nuclear deterrence is unethical.

Thakur 16 [Ramesh Thakur has served as Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations and as Senior Vice Rector of the United Nations University; “Ethics, International Affairs and Western Double Standards”; Asia & The Pacific Policy Studies; June 23, 2016; https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/app5.140]//eleanor

Most countries have chosen nuclear abstinence because of overwhelming abhorrence of these most indiscriminately inhumane weapons ever invented. Their non-use since 1945 is also largely explained by the strong moral taboo. Recently, the Holy See (2014) circulated an article arguing it was time to question the for-mer distinction between possession and use as the governing assumption of ethical discourse on nuclear deterrence. A ‘global ethic...of solidarity’ points to a ‘morally responsible global future’ which can only come from nu-clear abolition. As well as ‘legal obligations,’ the disarmament treaties ‘are also moral com-mitments.’The concept of nuclear deterrence now ‘works less as a stabilising force and more as an incentive for countries to break out’ of the Non-proliferation treaty (NPT). The ‘double standard’ in enforcing non-proliferation on some and not others ‘undermines the universal-ity on which the NPT was constructed.’ Be-cause of the known damage to civilians, nuclear deterrence rests on shaky moral ground. And investment in nuclear weapons si-phons off resources for poverty alleviation and development that ‘is essential to social justice.’ The humanitarian impacts movement could be a precursor to a growing defection from the NPT regime by frustrated non-nuclear weapon states. Its factual premise is the lackof individual or collective capacity to cope with the humanitarian impacts of a nuclear war. From this, it follows that for the sake of humanity’s survival, nuclear weapons must never be used again under any circumstances. And the only guarantee of non-use is total elimination (NZ 2013). The initiative thus up-dates the old World Court project in challeng-ing the IHL compliance of nuclear weapons use. Moreover, the leaders of the nuclear-armed states have an ethical obligation to in-form and educate their citizens about the reality of incapacity to cope with the devastation of a nuclear war. If the consequences of a nuclear war are systemic then decisions on arsenals, doctrines and use cannot be solely a matter of sover-eign privilege. The same is true with regards to the safety and security aspects of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Because a bad accident in one country can have horrific effects in neighbouring countries, they have the moral right to have their voices heard in the decision to build and operate nuclear plants to global safety standards: no incinera-tion without representation. At which point do non-nuclear weapon states conclude that defection from the NPT regime is likely to be politically effective, is morally permissible and may well be the ethically responsible course of action (Doyle 2009)—precisely the dilemma with which the AU is grappling vis-à-vis the ICC?

#### American deterrence posturing relies on a colonial cartography of the world as subjects of a new Western empire established through military installations throughout the global east and south – military colonialism is an unevaluated externality of the plan.

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As distinct from other peoples, most Americans do not recognize — or do not want to recognize — that the United States dominates the world through its military power. Due to government secrecy, our citizens are often ignorant of the fact that our garrisons encircle the planet. This vast network of American bases actually constitutes a new form of empire — an empire with a unique geography unlikely to be taught in any high school classroom. Without grasping the dimensions of this globe-girdling Baseworld, one can’t begin to understand the size and nature of our imperial aspirations, or the degree to which a new kind of militarism is undermining our constitutional order. Militarism and imperialism are Siamese twins joined at the hip; each thrives off the other. Already highly advanced in our country, they are both on the verge of a quantum leap that will almost surely stretch our military beyond its capabilities, bringing about fiscal insolvency and very possibly doing mortal damage to our republican institutions. Unfortunately, the only way this is discussed in our press is via reportage on highly arcane plans for changes in basing policy and the positioning of troops abroad. And these plans, as reported in the media, cannot be taken at face value. As a result, it’s almost impossible to assess the size, real value, or proposed reach of our empire of bases. Official records on these subjects are misleading, although instructive. According to the Defense Department’s annual “Base Structure Report” for fiscal year 2003, which itemizes foreign and domestic U.S. military real estate, the Pentagon currently owns or rents 702 overseas bases in about 130 countries and HAS another 6,000 bases in the United States and its territories. Pentagon bureaucrats calculate that it would require at least $113.2 billion to replace just the foreign bases — surely far too low a figure but still larger than the gross domestic product of most countries — and an estimated $591,519.8 million to replace all of them. The military high command deploys to our overseas bases some 253,288 uniformed personnel, plus an equal number of dependents and Department of Defense civilian officials, and employs an additional 44,446 locally hired foreigners. The Pentagon claims that these bases contain 44,870 barracks, hangars, hospitals, and other buildings, which it owns, and that it leases 4,844 more. These numbers, although staggeringly large, do not begin to cover all the actual bases we occupy globally. The 2003 Base Status Report fails to mention, for instance, any garrisons in Kosovo — even though it is the site of the huge Camp Bondsteel, built in 1999 and maintained ever since by the Halliburton subsidiary Kellogg, Brown & Root. The Report similarly omits bases in Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Qatar, and Uzbekistan, although the U.S. military has established colossal base structures throughout the so-called arc of instability in the two-and-a-half years since 9/11. For Okinawa, the southernmost island of Japan, which has effectively been an American military colony for the past 58 years, the report deceptively lists only one Marine base, Camp Butler. In fact, Okinawa “hosts” ten Marine Corps bases, including Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, which occupies 1,186 acres in the center of that modest-sized island’s second-largest city. (Manhattan’s Central Park, by contrast, is only 843 acres.) The Pentagon similarly fails to note all of the $5-billion-worth of military and espionage installations in Britain, which have long been conveniently passed off as Royal Air Force bases. If there were an honest count, the actual size of our military empire would probably top 1,000 different bases in other people’s countries, but no one — possibly not even the Pentagon — knows the exact number for sure. One thing is certain, though; the number has been distinctly on the rise in recent years. A Colonial “Footprint” Once upon a time, you could trace the spread of imperialism by counting up colonies. America’s version of the colony is the military base, and the impact and reach of our colonial empire has become reduced to a single word: Footprint. Of all the insensitive, if graphic, metaphors we’ve allowed into our vocabulary, none quite equals “footprint”. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Richard Myers and senior members of the Senate’s Military Construction Subcommittee such as Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) are apparently incapable of completing a sentence without using it. Establishing a more impressive footprint has become central to the new justification for a dramatic enlargement of our Baseworld empire in the wake of our conquest of Iraq. The man in charge of this project is Andy Hoehn, deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy. He and his colleagues are supposed to draw up plans to implement President Bush’s preventive war strategy against “rogue states,” “bad guys,” and “evil-doers.” They have identified something they call the “arc of instability,” which is said to run from the Andean region of South America (read: Colombia) through North Africa, across the Middle East to the Philippines and Indonesia. This is, of course, more or less identical with what used to be called the Third World — and perhaps no less crucially it covers the world’s key oil reserves. Hoehn contends, “When you overlay our footprint onto that, we don’t look particularly well-positioned to deal with the problems we’re now going to confront.” In order to put our forces close to every hot spot or danger area in this newly discovered arc of instability, the Pentagon has been proposing — this is usually called “repositioning” — many new bases, including at least four and perhaps as many as six permanent ones in Iraq. A number of these are already under construction — at Baghdad International Airport, Tallil air base near Nasariyah, in the western desert near the Syrian border, and at Bashur air field in the Kurdish region of the north. In addition, we plan to keep under our control the whole northern quarter of Kuwait — 1,600 square miles out of that nation’s 6,900 square miles.. Other countries mentioned as sites for what Colin Powell calls our new “family of bases” include the impoverished areas of the “new” Europe — Romania, Poland, and Bulgaria; and the nuclear-armed antagonists Pakistan (where we already have four bases), and India. Farther to the east, we have set our sites on Australia, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, and even, unbelievably, Vietnam. Morocco, Tunisia, and especially Algeria (scene of the slaughter of some 100,00 civilians since 1992, when, to quash an election, the military took over, backed by our country and France) are slated for bases in North Africa; in West Africa, Senegal, Ghana, Mali, and Sierra Leone (even though it has been torn by civil war since 1991) are probable locations for future military ‘colonies’. Most of these new bases will be what the military, in a switch of metaphors, calls “lily pads” to which our troops could jump like so many well-armed frogs from the homeland, our remaining NATO bases, or bases in docile satellites like Japan and Britain. To offset the expense involved in such expansion, the Pentagon seems ready to close many of our huge Cold War military reservations — all part of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s “rationalization” of our armed forces. In the wake of the Iraq victory, the U.S. has already withdrawn virtually all of its forces from Saudi Arabia and Turkey, in part to punish those nations for failing to support our war in Iraq. South Korea, perhaps the most anti-American democracy on Earth today, faces similar punishment. In Europe, these plans include giving up several bases in Germany, also in part because of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s defiance of Bush over Iraq. Still, while there is every reason to believe that the impulse to create ever more lily pads in the Third World remains unchecked, there are several reasons to doubt that some of the more grandiose plans, for either expansion or downsizing, will ever be put into effect or. For one thing, Russia is opposed to the expansion of U.S. military power on its borders and is already moving to checkmate American basing sorties into places like Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. The first post-Soviet-era Russian airbase in Kyrgyzstan has just been completed forty miles from the U.S. base at Bishkek, and in December 2003, the dictator of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, declared that he would not permit a permanent deployment of U.S. forces in his country even though we already have a base there. Moreover, the Pentagon’s planners do not really seem to grasp just how many buildings the 71,702 soldiers and airmen in Germany alone occupy and how expensive it would be to build even slightly comparable bases, together with the necessary infrastructure, in former Communist countries like Romania, one of Europe’s poorest countries. It’s also clear that generals of the high command have no intention of living in backwaters like Constanta, Romania, and will keep the U.S. military headquarters in Stuttgart, while holding on to Ramstein Air Force Base, Spangdahlem Air Force Base, and the Grafenwöhr Training Area. The “Global Cavalry” The models for all these new ‘lily pads’, according to Pentagon sources, are the string of bases we have built around the Persian Gulf in the last two decades in such anti-democratic autocracies as Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates. The foreign policy sensibility behind the Baseworld expansion, meanwhile, is already plain to see. In the words of the American Enterprise Institute, home to the most hawkish of the Bush administration’s neoconservative core, the idea is to create “a global cavalry” that can ride in from “frontier stockades” and shoot up the “bad guys” as soon as we get some intelligence on them. In fact, the “global cavalry” strategy promises to do the opposite. As the prominent British military historian, Correlli Barnett, has observed, the U.S. attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq only increased the threat from al-Qaeda. From 1993 through the Sept. 11 assaults of 2001, there were five major al-Qaeda attacks worldwide; in the two years since, there have been seventeen such bombings, including the Istanbul suicide assaults on the British consulate and an HSBC Bank. Military operations against terrorists are not the solution. As Barnett puts it, “Rather than kicking down front doors and barging into ancient and complex societies with simple nostrums of ‘freedom and democracy,’ we need tactics of cunning and subtlety, based on a profound understanding of the people and cultures we are dealing with — an understanding up till now entirely lacking in the top-level policy-makers in Washington, especially in the Pentagon.” In his notorious “long, hard slog” memo on Iraq of October 16, 2003, Defense secretary Rumsfeld wrote, “Today, we lack metrics to know if we are winning or losing the global war on terror.” Correlli-Barnett’s “metrics” indicate otherwise, but that’s almost beside the point. The “war on terrorism” is, at best, only a small part of the strategy behind the Pentagon’s Baseworld plans. The real reason for constructing this new ring of military installations along the equator is to expand our colonial reach by reinforcing our domination of the world.

#### The aff’s expansion of US military sophistication is a beat in the rhythm of warfare — mutating domains of warfare transforms individuals into calculable dividuals while metamorphosizing imperial apparatuses.

Grove 19 [Jairus Victor Grove is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Hawai'i Research Center for Future Studies at the University of Hawai'i at Mānoa; “Savage Ecology: war and geopolitics at the end of the world”; August 16, 2019]//eleanor

The discussion of weapons and their diffusion generally follows the state and the armies that use them. Always starting with great powers and the most “sophisticated” weapons, studies of military diffusion chart the slow drift of devices to the periphery as the technical knowledge and need or prestige of a weapon interacts with the technological capability and in some cases cultural values of a given state-military apparatus. The structural features of an agent, generally a state, either inhibit or induce the adoption of a weapons or fighting technique.15 However, the accounts of Emily Goldman and others break the technical object into software (content) and hardware (form) and ignore the internal consistency that makes a device “work.” As is the case in particular of the ied, there is nothing singularly in its design that would count as a trade secret or invention. Instead, we have to look elsewhere for the creativity and intensity of the ied. Rather than the laboratory or the inventor, the milieu or ecology of war is itself a source of mutation and innovation. No matter how much we revile the cruelty and devastation of war, it is a “metamorphosis machine.”16 War is generative, in the sense that it complicates the boundaries of the human, and it insists on distributive or assembled agency rather than the mythologies of great leaders or inventors. To this end it is necessary to think about war’s creative materiality beyond the simple divides of bullets and bombs, or security studies, and bodies and rights, or human security. Those are all materialities in their own right, but their ways of understanding the world say little about either the broader ecology or the other entities and assemblages that populate war’s ecosystem. After all, war has been creatively and formatively more than human since the first rock or bone was picked up to extend the striking power of the human arm or the first horse was mounted to shock the enemy. War did not “become” technological with the predator drone and the biopolitical intervention into the biome of the soldier’s body. War has always been an assemblage of things of which any particular human played only a linkage or fulcrum of a larger, more heterogeneous order. So it is in this assembly that we can look for the ied not as an object but as a partner with the humans that reinvents and innovates their return to the field of battle. So humans are not to be left out of this investigation. It is the humans who are confronted by a war of objects. The human body once immersed in the thick of combat resembles few of its enlightenment capabilities of reason or reflection; it is often the sinew between objects and forces from adrenaline to body memory to the attachment of a so-called suicide vest. War is a highly dispersed and entangled set of relations that are better described as a “continuous multiplicity” than through essentialist representation of discrete agents, things, or objects.17 So while it is necessary in this case to take an “object-oriented” approach, to see the world from the ied, we should resist transposing the subject onto the object. It is, at times, highly persuasive and therefore politically effective to anthropomorphize objects, but it is equally valuable in the milieu of war to objectify and then reassemble the operators—goats, mortar shells, wheel barrels—in the complex relay of change and mutation that makes the flow and tumult of war possible. We have to walk a fine line between loosening the grip of anthropocentrism while still holding on to the human element in the puzzle. To go too far into the world of the machine risks losing the rhythms and irruptions of war, an instrumental and mechanistic account of things. Therefore we have to focus on how the milieu of war and its attendant objects are built into the very architecture and distributed in the economic flows that war inhabits. Economics here should be taken in its broadest sense of oikos—the same root for both economy and ecology. Roads, bridges, smuggling, dense urban zones, topographies of race, affect, sexuality, postcolonial legacies, sacred attachment, then overrun by surplus weapons, cell phones, garbage, and concrete all play their part. The oikos, once unrestricted, finds the economy of war written into the very ground beneath our feet. It is here that the umwelt or lifeworld of war’s objects can be found.18 The ied is not merely the wires taken from any number of sources, or its explosive “package” ranging from original manufacture to the artifact of a forgotten war. Neither is the “device” reducible to its “improvisor,” the artisan who crafted its new arrangement of receptors and detonation feedbacks. It is the strange attraction or “prehension,” as Alfred North Whitehead would say, of all these things in their forces and arrangement. In Whitehead’s words, “the whole world conspires to produce a new creation. It presents to the creative process its opportunities and its limitations.”19 Like Darwin’s finches, even within this narrow temporal and geographic corner of warfare there are varied attributes and dif­ferent morphogenetic histories for each subspecies of ied. Some perceive light, heat, microwaves, sound waves, radio waves, and each an increasingly precise modulation of the electromagnetic spectrum. For detonation some require the interplay or sequence of many of these modes of communication. All require ways of being in the world, that is, ways of fighting war for which disrupting the flow of goods and services is strategically significant; ieds would not stop the Ostrogoths of the sixth century or the Sioux Nation, nor would they be that effective against the castles and fortified towns of the Middle Ages. Despite the varied existence of caltrops and many other “victim-operated weapons” throughout military history, the effectiveness of the ied is intimate with the larger assemblage it is plugged into to disrupt.20 The depth of material conspiracy necessary for something like an ied to emerge as an entity that can devastate the world’s most expensive military force compels those interested in the concept of war to look more closely at well-worn typologies of technological superiority as well as technological innovation, diffusion, and deployment.21 The effect of such a rethinking is not merely instrumental; it does not provide us with a new toolbox to better predict or plan the prosecution of wars. Instead, to foreground the efficacy of things makes the global experience of military acid reflux sensible, as in perceptible.22 This is how I read Stanley Hoffmann’s prescient warning in 1965 that international politics would increasingly become “a global echochamber of swarm-life.”23 Partitioning the sensible in favor of the “things” of war shows the values of national security doctrines based on technological superiority and hegemony devaluing themselves as the objects of war fight their way back into politics. The varied intensities or insistence of objects is not historical in the sense of development; however, there is something like a natural history that has come to pass such that particular technical or machinic objects make statements in more decisive ways. Gilbert Simondon posits the technical object as one that must create and inhabit its environment simultaneously. That is, the object cannot be disassociated from its ecosystem because each had to be virtually implied in the other for the actual object to emerge. For Simondon this keeps open the space of invention without the “new” being ex nihilo. As he puts it, the technical object “is caused by an environment which had merely virtual existence before the invention. The invention happens because a jump is made and is justified by the relationship which is instituted within the environment it creates.”24 The conditions of Hoffmann’s echochamber or what William Connolly calls a global resonance machine require a processes of amplification and dispersal, intensification and territorialization.25 Parts of an assemblage become more vibratory, singing with greater intensity, as in the case of American evangelical Christianity entering into an unexpected relationship with the crusaders of free market capitalism, or in the global feedback from both sides of the supposed civilizational divide, each providing sustenance to the other as in Connolly’s example.26 This raises the question: what is an amplifier? W. Ross Ashby, one of the founders of Cybernetics, describes an amplifier as “a device that, if given a little of something, will emit a lot of it. . . . Such devices work by having available a generous reservoir of what is to be emitted, and then using the input to act as controller to the flow from the reservoir. . . . It works by supplementation.”27 What is the reservoir war draws upon? Surplus weapons, postcolonial injustice, nationalist affect, or just rage can all be drawn into amplification. As amplification is not just a linear increase, it can result in qualitative changes. Amplification of rage can transform discontent into a change in voting preference; what in chemistry is called a phase transition like the movement from solid to liquid or, more rarely and surprisingly, when matter skips states and jumps from solid to the excited molecules of a gas; from discontent directly to revolt. Manuel DeLanda explains that the extrapolation of physical phase properties to human endeavors allows more fluidity and creativity in the nonlinear history of human development than the “stages” often presumed by development economists or archaeologists. Humanity in its relationship to the environment has “solidified” and “liquefied” at dif­ferent rates and times; “in other words human history did not follow a straight line, as if everything pointed toward civilized societies as humanity’s ultimate goal.”28 This is how machinic statements proceed—amplification or incipient elements lured into actuality by any number of irritants or perturbations, that is, resonances or loose relations that draw upon the abundant resources at hand, intensifying or amplifying the otherwise imperceptible assemblage. And an ecosystem is the medium or milieu that this amplification reverberates through. An ecosystem and its study—ecology—represents a concept for understanding the profound entanglement of objects that make immanent creativity possible at every level of the system. In the same moment that thought thinks, ecologically there must be some conceptual disaggregation of assemblages from environmental changes in intensity; differing folds or relations of entanglement become relativized such that disequilibrium, the engine for dynamism, is impossible—everything is everything. Guattari playfully refers to the danger of a pulsating undifferentiated substance as “cosmic pulp”—in fact at the cosmic scale it may be pulp.29 But this is of little use to those of us slogging our way through space-time at the scale of human organic life. Local changes in equilibrium, intensifications, are vital to human experience and efficacy in the world. Therefore the anthropocentrism of some forms of connection, change, and event are necessary for limiting or territorializing zones of entangled matter such that they are perceptible to an embodied, mortal species such as humans. This is what, I think, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari mean by a science: the positing of functives, constituting a molar perspective for the study of local orders and emergent ecologies such as war.30 The territorialization of spacetime into particular geographies of interest or study is the work of a function or, in the philosophical register, a concept. In this case the concepts of assemblage and ecosystem allow for the pulling apart of the world such that a difference in organization is perceptible and a milieu or medium can be at least temporarily diagrammed to show the movement or change in the organization of an ied without losing that this is something we can call an ied. So we need consistency for a technical object but we will not find a “condition of possibility” that we would want to call a cause. We are trying to describe the ied and milieu but not its cause. Instead of looking for the ied’s cause, my metaphysical wager is that orders, while not obeying laws of conformity, cluster or are attracted to particular lures or transient forms over periods of time. The important point here is the instance that abstract machines are created and transitory, this description resists the stasis of eternal forms or Platonic ideals. The vulnerability of abstract machines as well as their contingency upon their incorporation in concrete assemblages leave the universe open ended rather than finite and repetitive or merely combinatorial. Deleuze and Guattari refer to these as abstract machines, which they define as follows: “The abstract machine, or machines, is effectuated in forms and substances, varying states of freedom. But the abstract machine must first have composed itself, and have simultaneously composed a plane of consistency. Abstract, singular, and creative, here and now, real yet nonconcrete, actual yet noneffectuated.”31 This allows for there to be a “point” to naming something or identifying it without the necessity or permanency of identity. The space of possibility for the ied is a kind of strange attractor that traverses quantum, micro, meso, and cosmic scales, illustrating what Deleuze and Guattari call refrains, the lures of these strange abstract machines. Unlike theorists of identity or form, Deleuze and Guattari leave open the possibility that the creative advance at any level could also deterritorialize a given refrain, leading a new or differently creative thing to diverge from what came before it. So we are looking for consistency but not permanence. In Connolly’s description of consistency, “each level and site of agency also contain traces and remnants from the levels from which it evolved, and these traces affect its operation.”32 This does not mean the world is all flux and therefore impenetrable to thought and investigation. It means we ought not be too disappointed if the concepts we generate have a limited or even fleeting shelf life. So orders? Yes. One order? No. Therefore, real creativity, extending well beyond the human estate, has room to breathe. Why does a seemingly simple and technical device require so much theoretical or even metaphysical footwork? In part because ieds do not continue at a single pace, experience, or rhythm of duration. This is why, to some extent, jieddo’s attempts to settle on categorical and bounded definitions of ieds obfuscate more than they reveal. Land mines, discarded bomblets, unexploded ordinances, victim-operated weapons, victim rage, exclusionary urbanization, permanent genetic damage passed from generation to generation, e-wasted dumping, cheap arms sales, racial formations, resource extraction—all exhibit dif­ferent temporal flows and variably transversal connections that can become an ied. And the conflict or war that lured it into existence can dissipate and then reemerge days, months, years, decades, or even a century later. Five still-armed and dangerous American Civil War mines were unearthed and detonated in 1965 outside Mobile, Alabama.33 The milieu of war often lingers, mutates, and reemerges with differing levels of intensity long after “sustained combat” has ended. It is from the betwixt-between that something like an ied can emerge. It assembles in a maelstrom of decades of electronic garbage dumping, the accumulation of mines from past wars, new and old antagonisms, and stop/start development projects responsible for a morass of paved roads. All of this raises the question of the relation between the part and the whole. If causality is not a sufficient category, then is an ied a subset of war? Is it part of the assemblage of war? Certainly the ecology of war is populated by heterogeneous assemblages made of people, affects, guns, hills, culverts, streets, mines . . . And those objects are transversally entangled in spacetime. But what is the nature of such entanglements? How do we account for things as assemblages without losing either their distinctiveness as objects or their functions in larger machines?

### Link — Miscalc

#### Nuclear miscalculation is driven by imperial capitalist politics – any analysis of the US-Russia antagonism must decenter the “danger of the arms race” and pose the question of nuclear strategy as an ideological phenomenon.

Davis ’17 -- (Mike Davis, 8-1-2017, "Nuclear Imperialism and Extended Deterrence," Versobooks, https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/3350-nuclear-imperialism-and-extended-deterrence, accessed 7-5-2022) -- nikki

These paradoxes are not unintelligible. Behind Thompson's theoretical construct lies a number of very understandable political motivations. To depict the exterminist contamination as omnipresent is to dramatize the dangers of war with the most urgent and mobilizing of tocsins. To represent the sources of exterminism as a medley of involuntary or atomized forces, on the other hand, is to avoid the great divisive breach of class analysis and social identification of political opponents, and with it the risks of ideological hostilities incompatible with an irenic movement. To refuse investigation into the origins of the Cold War is to forestall the possibility of differential judgement of the two sides to it, that would be internationally even less ecumenical. A benign sleight of hand, of a kind familiar — perhaps inherent — in the discourse of all peace movements, is visible here. Yet the real history of our time still require its answers. These answers have political consequences, for peace and for socialism. In what follows, I shall argue that the Cold War in its wider sense is not an arbitrary or anachronistic feud staged essentially in Europe, but a rationally explicable and deeply rooted conflict of opposing social formations and political forces, whose principal centre of gravity has been for some thirty years now the Third World. That conflict would have existed and developed into a Cold War, even if nuclear weapons had never been invented. The Bomb has shaped and misshaped its evolution, and may yet put an end to it altogether. But it is not its spring. That lies in the dynamic of class struggle on a world scale. The rationality of the conflict derives from the incompatible interests of the major actors in it. Thompson contests this rationality, on the grounds that a drift towards common extermination cannot be in any side's interest. But, of course, this is not the first time in history that a discrepancy has opened up between rational interest and irrational outcome. What typically lies between the two is the recurrent historical phenomenon of class error, for which Marxists always need to make theoretical allowance. Class interest, as Hamza Alavi has pointed out, should be conceived not as a source of its own objective, correspondent expression, in an a priori adequacy of means to ends, but rather as the social basis of calculation of the agent concerned, that includes in its very definition the possibility of miscalculation in a world of antagonistic action and reaction.5 In the age of the hydrogen bomb, such miscalculation could indeed lead to mutual annihilation. In that sense, Thompson's warnings of the possibility of accidental triggering or faulty escalation need no further justification; the fear of these must haunt any sober peace movement today. The limitation of "Notes on Exterminism," however, is that in concentrating so much moral and mental attention on the irrational and inertial dangers of the arms race, it tends to ignore the deliberate and dynamic calculations of nuclear politics. The result is to sidestep consideration of how the Bomb functions as a central instrument of power in an age of revolution. But to pose the question of nuclear strategy as politics — and not bureaucratic inertias — it is necessary to retrieve all those categories that Thompson sets to one side as "irrelevant": conjuncture and crisis, origin and purpose, classes and modes of production. Indeed, to get at the deep structures of the Cold War we may need to dismantle the concept of exterminism.

#### US-Russia nuclear posture cannot be analyzed through the lens of military strategy but rather operates primarily on the level of ideological reproduction – miscalculation is a product of social compulsions that only the alt solves.

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What ultimately confers cohesion on the different components of exterminism is the bipolar confrontation itself. Thompson clearly hints that if the Cold War did not exist, it would have had to be invented — since it provides the indispensible basis for domestic unity. It is the mirror-image demand of internal hegemony, expressed through ideology, in both the United States and the Soviet Union that sanctions, reproduces, and addicts the social formation to exterminism. "Symmetry," in Thompson's usage, thus has two meanings. First it refers to the situation in which state power in each bloc has become the raison d'être of its opposite via the permanent brandishing of the Bomb. Secondly it indicates an actual homology between the bureaucratic and military structures of Cold War mobilization in the USSR and the United States. Taken as a whole, this portrait of hypermilitarized establishments imposing domestic order by gearing up for an apocalypse is not unlike Daniel Yergin's explanatory scheme of the dialectic between the American "national security state" and the Soviet "total security state." The difference, of course, is that Thompson takes the possibility of the apocalypse far more seriously than Yergin or the Harvard History Department. Finally, Thompson expects the actual slippage towards exterminism to come not from politics as we might expect — that is, from field of forces that must be analysed in terms of origins, intentions or goals, contradictions or conjunctures" (which he discounts) — but from the "messy inertia" of the weapons systems themselves. Thus he points to "pressures from the laboratories," "impatience amongst the war gamers," "the implacable upwards creep of weapons technology," or the "sudden hot flush of ideological passion" as its most likely immediate triggers. The specific scenarios of exterminism that he evokes tend towards either a Dr Strangelove or a latterday Sarajevo. In the first case, an accident — a computer malfunction, a paranoid airforce general, or perhaps only a low-flying formation of seagulls — trips the wire, disconnects the fail-safe mechanism and vapourizes the Northern hemisphere. In the second scenario — where analytic disputation is more possible — elaborate nuclear threats and linkages between conventional warfare and nuclear warfare have been emplaced as safeguards or signals to intimidate the enemy; the "enemy," however, is not intimidated (perhaps miscalculates) and the mad roulette of deterrence spins to a final halt at mutual assured destruction. This deeply pessimistic projection, on the other hand, coexists with a diagnosis that also points in a quite opposite direction. For, as we noted above, in Thompson's account exterminism is not only a fatal inertial thrust towards the end of Northern civilization, it is also, more hopefully, a formation in some sense external to and separable from the rival social systems which confront each other today, even if at present it prevails within both of them. This side of Thompson's analysis enables him to imagine the possible dismantling of the "deep structures of the Cold War" without the simultaneous dismantling of the deep structures of capitalist ownership or, for that matter, of bureaucratic domination. This vision finds its fullest and most generous expression in his recent pamphlet Beyond the Cold War. Its intellectual foundations are also there most clearly exposed. For in this text, the Cold War today — no longer just the arms race — is seen as a literally purposeless mechanism reproducing itself, whose only function is its own self-perpetuation. "What is the Cold War now about? It is about itself."1 No longer in any sense a rationally intelligible conflict, it is compulsive "habit" or "addiction" — if one materially supported by the sectional interests of "the military-industrial and research establishments of both sides, the security services and intelligence operations, and the political servants of these interests," and psychologically sustained by the need for internal bonding within American and Soviet societies, achieved by the mutual exclusion of a paradigmatic Other. Just because of this, "a revolt of reason and conscience," in the name of a common "human ecological imperative," could bring the Cold War to an end. The evidence of this revolt is the growth of the peace movements in Europe. For it was there that the Cold War started, and it is there that it could be overcome. "The Cold War can be brought to an end in only two ways: by the destruction of European civilization, or by the reunification of European political culture."2 Such a reunification would involve a detente of peoples rather than of states, unfreezing the glaciated divide between Western and Eastern Europe. But it would not necessarily abolish the principal economic or social structures of either. "Immense differences in social system would remain." But across them would now move "the flow of political and intellectual discourse, and of human exchange." As their rigid ideological and military guards came down, "the blocs would discover that they had forgotten what their adversary posture was about."3

### Link — Nation-State

#### Mainstream IR’s state-centric paradigm fails to recognize developments beyond Westphalian abstractions. That guarantees extinction.

Chengxin Pan 20, Faculty of Arts and Education, Deakin University, Australia, 2020, “Enfolding wholes in parts: quantum holography and International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations 2020, Vol. 26(S1) 14–38

According to the holographic worldview, the universe is “an undivided and unbroken whole” which is enfolded into parts. Thus, the division within as well as between society and nature is “a crude abstraction and approximation” (Bohm, 1980: 158, emphasis in original; see also Barad, 2007: 24–25). In his book Wholeness and the Implicate Order, Bohm expressed a pressing concern with the tendency to divide and subdivide the world into essentially different units or groupings: IR scholars are no stranger to the tendency described by Bohm. The world, apparently organized into sovereign states, appears to be as fragmented as ever, further compounded today by the rise of nationalism, populism, and identity politics, as well as by the socalled return to geopolitics or even the Cold War. All these fragmentations and conflicts in IR seem to conform with the Newtonian ontology of things. However, what is revealed in this orthodox ontology is merely the explicate order of IR, whose implicate order and implicate relations have yet to be adequately understood and theorized. Bohm’s insights into holographic relationality lay an important foundation for such theorizing in IR. As will be illustrated below, the Bohmian holographic theory can give IR, among other things, a stronger ontological commitment to whole and wholeness, a more holographic relational conception of parts such as states, and a novel account of differences as contingent and spatio-temporally situated unfoldments of holographic parts. Wholeness and the study of IR The concept of wholeness is central to Bohm’s ontological interpretation of quantum theory (Bohm, 1980; Bohm and Hiley, 1993; Zinkin, 1987: 6). Despite a growing effort to include a wider array of issues and factors, IR still has a rather “weak sense of a social whole” (Albert and Buzan, 2013: 121). Even as IR scholars focus on “macrolevel” factors such as international political systems, international structures, international societies, world systems, and global networks, these systemic factors are at best particular structural abstractions of world politics, such as anarchy, the distribution of capabilities, and international norms and rules. While these systemic or structural features are part and parcel of the whole, ontologically they are often seen as either mere external and causal determinants of state behavior, or ultimately reducible to parts (e.g. states, material resources, or ideas),15 rather than as the whole in the holographic sense of the word. By whole we mean the entirety of space, time, and the information, relations, structures, processes, movements, and parts/agents contained within that all-encompassing space-time. In the IR context, the whole goes well beyond states and the totality of their interactions. It embodies the whole social and ecological systems as well as their explicate and implicate relations both between and embedded within their constituent “parts.” Such “parts” may include regions, states, societies, cultures, religions, peoples, economies, markets, goods, histories, ideas, emotions, materials, creatures, and natural phenomena. Of course, what exactly makes up the whole for IR cannot be exhaustively tallied a priori, because by definition such a task is impossible in any given space-time. But the point is that wholeness should be given a higher ontological priority in IR. Just as trees do not grow as assemblages of previously separate branches, leaves, and roots, the world does not start off with merely fragmented parts and preexisting sovereign states which then come together to form a global system; it is the other way round: the whole permeates through the parts and forms the essential relational conditions under which parts emerge and exist. This approach makes it imperative for IR to look for relations in much broader contexts which otherwise have been invisible, understudied, or artificially carved up by mainstream IR. To advocate for wholeness does not mean always privileging “macro-level” issues at the global level. In any case, whole-part or macro-micro issues are always already entangled and co-emergent (Wendt, 2015: 257). Micro parts and issues, precisely because they are microscopic, may be particularly prone to be diffusely spread and enfolded into various parts of the whole. As a result, micro parts simultaneously develop an emergent, holographic property of the whole. The fact that the tiny coronavirus can be quickly enfolded into almost every corner of the whole world and turn global life upside down illustrates the part-whole entanglement, and we dismiss its holographically holistic nature and impact at our own peril. To further illustrate, often traditionally considered outside the purview of IR, micro issues or events such as music (Gienow-Hecht, 2015), sports (e.g. ping-pong diplomacy), the Chernobyl disaster (e.g. the collapse of the Soviet Union, van der Veen, 2013), a flight school in Florida (e.g. 9/11), US subprime mortgage crisis, Fukushima, Wikileaks, melting polar ice caps, a Tunisian street vendor (e.g. the Arab Spring and the Syria conflict) and now even COVID-19 may be all in various ways “localized” holographic instantiations of the wholes. As such, they can and do play an important part in both reflecting and shaping the whole, especially in the form of some unexpected events and surprising turns, such as the end of the Cold War, 9/11, the global financial crisis, the rise of Donald Trump, and the current global pandemic. True, some of those “micropolitical” issues have begun to attract IR’s attention (Kertzer, 2017; Solomon and Steele, 2017), but overall the discipline lacks an explicit and holographic ontological and conceptual foundation for a more systematic engagement with the duality of whole-part. Of course, we cannot deal with “the whole of reality all at once” (Bohm, 1980: 2; see also Wendt, 1999: 14). Often it is necessary to take things “apart” and analyze them as if they were separable units. But it is important to always remember the “as if” caveat, lest we reify them as something objectively autonomous. It is also worth remembering that ontologically international relations are always a holographic part of bigger wholes, not closed or autonomous systems or units in and of themselves. In this context, a quantum holographic perspective becomes imperative especially in the face, for example, of the increasingly apparent human-nature holographic entanglement as evidenced by mounting “local” environmental crises and their implications for economic development, international conflict, and planetary survival. Contrary to the prevailing IR approaches that continue to subordinate environmental issues to a state-centric framework and a “national economic” imperative (Saurin, 1996), a quantum holographic approach has the potential to bridge the ontological and conceptual division between the parts and the wholes.

#### The observer effect creates erroneous predictions in foreign policy. A quantum approach halts these false alarms.

Favour Obi-Okolie 14, Delta State University, Abraka Delta State, Nigeria, 2014, “Towards A Quantum Mechanical Model of Foreign Policy Analysis,” International Affairs and Global Strategy, Vol.27, 2014.

Uncertainty, as noted earlier, is one of the key features of quantum mechanics. It holds that no matter how carefully we observe, even with adequate knowledge of initial conditions, we can never objectively understand a physical reality. Applying the concept to politics, Cioffi-Revilla defines uncertainty as the “lack of sureness or absence of strict determination in political life”44 Rathbun furthers that “information is ambiguous because the world is complex and can only be approximated and partially understood due to cognitive limitations.”45 He therefore sought to explain the element of uncertainty within mainstream IR theories. For realists, it is experienced in fear of each other’s intention, while rationalists try to cope with uncertainty through international institutions charged to monitor and signal benign intent. For constructivists, uncertainty stems from an assumption that states are uncertain about action to take when norms as defined by identity are absent. Then cognitivists argue that uncertainty emanates from the confusion caused by the complexity of international politics as well as mental limitations of statesmen. 46 Assessing uncertainty from the quantum mechanical framework, we begin with Heisenberg who is arguably the first to introduce the principle. From his perspective, we cannot completely describe an object since we cannot simultaneously describe its momentum and position with exactitude. The more accurately we understand position, the less accurately we understand the momentum, vice versa. As such, it becomes impossible to predict the destination of a moving object since we cannot accurately determine its position and momentum at the same time. From quantum mechanical thought, this is may be due to hidden variables and/or non-locality. Non-locality describes the possibility of a quantum state to interact with another quantum state of the same pair, even when separated by large distances without an established means of communication. By position we refer to the location of an object relative to a reference point while momentum is taken to mean the measure of the motion of an object relative to its mass and velocity. Position in theoretical physics is synonymous with the condition of a State prior to an action or event being analysed. By condition we mean the geographic and politico-economic structure of a State. In the same vein, the foreign policy action of a State in a given case, accounts for momentum in physics. Therefore, by directly applying Heisenberg’s argument to foreign policy analysis, it is impossible to completely understand foreign policy behaviour of a State by merely understanding its condition prior to the behaviour being analysed. Also, it is impossible to predict the outcome of a given foreign policy behaviour. This explains why despite efforts to predict the outcome of a given foreign policy behaviour, mainstream approaches to foreign policy analysis have routinely fallen short in this regard. A good example showing the compatibility of Heisenberg’s uncertainty in foreign policy analysis could be found in the recent Arab Spring. An understanding of the socio-political landscape of the Arab world had led scholars of different schools to conclude that democracy was essentially incompatible with the Arab world. However, at the outbreak of the region-wide uprising, scholars began to foretell democratization. Soon, scholars began to make reversals in their predictions, such that it is no longer fashionable to equate the Arab uprising with democratization. What is deducible from this instance is that, in agreement with Heisenberg’s uncertainty, it is impossible to understand the present and predict the future by simply understanding initial conditions. This position is also understood by recalling that whereas the Cold War engaged IR scholars in a war of paradigms, none of the theories and models predicted the end of the conflict.47 Schrodinger’s wave equation furthers our understanding of the compatibility of quantum mechanics with foreign policy analysis. Inferring from his postulation, it is impossible to understand the totality of a State’s foreign policy behaviour. Rather, every State possesses every possible theoretical element that can be attributed to a State’s foreign policy. For instance, before observation is made, every state is weak and strong at the same time; aggressive and accommodating; cooperative and competitive. However, upon observation, the observer interferes with reality such that the condition of the State aligns with the premonition of the observer/analyst. Thus, we are uncertain of a State’s foreign policy behaviour until we decide to observe and/or analyse. Upon analysis, our uncertainty is substituted by the ‘creation’ of reality. It is at this point therefore that the foreign policy analyst relinquishes every claim to objectivity, having created the reality s/he claims to analyse. Relating the foregoing to Bohr’s contribution to Quantum Mechanics, the foreign policy analyst can no longer be regarded as an impartial observer but as an active participant. The instrument with which s/he assesses a phenomenon directly interacts with the physical object being observed to influence the result obtained. Consequently, we could safely assume that if no one was observing, then nothing would be existing. Then, should we now assume that occurrences in international politics are the creation of analysts? To a large extent, the answer weighs to the affirmative and accounts for why certain state and non-state actors, cognizant of this fact, have immensely invested towards gaining the attention of observers/analysts. Terrorist organizations routinely post videos of violence on the internet for analysts to ‘create’ their existence. States regularly release videos and images of military drills and military hardware. The essence is to gain attention of analysts who would therefore ‘create’ the desired reality. Indeed, terrorism is non-existent until it is so designated by analysts. More so, war is simply what analysts and observers make of it. In addition to the foregoing, quantum mechanics gives us insight in understanding causation. This is chiefly in its notion of interconnectedness which carries potentially far-reaching implications for foreign policy analysis. According to Senge, et al, we are now aware that interconnectivity is the organizing principle of the universe.48 The universe is interconnected in a complex web or relationships such that we cannot adequately understand a physical reality without acknowledging its web of relationships. However, this aspect of the universe was ignored by the Newtonian scientists perhaps as a result of the pervasiveness of relationships which can sometimes fade into the background so that “only the apparently separate ‘things’ of the world are noticed.”49 If objects are interconnected within the universe, do we then assume same for humans and States? Of course, yes. This is largely because humans as well as States share the same feature with all other objects: wave-particle duality. As particles they have form, boundaries, and identity while as wave, they possess an unstructured potential which, according to Zohar, spreads out across the boundaries of space, time, choice and identity.50 Therefore, State and non-State actors, as applicable to other objects, are interconnected or better still entangled in a complex manner that makes it particularly tasking if not impossible to accurately assess foreign policy behaviour. From the foregoing, it could be assumed that quantum mechanics emphasizes what we cannot do over what we can do. How does it then help our understanding of foreign policy? The answer is not far-fetched. By identifying what we cannot do, quantum mechanics saves us from raising false alarms and making erroneous claims. It rather makes case for intellectual diligence by encouraging cross-paradigmatic approach to foreign policy analysis. It underscores that no single theory or approach to foreign policy analysis is on its own adequate for foreign policy analysis. Thus, by engaging all possible approaches, the analyst increases the proportion of objectivity in his/her analysis.

### Link — Rationality

#### Their claim to rationality marks Western knowledge as the apex of truth to which all other epistemologies bow down — that creates borders where the African is marked as the irrational Other.

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[Modified] for ~~gendered language~~.

Control of Knowledge and Subjectivity

Ramose (2003) argues that the rationale that European colonialism operated on was an unsubstantiated belief that Africans, among other non-European races, were not rational beings hence, they were not entitled to what rational beings claimed as their entitlement and rights. He argues that: One of the bases of colonisation was that the belief ‘man is a rational animal’ was not spoken of the African, the Amerindian, and the Australasian. Aristotle’s definition of man was deeply inscribed in the social ethos of those communities and societies that undertook the so-called voyages of discovery—apparently driven by innocent curiosity. But it is well known that these voyages changed into violent colonial incursions. It seems then that the entire process of decolonisation has, among others, upheld and not jettisoned the questionable belief that ‘man is a rational animal’ excludes the African, the Amerindian, and the Australasian. (Ramose 2003: 1) What Ramose manages to reveal is that the imaginary right and exclusive claim to rationality by Europe(ans) is only realised because of material power fashioned to guard and preserve the myth that Africa is unable to rationally construct knowledge. The power of the gun is what Europe used to scatter its patterns, templates, designs and standards across the globe. Power in European terms is tantamount to instruments of control emitted by violence. This imaginary exclusive right to rationality by Europe(ans) has wide-ranging and extensive implications for knowledge production about Africa by Africans. This is meant to cast doubt and reinforce the modern bias on Africa and other non-European races; it is also meant to make the non-European doubt themselves as to their capacity to rationalise, think and philosophise. European imagination, and hence modernity, “is doubtful [that] Africans are wholly and truly human beings” and it questions the Africans’ capacity to philosophise (Ramose 2003: 5). The pattern that European imagination implanted in the mind of the African is to doubt herself and himself. This pattern is relatable to what Mudimbe (1987: 2) called the “organising structure” and what wa Thiongó (1981: 94) called the “organising principle”. This chapter adds the ‘ordering structure’ to the long-standing patterns of control that European civilisation subjected Africa to. The self-doubting African cannot and is not meant to know or produce knowledge about [theirself] ~~herself and himself~~, let alone [their] ~~her/his~~ surroundings and localities. Europeans, as are self-acclaimed exclusive recipients of rationality, have thus put themselves on a pedestal of knowledge production, and at the apex of correct and therefore truthful knowledge. There is an underlying attitude that exudes itself as though Europeans were the only race and civilisation that holds and embodies the truth. As a result, an African’s right to knowledge is contingent upon a “passive as well as uncritical assimilation” of the knowledge produced in Europe for Europeans and the whole world (Ramose 2003: 2). Africans are then supposed to faithfully implement the knowledge that is constructed, defined and designed “outside Africa” (ibid.). Coloniality of knowledge therefore refers to the Euro-North American intellectual thought as the referral point upon which all other epistemologies and knowledges are judged against. As an epistemological movement, “it has always been overshadowed by hegemonic Euro-north American-centric intellectual thought and social theories” (Ramose 2003: 2). Knowledge production, and the capacity to think and generate is a preserve of Euro-North American-centric modernity resulting in the creation of “border thinking” (Arturo Escobar in Mignolo 2001: 179). The thinking is located in the Euro-North American civilisation, beyond that geography, there exist no rationality. Such is the thinking of Euro-North American-centric civilisation.

### Link — Realism

#### Realism and rational choice theory explains the international system as only being sustained by Western cultural norms and values — this advances a social agenda in favor of ethnonationalism and fascism.

Reus-Smit ‘19 — Christian; Professor of International Relations at the University of Queensland, in Brisbane Australia. March 21, 2019; "International Relations Theory Doesn’t Understand Culture"; *Foreign Policy*; [edited for ableist language] <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/21/international-relations-theory-doesnt-understand-culture/>; //CYang

Realists are materialists at heart, yet they frequently make arguments that rest on cultural assumptions. They describe themselves as studying conflict groups, and when we probe the nature of these groups, they commonly appear as cultural units: nation-states with national characters, identities, and interests. The anarchic international system gives states certain primary interests — principally survival — but national culture is commonly seen as a key source of other interests.

Many realists admit that today’s international order rests on legitimacy as much as material might. And when explaining such legitimacy, they join others in emphasizing Western civilization, which is said to provide the norms and values that inform and sustain modern institutions. For former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and others, the erosion of this cultural foundation poses a fundamental threat. How can “regions with such divergent cultures, histories, and traditional theories of order vindicate the legitimacy of any common system?” Kissinger asked in his book World Order.

On the surface, it might seem like rational choice theory would have even less to say about culture than realism. Yet culture enters rationalist arguments, too, in three ways: when adherents explain the rational choice of norms, when they accommodate cultural preferences, and in their argument that common knowledge is essential to solving coordination problems. The last of these is particularly interesting, as it is here that rationalists express a version of IR’s default conception of culture. Coordination problems exist when actors have common interests but can only realize as much if they coordinate their choices, usually without direct communication.

To overcome such problems, actors rely on mutual expectations, and such expectations come from common knowledge: things I know, and you know, and we both know that we both know. Rationalists see cultural norms, values, and practices as a major source of such knowledge, and thus common culture is important to solving the variety of coordination problems actors navigate every day. Most rationalists focus on specific collaboration problems and localized common knowledge, but others make larger claims about social order. Here the claim is a familiar one: Culturally homogeneous societies, which they take as their baseline, are more conducive to the solution of coordination problems than diverse societies.

#### Prefer Hybrid IR instead of static realism – it reorients politics away from one of anarchy to the developing of marginalized first foreign policy.

Danso 22 [Kwaku Danso, 1-10-2022, African experiences and alternativity in International Relations theorizing about security, International Affairs, Volume 98, Issue 1, January 2022, Pages 67–83, https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/98/1/67/6484838] Eric

Social science knowledge production around security remains highly Eurocentric, often ‘shaped by specific cultures of thought, self-perpetuated epistemological superiority, and codified academic practices’.59 This Eurocentric bias constitutes a major barrier to dispassionate knowledge generation, leading to the misrepresentation of white security as global security; and by extension the politics of identity, which lies at the core of that bias, is occluded. In this context, Africa is particularly disadvantaged, as most scholarship that seeks to construct and mediate its conflicts is ungrounded and unrepresentative. The dominance of whiteness that is integral to such knowledge production results in a narrow and often parochial European perspective that is projected as universal. While taking cognizance of the geocultural diversity of ‘Africa’, which is highly dynamic, a more fundamental question about such methodological whiteness relates to the sources for the generation of the knowledge relating to Africa. Several contentions exist about what sources are available and necessary in presenting an African episteme that routinely overlooks orality as a credible source. Presenting an African episteme of alternativity must necessarily recognize orality as a credible source of knowledge. That acknowledgement of orality as a dependable source for structuring an African episteme was famously dismissed by Hugh Trevor-Roper, later Lord Dacre of Glanton, who asserted that: ‘Perhaps in the future there will be some African history to teach. But at present [the 1950s] there is none, or very little: there is only the history of Europeans in Africa. The rest is darkness.’60

Trevor-Roper’s contemptuous approach sought to consign Africa to the peripheries of history by overlooking the ways in which orality and oral traditions permeate every aspect of society, politics and everyday life. Hegel made similar trivializing conclusions about Africa. According to Kwame Anthony Appiah, in Hegelian thought, ‘Africa was tropical Africa, black Africa, tribal Africa, Africa without written records’—a place that Hegel had dismissed as not being a ‘historical continent’ in his Philosophy of History. 61 Orality, however, presents ‘a body of knowledge’ that forms the basis for the African community in thinking about the present, and moves beyond what E. H. Carr aptly captured as ‘the fetishism of documents’.62

Such fetishization effectively ignores African insecurities as they are experienced by social groups and communities across the continent. The absence of African insecurities from mainstream security knowledge attracts critical questions about the relevance of such knowledge, given the insufficiency of conventional IR and SS as neutral sites for knowledge production, knowledge dissemination and policy-making on African security. To counter Eurocentrism and therefore become relevant in African contexts, IR and SS discourses need to break with the stranglehold of the colonial past that is still present in European policy circles—as in the following quotation from a speech by the former French president, Nicolas Sarkozy: The tragedy of Africa is that the African man has never really entered history. The African peasant has known only the eternal renewal of time via the endless repetition of the same actions and the same words. In this mentality, where everything always starts over again, there is no place for human adventure nor for any idea of progress.63

This anachronistic trope and the other Eurocentric perspectives discussed earlier invisibilize African agency and embedded resources that have potential for regenerative responses to the security challenges facing African states and their societies. Thus, an episteme of alternativity appears necessary in order to decolonize security knowledge and its impact on policy-makers by helping to establish an ‘alternative’ epistemology of IR and SS that is genuinely global, inclusive and universal.

The episteme of alternativity refers to ‘the extent to which knowledge production endeavours to offer conceptual and practical alternatives for addressing current problems and/or for achieving normative and political goals and practical solutions via deconstructive and reconstructive modes of critique’ or inquiry.64 An episteme of alternativity is, therefore, an intellectual device embedded in critical discourses to enable the identification and transformation of problems on the basis of alternative interpretations and strategies in order to expand the possibilities for freedom and emancipation.65 Related to the episteme of alternativity are ‘alternative discourses’, conceived as the set of discourses developed in opposition to conventional Eurocentric social science. This set of discourses represents ‘a revolt against “intellectual imperialism”’ in the sense that it constitutes an ideational or intellectual setting in the ongoing struggle against neo-colonialism and racism in both intellectual and policy spaces.66 Similarly, alternative discourses challenge the racially slanted division of labour in the social sciences, within the political economy of knowledge and in the corresponding hegemonic structuring of knowledge generation, which ignores orality as a credible source.

The idea of alternativity or alternative discourse is linked to ‘alternative interpretations and strategies, based on normative commitments that differ from those articulated, or discoverable, in discourses or social arrangements in question, to facilitate the emancipation of subaltern social forces’.67 Thus, rather than constituting a single totalizing perspective, alternativity as an episteme serves as an ontological and epistemological site, first, for debunking entrenched knowledge deriving from path dependence, slavery, coloniality or the continuing entrapment in Eurocentrism of scholarly and policy discourses; and second, for the constitution or recognition of alternative knowledge and experiences that solve scholarly and practical problems. The process of deconstruction and reconstruction of knowledge, therefore, requires a focus on surrounding subnational, national and regional historical experiences and cultural practices in order to build situated alternatives or contextually grounded knowledge that enhance freedom and emancipation.68

While emphasizing the crucial role of ‘alternatives’, alternativity as an episteme does not imply the wholesale rejection of western scholarship or the replacement of concepts and categories used in western social science with non-western ones. Rather, it encourages thinking in eclectic or universal terms in order to decolonize knowledge through the integration of experiences and perspectives originating from the non-West into IR and SS discourses and theorizing. Thus the first stage in generating alternative discourse is to identify and expose Eurocentrism or Orientalism and their implications for spaces formerly colonized by Europeans. In relation to security in particular, these phenomena can be traced to the ‘omnipresence of statist assumptions’ still prevalent in SS.69

This is typical of traditional IR theories such as realism, which perceives security as a derivative of power.70 The perception of security as a function of power is based on the logic of anarchy and on the assumptions, first, that political differences and economic disputes within the state are always addressed authoritatively, and second, that threats to security will always originate from outside in the form of state aggression. The insufficiency of this perspective when applied to the context of Africa or current global challenges, including environmental stresses and strains as well as health pandemics such as Ebola and COVID-19, seems obvious.71 In Africa, it is the dynamics of state–society relations that are critical to understanding security. In other words, the relationship between the state and its citizens, in terms of state action and or inaction and the corresponding social responses, has been important in shaping security outcomes on the continent. The dominant statist assumption that underpins the Weberian state is therefore at variance with the underlying realities of the African context, where security policy (or, for that matter, security governance) is an outcome of the intermingling of multiple orders that are linked to both state and non-state actors within a framework of hybridity.

The concept of hybrid security orders is an evolving perspective that has the potential to elaborate and complement IR and SS theorizing about security, as it offers a perspective outside the conventional western assumptions and points of reference. The concept is emerging as an alternative framework to the legal– rational approach to politics and security which, while intrinsic to the state-centric logic of IR and SS, hardly reflects the lived experiences of most people outside the OECD states, often portrayed as the model against which the degree of state functionality and stability is judged.72 It reflects the ways in which the interplay between different actors and institutions, across the formal/informal divide, shapes the sites where security is conceived, negotiated, enacted and re-enacted. As a non-state-centric approach to security governance, hybridity has been defined as ‘the multiple sites of political authority and governance where security is enacted and negotiated’, including ‘the multiple ways traditional, personal, kin-based or clientelistic logics interact with modern, imported, or rational actor logics in the shifting historical conditions of particular national and local contexts’.73

Thus, unlike the Weberian state, which monopolizes the legitimate use of violence in order to provide security and other public goods, the African state must share the function of security governance with other actors, each of which may be perceived as legitimate and authoritative in its own right. While the Weberian or western security logic, which underpins the state fragility discourse, might identify the diffusion of power and authority over the apparatus of violence as a malady that needs to be cured in order to assure security, hybrid political orders conceive of the diversity of actors within the security arena as a source of strength and resilience in a context where the state has very limited reach and barely permeates its territorial peripheries. A limited state presence or state-delivered security does not, however, imply a return to the Hobbesian state of nature, as securitization theory and its underlying methodological whiteness logic suggest. This is because there exist a plethora of pre-colonial structures and institutions organized around clan heads, chiefs, queen mothers, traditional priests and secret societies that continue to maintain law and order,74 particularly in relational communities where members sharing a common sense of identity/kinship, language, religion and norms place strong emphasis on the values of collectivism, rather than individualism.75 Nor are statutory institutions necessarily the preferred forum for seeking justice and the resolution of political differences. Research suggests, for instance, that more than 80 per cent of day-to-day disputes in Africa are resolved through non-statutory mechanisms.76

In Liberia, for example, people in relational communities generally have a preference for out-of-court settlement of disputes, airing their grievances and seeking redress through indigenous structures, perceiving the police and the statutory courts as an ‘enemy’ and a ‘breeding ground for conflict in the community’.77 This is because the retributive justice delivered by statutory courts often carries the potential to distort and undermine the interlocking web of economic, political, social and strategic interdependence, such that relational disharmony ensues. The purpose of justice in such communities, therefore, is not to punish in the punitive sense traditionally upheld in western jurisprudence, but to achieve ‘an outcome that both sides accept as a fair basis for resettlement and the restoration of the unity and harmony that have been disrupted. Reconciliation is a cardinal principle of the settlement of disputes entrenched in communities across Africa.’78

The point is not to romanticize or idealize indigenous mechanisms of justice, security or conflict, as they are often no more effective than statutory institutions beyond the specific confines of relational communities in which they hold force. Indeed, they come with multiple problems, including their patriarchal hierarchies, which provide the basis for the exclusion of women and young people from processes of decision-making, and their tendency to gloss over people’s fundamental human rights and to corrode the legal–rational basis of the state. In fact, uncritical preoccupation with the ‘traditional’ ‘obscures the potentially regressive and violent features of governance beyond the margins of the state’.79 The fact remains, however, that these non-state entities exist empirically with huge influence on security governance, particularly when the state is unable or unwilling to deliver basic public goods, a rather common feature of the African state. These entities support the state and complement its institutions, enhancing the overall resilience of the system. They should be seen not as mechanisms to be supplanted within the ideational and material context shaped by methodological whiteness, in which context the African state continues to suffer from a legitimacy deficit, but as possessing a positive potential as agents of security governance, which can be harnessed to provide the state with a modicum of resilience.

Recognizing hybridity as an aspect of alternativity can enhance the policy relevance of research and knowledge production in IR and SS, particularly as ‘the boundaries between state and non-state security institutions have eroded to the point where they have become almost indistinguishable and their personnel are virtually interchangeable’.80 Hybridity therefore provides a veritable laboratory and a perspective that not only can complement and elaborate IR and SS knowledge generation and policy articulation, but can improve the security experiences and well-being of people in Africa and beyond, as they are recognized as both objects and subjects of security with agency.

### Link — Western

#### Displaying Europe as the “apex of civilization” alienates BIPOC populations and normalizes western rules.

--- this can be the catch all link that you just use to point out problematic shit in the 1AC.

Danso 22 [Kwaku Danso, 1-10-2022, African experiences and alternativity in International Relations theorizing about security, International Affairs, Volume 98, Issue 1, January 2022, Pages 67–83, https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/98/1/67/6484838] Eric

This is particularly evident in methodological whiteness, which whitewashes how race, as a generative and structuring device, has been intrinsic to knowledge production and the manner in which this influences ways of making sense of the world. Methodological whiteness, according to Bhambra, represents a way of reflecting on the world that fails to acknowledge the role played by race in the very structuring of that world, and of the ways in which knowledge is constructed and legitimated within it. It fails to recognise the dominance of ‘Whiteness’ as anything other than the standard state of affairs and treats a limited perspective—that deriving from White experience—as a universal perspective.21

Thus, methodological whiteness reflects a denial of the centrality of identity politics in the construction of the global power structure that the West constituted for itself. This single-image mode of worlding or world-making clearly shows the reluctance of IR scholarship to go beyond the popular Westphalian model to expose the role played by slavery and empire in the merger of the world as a single political unit—let alone the extent to which these historical processes structured human relationships and continue to organize the modern world.22

Howell and Richter-Montpetit suggest that the concept of ‘human’ is a constituted effect of the enslavement of ‘others’ and their concomitant rendering into things or subjects who were never considered as ‘(fully) human’ in the first instance.23 This mode of signification represented the ‘Black or savage Other’ as the foil against which the idea of ‘humanity’ takes on meaning. The configuration of the world and the organization of human relationships within it is, therefore, a product of racism and colonialism. The structuring effect of race is manifest in most western scholarship, including Samuel Huntington’s influential ‘The clash of civilizations’. According to Huntington, a civilization is ‘the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species’.24 While identifying civilization as marking the boundary between ‘humans’ and ‘other species’, Huntington casts doubt on the possibility of an African civilization. In his assessment of international events and processes following the termination of the Cold War, Huntington claimed that world politics would be shaped largely by the interactions among ‘seven or eight major civilizations’, which he identified as ‘Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African civilization’.25

This account demonstrates how white biases intrude on scholarly reasoning in the hegemonic production and reproduction of the world and on the place accorded to Africa within it. Not only does Huntington’s account signify the continuous reinvention of Africa, which is invariably represented as occupying the bottom link of the human ‘Chain of Being; that is, on a rung of the ladder lower than that of all’,26 his scepticism regarding whether or not Africa constitutes a civilization, which, according to him, distinguishes humans from other species, recalls how chattel slavery ‘dehumanized’ black Africans, rendering them into things, the property of the European slave master. The process of dehumanizing, in turn, stripped Africans of voice, submerging and silencing them, thereby enabling Europe, which ostensibly was more articulate and possessed of the finer forms of reason and morals, to arrogate to itself the role of the creator of ‘truths’ and the ultimate judge of morals and virtues. Such perspectives have also been informed by the absence of both comprehensive documented accounts and holistic archaeological evidence that shed light on Africa in past times, thereby leaving the reconstruction of Africa’s past and its historical scholarship to western scholars, who have tended to ignore orality as a tool for reconstructing the past.27

Thus, as well as writing the history of ‘man’ from its own perspective, Europe also downgraded the markers of knowledge for others to the ‘status of folklore, myths and shamanism’, distinguishing them from the ‘rational’, ‘logical’ and ‘objective’ approaches to knowledge production that were deemed hallmarks of European civilization.28 Methodological whiteness, by implication, is intrinsic to the process of determining the very nature of that which is just, right and morally permissible. Not even the construction of such seemingly inclusive concepts as cosmopolitanism and universalism are devoid of political effects, as they were characterized by the exclusion of non-European voices,29 and by the omission of slavery. Even Immanuel Kant—who is widely considered the prophet of normative universalism and moral cosmopolitanism30—ironically omits the institution of slavery from most of his major treatises on love, humanity and solidarity, while writing at a time when ‘slavery was both the reality and the most potent metaphor for the absence of liberty’.31 The contradictions and limits within Kantian thinking, and its links to colonialism and practices of racialization, undermine the acclaimed universalism of Kant’s law of hospitality.

Thus, despite the much-vaunted claim to objectivity in social science, and the representation of social science concepts, methods and knowledge as race-neutral, figures such as Huntington and Kant exemplify the way in which race is integral to knowledge generation and the manner in which the process of knowledge production is an outcome of underlying power relations.32 Their hegemonic construction of knowledge shows how methodological whiteness interferes with scholarly reasoning, constraining the potential for dispassionate knowledge generation. At the same time, methodological whiteness shows how the occlusion of race and coloniality remains a constitutive element of the IR and SS disciplines as well as of the very construction of the subjects and objects of security in world politics. The process involves the accentuation of certain facts, which is also known as ‘presence’, and the omission or suppression of others, through a process of ‘erasure’, in discussions of world politics. In other words, the absence or erasure of race is deployed either to make ‘becoming like Europe a moral imperative’,33 or, through colonially scripted imageries, to dismiss African agency and thereby to justify and perpetuate European paternalism on the continent. The proclivity of methodological whiteness to generate biased characterizations and interpretations of African people and their insecurities means that gaps often exist between what is captured in IR and SS knowledge as ‘truths’ and what actually pertains on the ground. This raises fundamental questions about the relevance and validity of truth claims in ongoing IR and SS scholarly and policy discourses in relation to states and societies in Africa.

Moreover, the constitutive character of race means that the dominance of whiteness manifests itself even when western academics and policy professionals make conscious efforts to leave many of their biases at the door.34 In other words, even when western scholars seek to be kind and sympathetic towards people in the non-West, they often struggle to overcome the structures of coloniality and the political and cultural instruments that have excluded colonized people from knowledge-forming and decision-making. It is for this reason that Wallerstein concludes that a majority of critical social science literature ends up reproducing tropes of Eurocentric bias in its analyses.35

Howell and Richter-Montpetit demonstrate this systematically by showing how Foucauldian security studies and the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory, which purport to serve as crucial correctives, end up reaffirming Eurocentric thought in security discourses.36 They show how the use of racially coded concepts project Europe as the apex of civilization while locating the modern-day equivalent to Hobbes’s ‘state of nature’ in the former colonial spaces in Africa. The Copenhagen School’s securitization theory,37 which otherwise reflects a clear methodological rigour in IR and SS theorizing, and openly recognizes race as a problem, has been exposed by Howell and Richter-Montpetit as a theory constituted by and steeped in racism. They identify in securitization theory an idea of ‘civilizationism’ which comprises ‘racist (theoretical) perspectives’ rooted in three basic assumptions: (1) Civilizations can, and ought to, advance, and some (western) civilizations are more ‘advanced’; (2) civilizational progress is not only technological and material, but political and moral; and (3) the ‘underdevelopment’ of certain civilizations represents a problem for, or threat to, developed ones.38

These assumptions combine with methodological whiteness and ‘antiblack racism’ to distinguish between politics and security, or politicization, which signifies reasoned or civilized dialogue engaged in by Europe/the West, and securitization, which is represented as coming with potential degeneration into a racially scripted imagery of an uncivilized ‘state of nature’, located mostly in African settings. Securitization, therefore, serves as a justification for breaking ‘normal’ political rules.

The pervasive nature of methodological whiteness means that its pernicious effects are also traceable to even scholarly works by many southern or non-western thinkers. This happens through the process of internalization or ‘internalized Orientalism’ whereby people, including scholars and policy-makers, develop a feeling of inferiority or self-hatred, while identifying with the radically different ideas handed over by the former colonizers.39 Through this process, black people come to share in the false belief that they are inferior to the white colonizers.40 This distorted image becomes manifest as an outcome of the psychological dimensions of colonization, made possible through the imposition of the colonizer’s systems of language, culture, religion and education. These cultural processes converge to develop in the minds of the colonized the corrupted belief that they are culturally inferior to whites and others, resulting in a sense of shame and self-contempt that leads to a feeling of hopelessness and a desire to think and behave like Europeans.41 As consequence, the West comes to serve as the point of reference not only for the former colonizer, but also for the postcolonial states and their citizens. When complemented by internalization or internalized Orientalism, methodological whiteness ossifies, becoming all the more resistant to change. The received wisdom that represents the West as the producer of security knowledge, on the one hand, and Africa as the consumer of security knowledge, on the other, has much to do with the failure to recognize the role played by race in the construction of the world and the production of knowledge within it.

These unequal relations also underpin and sustain the political economy of knowledge production,42 and the current balance of power between scholars in the West and their counterparts in the global South, resulting in what Alatas terms ‘academic dependency’ in the social sciences.43 In this relation of dependency, the building and testing of theory, as well as methodological innovations, are considered legitimate tasks of scholars in the global North, while scholars in the developing world are consigned to the collection of empirical data. The nature of this division of labour implies that theoretical and methodological innovation remains a major challenge for African scholars, who must meet western standards of knowledge production and of what constitutes legitimate knowledge. As a result, African scholars are often under-represented in most top international peer-reviewed journals in the social and physical sciences. This power imbalance has had implications for policy articulation and ownership in Africa, in the sense that security policy around such issue areas as security sector reform; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; and counter-insurgency has often been informed by knowledge generated by scholars from the global North.

Western control over the political economy of knowledge is further sustained through funding agencies from the OECD countries, which often exert huge influence on security knowledge production and policy focus through the funding priorities they emphasize. The colonial conditions in the political economy of knowledge are obscured by multiple strategies devised around research grants, privileges, scholarships, overseas education, publishing and citation practices. A particularly abrasive dimension is manifest in the form of ‘powerful’ scholars who have ‘built a small empire within an empire, strategically appropriating the contributions’ and ideas of scholars in the global South for their parochial interests with hardly any genuine or meaningful engagement with those in the subaltern position.44

### — China —

### Link — China

#### The 1AC’s “China threat” construction is a psychological projection of Western decline that seeks to maintain and extend militant imperialism in the Asian sphere.

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The “China threat” mentioned so often by U.S. officials in all quarters of Washington D.C. is a different kind of projection of power—a psychological projection of the coming end of the U.S.’ ability to dictate global affairs without any significant challenge. The United States, unlike China, has little to offer Africa or the rest of the Global South. U.S. share in the global economy has shrunk and the economic crisis precipitated by the COVID-19 pandemic will only accelerate this trend. Many nations in the Global South, especially African nations, have experienced generation after generation of poverty and underdevelopment under the U.S.-dominated financial arrangements of the IMF and World Bank . U.S. imperialism has deployed much of its military arsenal to Africa and Asia to arrest the possibility of South-South cooperation replacing U.S. and Western domination. The U.S. ruling class is not in complete agreement over how to carry out the related tasks of containing China and suppressing the self-determination of African nations. Former president Barack Obama expanded the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) to all but a single African country principally to gain political and military influence over African governments and persuade them over time to reject China. AFRICOM’s growth also aligned with the Obama administration’s “Pivot to Asia,” which ultimately laid the basis for the massive militarization of the Asia Pacific that Trump now oversees. China’s containment was primarily regarded as a project of military coercion where nations in Africa and Asia would bow to the dictates of the United States without needing to engage in direct conflict with China.

“The U.S. share in the global economy has shrunk.” Large sections of the Pentagon were not satisfied with this strategy. Out of the lust for a more confrontational approach with China came the strategy of “Great Power competition.” This strategy did not neglect the “Pivot to Asia” but rather buttressed the military encirclement of China with a host of maneuvers. Even more military assets have been shifted to the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, once called the Pacific Command, to the point of potentially draining AFRICOM of its own military resources. This would, as AFRICOM Commander General Stephen Townsend pointed out in his testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, leave the U.S. vulnerable to losing access to rare earth minerals and other vital resources on the continent that “America needs.” The disagreement within the military industrial complex over how to best contain China is a matter of form, not substance. Full-spectrum Dominance is where the entirety of the U.S. political and military apparatus has reached a uniform consensus. China and Africa are thus not only connected by their hundreds of billions worth in trade arrangements but also by their shared experience as targets of imperialism. The U.S. Indo-Pacific Command is currently in possession of over half of all U.S. military assets with more coming. Four hundred U.S. military bases surround China in countries such as Japan, South Korea, and the U.S. colony of Guam . While AFRICOM may be partially reduced to strengthen the U.S.’ military presence in the Asia-Pacific, there is no doubt that the U.S. will continue to undermine African sovereignty and use China, and to a smaller degree Russia, as justification.

The last and perhaps most important point I want to make is that the struggle for self-determination of oppressed nations is always an ideological struggle. Full-spectrum Dominance is a racist project. U.S. and Western media portray Africa and China in much of the same light. Africa is portrayed as a chaotic and backward continent where corruption is endemic and inherent to political life. Africans need the U.S. military to be safe and secure from themselves. China, on the other hand, is the chief “authoritarian” country in the world for its supposed suppression of Muslims in Xinjiang, protestors in Hong Kong, and, according to the Economist , people in mainland China by way of its campaign to alleviate poverty. Asia therefore needs the U.S. military to be safe and secure from China. These jingoistic portrayals of China and Africa provide fertile ideological ground for the U.S. empire to maintain and expand military operations under the guise of stamping out terrorism or countering the “China threat.” “Full-spectrum Dominance is where the entirety of the U.S. political and military apparatus has reached a uniform consensus.”

The transformation of Africa into a terrain for U.S. militarism has also brought about an ideological shift in the U.S. from a white savior industrial complex attitude of charity to a return of the White Man’s Burden mentality of re-civilizing the continent through force. Just as we know AFRICOM to be a coordinated military assault in the broader project of U.S.-led neocolonialism in Africa, so too is the U.S.’ military buildup in the Asia-Pacific part of a broader project to establish U.S.-compliant governments in Asia, including China. China is no longer just a convenient scapegoat for the hollowing out of the U.S. economy. Lockheed Martin and Raytheon directly fund think-tanks like the Austrailian Strategic Policy Institute to villainize China so that the U.S. can ban their social media apps, close their consulates, and sanction Chinese government officials in the name of the U.S.’ military strategy of Great Power competition. A key task in developing a united movement to eradicate U.S. military expansionism in Africa and in Asia is to be very clear about its severe consequences for the future of humanity at large. The U.S.-led overthrow of Libya in 2011 paved the way for the death and displacement of millions in Africa and the Middle East, as well as an explosion in the expansion of AFRICOM. U.S. attempts to gain political and military control of the Asia-Pacific means that nations in the region will be subject to the same economic and political development model employed in Africa. China and Africa are targets of the same criminal system that produces conditions of economic and political instability all over the world. And while the U.S. would be foolish to provoke a hot war with China, anti-imperialist forces the world over must understand that to leave the cause of peace and self-determination up to the aggressors is akin to political suicide

#### Representations of China as a threat justify U.S imperialism and the progress of Western racial superiority.

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For years, indeed since the period of the Enlightenment (seventeenth to eighteenth century), the European perception of other cultures had been framed by a grand narrative of human progression where the West was seen as representing the apex of human evolution. This belief was central to the social Darwinian theory in the social sciences, which provided the ideological justifcation for colonialism and global empire building [6]. The idea of racial and cultural diferences as a basic tenet of social discourse has prevailed over the years as a way of framing social change and human conflict. A prominent case of this strand of view is Huntington’s notion of ‘clash of civilizations’ and his division of the world into separate and competing civilizations [7]. Huntington argues that Western civilization is naturally dominant and remains distinctive from other cultures: European communities…will share cultural features that distinguish them from Arab or Chinese communities. Arabs, Chinese and Westerners, however, are not part of any broader cultural identity [8].

In his work on ‘Orientalism’, Edward Said, a critic of Huntington, critically examines how the West has reimagined, reconstructed and culturally reframed ‘the Orient’ as a means of pacifcation, domestication, subjugation and domination [9]. The orientalization of others has been a feature of European perception and representation of colonial and post-colonial societies [10]. This is part of a broader narrative of racial hierarchy which ranks ‘other’ societies as inferior and the West as the indisputable force for human civilization and progress [11]. The ‘civilizing mission’ became a part of European capitalist imperialism via its many constituent agencies such as Christianity, liberalism, racial superiority, science and military intervention [12].

This broad theme of image making to frame and defne others is the central focus of this paper. It focuses primarily on the historical roots of Sinophobia, the racialized construction of Chinese threat. The perception of an aggressive Chinese state, potentially hegemonic Chinese culture and expansionist economic interests through the Belt and Road initiative have all contributed to the construction of an imagery which is both racialized and a leverage for geopolitical and strategic contestation. Racialized framing works both ways. Chinese nationalism and anti-foreigner perception have been documented and goes back into history [13, 14]. While a lot have been written about Sinophobia, this chapter is more concerned with its history and how it has evolved over the years to better understand some of the implicit racialized underpinnings of contemporary geopolitics, especially the growing anti-China narratives amongst the Western powers such as the USA and Australia.

A dominant feature of contemporary Pacifc geopolitics is the way China is demonized by the ‘Western’ powers such as Australia, the USA, France and New Zealand as illegitimate intruders into a part of the world which Australian prime minister, Scott Morison, referred to as ‘our own backyard’ [15]. Referring to a move it attempted to sponsor to investigate the origin of COVID-19, the Australian prime minister insinuated that the ‘West’ should show solidarity and decisiveness against China’s ‘imperial power’ and ‘bully’ tactics [16].

Sinophobic narrative has morphed into an everyday political cliché as a result of repetitive enunciation over time, its role in geopolitical and ideological leveraging runs deep into the realm of cultural and racial prejudice to the extent that geopolitical paranoia has ‘blended neatly with thoroughly racialized forms of Western knowledge production’ [17]. The Sinophobic narratives and manoeuvrings by the USA, France and Australia in the Pacifc today have deeper racial and historical roots which can be traced back to the Western powers’ fear and demonization of China in the nineteenth century when global colonial interests began in earnest as well as the international transportation and treatment of Chinese labourers and how these shaped racial perceptions [18]. Sinophobia was a convenient ideological tool to justify capitalist penetration of China and the transportation and exploitation of cheap Chinese labour to other parts of the world. Today, Sinophobic sentiments form a justifcatory geopolitical narrative for Western powers and this is certainly the case in the Pacifc region, which has been an arena of big power contestation for much of the twentieth century.

The colonial history of anti-Chinese geopolitical narratives has evolved over the years and strands of this racialized perception continue today in both explicit and implicit forms since the European imperial penetration of China during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. These racialized imageries were used to justify extraction of Chinese labour, resources, land and control of its market. Colonial expansion and capitalist penetration were symbiotic processes [12]. This was a similar story throughout the world where European colonialism needed to justify their economic and political conquest by framing the colonized as readily exploitable subhumans with lower levels of intelligence and culture [19]. This trend continues and is part of global geopolitics where subconscious cultural and racialized bias underpins security and developmental narratives [20]. Western perceptions of non-Western states are often coloured with a sense of ‘otherness’, diference and even superiority-inferiority relationship. In the Pacifc, this was characteristic of Western perception of the Soviet Union during the Cold War and of China in the post-Cold War era. Overall, this paper makes the assertion that the Sinophobic narratives which help to define Pacific geopolitics in the contemporary era have deeper historical roots which are linked to the racialization of imperial conquest and exploitation in the last three centuries.

### Link — China — Cyber Threat

#### Depicting China as a cyber-threat is an Orientalist demarcation that renders China uncivilized and in need of US intervention.

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China as thief: cyber battles

The construction of China as potential enemy Other takes on an additional hue when we look at the depictions of China’s cyber activities—China moves from cheat to a more malicious cousin, the thief. The United States first focused on issues of “cyber warfare” in the mid-2000s to late 2000s, but at the time, the trope associated with China was not necessarily that of thief. In the mass news media, a militaristic lens framed much of the discussion, depicting China as a rule breaker flouting international norms and thus posing a security threat. For example, a Los Angeles Times article highlighted that “China in the last year has developed ways to infiltrate and manipulate computer networks around the world in what U.S. defense officials conclude is a new and potentially dangerous military capability, according to a Pentagon report” (Barnes, 2008). China is even placed in relation to al-Qaeda: “Cyber-attacks and cyber-espionage pose a greater potential danger to U.S. national security than Al Qaeda and other militants that have dominated America’s global focus since Sept. 11, 2001, the nation’s top intelligence officials said Tuesday” (Dilanian, 2013). This juxtaposition with al-Qaeda only served to heighten the military valence of China’s cyber activities, and a push to prepare for such a threat. Indeed, in the words of Senator Bill Nelson (D-FL): “The threat, to be sure, is real—and, we cannot allow ourselves to grow complacent …” (Nelson 2008). Snowden’s revelations of US spying on China in June of 2013 drastically changed the shape of the discussion however. Snowden demonstrated that the NSA (1) had two data centers in China from which it had been inserting spy software into vulnerable computers; (2) targeted the Chinese University of Hong Kong, public officials, businesses, and students; (3) hacked mobile phones; and (4) in 2009, hacked the Pacnet headquarters in Hong Kong, which runs one of the biggest regional fibre-optic networks. In response to Snowden’s revelations, a spate of articles compared the United States’ and China’s hacking, displaying a range of attitudes from journalists—some espoused that both countries demonstrate equivalent transgressive behavior, while others argued that China has crossed the line into more aggressive hacking that goes beyond the United States’ more benign “preemptive” hacking.

The latter attitude indicates the resilience of tropes of the Yellow and Red Perils, a China whose inherent ideological and cultural differences with the West makes it a threat. The different lenses through which journalists and pundits viewed China’s spying in comparison with that of the United States further invoke this Orientalist demarcation. An article in The Washington Post thus contrasts China’s behavior against that of the United States, which merely seeks “to examine huge amounts of communication metadata around the world to look for trends” and “to preempt some threat against the U.S.” China’s spying is described, however, as “infiltrating almost every powerful institution in Washington, D.C.,” “breaking into major news organizations,” “stealing sensitive military technology,” and “stealing so much intellectual property that China’s hacking has been called the ‘greatest transfer of wealth in history’” (Fisher, 2013). Drawing in particular on incendiary words like “stealing” and “infiltrating,” this article distinguishes China as a sneaky thief. US journalists and pundits, in charging China with stealing economic resources, have further solidified the demarcation of China as an inferior and dangerous Other. A well-circulated quote by national security pundit Adam Segal stated, “The problem is we’re not talking about the same things … We’re trying to make a distinction between cyber economic espionage and normal political-military espionage. The Chinese don’t make that same distinction” (Bengali & Dilanian, 2015). By portraying China as unable to grasp the fundamental distinction between economics and national security, Segal suggests China’s thievery is connected to a more fundamental character flaw—China is unable to grasp proper civilized norms. Similarly, US official response has been that China’s view of data collection as a sovereign right has rendered them essentially different from the United States and by implication, the civilized world. That Chinese governmental espionage involves the collection of economic intelligence that is shared with Chinese companies further departs from civilized norms. Michael Rogers, Director of the National Security Agency thus explained that “they clearly don’t have the same lines in the sand, if you will, with that regard” (Bennett, 2015). Historically, US depictions of China as uncivilized have occurred whenever China has gained power or threatened US interests. The narrative of China as a sort of child following in the United States’ footsteps on the path to modernity has proven exceedingly popular since World War II and frames the US approach to China as a potential ally and resource who at the same time may never be civilizable (Kim, 2010; Vukovich, 2012). In this Orientalist narrative, China’s journey to modernity is always understood as precarious and, moreover, subject to US vigilance as to whether it meets the appropriate benchmarks. The title of an editorial in The Washington Post epitomizes current iterations of this sentiment and the ease with which Orientalist imagery can be invoked to portray China’s path to modernity as needing US guidance when China falls out of line: “The US Needs to Tame the Cyber-Dragon: Stronger Measures are Need[ed] to Block China’s Economic Espionage [emphasis mine]” (“The U.S. Needs to Tame,” 2013). In reality, US vigilance can be attributed to the concern since the end of the Cold War, that a “sleeping giant” able to challenge US global hegemony is awakening (Kim, 2010).

Thus, the cultural work done by portrayals of China as unable to adhere to civilized norms serve to bolster the image of China as perpetually unprepared to be a responsible member of the international community. In fact, this narrative of China’s thievery serves to persuade the American public that China is a threat to the international community. One Wall Street Journal journalist perfectly echoes this sentiment: A China that leads the world in the theft of intellectual property, computer hacking and resource nationalism will prove extremely destabilizing. If it continues on this course, Beijing should not be surprised if other countries begin to band together to collectively counter some of the more harmful implications of China’s rise. A better outcome for all will be for China to embrace its responsibilities to help lead the world … (Metzl, 2011) This article, although hopeful that China may at some future point become a responsible global actor, even leader, ultimately reifies the notion that an increase in China’s global power is always suspect.

### Link — China — IR

#### Assertions of realism and liberalism recreate the Aff’s conflict scenarios. Only the alternative provides a sufficient frame to form policy solutions.

Chengxin Pan 22, Faculty of Arts and Education, Deakin University, Australia, 2022, “Chapter 10: China’s Rise as Holographic Transition: A Relational Challenge to International Relations’ Newtonian Ontology,” China’s Rise and Rethinking International Relations Theory, page 210-233

A China that holographically emerges out of the contemporary globalized world cannot be adequately understood by theories that are still based on the Newtonian ontology, which treats states like China as ontologically separate and distinct. In opening up a new ontological perspective, this chapter now turns to a brief examination of why mainstream IR theories, particularly realism and liberalism, need to be rethought. First, realism, and power transition theory in particular (Tammen and Kugler, 2006; Lai, 2011), have almost completely overlooked China’s contemporary holographic transition. Analysts from those perspectives routinely see in China the rise of a Nazi Germany-like great power, but the world in which China has been rising has largely moved on from the one in which Nazi Germany emerged. The current international system is more ‘regime-intensive’ than the period during which Europe and the United States came into prominence (Lanteigne, 2005: 32). Western theorists may have good reason to draw upon past European and American experiences to fear the prospect of China adopting its own ‘Monroe Doctrine’ or falling into the ‘Thucydides Trap’ (Allison, 2017). What they fail to adequately appreciate is that the whole from which China has emerged has now become quite different (Wang, 2013). The holographic relational perspective does not necessarily mean that China’s rise or ‘Chinese’ relationality will be peaceful (Shih, 2016: 687). Hard power still matters in contemporary world politics, and realism remains part and parcel of China’s strategic thinking. Hence, despite the existence of a holographic world, if Chinese leaders behave as if they live in a Newtonian world of mechanistic relations, then the earlier-mentioned fears of China may be warranted. In the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, rising antiglobalization sentiment and increasing global trade tensions, the shift to more emphasis on domestic circulation in China’s ‘dual circulation’ economic strategy seems to signal the winding back of its holographic engagement with the world. Nevertheless, a couple of points are worth noting here. One is that there is some Chinese recognition, at both scholarly and official levels, of the world as a cosmopolitan whole (for example in terms of ‘the community of common destiny’), and of the holographic entanglement that there is something of each in the other (ni zhong you wo, wo zhong you ni) (Xi, 2015). Whether Chinese foreign policy (for example the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)) will live up to such rhetoric remains to be seen, but at least such understanding could help underpin a consistent policy of opening up. Another point is that China’s holographic relational being/becoming is by definition relational and reciprocal. Given that how its significant ‘Others’ behave constitutes part of China’s holographic whole, the dominance of a zero-sum, non-holographic way of understanding and dealing with China from the ‘outside’ world is likely to produce a China that is similarly uncompromising and assertive. As China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi was quoted as saying during his discussion with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, ‘China will consider how to engage with the U.S. side based on the U.S. attitude towards China’ (Reuters, 2021). Second, while liberal scholars do pay close attention to China’s transformation and socialization (Economy and Oksenberg, 1999; Johnston, 2008), they also fail to recognize that its transformation/socialization is fundamentally holographic and multidirectional, rather than linear or unidirectional. Some liberal thinkers are right that it would be illogical and extremely difficult for today’s China to overturn the international capitalist order (Ikenberry, 2008); after all, China is already a holographic part of that order and so turning against that order would mean turning against itself. Still, many tend to misconstrue its holographic transition as reducible to Westernization or democratization in the Western image (Gilley, 2004; Hutton, 2006; Kristof, 2013), while forgetting that the sources of holographic influence on China are global, rather than merely ‘Western’. The global whole in which China exists and evolves includes also the ‘nonWestern’ world as well as ‘Chinese’ history and tradition (or what Wang Jisi calls ‘historical China’, see Chapter 6). To ignore those connections and their complex impact on China is to miss a significant aspect of China’s rise that does not fit well with the liberal narrative. Furthermore, even as China has absorbed many ‘Western’ influences (bearing in mind that there is nothing purely Western to begin with, as Hobson [2004] points out), such outside influences, once transmitted into China, may undergo further local holographic transition of their own by taking on some ‘Chinese’ characteristics (Pan, 2012: 116–17). Also, as China’s power grows and its relations further expand (such as through the BRI), it is certain to once again become a major source of holographic transition for other countries, just as it once was, particularly through its tributary system, in which the participation of the ‘barbarians’ was in part to ‘come and be transformed’ (lai-hua) (Fairbank, 1942: 132). Thus, China’s rise is both an object and an agent of holographic transition. To sum up, both the ‘identity’ of China and its implications for the world are inherently complex, dynamic and indeterminate. As a case of holographic transition, China’s rise defies the binary scenarios of either a hegemonic challenge to the Western-dominant order or a linear integration into it (see also Chapter 9). With China unable to meet the liberal expectation, there has now been growing disillusionment with, and renewed realist fear of, it in recent years (Pan, 2012: Chapter 7; Campbell and Ratner, 2018). China’s rise does pose many profound challenges, whether economically, politically, normatively or environmentally. But such challenges, despite their apparent ‘Chinese’ symptoms, often have their holographic origins in the world. Thus, without denying Chinese responsibility or agency, to effectively deal with those challenges requires us to see them also as global and holographic challenges that cannot be reduced to, let alone solved as, uniquely Chinese problems. Global problems demand global public policy and cooperative solutions. As such, the United States’ focus on ‘Chinese’ imports, for instance, as the cause of its job-loss problem misses the point. Similarly, attempts to contain China are unlikely to be effective given that China’s very being has been embodied and embedded in holographic relations with the global whole, with which we are all inextricably entangled and implicated.

### Link — China — Orientalism

#### Their emerging China threat dialogue is an Orientalist reaffirmation Western cultural superiority, legitimizes colonialism, and justifies paternalistic policing of China.

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The relationship of the United States and People’s Republic of China (China) is arguably one of the most important in this century. The ability of the United States and China to maintain a cooperative relationship will shape, to a large extent, outcomes on key global issues such as the stability and growth of the global economy, resource scarcity, climate change, and the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Since President Nixon’s policy of constructive engagement over four decades ago, the strategic partnership of the two has grown to an extent unimaginable back in 1972. The alignment of strategic interests between the two has led to policies of undeniable mutual benefit to date—on one hand, China’s access to world markets has allowed its economy to grow at impressive rates; on the other hand, this growth has helped to sustain US spending and thus, its maintenance of global hegemony.1 In recent years, however, sharp disagreements have surfaced on numerous fronts, and the United States has sought to maintain dominance in the partnership. One of the mechanisms that have facilitated this, we argue, is the construction of China via long-standing Orientalist tropes that, at once flexible and durable, are easily mobilized and adapted for strategic political ends. As formulated by foremost scholar Edward Said (2014), depictions of the “Orient” have served as ideological tools aiding empires since the late 18th century—first the British and French, subsequently, the United States. The role of knowledge production in the colonial project, which Said termed “Orientalism,” has relied primarily on producing images of the “Orient” in dualistic terms that serve to affirm Western cultural superiority—for example, in depicting the “Orient” as backward, the West becomes civilized; in casting the former as superstitious, the latter becomes scientific; in describing the former as irrational, the latter becomes rational; in representing the former as archaic, the latter becomes modern; in fashioning the former as evil, the latter becomes good; in painting a picture of the former as violent, the latter becomes peaceful. The affirmation of Western superiority and concomitantly, the cultural and moral inferiority of the “Orient,” have served to justify Western expansion and global control over lands, peoples, and resources.

Western construction of the cultural and moral inferiority of China has had a long history and includes an array of portrayals that can be read in light of specific European and US colonial aims. These include images of China as exotic and immoral in the 1700s, as a cunning and diabolical “Yellow Peril” in the late 1800s, as a freedom-loving and democracy-loving “China Mystique” during World War II, and as an ideological, economic, and military “Red Peril” during the Cold War (Kim, 2010; Leong, 2005). Since the end of the Cold War and the definitive establishment of US global hegemony, China has vacillated in the US imaginary between the latter two positions, viewed at times as a little brother following imperfectly the path toward modernity, at times imperiling the world order (Kim, 2010; Vukovich, 2012). This ambiguity continues to occur through the present day and, in light of China’s rise as a global power since the late 1990s, China is increasingly portrayed, not necessarily an enemy, but always a potential one. This construction of China as a potential enemy Other reflects the relationship of mutual interdependence carefully cultivated by many US administrations at the same time that it functions to justify the paternalistic monitoring and policing of China to ensure that China never overtakes the United States on the world stage. With this frame in mind, we examine the recapitulation of Orientalist tropes in the post-Cold War context, focusing, in particular, on representations and language used in US news media and political rhetoric.

#### Their selective narrative of US influence being under threat creates the complete erasure of oppositional perspectives which silences opposition and masquerades violent historical oppression.

Sehnal 21, New Mexico State University: Doctor of Philosophy — PhD, Rhetoric and Composition/Writing Studies, (Tyler, 80 YEARS OF “THE ORIENT”: RE-MAPPING THE TRAJECTORY OF AMERICAN ORIENTALISM IN THE WAKE OF COVID-19, <https://thescholarship.ecu.edu/handle/10342/9707>) //CHC-DS

Orientalism and its perpetuation of the West and the United States’ ability to selectively narrate history enables the all-but-complete erasure of oppositional perspectives like Uchida’s from universal perception. Professor and historian Takeya Mizuno examines the erasure of accounts oppositional to official narratives of Japanese American internment as a response to national security concerns or Japanese Americans’ supposed predisposition to commit acts of espionage, writing that the mass incarceration of Japanese Americans in West Coast internment camps marks a “dark spot in the history of press freedom, too” (Mizuno’s emphasis, 205). Mizuno posits that while interned Japanese Americans were allowed to have their own newspapers, “these publications were subject to either ‘censorship’ or ‘supervision’,” and that “in December 1941, the Japanese American community… [had] more than two dozen of vernacular newspaper on the West Coast alone. Only 6 months later, however, none of them existed due to the Army’s mass exclusion orders” (205). Mizuno’s research and exploration of Japanese American censorship in the wake of Pearl Harbor helps to further expose the problematization inherent in Orientalism—and the way Orientalism aided white America’s desperate self-preservation—in the aftermath of the Pearl Harbor attacks. Not only had American Orientalism enabled white officials’ mass imprisonment of innocent Japanese Americans but had also permitted the erasure of accounts depicting Japanese American innocence and, inversely, white America’s wrongdoings and penchant for anti-Asian sentimentality. Throughout American history, the West’s ability to construct and conceptualize “the Orient” “politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively” (Said 2) in any instance that white Americans and American officials perceive as a threat to American white supremacy has promoted several times over the comprehensive ostracism and often violent oppression of Asian and Asian American populations. In early 1942, the effects of Orientalism and Orientalist conceptualizations of Japanese Americans were felt at home: for Japanese Americans, perhaps the greatest impact of their internment post-Pearl Harbor was a harsh wakeup call. Despite “significant economic losses of income and property… for which they were not fully compensated” (Shoag & Carollo 8), the hardest pill for Japanese Americans to swallow in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor was the realization that, despite their citizenship or allegiance, white America’s best-interests always come first, especially when white Americans believe that their geographic preeminence or supremacy is under threat. Orientalism, coupled with the white supremacy inherent in the American enterprise, has enabled the comprehensive ostracism of Asian Americans at home in the U.S. and the widespread oppression of Southeast, East, and South-central Asian populations abroad. Twenty years after white officials adapted Japanese American populations across the West Coast into a singular caricature—that of a “saboteur”—American Orientalism would promote a new adaptation of Lee’s “Oriental” figure: the “warmongering Oriental.” Just as American officials perpetuated imagery of Japanese Americans as spies and saboteurs in the aftermath of the Pearl Harbor attacks to justify the incarceration of these populations at home, the West’s cultural domination of “the Orient” would enable the U.S. to ensure the prominence of images of “Orientals” as warmongers to justify the U.S.’ military involvement abroad two decades later. This time, however, America’s ability to rely on long-held Orientalist conceptualizations of the East and a majority population keen to maintain American white supremacy would ensure an even more violent oppression and dehumanization of Southeast Asian populations—the next supposed threat to white Americans’ cultural, racial, geographic, and imperial superiority and influence.

#### Their representations are a desperate desire to distinguish the Self from the ‘Oriental’, romanticizing the East as a dangerous yet exotic Other.

Sehnal 21, New Mexico State University: Doctor of Philosophy — PhD, Rhetoric and Composition/Writing Studies, (Tyler, 80 YEARS OF “THE ORIENT”: RE-MAPPING THE TRAJECTORY OF AMERICAN ORIENTALISM IN THE WAKE OF COVID-19, <https://thescholarship.ecu.edu/handle/10342/9707>) //CHC-DS

Examining Said and Lee’s works in tandem allows for a comprehensive overview of how Orientalism and conceptualizations of Asians and Asian Americans as “Orientals” have provided an underlying framework for widely perpetuated and generalizing Asian and Asian American prejudice in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. In the introduction to Orientalism, Said writes that the problematization inherent in Orientalism—historically—is that the Western world, by generalizing this region of the world as simply “the Orient,” has effectively produced the Middle East “politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively” (2). As Said explains, by constructing and producing these perspectives and narratives on “the Orient” and by “setting itself off against the Orient as a sort of surrogate and even underground self,” Western culture has effectively and continually “othered” “the Orient,” romanticizing it in the minds of Westerners as exotic and as existing in stark contrast to the western social, economic, philosophical and political experience (20). This has thus allowed the West to historically dominate, restructure, and possess a sort of constructive authority over the Orient. Two decades into the twenty-first century, Orientalism still enables the West to impose an appropriative violence on the East. According to Said, the West’s largely unchallenged generalizations and perceptions of the Orient and belief that these ideas could and can be propagated with “very little resistance” on the Orient’s part is what allows Orientalism to have such a “durability and…strength” as well as enables perpetuation of the notion that there is a great difference between Americans (“us”) and “them” or “all ‘those’ non-Europeans” (7). Specifically, Said writes that: Orientalism was ultimately a political vision of reality whose structure promoted the difference between the familiar (Europe, the West, “us”) and the strange (the Orient, the East, “them”). This vision in a sense created and then served the two worlds thus conceived. Orientals lived in their world, “we” lived in ours…. A certain freedom of intercourse was always the Westerner’s privilege; because his was the stronger culture, he could penetrate, he could wrestle with, he could give shape and meaning to the great Asiatic mystery. (43-44) Essentially, it is Western hegemony which allows for the widespread and widely accepted manipulation of Western perceptions of “the Orient,” thus enacting a violence on the East via the West’s generalizations, appropriation and narrow interpretations of the cultures that exist in this part of the world, largely for the Western world’s own understanding, benefit, and consumption. Lee’s Orientals explores the reasoning behind the West and white America’s desperate desire to uphold their historical stranglehold on perceptions and conceptualizations of “the Orient.” In the introduction to his book, Lee notes that racialized and stereotypical representations come about to perform “ideological tasks” (12). “The Oriental,” a caricature inclusive of all “Oriental” populations, Lee writes, “appears in various guises throughout American culture… [and] is embedded in the discourses of race, gender, class, and sexuality in America” (12). The fluidity of the Oriental as a caricature allows dominant Western and white American culture to readapt images of the Oriental depending on the particular “cultural crises in American society that give rise to… representations of the Oriental.” These “deployments,” according to Lee, come “in the wake of economic change,” any which spurs on “profound effects on the structures, relations, and meaning of families, gender, and race” in the United States (11). Lee explores, for example, adaptation of the Oriental into an outwardly menacing figure: as a threat to the native white laborer’s preeminence in the late nineteenth century. The propagation of imagery and rhetoric in the American southwest depicting industrious Asian Americans and laborers as the “harbingers of industrial wage slavery,” according to Lee, “disrupted the mythic narrative of westward expansion” (9) and Americans’ concepts of manifest destiny—ideas firmly rooted in notions of American white supremacy and imperialism. Lee also notes how, in response to the perceived threat of Chinese and Asian Americans to white American laborer’s preeminence, Chester A. Arthur signed 1882’s Chinese Exclusion Act into law. Later, Lee describes popular imagery of Southeast Asian populations perpetuated in the wake of the Vietnam War. Lee writes that, “The received wisdom of the Vietnam War narrative is that America’s defeat in Southeast Asia was brought about by a faceless and invisible Asian enemy” (11). Consequently, in the war’s aftermath, in the dystopic narrative of white America’s decline, Asian Americans came to be depicted as hidden and more discreet “agents of foreign or multinational capital” and interference (11). Both of these historical adaptations of the Oriental figure and any of the numerous adaptations that have characterized other “perilous periods” in white America’s history of desperate self-preservation have all contributed to one overarching narrative: a narrative presenting white America and American industrialism and imperialism as, ultimately, victims of Asian and Asian American industriousness, sexuality, intelligence, and assimilation. Historical reactions to the Oriental figure, including those barring Asian Americans from “immigration, citizenship, and participation in American society and culture” (13), Lee explains, have ultimately culminated in a dramatic transition: in the past century, narratives of Asians and Asian Americans as threats to America’s racial and class purity have evolved from a simple series of myths into a perceptible reality for white Americans. Nearly 150 years after Chester Arthur signed the Chinese Exclusion Act into law, white Americans again demonstrated their ability to reduce Asian populations to a singular image embodying a newly evolved threat to their way of life. Two decades into the twenty-first century, white Americans, seeking to put a face to their fears in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, effectively readapted the Oriental (and “the Orient” itself) into embodiments of disease. As Andrea Kitta’s Kiss of Death notes, perpetuation of these images of Asians and Asian Americans as the embodiments of disease and of the COVID-19 pandemic invariably leads to narratives of the “diseased outsider” (27). For context, Kitta references the Ebola outbreak in the early 2010s, for example, which likewise had “strong associations with locations” (27). Kitta notes that, in the aftermath of the disease’s outbreak, many Americans feared for the security of their “physical, social, or political boundaries” (28) and were quick to pin blame for the epidemic’s origins and the disease’s spread on anyone white Americans felt could be categorized under the broad, indistinguishable moniker of “African.” Nearly a decade later, many Americans have taken up this same habit, broadly classifying Asian and Asian American populations as inherent threats for spreading COVID-19, even if there is no reason to suspect they have at all played a role in the disease’s outbreak or spread beyond judgments made based on these individuals’ perceived ethnic, racial, or national identities.

#### Their framing of the Asian enemy as an unknowable threat perpetuates US self-victimization that saves face from dehumanizing the Asian Other.

Sehnal 21, New Mexico State University: Doctor of Philosophy — PhD, Rhetoric and Composition/Writing Studies, (Tyler, 80 YEARS OF “THE ORIENT”: RE-MAPPING THE TRAJECTORY OF AMERICAN ORIENTALISM IN THE WAKE OF COVID-19, <https://thescholarship.ecu.edu/handle/10342/9707>) //CHC-DS

The West’s unofficial selectivity when it comes to the popularization of Vietnam War narratives is an extension of Orientalism and Western cultural hegemony. During the war—and particularly in its aftermath—popular American media rapidly readapted the Oriental’s image. While at first the U.S. perpetuated images of North Vietnamese and other Southeast Asian populations as vicious warmongers as a means of justifying America’s continued imperialist war effort, the U.S.’ defeat at the hands of the North Vietnamese ultimately inspired the cultivation of a new image: one of “a faceless and invisible Asian enemy, aided and abetted by an American counterculture… like the now-mythic Viet Cong, [one] everywhere invisible and powerful” (Lee 11). Like other historical adaptations of the “Oriental” figure, white America’s paranoid perpetuation of this image of Orientals as invisible albeit vicious warmongers is a reflection of the U.S.’ enduring habit of self-victimization. White Americans’ conceptualizations of Southeast Asian populations as a singular, “invisible” entity to perpetuate its own victimized image is indelibly tied to white Americans’ enduring pursuit of self-preservation and—by extension—preeminence. More than two decades after constructing images of Japanese and other Asian Americans as Axis double agents “predisposed… to the commission of acts of espionage and sabotage” (Irons x), white Americans and officials downplayed the U.S.’ defeat in Vietnam by perpetuating images of an overly powerful and “invisible” enemy. This was done in order to redirect attention to a supposedly more pressing narrative: that of the defeated, victimized American soldier—his innocence forcibly relieved of him in the jungles of Vietnam, his mind traumatized by images of death, gore and of war. Inevitably, this perpetuated the premise that the most tragic narrative of Vietnam was that of an American soldier leaving behind a “healthy civilian environment to become immersed in a war that leaves him physically or psychically wounded,” thus idealizing “the myth of American innocence and benevolence” in Vietnam while irrefutably dehumanizing the North Vietnamese (Rollins 422). This idea perpetuated the false notions that American soldiers were the greatest victims of Vietnam and that the Vietnam War simply represented Vietnam’s rejection of American democracy and freedom, opting instead to embrace leadership by a chaotic, helpless, and violent communistic regime instead. These narratives of American victimization at the hands of a chaos-loving, unstoppable, unseeable and therefore inherently unbeatable enemy were perpetuated in the United States postVietnam to save face in the aftermath of a war that “set the U.S. economy on a downward spiral… left America’s foreign policy at least temporarily in disarray… [and] divided the American people as no other event since their own Civil War a century earlier” (Herring 104). Notably, even decades after the war, these narratives of American victimization have managed to maintain an unparalleled cultural supremacy. Speaking on the U.S.’ selective memory and on the longevity and continued perpetuation of these myths of the “battered American” and “warmongering Oriental,” author and professor Yen Le Espiritu wrote in 2008 that: Today, more than thirty years after the fall of Saigon… Public recollections of the Vietnam War—“the war with the difficult memory”—often involve the organized and strategic forgetting of the Vietnamese people… The controversial Vietnam War Memorial… provides a pointed example of this “forgetting.” Framed within the nationalist context of the Washington Mall, the memorial must “forget” the Vietnamese and “remember” the American veterans as the primary victims of the war. (1701-1702) Such dehumanizing images of the North Vietnamese were—and continue to persist as—products of exclusion. While the West continues to inundate popular media and perception with images of the battered American soldier, viewers and readers alike are left to “fill in the gaps” by conjuring up juxtaposed images of a boastful North Vietnamese army to contrast with those of the bested and battered armed forces of the U.S.

### Link — China — Tech Threat

#### Their construct of the Asian technological threat is a racialized source of fear that dehumanizes the Asian Other.

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Imagine a futuristic city where robots prevail. Since the advent of imperialism, this futuristic and otherly view has often served as the popularized Western conception of Asia. This concept is known as Techno-Orientalism, a phenomenon that primarily dominates discourse surrounding media portrayals of East Asia. According to journalist George Yang in Wired Magazine, Techno-Orientalism, which creates an ideology of the Asian “Other,” rests on Western logic of the East as a technological threat to the world. With Beijing’s technological rise in an increasingly globalized world, Techno-Orientalist frameworks have now become fundamental to specifically describing China. Plan A Magazine’s Lily Luo writes that the term “Techno-Orientalism” was originally coined by Asian scholars like David Roh, Greta Niu and Betsy Huang. These scholars perceived Techno-Orientalism as the projection of historical Orientalism, or what Khan Academy’s Nancy Demerdash describes as the “conception of an ‘Orient’ that was rooted in incivility.” Under the futuristic gaze of Techno-Orientalism, East Asians are not only conceived of as a racialized source of fear, but also a source of technological fear. In other words, the technological advancements of East Asian countries were perceived as a threat to the global order. Today, Techno-Orientalism is most evident in the Western media’s coverage of China, which often reflects what Yang describes as “Western anxieties about the East.” “China’s dystopian tech could be contagious,” reads a 2018 headline from The Atlantic. The word “contagious” implicitly projects the notion that China’s technology is somehow diseased, evoking imagery of illness and a plague — racialized elements that Yang states were formerly attributed to Chinese immigrants building the United States’s Transcontinental Railroad back in the 19th century.

The article goes on to describe China’s “social credit” system and its effects as a method of “social control” with “teeth.” The element of “teeth” provokes a more physical understanding of China’s technological capabilities. Instead of directly analyzing the mechanics of the system, the article employs metaphors that conjure up negative connotations of fear and violence. Another headline for a 2019 article in The American Conservative demonstrates a similar concept: “George Orwell’s Dystopian Nightmare in China.” The featured image displays a large cartoon of Chinese President Xi Jinping looming over ordinary citizens and handing them numbers intended to dictate their identities. The article cites the Orwellian vision of the world — particularly Social Psychologist Erich Fromm’s afternote about the dangers of men becoming machines — implying that this is what China has become. The issue is not endemic to a few articles or a handful of media organizations and publications. In a 2018 op-ed in Bloomberg, Cathy O’Neil argues that the United States must take an active stand against the surveillance state with the headline: “Want to See Your Dystopian Future? Look at China.” For The New York Post, a headline reads: “China’s ‘social credit’ system is a dystopian nightmare.” This angled coverage of China, unintentional or not, falls prey to a certain dehumanizing rhetoric in which the Chinese people are viewed as constant victims of a dystopian, futuristic state. In the process of shedding light on how China’s technological advancements may strip humanity away from Chinese citizens, an important topic that deserves coverage and criticism, Western media coverage paradoxically falls victim to the same trope: implying that Chinese people are mindless robots at the mercy of a technological villain.

It is necessary, though, to acknowledge that criticism of Techno-Orientalist sentiments pervasive in Western media is not based on the assumption that such articles are not credible. In fact, it is because these articles are so well-written and well-researched on a topic that merits global attention that it becomes even more essential to understand how racialized ideals manifest in complex ways within contemporary media discourse — even in the small ways, like headlines, images and adjectives. This problem becomes cyclical, especially because so many articles cite the ideas mentioned by others. This may explain how the media tends to exacerbate Sinophobia. Often, Western media’s hegemonic mindset regarding Beijing prizes competition over collaboration. This undermines a positive diplomatic relationship between the United States and China and, more critically, a nuanced American understanding of Chinese people, culture and values. When evaluating how Techno-Orientalism has shaped internalized conceptions of China, it is critical to be rhetorically careful and to distinguish between hard evidence and Western interpretations of that evidence. These interpretations appear to be motivated by hegemonic fears of Asian countries achieving unprecedented progress and subverting colonialist paradigms.

### — Russia —

### Link — Russia

#### Championing the US-NATO axis and securitizing Russia is a form of white Western anxiety that shifts the narrative away from the violent history of the Western project.

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Some years ago, Italian anarchist Camillo Berneri suggested that while not always visible in the social practices of everyday European life, the racist foundation for European fascism was still present, safely confined to a space in the European psyche, but always ready to explode in what he called a “racist delirium.” Today, white workers and the middle classes in Europe and in the United States, traumatized by the new realities imposed on them by the decline of the Western imperialist project and the turn to neoliberalism, are increasingly embracing a retrograde form of white supremacist politics. This dangerous political phenomenon is developing in countries throughout the European Union and in the United States. Just recently, the National Front, a racist, authoritarian party that labored on the fringes of French politics for years, has emerged as one of the dominant forces. The Tea Party in the United States, Golden Dawn in Greece, the People’s Party in Spain, the Partij Voor de Vrijheid in the Netherlands—in these and other countries, a transatlantic, radical racist movement is emerging and gaining respectability. The hard turn to the right is not a surprise for those of us who have a clear-eyed view of Euro-American history and politics. In all of the 20th century fascist movements in Europe, two elements combined to express the fascist project: 1) The rise of far-right parties and movements as the political expression of an alliance of authoritarian, pro-capitalist class forces bankrolled by sections of the capitalist class and constructed in the midst of capitalist crisis; and 2) racism grounded in white supremacist ideology. The neo-fascism that is now emerging within the context of the current capitalist crisis on both sides of the Atlantic has similar characteristics to the movements of the 1930s, but with one distinguishing feature. The targets for racist scapegoating are different. The targets today are immigrants: Arab, Muslim and African in Europe; and Latinos as well as the never-ending target of poor and working-class African Americans in the United States. What makes the rise of the racist radical right even more dangerous today is that it is taking place in a political environment in which traditional anti-racist oppositional forces have not recognized the danger of this phenomenon or—for strategic reasons—have decided to downplay the issue. That strategy has been tragically played out in the “immigrant rights” movement in the United States.

The brutal repression and dehumanization witnessed across Europe in the 1930s has not found generalized expression in the United States and Europe, at least not yet. Nevertheless, large sectors of the U.S. and European left appear to be unable to recognize that the U.S./NATO/EU axis that is committed to maintaining the hegemony of Western capital is resulting in dangerous collaborations with rightist forces both inside and outside of governments. The manufactured crisis with Russia over the issue of Ukraine is a case in point. The incredible recklessness and outrageous opportunism of the U.S./NATO/EU axis in destabilizing Ukraine—knowing that the driving forces on the ground were racist, neo-Nazi elements from the Right Sector and the Svoboda party—demonstrated once again the lengths this axis is prepare to go to achieve its geo-strategic objective of full-spectrum economic and political global domination. Yet, strangely, not only did many radicals in the United States and Europe not see the potential threat this situation represented—they seemed unable to penetrate the simplistic cold-war propaganda that suddenly re-emerged to frame events in Ukraine. Instead of being concerned that—as a direct consequence of U.S. actions—a government came to power in Europe that, for the first time since the 1930s, included ultra-nationalist, racist neo-Nazis in key positions, the left along with the general population allowed the corporate media and U.S. propagandists to turn the narrative away from U.S./EU destabilization of Ukraine to Putin’s supposed expansionist aspirations.

The ease in which the corporate media was able to flip that script and make Putin the new face of evil has been truly astonishing. And the fact that that narrative was embraced by most liberals and large sectors of the white left in the United States only affirmed that—having abandoned class analysis and anti-imperialism, and never really having understood the insidious nature of white supremacist ideology—the U.S. left has no theoretical framework for apprehending the complexities of the current period. The inability to extricate itself from the influences of white supremacist ideology has to be considered one explanation for the strange positions taken by large sectors of the white liberal/left over the last few years. How else can one explain the bizarre incorporation of the discourse of “humanitarian intervention” and the obscenely obvious racism of the “responsibility to protect”? Could it be that many white radicals have fallen prey to the subtle and not-so-subtle racial appeal to a form of cross-class white solidarity in defense of “Western values,” civilization and the prerogative to determine who has the right to national sovereignty, all of which are at the base of the rationalization of the “responsibility to protect” asserted by the white West?

The apparent incapacity of white leftists to penetrate and understand the cultural and ideological impact of white supremacy and its powerful effect on their own consciousness has weakened and deformed left analysis of U.S. and European foreign policy initiatives. It has also resulted in the U.S. and European left taking political positions that either objectively championed U.S./NATO imperialist aggression or provided tacit support for that aggression though silence. As a consequence of the abandonment of anti-imperialism and an active class-racial collaboration with the Western bourgeoisie, an almost insurmountable chasm has been created separating the Western left from its counterparts in much of the global South. Instead of more resolute anti-imperialist solidarity, broad elements of the white left in the United States and Europe have consistently aligned themselves with the policies of the U.S/NATO/EU axis that supports right-wing forces from Ukraine to Venezuela. Exaggeration, racial paranoia, and an overly simplistic and divisive—even “racist”—assessment of the liberal/left will be the charge. We accept those charges. We accept them because we know they will come. For those of us living outside the walls of privilege who must nevertheless accept the realities of the colonialist/imperialist-created global South, we don’t have the luxury of comforting illusions. Our lived experiences negate the false history of Europe’s benevolent civilization. We see developing in Europe and in the United States the very real possibility of a left-right racial convergence fueled by crisis, leftist ideological confusion and what appears to be a mutual commitment to maintaining the global structures of white supremacy. Understanding the violent history of the Western project and the pathological nature of white supremacy, we are forced to see with crystal clarity that within the context of the volatile economic and social conditions in Europe, giving legitimacy to neo-fascist forces like the ones in Ukraine might just be the fuel needed to ignite that racist, fascist delirium Berneri referred to.

#### Fears of Russia are just western ploy for imperialism

Gary Leupp 22, professor of History at Tufts, 3-5-2022, "Putin, Lenin, Imperialism and the (Real) History of Ukraine," https://portside.org/2022-03-05/putin-lenin-imperialism-and-real-history-ukraine, jy

All this was delivered in a tone of such indignant solemnity and moral authority that I imagine most people believed it. The fact of the matter was that Moscow—having repeatedly expressed alarm at NATO’s relentless expansion towards its border from 1999, having declared in 2008 that the inclusion of Georgia and Ukraine in NATO was a “red line” issue, having faced with frustration the U.S. announcement immediately thereafter that Ukraine and George would both join regardless of Moscow’s feelings about the matter, having made its point clear in the brief invasion of Georgia in 2008 (to end talk of Georgian membership), having watched a U.S.-backed coup topple a president friendly to Russia replacing him with a pro-NATO cabal—was re-annexing Crimea (not just Russian from 1783 to 1954, but still Russia’s main naval port, then on lease from Crimea, and coveted by NATO) and supporting separatists in the primarily Russian speaking population in the Donbass region primarily to prevent further NATO expansion.

In the real world, NATO is front and center here. In the world of imperialist propaganda, NATO has nothing to do with it, Russia’s stated concerns are ridiculous, and anyway, every country has the right to join a defensive alliance!

Now we hear from the same tired old anchors and their guests (former State and “Defense” Department officials, “senior foreign correspondents,” and imperialist propagandists still in demand despite their rich histories of disseminating lies), the updated version of the official line. It goes something like this: Russia has crossed a red line! It has invaded a sovereign country! Because Putin wants to revive the Russian Empire! (Often this gets rendered “Russia has invaded AGAIN” affording the commentator the opportunity to explain why the bloodless annexation of Crimea was ALSO an invasion. So too the Donbass assistance.)

In the real world, the U.S. has acted in the world since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the collapse of what Washington perceived as the global communist movement, with an effort to encircle Russia with the most horrifically threatening military force in world history. It has expanded NATO in the absence of any real threat to itself from 16 to 28 members, bordering Russia on the Baltic coast and threatening to encircle it entirely. It has used NATO to pursue wars in Serbia, Afghanistan, Libya, and Syria, in the last case illegally intervening in a failed effort to gain control over a longstanding Russian ally.

No one in their right mind can suggest that Russia holds a candle to the U.S. in imperial arrogance. Certainly not in this century.

In the real world, Biden became president determined to both reassert U.S. “global leadership” and to continue NATO expansion. His campaign literature in 2020 reminded us that he believed in the cause. And it was clear he had a particular interest in drawing Ukraine in, which meant convincing Germany and other unenthusiastic NATO members to agree that Ukraine had cleaned up its corruption sufficient to get the nod. He sent his secretary of state Anthony Blinken, who as Biden’s foreign policy advisor had urged him in 2002 to support Bush’s war on Iraq, to persuade the Germans that their gas pipeline to Russia threatened NATO unity! Meanwhile, U.S. puppet and NATO secretary-general Stoltenberg visited Kyiv to assure Ukraine that it will, indeed, be admitted to NATO. And the arms flowed into Ukraine.

Putin considered all this more threatening than ever. He amassed a force on the Ukrainian border. Biden sought to rally the European allies in a common response. While he warned of an imminent invasion, allies reflecting on recent history expressed some skepticism, and several leaders in their differing ways sought to arrange a peaceful solution. But there was never a question of withdrawing the offer to Ukraine or accepting a freeze of NATO expansion. Russian leaders complained that they were speaking to the deaf, or that the two sides were speaking different languages. The Russians were talking about their security, and need to defend their borders; the U.S. president was talking about his right to expand the alliance as he pleased.

For the U.S. media, what we see here is a clearly drawn conflict between Good and Evil, or in Blinken’s schoolmarmish conception “Democracy versus Autocracy.” What I see is two evils, neither of them democratic, locked in a conflict over the more powerful evil’s lust for further expansion. Both evils have their controlled news media and means to shape public consciousness.

The Russian media is promoting what the U.S. media depicts as a thoroughly distorted view of Ukrainian history. Without lingering on the credentials of the CNN reporters to discern distortions in anybody’s history, let’s look at what Putin has said. (I confess I haven’t seen a transcript, perhaps a sign that the speech may not contain some of what’s been reported; the bourgeois press manufactures quotes all the time. Lots of people still think the Iranian president Ahmadinejad said, “We will wipe Israel off the map!” if you can imagine.) This is what I gather it included.

Putin apparently stated that Ukraine has never been a real state. This is not true. It would be fair to say that Ukraine is not a state of great antiquity, like England since 927, France since 987, Russia since 862. It was settled by Celtic and Germanic peoples before it became the heart of a Turkic empire called Khazaria in the eighth century. Its ruling elite embraced Judaism as the national faith while the Byzantine Empire promoted Orthodox Christianity and Byzantine Jews settled in large numbers in the empire. The Khazar Empire fell in the tenth century as the Slavic-Scandinavian Rus established their capital in Kyiv. Four centuries later Moscow became the capital of the Russian state.

In the interim, Kievan Rus collapsed during the Mongol invasions, and what is now Ukraine was divided among the Golden Horde, the Crimean Tartars, and the Lithuanian-Polish state. The latter portion became, through a treaty in 1654, a province of Russia. After the Russian Revolution of 1917, the Bolsheviks recognized the province as a state, a soviet socialist republic, expanding its borders to include much territory inhabited by Russian-speaking Russians. The Crimean Peninsula was turned over to Ukraine by Russia when they were both with the USSR, in 1954.

Ukraine has been inhabited and crisscrossed by Scythians, Celts, Germanic peoples, Huns, Khazars, Mongols as well as Slavs. Given its history of incorporation into different states, it has regions with large German or Hungarian populations. Unless one considers the Polish-Lithuanian dependency a state, or the Russian province of Ukraine an independent state, the first independent Ukrainian state—or at least the closest approximation of an independent state so far—was the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Russia demanded that Ukraine be considered an independent state on the world stage; it held a separate UN seat. With Belarus it was one of the closest SSRs to Moscow, and most hesitant to withdraw from the union when Boris Yeltsin unilaterally dissolved it by pulling Russia itself out. Once established in its current configuration, Ukraine agreed to abandon its nuclear arsenal; it also agreed to a long-lease arrangement with Russia involving the vital Crimean naval base.

When Putin points to this history or at least aspects of it, he is not churning out lies at the level of the dutiful U.S. TV journalist who told us about Saddam Hussein’s involvement in 9-11; Iran’s plans to build nuclear weapons; or the threat of imminent genocide in Kosovo, Libya, or Syria. But he is distorting and oversimplifying to pooh-pooh Ukrainian nationalism in general and to facilely associate it with fascism. Thus he describes the current invasion as a “denazification” operation, while the talking heads in this country ridicule the accusation.

In the real world, Ukrainian fascist movements exist and were surely on display in the Maidan coup in 2014. They played a key role in the violent overthrow of an elected government, under Victoria Nuland’s watchful eye. There remains much support in some quarters for the wartime nationalist leader Stepan Bandera, who espoused a fascist ideology and helped round up Jews in Ukraine for the Nazi death camps. Anyone paying attention realizes that there are fascist elements in the military (the entire Azov Battalion) and that fascist parties, while small and with little electoral influence, have been able to stymie the implementation of the now-defunct Minsk Accords. So, yes, there is a fascist movement in Ukraine and it has a long history.

But the resistance movement in Ukraine looks like something else. And it’s making it look like Putin is exaggerating the fascist issue, real though it is, to evoke Russian memories of the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945), also known as the Anti-Fascist War. Crucial battles in this war were fought on Ukrainian soil, where some local communities sided with the fascists and embraced the Nazis’ Russophobia. Putin wants to essentialize Ukrainians as tending towards fascism, now working in tandem again with Russia’s enemies. This effort could well backfire among Russians who realize that Ukrainians are divided politically and ideologically among themselves and in any case undeserving of Putin’s characterization.

The most interesting element in Putin’s presentation is the idea that Lenin and the Communists—whom he has made it clear he despises, as he plays the part of a true son of the Russian Orthodox Church—are responsible for the terrible error of creating a Ukrainian state in the form of the old Ukrainian SSR! That, he suggests, was the origin of the current problem. Lenin, in his condemnation of tsarist Russia as “a prison house of nations,” in his commitment to proletarian internationalism, and to the self-determination of nations, foolishly allowed a Ukrainian republic to form. This state could, according to the Soviet constitution, depart from the union if it ceased to serve its needs. Thus Putin explains the origin of the problem.

In the real world, Putin’s former boss Boris Yeltsin led Russia when it, not Ukraine, left the USSR. The Supreme Soviet confirmed the legality of the withdrawal, as it had approved the departure of the Baltic SSRs. Ukraine was left with no alternative but to declare its own independence. Affected simultaneously by the same confusing process, Russians and Ukrainians retained amicable relations; the mere fact of new mutual independence was not a great problem for the relationship. Relations only deteriorated when, from around 2005, Ukrainian leaders requested NATO membership. In 2010 an anti-NATO president was democratically elected; the U.S. State Department oversaw a massive regime change effort to depict him as corrupt, anti-EU, impeding “Ukrainian’s European aspirations.” It succeeded in ousting him, and to some extent also succeeded in portraying the Maidan putsch, to the people of this country, as a democratic mass movement against a corrupt Russian puppet.

That Putin is a shameless, amoral mythmaker is not the issue. Nor even is his anti-communism. If we dwell of the evil he represents, we risk uniting with the shameless, amoral mythmakers around Biden. We risk succumbing to the simplistic Blinken concept of the world (no advance over George W. Bush’s “you’re for us or against us” biblical nonsense) as one divided between Good (“Democracy”) and Evil (“Autocracy”) and to the conclusion that to combat the latter we must unite with the former.

Lenin were he alive today would no doubt point out that Russia today, as well as the U.S., is a capitalist-imperialist country. He would promote (as he did during World War I) a strategy of “revolutionary defeatism,” based on the expectation that defeat in war would weaken the (current Russian) bourgeois state, allowing for a workers’ revolution. He would urge the same for the Ukrainian workers of all nationalities. He would warn as he did against “Great Russia chauvinism.” Putin, again, rejects all this. He is a Russian nationalist with (very traditional) Russian anxiety about border security. (If you ask why it is traditional, 1. look at a map; 2. read Tolstoy’s War and Peace.) He is despicable, but his demand that NATO ceases expansion is as eminently reasonable and Biden’s desire to expand it seems crazier by the day.

How should a Marxist see this situation? The principle contradiction here is certainly not “democracy” versus “autocracy,” although it’s telling that the opinion shapers need to speak in such primitive terms, as though addressing a third-grade civics class. It is the desire of the post-Cold War USA to maintain and expand its “full-spectrum dominance” as the planet’s sole superpower, able to use it’s terrifying military resources, control over the world banking system, access to private communications everywhere, manipulation of the flow of information and all the resources available to prevent the emergence of any rival—versus the post-Cold War Russia, again a capitalist power, driven by the same basic imperatives as the U.S. and similar toolbox of devises to pursue its “national interests” (which are now, of course, Russian bourgeois interests).

Repeat: it’s not Democracy, led by the Leader of the Free World, versus Autocracy, led by Putin (or Putin and Xi, or Putin, Xi and the new Iranian leader). No. It’s an expanding capitalist-imperialist superpower, one of the most racist, oppressive, and violent countries on earth, hell-bent on expansion at Russia’s expense, versus a middling capitalist-imperialist power hell-bent on stopping NATO’s expansion to its borders.

Rather like the U.S. would be hell-bent on preventing the Warsaw Pact, when there was such a thing, from expanding to include Mexico and Canada. If you are looking for truly appropriate analogies, linger on that one.

The worst thing that might happen—it is in fact happening already—is for leftists of shallow understanding to conclude that, in this one instance, yes, we should support the mounting sanctions, rejoice at the suspension of Nord Stream II, endorse the shipping of more weapons including those from Germany. Because Russia is the aggressor here! Such thoughts, reflecting no knowledge of (real) historical context, are as dangerous as the invasion itself.

Unity with Biden, who has supported every NATO war, plus the war on Iraq based on lies, who refuses to even think about a world without an expanding NATO, versus Putin who has (understandably!) protested with mounting intensity NATO’s expansion to surrounding European Russia, is impossible for a Marxist or any consistent anti-imperialist. Not that we say, “A plague on both your houses,” since we wish nobody an epidemic. We should say: the workers of the world HAVE no country. When we do, we can talk about defending it.

I do hope that, and would not be surprised if, Putin’s attack on Lenin has provoked some outrage among Russians who continue to read Lenin’s works. Such as “The Right of Nations to Self-Determination” (1914), “On the National Pride of the Great Russians” (1914), and “The Ukraine”(1917). In the latter essay, Lenin wrote:

…Ukrainian people do not wish to secede from Russia at present. They demand autonomy without denying the need for the supreme authority of the “All-Russia Parliament.” No democrat, let alone a socialist, will venture to deny the complete legitimacy of Ukraine’s demands. And no democrat can deny Ukraine’s right to freely secede from Russia. Only unqualified recognition of this right makes it possible to advocate a free union of the Ukrainians and the Great Russians, a voluntary association of the two peoples in one state. Only unqualified recognition of this right can actually break completely and irrevocably with the accursed tsarist past, when everything was done to bring about a mutual estrangement of the two peoples so close to each other in language, territory, character and history. Accursed tsarism made the Great Russians executioners of the Ukrainian people, and fomented in them a hatred for those who even forbade Ukrainian children to speak and study in their native tongue.

Russia’s revolutionary democrats, if they want to be truly revolutionary and truly democratic, must break with that past, must regain for themselves, for the workers and peasants of Russia, the brotherly trust of the Ukrainian workers and peasants. This cannot be done without full recognition of Ukraine’s rights, including the right to free secession.

We do not favour the existence of small states. We stand for the closest union of the workers of the world against “their own” capitalists and those of all other countries. But for this union to be voluntary, the Russian worker, who does not for a moment trust the Russian or the Ukrainian bourgeoisie in anything, now stands for the right of the Ukrainians to secede, without imposing his friendship upon them, but striving to win their friendship by treating them as an equal, as an ally and brother in the struggle for socialism.

Putin has attacked this view, and specifically the “Communist” view of the right of self-determination. He employs a few facts (such as Ukraine’s historical absorption into larger entities) to deny Ukrainians’ national identity, treating them paradoxically as both a sub-category of Russians and ridden with Russophobic neofacists. Here he is the one who sounds fascist, while Biden poses as the decent defender of the “rules-based world order.” That’s the order Russia has supposedly threatened more than the U.S. has done since the commencement of post-Cold War NATO expansion in 1999, the same year the U.S. and NATO waged a criminal war on Serbia to create a new state in open defiance of all those rules. But in fact the U.S. has been the aggressor here, Russia the threatened party, for a quarter-century. NATO expansion has proceeded in the dark, well below the radar of public concern or interest. Now finally it becomes the subject of discussion because Putin made it so.

But now, you say, is not the best time to condemn NATO. We’ll be called treasonous. But no; now that the issue is on the table, this could be a teaching moment. We could say, “Well, this time, at least, America’s on the right side!” But it’s not. It’s trying to salvage an ongoing project, and, whatever happens, this round, prepare for a grand conflict to come, by further binding Germany to its diktat, wooing Finland and Sweden into NATO, stationing more troops in Poland and Romania, etc. What we should say is: This is all about imperialism, and NATO expansion as a tool of U.S. imperialism. It is also about Russian chauvinism, but more about very real Russian security concerns. And about rage that Russian protests have only met with smirking references to the right nations have to make their own alliances.

The best thing we can do to support the Ukrainian people (excepting the fascist element, including the Azov Battalion) is to demand “our” country keep its hands off Ukraine, stop interfering in its affairs, permanently end NATO enlargement, and withdraw the invitation to Ukraine to join. One should also demand the removal of warmonger Victoria Newland (also known as “Fuck the EU!” Vicky) from her State Department post. As for the Russian people, let us wish them well in organizing against their own oppression avoiding any association with U.S. regime change efforts.

Recall that the U.S. LOVED Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s, as Russia slipped into abject misery under oligarch capitalism. Recall how Clinton arranged for an IMF loan to secure Yeltsin’s victory in a 1996 election it appeared a “Communist” would win. Yeltsin, who bombarded the Russian parliament building when the Duma refused to dissolve at his order, was Washington’s idea of a fine Russian partner, who would protest only meekly when Clinton expanded NATO and used NATO to aerially bombard the first European city so attacked since 1945. (Why do I mention this? Because reporters now keep saying that the Russian bombing in Ukraine is the first. They lie. In fact, the bombing of Ukraine is in a way a response to the earlier bombing of Serbia.)

What the U.S. cannot tolerate in Yeltsin’s successor is his persistent opposition to NATO expansion. Thus he is depicted as an autocrat (such as U.S. allies who fit the bill are not), a moral monster (such as the Saudi crown prince is not), a fountain of corruption secreting away billions. He was not so depicted when he offered to permit NATO to transport weapons through Russia to Afghanistan in 2002. He became a villain when he began to sharply protest NATO expansion, and has been vilified all the more after each measured response to that expansion. For the left to join the chorus now would make us like the “socialist” French and German legislators who voted war credits to their respective governments in 1914, abandoning any pretense of proletarian internationalism and lining up behind their bourgeoisie. Three years later Lenin published his famous pamphlet, “Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism,” noting the shamelessness of the Second International and its failure to grasp that modern wars are waged by competing capitalist blocs, in which the workers have no stake but are pitted against one another by state forces using coercion, nationalism and fear.

We remain in the historical era of capitalist imperialism. This is not a time to make peace with it. Our task in this country is to defeat our ruling class, and nobody else’s, surely not in tandem with a president every bit as cracked and dangerous as the Russian leader.

#### The aff’s securitization of Russia relegitimizes the strength of the West while also encouraging increased NATO militarism – should be rejected

Diesen 22 [[Glenn Diesen](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-981-19-1468-3_3#auth-Glenn-Diesen) is a Professor at the University of South-Eastern Norway, and Editor at Russia in Global Affairs, 4-1-2022, The Foundational Stereotypes of Anti-Russian Propaganda, SpringerLink, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-981-19-1468-3\_3] Eric

Propaganda is characterised by the appeal of virtuous ideas such as reason, civilisation and human freedom to define the in-groups and the diametrically opposite to define Russia as the main out-group. Relations between the West and Russia have throughout history been conceptualised as a relationship between political subjects that drives civilisation forward, and political objects that must be civilised. The teacher-student relationship justifies a hierarchy and sovereign inequality as inferior ethnicity, morality, culture and values cannot be given equal status to the superior.

Propaganda is instrumental to legitimise special privileges for the West as the teacher, while the uncivilised nature of the Russian student presents an ultimatum—accept the role as the apprentice or be confronted in the form of containment or defeat. Either way, the stereotype precludes Russia from restoring its political subjectivity and sovereign equality. Russia’s acceptance of its role as an apprentice of the West is imperative for the West own identity-building as a benign hegemon devoted to socialising and civilising for common good. Andrius Kubilius, a member of the European Parliament and the former Prime Minister of Lithuania, argued for a combination: “The new EU strategy towards Russia should entail three elements—deterrence, containment and transformation” (Kubilius, 2021). The inferior “Other” often plays the dual role of both a backward people and as an existential threat (Linklater, 2005). Case in point, Hitler’s propaganda against the Jews were defined by two distinct styles of language—either “scornful derision” of the inferior race or “panicstricken fear” of their threat to civilisation (Klemperer, 2006: 162). Russophobia has similarly produced two depictions in the language over the past 500 years—disdain for Russians as an uncivilised and backward people, and simultaneously an immense threat. Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was common to argue that despite Russia’s “syndrome of backwardness”, it representts a threat to international security (Snyder, 1994: 181).

Consequently, propaganda can produce what Orwell referred to as doublethink, which is the act of accepting two contradictory beliefs simultaneously. Russia is depicted as hopelessly weak and lingering towards collapse, and simultaneously an all-powerful threat responsible for nearly all of the West’s problems. US Senator John McCain argued that “Russia is a gas station masquerading as a country” that is crippled by corruption and authoritarianism, although it is also a country that can mastermind a great conspiracy of influencing almost every election and referendum across the West. Scornful derision is expressed towards Russia’s hopeless economy the size of the Italian economy and its military budget being less than 10% of NATO’s military budget, yet simultaneously the panic stricken fear of Russia conquering Europe requires the Western bloc to continuously increase its military spending, end economic reliance on Russia and rediscover solidarity against the Russian menace. During the Russian Duma elections, some media reports argued that Russia has no democracy, yet in the breath celebrated that Putin’s United Russia party lost many seats in the Duma. During the tensions between Ukraine and Russia in 2021/22, the Ukrainians were portrayed as brave, united and capable of destroying the Russian invading forces, while other reports there were warnings that the large hordes of Russian troops on the Ukrainian border could overwhelm the poor Ukrainians within a few days or hours.

#### Constant securitization destroys the ability for adequate cooperation

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Towards the end of the Cold War, the necessity of russophobia became evident as reduced tensions with the Soviets became a threat to the West. Some argued that Gorbachev’s policies towards the West were insincere.

Although, irrespective of sincerity, the Soviet peace offensive threatened the entire foundation of solidarity with the West as an in-group by altering its relationship with the Soviets as the out-group. Critics argued that the principal policy of the Soviets was to reduce the American presence in Europe and sow divisions to increase Moscow’s influence (Gelman, 1987). Gorbachev’s “peace offensive” was thus met with profound scepticism as it reduced European dependence on the US and it undermined Western solidarity and thus the balancing of the Soviet Union.

The reactions to Gorbachev’s peace offensive was similar to that of the Soviet peace offensive after Stalin’s death in 1953—when Moscow made concessions, walked back its rhetoric of world revolution, and called for peaceful conflict resolution with the West. The efforts were largely denounced by the US as “peace propaganda” aimed to sow divisions, prevent rearmament and create the image of the Soviets as a proponent of peace. US Secretary of State Dean Acheson criticised that “the Russians have sought to ‘monopolize’ the dove of peace” (Brooks, 2000: 6). Thus, the mere call for peace threatened the dichotomous stereotype of the benign US versus the belligerent Soviet Union.

When the Cold War finally came to an end, the obvious question for scholars of propaganda should have been how the fierce propaganda throughout the Cold War would undermine a post-Cold War settlement. During the Cold War, Solzhenitsyn had expressed concerns that the anti-communist propaganda had become interchangeable with antiRussian propaganda. Solzhenitsyn had advocated that the US should also label Russia as a “captive nation” and a victim of communism rather than a benefactor as it would generate sympathy for the Russians, create a common opposition to communism, and lay the foundation for a harmonious peace once communism collapsed (Lapidus, 1984). However, the US strategy for “captive nations” was a Cold War propaganda strategy to use ethnic nationalism to divide and destabilise the multi-ethnic Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (Lapidus, 1984). Thus, the preference for portraying the Soviet Union as a manifestation of Russian imperialism would result in the continuation of containment after the Cold War by fuelling ethnic nationalism and mobilise US sentiment against post-communist Russia.

A workable peace after the Cold War was obstructed by making NATO an insurance policy against future conflicts with Russia. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright confirmed the insurance policy logic in a testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee in April 1997: “On the offchance that in fact Russia doesn’t work out the way that we are hoping it will… NATO is there” (Carpenter & Conly, 1998). Former US Secretary of State James Baker (2002) acknowledged that NATO had become “an insurance policy against resurgent and possibly virulent Russian nationalism”. Baker warned against the approach of preparing NATO for a future conflict with Russia as it would become a self-fulfilling prophecy. When Russia eventually responded to these security challenges, NATO could denounce Russia as aggressive and threatening, thus gradually returning to its official mission of containing Russia.

There was initially an overwhelming consensus among US policymakers after the Cold War that NATO expansion would poison the relationship with Russia and reignite a conflict (Grayson, 1999). After significant lobbying, the consensus shifted under the ideological argument that NATO had converted itself into a peaceful community of democracies. Beneath the new branding of NATO, there was nonetheless recognition for the implied continued mission of containing Russia (Grayson, 1999; Mandelbaum, 1995). Even hawks, such as Richard Pipes signed a statement by the Coalition Against NATO Expansion (CANE), which recognised that: By its nature, a military alliance is directed against someone. The geography of NATO expansion makes its target clear: Russia... The proposal to expand NATO tosses it away by telling Russia in unmistakable terms that it remains excluded from the community of Western nations... [Russia] will remember, and ultimately, she will react, either from a position of renewed strength or out of desperation. The last great unfinished business of the 20th century is the reintegration of Russia with the West. With the proposal to expand NATO, we have turned our back on it. (CENA, 1998)

NATO’s messaging to Russia was characterised by a contradictory approach of reassurance and deterrence. NATO reassured Russia it was not considered a threat and was not the target of NATO, although simultaneously deterring Russia by cautioning that NATO would be turned against Russia if it chose the wrong path. NATO (2010) defined this insurance policy: “because Russia’s future policies toward NATO remain difficult to predict, the Allies must pursue the goal of cooperation while also guarding against the possibility that Russia could decide to move in a more adversarial direction”.

As Russia is presented with the dilemma of being an apprentice or threat to Western civilisation, the West had to respond with strategic ambiguity. Attempting to simultaneously civilise and contain Russia demanded strategic ambiguity in the 1990s as Russia had to internalise the notion of the West as a benign hegemon in order for Russia to accept its role as a political object. Russia could not be defined as a threat and openly contained, yet Russia could not be disconfirmed as a threat as it would undermine the security guarantees to the Central and Eastern European allies.

Russia raising the security concerns of an expanding military alliance and being excluded from Europe reaffirms Russia’s backwardness and made NATO expansion even more necessary. NATO had transformed itself into a community of liberal democratic values and NATO’s failure to expand was a great danger as it would reaffirm the Soviet propaganda that NATO is an offensive military alliance rather than a defensive alliance: “If Russia’s rulers have no revanchist aspirations, they have no reason to resent NATO’s inclusion of the new democracies” (Will, 1996). Kennan, the author of the Long Telegram of 1946 and architect of the containment policy against the Soviet Union, lived well after the collapse of the Soviet Union and was exasperated that the containment policy would continue against post-Soviet Russia. In an interview with Friedman (1998), Kennan lambasted the “ill-informed” Senate debates that demonstrated “so little understanding of Russian history and Soviet history”, which subsequently resulted in the decision to expand NATO: I was particularly bothered by the references to Russia as a country dying to attack Western Europe. Don’t people understand? Our differences in the cold war were with the Soviet Communist regime. And now we are turning our backs on the very people who mounted the greatest bloodless revolution in history to remove that Soviet regime. Of course there is going to be a bad reaction from Russia, and then [the NATO expanders] will say that we always told you that is how the Russians are -- but this is just wrong.

Bloc discipline within an alliance requires the continuous elevation of an external threat to perpetuate the dividing lines between the in-group and the out-group. The endurance of anti-Russian propaganda therefore requires the creation of a Russian threat when it is insufficient or absent. In Italy, the US pursued clandestine stay-behind operations after the Second World War under the codename Operation Gladio lasting until 1990, in which the CIA and NATO conducted false-flag terrorist attacks that could be blamed on red brigades (Ganser, 2005). Such staybehind operations also existed in other Western European states, and the European Community (1990) acknowledged that Western intelligence agencies in collaboration with NATO “were involved in serious cases of terrorism and crime” against the populations of Western Europe. The US planned similar false-flag operations within its own territory. Case in point, the US Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed Operation Northwoods in 1962, in which the US government would commit acts of terrorism against American civilian and military targets to blame them on the Cuban government (Nelson, 2001). Declassified documents also reveal that the US sought to acquire an authentic Soviet aircraft or manufacture a replica to stage “a provocation operation in which Soviet aircraft would appear to attack US or friendly installations to provide an excuse for US intervention” (US National Archives, 1962: 2).

The similar need to uphold solidarity and bloc discipline made empathy towards Russia problematic after the Cold War. Dissenting from the West and US leadership is labelled as a threat to alliance solidarity, which enables Russia to divide the West. The framing of alliance solidarity to shield against the Russian threats is central to obtaining compliance by allied states.

#### Apophenia DA – constant propaganda and securitized rhetoric should be rejected

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Seeking order in chaos is an evolutionary instinct in human nature that developed for survival. The process of creating order entails discovering patterns, however, perceiving patterns, where they do not exist, is the source of paranoia and conspiracy theories that eventually unravels order and the internal cohesion of the in-group.

Propaganda can unravel order if artificial patterns are created to the extent it decouples from reality. Apophenia is defined as the proclivity for “unmotivated seeing of connections” in random data or events, which fuels paranoia when these connections are traced back to a hidden authority (Conrad, 1958). Governments can fuel psychotic disorder and conspiracy theories in the population by continuously escalating paranoia about the Other, the out-group contrasted to the in-group (Popper, 1966).

Ideological conformity can produce collective self-delusion by inoculating the group from hard facts. Propaganda develops dichotomous stereotypes and thus radicalise opinions by eliminating middle ground. Albert Maysles famously said that “tyranny is the deliberate removal of nuance”. Hannah Arendt (1951: 474) similarly cautioned that “the selfcompulsion of ideological thinking” disconnects people from reality and opens the door to totalitarianism: The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi… but people for whom the distinction between fact and fiction (i.e., the reality of experience) and the distinction between true and false (i.e., the standards of thought) no longer exist.

Propaganda in its excesses diminishes the ability to reflect on internal problems, which continues to weaken the political culture and trust in Western societies. A key strength of open societies is the ability to air their problems to correct and improve, as opposed to closed societies that suppress their problems and thus create a rot decay in the system. As famously stated by Thomas Jefferson: “If a nation expects to be ignorant and free in a state of civilization, it expects what never was and never will be”.

### Link — Ukraine

#### Imperialism was the reason for the war in Ukraine — war is an inevitable result of the affirmative’s politics.

Svensson ’22 — Niklas Albin; Swedish journalist and media personality. March 18, 2022; "How western imperialism prepared the ground for the conflict in Ukraine"; *Socialist Appeal*; https://www.socialist.net/how-western-imperialism-prepared-the-ground-for-the-conflict-in-ukraine.htm; //CYang

Contrary to the assertions of western propaganda, the war in Ukraine is not the result of Putin’s mental state, but is the product of belligerent aggression by US imperialism and NATO. They are responsible for the current catastrophe.

As the Russian army continues to shell the cities of Ukraine, the western press and politicians are doing their utmost to conceal the role of western imperialism in the disaster. Far from being a neutral party, the West have been provoking the conflict for their own imperialist reasons.

As bombs and rockets fall on Ukrainian cities, workers around the world are naturally appalled at the death and destruction caused by the Russian invasion. However, the role that the West has played in this conflict is never explained.

If we think about it for a minute, it is clear that the war in Ukraine is not just a war between Ukraine and Russia, but a proxy war between the western allies and Russia. There is no doubt whose side the West is on. For the past few years, the Ukrainian military has been armed and trained by NATO countries.

Today, Ukraine is seeing its war effort bankrolled by the EU and the US. They are sending both weapons and money in an unprecedented way. Germany has broken its long-standing rule of not sending arms. The House of Representatives recently approved $13bn to Ukraine, and so on.

We might ask: where was this money when Ukraine was in the midst of a devastating economic crisis? Now they are at war, it is clearly considered money well spent. When the mass of Ukrainians faced poverty and destitution, that wasn’t so much the case. The fact that western arms manufacturers are making huge profits out of this, is the icing on the cake.

What good will this support do? Very little. If it has its intended consequences, it will prolong the war, but at a devastating cost.

Of course, it won’t be politicians, journalists, and CEOs in the US or Western Europe who face this devastation, but the millions of Ukrainians who are having their homes and livelihoods destroyed. The Russian army will clearly level Ukraine’s cities to the ground before they allow the country to join NATO.

European workers will also feel the pinch, with skyrocketing energy prices. This is not to mention the workers and poor of Egypt and Lebanon, who are massive consumers of Russian and Ukrainian wheat. Yet, as US President Biden and UK Foreign Secretary Liz Truss made clear, it is “a price worth paying”. Of course, that’s easy for them to say.

For the countries of NATO, there is an important principle at stake: keeping Ukraine firmly in their sphere of influence and not allowing Russian interference. This is tied up in flowery phraseology about sovereignty and self-determination. But behind beautiful phrases, as is so often the case, lie imperialist interests.

Promises made

The root of this conflict can be traced back to the collapse of the Soviet Union. At the time, the Warsaw Pact was in force throughout Eastern Europe. The pact had been created specifically to counter the inclusion of West Germany into NATO.

Soldiers of the Soviet Union were stationed throughout Eastern Europe — on the one hand as a guarantee against a western attack; and on the other as a means of securing the control of the state bureaucracy in Moscow over the nations of Eastern Europe.

By 1989, however, the pact was falling apart. The capitalists of the West saw a massive opportunity for new profitable investments all over Eastern Europe, including in Russia itself, as a result of the return to capitalism, which was on the cards in the region. They were very keen to keep the army of the Soviet Union from intervening to reverse the process.

The state bureaucracy of the Soviet Union had used its troops to suppress the revolutionary movements in Hungary in 1956 and in Prague in 1968. At that time, political revolution, rather than the restoration of capitalism, was on the agenda. But there was nevertheless a fear among capitalist politicians that the army would once again intervene.

In the military establishment, there was strong support, not for socialism of course, but for the prestige of the military of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.

The West, therefore, promised a number of things to the leaders of the Soviet Union. In particular, it promised not to expand NATO. George Bush Sr. made a promise to Gorbachev not to take advantage of the various movements in Eastern Europe to harm Soviet security interests in 1989. At the time of German reunification in 1990, this became a particularly sensitive question.

The West German Foreign Minister Genscher gave a speech where he said that in order not to harm Soviet security interests, NATO should rule out “expansion of its territory to the east, i.e. moving closer to Soviet borders”.

A treaty on German unification — signed by the two German republics, the Soviet Union, France, United Kingdom, and United States — stipulated that, although the new United Germany was free to join NATO, after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from East Germany (GDR), no foreign troops would be stationed in the former GDR.

Throughout the process, the western powers were very aware that the acceptance of the Soviet Union was conditional on assurances as to the intentions of the West vis-a-vis the Eastern European countries.

On 9 February 1990, US Secretary of State James A. Baker made the offer to Gorbachev that NATO would not expand one inch eastward, if the Soviet Union accepted that the new United Germany would join NATO.

On the following day, West German Chancellor Kohl promised Gorbachev that “NATO should not expand its scope”. And the promises continued throughout 1990 and the following year.

In March 1991, just a few months before the Warsaw Pact was dissolved British Prime Minister John Major told Gorbachev that, “we are not talking about the strengthening of NATO”; and on the question of NATO expansion that, “nothing of the sort will happen”. The Warsaw Pact was duly dissolved on 1 July 1991.

The National Security Archive of George Washington University compiled a number of documents that show the flurry of diplomatic activity designed to offer assurances to the Soviet leaders, called NATO Expansion: What Gorbachev Heard. They really leave no room for doubt about what was promised at the time. But the promises were broken a few years later.

The plunder of Eastern Europe

The oligarchy in Russia that was being created out of the plundering of state assets was not yet strong enough to assert itself. The economy was in free fall, and the resistance of the working class hadn’t yet been fully overcome. Russia in the 1990s became a playground for the new oligarchs and western finance capital.

The personification of this process was President Yeltsin, who leaned heavily on the West in order to maintain his rule. If Gorbachev was trying to balance between market reforms and the old planned economy, Yeltsin became the face of open counter-revolution and market reform.

At crucial points, the West stepped in to reinforce his position vis-a-vis protesting workers and a wing of the bureaucracy that still hadn’t completely gone over to capitalism.

Even when Putin was positioning himself to take over from Yeltsin, he leaned on the West, including public meetings with Tony Blair and others. He was intended to be their new man in Moscow. The restoration of capitalism up to this point had meant the subservience of Russia to western imperialism.

The West was pushing its influence into Eastern Europe. The working class in the region had been thoroughly demoralised and atomised by the process of capitalist restoration. They were ripe for exploitation, and western capital moved in to do just that.

German capital played a big role in this, becoming a key player in the economies of Eastern and Central Europe, as well as in the Balkans. In the process, it played a decisive role in the reactionary break-up of Yugoslavia.

Swedish finance capital took over banking in the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). Industries throughout Eastern Europe were gobbled up by European companies, particularly the ones that were in a good state. The German car producer Volkswagen took over Škoda, etc. But these new acquisitions remained vulnerable to a Russia that was starting to find its feet.

The war in Chechnya, where Russia brutally suppressed the local independence aspirations, was a sign that Russia wasn’t quite the pushover it used to be. The war also formed a crucial component in Putin’s presidential campaign.

He styled his presidency as one of revival, including the reintroduction of the national anthem of the Soviet Union (with new, nationalist, lyrics).

Broken promises

If the Russian oligarchs were the big gangsters, the little gangsters of Eastern Europe that had become rich on the back of the firesale of state assets were now worried about their bigger neighbour to the east. Formal inclusion in the western sphere of influence was an attractive option.

In short order, between 1999 and 2004, most states of the former Warsaw Pact were incorporated into NATO. The inclusion, in particular of the Baltic States, brought NATO right up to the borders of Russia.

Now, US troops could be readily deployed right on the borders of Russia, some two hours drive from St. Petersburg; although in order to reduce the amount of provocation, no US troops were deployed at that stage. The US was, for now, sticking to that part of the agreement that stipulated that there would be no permanently stationed troops east of Germany. But this wouldn’t last, as we shall see.

Madeleine Albright, Bill Clinton’s Secretary of State, related the Russian opinion of this at the time (1998): “[Russian president] Yeltsin and his countrymen were strongly opposed to enlargement, seeing it as a strategy for exploiting their vulnerability and moving Europe’s dividing line to the east, leaving them isolated.”

About the same time, NATO conducted a 78-day bombing campaign against Yugoslavia (Serbia), which caused enormous economic damage.

In a lecture on the 2014 crisis in Ukraine, Professor John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago explained the significance of this: “NATO not only intervened in the affairs of a non-NATO country, but took sides against the Serbs, allies of the Russians, and did so without United Nations Security Council approval.”

This was followed by interventions in Kosovo, where Russian armoured units had a stand-off with NATO troops; Afghanistan, where the US spuriously triggered the mutual defence article 5; and, more recently, Libya.

The implication was clear, NATO wasn’t just a defensive alliance, but something that could be used by the West to further their interests against Russia.

Russia draws a line in the sand

NATO continued its programme of expansion. In 2008, a summit took place in Bucharest where a declaration was adopted. Contrary to the wishes of Ukraine and Georgia, the two countries weren’t immediately approved for membership.

Nevertheless, the declaration clearly stated that: “NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO.”

In response to this declaration, Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister stated: “Georgia’s and Ukraine’s membership in the alliance is a huge strategic mistake which will have the most serious consequences for pan-European security.”

Putin called NATO membership of Georgia and Ukraine a “direct threat” to Russia.

In a leaked cable on February 1, 2008, the US ambassador to Moscow explained the Russian position:

“5. (C) Ukraine and Georgia's NATO aspirations not only touch a raw nerve in Russia, they engender serious concerns about the consequences for stability in the region. Not only does Russia perceive encirclement, and efforts to undermine Russia’s influence in the region, but it also fears unpredictable and uncontrolled consequences which would seriously affect Russian security interests. Experts tell us that Russia is particularly worried that the strong divisions in Ukraine over NATO membership, with much of the ethnic-Russian community against membership, could lead to a major split, involving violence or at worst, civil war. In that eventuality, Russia would have to decide whether to intervene; a decision Russia does not want to have to face.” (Cable: 08MOSCOW265\_a)

Around the same time, the US was toying with the idea of setting up a missile defence system in Poland. The Polish government was pushing for this, not so much because it would have protected Poland from missiles, but because it would have established a permanent military presence of the US in the country.

The Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement in July 2008 — using the same words as Putin had in January — stating that if the project goes ahead, “we will be forced to react not with diplomatic, but with military-technical methods”. The Polish project was supposedly defensive, and not directed against Russia, but that was just words.

The question of the positioning of missile systems has a history. The US and their allies like to pretend that posting of US soldiers or missiles in Eastern Europe is not an aggressive move at all.

But the US has long held the Monroe doctrine, declaring the whole of the Americas a no-go zone for other imperialist powers. We don’t have to imagine what the US would have thought if one of their adversaries were to put troops and missiles in, let’s say, the Caribbean.

We already know what their reaction would have been. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the US threatened nuclear war over the presence of Soviet missiles and troops on Cuba. One could imagine what they would have said if the Chinese placed troops and missiles in Cuba or in Mexico today.

The continued provocations of NATO pushed Russia and Putin to draw a line in the sand. They utilised the unresolved conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia to launch an invasion of Georgia.

The war lasted 12 days, and ended with Georgia being forced to accept the de facto independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Although this was never part of the formal agreement, it also effectively prevented Georgia from continuing its path to NATO membership.

This could have been the end of it, but the West had not yet given up its hopes of expanding its sphere of influence. Certain concessions were indeed made; the Polish missile base plan was dropped, for example. However, another serious flashpoint was to occur in Ukraine — a flashpoint which was really the prelude to the present war.

The Maidan movement

In 2013, Ukrainian President Yanukovich was negotiating trade agreements with Europe. Yanukovich played the role of attempting to balance between Russia and the West. He had negotiated an association agreement with the EU, but this threatened Ukraine’s relationship with Russia.

Putin opposed the association agreement, correctly seeing it as an attempt to pull Ukraine closer into the orbit of the EU. Oligarchs from Eastern Ukraine sided with Putin, fearing the loss of the Russian market. Putin instead offered trilateral negotiations between the EU, the IMF, and Russia, but such an offer was rejected by the EU.

This was clearly a take-it-or-leave-it question for the EU, which was not keen on supporting the ailing Ukrainian economy. Its promise of $1bn was paltry, and would have done little. Russia was offering $15bn. No wonder Yanukovich went with the latter.

Angela Merkel commented on the Russian opposition to the deal that “the Cold War is over”. But the actions of both the Russian government and the West proved that the opposite was the case. She further remarked to Yanukovych that they “had expected more” from him.

For some time, the association with the European Union had been dangled by the West as a carrot. The promises of easy access to the labour market in the West, investments, etc., led a layer of the population to come out onto the streets in favour of the agreement in November 2013. This was cultivated by EU leaders.

As would be shown by subsequent events, the EU had no intention of providing Ukraine with full EU membership. They were happy to peel Ukraine away from Russia, even at the cost of civil war. But they did not want to provide any serious support.

Even now, the EU leaders are opposed to Ukraine joining, however the EU Parliament votes. If Ukraine was to join the EU, they would have access to the EU budget and visa-free travel. This, the EU leaders are not the least bit interested in.

However, as the protests developed, they were happy to defend the right of Ukraine to join the EU. The German Foreign Minister, Westerwelle, said that the rallies in support of the accession agreement showed that “the heart of the Ukrainian people beats in a European way”. But this didn’t mean that they would be allowed to join the EU.

As the protest developed, the US got involved. On 3 December White House Press Secretary Jay Carney stated:

“Violence and intimidation should have no place in today’s Ukraine. We continue to support the aspirations of the Ukrainian people to achieve a prosperous European democracy. European integration is the surest course to economic growth and to strengthening Ukraine's democracy.”

But the more aggressive wing of the US bourgeois wanted to go still further. Senator John McCain made several bellicose statements and visited the Maidan protests, giving a speech there on 15 December. A coup was being prepared.

An audio recording of a conversation between the US Secretary of State and the US ambassador to Ukraine was posted on Youtube, most likely by Russian intelligence. It is clear evidence that the US was involved in planning the removal of Yanukovych.

The aim of the US involvement was clear: install a government friendly to the West that would sign the EU accession agreement and continue to advocate for Ukraine’s inclusion in NATO.

It’s doubtful whether the intention was ever to let them join, but they certainly aimed to continue dangling the hope of economic prosperity (in the form of EU membership) and military security (in the form of NATO membership) in front of the eyes of the Ukrainians.

The coup duly took place on 22 February 2014. The new regime wasted no time in proclaiming their anti-Russian intentions. The day after, 23 February, the Ukrainian Parliament repealed Russian minority language laws. One month after the coup, they signed the accession agreement.

In the process of mobilising against Yanukovich, the imperialists and the pro-western Ukrainian oligarchs revived the ghost of the Nazi-collaborating fascist groups of the Second World War, and neo-nazis provided the shock battalions of the Maidan protests.

As we have seen, the new regime incorporated the legacy of the Nazi collaborators in its institutions, including the chant “Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the Heroes!”, which even became the official chant of the Ukrainian army. Disgustingly, it has also been taken up by western liberals over the past few weeks.

The reaction of Putin and the Russian government was predictably hostile. The new government posed a threat to the Russian naval base in Sevastopol, in particular. And within a month, Putin had annexed Crimea to secure Russian access to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.

He also backed — initially reluctantly, and eventually forcefully — the separatist rebels in the Donbas, particularly on the two occasions when it looked like the Ukrainian army was about to defeat them.

Ironically, the achievement of the Ukrainian nationalist movement has been the loss of three important regions of Ukraine. All this was clearly encouraged, from start to finish, by the US; and also, somewhat more reluctantly, by the EU.

NATO’s continued meddling

In 2017 and 2020, NATO added two more countries that were formerly part of the Russian sphere of influence to its alliance: Montenegro and Macedonia. In and of itself, these additions were not decisive. But they demonstrated that NATO was prepared to continue its expansion, even possibly to Ukraine.

The US and the EU continued to incite Ukraine against Russia. They were encouraged to break the Minsk II agreement, which the Ukrainian nationalists had opposed from the start. New drones were provided to Ukraine by Turkey, and the US were supplying Javelin anti-tank missiles. Basically, they were preparing for another offensive in the Donbas.

As late as January this year, the secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defence Council, Oleksiy Danilov, declared:

“The fulfilment of the Minsk agreement means the country’s destruction. When they were signed under the Russian gun barrel — and the German and the French watched — it was already clear for all rational people that it’s impossible to implement those documents.”

The Ukrainian government continued its hostility towards the Russian-speaking minority. In 2019, Zelensky introduced a language law mandating the use of Ukrainian language in the service industry and for tuition in schools.

It was now punishable by law for a waiter to greet someone in Russian, unless the customer had specifically requested this. Similarly, schools that had been conducting their tuition in Russia were now banned from doing so. It was yet another provocation against the Russian minority — and Russia.

And the pressure was kept up. In the spring of 2021, NATO held a massive exercise called ‘Defender Europe 2021’, including manoeuvres in all the Baltic States and Poland. Ukraine was one of 26 participating countries.

According to the US army, the exercise “demonstrates our ability to serve as a strategic security partner in the western Balkans and Black Sea regions while sustaining our abilities in northern Europe, the Caucasus, Ukraine and Africa”. Basically, all the areas that Russia and the West are disputing.

NATO would, of course, claim this was not hostile to Russia. But their exercises were about as ‘friendly’ as the Russian exercises in Belarus before the invasion. The exercises also included US B1 bombers skirting Russian airspace, pushing Russia to scramble fighters in response.

In the summer of 2021, the British government also sent a warship, HMS Defender, into Russian territorial waters, south of Crimea. They were there to “make a point”, which was that Britain does not recognise Crimea as Russian, referring to it as “Ukrainian waters”.

In October, the US once again flew bombers around Russian airpsace, this time in the Black Sea. Then, in September, under the guise of ‘Partnership for Peace’, NATO held exercises in Ukraine involving US troops.

Furthermore, NATO countries undertook an effort to train the Ukrainian armed forces. Using the Yavoriv Military Training ground, between Lviv and the Polish border — also known by the Orwellian name of the International Center for Peacekeeping and Security — since 2015, NATO trainers have been shaping the Ukrainian army to NATO standards, including the neo-nazi batallions which are part of the National Guard. This is the military base which was destroyed by Russian bombardment on 12 March.

The whole intention of these exercises, flights, training, etc., is clear. NATO was not even that circumspect about it. They wished to prove their willingness to move troops in Eastern Europe, to prepare for war with Russia, and to support Ukraine in its conflict with Russia.

Of course, as events have shown, NATO has no intention of actually fighting a war, but they wanted to send a signal.

Zeeshan Aleem, a columnist at MSNBC expressed it pretty well: “By dangling the possibility of Ukraine’s NATO membership for years but never fulfilling it, NATO created a scenario that emboldened Ukraine to act tough and buck Russia — without any intention of directly defending Ukraine with its firepower if Moscow decided Ukraine had gone too far.”

Professor Maerskheimer put it rather more bluntly back in 2015: “The West is leading Ukraine down the Primrose Path and the end result is that Ukraine is going to get wrecked.” He added:

“What we’re doing is encouraging the Ukrainians to play tough on Russia. What we’re doing is encouraging the Ukrainians to think that they will ultimately become part of the West because we will ultimately defeat Putin and we will ultimately get our way.”

The end result of playing hardball with Russia is that Ukraine is now being destroyed.

Whether western leaders like Biden and Johnson actually imagined that Russia would invade Ukraine, we cannot know — but they were clearly prepared to risk it.

They were on their high horse throughout the autumn and the winter, defending Ukraine’s right to join NATO, much as they had been defending Ukraine’s right to join the EU. Or maybe, more specifically: their right to apply to join — because so far there is no plan of actually giving them membership of either organisation.

Who is responsible?

With over two million refugees fleeing the country, and with most of Ukraine’s cities under siege and bombardment, many are asking themselves: who is responsible for this?

The West blames Putin, speculating that he may have gone mad. But if you look beyond the headlines, this conflict is only the rising to the surface of the antagonism between Russia and the countries of NATO.

Western imperialism has been constantly attempting to push forward the boundaries of NATO and the EU. When it has done so, Russia has persistently explained that this was unacceptable. It even threatened to use force.

When threats weren’t successful, the Russians actually used force, as in Georgia, in the conflict in Donbas, and in Syria. It was abundantly clear that Russia was prepared to use military measures to enforce its interests.

The West probably didn’t know how far they could push Putin. But they were prepared to gamble with the lives of the Ukrainian people that Putin was bluffing. They persistently provoked Russia. And now the people of Ukraine are paying the price.

This winter, the US could have offered some concessions. The truth of the matter is that the US and the EU were not ready to give Ukraine formal status in NATO or the European Union. They had no such intentions. Something could have been agreed. Putin was asking for assurances in writing, as verbal ones seem to have little value.

Instead, Biden, Johnson, and Macron got on their high horse, talking about ‘Ukrainian sovereignty’, ‘their right to join NATO’, etc. They were also urging the Ukrainian government to take a hard line. “Go ahead, we’re behind you” was the message. This, far from reassuring the Russians, was likely to have made them rather more concerned.

Only Macron and Scholtz seem to have had second thoughts, fearing the cost of millions of refugees, the bill for the reconstruction of Ukraine, and, of course, the threat to the European oil and gas supplies.

The West’s attitude was, and continues to be, that they’re prepared to fight to the last drop of blood for Ukraine’s right to join NATO — the last drop of Ukrainian blood, that is.

There is, of course, nothing progressive about the Russian invasion. The talk about fighting Nazis, although undoubtedly quite popular in Russia, is merely a smokescreen. The effect of this invasion is, at least temporarily, to strengthen reactionary forces on all sides. It also threatens to foment deep divisions between Russian and Ukrainian workers.

Nonetheless, to see this as just a Russian invasion of Ukraine is quite wrong, and serves to cover up the role that NATO played and continues to play in stoking up tensions. Far from being a defensive alliance, it is an alliance primarily directed against Russia in Eastern Europe, which continues to push its boundaries closer and closer.

NATO, as well as the EU, is a means of furthering western interests in Eastern Europe, against those of Russia — and China, if it comes to that.

The war in Ukraine is precisely about the level of influence that NATO countries — primarily the US, Britain, France and Germany — are to have over Ukraine. As the alliance is unwilling to commit its own troops to the fight, it is therefore being played out as a proxy war between the Russian army and the Ukrainian army, funded and supplied by NATO countries.

From this, we can also deduce that this is not at all a war about Ukraine’s ‘right to self-determination’, or its ‘sovereignty’, but about which imperial power should dominate it. Is Ukraine to be under Russian domination or western domination? Or can they carve up some kind of deal about the mutual exploitation of the country?

They failed to resolve this question through diplomatic means, and so now they are attempting to settle it through the force of arms. As Clausewitz said: “War is the continuation of politics by other means.”

#### American imperialism is the taproot of the Ukraine war. Absent the alternative, nuclear war is inevitable.

Mearsheimer 22 [John J. Mearsheimer, the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago; 6-23-2022; "The Causes and Consequences of the Ukraine Crisis"; National Interest; https://nationalinterest.org/feature/causes-and-consequences-ukraine-crisis-203182?page=0%2C3; KL]

The war in Ukraine is a multi-dimensional disaster, which is likely to get much worse in the foreseeable future. When a war is successful, little attention is paid to its causes, but when the outcome is disastrous, understanding how it happened becomes paramount. People want to know: how did we get into this terrible situation?

I have witnessed this phenomenon twice in my lifetime—first with the Vietnam war and second with the Iraq war. In both cases, Americans wanted to know how their country could have miscalculated so badly. Given that the United States and its NATO allies played a crucial role in the events that led to the Ukraine war—and are now playing a central role in the conduct of that war—it is appropriate to evaluate the West’s responsibility for this calamity.

I will make two main arguments today.

First, the United States is principally responsible for causing the Ukraine crisis. This is not to deny that Putin started the war and that he is responsible for Russia’s conduct of the war. Nor is it to deny that America’s allies bear some responsibility, but they largely follow Washington’s lead on Ukraine. My central claim is that the United States has pushed forward policies toward Ukraine that Putin and other Russian leaders see as an existential threat, a point they have made repeatedly for many years. Specifically, I am talking about America’s obsession with bringing Ukraine into NATO and making it a Western bulwark on Russia’s border. The Biden administration was unwilling to eliminate that threat through diplomacy and indeed in 2021 recommitted the United States to bringing Ukraine into NATO. Putin responded by invading Ukraine on February 24th of this year.

Second, the Biden administration has reacted to the outbreak of war by doubling down against Russia. Washington and its Western allies are committed to decisively defeating Russia in Ukraine and employing comprehensive sanctions to greatly weaken Russian power. The United States is not seriously interested in finding a diplomatic solution to the war, which means the war is likely to drag on for months if not years. In the process, Ukraine, which has already suffered grievously, is going to experience even greater harm. In essence, the United States is helping lead Ukraine down the primrose path. Furthermore, there is a danger that the war will escalate, as NATO might get dragged into the fighting and nuclear weapons might be used. We are living in perilous times.

Let me now lay out my argument in greater detail, starting with a description of the conventional wisdom about the causes of the Ukraine conflict.

The Conventional Wisdom

It is widely and firmly believed in the West that Putin is solely responsible for causing the Ukraine crisis and certainly the ongoing war. He is said to have imperial ambitions, which is to say he is bent on conquering Ukraine and other countries as well—all for the purpose of creating a greater Russia that bears some resemblance to the former Soviet Union. In other words, Ukraine is Putin’s first target, but not his last. As one scholar put it, he is “acting on a sinister, long-held goal: to erase Ukraine from the map of the world.” Given Putin’s purported goals, it makes perfect sense for Finland and Sweden to join NATO and for the alliance to increase its force levels in eastern Europe. Imperial Russia, after all, must be contained.

While this narrative is repeated over and over in the mainstream media and by virtually every Western leader, there is no evidence to support it. To the extent that purveyors of the conventional wisdom provide evidence, it has little if any bearing on Putin’s motives for invading Ukraine. For example, some emphasize that he said that Ukraine is an “artificial state“ or not a “real state.” Such opaque comments, however, say nothing about his reason for going to war. The same is true of Putin’s statement that he views Russians and Ukrainians as “one people“ with a common history. Others point out that he called the collapse of the Soviet Union “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.” Of course, Putin also said, “Whoever does not miss the Soviet Union has no heart. Whoever wants it back has no brain.” Still, others point to a speech in which he declared that “Modern Ukraine was entirely created by Russia or, to be more precise, by Bolshevik, Communist Russia.” But as he went on to say in that very same speech, in reference to Ukraine’s independence today: “Of course, we cannot change past events, but we must at least admit them openly and honestly.”

To make the case that Putin was bent on conquering all of Ukraine and incorporating it into Russia, it is necessary to provide evidence that first, he thought it was a desirable goal, that second, he thought it was a feasible goal, and third, he intended to pursue that goal. There is no evidence in the public record that Putin was contemplating, much less intending to put an end to Ukraine as an independent state and make it part of greater Russia when he sent his troops into Ukraine on February 24th.

In fact, there is significant evidence that Putin recognized Ukraine as an independent country. In his July 12, 2021, article about Russian-Ukrainian relations, which proponents of the conventional wisdom often point to as evidence of his imperial ambitions, he tells the Ukrainian people, “You want to establish a state of your own: you are welcome!” Regarding how Russia should treat Ukraine, he writes, “There is only one answer: with respect.” He concludes that lengthy article with the following words: “And what Ukraine will be—it is up to its citizens to decide.” It is hard to reconcile these statements with the claim that he wants to incorporate Ukraine within a greater Russia.

In that same July 12, 2021, article and again in an important speech he gave on February 21st of this year, Putin emphasized that Russia accepts “the new geopolitical reality that took shape after the dissolution of the USSR.” He reiterated that same point for a third time on February 24th, when he announced that Russia would invade Ukraine. In particular, he declared that “It is not our plan to occupy Ukrainian territory” and made it clear that he respected Ukrainian sovereignty, but only up to a point: “Russia cannot feel safe, develop, and exist while facing a permanent threat from the territory of today’s Ukraine.” In essence, Putin was not interested in making Ukraine a part of Russia; he was interested in making sure it did not become a “springboard“ for Western aggression against Russia, a subject I will say more about shortly.

One might argue that Putin was lying about his motives, that he was attempting to disguise his imperial ambitions. As it turns out, I have written a book about lying in international politics—Why Leaders Lie: The Truth about Lying in International Politics—and it is clear to me that Putin was not lying. For starters, one of my principal findings is that leaders do not lie much to each other; they lie more often to their own publics. Regarding Putin, whatever one thinks of him, he does not have a history of lying to other leaders. Although some assert that he frequently lies and cannot be trusted, there is little evidence of him lying to foreign audiences. Moreover, he has publicly spelled out his thinking about Ukraine on numerous occasions over the past two years and he has consistently emphasized that his principal concern is Ukraine’s relations with the West, especially NATO. He has never once hinted that he wants to make Ukraine part of Russia. If this behavior is all part of a giant deception campaign, it would be without precedent in recorded history.

Perhaps the best indicator that Putin is not bent on conquering and absorbing Ukraine is the military strategy Moscow has employed from the start of the campaign. The Russian military did not attempt to conquer all of Ukraine. That would have required a classic blitzkrieg strategy that aimed at quickly overrunning all of Ukraine with armored forces supported by tactical airpower. That strategy was not feasible, however, because there were only 190,000 soldiers in Russia’s invading army, which is far too small a force to vanquish and occupy Ukraine, which is not only the largest country between the Atlantic Ocean and Russia, but also has a population over 40 million. Unsurprisingly, the Russians pursued a limited aims strategy, which focused on either capturing or threatening Kiev and conquering a large swath of territory in eastern and southern Ukraine. In short, Russia did not have the capability to subdue all of Ukraine, much less conquer other countries in eastern Europe.

As Ramzy Mardini observed, another telling indicator of Putin’s limited aims is that there is no evidence Russia was preparing a puppet government for Ukraine, cultivating pro-Russian leaders in Kyiv, or pursuing any political measures that would make it possible to occupy the entire country and eventually integrate it into Russia.

To take this argument a step further, Putin and other Russian leaders surely understand from the Cold War that occupying counties in the age of nationalism is invariably a prescription for never-ending trouble. The Soviet experience in Afghanistan is a glaring example of this phenomenon, but more relevant for the issue at hand is Moscow’s relations with its allies in eastern Europe. The Soviet Union maintained a huge military presence in that region and was involved in the politics of almost every country located there. Those allies, however, were a frequent thorn in Moscow’s side. The Soviet Union put down a major insurrection in East Germany in 1953, and then invaded Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 to keep them in line. There was serious trouble in Poland in 1956, 1970, and again in 1980-1981. Although Polish authorities dealt with these events, they served as a reminder that intervention might be necessary. Albania, Romania, and Yugoslavia routinely caused Moscow trouble, but Soviet leaders tended to tolerate their misbehavior, because their location made them less important for deterring NATO.

What about contemporary Ukraine? It is obvious from Putin’s July 12, 2021, essay that he understood at that time that Ukrainian nationalism is a powerful force and that the civil war in the Donbass, which had been going on since 2014, had done much to poison relations between Russia and Ukraine. He surely knew that Russia’s invasion force would not be welcomed with open arms by Ukrainians, and that it would be a Herculean task for Russia to subjugate Ukraine if it had the necessary forces to conquer the entire country, which it did not.

Finally, it is worth noting that hardly anyone made the argument that Putin had imperial ambitions from the time he took the reins of power in 2000 until the Ukraine crisis first broke out on February 22, 2014. In fact, the Russian leader was an invited guest to the April 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest where the alliance announced that Ukraine and Georgia would eventually become members. Putin’s opposition to that announcement had hardly any effect on Washington because Russia was judged to be too weak to stop further NATO enlargement, just as it had been too weak to stop the 1999 and 2004 waves of expansion.

Relatedly, it is important to note that NATO expansion before February 2014 was not aimed at containing Russia. Given the sad state of Russian military power, Moscow was in no position to pursue revanchist policies in eastern Europe. Tellingly, former U.S. ambassador to Moscow Michael McFaul notes that Putin’s seizure of the Crimea was not planned before the crisis broke out in 2014; it was an impulsive move in response to the coup that overthrew Ukraine’s pro-Russian leader. In short NATO enlargement was not intended to contain a Russian threat but was instead part of a broader policy to spread the liberal international order into eastern Europe and make the entire continent look like western Europe.

It was only when the Ukraine crisis broke out in February 2014 that the United States and its allies suddenly began describing Putin as a dangerous leader with imperial ambitions and Russia as a serious military threat that had to be contained. What caused this shift? This new rhetoric was designed to serve one essential purpose: to enable the West to blame Putin for the outbreak of trouble in Ukraine. And now that the crisis has turned into a full-scale war, it is imperative to make sure he alone is blamed for this disastrous turn of events. This blame game explains why Putin is now widely portrayed as an imperialist here in the West, even though there is hardly any evidence to support that perspective.

Let me now turn to the real cause of the Ukraine crisis.

The Real Cause of the Trouble

The taproot of the crisis is the American-led effort to make Ukraine a Western bulwark on Russia’s borders. That strategy has three prongs: integrating Ukraine into the EU, turning Ukraine into a pro-Western liberal democracy, and most importantly, incorporating Ukraine into NATO. The strategy was set in motion at NATO’s annual summit in Bucharest in April 2008, when the alliance announced that Ukraine and Georgia “will become members.” Russian leaders responded immediately with outrage, making it clear that they saw this decision as an existential threat, and they had no intention of letting either country join NATO. According to a respected Russian journalist, Putin “flew into a rage,” and warned that “if Ukraine joins NATO, it will do so without Crimea and the eastern regions. It will simply fall apart.”

William Burns, who is now the head of the CIA, but was the US ambassador to Moscow at the time of the Bucharest summit, wrote a memo to then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice that succinctly describes Russian thinking about this matter. In his words: “Ukrainian entry into NATO is the brightest of all red lines for the Russian elite (not just Putin). In more than two and a half years of conversations with key Russian players, from knuckle-draggers in the dark recesses of the Kremlin to Putin’s sharpest liberal critics, I have yet to find anyone who views Ukraine in NATO as anything other than a direct challenge to Russian interests.” NATO, he said, “would be seen … as throwing down the strategic gauntlet. Today’s Russia will respond. Russian-Ukrainian relations will go into a deep freeze...It will create fertile soil for Russian meddling in Crimea and eastern Ukraine.”

Burns, of course, was not the only policymaker who understood that bringing Ukraine into NATO was fraught with danger. Indeed, at the Bucharest Summit, both German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy opposed moving forward on NATO membership for Ukraine because they understood it would alarm and anger Russia. Merkel recently explained her opposition: “I was very sure … that Putin is not going to just let that happen. From his perspective, that would be a declaration of war.”

The Bush administration, however, cared little about Moscow’s “brightest of red lines” and pressured the French and German leaders to agree to issuing a public pronouncement declaring that Ukraine and Georgia would eventually join the alliance.

Unsurprisingly, the American-led effort to integrate Georgia into NATO resulted in a war between Georgia and Russia in August 2008—four months after the Bucharest summit. Nevertheless, the United States and its allies continued moving forward with their plans to make Ukraine a Western bastion on Russia’s borders. These efforts eventually sparked a major crisis in February 2014, after a US-supported uprising caused Ukraine’s pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych to flee the country. He was replaced by pro-American Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk. In response, Russia seized Crimea from Ukraine and helped fuel a civil war between pro-Russian separatists and the Ukrainian government in the Donbass region of eastern Ukraine.

One often hears the argument that in the eight years between when the crisis broke out in February 2014 and when the war began in February 2022, the United States and its allies paid little attention to bringing Ukraine into NATO. In effect, the issue had been taken off the table, and thus NATO enlargement could not have been an important cause of the escalating crisis in 2021 and the subsequent outbreak of war earlier this year. This line of argument is false. In fact, the Western response to the events of 2014 was to double down on the existing strategy and draw Ukraine even closer to NATO. The alliance began training the Ukrainian military in 2014, averaging 10,000 trained troops annually over the next eight years. In December 2017, the Trump administration decided to provide Kyiv with “defensive weapons.” Other NATO countries soon got into the act, shipping even more weapons to Ukraine.

Ukraine’s military also began participating in joint military exercises with NATO forces. In July 2021, Kyiv and Washington co-hosted Operation Sea Breeze, a naval exercise in the Black Sea that included navies from 31 countries and was directly aimed at Russia. Two months later in September 2021, the Ukrainian army led Rapid Trident 21, which the U.S. Army described as an “annual exercise designed to enhance interoperability among allied and partner nations, to demonstrate units are poised and ready to respond to any crisis.” NATO’s effort to arm and train Ukraine’s military explains in good part why it has fared so well against Russian forces in the ongoing war. As a headline in The Wall Street Journal put it, “The Secret of Ukraine’s Military Success: Years of NATO Training.”

In addition to NATO’s ongoing efforts to make the Ukrainian military a more formidable fighting force, the politics surrounding Ukraine’s membership in NATO and its integration into the West changed in 2021. There was renewed enthusiasm for pursuing those goals in both Kyiv and Washington. President Zelensky, who had never shown much enthusiasm for bringing Ukraine into NATO and who was elected in March 2019 on a platform that called for working with Russia to settle the ongoing crisis, reversed course in early 2021 and not only embraced NATO expansion but also adopted a hardline approach toward Moscow. He made a series of moves—including shutting down pro-Russian TV stations and charging a close friend of Putin with treason—that were sure to anger Moscow.

President Biden, who moved into the White House in January 2021, had long been committed to bringing Ukraine into NATO and was also super-hawkish toward Russia. Unsurprisingly, on June 14, 2021, NATO issued the following communiqué at its annual summit in Brussels:

We reiterate the decision made at the 2008 Bucharest Summit that Ukraine will become a member of the Alliance with the Membership Action Plan (MAP) as an integral part of the process; we reaffirm all elements of that decision, as well as subsequent decisions, including that each partner will be judged on its own merits. We stand firm in our support for Ukraine’s right to decide its own future and foreign policy course free from outside interference.

On September 1, 2021, Zelensky visited the White House, where Biden made it clear that the United States was “firmly committed” to “Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations.” Then on November 10, 2021, Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and his Ukrainian counterpart, Dmytro Kuleba, signed an important document—the “US-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership.” The aim of both parties, the document stated, is to “underscore … a commitment to Ukraine’s implementation of the deep and comprehensive reforms necessary for full integration into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions.” That document explicitly builds not just on “the commitments made to strengthen the Ukraine-U.S. strategic partnership by Presidents Zelensky and Biden,” but also reaffirms the U.S. commitment to the “2008 Bucharest Summit Declaration.”

In short, there is little doubt that starting in early 2021 Ukraine began moving rapidly toward joining NATO. Even so, some supporters of this policy argue that Moscow should not have been concerned, because “NATO is a defensive alliance and poses no threat to Russia.” But that is not how Putin and other Russian leaders think about NATO and it is what they think that matters. There is no question that Ukraine joining NATO remained the “brightest of red lines” for Moscow.

To deal with this growing threat, Putin stationed ever-increasing numbers of Russian troops on Ukraine’s border between February 2021 and February 2022. His aim was to coerce Biden and Zelensky into altering course and halting their efforts to integrate Ukraine into the West. On December 17, 2021, Moscow sent separate letters to the Biden administration and NATO demanding a written guarantee that: 1) Ukraine would not join NATO, 2) no offensive weapons would be stationed near Russia’s borders, and 3) NATO troops and equipment moved into eastern Europe since 1997 would be moved back to western Europe.

Putin made numerous public statements during this period that left no doubt that he viewed NATO expansion into Ukraine as an existential threat. Speaking to the Defense Ministry Board on December 21, 2021, he stated: “what they are doing, or trying or planning to do in Ukraine, is not happening thousands of kilometers away from our national border. It is on the doorstep of our house. They must understand that we simply have nowhere further to retreat to. Do they really think we do not see these threats? Or do they think that we will just stand idly watching threats to Russia emerge?” Two months later at a press conference on February 22, 2022, just days before the war started, Putin said: “We are categorically opposed to Ukraine joining NATO because this poses a threat to us, and we have arguments to support this. I have repeatedly spoken about it in this hall.” He then made it clear that he recognized that Ukraine was becoming a de facto member of NATO. The United States and its allies, he said, “continue to pump the current Kiev authorities full of modern types of weapons.” He went on to say that if this was not stopped, Moscow “would be left with an ‘anti-Russia’ armed to the teeth. This is totally unacceptable.”

Putin’s logic should make perfect sense to Americans, who have long been committed to the Monroe Doctrine, which stipulates that no distant great power is allowed to place any of its military forces in the Western Hemisphere.

I might note that in all of Putin’s public statements during the months leading up to the war, there is not a scintilla of evidence that he was contemplating conquering Ukraine and making it part of Russia, much less attacking additional countries in eastern Europe. Other Russian leaders—including the defense minister, the foreign minister, the deputy foreign minister, and the Russian ambassador to Washington—also emphasized the centrality of NATO expansion for causing the Ukraine crisis. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov made the point succinctly at a press conference on January 14, 2022, when he said, “the key to everything is the guarantee that NATO will not expand eastward.”

Nevertheless, the efforts of Lavrov and Putin to get the United States and its allies to abandon their efforts to make Ukraine a Western bulwark on Russia’s border failed completely. Secretary of State Antony Blinken responded to Russia’s mid-December demands by simply saying, “There is no change. There will be no change.” Putin then launched an invasion of Ukraine to eliminate the threat he saw from NATO.

Where Are We Now & Where Are We Going?

The Ukraine war has been raging for almost four months I would like to now offer some observations about what has happened so far and where the war might be headed. I will address three specific issues: 1) the consequences of the war for Ukraine; 2) the prospects for escalation—to include nuclear escalation; and 3) the prospects for ending the war in the foreseeable future.

This war is an unmitigated disaster for Ukraine. As I noted earlier, Putin made it clear in 2008 that Russia would wreck Ukraine to prevent it from joining NATO. He is delivering on that promise. Russian forces have conquered 20 percent of Ukrainian territory and destroyed or badly damaged many Ukrainian cities and towns. More than 6.5 million Ukrainians have fled the country, while more than 8 million have been internally displaced. Many thousands of Ukrainians—including innocent civilians—are dead or badly wounded and the Ukrainian economy is in shambles. The World Bank estimates that Ukraine’s economy will shrink by almost 50 percent over the course of 2022. Estimates are that approximately 100 billion dollars’ worth of damage has been inflicted on Ukraine and that it will take close to a trillion dollars to rebuild the country. In the meantime, Kyiv requires about $5 billion of aid every month just to keep the government running.

Furthermore, there appears to be little hope that Ukraine will be able to regain use of its ports on the Azov and Black Seas anytime soon. Before the war, roughly 70 percent of all Ukrainian exports and imports—and 98 percent of its grain exports—moved through these ports. This is the basic situation after less than 4 months of fighting. It is downright scary to contemplate what Ukraine will look like if this war drags on for a few more years.

So, what are the prospects for negotiating a peace agreement and ending the war in the next few months? I am sorry to say that I see no way this war ends anytime soon, a view shared by prominent policymakers like General Mark Milley, the Chairman of the JCS, and NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg. The main reason for my pessimism is that both Russia and the United States are deeply committed to winning the war and it is impossible to fashion an agreement where both sides win. To be more specific, the key to a settlement from Russia’s perspective is making Ukraine a neutral state, ending the prospect of integrating Kyiv into the West. But that outcome is unacceptable to the Biden administration and a large portion of the American foreign policy establishment, because it would represent a victory for Russia.

Ukrainian leaders have agency of course, and one might hope that they will push for neutralization to spare their country further harm. Indeed, Zelensky briefly mentioned this possibility in the early days of the war, but he never seriously pursued it. There is little chance, however, that Kyiv will push for neutralization, because the ultra-nationalists in Ukraine, who wield significant political power, have zero interest in yielding to any of Russia’s demands, especially one that dictates Ukraine’s political alignment with the outside world. The Biden administration and the countries on NATO’s eastern flank—like Poland and the Baltic states—are likely to support Ukraine’s ultra-nationalists on this issue.

To complicate matters further, how does one deal with the large swaths of Ukrainian territory that Russia has conquered since the war started, as well as Crimea’s fate? It is hard to imagine Moscow voluntarily giving up any of the Ukrainian territory it now occupies, much less all of it, as Putin’s territorial goals today are probably not the same ones he had before the war. At the same time, it is equally hard to imagine any Ukrainian leader accepting a deal that allows Russia to keep any Ukrainian territory, except possibly Crimea. I hope I am wrong, but that is why I see no end in sight to this ruinous war.

Let me now turn to the matter of escalation. It is widely accepted among international relations scholars that there is a powerful tendency for protracted wars to escalate. Over time, other countries can get dragged into the fight and the level of violence is likely to increase. The potential for this happening in the Ukraine war is real. There is a danger that the United States and its NATO allies will get dragged into the fighting, which they have been able to avoid up to this point, even though they are already waging a proxy war against Russia. There is also the possibility that nuclear weapons might be used in Ukraine and that might even lead to a nuclear exchange between Russia and the United States. The underlying reason these outcomes might be realized is that the stakes are so high for both sides, and thus neither can afford to lose.

As I have emphasized, Putin and his lieutenants believe that Ukraine joining the West is an existential threat to Russia that must be eliminated. In practical terms, that means Russia must win its war in Ukraine. Defeat is unacceptable. The Biden administration, on the other hand, has stressed that its goal is not only to decisively defeat Russia in Ukraine, but also to use sanctions to inflict massive damage on the Russian economy. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin has emphasized that the West’s goal is to weaken Russia to the point where it could not invade Ukraine again. In effect, the Biden administration is committed to knocking Russia out of the ranks of the great powers. At the same time, President Biden himself has called Russia’s war in Ukraine a “genocide” and charged Putin with being a “war criminal” who should face a “war crimes trial” after the war. Such rhetoric hardly lends itself to negotiating an end to the war. After all, how do you negotiate with a genocidal state?

American policy has two significant consequences. For starters, it greatly amplifies the existential threat Moscow faces in this war and makes it more important than ever that it prevails in Ukraine. At the same time, it means the United States is deeply committed to making sure that Russia loses. The Biden administration has now invested so much in the Ukraine war—both materially and rhetorically—that a Russian victory would represent a devastating defeat for Washington.

Obviously, both sides cannot win. Moreover, there is a serious possibility that one side will begin to lose badly. If American policy succeeds and the Russians are losing to the Ukrainians on the battlefield, Putin might turn to nuclear weapons to rescue the situation. The U.S. Director of National Intelligence, Avril Haines, told the Senate Armed Services Committee in May that this was one of the two situations that might lead Putin to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine. For those of you who think this is unlikely, please remember that NATO planned to use nuclear weapons in similar circumstances during the Cold War. If Russia were to employ nuclear weapons in Ukraine, it is impossible to say how the Biden administration would react, but it surely would be under great pressure to retaliate, thereby raising the possibility of a great-power nuclear war. There is a perverse paradox at play here: the more successful the United States and its allies are at achieving their goals, the more likely it is that the war will turn nuclear.

Let’s turn the tables and ask what happens if the United States and its NATO allies appear to be heading toward defeat, which effectively means that the Russians are routing the Ukrainian military and the government in Kyiv moves to negotiate a peace deal intended to save as much of the country as possible. In that event, there would be great pressure on the United States and its allies to get even more deeply involved in the fighting. It is not likely, but certainly possible that American or maybe Polish troops would get pulled into the fighting, which means NATO would literally be at war with Russia. This is the other scenario, according to Avril Haines, where the Russians might turn to nuclear weapons. It is difficult to say precisely how events will play out if this scenario comes to pass, but there is no question there will be serious potential for escalation, to include nuclear escalation. The mere possibility of that outcome should send shivers down your spine.

There are likely to be other disastrous consequences from this war, which I cannot discuss in any detail because of time constraints. For example, there is reason to think the war will lead to a world food crisis in which many millions of people will die. The president of the World Bank, David Malpass, argues that if the Ukraine war continues, we will face a global food crisis that is a “human catastrophe.”

Furthermore, relations between Russia and the West have been so thoroughly poisoned that it will take many years to repair them. In the meantime, that profound hostility will fuel instability around the globe, but especially in Europe. Some will say there is a silver lining: relations among countries in the West have markedly improved because of the Ukraine war. That is true for the moment, but there are deep fissures below the surface, and they are bound to reassert themselves over time. For example, relations between the countries of eastern and western Europe are likely to deteriorate as the war drags on, because their interests and perspectives on the conflict are not the same.

Finally, the conflict is already damaging the global economy in major ways and this situation is likely to get worse with time. Jamie Diamond, the CEO of JPMorgan Chase says we should brace ourselves for an economic “hurricane.” If he is right, these economic shocks will affect the politics of every Western country, undermine liberal democracy, and strengthen its opponents on both the left and the right. The economic consequences of the Ukraine war will extend to countries all over the planet, not just the West. As The UN put it in a report released just last week: “The ripple effects of the conflict are extending human suffering far beyond its borders. The war, in all its dimensions, has exacerbated a global cost-of-living crisis unseen in at least a generation, compromising lives, livelihoods, and our aspirations for a better world by 2030.”

Conclusion

Simply put, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine is a colossal disaster, which as I noted at the start of my talk, will lead people all around the world to search for its causes. Those who believe in facts and logic will quickly discover that the United States and its allies are mainly responsible for this train wreck. The April 2008 decision to bring Ukraine and Georgia into NATO was destined to lead to conflict with Russia. The Bush administration was the principal architect of that fateful choice, but the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations have doubled down on that policy at every turn and America’s allies have dutifully followed Washington’s lead. Even though Russian leaders made it perfectly clear that bringing Ukraine into NATO would be crossing “the brightest of red lines,” the United States refused to accommodate Russia’s deepest security concerns and instead moved relentlessly to make Ukraine a Western bulwark on Russia’s border.

The tragic truth is that if the West had not pursued NATO expansion into Ukraine, it is unlikely there would be a war in Ukraine today and Crimea would still be part of Ukraine. In essence, Washington played the central role in leading Ukraine down the path to destruction. History will judge the United States and its allies harshly for their remarkably foolish policy on Ukraine. Thank you.

### — Security Cooperation —

### Link — Arms Sales

#### Arms sales to US allies via military supply chains are part and parcel with imperialist assemblages of warfare.

Grove 19 [Jairus Victor Grove is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Hawai'i Research Center for Future Studies at the University of Hawai'i at Mānoa; “Savage Ecology: war and geopolitics at the end of the world”; August 16, 2019]//eleanor

This description seems to suggest that the study of war’s ecology ought to be a question of political economy, given the arms market, the growth of cities, and the burgeoning slums. However, it is not the arms that are sold and purchased that have altered the outcome of two major wars but the weapons left behind, the actual surplus from previous wars that then combined with the deluge of electronic waste shipped, dumped, and smuggled throughout the Global South. It is also not the overpopulated struggling cities of the Global South pumping out billion-dollar military platforms or invading nations halfway around the world. Political economy thought in traditional terms is ill-equipped to deal with the far-from-equilibrium systems of global life. After all, economic explanations of urban growth failed to predict the dramatic increases in urban size and slum intensity. The prevailing wisdom of development economics was that the persistent and intensifying economic decline since the 1970s experienced throughout the developing world would slow the growth of cities.47 The exact opposite has occurred. In fact, as jobs and economic opportuni- ties have diminished substantially along with the buying power of wages in cities throughout the Global South, the number of people relocating to cities has spiked upward, seemingly undeterred by the economic conditions. Paul Virilio makes a compelling case that these newly emergent megaslums ought not be called cities or even really urban. They are makeshift settlements whose only apparent similarity to earlier settlements called cities is the density of population. The ultracity, as Virilio calls it, does not follow the rhythms or any organizational structure we would commonly call urban. In many cases the megaslums have a kind of persistent temporary status. This is seemingly a contradiction in terms but one that aptly describes the situation in which many of the slums began as refugee camps or emergency living facilities and, while outlasting their temporary or emergency expectations, still have extraordinarily transient populations as well as a nearly continuous rate of creation and destruction as the result of attempts by the state to raze settlements and the often fragile structural integrity of shacks and shanties. Virilio uses the phrase revolution de l’empart massif to describe the conflicting movements of internalization and exclusion.48 Mike Davis argues that austerity measures, wars, and the general failure of cash crops and resources in export-based development models have created a kind of perfect storm for the displacement and relocation of rural populations to urban centers.49 Some of these factors are within the traditional jurisdiction of economics; however, none represents a smooth relation between economic indicator and outcome. Therefore it is useful to restore oikos to its larger purview that supersedes economy, to return to ecology all of its political, material, and historical inflections. The presence of traditional military resources such as tanks and fighter jets that would be used to judge the material power of opponents in conflicts is no more indicative of outcomes than economic growth is predictive of urbanization. In these calculations, tanks and planes would be quantified to make judgments about military strength that small arms and abandoned mines would not. For instance, by traditional judgments of material power, Saddam Hussein was better armed and prepared for war in 1991 and therefore stronger than in 2003. However, the first Gulf War was a resounding success by military standards because Saddam Hussein fought the coalition forces using a large stockpile of weapons and training received from the licit and illicit Western and Soviet arms markets. Technological assistance referred to in the U.S. budget as “security assistance” involves a very dif­ferent flow of goods and services than the emergent objects of waste and surplus that form the milieu of the ied and the seemingly insignificant trade in small and light arms. When states play by the norms and procedures of modernist warfare, a quantity theory of war is operative and exhibits relatively predictable outcomes. J. F. C. Fuller coined this phrase to describe the mobilization and execution of nationalist war under the power of steam. For Fuller, a new episteme of military thinking emerges from an assemblage of mass nationalism, gunpowder, steam engines, communication lines, and capitalist economies, such that “it is war that shapes peace, and armament that shapes war.”50 To have more of something, a quantitative advantage, the units being measured have to be interchangeable or roughly isomorphic. If the application of force by opponents is similar in kind, then the quantity of force applied in the form of bullets, tanks, and bombs may determine the outcome of war. In the case of the first Gulf War, quantity was on the side of the coalition forces even though the Iraqi military was well armed. The current conflict in the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan, however, is intensively and extensively asymmetrical—not in the sense that it is uneven, as is often the understanding of this term, but in the sense that there is a mismatch or incommensurable difference between the resources and tactics of each side. James Der Derian refers to this mismatch of contemporary global politics as heteropolarity rather than multipolarity as the poles are compositionally nonidentical.51 The forces being mobilized are not comparable at the level of tactics, organization, or agenda. Therefore, quantity is not predictive of the outcome. In fact, quantity is not quantifiable. Clausewitz calls this the impossibility of polarity in war that results because there is seldom anything approaching equilibrium.52 So to say that the U.S. military possesses more tanks than the Taliban or Pashtun fighters is true, as neither possess any armored vehicles. But that accounting of relative strength would only be relevant if both sides were fighting a tank war. For example, ieds could be counted and compared, say, to their kissing cousins the “smart mines.” However, that would tell us little about the possible outcome of the conflict. The United States could possess twice as many mines as its competitors and the uncertainty would still persist. In part this is because of the differential flows and organizations of the opposing forces. The United States relies on major roads that can accommodate large caravans of trucks and vehicles. Without a nearly constant flow of goods and soldiers, the U.S. military would starve. Therefore, ieds consistently do damage because convoys, whether for supply or patrols to ensure the passage of supplies, are highly susceptible to disruption. And that vulnerability is not reversible. Understanding this asymmetry requires understand- ing the assemblages of things that organize the differing lifeworlds spanning the theater of operations. While it may be impossible to exhaust the census of “things” or give a causal accounting of all the objects that make up a milieu, the multiplication of objects that take part can provide a foothold for navigating the emergence and recurrence of conflicts. The improvised explosive device is exceptional for this pursuit because its recurrence, mutation, and advance have ravaged the roadways and urban corridors of the present U.S. occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan despite the best efforts of the dod to target the supplies used to construct ieds and the initiatives to track down and eliminate the humans who build them. According to a 2010 report in The Guardian, ieds have accounted for nearly half of all combat deaths and half of all casualties in Iraq and 30 percent of deaths and 50 percent of casualties in Afghanistan.53 Since the $30 billion counter-ied effort began in Afghanistan, the number of lethal ieds has tripled. It should be mentioned that the numbers of civilians killed by these machines is difficult to measure, but estimates suggest that numbers exceed U.S. combat deaths of all kinds.54

### Link — Reform

#### Reform is de-stabilizing propaganda aimed at dis-unifying the working class.

Summer Pappachen 21, Ph.D. student of comparative politics and political theory at Northwestern U, “What is imperialism? An introduction,” 9-20-21, <https://www.liberationschool.org/what-is-imperialism/>, jy

Marx on colonialism and anti-colonial struggles

Marx analyzed capitalism in Britain for his major work because data on the country’s industrial system was rich and accessible, and because it was where capitalism was most highly developed at the time. However, Marx was clear that British capitalism was not confined to Britain, and that the object of study was Britain as a capitalist and colonizing power. British industrial capitalism was advanced because of its stature as a colonial power.

Marx’s critique of political economy showed how the prevailing ideas of colonialism were reactionary and not in the interests of British workers. For example, he noted how British colonies like Ireland could be utilized for excess labor-power and how wage laborers can’t be free while slavery exists. Most famously, he wrote that British capital was accumulated through “conquest, enslavement, robbery, murder,” and more specifically through national and international debts, “the discovery of gold and silver… the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population,” and “the conquest and looting of the East Indies” [3].

The study that examines the political economy of Britain ends with a chapter on colonialism because Marx knew that, while capital’s contradictions couldn’t be solved without revolution, they could be pushed back and displaced through intensified colonial expansion. In fact, Marx’s theory of value was a global theory of value, as value necessarily expands and requires capitalist powers to engage in colonial and, later, imperialist practices [4]. Colonialism is explicitly mentioned, for example, as a process that can counter the tendency for the rate of profit to fall [5].

Moreover, Marx even acknowledged that uprisings in the colonized world could spark workers’ uprisings in the colonial motherland. During the Taiping Rebellion in China–which Marx supported wholeheartedly–he wrote:

“It may seem a very strange, and very paradoxical assertion that the next uprising of the people of Europe, and their next movement for republican freedom and economy of government, may depend more probably on what is now passing in the Celestial Empire” [6].

Even during Marx’s time, what we today call the Global South–including Africa, Asia, and Latin America–were, along with oppressed nations in the North, exploited for the enrichment of the colonizing capitalist states.

From colonialism to imperialism

Yet it wasn’t until after Marx died that the shift from colonialism to imperialism began. Marx died in 1883, just before the 1884 Conference of Berlin rapidly accelerated the transition to a global imperialist order. Less than 20 years later, the imperialist powers had terrorized, plundered, and looted almost all of Africa, stripping away long histories of self-governance.

For a definition of imperialism, we have to turn to Lenin, who can help us understand what imperialism really is, and why it isn’t an adjective that describes particular policies of certain administrations, but instead refers to a particular stage of capitalist development. Lenin distinguishes imperialism from colonialism in the following manner:

The characteristic feature of the period under review is the final partition of the globe—final, not in the sense that a repartition is impossible; on the contrary, repartitions are possible and inevitable—but in the sense that the colonial policy of the capitalist countries has completed the seizure of the unoccupied territories of our planet. For the first time the world is completely divided up, so that in the future only redivision is possible, i.e., territories can only pass from one “owner” to another, instead of passing as ownerless territory to an “owner” [7].

Imperialism began when the colonizing powers had already divided the world between themselves. The only way to expand from that point on was to re-divide the colonial territories, which inevitably meant war. Such redivisions were at the roots of the First and Second World Wars.

Imperialism: Capitalist wars and revolutionary solutions

“Imperialism,” Lenin wrote, “is the highest stage in the development of capitalism” [8]. This means there is no separating imperialism from capitalism: one is a stage within the other.

Capitalism has, since its birth, used legal and extralegal violence to accumulate wealth in the hands of the capitalist class through a process called primary accumulation. Within England, one of capitalism’s first acts was expropriating peasants from their land, forcibly converting them into wage laborers and transforming their means of subsistence into commodities they had to purchase. Such dispossession was carried out by state and individual terrorism. The colonized world suffered a similar yet sharper fate, as we saw Marx describe above.

Writing during the beginning of World War I, Lenin wrote that “capitalism only became capitalist imperialism at a definite and very high stage of its development, when certain of its fundamental characteristics began to change into their opposites” [9]. “Economically,” he writes, “the main thing in this process is the displacement of capitalist free competition by capitalist monopoly” [10]. Gone were the (brief) days when small businesses competed with each other in limited markets. Instead, capital was centralized in fewer and fewer hands. “Capitalism has grown into a world system of colonial oppression and of the financial strangulation of the overwhelming majority of the population of the world by a handful of ‘advanced’ countries,” Lenin wrote [11]. Their “booty” accrues to a handful of imperialist powers “who are drawing the whole world into their war over the division of their *booty*” [12].

Some thought that the tendency toward monopoly would result in one single company for every industry, which would represent a limit to capitalism within capitalism. Yet during economic crises and due to state intervention, such monopolies never cohered. Today, major corporations and financial institutions, largely located in the Global North, have conglomerated and vertically integrated to the extent that a handful of monopolies dominate the entire international economy. To be sure, they’re often separate entities, but they’re united by finance and the state. Lenin referred to the then-new phenomenon of the merging of industrial and banking capital as “finance capital,” a form of capitalism that is still dominant today.

Because of this drive toward monopoly, capitalism cannot be reformed into a peaceful regime. Capitalism can never become anti-imperialist, non-imperialist, or, to use the phrase of Lenin’s target, Karl Kautsky, “ultra” or “super-imperialist.” Kautsky believed that the territorial expansion of capitalism had reached its limits and that the only solution was for the powerful nations to form a bloc and establish an equilibrium. Lenin said this state was merely a “truce” between wars.

Governments of imperialist countries act in the interests of these monopolies, using their armies and militaries to pursue their objectives. The U.S. military is an extension of capital’s drive to constantly conquer new markets and resources, even when it creates them through destruction. It goes to war to compete with other imperialist rivals for markets and resources, to keep rising capitalist powers in their place, to oppress independent and socialist nations, to find new markets, resources, and springs of profit, and to mitigate against worker rebellions at home.

When Israel bombs Palestine or the U.S. launches airstrikes against Syria, sanctions Venezuela, or blockades Cuba, these are not individual policy decisions, nor are they the result of any single politician’s mindset. These are economically necessary and structural features of capitalism that cannot be reformed away. To be sure, there is a great deal of debate within the U.S. political and military establishments over what particular policies to pursue, means to deploy, and objectives to attain at particular junctures. Yet, the consensus remains: the U.S. won’t accept any challenge to its imperialist dominance.

The only solution is the overthrow of capitalist imperialism, and the building of socialism. By its very definition, imperialism needs to dominate every market, raw material, natural resource, and worker on the planet. The tactics it deploys to do so are varied, ranging from sanctions and blockades to war threats, bombing campaigns, and all-out regime-change operations. The U.S. remains the primary imperialist power, although its dominance is increasingly contested by other countries that are merely trying to rise within the capitalist order. The People’s Republic of China, however, constitutes a serious threat to imperialism insofar as it works to provide an alternative to U.S. domination for underdeveloped countries.

Today as in Lenin’s time, the global antagonism between imperialist and oppressed nations reverberates and structures our world and our struggles [13].

Conclusion: Proletarian internationalism

In reality, it is the workers and oppressed who are powerful. We are the ones who will take power out of the hands of monopolies and turn it over to the toiling masses through revolutionary struggles.

Here in the United States, it is the duty of all progressive and revolutionary people to strike imperialism at its heart. Ending imperialism in the U.S. will mean liberation not only for us, but also for oppressed peoples around the world, for they would be able to exercise their right to self-determination without interference. The Cuban people could build socialism without blockades from the US; Korea could reunite once again without threat of U.S. military intervention; Palestine would be free from U.S.-Israeli occupation.

Yet our class is constantly bombarded with imperialist propaganda that aims to divide us against our allies abroad and to unite us with our enemies at home. “We’re all Americans,” they tell us, slyly ignoring the class, national, and other divisions in the imperialist heartland. Imperialist propaganda takes diverse forms, and many of them liberal and even “progressive.” Wars are never waged in the name of resources or profit, but rather in the name of “human rights,” “democracy,” and even the “protection of minorities” [14]. For each form of propaganda, we have to respond clearly and resolutely: NO to U.S. imperialism! U.S. troops out of everywhere! These demands are consistent regardless of our evaluation of the nation or government under attack.

We have to show that workers in the United States have nothing to gain through U.S. imperialism, whether it pursues its objectives through military war or economic sanctions. We have to show our class that, not only do we have nothing to gain, but we suffer continual losses from imperialism–we lose our lives, our jobs, our communities, and more. By showing these truths to workers, we help unite and raise the consciousness of our class, which are indispensable to building a socialist revolution here in the “belly of the beast.”

While the global imperialist system has changed quite drastically since Lenin’s time, the primary political directive remains the same: Fighting to end imperialist war is necessary, but it is part of the struggle for the real solution: to take power out of the hands of the banks, financial oligarchies, landlords, and militarists, and put it in the hands of the many. We can’t do that if our class can be won back over to the side of our enemies.

### — Impacts —

### Link — Human Rights

#### “Human rights” are a hollow promise that resolve the moral guilt of Western capitalism without resolving the lived experience of colonization.

Nyere 20, Chidochashe Nyere, PhD is a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the Institute for Pan African Thought and Conversation, University of Johannesburg., (Chidochashe, “NATO’s 2011 Invasion of Libya: Colonialism Repackaged?” in Reimagining Justice, Human Rights and Leadership in Africa, pp. 123-156, DOI:10.1007/978-3-030-25143-7\_7) //CHC-DS

Universal Human Rights

The other myth that is at the foundation of Eurocentrism and European modernity is the veneer of universal human rights. The so-called human rights are applicable and ascribed to everyone when it suites European modernity. The rights can be easily denied other races particularly the Black race when it is convenient for Europe. This epitomises Eurocentrism. Europe seemingly is the only civilisation that dictates what goes and for who it goes. In convergence with this notion, Ramose (2003: 2) speaks of an intrinsic link between land and human life. Life exists and is located somewhere; the attachment and location of human life to land are unquestionable. In other words, life is geographically located. The colonisation of Africa—“losing land to the conqueror”—therefore, was tantamount to losing a “vital source of life” for the Africans (Ramose 2003: 2). Hence, European colonial conquests not only entrenched its domination in foreign spaces and places, it literally killed and murdered other civilisations that occupied those spaces and places it invaded and conquered. So far, this work has noted the inconsistency of the lived experience and reality of European prescription of modernity to other civilisations. The inconsistency lies in that the rhetoric speaks of ideals presumably ascribed for, and on, everybody. The reality proves the rhetoric to be untrue. The United Nations was created in 1945 following the so-called World War II, formed to liquidate and obliterate “international wars” (UN 2018). The irony is that when the UN was formed, colonialism was at its peak in Africa. The formation of the UN, therefore, did not include Africa because it was just Europe’s extension, if not property. In other words, Africa was forcibly incorporated into the international system without its involvement, consultation, consent and ascent. Not only was Africa forcibly incorporated into the international system, it was also forcibly incorporated into the capitalist market system (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015: 485). Ramose concurs with Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s view and submits that Africa’s loss of sovereignty meant that: [T]he African was compelled to enter into the money economy. Having been thus rendered poor by the stroke of the pen backed by the use of armed force, the African was compelled to find money to assure not only individual survival but also to pay tax for owning a hut, for example. In this way, the African’s right to life—the inalienable right to subsistence—was violated. (Ramose 2003: 2) The assumption of sovereign equality bequeathed on all states in the 1648 Westphalian Treaty, and the de-recognition of Africa as a sovereign space and place in 1886 by European imperial powers, and the re-incorporation of Africa in 1945 into the European international system, proves the consistent inconsistency and the absurdity of European modernity. Ramose (2003: 2) asserts that human rights “revolve around the recognition, protection and respect of the right to life”. As such, the continual violation of human rights by the current world order is problematic and unjust, which renders the rhetoric of human rights meaningless to Africans. If the rhetoric about human rights is to arouse or evoke any meaning in Africans’ experiences and consciousness, it must reinstate and rehabilitate materially and bestow recognition of, and uphold Africa’s “inalienable right to subsistence” (Ramose 2003: 2). The UN, a perceived global authority that seeks to champion universal human rights by some states and actors, and if at all well-meaning, should it not then seek to revisit the colonial question for redress especially to victims of the greatest crime against humanity—colonialism? It cannot be that Africa’s human rights continue to be trampled on and left unchallenged. Kissinger (2014: 7) draws the readers’ attention to the current “world community” modelled on the European Concert of State which was formed as a result of the Westphalian Treaty of 1648. The modelling of the entire world on the European Concert of State is representative of Eurocentrism and the idea of coloniality. In August 2001, the United Nations held a Conference on Racism in Durban, South Africa. At that Conference, the USA withdrew its delegation together with Israel, in protest of demands put by Africans that the rights of Africans particularly be recognised and that crimes against humanity committed by colonial masters be accounted for and recognised for what they are. Ramose observed that: The majority of the Western countries present at the conference insisted that the prevailing inhumanity of the global structural violence and poverty should be maintained. This they did by ensuring that the conference would adopt resolutions that would absolve them from both the moral and the legal guilt of the violence of colonisation and the inhumanity of racism. (2003: 3) Accounting for colonial injustices would mean acknowledging the dispossession of Black people of their land, among other elements; a thorny issue that capitalism cannot admit to, seeing that the dispossession was covered up by property rights—a fundamental principle of capitalism—and contained in a façade of legal documents including international law and National Constitutions of various countries. Colonialism and capitalism are thus protected by law, particularly the Roman Law and the Roman–Dutch Law. Needless to note that the Roman Law and the Dutch Law are European and naturally seek to entrench Eurocentrism.

### Link — I-Law

#### International law is not neutral, but rather codifies inequality — their faith in the “impartial” rule of law creates international winners and losers.

Hurd ’20 — Ian; Department of Political Science, Northwestern University. September 16, 2020; “The case against international cooperation”; *International Theory*, First View, Pages 1-22; Accessed online via Cambridge University Press; <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1752971920000470>; //CYang

First, the rule of law ideal, consisting of the neutral application of rules across cases, is not politically neutral. International law is necessarily partial to some goals and opposed to others and it will therefore have unequal effects on its constituents. The rose-colored glasses that are often used to interpret the world of international law lead scholars to assume that global governance enacts the best ideals of humanity, universally shared and therefore uncontroversial. Darryl Robinson adopts this view in his analysis of international criminal law (ICL): ‘I believe that cosmopolitanism resonates with the aspirations of ICL: a concern for human beings that extends beyond borders; a willingness to embrace alternative governance structures to supplement state structures; and inclusiveness of the concerns of the “international community as a whole”’.Footnote69 Shashi Tharoor has called the United Nations ‘the best hope the world currently has’ for its problems because it ‘brings all the countries of the world together to pursue collectively the security and welfare so essential to our common humanity’.Footnote70 This is an ‘enchanted view’ of international law and governance.Footnote71 Fernando Nuñez-Mietz assumes that international law is naturally morally good: ‘the content of much of international law is a reflection of shared understandings of what is morally right’.Footnote72 To liberals, international law can seem like a magical machine that takes in hot controversies and feeds out cool, impartial solutions.

The limits of this view are easy to see. If one were to take the same assumption into the study of tax law, the results would be equally weak. As tax law creates categories for different kinds of income and wealth and it sets rules to govern how each is taxed, it draws lines around types of person or institution and taxes them differently. These are understood as political because they affect different interests differently, and they are fought over in legislatures and in the streets by the partisans of these interests. The law is politically productive in the sense that it creates inequalities which then present to individuals as incentives to get on one side or other of the law and gives rise to new terrains of political contestation.Footnote73 In the USA for instance, where religious institutions are not taxed, courts are required to monitor the distinction between religious and non-religious institutions so that the rule can be ‘correctly’ applied as various entities seek to be declared ‘religious’ for tax purposes.Footnote74 The social distinction between religious and non-religious is made into a legal distinction, governed by the state, with tax consequences. Tax law might be applied in a neutral manner in the sense that everyone is expected to follow the same rules equally but the effect of application is not neutral because the law works to the advantage of some over others. It cannot be apolitical.

International law can be seen in the same light. Depending on how it is used it could prioritize the interests of states over people, or powerful states over less powerful, or corporations over nature, or the opposite of these. It specifies which laws govern the Nepalese peacekeeper sent to Haiti by the United Nations and it regulates how a Haitian who suffers harm by that peacekeeper can seek compensation and from whom.Footnote75 It constrains some kinds of killing and while empowering others.Footnote76 And it could be written differently so that it would encompass different sets of winners and losers,Footnote77 just as tax law could. But it can't be written so that it benefits everyone.

Because international law reflects partial rather than universal interests, it is important to investigate which interests are served and which are denied. The empirical, pragmatist research agenda that I advocate in place of cooperation theory traces the actual distribution of welfare and power created by these rules or institutions.Footnote78 David Kennedy has pursued this work in connection with humanitarian action, motivated by the idea that ‘once we see international humanitarians as participants in global governance — as rulers — it seems impossible not to be attentive to the possible costs, as well as the benefits, of our work’.Footnote79 The simple assumptions of liberalism, of consent and mutual gains are bypassed. As David Lake says, ‘as a set of rules, international orders affect individuals and groups in different ways, and these actors pursue their interests to the extent of their abilities, including legitimating the rule of some foreign country or resisting that rule. International order is not simply Pareto-improving cooperation, as often theorized in international relations, but involves hard bargaining and winners and losers’.Footnote80

Second, because it has these political effects, international law is a powerful tool for governments and others and it has come to occupy an important place in their strategic behavior. States and activists invoke international law strategically with an eye on its potential to help them achieve their goals. It empowers governments, as well as constraining them. The instrumental use of law to advance interests is seen by some liberal theorists as the direct contradiction of the idea of the rule of law, but as a practice it is ubiquitous in IR. Brian Tamanaha argues against instrumentalism in his book Law as a Means to an End: Threat to the Rule of Law.Footnote81 A similar complaint comes up around international courts. Shannon Fyfe, noted above, seeks to root out ‘impermissible political influence’ from the work of the ICC while allowing it the admittedly political goal of deterring or punishing perpetrators.Footnote82 These complaints presume the separation of law from politics and they strive to keep each in its box.

A political approach to law recognizes that instrumentalism is an inescapable part of legalization. This is true of international law just as it is of domestic tax law. Countries bring cases to international tribunals when they believe that a legal judgment will help their political goals, as Australia did over Japanese whaling and the USA did at Nuremberg and governments do with self-referrals to the ICC.Footnote83 Contesting political disputes in legal form is the norm not an aberration. The turn to law, in the form of legal institutions, legal resources, and legal logics, is a political one, with characteristic effects on the shape of arguments, the roster of authorized actors, and the distribution of power and payoffs.Footnote84 ‘Law’, said Judith Shklar, ‘is a political instrument’Footnote85 and Martti Koskenniemi went on to say that every legal choice is a ‘politics of law’.Footnote86

The instrumentalization of legal resources for political purposes follows naturally from the idea of the rule of law, which elevates legal institutions to the authoritative position of deciding how things should go. A regime of legal supremacy directs actors to fight their fights in the language of law. This is not particularly controversial as a conceptual point — indeed, it sits inside much liberal analysis of law — but the methodological commitment to separating legal from political makes it harder to recognize and study.Footnote87 Bower says that the goal of legal discourse is to ‘shift the strategic terrain [between contending parties] such that the other arguments are no longer sustainable’.Footnote88 Even in a setting where courts are not available, legal argumentation is strategically powerful. David Luban identifies the expressive power of international prosecution as the main payoff to the ICC itself: ‘the most promising justification for international tribunals is their role in norm projection’.Footnote89 The court's function is in a sense ceremonial, showing the values of the international community in vivid color. This is political theater, deployed instrumentally in pursuit of what he sees as universal goals.

The widespread commitments to rule-of-law ideology in world affairs means that being seen as acting lawfully is politically powerful — it gives legitimacy to the state and its policy.Footnote90 These are valuable resources and we should expect actors to reach for them. The substance of international law will tilt in the direction of those with the capacity to invoke it, shape it, and apply it, that is to say: toward strong states rather than weak states or non-state actors.

#### “We make I-Law more equitable” is a link magnifier.

Hurd ’20 — Ian; Department of Political Science, Northwestern University. September 16, 2020; “The case against international cooperation”; *International Theory*, First View, Pages 1-22; Accessed online via Cambridge University Press; <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1752971920000470>; //CYang

The hope that law might be a weapon of the weak is widely shared among liberal scholars but it runs into empirical difficulty. Lee Seymour notes that the ICC prosecutor once declared ‘I believe in law as power for all; it is the ultimate weapon that the weak have against the strong’.Footnote91 Adam Bower also sees the ICC as empowering weaker players relative to the USA.Footnote92 Harold Koh recently outlined his vision of ‘law as resistance’ in his book on legal efforts to counter the Trump administration at home and abroad.Footnote93 To be sure, there are many instances where less powerful actors use the law to defend themselves against powerful states. Harold Koh's account of legalized resistance offers some success stories as does David Cole's similar book on domestic US constitutional issues, Engines of Liberty.Footnote94 But the capacity of law to serve the interests of the weak is minor compared to its more common function of serving the goals of those who control it. Since international law is authored by states and mainly developed, interpreted, and changed by strong states, its development over time tracks the changing interests of those governments. This is evident around the rules of self-defense in the law on the use of force, which evolved from its mid-20th century origins as a ban on war into a more permissive regime that the USA and others now use to legitimize military operations under the headings of counterinsurgency, intervention, and targeted killing.Footnote95 Strong states have the capacity to shift the operative interpretation of international legal rules — this is baked into international legal theory and practice, as Tom Ruys notes that treaty interpretation must take into account ‘evolutions in the international security environment’ as it decides what is lawful and what isn't.Footnote96 Thomas Franck and W. Michael Reisman embedded this point in their grand theories of international law, offering great-power interests a prominent role as a formal source of legal change.Footnote97 With this in mind, we can comfortably predict that international legal development will follow the interests of the most powerful actors. This is not a weapon of the weak.

#### ILaw is an architecture by Europe, for Europe — it exists only for the safety of those deemed recognizable by the Empire, consuming everyone else.

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Admittedly, the utility value of these institutions (EU, AU, UN, etc.) lies in that they have potency to provide an even-handed and impartial framework for the engagement of a diverse community of states, if handled fairly, justly and with symmetrical influence of the involved parties (Kissinger 2014: 7). The current global power structural configuration was an invention of Europe, and as the architect of this system of world governance, Europe championed the “balance of power concept” with itself as the author and adjudicator of that system (Kissinger 2004: 7). This reveals the genesis of the asymmetrical power configuration in this ‘new world order’ system. This means that the rationale of colonialism is coloniality. Coloniality propelled the Europeans to conquer other civilisations in order to impose their sense of order on every ‘other’ civilisation. The Westphalian Peace Treaty was signed in 1648, indicating the official codification of the doctrine of state sovereignty. The Berlin West Africa Conference, known for the slogan ‘Scramble for Africa’ occurred in 1885–1887 (Iliffe 1979; Pakenham 1992; Chamberlain 2010). The Versailles Treaty was signed in 1919 signalling the end of World War I (Kissinger 2014: 24) demonstrating the European doublestandards and asymmetrical power relations. This also speaks of the inconsistencies of European modernity. The double-standards applied by Europe in its interactions with the rest of the world are conspicuous. Another example of this is that the same European-centric worldview developed international law. International law entailed that “if a state would accept these basic requirements, it could be recognised as an international citizen able to maintain its own culture, politics, religion and internal policies, shielded by the international system from outside intervention” (Kissinger 2014: 27). Europe as the self-appointed architect, arbiter and adjudicator of states’ behaviours considered international law “as an expandable body of agreed doctrine aimed at the cultivation of harmony, with the Westphalian treaties themselves at its heart” (Kissinger 2014: 27). It can be deduced, therefore, that international law was designed for Europe and had only Europe at the centre of its creation and intended application, which then explains why international law was not upheld at the Berlin West Africa Conference, Africa was partitioned to the whims of European imperial powers without any consequence. This renders international law whim some as it is selectively applied, revealing the impunity of international law. International law speaks of recognition as the precondition for the acceptance of a state in the fold of the international community of states. It consequently speaks of being shielded and protected from external intervention. Recognised by who? Shielded from who? This is problematic for the African polity. How can an imposed order maintain a culture, politics and internal processes of African ecologies and localities, when an outside imposition has already been put? If a state does not accept or conform, it is not protected from outside intervention. Is this not coloniality of power at its highest expression? Europe is the recogniser of states and therefore the guarantor of political independence of states; Europe is the power that recognises states, protects states and policies states into conformity and order. The European civilisation is the ordering state, from which all order is derived. Such is the control that Europe has on the current global power structural configuration. This undoubtedly makes Europe an Empire. A British Statesman, Lord Palmaston, once quipped that “our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow” (quoted in Kissinger 2014: 29–30). Europe prescribes what order is and what it is not, if a state conforms to the prescribed order it is insulated from Europe’s wrath, but a deviant state is meted with violence. The problem with the order of Europe is that it is foible and it varies and changes depending on whom is in question. The Euro-North American-centric modernity is not even apologetic about this matter. Kissinger evinces the rationale behind this arrogance; he notes, “we mean to do what may seem to be best, upon each occasion as it arises, making the interests of our country one’s guiding principle” (Kissinger 2014: 30). This, in fact, is not a principle because it is whim some, always depending on circumstances; should a principle not be mandible depending on circumstance(s)?

### Link — Information Warfare

#### The 1AC extends the expansion of warfighting’s newest terrain: Human brains — their obsession with hacking and weaponizing cognition as a new frontier of great power warfare is a mode of neuro-geopolitical entanglement that annihilates value to life through a regime of cognitive discipline.

Grove 19 [Jairus Victor Grove is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Hawai'i Research Center for Future Studies at the University of Hawai'i at Mānoa; “Savage Ecology: war and geopolitics at the end of the world”; August 16, 2019]//eleanor

This is the terror that keeps Jürgen Habermas up at night. What will we do if we discover our freedom is contingent, that our very nature can change?31 The plan of the rest of this chapter is to follow Malabou’s provocation through to the heart of that terror. However, unlike Habermas and others, I hope to do so without the sentimental attachment to a humanity that never existed. Rather, I want to push Malabou’s concepts further. I want to consider what happens to plasticity and destructive plasticity when they are let loose in the wilds of politics. As knowledge of our formable and forming nature becomes not just known but made practical, the nightmare of humanists becomes real. Populations of human bodies without essential identities can be altered or, in the language of cybernetics, steered. Unlike understandings of power, even subtle forms of disciplinary power, plasticity on the scale of the individual and the polis represents the possibility of change without subjection, that is, without resistance. Rather than the relations of power that make subjects in the Foucauldian image, we have the possibility of designing or steering subjects that have no index of what they were before, such that something could resist. Instead, plasticity represents the possibility of a frictionless change—in the sense that one can imagine (and has imagined) the alteration of the brain or the assemblage of bodies-brains-semiotics-technics that is often called the social—that would leave no trace of what could be called an alternative. This is not the failure of resistance to produce an outcome, as in the case of the noncompliant prisoner who nonetheless remains imprisoned. Instead, plasticity raises the question of techniques that produce bodies that do not know that the “they” that they once were wanted to resist or even are imprisoned. The incorporation of plasticity into politics raises the specter of Gilles Deleuze’s “societies of control,” in which individuals become “dividuals”— humans as counters in a flexible and constantly “modulating” economy.32 Control in this context is often read systemically, as if only the “society” views humans as counters but the “dividuals” themselves, like Robert Duvall’s character in thx 1138, yearn to be free, to be unique. Confronting plasticity and its explosive potential to obliterate precursors poses a dif­ferent dividual, a real dividual: bodies stripped not just of their identity but of the desire to have an identity or to have an identity nonidentical to the identity that preceded it. Control represents the real possibility of order without the leverage or friction of ordering. Normatively I do not disagree with Habermas and others that this reduction of freedom to an engineering problem is horrifying. The point of disagreement is that arguing against the existence of such a possibility will have an effect on the probability of this nightmare.33 The attempt to safeguard humanity through the scapegoating of materialist thinking is self-defeating, as it insists that human freedom and dignity are independent of the brain while also decrying the possibility of each “becoming material.” In its cruelest form, this line of argument amounts to trying to cure someone with Alzheimer’s by scolding her about the intrinsic dignity and rationality of humans. Lesions beat argument every time. So rather than taking recourse to moralize the horror of control, it is necessary to take seriously the possibility of control as a material configuration enabled by the inessential nature of humans: their plasticity. Furthermore, I ask the reader to affirm the horror of destructive plasticity rather than look away or flee into the arms of humanist sentimentality.

### Link — Modernization

#### The discourse of modernization is a foundational pillar of Western imperial hegemony – it serves as the justification for the transformation of the “backwards” and “primitive” postcolonial world into a mirror of “enlightened civilization” by the Western savior of NATO – reject the epistemic trajectory of the 1AC.

Klein ’90 -- (Bradley S. Klein, 1990, " How the West was One: Representational Politics of NATO," International Studies Quarterly , Sep., 1990, Vol. 34, No. 3, Special Issue: Speaking the Language of Exile: Dissidence in International Studies (Sep., 1990), pp. 311-325, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2600572.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A701409b23f8b2f68890516448f972a45&ab\_segments=&origin=&acceptTC=1, accessed 6-30-2022) -- nikki

Modernization For Kennan, the primary threat to Western security lay not in Soviet military power but in the weakened fabric of Western life. To counter this weakness, he argued, the decisive policies should not be military encirclement but the rebuilding of Western infrastructures. Writing in 1948 in the context of debates about the European Recov- ery Plan, the ERP, Kennan argued: This is the significance of the ERP, the idea of European Union, and the cultiva- tion of a closer association with the U.K. and Canada. For a truly stable world order can proceed, within our lifetime, only from the older, mellower and more advanced nations of the world-nations for which the concept of order, as opposed to power, has value and meaning. If these nations do not have the strength to seize and hold real leadership in world affairs today, through that combination of political greatness and wise restraint which goes only with a ripe and settled civilization, then as Plato once remarked: ". . . cities will never have rest from their evils,-no nor the human race, as I believe." (Kennan, 1948:100) Kennan's famous "Long Telegram" of 1946 (Kennan, 1946:63) concluded with the observation that "Much depends on health and vigor of our own society. World communism is like a malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue." This medicalized representation was to find a more sustained account in the work of W. W. Rostow, the architect of modernization theory and a key figure in the articulation of modern Western identity. In Rostow's memorable words (1960:162, 1961:235), "Communism is a disease of the transition" from traditional to modern society. It would require Western military intervention in the form of anti-guerrilla insurgents to staunch the infection. To reconstruct the West, and to bring the rest of the world along with it, would require therapies of "modernization." These would prove cru- cial in the development of a recognizably Western world order, for "to modernize" would come to mean to improve, to upgrade, to make something better by technical refinement. In both economic development and military deterrence, themes of "modernization" were to animate public policy. Economic modernization refers to the process of enforced changes, implemented from above by a secular state system, that strategically alter the social landscape and prepare the way for a capitalist, market-oriented political economy. The master plan for this reworking of international life was the self-consciously proclaimed handbook of Westernization, Rostow's The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (1960). The book was crucial in setting the terms of the subsequent "development" paradigm (Gendzier, 1985:6). The basic idea was to absorb the newly independent, formerly colonial states into a global political economy. Rostow's stages of growth presented the clearest attempt to draw the post-colonial world into the Western orbit. His teleological unfolding of the various stages of development culminates in "the age of high mass consumption." As Rostow's words attest, the millennial deliver- ance of life that results is truly an inspiring achievement: "The second stage of growth embraces societies in the process of transition; that is, the period when the preconditions for take-off are developed; for this is the time to transform a tradi- tional society in the ways necessary for it to exploit the fruits of modern science, to fend off diminishing returns, and thus to enjoy the blessings and choices opened up by the march of compound interest" (Rostow, 1960:6). This paean to impending affluence is a useful example of how "modernization" draws its sustenance from particular representations of life. Implicit in this celebra- tory account of development is a series of conceptual commitments that need to be brought to the foreground if practitioners concerned with "developing" societies are to understand fully what analysts have in store for them. "Traditional" societies are seen as mired in a pre-Newtonian world, confined to natural horizons with a fixed "ceiling on the level of attainable output per head" (Rostow, 1960:4). Such a limiting cosmology has to be transformed for modernization to proceed. This "pre-modern" worldview is to be replaced by a recognizably "modern" one of unlimited growth. Nature thereby becomes a resource for use by human beings who now stand at the center of all things. A network of representations is called into play here: mutually dependent concep- tions of nature, man, goods, and society. A set of dichotomies is invoked, with the "pre-Newtonian" world on one side and "modern" affluent cultures on the other: traditional society/modern society, nature/science, subsistence/wealth. Only by tac- itly invoking these dichotomous representations and invoking one side continually against the other is Rostow's discourse of development possible. But the mediation of the transition processes required here is by no means politi- cally neutral. It is strikingly violent. Rostow's developmental discourse draws upon a key assumption that modern, Western developed societies are simply better and more desirable than traditional, pre-modern societies. Ever the economist, he calls this "the demonstration effect" of modern technology and lifestyles. The world's people really want Western products. Butjust in case they don't-and here Rostow's text gets murky-they can always look over the shoulder of traveling salesmen and see battleship guns in the harbor. Surely, this is an impressive sight, one that demon- strates the (potentially) superior effects of modern Western society. Spurred on by these "demonstration effects" of Western goods, the peoples of the formerly colonial world are induced to follow along and to develop themselves in the footsteps of their uninvited guests. When problems develop in the modernization process, the state steps in to expe- dite change. Rostow, writing in the heady days of development, was characteristically sanguine about this process, seeing as the only obstacle the unfortunate tampering by Communist elements-whom, he argued, could be dealt with through covert action and counter-insurgency warfare. When more profound social problems threatened the developmental process, more sophisticated forms of military and paramilitary involvement would be needed. Samuel P. Huntington, with a keener eye than Rostow towards the political difficulties of modernization and thus more attuned to the prerequisites of institution building, delivered the theoretical justifica- tion for the constructive, socially transformative role of Third World military elites in his Political Order and Changing Societies (1968). Looking favorably upon the contri- bution to modernization of such reformers as Ataturk, Nasser, and Sukarno, Hun- tington argued that in elite-bound, traditional societies, the military represents a new and liberating political force that can break the hold of reactionary forces and loosen their hold upon the economy and culture. In other words, the domestic military had to be cultivated as part of the state building process, in the name of enforced mod- ernization from above. To prepare local elites for this task, a whole series of mea- sures would be needed, ranging from police training, the sale of arms designed for local use against domestic sources of turbulence, and the defeat of revolutionary labor movements in the name of creating favorable climates for international invest- ment and wage assembly work (Packenham, 1973; Augelli and Murphy, 1988; Klein and Unger, 1989). This, too, was the stuff of modernization. It was always part of postwar U.S. strategy, and it represents the dark underside of the developmental process. As a discourse of reconstruction, developmental modernization provided an architecture for the physical and social reshaping of the global landscape. In Europe this was conducted under the umbrella of the Marshall Plan. Globally, the impetus for this reorientation of life was provided by the World Bank, Truman's Point Four Pro- gram, Kennedy's Peace Corps, and a panoply of political-economic-military alliance projects that linked domestic state building with transnational integration under the U.S. aegis (Barnet, 1972; Fagen, 1979). In the absence of any identifiable external threats to such areas as Latin America or the Southwest Pacific, for instance, the only plausible argument for the creation of the Rio Pact in 1947 or ANZUS was to use a military security bond as the cutting edge for state/society building along modern, Western lines. In Europe, however, the invocation of an external security threat enjoyed a modicum of plausibility merely through the existence of Soviet "other- ness." Continental unity had been shattered, after all. Central Europe disappeared in the spring of 1945. Throughout the postwar era, there were only East and West. The task of defining the boundaries and limits of Western identity was made considerably easier with the creation on the other side of the Iron Curtain of an adversary whose culture and world view offered, it was argued, a reverse image of everything cele- brated by the emergent allies.

### Link — SCS War

#### Depicting China as a maritime threat recapitulates it as a lawless bandit, legitimizing the US “manifest destiny”.

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China as lawless bully: maritime disputes

To cheat and thief, we can layer the trope of lawlessness, readily employed in media representations and political rhetoric over maritime territorial and EEZ disputes involving China and its neighbors in the Western Pacific. China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea are largely historical in nature and do encroach on the 200 nautical miles EEZ of neighboring countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) does not expressly prohibit land reclamation in the sea as long as due notice is given to other concerned states and due regard to the rights of other states (Art. 60.3, 56.2, and 56.3) is taken into account, while the obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment is observed (Art. 192). Parties to a dispute are also obligated to refrain from acting in a manner that would jeopardize or hamper a final agreement resolving the dispute (Art. 74.3 and 83.3). The frantic building of artificial islands to enhance the legality of China’s claims, unilateral installations, and skirmishes in the disputed areas are thus amenable to interpretation as lawless bullying. An editorial in the Wall Street Journal titled “Calling Out China’s Lawlessness; The US Points Out that Beijing’s Claims to the South China Sea Don’t Stand Up,” describes the “sketchy legality of its [Beijing’s] actions” and claims that “China is changing the status quo in the South China Sea with force and the threat of force” (“Calling Out,” 2014). This characterization in the media is consistent with political rhetoric. US Secretary of State John Kerry was reported to have said in May 2014 that China’s “introduction of an oil rig and numerous government vessels in waters disputed with Vietnam was provocative” (Ives & Fuller, 2014). Eliot Engel of the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee framed China’s actions in skirmishes with Vietnam as “needless provocations” (Engel, 2014).

At the same time, media representations and political rhetoric have tended to obscure the fact that China’s regional neighbors all built airstrips and outposts on the claimed islands long before China ever did. China also displays inconsistent behavior in that it has reached agreements with Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin and South Korea in the Yellow Sea to divide fisheries equally and carry out joint enforcement patrols in keeping with international law.3 Indeed, China has in land disputes signed “fair and balanced” treaties with 13 out of 14 neighbors in keeping with international legal principles (Kraska, 2015). These instances have not, however, drawn any significant media attention. Instead, the emphasis on China’s non-compliance with international law in the South China Sea disputes has served to recapitulate China in Orientalist terms as uncivilized and, moreover, as a fully awakened “sleeping giant” that bullies its neighbors and is unsuited to replace the US as regional leader. US political rhetoric and media representation has also obscured the vagueness of international law when applied to the East China Sea dispute as it would be inconsistent with the image of China as a lawless bully in the South China Sea. The UNCLOS appears to have a straightforward framework that gives states maritime jurisdiction over resources 200 nautical miles from their coastal baseline, but it says nothing about how overlapping maritime jurisdictions are to be resolved. In the case of the East China Sea, the area of dispute is only 360 miles across at its widest point. At the heart of the territorial dispute between China and Japan is the “territorial acquisition” of the Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands, but there is no convention on how states acquire sovereignty over disputed territories.4 The flexibility of applicable principles in international customary law have instead allowed both China and Japan to invoke the law to justify their claims to sovereignty (Ramos-Mrosovsky, 2008). China’s refusal to have the dispute adjudicated by an international body reflects the unpredictability of outcomes and not necessarily China’s lawlessness, especially when viewed, in light of a similar disinterest on the part of the Japanese.

The essentialization of China as lawless, despite the malleability of international law and dissimilar behavior in other disputes, has the potential to drive a wedge between China and her neighbors, thus “containing” China’s growing influence in the region. Indeed, the depiction of China as a lawless bully plays up the insecurities of its immediate—and in many cases, much weaker—neighbors, whose heavy reliance on international law to constrain hegemonic behavior is palpable. The breaking of norms has been identified as a crucial signal that heightens threat perception (Farnham, 2003). In the context of long-standing maritime territorial disputes, playing up an image of China as a lawless bully also suggests that the United States continues to be a necessary power broker in the region. The notion that there is an overbearing bully in the neighborhood that could care less about the rules of the game returns the United States to the role of protector in the post–Cold War period—its ostensible “manifest destiny.” Since the late 1990s, titles such as “Spratly Spat Heats up over Chinese ‘Bullying’” (Lamb, 1998) or “Asian Nations Support US Silently” (Wiseman, 2001) demonstrate how constructing China as a lawless bully serves to reinforce this purpose. Indeed, a recent editorial in The Wall Street Journal makes this link explicit in the text: Washington’s hesitant response has allowed controversy to build around freedom-of-navigation missions that should be routine. Beijing’s strategy in the South China Sea is to bully its neighbors and achieve regional hegemony through coercive means short of war. Turning peaceful naval patrols into diplomatic hot potatoes is exactly the sort of change Beijing seeks. (“A 12-Mile,” 2015)

Here, China’s behavior is portrayed as incorrigibly belligerent, in distinct contrast to genteel US diplomacy. One Wall Street Journal article makes this point clear in its title alone: “Chinese Diplomacy Off Course; By Overreaching in the South China Sea, Beijing has Drawn the US Irrevocably into the Debate” (Wain, 2000). This article embodies the dominant narrative that assumes implicitly the rightful role of the United States to dole out proper diplomacy and take on any transgressors to maintain world peace. A Wall Street Journal article describing China’s “increasingly powerful—but highly opaque—military and its more assertive stance [towards the South China Sea]” emphasize China’s military as an inherent threat to world order but construct the US military according to a different standard, again assuming the righteousness of US military intervention (Page, 2011). In this regard, it is important to note that US grand strategy consists of preventing the development of any regional power capable of obstructing US access to Eurasia—where most of the world’s resources and economic activity are located. This long-term security goal has informed the Obama administration’s much-touted Pacific Pivot policy, which many have viewed as a “China containment policy.” A Congressional Report notes that although U.S. policymakers have not often stated this key national strategic goal explicitly in public, U.S. military (and diplomatic) operations in recent decades—both wartime operations and day-to-day operations—can be viewed as having been carried out in no small part in support of this key goal. (O’Rourke, 2014) China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea cover about 90% of the area that could potentially allow China to deny the United States such access. As China continues with the modernization of its naval and air capabilities, US apprehension has increased that the disputed land features in the South China Sea are being used to bolster military and coast guard forces that can monitor and respond to the activities of US allies, deny the US navy access to these waters, and ultimately check US naval dominance in the region.

It is for this reason that the United States has insisted on freedom of navigation and innocent passage—protected by UNCLOS—through these contested waters, although tensions with China have ratcheted up considerably as a result. As direct conflict between the United States and China has become a real possibility, and as the United States has not ratified the UNCLOS, the United States has attempted to base its actions on firm legal principles, and in turn, to frame China’s behavior in the region as lawlessness. Through US portrayals of China as a lawless bully, China incurs reputational costs in the global and regional community that have the potential to exert pressure on China to stand down. The guided-missile destroyer USS Lassen was thus sent in October 2015 on a “freedom of navigation” patrol within 12 nautical miles of islands artificially built by China in the Spratly chain, which the United States insists is in compliance with international law.5 The United States revealed this aim in another dispute on whether China has an international legal right to regulate foreign military actors operating within China’s 200-nautical-mile EEZ. The United States’ view, which China disagrees with, is that China has a right to restrict military and surveillance activities only within 12 nautical miles of its territorial waters. Tensions reached new heights when China announced in November 2013 an East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) that not only covered her territorial waters but extended into its EEZ and thus, the contested areas in the East China Sea. US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel responded in a press statement that “We view this development as a destabilizing attempt to alter the status quo in the region. This unilateral action increases the risk of misunderstanding and miscalculations,” yet the United States followed shortly by flying two B-52 bombers through the zone (Harlan, 2013). Certainly, there have been media analyses that characterize China’s behavior as motivated by normal national self-interest or that point out that US actions to curtail China are “hypocritical” and “hegemonic” (see, for example, Denyer, 2015; Wu, 2005). However, many more choose to reprise long-standing debates about whether China is a military threat or not, with titles such as “US Starting to View China as Potential Enemy” (Mann, 1995) and “Weakening Yet Still Aggressive, China Poses Test for U.S. Presidential Candidates” (Sanger, 2015). None take seriously China’s claims that its actions in the region have been defensive in nature. Even with a wide range of opinions on the matter, by focusing on the issue of China’s military buildup, these news articles only serve to heighten this perceived threat by inferring threatening intent from growing military capabilities.

Political rhetoric tends to contain far less ambiguity, however, some even going so far as to suggest that the United States has been unnecessarily patient toward China. Senator John McCain (2016), Chairman of the Committee of Armed Services, thus commended and encouraged the continuance of the freedom-of-navigation operation of October 2015, adding that “this decision is long overdue.” In a keynote speech delivered at the Fourth Annual CSIS South China Sea Conference in 2014, Representative Mike Rogers (R-MI), Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence further advised that the United States should stop being “deferential” to China’s “naked aggression” as it continues to “bully” and “intimidate” its neighbors.6 Indeed, political rhetoric appears to take China’s image as lawless to its logical conclusion—China as the full-fledged threat to regional stability legitimizes any force that the United States might be compelled to take in the future to contain such a threat. Unpacking the great power rivalry in the maritime disputes thus helps us to understand the cultural work that the trope of lawless bully does to bolster the long-term security objectives of the United States in the region.

### Link — Tech Leadership

#### US tech leadership is foundational to digital domination and usurps sovereignty in the Global South.

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Colonial conquest typically entails dispossession of valuable resources from the native peoples and the ownership and control of critical infrastructure by colonial powers. In South Africa, shortly after diamonds and gold were discovered in Kimberley and the Witwatersrand, a handful of mining magnates seized the most valuable land. The Oppenheimer family dynasty controlled almost all the country’s diamonds, half the gold and platinum, and a quarter of the coal. With their accumulated riches, they obtained critical stakes in many other industries, including banking, steel, auto, electronics, and agriculture.21 In many parts of the Global South, critical infrastructure such as railways were designed by colonial powers not to benefit the indigenous population, but to service the mother country. In the arrangement that emerged through European colonialism, raw materials were extracted by exploited local labor and shipped back to the empire. In some cases, colonial forces would import the cheap, machine-made industrial products to the villages, undermining local artisans and the capacity to build competitor industries. In Africa and elsewhere, railroads were built from the country interior straight to the ports and military stations, with little “spread effect” to connect up the indigenous people. The architectural design of the production system was not engineered to benefit the local inhabitants, but to “serve immediate European needs”.22 Under digital colonialism, foreign powers, led by the United States, are planting infrastructure in the Global South engineered for its own needs, enabling economic and cultural domination while imposing privatized forms of governance. To accomplish this task, major corporations design digital technology to ensure their own dominance over critical functions in the tech ecosystem. This allows them to accumulate profits from revenues derived from rent (in the form of intellectual property or access to infrastructure) and surveillance (in the form of Big Data). It also empowers them to exercise control over the flow of information (such as the distribution of news and streaming services), social activities (like social networking and cultural exchange), and a plethora of other political, social, economic, and military functions mediated by their technologies. The control of code is foundational to digital domination. In Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace, Lawrence Lessig (1999/2006) famously argued that computer code shapes the rules, norms, and behaviors of computer-mediated experiences in ways similar to architecture in physical space (e.g. imperial railways designed for colonization).23 As a result, “code is law” in the sense that it has the power to usurp legal, institutional, and social norms impacting the political, economic, and cultural domains of society. This critical insight has been applied in fields like copyright, free speech regulation, Internet governance, blockchain, privacy, and even torts. What has been missed, however, is how US dominance of code — and other forms of digital architecture — usurps sovereignty in foreign countries. The power of the United States over code and other digital infrastructure constitutes a new form of imperialism. Digital forms of power are linked together through the three core pillars of the digital ecosystem: software, hardware, and network connectivity.24 Software is the set of instructions that define and determine what your computer can do. Hardware is the physical equipment used for computer experiences. The network is the set of protocols and standards computers use to talk to each other, and the connections they make. Domination over these three elements — software, hardware, and networks — provides a great source of power over people. Let us consider each in turn. Software is the coded logic that constrains and enables particular user experiences. For example, software determines rules and policies such as whether or not users can post a message anonymously at a website, or whether or not users can make a copy of a copyright-restricted file like an e-book. The rules that a programmer codes into the software largely determines technological freedoms and shapes users’ experiences using their devices. Thus, software exerts a powerful influence on the behavior, policies, and freedoms of people using digital technology. Control over software is a source of digital domination primarily exercised through software licenses and hardware ownership. Free Software licenses allow people to use, study, modify, and share software as they see fit.25 By contrast, non-free software licenses grant a software designer control over users by precluding the ability to exercise those freedoms. With proprietary software, the humanreadable source code is closed off to the public, and owners usually restrict the ability to use the software without paying. In the case of Microsoft Windows, for example, the public must pay for the program in order to use it, they cannot read the source code to understand how it works, they cannot change its behavior by changing the code, and they cannot share a copy with others. Thus with proprietary licensing, Microsoft maintains absolute control over how the software works. The same goes for other proprietary apps, like Google Play or Adobe Photoshop.26 By design, non-free software provides the owner power over the user experience. It is authoritarian software. Control over hardware is a second source of digital domination. This can take at least three forms: software run on third-party servers, centralized ownership of hardware, or hardware designed to prevent users from changing the software. Let us consider each of these in turn. In the first instance, software is executed on someone else’s computer. As a result, users are dispossessed of their ability to control it. This is typically accomplished through Software as a Service (SaaS) in the cloud. For example, when you visit the Facebook website, the interface you are provided executes on third party hardware (i.e. on Facebook’s cloud servers). Because users cannot change the code running on Facebook’s servers, they cannot get rid of the “like” button or change the Facebook experience. “There is no cloud,” the saying goes, “just someone else’s computer.” Corporations and other third parties design cloud services for remote control over the user experience. This gives them immense power over individuals, groups, and society.27 In the second instance, people become dispossessed of hardware ownership itself. With the rise of cloud computing, it is possible that hardware manufacturers will soon only offer low-powered, lowmemory devices (similar to the terminals of the 1960s and 1970s) and computer processing and data storage will be primarily conducted in centralized clouds. With end-users dispossessed of processing power and storage, software and data would be under the absolute control of the owners and operators of clouds.28 In the third instance, hardware is manufactured with locks that prevent users from changing the software on the devices. By locking down devices to a pre-determined set of software choices, the hardware manufacturer determines which software is allowed to run when you turn on your device.29 Thus, hardware restrictions can prevent the public from controlling their devices, granting device manufacturers them power over users. Control over network connectivity is a third source of digital domination. Net neutrality regulation proposes that Internet traffic should be “neutral” so that Internet Service Providers (ISPs) treat content flowing through their cables, cellular towers, and satellites equally. According this philosophy, those who own the pipes are “common carriers” and should almost never be allowed to manipulate the data that flows through them.30 This constrains the ability of wealthy media providers to pay for faster content delivery speeds than less wealthy providers (such as grassroots organizations, small businesses, and common people). More importantly, by treating traffic equally, net neutrality prevents network discrimination against various forms of traffic critical to civil rights and liberties. For example, the Tor browser facilitates anonymous Internet communications, but the use of the Tor network can be detected by Internet Service Providers and throttled (i.e. slowed to a crawl).31 Net neutrality prevents this form of discrimination and protects the end user’s freedom to utilize the Internet as they wish, without third party favoritism, blocking, or throttling. Each of the three pillars of the digital ecosystem — software, hardware, and network — constitute a source of power and control. To illustrate the point, let us consider some concrete examples related to social justice in the Global South. The copyright industry is threatened by the mass sharing of paywalled publications over the Internet (what they derisively label “piracy”). Given that hard drive capacity and Internet speeds will rapidly increase over time, the capacity to share vast libraries of music, movies, books, and other media is steadily increasing. What will be done when each person has a 40 terabyte hard drive and can trade the entire collection of popular music from the last century within an hour? Advances in technology deepen the need for architectural control to police the copyright system. One way to stop file sharing is to control software. The industry built Digital Rights Management (DRM) software, for example, to prevent copyright-restricted publications from playing on a user’s computer unless the user pays to access it first. This works well with proprietary software because people cannot remove the DRM. However, if the DRM software is Free Software — which allows people the freedom to use, study, modify, and share the software — people can remove the DRM code that locks the content. Thus, industry is bolstered by proprietary software as a means to enforce copyright. A second way to prevent sharing is to take control of the hardware. If, for example, people stop running software on their own devices — and instead run their computer experiences through centralized cloud servers — then cloud providers can determine their “access” to copyrighted data. In this scenario, users cannot copy and trade media over the Internet because the data “streams” to their device from a content owner’s platform (e.g. Netflix or Spotify) which provides media content through their servers. Thus, the widespread distribution of storage capacity and broadband Internet threatens the copyright monopoly.32 A third way to prevent sharing media is to control the network. People may own and control their software and hardware, but if they can be spied on by an ISP or government, then they can be fined or arrested for copyright infringement, or have their Internet connection throttled or terminated. People might use privacy protection technologies to conceal their content sharing — such as the Tor network or Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) — but this can be thwarted by ISPs throttling Tor or VPNs. In this scenario, control of the network (ISP discrimination) is used to make anonymous content sharing impractical. Thus, public control of the network threatens copyright enforcement. To bring this back to colonialism, US multinationals have designed digital architecture which, in one way or another, allows them to accumulate vast fortunes based on rent or data extraction. In the case of copyright, control over software, hardware, or the Internet is used to protect the copyright monopoly in the name of intellectual property rights. Given that the marginal cost of producing digital works is near-zero, prominent intellectuals have challenged copyright paywalls in the interest of socioeconomic justice and out of concern that draconian technologies are needed to enforce digital forms of copyright.33 Free access to digital publications for all people on planet earth, irrespective of their wealth, could improve education, culture, equality, democracy, and innovation. Western technology has been engineered to block free sharing, which impoverishes poor people’s ability to obtain knowledge and culture and reduces communication between rich and poor. Facebook’s Free Basics service offers another case example of how Big Tech corporations expand empire in the Global South. Free Basics offers a stripped-down version of free Internet services to people with little or no disposable income. Facebook decides which content and websites the poor can access — while of course offering Facebook itself within the app. Free Basics is zero-rated by ISPs, meaning that data transfers inside the app are paid for by ISPs instead of their customers. The ISPs hope that the limited Internet experience will lead to paying customers who, having tasted a free sample, will purchase data for the full experience. Free Basics not only has Facebook playing Internet gatekeeper of the poor, it also violates net neutrality laws: zero-rated offerings place content providers on unequal footing. Several countries have terminated Free Basics, in part due to popular backlash.34 However, Internet.org has put over 100 million users from over 60 countries — including South Africa — into the Facebook platform, which channels them towards the Facebook ecosystem. Integrating platforms like Facebook outside the US does more than drain local advertising revenue: it undermines various forms of local governance. Seventy-five percent of web publisher’s traffic now comes from Google (46%) and Facebook (29%).35 Centralization of services into their hands provides them with centralized control over communications — by way of code. These two firms filter search results and news feeds with proprietary black box algorithms, granting them enormous power to shape who sees which news. Leftist outlets have published data suggesting that Google censors socialist views, while Facebook has been found to favor mainstream liberal media.36 Platforms also regulate freedom of speech and association.37 If an online social network detects certain keywords and forms of speech, they can censor it, or ban the user. Moreover, they can prohibit the right to associate with others in the pursuit of social, political, economic, cultural, and religious ends. This has been carried out against Palestinians (e.g. with the removal of the page for the political party, Fatah), as well as the far-right.38 As private overlords of critical information infrastructure, US multinationals have the power to regulate the press, speech, and association in foreign territories, as they see fit. These examples demonstrate how structural domination of the tech ecosystem undermines local sovereignty through privatized forms of political, economic, and social governance. This helps the US perpetuate copyright paywalls, control information flows, spread their platform monopolies, supplant local autonomy, filter communications, and deepen dependency on the US. In turn, corporations increasingly profit from Big Data surveillance, an exploitative human rights transgression against the Global South. We discuss this element next.

#### BigTech is the newest iteration of corporate colonialization that extracts the Global South.

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Under colonialism, Europeans dispossessed the natives of their land, settled their territories, put them to work as slaves and servants, instituted horrific acts of violence, and perpetuated dependency and plunder through strategic underdevelopment. Corporations played a pivotal role through the “pathological pursuit of profit and power”.8 In 1602, the Dutch East India Company became the first modern global corporation. Fifty years later, they initiated European conquest in Southern Africa with the establishment of the Cape Colony. Over the next two centuries, whites seized large swaths of land as colonists expanded into the interior. After the discovery of diamonds and gold, the British and the Afrikaners consolidated the remaining majority of land and further subjugated the African population under racist regimes of labor exploitation. In no time flat, a handful of corporations came to dominate large parts of the economy.9 Today, a new form of corporate colonization is taking place. Instead of the conquest of land, Big Tech corporations are colonizing digital technology. The following functions are all dominated by a handful of US multinationals: search engines (Google); web browsers (Google Chrome); smartphone and tablet operating systems (Google Android, Apple iOS); desktop and laptop operating systems (Microsoft Windows); office software (Microsoft Office, Google Docs); cloud infrastructure and services (Amazon, Microsoft, Google, IBM); social networking platforms (Facebook, Twitter); transportation (Uber, Lyft); business networking (Microsoft LinkedIn); streaming video (Google YouTube, Netflix, Hulu); and online advertising (Google, Facebook) — among others. GAFAM now comprise the five wealthiest corporations in the world, with a combined market cap exceeding $3 trillion.10 If South Africans integrate Big Tech products into their society, the United States will obtain enormous power over their economy and create technological dependencies that will lead to perpetual resource extraction. As an empirical matter, this point has been understudied. Nevertheless, early research and anecdotes suggest the economic impact of Big Tech intermediaries is detrimental to local African industries. Murphy, Carmody, and Surborg studied the role of ICTs among small, medium, and microsized enterprises (SMMEs) in South Africa’s and Tanzania’s wood and tourism industries. They found that ICTs introduced the dominance of information intermediaries. Increased use of ICTs also led to greater worker surveillance in some instances. They concluded that ICT integration is, on balance, benefiting foreign-owned businesses and corporations.11 Similar conclusions can be derived from press accounts of the transportation industry. Since Uber began operating in Johannesburg in 2013, there have been labor strikes and violent clashes in the “South African taxi wars”. Several e-hailing taxi murders have been carried out by metered taxi drivers, who have warned that Uber will “burn” if it remains in South Africa. At the same time, many Uber drivers endure onerous working conditions for low pay.12 Uber has had devastating effects in Africa and beyond.13 The company takes around 25% commission for each trip, in addition to hidden costs,14 leading to an outflow of revenue from the local economy to foreign coffers. Moreover, they are able to undercut local markets by offering artificially low prices: Uber can operate at a loss — to the tune of billions — thanks to funding from Wall Street and other wealthy investors.15 With the backing of corporate finance, it leverages predatory subsidies, network effects, Big Data analytics, and the deregulatory effects of its position as an “intermediary” to stamp out competition and colonize the market. Within just two years, Uber sported a net worth of R1.65 billion (~$125 million) inside SA.16 Similar problems have emerged in the media. In April 2017, the online news outlet GroundUp dropped Google Ads from its website. GroundUp’s Nathan Geffen explains the Google advertising model is “broken” for publishers who “have to put up with poor quality, misleading adverts in exchange for small change.” “The problem,” Geffen says, “is that nearly all the power in the online advertising relationship lies with Google.” The ad giant also serves up censorship threats: in one example, Google issued a warning to GroundUp for publishing a picture containing a painted bare breast as part of a protest action.17 In November 2017, Financial Mail’s Anton Harber wrote a feature story deeming Google and Facebook “the biggest threat to South African news media”.18 Google takes 70% of local online advertising, while social media — led by Facebook — takes another 12%. The major SA media groups are left with just 8% of the pie. The Google and Facebook “nemesis” are an expanding duopoloy: they take 77% of online advertising spend in the US and captured virtually all the ad growth in 2016.19 If his continues, Harber exclaims, “the big two could have a devastating effect on the media’s role in defining democracy”.20 These early case examples — the thin integration of ICTs into the wood and tourism industries in South Africa and Tanzania, Uber colonization of taxi markets, and the rising dominance of Google and Facebook in South African media — provide clear instances of digital colonialism whereby foreign corporations undermine local development, dominate the market, and extract revenue from the Global South. As we see next, this power is obtained primarily through the structural domination of digital architecture, which leads to more general forms of imperial control.

### — Regions —

### Link — Africa

#### NATO is the epitome of colonial capitalism — “humanitarianism” is a guise for neo-colonialist resource extraction and securitization that cause a historical net-increase in violence.

Djibo Sobukwe 22, Member of the Research and Political Education Team of the Black Alliance for Peace, 2-23-2022, "NATO and Africa: A relationship of colonial violence and structural White supremacy," https://mronline.org/2022/03/01/nato-and-africa/, jy <3 BB

Considering the public media attention and concern about possible expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), it is worth reminding people about NATO’s bloody history in Africa. NATO was founded in 1949 after WWII at a time when African countries were still under the yoke of colonialism. In fact most of the original founders of NATO had been Africa’s principal colonizers such as UK, France, Portugal, Belgium, Italy and the USA as lead NATO organizer and dominant partner. The organization was established as a collective defense against the Soviet Union with the requirement (Article 5) that any attack on one was considered an attack on all and therefore requiring a collective response.

Since NATO was founded with the purported purpose of halting possible Soviet aggression and stopping the spread of Communism it would seem to follow that after the collapse of the USSR in 1991 there would no longer be a need for NATO. Since then however, NATO has expanded from the founding twelve to at present thirty member states many of whom are eastern European countries, formerly Soviet republics and Warsaw Pact allies. Today, NATO has become a huge axel in the wheel of the military industrial complex controlled by U.S. empire for the purpose of full spectrum dominance, driven by the ferocious appetites of corporate capital.

Colonial Africa as NATO Bases

Walter Rodney accurately describes the early foundation of colonial Africa’s relationship with NATO which continues today as he described in How Europe Underdeveloped Africa:

Needless to say, in the 1950’s when most Africans were still colonial subjects, they had absolutely no control over the utilization of their soil for militaristic ends. Virtually the whole of North Africa was turned into a sphere of operations for NATO, with bases aimed at the Soviet Union. There could have easily developed a nuclear war without African peoples having any knowledge of the matter. The colonial powers actually held military conferences in African cities like Dakar and Nairobi in the early 1950’s, inviting the whites of South Africa and Rhodesia and the government of the USA. Time and time again, the evidence points to this cynical use of Africa to buttress capitalism economically and militarily, and therefore in effect forcing Africa to contribute to its own exploitation. [emphasis added]1

Kwame Nkrumah had already warned in his 1967 Challenge of the Congo that there were at least seventeen air bases, nine foreign naval bases, three rocket sites and an atomic testing range operated by NATO in in North Africa, in addition to military missions in about a dozen other African countries, not to mention the exploitation of raw materials for the production of nuclear weapons occurring in the mines of Congo, Angola, South Africa and Rhodesia.2 Nkrumah called for the urgent need to counter the challenge of NATO in the strategy he outlined in his Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare which included the call for a military high command and an All African People’s Revolutionary Army (AAPRA).3

The example of Portugal, as one of the original members of NATO is worth exploring. The great freedom fighter of Africa, Amilcar Cabral, called Portugal “a rotten appendage of imperialism” he said, “Portugal is the most underdeveloped country in Western Europe. Portugal would never be able to launch three colonial wars in Africa without the help of NATO, the weapons of NATO, the planes of NATO the bombs- it would be impossible for them.”4

Cabral goes on to explain that the only reason Portugal was able to hold on to its colonies in Africa is because it had been a semi-colony of Britain since 1775 and Britain defended Portugal’s interest during the partition of Africa. Furthermore NATO, a creation of the U.S., uses Portugal and its colonies as part of the larger objective of domination of Africa and the world.5 Portugal conducted a vicious war against its colonies in Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, Angola, and Mozambique much like the U.S. did in Vietnam. In both cases, colonizing powers used the most modern weapons including napalm and cluster bombing campaigns killing thousands, against guerilla armies that refused to bow down. The Portuguese dictator Marcelo Caetano was forced to give up economic interests in Angola to some of the NATO powers in exchange for the NATO armaments and supplies used.6 Yet, Portugal still lost the war against the heroic anti-colonial forces.

NATO’s Strategy of Neo-colonialism

Imperialism has always used its strategy of divide and rule. To enable the acceptance of the idea of a ‘benevolent’ NATO, the colonial powers knew that they had to convince and recruit a neo-colonial class of indigenous Africans who would do their bidding. This divide played itself out in the national liberation movements between those who were friendly to imperialist forces and those who wanted a real break from colonialism. Nkrumah explains in Neo-colonialism, The Last Stage of Imperialism, the wide array of methods employed by neocolonialism, ranging from economic, political, religious, ideological and cultural spheres. To do this, NATO works hand in hand with other mechanisms of imperialism like the CIA 7 which was instrumental in the coup against the Nkrumah government and the murder of Patrice Lumumba.

The settler colony of Azania/South Africa would be another example of a NATO outpost. From the beginning it was obviously on the side of the Western/ NATO powers since it was essentially a colony of Britain and therefore was a NATO surrogate. In 1955 South Africa and Britain formulated the Simonstown agreements which contained provision for the naval surveillance and defense of the African continent from Cape to Cairo. In spite of a purported arms embargo, NATO countries and Israel also provided South Africa with the necessary technology to develop nuclear weapons.

NATO & AFRICOM

AFRICOM is actually a direct product of NATO via EUCOM, the U.S. European command. EUCOM is a central part of NATO and originally also took responsibility for 42 African states. In 2004 NATO ended a five-year period of expansion; in 2007 the EUCOM commander proposed the creation of AFRICOM. James L. Jones Jr. explains how he came to make the proposal for AFRICOM from his position as commander of EUCOM as well as commander of operational forces of NATO.

The U.S./NATO role in the destruction of Libya in 2011 is important to highlight because it offers some important lessons. First, U.S. imperialism and its western lackies do not accept any country that decides to be an independent force outside of its sphere of influence. Secondly, it also demonstrates how NATO can work hand in hand with other U.S./western dominated world structures like the UN. In 2011 the UN (resolution 1973) gave political authorization for a “no fly zone” and blockade of Libya purportedly to “protect” its citizens but which ultimately resulted in the destruction of Africa’s most prosperous country with the highest Human Development Index.

U.S. led NATO forces launched a bombing campaign that killed thousands of civilians and caused tens of billions of property and infrastructure damage. This shows that although U.S.-led NATO sometimes uses the UN for political cover, it has no problem illegally overstepping its UN mandate to commit its crimes against humanity and achieve its regime change goals. Even a few countries that abstained from the UN vote like China said they did so as not to offend the reactionary Arab League and the African Union which approved of the resolution. In this case indirect and direct cooperation between NATO, the UN, the AU, and the Arab League (which includes the GCC countries) shows the expansive and deeply woven web of U.S. and NATO reach.

The book The Illegal War on Libya edited by Cynthia McKinney, includes the chapter titled “NATO’s Libya War, A Nuremberg Level Crime” in which Stephen Ledman writes:

“The U.S.-led NATO war on Libya will be remembered as one of history’s greatest crimes, violating the letter and spirit of international law and America’s Constitution. The Nuremberg Tribunal’s Chief Justice Robert Jackson (a Supreme Court justice) called Nazi war crimes ‘the supreme international crime against peace.’ Here are his November 21, 1945 opening remarks:

The wrongs which we seek to condemn and punish have been so calculated, so malignant, and so devastating, that civilization cannot tolerate their being ignored, because it cannot survive their being repeated.

Jackson called aggressive war “the greatest menace of our times.” International law defines crimes against peace as “planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of wars of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.”

All U.S. post-WWII wars fall under this definition. Since then, America [U.S.] has waged direct and proxy premeditated, aggressive wars worldwide. It has killed millions in East and Central Asia, North and other parts of Africa, the Middle East, and Europe, as well as in Central and South America.8

Those mentioned here are but a small sampling of NATO/AFRICOM’s bloody works in Africa’s past. NATO continues to operate under guise the of “training” and “humanitarian” peacekeeping assistance. Jihadist terrorist violence on the continent has increased since the founding of AFRICOM and NATO’s destruction of Libya resulting in civilian casualties and instability which the west has used as pretext and justification for the continued need for AFRICOM. As the Black Alliance for Peace’s AFRICOM watch bulletin reported, since the founding of AFRICOM there has also been an increase in coups by AFRICOM trained soldiers.

Consistent with what Nkrumah, Rodney and others warned of in the 1960’s and 1970’s NATO continues today in the form of AFRICOM facilitating wars, instability, and the corporate pillage of Africa. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) for example is continuously plundered for its strategic raw materials such as cobalt, tantalum, chromium, coltan, and uranium etc. These minerals are strategically important not only for electronic devices but also for the technologies that drive the military industrial complex. AFRICOM continues to rely on its neocolonial African proxies to fight wars on its behalf in the DRC and throughout Africa to achieve its objectives. With the rise of China, the U.S./NATO now seek to ensure full spectrum dominance that seeks to shut China or any other country out of the competition to control global capital.

#### The gratuitous violence of African colonialism is the unseen underside of enlightened modernity -- the rise of NATO is inextricably tied to the colonial governance of Africa – NATO serves as a proxy of the military industrial complex operationalized in service of genocidal extermination and expropriation of African land and peoples.

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The Portuguese dictator Marcelo Caetano was forced to give up economic interests in Angola to some of the NATO powers in exchange for the NATO armaments and supplies used.6 Yet, Portugal still lost the war against the heroic anti-colonial forces. NATO’s Strategy of Neo-colonialism Imperialism has always used its strategy of divide and rule. To enable the acceptance of the idea of a ‘benevolent’ NATO, the colonial powers knew that they had to convince and recruit a neo-colonial class of indigenous Africans who would do their bidding. This divide played itself out in the national liberation movements between those who were friendly to imperialist forces and those who wanted a real break from colonialism. Nkrumah explains in Neo-colonialism, The Last Stage of Imperialism, the wide array of methods employed by neocolonialism, ranging from economic, political, religious, ideological and cultural spheres. To do this, NATO works hand in hand with other mechanisms of imperialism like the CIA 7 which was instrumental in the coup against the Nkrumah government and the murder of Patrice Lumumba. The settler colony of Azania/South Africa would be another example of a NATO outpost. From the beginning it was obviously on the side of the Western/ NATO powers since it was essentially a colony of Britain and therefore was a NATOsurrogate. In 1955 South Africa and Britain formulated the Simonstown agreements which contained provision for the naval surveillance and defense of the African continent from Cape to Cairo. In spite of a purported arms embargo, NATO countries and Israel also provided South Africa with the necessary technology to develop nuclear weapons. NATO & AFRICOM AFRICOM is actually a direct product of NATO via EUCOM, the U.S. European command. EUCOM is a central part of NATO and originally also took responsibility for 42 African states. In 2004 NATO ended a five-year period of expansion; in 2007 the EUCOM commander proposed the creation of AFRICOM. James L. Jones Jr. explains how he came to make the proposal for AFRICOM from his position as commander of EUCOM as well as commander of operational forces of NATO. The U.S./NATO role in the destruction of Libya in 2011 is important to highlight because it offers some important lessons. First, U.S. imperialism and its western lackies do not accept any country that decides to be an independent force outside of its sphere of influence. Secondly, it also demonstrates how NATO can work hand in hand with other U.S./western dominated world structures like the UN. In 2011 the UN (resolution 1973) gave political authorization for a “no fly zone” and blockade of Libya purportedly to “protect” its citizens but which ultimately resulted in the destruction of Africa’s most prosperous country with the highest Human Development Index. U.S. led NATO forces launched a bombing campaign that killed thousands of civilians and caused tens of billions of property and infrastructure damage. This shows that although U.S.-led NATO sometimes uses the UN for political cover, it has no problem illegally overstepping its UN mandate to commit its crimes against humanity and achieve its regime change goals. Even a few countries that abstained from the UN vote like China said they did so as not to offend the reactionary Arab League and the African Union which approved of the resolution. In this case indirect and direct cooperation between NATO, the UN, the AU, and the Arab League (which includes the GCC countries) shows the expansive and deeply woven web of U.S. and NATO reach. The book The Illegal War on Libya edited by Cynthia McKinney, includes the chapter titled “NATO’s Libya War, A Nuremberg Level Crime” in which Stephen Ledman writes: “The U.S.-led NATO war on Libya will be remembered as one of history’s greatest crimes, violating the letter and spirit of international law and America’s Constitution. The Nuremberg Tribunal’s Chief Justice Robert Jackson (a Supreme Court justice) called Nazi war crimes ‘the supreme international crime against peace.’ Here are his November 21, 1945 opening remarks: The wrongs which we seek to condemn and punish have been so calculated, so malignant, and so devastating, that civilization cannot tolerate their being ignored, because it cannot survive their being repeated. Jackson called aggressive war “the greatest menace of our times.” International law defines crimes against peace as “planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of wars of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.” All U.S. post-WWII wars fall under this definition. Since then, America [U.S.] has waged direct and proxy premeditated, aggressive wars worldwide. It has killed millions in East and Central Asia, North and other parts of Africa, the Middle East, and Europe, as well as in Central and South America.8 Those mentioned here are but a small sampling of NATO/AFRICOM’s bloody works in Africa’s past. NATO continues to operate under guise the of “training” and “humanitarian” peacekeeping assistance. Jihadist terrorist violence on the continent has increased since the founding of AFRICOM and NATO’s destruction of Libya resulting in civilian casualties and instability which the west has used as pretext and justification for the continued need for AFRICOM. As the Black Alliance for Peace’s AFRICOM watch bulletin reported, since the founding of AFRICOM there has also been an increase in coups by AFRICOM trained soldiers. Consistent with what Nkrumah, Rodney and others warned of in the 1960’s and 1970’s NATO continues today in the form of AFRICOM facilitating wars, instability, and the corporate pillage of Africa. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) for example is continuously plundered for its strategic raw materials such as cobalt, tantalum, chromium, coltan, and uranium etc. These minerals are strategically important not only for electronic devices but also for the technologies that drive the military industrial complex. AFRICOM continues to rely on its neocolonial African proxies to fight wars on its behalf in the DRC and throughout Africa to achieve its objectives. With the rise of China, the U.S./NATO now seek to ensure full spectrum dominance that seeks to shut China or any other country out of the competition to control global capital.

#### This debate begins deep within the archives of this resolution. This debate begins in 1949, at the founding of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This debate begins with the unseen underside of enlightened modernity, with the strands of gratuitous violence we trace across time, with the perpetual accumulation of fungible African life and lives, with the invisible relations of colonial sociopolitical dominance. This debate begins at the start of 73 fateful years in which, like imperial clockwork, the world ended every day.

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While the Pentagon and the United States State Department continues to provide a distorted rationale for the instigation of a major military conflict in Eastern Europe, billions of dollars are being utilized to transfer offensive weapons aimed at preventing a peaceful resolution to the current war in Ukraine. Although the corporate and government-controlled media outlets in Western Europe and North America have reported to the public on a daily basis that their own administrations cannot be blamed for the current war in Ukraine, for any serious observer, the culpability for the tensions now existence on an international level can be traced back to the desire by imperialism to expand the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO was formed in 1949 in the aftermath of the Second World War and the initiation of the Cold War by Washington against the rising socialist and national liberation movements around the world. In 1949, only two countries on the African continent were independent, Ethiopia and Liberia. Both of these countries in 1949 were highly compromised due to the intervention of the United States and Britain in their internal affairs stemming from the legacy of African enslavement and the rise of imperialist fascism during the 1920s and 1930s. The founding members of NATO were all in North America and Western Europe being Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. Many of these states were involved in the Atlantic Slave Trade and colonialism. All of them benefited from the super-exploitation of African and other oppressed peoples after the transformation of the world economic system beginning in the 15th century. The outcomes of the World War I and World War II left the U.S. as the dominant imperialist power in the world. The only real and effective challenge to the hegemony of the U.S. and its allies during the post WWII period were the socialist states of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the People’s Republic of China (PRC) founded in 1949 after more than two decades of armed struggle, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) consolidated in 1948, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the north which declared independence in August 1945, along with the other anti-capitalist, anti-colonial and anti-neo-colonial movements arising in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and Latin America, which were objectively bolstered by the burgeoning African American and workers’ struggles which developed during the late 1940s and 1950s. The position of the U.S. during the 1950s and 1960s represented the height of political hypocrisy. African Americans were being denied fundamental civil rights protections which were originally put in place during the period after the Civil War (1861-1865). There were Civil Acts and amendments to the U.S. Constitution between 1866-1875 ostensibly designed to reconstruct some semblance of democratic governance. Nonetheless, the Reconstruction process was overthrown during the latter decades of the 19th century placing African Americans in the social position of neo-slavery at worst and second-class citizenship at best. Participants in the leading civil rights organizations after WWII were pressured to denounce the socialist camp and pledge allegiance to U.S. imperialism as the only legitimate system of governance not only domestically but internationally. Those leading activists and public figures who refused to adopt the Cold War policies of Washington were subjected to investigations, prosecution, imprisonment, economic isolation and exile. All the while African Americans were being lynched by mobs, killed without justification by police, executed by the state and denied fundamental due process and equal protection under the law. Military Interventions to Halt National Liberation Two examples of repression and mass killings by countries in the aftermath of WWII were carried out in French-controlled Algeria and the British-dominated Gold Coast (later known as Ghana after independence in 1957). These acts by the colonial powers were designed to preserve imperialist rule in Africa. Both Britain and France were founding members of NATO. In Algeria on the same day as Nazi Germany surrendered to the Allied forces, French troops massacred thousands of people across the North African state for merely demonstrating against the racist and repressive policies of Paris. France had colonized Algeria since 1830 and would not relinquish control until the people waged an eight-year armed and diplomatic struggle aimed at national liberation. Even France24 in a report published during 2021 said of the historical event: “On May 8, 1945, thousands had rallied in Setif as allied powers, including colonial ruler France, marked a hard-won victory in Europe over Nazi Germany. ‘Long live the allied victory,’ demonstrators shouted. But the festive gathering soon turned into a demonstration for an end to colonial rule, with cries of ‘Long live independent Algeria!’ That was a provocation for French police, incensed by the appearance, for the first time, of Algerian flags. As they ordered the removal of the green and white standards, scuffles broke out. Demonstrator Bouzid Saal, 22, refused to drop his flag — so a French policeman shot him dead. Outrage tore through the massive crowd. The ensuing riots and revenge attacks on Europeans sparked a wave of repression by French authorities that left as many as 45,000 dead, according to Algerian official figures. French historians put the toll at up to 20,000, including 86 European civilians and 16 soldiers. The killings would have a transformative impact on the nascent anti-colonial movement. A full-blown independence war broke out nine years later, finally leading to the country’s independence in 1962…. The French launched a 15-day campaign of violence, targeting Setif and the surrounding rural region, bombing villages and hamlets indiscriminately. General Raymond Duval led French authorities’ ruthless clampdown, imposing martial law and a curfew on a patch of territory stretching from Setif to the sea, 50 kilometers (30 miles) north. Nationalist leaders were detained on pure suspicion, and villages suspected of harboring separatists were strafed by the air force and set ablaze. Women, children and the elderly were massacred, and some 44 villages were destroyed in 15 days of retribution. Executions continued until November 1945, and some 4,000 people were arrested.” (https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20210508-algeria-marks-first-national-day-of-remembrance-over-mass-killings-under-french-rule) Of course, the official propaganda of the U.S. is that the purpose of their intervention in WWII was to fight against fascism and spread democracy in Europe. Yet the Allies utilized repression in an attempt to prevent the majority of people around the globe suffering under the yoke of western domination from achieving freedom and national independence. In recent months the Algerian government has been involved in a diplomatic row with France as well as Spain over the legacy of colonialism and the status of the Western Sahara, which remains under the control of the Kingdom of Morocco with the support of the imperialist centers of authority in Europe and North America. French President Emmanuel Macron made statements suggesting that Algeria as a country did not exist prior to 1830 and the history of the anti-colonial movement, as told by Algiers, were a fabrication. These provocative comments by Macron and the role of Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez who endorsed the continued colonization of the Western Sahara under Moroccan tutelage, represents the contemporary attitude of NATO member-states. The second example related to the founding NATO member-states’ historic repression against anti-colonial movements occurred in the Gold Coast on February 28, 1948. African veterans of the war combined with traditional leaders boycotting the inflated prices of British-controlled goods, held peaceful protests to request adequate pensions and benefits for their military service for London as well as reasonable costs for commodities. British security forces opened fire on the demonstrators marching to Christiansborg Castle (Osu) to present their petition to colonial authorities when three leaders of the protest were assassinated. Later as the African masses rose up in rebellion against the massacre, the British arrested scores of people deemed as the organizers of the unrest. This series of events in 1948 led to the independence struggle headed by Dr. Kwame Nkrumah who founded the Convention People’s Party in June 1949, just over one year later, creating the conditions for another eight-year campaign to achieve freedom from Britain on March 6, 1957. Nkrumah had been brought back to the Gold Coast in late 1947 to work as an organizer for the then United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC), an anti-colonial grouping. In the aftermath of the event of February 1948, sharp differences would surface between Nkrumah and other leading UGCC officials. A source on the events of 1948 in the Gold Coast notes: “The people’s protests lasted five days. By 1st March the colonial governor had declared a state of emergency and put in place a new Riot Act. On 12th March the governor ordered the arrest of ‘The Big Six,’ leading members of the UGCC, which included Kwame Nkrumah, as he believed they were responsible for orchestrating the disturbances. The Big Six were incarcerated in remote northern parts of the country. It was around this time that Nkrumah and the other five began to have significant disagreements over the direction of the movement for independence. By 1949 Nkrumah had broken away from the UGCC to form the Convention People’s Party (CPP) taking the masses of the people with him. The CPP, through a campaign of ‘Positive Action,’ achieved an end to the Gold Coast colony and brought the new dawn of independent Ghana on 6th March 1957.” (https://praad.gov.gh/index.php/the-riots-of-28th-february-1948/) The independence movements in Africa utilized various forms of organizational tactics aimed achieving victory over colonialism. In the former Portuguese colonies of Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Angola, Africans had no other choice than to resort to arms in their fight against Lisbon. Portugal received maximum logistical and diplomatic support from NATO in their war against the national liberation movements of the PAIGC, MPLA and FRELIMO in Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique respectively. Azores island in the Atlantic served as a NATO base of operations against the guerrilla movements in Africa. Under the U.S. administration of President Richard Nixon from 1969-1974, the Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger even wrote memorandums encouraging the Pentagon and NATO unconditional support for fascist-colonial Portugal. These memoranda were also designed to undermine the morale of the liberation movements and solidarity efforts in the West seeking to end colonial rule of tens of millions of African people. After the failure of the war by Lisbon to defeat the liberation movements, a military coup occurred in Portugal in April 1974. Although the question of NATO membership did not initially arise, a debate would erupt over the future role of the country within the military alliance. Portugal relinquished control over its African colonies, however, the European country remained within the western sphere of influence including membership in NATO. NATO and Imperialism in the 21st Century Over the last two decades, NATO has enhanced its profile through participation in numerous U.S.-coordinated military operations in the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Libya. These interventions have left untold numbers of civilians and government personnel dead, injured and displaced. After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, Yugoslavia erupted in micro-nationalist warfare which lasted until the conclusion of the decade. The 1999 bombing of Serbia, including the capital of Belgrade, was designed to solidify the dominance of the Pentagon-NATO alliance in Europe and consequently throughout broader geo-political regions of the world. Serbia was subjected to massive airstrikes for over two months. The following year, even after the government in Belgrade had been functionally neutralized, then President Slobodan Milosevic was overthrown, kidnapped and brought to the Netherlands to stand trial in a U.S.-engineered special tribunal on war crimes. Milosevic later died in detention while in subsequent years, several of the newly-independent states in the area were recruited into NATO. Afghanistan in 2001 was bombed, invaded and occupied by the U.S. which mobilized other NATO states to engage in the 20-year war ostensibly aimed at ending jihadist terrorism in Central Asia. After eight months in office President Joe Biden ordered the withdrawal of Pentagon forces from Afghanistan. Other NATO states had already exited the country. The character of the pullout from Afghanistan resulted in the deaths of 13 Marines stationed outside the airport at Kabul during the evacuation. In retaliation, the U.S. launched a drone strike on innocent people in Kabul killing members of a family which had cooperated with the NATO occupation. At present, there is a widespread humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan leaving millions displaced, impoverished and hungry. To add even more distress to the Afghan people, Biden expropriated $3.5 billion in assets being held in U.S. banks. Consequently, the White House has turned its back on the victims of a disastrous NATO intervention and occupation leaving tens of millions without employment, food, medicines and the capacity to generate income and international trade. (https://www.dw.com/en/us-to-split-7-billion-in-afghan-assets-between-relief-9-11-victims/a-60748785) This humiliating withdrawal from Afghanistan by the Pentagon and NATO has served to further damage the popular standing of the Biden presidency. Nonetheless, there has been no reduction in the Pentagon budget which strangles the working and oppressed masses in the U.S. At present the war in Ukraine has taken center stage in regard foreign and domestic policy. Countries around the world are being pressured into rallying alongside imperialism in its war drive to expand the NATO project through the destabilization of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China in the Far East. In the North African state of Libya during the early months of 2011, the U.S. backed counter-revolutionary rebel elements sought to overthrow the Jamahiriya government led by Col. Muammar Gaddafi. The United Nations Security Council at the time voted to pass two resolutions which authorized a total arms and economic blockade against Libya as well as the establishment of a so-called no-fly zone which is merely another form of war declaration. A similar no-fly zone had been imposed over Iraq during the 1990s accompanied by draconian sanctions which killed an estimated one million people, many of whom were women, children and seniors. (https://www.nato.int/nato\_static/assets/pdf/pdf\_2011\_03/20110927\_110311-UNSCR-1973.pdf) After the ground operations in Libya, which began on February 17 were not reaping the desired results by imperialism, a massive blanket bombing of the oil-rich country by the Pentagon and NATO was launched on March 19 which lasted for seven months. There were reports that anywhere between 50,000 to 100,000 people were killed and two million displaced. The longtime leader Muammar Gaddafi was targeted and assassinated as he was attempting to exit the areas around Sirte. The impact of the destruction of Libya as in the cases of Yugoslavia and Afghanistan had regional and international implications. Instability due to the dislocation of millions during and after the air campaign fueled further destabilization in neighboring Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad. Libya since 2011 has become a notorious center for human trafficking and internecine conflict that has spilled over into other states prompting migration across the Mediterranean into Southern Europe. The human traffickers engage in dangerous methods of transportation across North Africa and the Mediterranean Sea. Thousands die every year seeking to escape the detention centers and continuing sectarian battles in Libya. The migration of Africans and Asians to Southern Europe has provided a political rationale for the growth of ultra-right groupings and governments committed to ending entry into their countries by people of color. European Union (EU) coast guard units routinely intercept migrants at sea to repatriate them back to Africa. In Europe, migrants are often confined to detention centers where they are harassed by the authorities. Moreover, on a political electoral level, the migration question has become a major wedge issue in Europe and the U.S. Successive administrations in Washington led by Democrats and Republican have failed to develop a comprehensive immigration policy. At least part of this inability to adequately address the issue lies in the refusal to abandon the imperialist foreign policy of Washington and Wall Street. Imperialist wars of occupation since 2001 involving Afghanistan, Iraq, Haiti, Syria, Yemen, Libya, among other states, are at the root of the dislocation of tens of millions. This is the largest number of refugees and internally displaced persons since the conclusion of WWII. The UN Refugee Agency reports on its website that: “At least 82.4 million people around the world have been forced to flee their homes. Among them are nearly 26.4 million refugees, around half of whom are under the age of 18. There are also millions of stateless people, who have been denied a nationality and lack access to basic rights such as education, health care, employment and freedom of movement. At a time when 1 in every 95 people on earth has fled their home as a result of conflict or persecution, our work at UNHCR is more important than ever before.” (https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/figures-at-a-glance.html) These figures are rarely reported on in the U.S. media, and when they are, it is not done in a manner which links the unprecedented levels of displacement with imperialist wars waged by the Pentagon, NATO and its allies around the globe. Absent of a social and historical context in which to explain the origins of the crisis, people are encouraged to believe that the refugee, IDP and migrant situations are somehow a result of the purported moral deficiencies of people in Africa, Latin America and Asia. Yet the African, Latin American and Asian geo-political regions are still being targeted by NATO for containment, exploitation and conquest. By absolving itself of culpability, the U.S. can attempt to justify its denial of entry to migrants and refugees and their discriminatory treatment while awaiting a decision on whether they can legally live in the country. Within the immigration laws and policies of the U.S., racism is often utilized to limit the number of peoples of African, Asian and Latin American descent into the U.S. In the Horn of Africa state of Somalia there has been instability for the last three decades due to the political and military interference of the U.S. and NATO. More recently in 2006-2007, the administration of President George W. Bush encouraged troops from Ethiopia under the TPLF-EPRDF leadership of Meles Zenawi to invade Somalia in order to prevent the consolidation of power by the Islamic Courts Union. Airstrikes by the Pentagon and the British Royal Air Force were initiated on a regular base in Somalia under the guise of preventing terrorism. Numerous attempts to form a unified civilian transitional government has not been able to include the Al-Shabaab underground armed guerrillas. Al-Shabaab has since its emergence as the major opponents to the western-backed federal government, has split into at least two identifiable factions. For the last fifteen years, the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), which included troops from several regional states including Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Uganda, has failed to military defeat al-Shabaab. Once again in recent weeks, the mandate of AMISOM was extended for another year with no real prospect of a final resolution to the conflict in Somalia. Much of the military training and weaponry are supplied by the U.S. and its NATO allies for AMISOM. The putative peacekeeping operations also maintains UN Security Council diplomatic backing and funding. U.S. soldiers and other personnel working with intelligence agencies have been killed in action in Somalia. Suicide bombings and other armed attacks take place in several areas of the country including the capital of Mogadishu. Relationships developed between AU member states with the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and NATO are not just on a bilateral basis. NATO itself has outlined an extensive program of engagement, training and collaboration with the AU Secretariat in Addis Ababa. The same reasons cited by AFRICOM for its deployments of thousands of troops on the continent mirrors the language of NATO. Both institutions claim that they are invited to participate in joint training exercises with African military forces from various regions. In addition, a significant number of African officers are trained in Pentagon war colleges in the U.S. Unfortunately, and not surprisingly, some of these ranking soldiers have been involved in military coups against elected governments. This has been the case in Mali, Guinea and Libya where internal conflict and lack of democratization is objectively underwritten by the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). AU-affiliated regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have been unable to reverse a series of military coups taking place in Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso and Chad. ECOWAS along with France and the U.S. have issued statements opposing the military usurpation of power yet these coup regimes remain in office with absolute impunity. Therefore, the training supplied by the Pentagon and NATO cannot ensure stability and security on the African continent. In order for AU member-states to achieve genuine independence and sovereignty it must come from the internal dynamics within the political structures established by the democratic forces operating inside these countries. The western bourgeois democracies represented by NATO have never extended the notions of self-determination and independent foreign policies to the underdeveloped nations and regions of the world. In language provided by NATO in regard to its cooperation with AU member-states, the military alliance says: “Since 2005, NATO has been cooperating with the African Union (AU) – a regional organization with 55 members created in 2002. The NATO-AU relationship started modestly with AU requests for logistics and airlift support for its mission in Sudan. The cooperation has evolved over time and, although primarily based on ad-hoc military-technical cooperation, NATO Allies are committed to expanding cooperation with the AU to make it an integral part of NATO’s efforts to work more closely with partners in tackling security challenges emanating from the south.” (https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_8191.htm) However, over the last 17 years the degree of instability in Africa has heightened substantially particularly since the Pentagon-NATO engineered counter-revolution in Libya during 2011. Conditions have deteriorated in some countries such as the Central African Republic and Mali that the governments of these states, even the military juntas, are turning towards Moscow for security assistance and training. (https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/02/08/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/) France and the U.S. have taken great exception to the presence of Russian-based military advisors in the CAR and Mali. The Wagner group, a defense services corporation which operates as a private enterprise, has been present in Mali in recent months prompting threats by Paris to withdraw its military assistance to Bamako. In response, the military junta in Mali ordered the French ambassador to leave the West African state within 72 hours. (https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220131-mali-authorities-give-french-ambassador-72-hours-to-leave-the-country) In the same above-quoted NATO document on AU cooperation, it goes on to emphasize: “In January 2007, the AU made a general request to all partners, including NATO, for financial and logistical support to AMISOM. It later made a specific request to NATO in May 2007, requesting strategic airlift support for AU member states willing to deploy in Somalia under AMISOM. In June 2007, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) agreed, in principle, to support this request and NATO’s support was initially authorized until August 2007. Strategic sealift support was requested at a later stage and agreed in principle by the NAC in September 2009. The AU’s strategic airlift and sealift support requests for AMISOM have been renewed on an annual basis. The current NAC agreement to support the AU with strategic air- and sealift for AMISOM extends until January 2022…. NATO has a liaison office at the headquarters of the AU. The liaison office is comprised of a Senior Military Liaison Officer, a Deputy and one support staff. The liaison office provides, at the AU’s request, subject matter experts, who work in the AU’s Political Affairs, Peace and Security Department alongside African counterparts. The NATO Senior Military Liaison Officer is the primary coordinator for the Alliance’s activities with the AU. The size of NATO’s presence on the ground in Addis Ababa is based upon the requests from the AU and the availability of resources from Allies.” How can the AU member-states secure and protect the interests of the 1.3 billion people on the continent with these levels of penetration by NATO within its military structures? These contradictions must be corrected in order to build viable internal defense mechanisms, combined with strategies and tactics which are compatible with the needs of the workers, youth and farmers in Africa. Neo-colonialism is manifested in the economic and subsequent military policies of contemporary African states. The source of what is described as “Islamic terrorism” has its origins in the counterinsurgency efforts by Washington to undermine those governments seeking to build genuine independence, unity and socialism. The jihadist groupings founded and funded by Washington and its allies serve the interests of the Pentagon and NATO by providing a rationale for sanctions, bombings, invasions and the installation of puppet regimes beholden to the interests of imperialism. Global Impact of NATO Expansion in Eastern Europe: Food Deficits and Energy Crises One of the most alarming aspects of the war in Ukraine and the ongoing sanctions against the Russian Federation are the sharp rise in prices for consumer goods and energy. Fuel prices in the state of California in the U.S. have gone up to as high as $6 per gallon. In other regions of the country, prices are coming down slightly perhaps due to the release by the Biden administration of millions of barrels of oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), a tactic which has been used by other presidents in the past. The U.S. has witnessed the highest inflation rate in over 40 years. The 7-8% rate noted by the federal government does not tell the complete story. Costs related to living expenses such as rents, taxes, car prices, food and other commodities have increased substantially. Since there has not been a raise in the minimum wage means that working people are losing income every single quarter of the year. On an international scale, food supplies to various geo-political regions have been seriously curtailed because Russian and Ukraine are considered two of the largest agricultural producers in the world. In various African and Middle Eastern states, the potential for enormous food deficits is more than apparent. These countries are attempting to emerge from the COVID-19 pandemic since early 2020 which caused serious disruptions in industrial and agricultural production. Lockdowns and the rapid spread of the coronavirus has caused millions of deaths and many more severe illnesses which often have long term public health, economic and social consequences. One report on the escalating crisis in food supplies published by the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington pointed out that: “Russia and Ukraine are considered the breadbasket of the world. In 2021, the two countries exported more than one-quarter of the world’s wheat. They are both major suppliers of corn, sunflower seed oil, and barley; Russia is also a major supplier of fertilizer, which is critical for agricultural production. Food prices are soaring, exacerbating inflation rates and reducing the purchasing power of populations across the Middle East and Africa, where 70% of Russian wheat exports went in 2021. These escalating costs, fed by actual and anticipated scarcity, are exacerbating economic crises for Egypt and Lebanon, with a heavy reliance on Russian and Ukrainian wheat imports, and imperiling vulnerable populations in conflict zones, including Yemen, Syria, and Somalia, which heavily rely on emergency food aid.” (https://agsiw.org/the-ukraine-crisis-deepens-food-insecurity-across-the-middle-east-and-africa/) In the energy sector the banning of Russian oil and natural gas in Western Europe are inevitably causing disruptions in supply. Opportunistically the U.S. has proposed a plan to redirect its energy supplies to NATO countries in Eastern and Western Europe. However, this process. which is highly unfeasible, will take time to develop the necessary supplies of oil and natural gas to those states which have adopted Washington’s foreign policy. Sanctions above all else are acts of war. The attempted strangulation of countries such as Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Russia and China, etc. are designed to destabilize these states and to make them susceptible to regime change in favor of the U.S. and other NATO governments. Russia, China and a host of other states have vowed to resist these efforts to isolate them from world trade and international relations. The New York-based think tank, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), acknowledged the strategic role of Russia in providing energy resources to European states. An article on the CFR website reveals: “Overall, Russia supplies about one-third of European natural gas consumption, used for winter heating as well as electricity generation and industrial production. The European Union (EU) also turns to Russia for more than one-quarter of its crude oil imports, the bloc’s largest single energy source. Some EU states are far more dependent than others. Portugal and Spain use little Russian energy, while Germany, the largest European economy, gets more than half of its natural gas and more than 30 percent of its crude oil supplies from Russia. France gets most of its electricity from nuclear power but still relies on Russian imports to meet its fossil fuel needs. Analysts say plans in Germany and other countries to phase out nuclear and coal power could increase this dependence.” (https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/russias-energy-role-europe-whats-stake-ukraine-crisis?gclid=CjwKCAjw9e6SBhB2EiwA5myr9mQXtnhE8l2nWlzuul9zpCJvZC1cIqzYGnhaBZ9K\_EvLfQKszq2T0xoCLWEQAvD\_BwE) These factors portend much for the economic and consequent political future of the capitalist and imperialist governments in Europe. The disruptions in food and energy supplies perpetuated by the foreign policy imperatives of Washington and Wall Street will have ramifications far beyond the theater of war in Ukraine and Russia.

#### Africa is the perpetual ghost of the Euro-American regime, located in the blind spot of imperial international relations, in a perpetual zone of sacrifice –a paradigmatic reframing of the theories that undergird modern rational discourse is necessary.

Nyere ’20 -- (Chidochashe Nyere, 01-2020, "NATO’s 2011 Invasion of Libya: Colonialism Repackaged?," Reimagining Justice, Human Rights and Leadership in Africa (pp.123-156), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/335080330\_NATO%27s\_2011\_Invasion\_of\_Libya\_Colonialism\_Repackaged, accessed 7-2-2022) -- nikki

Coloniality of Power and the Global Power Structural Configuration: Unmasking the Politics and Philosophy of Empire Epistemologically, this chapter seeks to unmask the fault lines of the philosophy of the European-centric empire as implicated in the generation of problems epitomised by the invasion of Libya in 2011 by NATO forces. It seeks to do so, by exposing some myths that informed, fueled and continue to precipitate global coloniality in the absence of physical colonialism. Current international relations (IR) theories have proven to be limited and unable to solve and eradicate this epistemic challenge, partly because dominant and traditional IR theories are located in the very European modernity that they disguise and camouflage in the purported objectivity of science. The philosophy of the Eurocentric empire universalised these particular theories of IR by force (violence of colonialism) as they are part of the modernity project of colonisation (Howe 1990: 677). The chapter further aims to demonstrate the deficiency and bankruptcy that foregrounds traditional IR theories’ assumptions, assertions and proclamations particularly that Western-centric IR theories are scientific, objective and universally applicable or replicable. Such proclamations overlook the fact that these IR theories are located in particular ecologies of Europe and therefore, are subjective. All knowledge is particular and subjective to its ecology or locality. Since 1919, the official initial academic inquiry of IR as a discipline, IR theories have not adequately addressed what the discipline initially set out to do—to curb and liquidate international conflict. This suggests that the epistemologies (particular epistemic ecologies and localities) that have informed IR theories to date are inadequate and have reached some sort of cul-de-sac, or a dead-end. These epistemologies beg the question and engage in circular reasoning. This necessitates an alternative frame of reference. Contingent upon Albert Einstein’s idea that insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result each time, this chapter opts to engage a non-conventional theory in the discipline of IR. As such, this work advances the decolonial perspective as a possible solution to problems caused by epistemologies located in the ecologies and localities of Western, Euro-North American-centric modernity that purport themselves as objective, scientific and universal. The chapter will unmask the inadequacies of Euro-North American-centric modernity in the face of mounting and current global problems, particularly those played out in the field of international relations. IR as an academic discipline started in 1919 at Aberystwyth, University of Wales (now Aberystwyth University), a year after the end of World War I (Ziegler 1987). This, however, as Nyere (2014: 18) argues, “does not mean that intellectual origins of political realism and liberalism only started in 1919”. The main objective and aim of IR theorising was solely to find peaceful solutions to international disputes and therefore avert a similar conflict to World War I. IR failed in that regard because just barely after a decade, World War II started. Like the predecessor of the United Nations, the League of Nations, IR as an academic discipline has failed in achieving what it set out to do in the first place. Since 1945, the end of World War II and the signing of the United Nations Charter in San Francisco, USA, there has not been a single decade that the world has not witnessed an international conflict or war (Bennet 1998: 7). Rational theories in the discipline of IR, such as realism, liberalism, feminism, Marxism and constructivism, are expressive of ideas, concepts and views located in modernity. The ideas expressed in IR rational theories are embodied by scholars that are mainly located in modernity, particularly from the Global North and reflect the rationale of European modernity. The major problem of modernity is the inexplicable discrepancy and inconsistency between its rhetoric and its lived reality, its illusion vis-à-vis its essence, particularly from the experience of people of the Global South in general, but by Africans in particular. As such, this chapter intends to unmask the inadequacy of mainstream theories and lenses in explaining the ghosts and blindspots of empire because these ghosts and blind-spots are born within the empire. The European-centric empire is not sufficiently able to be reflexive on its theories and to see beyond its assumptions and assertions. As such, this chapter suggests the need to explore outside the lenses of established theory.

### Link — Geography

#### Geography DA — their framing of foreign worlds demarcates zones of being and non-being, where non-being in the New World (order) is denied humanity and civility and subject to US coloniality.

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Modernity’s Creation of Zone of Being and Zone of Non-being

In the Euro-North America-centric worldview, the accident of geography is esteemed more than the essence of humanity. There is more value placed on the geography of where human beings originate from, than the actual humanity. This worldview perceives two distinct zones; zone of being and the zone of non-being based on the exclusion that emanates from geography and subsequently, race. Kissinger highlights the fact that, despite the global power structural configuration that was created and is perpetuated by the Euro-North American-centric global domination, it is in fact a European accident that was realised and now purports itself as an essence; the realisation was, and is, maintained by force and aggression. He argues that the “international relations” of the 1490s were a mere European regional undertaking which was to be globalised through the violence of colonialism (Kissinger 2014: 18). The Euro-North American-centric new world order was born out of imagination. The socially constructed borders of what determined humanity and non-humanity were realised by force and are consistently consolidated by either the use of aggression or the threat thereof. The demarcation is not only imaginary, it was materialised. Ramose (2001: 5) submits that the “amity lines” that enveloped the Euro-North American-centric civilisation while isolating the rest of the “overseas zone” were geographically located “along the equator or the Tropic of Cancer in the South, along a degree of longitude drawn in the Atlantic Ocean through the Canary Islands or the Azores in the west, or a combination of both”. This demarcation, that separated the Western Meridian from the Azores, was to not be shifted under whatsoever circumstances. In other words, this Western Meridian separated the Western Hemisphere and the overseas zone signalling the end of Europe and the geography that existed beyond the “amity line” signalled the beginning of the “New World” (Ramose 2001: 5). The overseas zone was not governed by Europe and hence no law applied there, except for the “laws of the stronger”; this meant civility was curtailed to exist only in the Western Meridian, beyond that lay a territory of barbarity. Kissinger (2014: 18) quips that as far back as 1550–1551, King Charles the V, a Christian, summoned a council of theologians for deliberations and that council concluded that “people living in the Western Hemisphere were human beings with souls—hence eligible for salvation”. That pronouncement implied that people who lived beyond the Western Hemisphere where therefore, non-human beings and without souls. In fact, that conclusion justified “conquest and conversion” (Kissinger 2014: 19). This then speaks to the audacity with which Europeans imposed their religion, even forcefully at times, on people in spaces and places they colonised and conquered. Coloniality of power was henceforth geographically and asymmetrically constituted in favour of the Western Hemisphere. This was the creation of the European-centric “zone of being” and the “hellish zone of non-being” for non-Europeans, but Africans particularly. What is noteworthy of the amity lines is that, unlike the “Rayas” lines, they represented a zone that was subject to conflicting interests arising between a duo of “contractual parties” that sought to seize land and commandeer the inhabitants of that land. The conflicting parties only shared consensus on the “freedom of the open spaces that began beyond the line” (Ramose 2001: 5). This speaks of the condescending attitude that engulfs the Euro-North American-centric civilisation. It ascribes humanity to itself and, beyond the geography of what it knows and the proximity to it, denies other humans of their humanity. The interaction between the conflicting parties in the zone of being are amicably resolved through a contract, and beyond the zone of being, the barrel of the gun, aggression and violence become the order of the day—the “hellish zone of non-being”. In the ‘hellish zone of non-being’, “force could be used freely and ruthlessly” because there existed no humanity in those spaces and places (Ramose 2001: 5). This meant that anything that happened outside the Euro-North American-centric world did not have legal merit nor consequence and had no moral or political merit. Hence, John Tully’s observation that “there is no sin beyond the equator” (2011: 85). Sins and transgression are only committed in the zone of being, where civility, legality, morality and reciprocity are located and enforceable. In the hellish zone of non-being, chaos, pandemonium and disorder are the norm. To this effect, Mamdani (2004: 4) argues that “when violence does not cross the boundary between ‘the west’ and the rest—it is called ‘communal conflict’, as in South Asia, or ‘ethnic conflict’, as in Africa” (Mamdani 2004: 4). Chossudovsky (2015) evinces what he terms the “hegemonic project” of the “globalisation of war” by the USA. He submits that there are major US-sponsored military and undercover intelligence operations that are run concurrently in regions such as, but not limited to, the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe, the Far East and Central Asia. These covert operations are designed to destabilise sovereign states, particularly those states that defy the global power structural configuration of the Euro-North American-centric world view. The USA and its allies, Western Europe, do this to consolidate its grip on the control of the ‘new world order’, and by so doing, continuously defines and sustains global coloniality through the control of colonial power matrices—coloniality of power.

### Link — Middle East

#### Echoes of the Modernized West creates a spatialized differentiation between the Western identity and the ‘Islamic’ threat that justifies re-asserting NATO into the geopolitical South.

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Re-presenting the South

With the end of the cold war, the South assumed a more prominent role in the security discourse of NATO than it did during the cold war. The first sign-post was set by the Alliance's Strategic Concept in November 1991. In this document, NATO acknowledges the disappearance of its dominating cold-war threat from the East, and establishes a different scenario, in which 'challenges and risks' are 'multi-faceted and multi-directional'. As one of the directions from which such risks and challenges might stem, the alliance identifies the countries in the Southern Mediterranean and Middle East. The stability and peace of the countries on the southern periphery of Europe are important for the security of the Alliance, as the 1991 Gulf war has shown. This is all the more so because of the build-up of military power and the proliferation of weapons technologies in the area, including weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles capable of reaching the territory of some member states of the Alliance (NATO, 1991:5). What sounded rather innocuous then, has subsequently been phrased in a more pointed way. Or, to phrase it in William Connolly's (1991:64) terms, what was then constituted as a 'difference' was turned into 'otherness', into a quintessential danger. It is in this context that Secretary-General Willy Claes set the tone, constituting the countries to the South of Europe as the sites of a force, comparable in its dangerousness only to NATO's old enemy, Communism. It comes by many names: fundamentalism, Islamic fundamentalism, Islamism, yet its nature is clear: it poses a threat to the West by denying that the latter identity is the only acceptable political identity. Fundamentalism is at least as dangerous as Communism. Please do not underestimate this risk... I cannot see how fundamentalism could accord with democracy. And NATO is much more than a military alliance. It is also committed to defend the basic principles of civilization, which connect North America with Western Europe (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 1995:9).

As indicated above, Claes's statements did not go uncontested within NATO's diplomatic community. Yet at the same time, one should not consider this articulation of post-cold war identity\difference to be unrepresentative. An article by a Portuguese scholar, published by NATO in October 1994, virtually anticipated Claes' identification (Gaspar, 1994). Also, NATO distributed a report by the North Atlantic Assembly's Sub-Committee on the Mediterranean Basin on 'The Rise of Religious Fundamentalism and the Future of Democracy in North Africa' (North Atlantic Assembly, 1994), which in a similar tone establishes 'Islamism' as the anathema to Western cultural identity. In responding to the rise of Islamism, Alliance countries must take three factors into account. The first is Islamic political thought, which is distinct from Western thought on a fundamental point, namely its difficulty in accepting the independence of politics from the religious and private spheres of human activity. ... Secondly, the present governments of the North African countries do not exhibit the main characteristics of democracy... Thirdly, Islam is thriving against a background of political and economic crisis generally linked to the failure of a mode of development which gave priority to major industry and state action at the expense of the peasantry, private enterprise and the development of the middle class (North Atlantic Assembly, 1994: ii-iii). This is a central statement in the re-constitution of the South: modernization has ended and failed, and it has produced a monster. The modernization paradigm that informed the identification of the South during most of the cold war would allow for manifestations of crisis as 'collateral damages' in a transition process to Western standards of economic, political and social modernity. The post-cold war texts presented here on the other hand turn political and economic crises into key features of these countries, features that now identify these countries as essentially anti-Western.7 A comparison of the security situations of the Middle East and of Europe discloses their asymmetry on many levels. Europe is a community of states engaged in a process of integration, while the Middle East remains an area where the dynamics of fragmentation can lead to conflicts among states; the common boundary between the two areas separates democracy from autocracy, market economies from under-developed economies, modern societies from archaic social structures torn asunder by the phenomena of modernization. (Gaspar, 1994:29). While there are faint echoes of the modernization paradigm resonating in this description (underdeveloped economies), they no longer hold the promise of ultimately becoming part of the West. Rather, against the 'anti-Western radicalization' (Gaspar, 1994:29) the West is recommended to use a strategy of containment. "In the Middle East, democratization does not seem to be on the agenda and there is no question of expanding the European security complex into this area or integrating it into European or Western institutions" (Gaspar, 1994:28). Rather, the identification of 'Islamism' could hold the promise of re-constituting the West as a common trans-Atlantic identity against the Islamic Other. "Thus, in the end, the post-Cold War crisis in the Middle East could serve as a catalyst to the consolidation of the European and Atlantic communities through their efforts to coordinate a coherent Middle East policy" (Gaspar, 1994:30).

What is at work here is a spatial differentiation that constructs a boundary between the West and the 'Middle East', reminiscent of, and at the same time anticipating, the adversarial relationship between East and West in the days of the cold war. This argument is further supported by the increasing militarization of the identification of the South in the aftermath of the Gulf War. Here, NATO's texts are increasingly concerned with the proliferation of 'weapons of mass destruction'. "[The] Gulf crisis proved that the threats now facing Europe no longer come from only one direction, and has provided all too tangible evidence of the danger of a proliferation of weapons of mass destruction" (Colombo, 1992:3). The point here is, of course, that such weapons in themselves are not the problem. Rather, they become dangerous in the hands of the Other, in the hands of the 'Saddams', 'rogue nations' and 'fundamentalists' of this world. Thus, the current discussions on the future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) already presupposes and at the same time reinforces an identity of the South as the Other (Mutimer, 1997). There is, however, a crucial difference between the adversaries of NATO in the cold war, and the post-cold war era, respectively. The spatial differentiation between East and West was undergirded by a nuclear Mutually Assured Destruction, which sealed off the 'tectonic plates' of East and West from any mutual interference. Berlin 1953, Budapest 1956, and Prague 1968 are sign-posts of this principle. With nuclear deterrence denied to the South, the West is currently constituting an Other that is much more accessible to intervention. The geopolitical space of the South might yet become the maneuver-grounds for a re-assertive NATO.

### Link — Space

#### Settler colonialism is structured by the imperative of progress that demands the universal imposition of linear time and the reproduction of evacuated space – indigenous continuities of space and time are located simultaneously as the “blank slate” upon which the “perfect laboratory” can be constructed and the antagonistic pre-modern savage obstructing the emergence of settler modernity. From the Lakota nation massacred in service of industrial development in the Black Hills to the usage of the Galapagos as a microcosm for evolutionary study to the taking of Navajo lands for spaceflight testing to the indigenous Hawaiian protectors of Mauna Kea whose spiritual connections are being erased in favor of Western astronomy, the scientific terrain of outer space cannot be conceptualized apart from the ongoing process of imperialistic otherization that legitimates settler sovereignty in the present.

Sammler and Lynch ’21 -- (Katherine G Sammler, Casey R Lynch, 9-2-2021, "Apparatuses of observation and occupation: Settler colonialism and space science in Hawai'i," SAGE Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/02637758211042374, accessed 1-12-2022)//nikki

Settler colonial space-times [T]he idea of a closed system [is] a concept that was constituted by the island laboratory and the irradiated atoll and perpetuated by the aerial view. (DeLoughrey, 2012: 168) The links between space science, Western imperialism, and settler colonialism are not confined to the history of Cook’s voyages or the settler colonial conditions of contemporary Hawai'i. Rather, they are entangled in ongoing histories of the Enlightenment in which ideologies of European superiority – used to justify violent conquest and pillaging of Indigenous lands – rely upon claims of scientific objectivity, modernity, universality, and futurity (Byrd, 2011). In this section, we situate TMT and HI-SEAS in the history of colonial imaginaries of islands as abstract laboratories for scientific experimentation. We then consider how this erasure of space is entangled with Western conceptions of time that relegate Indigeneity to the past while producing linear, progressive futures (Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua, 2017). We bring these reflections together through Barad’s notion of the apparatus, which we employ to critically examine TMT and HI-SEAS. Island laboratories Since Cook’s expeditions, the West has subjected the constellation of Pacific Islands to a multitude of science experiments (DeLoughrey, 2012; Farbotko, 2010). Salmond (2003: ix) explains how “[a]s the edges of the known world were pushed out, wild nature – including the ‘savages’ and ‘barbarians’ at the margins of humanity - was brought under the calm, controlling gaze of Enlightenment science, long before colonial domination was attempted.” There is a long history of the liveliness of islands being abstracted by colonial powers and scientists alike, from seemingly innocuous use of the Galápagos as discrete microcosms for theorizing evolution (Matsuda, 2006); to the United States’ devastating testing of nuclear weapons on the Marshall Islands; to botany’s role in the colonization of Hawai’i and its extension into contemporary experiments with genetically-modified organisms replacing native plant species (Goldberg-Hiller and Silva, 2015). As with other landscapes, specific imaginaries of place play a unique role in colonial practices on islands. Continental views of islands align with Enlightenment scientific desire for blank slates, perfect laboratories (Greenhough, 2006; Matsuda, 2007). Mobilizing imaginaries of frontier and isolation, representations of islands within a continental and colonial gaze are, as Matsuda explains, “distant, isolated, uninhabited, and abstract spaces” (2007: 230). The purported distance of the island colony enacts a separation between colonizer and colonized landscape that allows for specific relations and forms of observation. Islands become simplified models of a complex world, acting as “quintessential sites for experimentation” (Baldacchino, 2007: 165) based on fetishized assumptions about island spatiality. Scientists use islands to isolate variables and substitute space for time to construct linear timestreams. Islandness functions as stand-in for a computational time-step within an experimental design. These purported blank slates endow the initial time-step essential to modelling. Islands and their peoples have been employed to examine theories of geological, biological, human, and socio-cultural evolution. DeLoughrey describes how island spatiality is considered bound by “the theme of isolation, a model that had been deployed in the 19th century to propose the theory of evolution, and which re-energized the longstanding colonial understanding of the island as a laboratory” (2012: 168). The expansion of U.S. empire specifically enrolled island colonies from Puerto Rico to the Philippines as sites for grisly experimentations, from weapons to biomedical research on non-white bodies who were seen as relics of earlier stages of evolution (Immerwahr, 2019). Just as islands and their peoples have been used to model past evolutions, they are also established as models for specific futures. Baldacchino describes islands as sites of novelty; they tend toward clairvoyance; they are disposed to act as advance indicators or extreme reproductions of what is present or future elsewhere … with fallacious simplicity, [they] can be conceived as a convenient platform for any whim or fancy. (2007: 165) Islands have emplaced visions of future climate dystopias (Farbotko, 2010) and imagined libertarian capitalist utopias (Lynch, 2017). The continuation of these projects of empire and white supremacy are shaping plans for human colonization of Moon and Mars. Such projects re-articulate debates around questions of race, ability, eugenics, reproduction, and human psychology in journals like Futures – including a 2019 special issue on ethics in offworld colonization. Through these projects, islands and peoples are erased and overwritten by the totality of the model world they represent. As DeLoughrey explains, “Western colonizers had long configured tropical islands into the contained spaces of a laboratory, which is to say a suppression of island history and Indigenous presence” (2012: 172). An affective landscape of history, more-than-human relationality (Watts, 2013), and lived social place gets transformed into independent, sterile variables instrumentalized in the projection of specific futures. Such discourses intersect with space science imaginaries of exploration, exoticism, and otherworldliness. Settling time As an empire of time rather than space … many significant American national theorists sought to escape the political paradoxes of space by conquering time. (Allen, 2008: 13) Allen examines how U.S. empire depends upon three notions of time: a romanticized historical time recounting myths of the nation’s founding, the geological time of natural history, and the mechanized time of the clock and apparatuses of measurement. The organization and control over these three temporalities constitutes a colonial totality (Matson and Nunn, 2017) that works to settle time as much as space in the projection of settler futures. The projection of settler futures depends on the ordering of time, constituted by ideologies of progress, of a mythologized past and present oriented toward the future. Scientific “progress” is positioned as a universal value key to constructing the future, while questioning the actions of Western science is positioned as irrational or reactionary. Concerning the TMT controversy, Casumbal-Salazar writes: Relegated to the ‘dark ages’ of tradition, Native peoples appear as the agonistic menace of the modern scientific state. Delegitimized as irrational within the gendered hierarchies of Western science and philosophy … Hawaiians become suspect and subject to institutional anti-Native racism yet fetishized as an archeological remnant within multicultural society. (2017: 2) In dominant discourses, Indigenous time is linked to the past, with the present constituted on assimilation and the future on complete erasure (Rifkin, 2017). The existence of contemporary Indigenous peoples poses a challenge to ongoing settler colonial hegemony. Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua explains how “settler state officials cast the kiaʻi [land protectors, caretakers] as impediments on the road to ‘progress’ (aka settler futurity) … (mis)representing us as fixed in place, pinned in a remote time” (2017: 191–192). Enlightenment notions of universality erase difference and thus Indigenous claims to prior rights or sovereignty. While these conceptions of time have long been critiqued, they continue to shape the central logics of contemporary Western science, including space science. Linear conceptions of time are necessarily produced out of complex practices that organize and control relative and variable spatio-temporal formations. Rifkin posits a multiplicity of temporalities, writing: temporalities need to be understood as having material existence and efficacy in ways that are not reducible to a single, ostensibly neutral vision of time as universal succession. The concept of frames of reference provides a way of breaking up this presumed timeline by challenging the possibility of definitively determining simultaneity … Within Einsteinian relativity, simultaneity depends on one’s perspective based on one’s frame of reference. (2017: 20) Einstein’s theory of relativity demonstrates how time is relative, variable, and dependent on acceleration, which is a function of location within a gravitational field. It is a relationship between space, masses, and matter. As Valentine explains: gravity is a consequence of the relational warping of spacetime by matter … That is, gravitational effects are literally universal but emerge locally through relativistic and constantly shifting specific relations among the mass of cosmic bodies and spacetime, producing variable observations from differently situated observers of one another (2017: 189–190). The practices of Western astronomy are dependent on variable and relative relations among space and time. Whether it is earth-bound astronomers punching the clock on Martian time (Mirmalek, 2020) or the stretching of temporal experience in a gravity well, the location of bodies matters as it produces ‘differently situated observers,’ who experience time differently based on their frames of reference. Yet, time is held as a stable frame of reference from which the colonial scientist constitutes the metric for a purportedly universal observer situated in a neutral position of observation. Even Western science’s own understanding of time refuses to conform to Enlightenment notions of universality, demonstrating a contradiction between this ontology and the broader political and social ideologies with which it is entangled. While notions of linear, progressive time are used to justify settler colonial projects, the relative and contingent relationships among space, time, and matter complicate claims to universality. Time, like space, is subject to practices of organization and control that produce subject–object relations key to the Western colonial project. For instance, geologic time, or what Allen refers to as “vertical time,” is the spatial-temporal imaginary of geologic strata. He describes that, while “history often depicted time advancing horizontally across space, the geological revolution made it possible to imagine time extending perpendicularly into the territory beneath the nation” (Allen, 2008: 165). The deep time of geology historicizes Western civilization as the top layer, the apex of natural history, and thus stands to justify colonialism and its civilizational projects. The exploration of cosmological time in the space sciences extends the colonial project further into the far expanses of the future and the totality of the universe. The apparatus Gazing out into the night sky or deep down into the structure of matter, with telescope or microscope in hand, Man [sic] reconfirms his ability to negotiate immense differences in scale in the blink of an eye. Designed specifically for our visual apparatus, telescopes and microscopes are the stuff of mirrors, reflecting what is out there … Man is an individual apart from all the rest. And it is this very distinction that bestows on him the inheritance of distance, a place from which to reflect-on the world, his fellow man, and himself. A distinct individual, the unit of all measure, finitude made flesh, his separateness is the key. (Barad, 2007: 134, emphasis added) In Barad’s deconstructive reading of Enlightenment science, linear time and evacuated space are both the product of active material processes through which a purportedly universal “Man” continually enacts a separation between himself and the universe. It is this supposed separation from the rest of existence that constitutes “Man” as the subject of a masculinist science and the remainder of the universe as the object of his will. Practices of scientific observation and colonial occupation work in tandem to re-enact and reinforce this fundamental subject–object relationship. Critical scholars of science have long argued against the purported passivity of observation, from critiques of the Archimedean point (Yaqoob, 2014) to feminist theories of the embodied and situated nature of knowledge production (Haraway, 1988). Yet, beyond simply noting the ontological impossibility of Man’s separation from the universe, Barad theorizes an emergent and contingent form of separability – what she calls agential separability – that is (re)produced through the material practices of apparatuses. Barad explains that “apparatuses enact agential cuts that produce determinate boundaries and properties of entities within phenomena” (2007: 148). Apparatuses determine what comes to matter and how, thus producing differences between subject and object, which are not stable positions but rather enacted and contingent forms of relationality. We employ the apparatus to explore how subject–object relations of Western colonial science are not universal and absolute, but rather enacted through material practices that selectively produce the privileged subject positions on which settler colonialism and space science both depend. Barad’s theory of spacetimemattering highlights the mutual constitution of space and time through the ongoing material re-configuring of the world. Apparatuses are neither neutral probes of the natural world nor social structures that deterministically impose some particular outcome …  the notion of an apparatus is not premised on inherent divisions between the social and the scientific …  [they] are the practices through which these divisions are constituted. (Barad, 2007: 169) Reconceiving subjectivity, objectivity, space, time, and matter in this way implies that questions of ethics are inseparable from apparatuses as practices that produce differences and iteratively construct the world. Apparatuses enact material changes through which some possibilities are realized while others are foreclosed. Ontologically, apparatuses produce spatial, temporal, and material relations that constitute projects of Western colonial science. This approach helps elaborate arguments like those of Matson and Nunn that “even the most futuristic space telescopes have embedded within them a lineage of Euro-western cultural supremacy” (2017: n.p.). This is not to simply claim that telescopes are in some way symbolic of settler colonial relations, but to recognize how space science apparatuses actively orient relations of observation and materialize settler colonial relations. Both TMT and HI-SEAS constitute apparatuses that extend spatially well beyond the infrastructural footprint on these mountains, to the island and surrounding ocean, into the atmosphere, to Moon, Mars, and cosmos. As part of these apparatuses, mountain environments of Hawaii become both a gateway to the cosmos and simulation of an alien landscape. Temporally, the apparatus stretches beyond contemporary scientific practices, drawing on longstanding histories of European imperialism, Western law, and settler colonial logics, and projecting these ideologies into offworld futures. Materially, these projects enroll technological, logistical, and physical systems, including roads, mirrors and lenses, sensors and surveillance devices, electromagnetic waves and domes, the geology of the Hawaiian landscape, and bodies of observer and observed.

#### Outer space is a perpetual site of conquest and colonization – the latest iteration of the genocidal project of terra nullius aimed at the naturalization of settler sovereignty over the “untamed” and “unknown” geographies of space. The project of extraterrestrial appropriation is rooted in the eliminatory logics of settler colonialism that seek to reinstitute the dispossession of Manifest Destiny in the present at the expense of indigeneity.

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To most scholars, and certainly to the virtual majority of Indigenous peoples on Turtle Island, it is no secret that the country we call the United States of America was built upon the brutal subjugation of Indigenous people and Indigenous lands. Fueled by the American settler myths of terra nullius (no man’s land) and Manifest Destiny, the American settler state proceeded upon a project of cultural and physical genocide, with lasting effects that endure to the present day. The ‘settler myth’ permeates American culture. Words such as ‘pioneer’, the ‘West’, ‘Manifest Destiny’ grab the imagination as connected to the growth of the country in its early history. America sprang forth from a vast open ‘wilderness’. Of course, for Indigenous people, we know differently—these lands had complex cultural frameworks and political entities long before colonization. Words like ‘pioneer’ and ‘Manifest Destiny’, have deep meanings for us too, as they are indicative of the very real damage dealt against our cultures and nations, damage that we have had to work very hard to undo. Trump’s address raises key insights into the continuing logics of settler colonialism, as well as questions of its future trajectories. Trump’s invocation of ideas such as the ‘frontier’ and ‘taming the wilderness’ draws attention to the brutal violence that accompanied the building of the American state. Scholars such as Greg Grandin (2019) make the case that the frontier is part of what America is—whether it is the ‘Wild West’, or the U.S.-Mexican border, America is always contending with a frontier that must be defined. Language surrounding ‘frontier’ is troubling because it perpetuates the rationale of why the American settler state even exists—it could make better use of the land than Native people would, after all, they lived in wilderness. This myth tells us that what we know as the modern world was built through the hard work of European settlers; Indigenous people had nothing to offer or contribute. For someone like Mr. Trump, whose misgivings and hostility towards Native people have been historically documented, this myth fits well with his narrative as President—he is building a ‘new’ America, one that will return to its place of power and influence. The fact that similar language is being used around the potential of American power being extended to space could reasonably be expected, given the economic and military potential that comes from such a move. Space represents yet another ‘unknown’ to be conquered and bent to America’s will. However, such interplanetary conquest does not exist solely in outer space. I wish to situate the very real colonial legacies and violence associated with the desire to explore space, tracing the ways that they are perpetuated and reified through their destructive engagements with Indigenous peoples. I argue that a scientific venture such as space exploration does not exist in a vacuum, but instead draws from settler colonialism and feeds back into it through the prioritization of ‘science’ over Indigenous epistemologies. I begin by exploring the ways that space exploration by the American settler state is situated within questions of hegemony, imperialism, and terra nullius, including a brief synopsis of the controversy surrounding the planned construction of the Thirty Meter Telescope on Mauna Kea. I conclude by exploring Indigenous engagement with ‘space’ in both its Earthbound and beyond-earth forms as it relates to outer space, and what implications this might have for the ways we think about our engagement with space as the American settler state begins to turn its gaze skyward once again. I position this essay alongside a growing body of academic work, as well as journalistic endeavors (Haskins, 2020; Koren, 2020) that demands that the American settler colonial state exercise self-reflexivity as to why it engages with outer space, and who is advantaged and disadvantaged here on Earth as a result of this engagement. Settler Colonialism and ‘Space’ A brief exploration of what settler colonialism is, and its engagement with ‘space’ here on Earth is necessary to start. Settler colonialism is commonly understood to be a form of colonialism that is based upon the permanent presence of colonists upon land. This is a distinction from forms of colonialism based upon resource extraction (Wolfe, 2006; Veracini, 2013). What this means is that the settler colony is intimately tied with the space within which it exists—it cannot exist or sustain itself without settler control over land and space. This permanent presence upon land by ‘settlers’ is usually at the expense of the Indigenous, or original people, in a given space or territory. To reiterate: control over space is paramount. As Wolfe states, “Land is life—or at least, land is necessary for life. Thus, contests for land can be—indeed, often are—contests for life” (2006: 387). Without land, the settler state ‘dies’; conversely, deprivation of land from the indigenous population means that in settler logic, indigeneity dies (Povinelli, 2002; Wolfe, 2006.) The ultimate aims of settler colonialism is therefore the occupation and remaking of space. As Wolfe (2006) describes, the settler state seeks to make use of land and resources in order to continue on; whether that is through homesteading/residence, farming and agriculture, mining, or any number of activities that settler colonial logic deems necessary to its own survival. These activities are tied to a racist and hubristic logic that only settler society itself possesses the ability to make proper use of land and space (Wolfe, 2006). This is mated with a viewpoint of landscapes prior to European arrival as terra nullius, or empty land that was owned by no one, via European/Western conceptions of land ownership and tenure (Wolfe, 1994). Because of this overarching goal of space, there is an inherent anxiety in settler colonies about space, and how it can be occupied and subsequently rewritten to remove Indigenous presence. In Anglo settler colonies, this often takes place within a lens of conservation. Scholars such as Banivanua Mar (2010), Lannoy (2012), Wright (2014) and Tristan Ahtone (2019) have written extensively on the ways that settler reinscription of space can be extremely damaging to Indigenous people from a lens of ‘conservation’. However, dispossession of Indigenous space in favor of settler uses can also be tied to some of the most destructive forces of our time. For example, Aboriginal land in the Australian Outback was viewed as ‘empty’ land that was turned into weapons ranges where the British military tested nuclear weapons in the 1950s, which directly led to negative health effects upon Aboriginal communities downwind from the testing sites (Vincent, 2010). Indigenous nations in the United States have struggled with environmental damage related to military-industrial exploitation as well. But, what does this all look like in regard to outer space? In order to really understand the potential (settler) colonial logics of space exploration, we must go back and explore the ways in which space exploration became inextricably tied with questions of state hegemony and geopolitics during the Cold War. US and Soviet space programs were born partially out of military utility, and propaganda value—the ability to send a nuclear warhead across a great distance to strike the enemy via a ICBM and the accompanying geopolitical respect that came with such a capability was something that greatly appealed to the superpowers, and when the Soviets took an early lead in the ‘Space Race’ with Sputnik and their Luna probes, the United States poured money and resources into making up ground (Werth, 2004). The fear of not only falling behind the Soviets militarily as well as a perceived loss of prestige in the court of world opinion spurred the US onto a course of space exploration that led to the Apollo moon landings in the late 1960s and the early 70s (Werth, 2004; Cornish, 2019). I argue that this fits neatly into the American settler creation myth referenced by Trump—after ‘conquering’ a continent and bringing it under American dominion, why would the United States stop solely at ‘space’ on Earth? To return to Grandin (2019), space represented yet another frontier to be conquered and known by the settler colonial state; if not explicitly for the possibility of further settlement, then for the preservation of its existing spatial extent on Earth. However, scholars such as Alan Marshall (1995) have cautioned that newer logics of space exploration such as potential resource extraction tie in with existing military logics in a way that creates a new way of thinking about the ‘openness’ of outer space to the logics of empire, in what Marshall calls res nullius (1995: 51)[i]. But we cannot forget the concept of terra nullius and how our exploration of the stars has real effects on Indigenous landscapes here on Earth. We also cannot forget about forms of space exploration that may not be explicitly tied to military means. Doing so deprives us of another lens through which to view the tensions between settler and Indigenous views of space and to which end is useful. Indeed, even reinscribing of Indigenous space towards ‘peaceful’ settler space exploration have very real consequences for Indigenous sovereignty and Indigenous spaces. Perhaps the most prominent example of the fractures between settler space exploration and Indigenous peoples is the on-going controversy surrounding the construction of the Thirty Meter Telescope on Mauna Kea, on the island of Hawaii. While an extremely detailed description of the processes of construction on the TMT and the opposition presented to it by Native Hawai’ians and their allies is beyond the scope of this essay, and in fact is already expertly done by a number of scholars[ii], the controversy surrounding TMT is a prime example of the logics presented towards ‘space’ in both Earth-bound and beyond-Earth contexts by the settler colonial state as well as the violence that these logics place upon Indigenous spaces, such as Mauna Kea, which in particular already plays host to a number of telescopes and observatories (Witze, 2020). In particular, astronomers such as Chanda Prescod-Weinstein, Lucianne Walkowicz, and others have taken decisive action to push back against the idea that settler scientific advancement via space exploration should take precedence over Indigenous sovereignty in Earth-space. Prescod-Weinstein and Walkowicz, alongside Sarah Tuttle, Brian Nord and Hilding Neilson (2020) make clear that settler scientific pursuits such as building the TMT are simply new footnotes in a long history of colonial disrespect of Indigenous people and Indigenous spaces in the name of science, and that astronomy is not innocent of this disrespect. In fact, Native Hawai’ian scholars such as Iokepa Casumbal-Salazar strike at the heart of the professed neutrality of sciences like astronomy: One scientist told me that astronomy is a “benign science” because it is based on observation, and that it is universally beneficial because it offers “basic human knowledge” that everyone should know “like human anatomy.” Such a statement underscores the cultural bias within conventional notions of what constitutes the “human” and “knowledge.” In the absence of a critical self-reflection on this inherent ethnocentrism, the tacit claim to universal truth reproduces the cultural supremacy of Western science as self-evident. Here, the needs of astronomers for tall peaks in remote locations supplant the needs of Indigenous communities on whose ancestral territories these observatories are built (2017: 8). As Casumbal-Salazar and other scholars who have written about the TMT and the violence that has been done to Native Hawai’ians (such as police actions designed to dislodge blockades that prevented construction) as well as the potential violence to come such as the construction of the telescope have skillfully said, when it comes to the infringement upon Indigenous space by settler scientific endeavors tied to space exploration, there is no neutrality to be had—dispossession and violence are dispossession and violence, no matter the potential ‘good for humanity’ that might come about through these things. Such contestations over outer space and ethical engagement with previously unknown spaces will continue to happen. Outer space is not the first ‘final frontier’ (apologies to Gene Roddenberry) that has been discussed in settler logics and academic spaces. In terms of settler colonialism, scholars have written about how Antarctica was initially thought of as the ‘perfect’ settler colony—land that could be had without the messy business of pushing Indigenous people off of it (see Howkins 2010). Of course, we know now that engagement with Antarctica should be constrained by ecological concern—who is to say that these concerns will be heeded in ‘unpopulated’ space? What can be done to push back against these settler logics?

### Link — Turkey

#### Erdogan is a capitalist scum.

Özgür 22 [Ozan Özgür; World Socialist writer; 6-14-2022; "NATO-Russia war inflames conflict between Turkey and Greece"; World Socialist Web Site; https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2022/06/14/xxxd-j14.html; KL]

Amid the ongoing US-NATO war against Russia in Ukraine, tensions are rising dangerously between NATO member states Turkey and Greece in the Aegean Sea. The two countries are holding war games aimed at each other, trading accusations of disregarding international treaties, and violating each other’s borders with jet fighters and warships.

The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) Ephesus 2022 exercise, held in the Aegean Sea and attended by more than 10,000 military personnel, ended last week. Thirty-seven countries, including the United States and Italy, participated in air, sea and land drills. Held in Seferihisar, only 1.5 kilometers from the nearby Greek island of Samos in the Aegean Sea, the exercise was based on the scenario of a “military landing on an island.” It was widely treated in Turkish capitalist media as a threat against Greece.

Greek media reported that during Greece's naval exercise Storm 2022, which ended on May 27, Turkey sent “two F-16 fighter jets that violated Greek airspace, reaching just two 2.5 nautical miles from the northern port city of Alexandroupoli.”

During the Ephesus 2022 exercise, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan accused Greece of militarizing Aegean Sea islands in violation of international agreements. He warned Athens 'one last time' on this: “We invite Greece to stop militarizing the islands that have non-military status and to act in accordance with international agreements. I’m not joking, I’m speaking seriously.”

Threatening to militarize Turkish islands if necessary to threaten Greece, Erdoğan said, “We again warn Greece to avoid dreams, statements and actions that will lead to regret, just as they did a century ago,” a reference to the Turkish war of independence against the British-backed Greek invasion in 1919-1922.

A week ago, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Çavuşoğlu accused Greece of violating its peace treaties with Turkey: “But what is another reason for Greece to be aggressive? Greece's violation of the status of the islands given to it in the 1923 Lausanne Treaty and 1947 Paris Treaty under the condition of not militarizing them [Greek islands in the Aegean Sea], and our raising this violation within the framework of international law.”

Cavusoglu added: “The sovereignty of the islands will be questioned if Greece does not end its violation.” This threat to “question” Greece’s sovereignty over islands it controls amount to a threat to invade them and go to war.

The Greek Foreign Ministry reacted to the Ephesus-2022 exercise and statements by Turkish officials on Twitter, writing, “Ankara poses a threat to regional peace and security.” On Thursday, Greek government spokesman Giannis Oikonomou dismissed the Turkish claims, calling them “Ahistorical claims and baseless myths that can neither challenge nor, let alone, substitute for international law and international treaties.”

Accusing Erdoğan of provocation, Oikonomou threatened, “It is clear to everyone that our country has upgraded its geostrategic and geopolitical footprint as well as its deterrent capacity to be able at any time to defend its national sovereignty and sovereign rights.”

A century after World War I began in the Balkans, NATO and the bourgeois governments in the region again risk plunging the world into a catastrophic war. In 2020, tensions between Turkey and Greece over natural gas and sea borders in the eastern Mediterranean were defused by EU and especially German mediation. Greek-Turkish talks resumed. However, as the World Socialist Web Site warned, “History shows such conflicts cannot be peacefully resolved under capitalism, whether or not a temporary Greek-Turkish peace deal is somehow reached.”

The US-NATO war on Russia in Ukraine has now inflamed the Greek-Turkish conflict, turning the Aegean into an undeclared second front in the NATO-Russia war.

The right-wing government of Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis has unabashedly aligned itself with Washington’s moves against Russia. The Greek port of Alexandroupoli in the northern Aegean Sea has been transformed into a major US military base. Alexandroupoli is also being used to deliver weapons to Ukraine and to NATO forces along the border with Ukraine in Romania.

The Turkish bourgeoisie has pursued a cynical, two-faced policy on the NATO war on Russia. On the one hand, it has backed NATO’s Ukraine policy, including the far-right coup NATO backed in Kiev in 2014, and armed Kiev with armed Bayraktar TB2 drones. On the other, it has kept diplomatic channels with Russia open, greeting Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Ankara, and posed certain obstacles to the most aggressive NATO moves targeting Russia.

Ankara closed the straits linking the Mediterranean Sea to the Black Sea coast of Ukraine and Russia to both NATO and Russian warships, blocking a NATO naval attack on Russia. It also threatened to veto NATO’s plans to absorb Sweden and Finland and post NATO troops on Russia’s northern border with Scandinavia. The Turkish government was not objecting to the war, however, but continuing its long-standing targeting of the Kurdish people: it denounced Sweden and Finland for having ties to Kurdish-nationalist organizations.

Washington responded to this veto threat by inviting Mitsotakis to give a speech denouncing Turkey in the US Congress. During his enthusiastically received speech, Mitsotakis blamed Turkey for the division of the Mediterranean island of Cyprus and demanded a halt to US F-16 sales to Turkey. US President Joe Biden also gave Mitsotakis strong support.

Erdoğan condemned Mitsotakis' trip, declaring that Mitsotakis “no longer exists” for him. Erdoğan added that he viewed the US-NATO bases in Greece, targeting Russia and growing Chinese economic influence in the region, as a threat to his government, saying, “And, most importantly, there are nearly a dozen bases in Greece. Whom does Greece threaten with those bases?”

Workers in Greece, Turkey and internationally must be warned: the danger that the conflicts in the Black Sea and the Balkans will escalate uncontrollably into a world war is very great. In the third year of the COVID-19 pandemic, prices are spiraling out of control as the financial aristocracy massively increases its wealth. This has provoked strikes and protests internationally, and capitalist governments are all terrified of the international eruption of the class struggle.

In Greece, there have been protests against the arrival of NATO forces, including the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, to threaten Russia. Strikes have also broken out among rail workers against being forced to ship US tanks towards the Ukrainian and Russian borders. This follows a decade of savage austerity imposed by the European Union and both Mitsotakis’ New Democracy and the pseudo-left SYRIZA (“Coalition of the Radical Left”) governments.

In Turkey, the last year has seen an eruption of health care strikes against the official mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic and wildcat strikes in auto, steel, mining, shipbuilding and other industries against the devastating surge in prices. A one-day nationwide strike by over 100,000 doctors in Turkey is set to begin today.

Erdoğan and Mitsotakis are nearly at war with each other, but they are united in the attempt to use militarism and nationalism to divide the working class and suppress the growing struggles on both shores of the Aegean Sea. It is impossible to tell where their reckless military adventurism ends, and where their incitement of anti-worker chauvinism begins. The decisive question this poses is unifying workers’ struggles internationally in a socialist, anti-war movement to bring down these governments and transfer power to the working class.

## Grove

### Link — Grove [Emerging Tech]

#### Emerging technologies are a resonance in a larger ecology of warfare — War is not an isolated, discrete eruption but rather the constitutive fabric of planetary relations.

Grove 19 [Jairus Victor Grove is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Hawai'i Research Center for Future Studies at the University of Hawai'i at Mānoa; “Savage Ecology: war and geopolitics at the end of the world”; August 16, 2019]//eleanor

War as defined by classical war studies suggests a distinct class of actors, interests, aims, and expertise. As a result, the study of war as well as much of the social mobilization of war presumes an exteriority of war and warfare from other sectors and institutions like the economy or the state. For those who study military history, war—in this limited understanding—can certainly be decisive in the rise and fall of nation-states and even transformations of the global system when that system is only indexed by the states that populate it, but the pursuit of these histories still presumes a kind of exceptional character of war. War following this line of thought is a cataclysmic event that interrupts the otherwise normal character of daily life. For others, particularly in the field of strategic studies, warfare is a tool, an instrument whereby states and sometimes organizations pursue ends beyond the limits of politics and persuasion. War compels and determines a course of action as an orchestral direction of overwhelming force. For those who hope to abolish war, a parallel exteriority animates their theorizing about war. War, according to these thinkers, is reducible to the self-interest of hegemonic states, the militarism of soldiers, and the self-amplifying loop of profit and power. Presidents, generals, ceos, arms dealers, and patriots come together to pursue war as an end in itself. Again, those actors and those pursuits are treated as outside the normal realm of human social relations. But what if war is history? What if the very form of life that created, was reinforced by, mutated with, and emerged from the Eurocene is warlike? State-making, territorialization, expansion, annihilation, settlement, and globalization are all warlike relations. I want to consider the possibility of war and warlike relations as processes of making a form of life in which warfare is normal. And what I mean by normal is much more than what we mean when we use concepts like ideology or legitimacy or discipline. By normal, I mean the very fabric of relations that makes a form of life and a world: a war body, a war assemblage, a war ecology. I am not suggesting that war is the only form of life. There are surviving forms of life interior and exterior to the Eurocene. No process of annihilation succeeds without leaving at least a trace.3 However, the normal workings of daily global life are a state of war. Rather than think of state of war in the juridical or theoretical sense, which distinguish war from peace on the grounds of declarations or measures of order, I want to consider war as an ecology endemic to the Eurocene. So by state of war I mean state in the sense that physicists or chemists think about states of matter. Every state of matter is an order, and despite that order, every state of matter has some elements of other states. A state of matter exhibits properties like solidity, liquidity, gaseousness, or the full-on freak-out of plasma but is not entirely made up of that state. And yet the state still has an effect despite that heterogeneity. So to say that we live in a global state of war, and that the making of the Eurocene was that making of a global state of war, is to say that war intensifies the field of relations that make the world what it is right now, not that it exhausts the possibility of what the world can become. Instead, the practices and organizations—from resource extraction, enclosure, carbon liberation, racialization, mass incarceration, border enforcement, policing and security practices, primitive accumulation by dispossession, targeted strikes, to allout combat—are relations of war rather than merely correlates or opportunities for a war metaphor. To put it a bit more bluntly, politics, colonialism, settlement, capitalism, ecological destruction, racism, and misogynies are not wars by other means—they are war. War is not a metaphor; it is an intensive fabric of relations making the Eurocene. To make this claim requires rethinking—somewhat bombastically—the meaning of war. If war has such a wide application, it would seem to mean nothing. In talks, roundtables, and casual conversations, colleagues have often suggested that such an expansive definition of war is polemical or even absurd. Others have said that spreading war so thin cheapens the sacrifices and tragedies of those who have experienced “real war.” It is curious to me that many of the same people have no difficulty assigning similar base or structuring characteristics to capitalism, settlement, or patriarchy. I do not see war as a replacement or a displacement of those structuring structures. Instead, war is like those other complicated, heterogeneous, abstract machines but interrelated and importantly semiautonomous in the making of the world. The importance of shifting the point of emphasis or break between war and other “big processes” is to emphasize the way collectively making death comes to be its own organizing ecology rather than just an instrumental means for other ecologies, such as racism or sexism or capitalism, that are often more obviously invested in ordering—subordinating orders—than destruction. Furthermore, I do not think, given the extreme level of violence and deprivation necessary to create the global ecology we now inhabit, that it is “a stretch” to call war the constitutive fabric of planetary relations. Instead, war as an intensive difference takes possession of other categories, at which point phase shifts take place in categories like racism or economics. What was the slow, lethal burn of postslavery policing escalates into the fury of outright combat in the streets, a race war in the streets of 1921 Tulsa or the 2015 streets of Baltimore. Even in our sacred texts of democratic theory, the pulsing tributaries of war run throughout descriptions of political formation. John Locke argued with little dispute that slavery was the institutionalization of war.4 And W. E. B. Du Bois said of the process of reconstruction after slavery that war had begun again, and in fact had never ended.5 Do we think that the same could not be said for the vast carceral project directed at black people described so well by Michelle Alexander or Loïc Wacquant?6 The common retort is to ask whether this line of thinking means all forms of killing should be considered war. I think that is a reasonable question. However, I believe that retort actually demonstrates the problem of war in the Eurocene. Take, for instance, the lynching of African Americans after the American Civil War or the routine murder of Native Americans by settlers before the arrival of the American cavalry during the period of westward expansion. Were these killings disparate acts of murder or strategically valuable microevents of war? How would patriarchy’s sadistic continuity and heterogeneous creativity across geography and time survive without the nearly viral practices of domestic violence that suture norms to bruises, scars, and corpses? To exclude the way each micropractice of war—murder—aggregates over time and space into continental scale, slow-motion warfare would significantly impoverish our understanding of the role war plays in the making of global systems. Any one act of brutality could be dismissed on idiosyncratic grounds and attributed to lazy claims about human nature. Or these acts of brutality can be brought into a conceptual jurisdiction of war such that we can get a glimpse of how these seemingly disparate practices of violence resonate, congeal, and order the global system. The historical granularity necessary to prove this seemingly absurd proposition is well beyond the scope of this book. Instead, this chapter and the larger aim of the book try to identify operators or machines in the emergence of war that confound the tried and true questions of sovereignty, security dilemmas, and the increasingly apparent absurdity of circumscribing global political change to the behavior of “great powers” in a rationalist and statecentric sense. The commitment to a world run by the causal agents of states, regimes, and norms (whether thick or thin) appears to me like the Velveteen Rabbit: toys whose straw stuffing is beginning to poke through worn skin and whose button eyes have been long since lost. Unlike the mythic rabbit, there is nothing real for these fetishes to become.7 The first step to understand war as a form of life that is world forming requires building a community of concepts capable of capturing the diversity of relations at work in the making of war. It is a messy inquiry. In recoil from this indiscernible mess, there are those who would rather “un–black box” phenomena by exhaustively identifying all actants or detailing complex processes of social and material change, but these approaches are ill-suited to describing the broader ecology of war. The problem with the desire to explain or un–black box phenomena is that it seduces us to focus on those phenomena on which we think we have the best chance of imposing an artificial autonomy or separation of things and events. Those phenomena that seem to give themselves up to analyzable bits and pieces are prized for publication and research funding. This cult of discreteness has not gotten us very far. Reality does not, as some realist philosophers say in a creepy analogy to butchering, “cut at the joints.”8 Positivism, even the complexity and systems variety, wants an object of inquiry at an instant. In a particularly Whiteheadian moment, Merleau-Ponty responds to the desire for discreteness with disdain: In human existence, then, there is a principle of indetermination, and this indetermination does not merely exist for us . . . from some imperfection in our knowledge. . . . Existence is indeterminate in itself because of its fundamental structure: insofar as existence is the very operation by which something that had no sense takes on sense. . . . Existence has no fortuitous attributes and no content that does not contribute to giving it its form, it does not admit any pure facts in themselves, because it is the movement by which facts are taken up.9 In the attempt to vivisect existence—to reduce to an instant what is process and movement, rhythm and relation—those more subtle connections or resonances whose effects are felt but not discrete are overshadowed by those relationships we can chart and measure. Such an approach circumscribes our thinking rather than allowing it to remain open to the emergence of thought as provoked by a wild world. Domesticated notions of complexity are stand-ins for the merely complicated. Real complexity suggests that there is novelty in the world rather than thinking that novelty is an effect of a complicated process. This is what Merleau-Ponty means when he says that the indeterminate is the “fundamental structure of the world.” Those who see in complexity the mere character of complicatedness invest in that image of complexity the hope for more sophisticated predictive models and desire a mechanistic universe defined by initial conditions.10 For those striving to create positivism 2.0, chance exists as an endangered species to be extinguished once all the data are in. I think this diminishes the creative and chaotic elements of becoming characteristic of ecologies like war, and reinvests the desire for order and control with a false and dangerous telos. The aleatory is reduced to a question of epistemology rather than being seen as a generative principle of the cosmos, giving new confidence to those who would see to make useful predictions or pronouncements upon their models of the world. I admit it is tempting when new scientific discoveries verify our own theoretical belief in thinking that somehow science has finally gotten it right. However, one need only look at what happens when the image of thought founded on this new faux-empiricism combines with the shabby categories of interest and security to see how quickly scientific facts about complexity or quantum physics or networks or sociobiology can be put to use for preventive war and social control.11 In international relations, even insights about uncertainty can become a predictive social scientific method.12 The postcolonies and pockets of peoples surviving settlement are still finding that the “study” of their cultures’ complexities serves the interests of those who would obliterate difference rather than those who would insist on a new pluralism. Anthropologists, sociologists, and economists—all armed with the latest in social-actor-network theory, complexity equations, and advanced social media scraping algorithms—are deployed as part of the subsequent revisions of the Human Terrain System in Iraq, Afghanistan, Chicago, Los Angeles, the Dakota Access Pipeline, Yemen, Mexico, Mali, and back again. Knowledge separated from its ethical considerations is readily weaponized.13 Rapidly scoping from the micro of culture to the macro of the planetary scale, the Eurocene is already transitioning from territorial warfare to geopolitically motivated geoengineering and regional terraforming to institutionalize hegemony geologically while still refining the microscopic collection of data on threats as small as a single person.14 Inspired by the work in early chaos and catastrophe theory, Deleuze and Guattari suggest another path for the pursuit of complexity. Rather than ignore the overwhelming complexity of the world, scientific inquiry can be a way to cope with chaos “defined not so much by its disorder as by the infinite speed with which every form taking shape in it vanishes.”15 Creative sciences attack the problem of chaos by attributing functions to chaos so that its shifting patterns, orders, and relations can be thought. Functions are a kind of “fantastic slowing down, and it is by slowing down that matter, as well as the scientific thought able to penetrate it with propositions, is actualized.”16 I want to develop war as something between a function and a concept. I am trying to draw together consistencies by extending out, “building bridges,” and occupying larger zones of components and functions that attempt to slow down, distinguish, and make actual indexible territories of interest, which only appear whole because investigation as a science has imposed a kind of temporary and hesitant “freeze frame.”17 One could become worried that such provisional moments could get mistaken for reality itself, however, with close attention, care for the world, such mistakes are hard to maintain. The relational (in movement-process) and substantive character of the world defies reductionism. Novelist and philosophical tinkerer Tristan Garcia explains the neither/nor of concept object-relations as follows: A thing is nothing other than the difference between that which is in this thing and that in which this thing is. Unless one guarantees this double sense, there are no thinkable things. Every reductionist who claims to deduce that which this or that thing is from that which composes this or that thing only succeeds in dis-solving the very thing that they claim to account for. We attempt to accomplish the exact opposite of this: to guarantee things as invaluable differences embedded in the distribution channels of being of the world. To complete our task, we set out to discover the meaning which circulates among things, between that which composes them and that which they compose, inside or outside us, with or without us.18 War in particular demands this double aspect of things to capture war’s territorializing and deterritorializing tendencies to make and unmake things and be a thing all at the same time. Although throughout the book I take inspiration from new scientific research—examples from neuroscience, physics, evolutionary biology, artificial intelligence, and experimental psychiatry—that inspiration will not be used to build some new, more stable, method of inquiry, but instead I will try to trouble a still pervasive image of the world as law-governed. Therefore, war serves a double movement: it presents itself as an ordering principle or form of ecology despite the frequent conflation between war and chaos, while also undermining the image of the world as one ruled by the laws of a singular transcendental order. Even many postpositivists, particularly interpretivists, of various kinds are unsettled by this kind of open-ended or experimental thought, absurdly big claims, oriented around assemblages, resonances, or systems of thought particularly in the context of war and violence because it means letting go, at least for a moment, of the desire to ascribe blame or culpability—from my perspective, consonant with causality—to particular individuals in time and space. This is a deficit, but it comes with the benefit of elucidating, even if only vaguely, the operators in the generation of technics, affects, peoples, and weak or novel connections in the savage ecologies that often determine, or at least circumscribe, the incipient possibilities of action by the individuals we so desperately want to hold accountable for their failures or vices. Remember Walt Whitman’s words that began this book, “The war—that war so bloody and grim—the war I will henceforth forget—was you and me.” The question in the context of this research is: Why is there so consistently an arrangement of racial supremacy, power, ethics, and violence to prosecute or distribute war and technical-martial logic to support and distribute it? While it is valuable to investigate how leaders can function to amplify conflict, what is striking is how quickly any one leader can be replaced and how little the trajectory of war changes. Following Sloterdijk’s pronouncement on the becoming atmospheric of contemporary warfare, collective violence is saturating every corner of the Earth system, but like carbon, neither the distributors nor distribution of violence is equitable. Saturation is no excuse for universality. There will never be a we that is human as such. And yet there is also no tribe, history of proper names, or nation-state that can bear the responsibility in any meaningful way. Twenty or thirty generations of malicious and sadistic decisions cannot amount to the collective effect of the heterogeneous relations that produced the Eurocene but neither should we let go of the particular forms of life that congealed around an instrumental approach to collective violence that swallowed and then organized peoples, nonhuman peoples, and things throughout Europe and then the regions those people, nonhuman peoples, and things settled. Mapping something like the totality of those actors and relations is impossible and maybe even counterproductive, but tracing the lineages of warfare that came to enable the expansion of the Europeans until they became a “cene,” a geologically and geopolitically significant order, may gather up a swarm of conceptual machines still buzzing through our contemporary moment. Consequently, I am less interested in why once such an institution or assemblage is in place, a leader at a given moment succeeds in making actual the already present virtual tendencies of war. Consider how difficult it is to reconcile our lost hope for Barack Obama with the expected failure of George W. Bush or how quickly the terror over Donald Trump was normalized once the adults from the military stepped in, precisely because foreign policies of each arrangement of leadership are in many ways indistinguishable, particularly from the perspectives of their victims.19 It is not surprising to me, then, that sovereigns make war, or that they take advantage of democratic paradoxes to do so. The problematic that drives this section is how such a complex, mobile, and global ecology of war so closely aligns and adheres to such a seemingly local decision as a sovereign act of violence or declaration of war. One might take a lesson from the electrification of sound. In order to amplify or magnify a sound and preserve the fidelity of a particular harmonic arrangement, one cannot simply “turn up” the volume. It requires a certain interface between the means of amplification, the ambient qualities of the room, the number of people present, and the resonant capabilities of those people, the furniture, the walls, the floor, and the ceiling. Similarly, political decrees or decisions to produce effects must reverberate and interface with complex assemblages of institutions, economies, ethical dispositions, affective discourses, and other machinic operators. From this perspective, sovereign “decisions,” whether by presidents or suicide bombers, appear to be on both sides of the razor’s edge between cause and effect. Such an approach requires, as Deleuze writes, “not so much . . . convincing, as being open about things. Being open is setting out the ‘facts’ not only of a situation, but of a problem. Making visible things that would otherwise remain hidden.”20 So we have a world full of sovereign violence, but the place of a given sovereign in the distribution of that violence remains obscure. What follows is an attempt to flush out the contemporary milieu or ecology of war in its mutational, material, and global tendencies to open up the landscape for something that requires a history. In the following chapter, I return to the specific historical mutations of war that contributed war’s contemporary becoming as a Euro-cum-American facialization of the Eurocene. The sections that follow look for these “loose associations” or dif­ferent assemblages that may not yet have converged or connected but have tendencies and internal resonances that I think organize war’s various becomings. In particular, I consider the ecology of annihilation that characterizes American practices of warfare now dominant among “great powers.” These parts do not follow one from the other. They are often disjointed in their locations and themes. The hope is that the consistency that does connect them is one of possibility or chance rather than necessity so that the sense of inevitability that often characterizes the analysis of global security is not so easily territorialized for the capture of war. Some connections will appear more obvious than others, but, like other kinds of ecologies, sometimes the connections are merely the happenstance of coinciding; contingency can produce novelty and novelty can be catastrophic and horrifying. From this perspective, I ask what it would mean to consider the driving force of the Eurocene, war, ecologically.

#### The 1AC occludes the true nature of warfighting by reducing the milieu of warfare into a series of casual, normative decisions — instead, warfare is an abstract machine, a creatively mutating front that sutures everyday atmospheres of violence.

Grove 19 [Jairus Victor Grove is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Hawai'i Research Center for Future Studies at the University of Hawai'i at Mānoa; “Savage Ecology: war and geopolitics at the end of the world”; August 16, 2019]//eleanor

If that is not tautological enough, I want to specifically address ecological relations, which rather than a redundancy is meant to dramatize the creativity and variable interinvolvement from top to bottom, cosmos to microorganism in all things. So an ecology of things describes an indefinite set of more and less interpenetrated force fields, following Timothy Morton’s insistence that “the ecological thought permits no distance . . . all beings are related to each other . . . in an open system without center or edge.”26 Even as Morton at times is repelled by the airlessness and objectlessness of such an ontology, his hyperobjects and other formulations cannot help but thrive in such an ecological thinking. As a way of thinking, ecology comprises all the systems causally relevant to one another even when that relevance fluctuates with changes in the intensity of interinvolvement.27 Therefore, all systems are actual and present in every other system, but the significance of the presence fluctuates.28 The differences in fluctuations are the differences that provoke us to notice and think. To give some space between what is present and what is potentially present in the everything that is the ecological, Deleuze, like Canguilhem, often referred to the broader ecological category of all actual things in their pluripotential relations as the milieu, ranging from the milieu of a particular songbird to the cosmic milieu of the current epoch.29 Even the milieu that comprises all the milieus, the set of all sets, if you will, is not a closed system for Deleuze. It is made up of many overlapping and intercalated assemblages, each influenced by the varying intensities of force fields that bear on their multiplicity, that is, the structure of their “space of possibility” of what we mean by difference in itself or novelty that differs.30 Channeling Morton again, “the very question of inside and outside is what ecology undermines or makes thick and weird.”31 Sometimes those things that provoke or encounter us are territorialized before we encounter them, and in the case of concepts, I think, we participate in their territorialization. War, as a concept, is a participatory territorialization; its definiteness is lent to it by our interest, but war is receptive and resonates without our interest because it is a real fabric of immanent relations making and being made by milieus.32 To move from the abstract to the concrete, war, as a particular kind of ecology, may be populated by martial assemblages such as soldiers, tanks, uniforms, gas masks, rations, and bullets. These assemblages are then crosscut by the mobile and nearly instantaneous arrival of the sex trade, black markets that provide a missed brand of toothpaste, a claymore mine, a valuable medicine, and food for civilians whose support infrastructure has been devastated by the indiscriminate aerial bombing of their cities of residence.33 There can be nonhuman animal assemblages such as great apes and forest habitats that fight back against civil wars, or swarms of disease-carrying mosquitoes that alter the internal ecosystem of warm-blooded mammals.34 These overlapping assemblages may then be further amplified by a drought or famine that raises tensions between civilians and soldiers due to the relatively constant supply of food and water that passes by hungry or thirsty civilians on the way to a well-stocked military barracks.35 All these assemblages feel the weight of gravity, and even the potentially mutagenic effects of cosmic rays; but on the temporal register of human daily routine, on any one of maybe twenty-six thousand or so days in an average Western lifespan, these force fields of the cosmic variety will remain incipient.36 But maybe not. At a critical juncture of command, or a heightened moment of tension, say, between two superpowers on the brink of war, the intervention of an asteroid like the one that hit Tunguska on June 30, 1908, could cascade into global nuclear war. In what must be an infinitesimal slice of time in the life of an asteroid or a comet, what if the Tunguska event had taken place fifty-four years later during the events of October 1962?37 Would the Soviet Union have been able to distinguish the nearly thirty-megaton blast caused “naturally” by the cosmic object from a nuclear ground burst?38 What about forward-deployed forces like those of Saddam Hussein’s in the First Gulf War who were instructed to launch all chemical and biological weapons if radio contact with Baghdad was disrupted, with that disruption being the effect of a particularly intense solar storm?39 Warfare is chancy, more and less than its command structure or troop training, because it is ecological. Does this mean that wars never happen because of “first-move advantages” or offense/defense theory? Is the security dilemma irrelevant?40 No, and these features certainly inhabit the assemblages discussed above. However, we make too much of them precisely because causal stories are within the jurisdiction of human leaders and experts. The presence of something like “easy conquest” may be observable post hoc, but it would not be the cause of a war in its totality. In the cosmology of global politics I am trying to build, events have a complex natural history, an ecology that is radically empirical but antagonistically antipositivist in that it does not conform to the metaphysical religion of nature’s uniformity. As E. H. Carr remarked after his engagement with early complexity mathematician Henri Poincare, the propositions of scholarship must abandon Isaac Newton for hypotheses to “crystalize and organize further thinking . . . advancing simultaneously ‘towards variety and complexity’ and ‘towards unity and simplicity.’”41 Such a double articulation—not a dialectic—eschews parsimonious theories of international politics in favor of a deep intimacy with the processes of the world or what Brian Massumi following William James calls extreme realism. 42 Thus warfare in practice and war as concept are not instrumental or successfully restrained by cold calculations of national interest. Instead, war names the mutational rhythm or machinic character in warfare that is not reducible to warfare. This is why we should refer to war as an axiomatic or abstract machine. War is a concept, a slice of chaos, to describe what remains consistent enough to demand a concept, and provocative and mercurial enough to explain the periodic breaks, innovations, and catastrophes of martial life. Therefore, the question of war is not one that is to be answered by a primary cause or a number of factors in which each can be subsumed under a law, becoming more clear as the more detailed description of its inner workings is finely vivisected and categorized. Nor is war timeless. What has been categorized under the heading of war ranges from interspecies combat between early hominids to the dropping of atom bombs. Still, there is not a continuous line that can be drawn from Paleolithic tool use to the ballistic missile Minuteman III. Instead, there is a changing ecology of relations out of which the wielding of force and combat is organized and mobilized and endures over a slice of time and space we can name the Eurocene. To begin with a category of war presumed to be ahistorical that is then used to strain historical events that are in some way recognizable as war tells us very little about any particular practice or event and even less about the relations that connect those events through time and space such that a concept makes sense to create a new kind of science of war. Becoming War In our contemporary era of networks, counterinsurgencies, and indiscernible zones of peace and conflict, war enters the battlefield more obviously at odds with sovereign warfare. It may help to work in reverse, as the contemporary conflicts demonstrate quite starkly how “rigorous” definitions of war fall apart, before working our way through some of the slower, more subtle historical attractors of war such as annihilation. The examples in the contemporary memory are not hard to find. Consider the soldiers of My Lai who did their jobs horrifically too well, and the absent without official leave (awol) soldiers who refuse to fight in Israel or elsewhere. The tragic irony of the global war on terrorism cannot be understood until we grasp the relationship of war to the state of affairs rather than the relationship between warfare and the state of which much ink has been spilled. For instance, war is not initially apparent in the seeming strategic deployment of the Mujahedin—mercenaries armed and trained by the Central Intelligence Agency (cia) against the Soviet army—until the Mujahedin’s character of war exceeds and escapes the state apparatus’s strategic proxy warfare to return as civil wars in the Congo or the networked logistics of Al Qaeda. The U.S. attempt to break the deadlock of bipolar deterrence via nonstate actors did not fail to disrupt the bipolar balance of power. Instead, it worked too well, unleashing a new mode of organization for violence and warfare. Instead of the nitpicking debates over personalities and financial connections that try to prove or disprove that the cia “created” Osama bin Laden, we should map the ways new organizations of violence were let loose, imitated, reinvented, and then echoed across the planet.43 Whether by conspiracy or imitation, the Mujahedin reterritorialized in the post–Cold War, creating a veritable franchise of warlords throughout Africa and Central Asia, and not just with the name brands of Al Qaeda, Boko Haram, and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (isis) but the numbers of other novel forms of warfare taking place in conflict far outside the civilizational drama of the war on terrorism. Drug cartels in Mexico, neo-Nazis, Christian militias, and even neo-Nazi sympathizers within the German military are using the decentralized structures of information sharing, improvised precision weapons, social media recruiting, weapons development, and on and on—a new order congealed out of a previous order already containing the vestigial structures necessary for what would come next. Similar to the globalization of Mujahedin-like organizational types and techniques, the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 could not be contained or instrumentally directed despite the great power status and traditional state form of the United States. The funding of opposition militias, both Sunni and Shia, against the Revolutionary Guard, combined with the dramatic assault of shock and awe, succeeded in the successful overthrow of the Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein. Yet the fighting did not stop there. It continued and it multiplied. The new assemblage of opposition created by the U.S. invasion, while not unified or even organized, successfully forced the U.S. to give up on permanent military bases and, for a time, enter a state of withdrawal asymptotically approaching zero. However, U.S.-led warfare returned and at the time this book is going to press is gaining momentum. In writing this manuscript over a period of six years, I have wondered whether I would need the past tense to describe the on-again, off-again conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan. So far the past tense seems indef­initely postponed. While it is impossible to identify strict causal relations between events, the actions of the United States in Iraq severely undermined its ability to gain support for its military intervention in Libya, Afghanistan, Yemen, and beyond, and the organizational types set loose during the Cold War have entered into fecund relations for the multiplication of species of war making. The frequent riots in Mosul against continued U.S. drone violence and special ops assassinations reverberates throughout the on-again, off-again uprisings and state captures of Arab uprisings are now almost forgotten outside the region. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan continue to return home to the U.S. territory in the form of debt, unemployment, and hundreds of thousands of soldiers with traumatic brain injuries, each further amplifying the reach of war long after any particular temporal segment of warfare has ended.44 The ecology of war also produces new bodies that emerge from the preparation of warfare and combat, both friend and enemy, as deterritorialized and reterritorialized bodies. In the case of the U.S. soldier, the body is subjected to intensive training and discipline, given amphetamines for response time and alertness, new eyes for night vision and multidirection sensation, then drenched in affect overdrive forms of right-wing media, as well as lingering religious or communal or national zeal brought with each soldier that is then worked up into a battle-ready lather.45 Insurgents and bombers are also prepared in a number of ways with the elixirs of fear, hate, black market drugs like the isis amphetamine of choice Captagon, revenge, duty, religion, ideology, and reconfigured communications technologies.46 All result in alterations in brain chemistry and perception.47 The body in war abandons its organs, the rectum, the eyes, the brain, a limb, to house the bomb or weapons platform that is its new organ, its machine that will alter the war space that it will soon be plugged into.48 Hence the productive capacity of bodies-in-war to produce more fear, anger, revenge, hate, sorrow, and frustration is limited only by the creativity and plasticity of the relations that create them. There is no moral order or normative boundary to what a body can do. War Is a Creative Force War is what escapes and deterritorializes constraints. Contrary to those like Martin Heidegger or Theodor Adorno who see war as a pure instrumentality, the ignoble novelty of violence demonstrates that the enframing of war is never complete. The standing reserve of warfare (soldiers, bullets, bombs, civilians to be protected, totals of enemies to be killed, etc.) is never wholly subsumed as a resource or instrument. The fog of war, unforeseen escalation, levée en masse, low-tech assemblages, ~~blind~~ allies, ad hoc militias, and the defensive advantage of weakness express the creative elements of war as they have been named; however, this list is not exhaustive. It is not an exaggeration to say that no historical development of humanity has entirely escaped the gravitational pull of war. It would be more accurate to say that war has organized a common and highly dispersed martial form of life that thrives in the Eurocene. We do not like to ask the question, but what if ever-present violence has become a way of being, a form of life? What would it mean to speak of war as a “fabric of immanent relations” rather than merely a regrettable means for politics?49 As scholars of war and geopolitics, in my estimation, we do not take seriously enough the metamorphoses of war. War is often relegated by analysts to the status of an effect or an object rather than a concept unto itself. So wars are declared; wars are waged; wars are ended; war is even outlawed. People do not speak of war as they do the political, the ethical, and so on. We need to consider what centuries of wars do. What is war’s analogue to the political as the political is to politics? This is important if we want to consider that just maybe the martial is more central than the political or ethical to the forms of life that thrive and expand in the Eurocene. Like politics or ethics, each tactile act in warfare is another comportment of the body, a technique of musculature, posture, style, gait, each with its own possibility not just to survive war but to live war.50 And the life that emerges, spreads. This raises a series of questions ignored by normative investigation of how we ought to fight or what would constitute a just war. For example: How long can peace be absent before the body finds its satisfaction in an assemblage of war rather than in the “beauty” or justness of peace? When does a body or collective find the transition to peace to be as abrupt and violent as the outbreak of conflict? And are we really so convinced of a future “pacific” human society, as Kant was in his Theses for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent (1784), that we cannot imagine warfare ceasing to be an aberration? Hasn’t it already for the powers that organize the international order? The stakes here are not trivial; there is no providence that guarantees we are meant to live in peace, which means there are also no natural laws to prevent us from fully becoming war. And how many centuries has war come to define the expansion, integration, and annihilating homogenization of planetary relations? How many generations of bodies since 1492 have been created by a state of war?

#### The plan is a self-fulfilling prophecy that makes war inevitable.

Grove 19 [Jairus Victor Grove is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Hawai'i Research Center for Future Studies at the University of Hawai'i at Mānoa; “Savage Ecology: war and geopolitics at the end of the world”; August 16, 2019]//eleanor

In war, new bodies are made, but not by war any more than war is made by bodies. Instead, there is what Massumi describes as an “instantaneous backand-forthing between now and the future, and between disparate domains of activity. . . . The strike of paradox renders the gesture inventively ‘undecidable’—in addition to being true.”57 In the slight difference between axe swings—one to chop wood, the other to sever arms—is the incipient possibility of dif­ferent “cultural beings” and the longue durée of dif­ferent forms of life. This incipience is contained not in the decision but in between the world and the body and then subsequently in the worlds those bodies make. The in-between of incipience is also not restricted to the human. A slight difference in urban development—one high-rise to promote downtown living and another to contain racial difference—may just as easily extend from the indiscernibility of reality and enable or amplify a particular becoming, or make it more durable or more contagious. Similarly, we should puncture the myth that the preparation for war and the prosecution of war are dif­ferent in kind. Instead, we should treat the body and the body of war as an “ecology of process.”58 In preparation—the becomings of war—it is not just the habit of sighting and pulling triggers, innovating new strategies and the means to eliminate populations like the cities of Dresden or Hiroshima. It is the affective mood, the technological and urban regulators and amplifiers of the flows that slow and congeal into new habits—like dropping a bomb from thirty thousand feet and other incipient possibilities, pre-adaptations, that might at another moment find expression, like refusing to launch nuclear weapons in a time of crisis.59 War makes worlds and worlds make war. Shifting our interests from events and acts to processes and habits directs our attention to how the outbreak of war may be subterranean in habitual activities that are not seemingly warlike. We should not be fooled by the common sense that because things are not always at the fever pitch of war, war is not working behind the scenes in our imaginative, judging, and bodily faculties as well as our ports, freeways, internet connections, satellite feed, and toxic runoff, emotional and molecular. Some preparations for war move too slow to be seen.60 If we want to attend to war’s invitation to be thought, we must make more vivid those preparations for warfare that often get lost in political realist discussions of armaments and troop movement, like the slow accretion of carbon over a century or two, the reorganization of waste, the resignification of belonging, and other more gradual processes in the conversion of lifeworlds to “operational atmospheres” for past and future wars, exposing what Sloterdijk calls “new surfaces of vulnerability.”61 The consequences of a life of war far exceed any particular battle or even world war.

#### Warfare is an engine that operationalizes entire societies in service of its destructive rhythm — the 1AC’s move to advance techno-warfighting is inextricably linked to racial violence, settler colonialism, and imperialism.

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In light of the total ecological wars of U.S. settlement and the total consummation of technological advance and warfare, there is a temptation to use Fuller’s claim about the opening of the conceptual boundaries between war, economy, life, and politics at the end of the nineteenth century to allow war as a technological Western art to be the final word on the possibilities of life. Many others have joined Fuller in this claim. For Marx, civil society is a kind of congealed war.89 For Du Bois, the Reconstruction era was war continued.90 For Foucault, politics was war by other means.91 Foucauldians and those who follow Agamben make similar claims in the expansion of Foucault’s inversion to a general description of global politics.92 It is this, Foucault’s formulation taken globally, that has most caught fire among critical scholars of international politics and elsewhere. Foucault’s account of the reversal of war and politics rests on a distinction between the sovereign or juridical orders of the sixteenth to seventeenth centuries and the rise of a security dispositif beginning at the end of the eighteenth century.93 However, this epistemic shift from sovereign war to governmentalized policing is insufficient to explain the formation of what Foucault elsewhere called counterconducts, that is, the emergence of new practices and relations of war that are not derivative of or contingent on the particular carceral logic of the city and its milieu. Again, if we follow this logic, we fall victim to a historical periodization that reinforces the provincial Eurocentrism that all too often confines genealogical analysis to the European continent as the source of change. To repeat the critical maneuvers of Foucault rather than merely follow his extant texts requires attention to the material formations of war (particularly those outside the city and beyond the European continent) that follow their own organizational and emergent logics, and which far exceed the inside/outside distinction Foucault draws between the rise of the police and what he characterizes as a lingering form of classical war at home in the European balance of power.94 By turning Clausewitz’s words inside out, what we are left with is little more than war as an instrument; it is just that now war is waged on more fronts, both internal and external. This does nothing to complicate the concept of war. J. F. C. Fuller’s materialist account of the slugfest between what he calls the constant tactical factor and the quantity theory of war comes to a similar conclusion as Foucault, but the inversion of Clausewitz and the targeting of whole populations provokes an image quite dif­ferent from that of biopolitics. Instead, quoting Fuller from 1942: “War ceasing to be a struggle between life values becomes a blind destructive force, like an earthquake, a volcanic eruption or a typhoon. Whole populations are now attacked, wiped out, enslaved or herded from one country into another like cattle. . . . the entire life of the enemy state comes to be the object of attack.” Fuller continues quoting Ely Culbertson, “From time immemorial, men fought against men, and weapons were but accessories; in this and in future wars, machines fight against machines and men are all but auxiliaries . . . engines of destruction which devour their substance.95 This process occurs because war is an assembly of things set in motion and held together by the racial refrain of settler colonization, the imperial and postimperial transforms territory into operational space, and, as an assemblage, war is also transformed by those mutations and expansions. Following the ecological account developed in the last chapter, war is not a tool of the state or a failure of order. War is a phylum of organizing principles, refrains, and protocols unto itself. War drags along with it the whole of the population—its vitality, industry, inventiveness, movement, rhythm, and affect—and attests to the human and nonhuman character of the population and violently metabolizes other forms of life in its path. If we want to call war biopolitical, then bios must extend beyond the human and certainly the thin European conception of humanism, and even the nonhuman animal, into the creative anime of all things, and into the formative and energetic forces of war from its beginnings. Mass war was set loose by the French Revolution’s levée en masse as much as it was made possible by gunpowder, supply lines, radio, interchangeable parts, mass production, and the increasing speed and efficiency of transportation and communication of information, whether linguistic or otherwise, as well as new terrains of racialized enmity. All these feedbacks point to a milieu or ecology of war that, while overlapping with the market or the epistemophilia of nineteenth-century humanizing sciences, lured these assemblages into connection at least as much as Foucault’s account of late capitalism or humanist governmentality. Therefore, the constant tactical factor—war as mutative creativity—is not just an axiomatic or abstract machine of war. It is a global abstract machine traversing the war/nonwar divide; war individuates specific forms of life. Hence, we can talk about warlike relations and governance as a martial logic without having to find combat present in either of these conceptual expansions. This statement would seem consistent with those inspired by Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, who seek to supplement Foucault by rebranding the global system an empire. However, while Negri describes the veritable deterritorialization of war, politics, economy, and life, he too quickly subsumes these deterritorializations under the logic of capitalism. For him, war is little more than a supplement or effect of capital: “War seems the only possible solution. . . . With the disappearance of the internal criteria that allow that self-regulation and self-valorization of development, it is the violence of the strongest that creates the norm. . . . it guarantees the smooth running of society and widens the terms of the market.”96 This is too simplistic, and perhaps this formulation should also be flipped on its head. War ought to be seen from the other side too as a martial machine with capitalist biopolitical effects, not just a capitalist axiomatic with martial effects. This would shift the emphasis from an anthropocentric preoccupation with human “states of emergency” or sovereign states of exception, or market failure, to the emergence of material assemblages that amplify human events such that they reverberate throughout the assembly of things. Within the analytic frame of capitalism, the microbial devastation of the Americas as well as the subsequent annihilation of forms of life would be incidental to the project of expansion rather than at their core.

### Link — Grove [NATO]

#### The US and NATO alliance operates via a machinic ecology that automates war through the weaponization of life — sustainable warfare transforms war into a permanent fact of existence.

Grove 19 [Jairus Victor Grove is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Hawai'i Research Center for Future Studies at the University of Hawai'i at Mānoa; “Savage Ecology: war and geopolitics at the end of the world”; August 16, 2019]//eleanor

The competition environment of increasingly long wars, now stretching decades rather than months or years, is ripe for the emergence of such forms of life not unlike the already too-present emergence of child soldiers or battlefield-created antibiotic-resistant microbes.82 Conflict zones now last for generations. Think of how few denizens in Iraq can remember a time before a U.S. invasion. Beyond the ongoing combat with isis, current generations of Iraqis now suffer from war-induced air pollution and geneticsdamaging heavy metals in the water table. War has, on a human timescale, permanently changed their zone of the atmosphere and terrestrial environment.83 The long war is, for many, an endless war as they were born in war and will likely die before a conclusion is found. The stories of J. G. Ballard and Joe Haldeman are no longer fictional for many in the Middle East, as well as parts of Africa and Central and South Asia.84 As William Gibson said in an interview on npr, the future is already here, just unevenly distributed. This is particularly true of the future of war.85 Thus contemporary warfare waged by U.S. and nato forces is a form of sustainable warfare: slower casualty rates; geographically dispersed targets; automated and subcontracted violence; and zones of indistinction between war, crime, development, and humanitarian intervention. All render the otherwise effective means of war termination ineffective. Sustainable warfare means a near-permanent state of war to incubate new forms of life: organic, mechanical, and digital as well as every possible hybrid permutation. What comes out of such an encounter between war, life, and creativity is something like the weaponization of life itself. Sloterdijk has considered at length the weaponization of the lifeworld in the history of gas weapons and incendiary bombing.86 However, I have something a little dif­ferent in mind. Rather than the weaponization of the umwelt of life, I want to think through the weaponization of the process of life during the five-hundred-year ecological experiment of the Eurocene. What artificial life confronts us with is the possibility of weaponizing evolution, or the conditions that reproduce and create new forms of life. I do not mean the “weaponization” of life in the banal metaphoric sense but the actual harnessing of creative evolution in the making of weapons. This is a selective breeding and husbandry of war made possible by the collision between the faltering and expanding strategic aims of Eurocene geopolitics, and autonomous or creative forms of emergent artificial life. The coming-to-life of lethal technics with an appetite for “us” and our “others” is not as fantastic as the history of robot-paranoia-inspired movies like the Terminator series would suggest. After all, humans and other nonhuman animals such as dogs are already evidence of this phenomenon. Humans and human cognition coevolved with and through war and technologies of war.87 According to Sloterdijk, with the emergence of “long-distance weapons and tools, the hominids managed to escape the prison of bodily adaptation.”88 Therefore the novelty of the approaching future is a kind of second-order weaponization of life or, maybe more appropriately, the vitalization of weapons. What would constitute such a “vitalization”? And what would the consequences of this vitalization be? In a philosophical sense, it would be a world of military surplus that insists on its own superlative existence.89 Are weapons seeking their intended use as an end in itself? Objects for themselves are creeping out of the bifurcating ecologies of brilliant waste; the descendants of land mines and ieds and cluster bombs are thriving in the data-rich nutrient of the always already militarized internet of things. Images of these vital weapons, of mechanical-machinic life, should also challenge our concepts of artificial intelligence and how ai might succeed at modeling human consciousness. That is, human consciousness is itself already a weaponization of a brain, appendages, thumbs, eyes, and coordination, and therefore a martial consciousness by design.90 To successfully model human consciousness would be to create machines capable of sadism, torture, and murder rather than instrumental killing. And what of the automation of us?91 The long-term corrosion of human life resulting from the global automation of war, peacekeeping, and policing is impossible to predict in its particularity but less difficult to predict in its philosophical outcome given current trajectories of research and deployment. The ethical catastrophe of making war and surveillance easier and cheaper, while at the same time automating ascending layers of decisionmaking, transforms the thin amalgam of cosmopolitanism and global rights claimed by contemporary interventions into a perpetual motion machine. Although algorithms currently automate technical procedures such as takeoff and landing, object recognition software makes possible the automated acquisition of targets, the killing of those targets, as well as the risk and value of collateral damage. The real revolution in automation is happening as object recognition software and its capacity to recognize objects such as tanks or ak-47s gives way to more sophisticated (or pseudo-sophisticated) capacities of gait and behavior recognition.92 Following Banu Bargu’s work on necroresistance, this form of targeting is necropower par excellence as it returns the entire field of battle to the physiognomy of the body itself. According to Bargu, “The insurgent’s body becomes the concrete battleground of domination and resistance, subjugation and subversion, sovereignty and sacrifice.”93 In 2016 Turkey’s armed forces foundation company aselsan began construction of fully autonomous machine-gun turrets called “smart towers” to use at the Syrian border with the capability to target and kill without human oversight.94 Politically, the decisionistic character of sovereignty to pursue war becomes a mathematical fact rather than a human judgment of enmity automating politics, if not fully automating any one machine or human soldier. Furthermore, the developing drone capabilities referred to as signature strikes that choose targets based on behavior rather than identity move beyond questions of citizenship or even identity common to war and violence. Instead they rely on metrics for identifying and judging behaviors as worthy of eliminating.95 From the ecology of autonomous and increasingly aware weapons, a new ontology of the enemy emerges as a technical procedure well beyond the political landscape of enmity. Rather than simply automating the “hunt” for enemies chosen by political processes, so-called signature strikes signal a shift to the automation of the political decision of who is and is not an enemy in the first place.96 The identity that corresponds to the enmity of combat is replaced by an algorithmic definition or function of dangerousness. This shift from what Human Rights Watch has termed “human on the loop” practices to “human out of the loop” practices pushes the posthuman character of war further into the Cavellian nightmare zone in which everything is an object to be targeted but never to be encountered or recognized.97 An object either is or is not dangerous as its temporally specific and targetable function. The cause or reason behind those attributes is no longer relevant. These changes will not be political events. The switches will be flipped by military planners or software developers without accountability.98 If we continue on this trajectory, practicality will replace both strategic and moral thinking. Further, that practicality will be habituated by bodies that also cease to think about the quaint human algorithms of morality and duty. The fora in which such decisions will be made if at all are likely to constrict, as secrecy predominates in an environment charged by a dangerous mix of paranoia and real danger. And then it will all be modeled, explicated, and encoded. In such a world, the event of machine awareness will parallel the loss of forms of human awareness. To take a more speculative tone, what will a close encounter with nonhuman intelligence do to force a “persisting us” to rethink the use to which we have put machines in the pursuit of what we ourselves have been unwilling to do? The answer is hard to consider because the “we” that remains at such a point may appear to us now as alien or inhuman as the machines I am speculating about.99 We should take seriously the full spectrum of possibilities of what artificial life will look like if it emerges from the current world of surveillance and war that drives its evolution. To put it simply, what happens when we make artificial life in our own image or our martial image refracted through the physiognomy of beetles or sharks? What emerges will be a form of life native to the Eurocene.

### AT: Grove is wrong about the Eurocene

#### Even if they win that “the Eurocene” is inadequate terminology, our theory of warfare is still an accurate characterization of the current epoch.

Grove 19 [Jairus Victor Grove is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Hawai'i Research Center for Future Studies at the University of Hawai'i at Mānoa; “Savage Ecology: war and geopolitics at the end of the world”; August 16, 2019]//eleanor

Even if we still decide we want to retain the Anthropocene as the name of our current predicament, it is worth pausing and spending some time trying to determine what contribution war makes to the making of this epoch. Whether we call the geological present the Anthropocene or not, it is important to consider what makes the current epoch nameable at all, that is, the material formations of the contemporary. As Paul Rabinow often repeats, the question of inquiry into the contemporary is the pursuit of “what difference today introduces with respect to yesterday.”1 And as this is a book about the martial character of homogenization, it should come as no surprise that I think warfare, or homogenization by organized violence, plays a central role in the making of the contemporary global system. Significantly, warfare, as a driver of mutation and change, is largely left out of the contemporary debates about the Anthropocene. And, even if geological significance is the cause for naming, I suspect that the fossils left behind by this era will more often than not be implements and impressions of war.2 From the atom bomb to the untold billions of martial artifacts, including shells, planes, and fallen soldiers, the last five hundred years will certainly be characterized by an accelerating rate of organized and disorganized murder and violence.

## Pan

### Link — Pan [Colonialism]

#### Their securitization is part of the colonialist desire to secure the role of the West — rather than maintaining hegemony to stave off threats, the US creates threats to maintain hegemony.

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Constructing the Western Self in the ‘China Threat’ Paradigm

The ‘China threat’ paradigm is a discursive construct closely linked with Western/American colonial desire and historical experience. It reflects the inability or at least unwillingness of the Western/American self to make sense of China beyond their own fear and realpolitik trajectories. In doing so, its ethnocentric representation of China provides the West with a measure of strategic familiarity and moral certainty, thus reaffirming the self-imagination of the West. The imagination of an external ‘threat’ or Other has long been instrumental to the formation and maintenance of self-identity.31 In the logic of what Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri call ‘colonialist representations’, the difference of the Other, first having been pushed to the extreme, ‘can be inverted in a second moment as the foundation of the Self. In other words, the evil, barbarity, and licentiousness of the colonized Other are what make possible the goodness, civility, and propriety of the European Self’. They go on to say that ‘Only through opposition to the colonized does the metropolitan subject really become itself’. 32 The threatening imagery of ‘wilderness’ in the early periods of American nation-building served a similar purpose in that it helped maintain America’s ‘New World mythology’. As James Robertson notes, ‘there is no New World without wilderness. If we are to be true Americans (and thus part of that New World and its destiny), there must be wilderness. The symbol is an imperative for our real world’.33 The construction of self-identity through the discourses of threat, Otherness and wilderness perhaps culminated in the poetics and politics of the Cold War, ‘an important moment in the (re)production of American identity’.34 In this process, discourses of international relations and foreign policy played a central role. They helped create and police boundaries and Otherness so that a unified self could be identified and protected. As Campbell notes, ‘The constant articulation of danger through foreign policy is thus not a threat to a state’s identity or existence: it is its condition of possibility. While the objects of concern change over time, the techniques and exclusions by which those objects are constituted as dangers persist’.35 In this sense, although the Cold War was a pivotal moment in the Western/American construction of threat, such a discursive practice is not confined to the Cold War.36 Not surprisingly then, the Cold War’s end did little to disrupt the discursive ritual of constructing Otherness. If anything, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise of the ‘Evil Empire’ demanded more threats, simply because their very absence would become a threat to the coherence and unity of the West/the US. Without clearly identifiable enemies, ‘there can be no overarching ontology of security, no shared identity differentiating the national self from threatening others, no consensus on what—if anything— should be done’. It is, as noted before, embedded in the modern quest for certainty, and the Cold War mentality is only a historically specific manifestation of that ongoing modern colonial desire. 37 For this reason, Mearsheimer quite accurately predicted that ‘we will soon miss the Cold War’.38 Mearsheimer’s prediction certainly rang true within a number of US government agencies and institutions, most notably the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), whose very identity and institutional certainty had hinged on fighting the Cold War Communist ‘Other’. If the ‘Communist threat’ no longer existed, the Pentagon would find it a lot harder to justify its massive military spending, if not its very raison d’être. More importantly, if history had indeed been won and there was little left to fight for, would the moral leadership of the US ‘as a force for good in the world’ still be in demand?39 In the words of Huntington: ‘if there is no evil empire out there threatening those principles, what indeed does it mean to be an American, and what becomes of American national interests?’ 40 Would the West, a ‘highly artificial’ construct, be able to survive?41 In this context, it became imperative for the West to continue invoking threat, which would also help counter the internal danger of ‘declining strength, flagging will and confusion about our role in the world’. Worse still, might the rest of the world, now no longer in need of the ‘indispensable nation’, break loose or even turn around and resent the latter’s hegemony? 42 Hence the persistent colonial desire for a threatening Other, which by now is not only a source of paranoia, but also one of secret fascination. Clearly mindful of this Western paradoxical affection for enemy, Georgi Arbatov, Director of a Moscow think tank, told a US audience the year before the collapse of the Berlin Wall: ‘We are going to do something terrible to you—we are going to deprive you of an enemy’. 43 Arbatov was no doubt correct to imply that for the US living without an identity-defining enemy would be terrible indeed, but he only got half right. For the ‘enemy’ qua enemy to the US is often not determined by that ‘enemy’ itself. Rather, as noted before, it is primarily a category in the colonial desire built into the modern American selfimagination. Consequently, ‘To prove that we are menaced is of course unnecessary… it is enough that we feel menaced’.44 As a consequence, the post-Cold War period witnessed a proliferation of freshly minted threats, ranging from Robert Kaplan’s famous ‘Coming Anarchy’ thesis through Mearsheimer’s ‘Back to the Future’ scenario to Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ prediction. That is, it is not up to the ‘enemy’ to decide whether or not it can cease to be an enemy. While the USSR as a specific threat might have gone, the ‘emotional substitute’ of fear in the Western/American self-imagination lived on, always eager and able to find its next monster to destroy. 45 Meanwhile the emergence of the Iraq threat in the waning days of the Cold War temporarily allowed George Bush Snr. to regain ‘a whole plateful of clarity’ about ‘good and evil, right and wrong’. 46 Yet, for many anxious strategic planners, to best demonstrate why the US should remain an indispensable nation, the most indispensable enemy had to be China. The ‘beauty’ of this mega threat lies in its apparent ability to satisfy the colonial desire of Western/American self on both strategic and moral grounds. Strategically, China’s vast size would be the most obvious and convenient justification for the often expensive strategic programmes pursued by Washington. This was true even in the midst of the Cold War when America’s main obsession was with the Soviet Union. In 1967, President Lyndon B. Johnson ordered his Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to build an antiballistic-missile (ABM) system. McNamara was personally opposed to such a system, believing that it could be easily countered by a slight increase in the number of Soviet offensive missiles. But unable to challenge the President’s order, McNamara gave a speech, which, after stating all the reasons why an ABM was a bad idea, concluded that the US still needed one to defend against an attack by China. Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Warnke walked into McNamara’s office later that day and asked, ‘China bomb, Bob?’ McNamara simply replied: ‘What else am I going to blame it on?’47 The end of the Cold War has only further cemented China’s role as the indispensable threat. Representing a most suitable strategic target for the tools at hand, China, as Bruce Cumings explains, has basically become ‘a metaphor for an enormously expensive Pentagon that has lost its bearings [since the end of the Cold War] and that requires a formidable “renegade state” to define its mission (Islam is rather vague, and Iran lacks necessary weight)’. 48 Only in the aftermath of ‘September 11’ was China temporarily let off the hook, when terrorism in general, and the more tangible ‘Axis of Evil’ in particular, served an essentially similar function of reassuring American self-identity and certainty.49 As well as helping sustain the military-industrial complex, the China threat also has moral and political utility for the vitality of Western self-image. Beijing’s continued existence as an authoritarian regime contributes both to the self-congratulatory image of ‘democratic peace’ in the West in general, and to the need for American leadership and moral authority in particular. Insofar as China reminds us that ‘history is not close to an end’,50 the US-led West can continue to be called upon by the oppressed for moral leadership. Facing a China-led coalition of the world’s despotic regimes, the enlargement of the Western self to form a league of democracies can be relatively easily justified, perhaps even with a measure of urgency. 51 In short, the moral challenge posed by China serves as a valuable discursive site where the Western/American self can continue to be coherently imagined, constructed and enacted.

### Link — Pan [Diplomacy]

#### ‘Constructive engagement’ is a disillusionment to the fantasy of a China guided by the US — this is not innocent, but rather a volatile dynamic that spirals into confrontation.

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This is why the ‘China opportunity’ paradigm is largely responsible for the China disillusionment. It blames China for its false promises, hence the China fantasy (as opposed, for example, to an admission of the China opportunity fantasy). Proponents of this paradigm could readily concede that they have got China wrong, Such disappointment, when repeated, is fertile ground for disillusionment and resentment. 101 but rarely do they acknowledge that they have got their very paternalistic hope wrong to begin with. Lucian Pye claimed that his political theory ‘makes sense logically, but it falls apart when applied to traditional China’,102 a phenomenon which, in his view, could only be attributed to what he sees as an erratic Chinese political culture that ‘thwart[s], frustrate[s], and even embarrass[es] those who try to help [China]’. He went on to say that ‘For all who befriend China, the story is the same: high hopes then disappointment’. There was no doubt in his mind that China should take sole responsibility.103 Similarly, if today a ‘democratic China’ envisaged by the ‘China opportunity’ paradigm turns out to be an illusion, China opportunity believers would argue that it is China, rather than their China expectation, that is the culprit. Bruce Gilley, for example, insists that though the democratic project in China is ‘beset with difficulties in practice’, it is ‘faultless in appeal’. 104 While Gilley is for now an enthusiastic believer in the opportunity of China’s democratisation (to recall, he argues that the prospects for a democratic China ‘are now better than ever’), it is safe to predict that if such prospects remain elusive ten or twenty years from now, chances are that he would probably choose disillusionment with China over a critical reflection on his democratic project itself. Consequently, though the ‘China fantasy’ discourse appears to be a critique of the ‘China opportunity’ paradigm (and the associated engagement strategy), in reality it has its very roots in it. By identifying China as a scapegoat for the unfulfilled China opportunity, the ‘China fantasy’ serves to keep the premises of this China paradigm intact. In fact, most ‘China fantasy’ advocates are in essence strong believers in the ‘opportunity’ paradigm. This may help explain why many who are disillusioned with China are not typical China-bashers or hardliners, but instead China opportunity believers who are ‘mugged by reality’, just as a neoconservative is often a disillusioned liberal. 105 Mann’s position is again instructive here. Even as he heaps scorn on a set of illusions about the ability of commerce and economic engagement to effect political change in China, he concludes The China Fantasy with this telling confession: ‘I have never written a book in which I hoped so fervently that I would be proved wrong. It would be heartening if China’s leaders proceed along the lines that America’s political leaders predict’. So it turns out that he doubts neither the desirability nor the possibility of the China opportunity project per se. His main misgiving, rather, is that Western engagers, taking that outcome for granted, are too naïve or too complacent to contemplate alternative policies to see it through. 106 In this context, through its ‘China fantasy’ offshoot, the ‘China opportunity’ paradigm is partly responsible for the hardline turn in Western approach to China. Herein lies the danger of this China paradigm and its strategy of ‘constructive engagement’. Engagement, as Jean A. Garrison points out, ‘rests on the dangerous hope for regime change in China…. This “hope” raises expectations among certain constituencies that make presidents susceptible to political backlash when progress is not forthcoming’.107 What we are witnessing today is in large degree a product of such political backlash, which, if unchecked, could launch US-China relations on a dangerous path of spiralling confrontation. In fact, such a path has been well-trodden in history. A cursory look at past Sino-Western interactions reveals that their clashes were not just due to their conflicting interests or diverging values per se, but also due to the recurring volatile dynamics of mutual hope and subsequent mutual disillusionment. Though no bilateral relationship can be free from the fluctuation of hope and disenchantment, in their dealing with China, the West in general and the US in particular have been especially prone to the pendulum cycle of paternalistic hope and ‘rightful’ disillusionment, with the end of each such cycle frequently marked by prolonged estrangement and open hostility.108 In September 1792, when Lord Macartney set out on his historic voyage to China, the United Kingdom, a rapidly industrialising nation filled with selfconfidence and hope, painted the Middle Kingdom as an unlimited market open to British commerce. But as Macartney was about to return from his controversy-ridden China mission, that expectation was met with bitter disappointment. Many members of his embassy, lamenting their fractured illusions, argued that this failure warranted ‘more direct methods’ to prize open the China market. Macartney himself seemed cautious on the use of offensive measures against China so long as ‘a ray of hope remains for succeeding by gentle ones’. Nevertheless, his thwarted mission heralded a long-lasting change in Europe’s attitudes towards China from admiration to disillusionment and disdain. 109 In a way, the frustration with Chinese ‘obstructiveness’ to the British and European desire to conduct unrestricted trade subsequently foreshadowed nearly a century of European gunboat diplomacy in the ‘Far East’. The transformation of America’s so-called ‘special relationship’ with China into the Cold War animosity also ran parallel with a metamorphosis from hope to disillusionment in the US. 110 As Michael Hunt observes, America’s initial paternalistic vision of ‘a China transformed under American guidance’, at first fuelling ‘a patiently paternal approach’ to China, was bound to ‘evolve into a policy of coercion once hope in the Chinese government was gone’. 111 Such hope, shattered by the Communist victory in China’s civil war, was replaced with strong indignation with the ‘ungrateful’ Chinese ‘who had bitten the hands that had fed and nurtured them, repaying a century of American benevolence with hatred and enmity, causing deep parental sorrow, arousing righteous anger and meriting just punishment’.112 While the origins of their Cold War rivalry are no doubt complex and multifaceted, Hunt is nevertheless right that ‘Our own immoderate expectations of China’s fitting the American mold and our surprise and overreaction to China going her own way’ played a major part in ‘the general instability that has characterized our bilateral relations’. 113 Perhaps it was for this reason that during the 1950s and 1960s the US seemed more resentful and fearful of China than of the Soviet Union, hence the adoption of a tougher policy of containment and isolation against Beijing. 114 The Soviet Union had never invoked the same level of hope and fantasy for the US as had China. History never exactly repeats itself, but the fact that China is now once again on the cusp of changing from the object of hope to that of disillusionment for the West does not bode well for Sino-Western relations. Unrealistic as it may sound, the fantasmatic imagination of China as an opportunity for Western commercial expansion and/or democratic enlargement per se is not problematic. Social and political life cannot function without hope or even fantasy. What is problematic, though, is that once reified into an unreflective paradigm, such China opportunity fantasies are unable or unwilling to recognise themselves as such. At one level, given such false promises, the ‘China opportunity’ paradigm is too good to be true. But at another level, taking up the mantle of a regime of truth, it is considered too true to be subject to critical self-scrutiny even when it is not borne out in practice. To ease this inherent tension, the ‘China opportunity’ paradigm chooses to blame others, especially its very object, for its lost opportunity and delayed or ‘stolen’ pleasure of self-fulfilment. Through such blame shifting, the ‘China opportunity’ paradigm has significant, if only unintended, policy consequences, as the recent deterioration in Sino-Western relations can attest. To be sure, the hardening of Western strategy towards China cannot be blamed on the volatility of the ‘China opportunity’ paradigm alone. It seems also to have coincided with a period of dented self-confidence in the U.S. and Europe in the wake of the global financial crisis and the eurozone debt crisis, with this firmness in dealing with China designed partly to dispel the perceived weakness and decline in the West. Moreover, in the chorus of getting tough on China, hardline realists have never left the centre-stage. Their unaccommodating approach to China has less to do with disillusionment and more with their longstanding fear of China’s emergence as a geopolitical rival, regardless of its democratisation or not. However, attributing the hardline approach to the role of hardliners is not only tautological, but it does not adequately explain the sudden surge of aggressive posture from the West. It is in this sense that we need to understand the ‘China opportunity’ paradigm, not as an innocent, optimistic framework of analysis, but in terms of volatile international practice. Despite or because of its normative project of engagement with China, this paradigm has been part of the problem, rather than its solution.

### Link — Pan [Discourse Shapes Reality]

#### Discourse shapes reality — threat paradigms legitimize neocon policymaking.

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First, the threat paradigm helps define (or at least renew) the purpose of containment as a policy. Bernard Schaffer tells us that policy has three dimensions of meaning: purposes; the review of information and the determination of appropriate action; and the securing and commitment of resources in its implementation.12 Thanks to a China threat ‘out there’, a new purpose can be injected into US foreign policy. It provides a rationale for a policy that would otherwise struggle to justify its contemporary relevance. This constitutive effect on US China policy can be likened to the way in which the discourse of terrorism justified and legitimised the US-led ‘War on Terror’. For a start, the terrorist threat immediately gave George W. Bush a hitherto elusive sense of certainty about his mission and policy direction. As reported in the New York Times, not until the ‘September 11’ tragedy did the President begin to feel ‘sure about what he should be doing’. We are familiar with the second and third dimensions of policy, but no policy can exist without the first, namely, a certain purpose (or purposes). In fact, functioning like a fulcrum, the articulation of a relevant purpose is often the very first—sometimes also the most difficult—step in a policy-making process. For instance, as far as US strategic planners are concerned, the main challenge lies not in implementing a policy of military build-up, but in justifying or identifying a legitimate public purpose for that policy. Likewise, for weapons manufacturers, promoting arms sales is not an overly complicated task; but in order to translate it into official policy, they require a rationale, or more specifically, a legitimate target against which their arms should be deployed. In both cases, identifying a purpose or target is crucial to policy-making. 13 Second, the threat paradigm contributes to policy-making by spelling out some specific policy options. From the beginning, the representation of China as a danger is not merely an intellectual question about ‘what is China?’; it is always concerned with the practical question of ‘what to do about it?’ For example, in their book The Coming Conflict with China, Bernstein and Munro devote a whole chapter to the issue of how to manage China’s rise. Among their policy recommendations are maintaining a strong US military presence in Asia, strengthening Japan, continuing arms sales to Taiwan, and restricting China’s nuclear weapons arsenal. While the rise of terrorism has enabled the US to preoccupy itself with the ‘War on Terror’ for more than a decade, at least for a particular section of the US foreign policy establishment, a more lasting purpose for US foreign and security policy requires the China threat. 14 Similarly, in the last pages of The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Mearsheimer believes that an appropriate China policy is not what he calls the ‘misguided’ engagement strategy, but containment to ‘slow the rise of China’. 15 Charles Krauthammer, a prominent neoconservative proponent of the China threat argument, not only advocated explicitly for containing China in his 1996 Time magazine article, but also detailed how this can best be done. Taking ‘a rising and threatening China’ as a pregiven fact, he insisted that ‘any rational policy’ towards the country should be predicated on various containment strategies such as strengthening regional alliances (with Japan, Vietnam, India, and Russia) to box in China, standing by Chinese dissidents, denying Beijing the right to host the Olympics, and keeping China from joining the WTO on its own terms. Speaking with a sense of urgency, he urged that this containment policy ‘begin early in its career’.16 Feeling the same sense of urgency, Peter Navarro, in his book The Coming China Wars, warns consumers, corporate executives, and policy-makers of gathering storm clouds on the horizon. He then offers a range of policy prescriptions on ‘How to fight—and win!—the coming China wars’ (the title of his book’s final chapter).17 These require, for example, that the US ‘adopt a “zero-tolerance” policy toward intellectual property theft’, ‘condemn China’s actions in the strongest of terms, and if China’s abuses of power continue, seek to strip China of its permanent veto’ in the United Nations. What those policy prescriptions have in common, he adds, is that ‘they require the economic and political will to stand up to China, along with the military might to back up the prescriptions’.18 If the military and economic threat of China entails military and economic containment, the image of China as a brutal, authoritarian state helps lay the foundation for moral and ideological sanction. Advising on how to deal with ‘hostile regimes’ in general, Kagan and Kristol offer a rich recipe of regime change: Tactics for pursuing a strategy of regime change would vary according to circumstances. In some cases, the best policy might be support for rebel groups, along the lines of the Reagan Doctrine as it was applied in Nicaragua and elsewhere. In other cases, it might mean support for dissidents by either overt and covert means, and/or economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation…. But the purpose of American foreign policy ought to be clear. When it comes to dealing with tyrannical regimes, especially those with the power to do us or our allies harm, the United States should seek not coexistence but transformation.19 Counting China as one of those ‘tyrannical regimes’, they urge that the US and the West make it harder for the Chinese regime to resolve its contradictions, thereby hastening its collapse.20 Of course, policy prescriptions from the China threat literature are not necessarily actual official policies, but through the influence of mainstream media and policy consultancy, the line between them is often easily crossed.

### Link — Pan [Industrial-Academic Complex]

#### China securitization is a product of the military-industrial-academic complex, where the power of defense contractors and politicians produces knowledge, and that knowledge upholds Western power.

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THE POWER/KNOWLEDGE NEXUS IN THE AMERICAN CHINA-THREAT KNOWLEDGE COMMUNITY

The political economy of the China fear no doubt has something to do with the Cold War mentality, political self-interests, and even greed on the part of politicians and defence contractors. However, those factors alone cannot legitimately sustain military Keynesianism unless the fear is sanctioned by ‘objective’ knowledge. In other words, the political economy manifested in the ‘China syndrome’ cannot be the sole work of the military-industrial complex. Rather, demonstrating a classic case of the desire/power/knowledge nexus, it relies on the valuable service provided by the China-threat knowledge community. This epistemic community allows Sinophobia an aura of objective truth, credibility and urgency, through which public support can be easily galvanised for the power elite and their various political economic agendas under the unquestioned guise of defending national security against an existential threat. If Congressmen, the military services, and defence contractors so far have had much luck in securing the massive military budgets they have wanted, they should thank not China, but this knowledge community for its contribution of the weapon of ‘truth’. As Andrew Bacevich notes, intellectuals, through their imagination of self and Other, have played a key role in the continuation of military Keynesianism. He rightly points out that ‘Militarism qualifies as our very own work, a by-product of our insistence on seeing ourselves as a people set apart, unconstrained by limits or by history’. 51 Thus, the ‘China threat’ paradigm as a particular scheme of self/Other construction is central to US military Keynesianism. From the beginning, the military-industrial complex has been a military-industrial-academic complex, of which the knowledge-producing community of the ‘China threat’ paradigm is a fully-paid-up member. Figuring prominently in this China-threat knowledge community are think tank fellows, opinion leaders, as well as university academics. By way of workshops, reports, media commentaries, opinion pieces, congressional testimonies, books, and journal articles, they contribute to the constant production of the danger code on China and a prevailing structure of feeling within which the political economy of fear in the US and the West more generally can operate without a hitch. Some members of the China-threat knowledge community maintain the umbilical cord between knowledge and power by speaking directly to power and for power. They may be called ‘embedded experts’,52 who hold public office in the national security apparatus. For example, after George W. Bush’s election victory in 2000, Bush acknowledged that his administration ‘borrowed’ twenty of the best people from the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) for state service in America’s hour of need.53 In all, the neoconservative Center for Security Policy (CSP) supplied twenty-two former advisers or board members to the same administration.54 Other ‘embedded experts’ come from leading universities. Aaron L. Friedberg, well-known for his view of the China threat, is a professor of politics and international affairs from Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School (WWS) whose graduate programmes proudly boast the rather accurate and fitting ambition of ‘preparing future public service leaders’. In his other life, Friedberg served as Dick Cheney’s National Security Advisor on China Affairs from 2003 to 2005 and was appointed to the Department of Defense’s (DoD) Defense Policy Board in 2007. Another good example is Paul Wolfowitz, an architect of the US policy on China as a ‘strategic competitor’. Before becoming Deputy Secretary of Defense from 2001–2005, Wolfowitz was the dean of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University, a School originally founded by Paul Nitze, a senior government official who was instrumental in shaping US defence policy on the basis of the Soviet threat during the Cold War. It is unnecessary to add that the AEI and the CSP are both home to some of the most outspoken commentators in the China-threat knowledge community. During the George W. Bush presidency, the China-threat knowledge community led by some prominent neocons became immensely influential. But the knowledge/power nexus is by no means unique to the Bush administration. As exemplified by the so-called ‘Blue Team’, the China-threat knowledge community was politically active throughout the Clinton years in the 1990s. Named after the side that represents the US in the Pentagon’s war games (the unnamed foe is called the ‘Red Team’), the Blue Team was a loose community of members of Congress, top congressional staff, Republican political operatives, former intelligence officers, journalists, think-tank analysts, historians and scholars, some of whom were ‘tenured professors at the country’s most prestigious universities’. 55 Through this informal yet powerful network, ‘China threat’ experts from top universities and leading think tanks were able to collectively exert steady influence on America’s national security establishment. Manifested in the service of power by the priesthood of China-threat experts, the power/knowledge nexus is not a one-way street. In essence, it is a symbiotic relationship, for the production of such knowledge cannot be detached from the power arrangement it serves. Therefore, any understanding of this connection would be incomplete without looking at how this particular China knowledge is defined, promoted, and regulated by power. Though specific knowledge about the China threat may be the work of university academics and think tank analysts, its conceptual and financial ancestry can often be traced back to the military-industrial complex and the national security state, which, whether explicitly or implicitly, help delineate the intertextual, paradigmatic boundaries of what kind of questions can be asked, what topics are off limit, and even what counts as legitimate knowledge. Just as area studies in the US were shaped by power, ideology and geopolitics, so too is this powerful China paradigm in contemporary China watching. Indeed, the discursive production of the China threat makes for a sizeable knowledge industry. Some of the most prominent players in this industry include both individual scholars and such media outlets as the Weekly Standard, Commentary, Wall Street Journal, The Washington Times, and Encounter Books, a San Francisco-based publishing house. A self-promotion material produced by the Weekly Standard offers a rare insight into part of the operation of this industry. ‘Thanks to a unique VIP distribution system, a select list of the most powerful men and women in government, politics, and the media receive the publication via hand-delivery on Sunday morning—just in time for the nationally televised talk shows’, thus boasts the neoconservative flagship magazine. 56 Many hawkish and neoconservative think tanks such as the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) and the AEI are behind these media outlets and marketing operations. Those think tanks, pivotal in the production of the ‘China threat’ knowledge, in turn are staffed by retired politicians, generals, and intelligence officers from the political establishment through what some have called the ‘revolving door’ phenomenon. That is, former government officials, military servicemen, and defence industrialists (re)join the ranks of professors and research fellows at universities and think tanks, thereby bringing the influence of power directly to the process of knowledge production. A quick glance at the signatures on the PNAC’s 1997 founding statement reveals ‘a rogue’s gallery of intransigent hardliners’ who are mainly exgovernment and ex-Pentagon officials in the Reagan era. Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, William Bennett, I. Lewis Libby and Eliot Cohen are only some of the most recognisable luminaries. And there is no prize for guessing what kind of knowledge those officials-turned-nationalsecurity gurus would bring to the understanding of China. The 2000 PNAC report, entitled Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces, and Resources for a New Century, insists that China is ‘the potential enemy’. The report’s author, Thomas Donnelly, once worked as a professional staff member at the US House of Representatives Committee on National Security. Later, he became a Director at Lockheed Martin before his move through the revolving door again to a post at the AEI.57 The AEI, the CSP, and the Heritage Foundation, all key sources of the China-threat knowledge in the forms of policy briefs, research reports and opinion pieces, tell a similar story. One China specialist at the AEI, Dan Blumenthal, was previously senior director for China, Taiwan and Mongolia in the Secretary of Defense’s Office of International Security Affairs. Another AEI China expert, the late James Lilley, was formerly a CIA station chief in Beijing, Director of the American Institute in Taiwan, and Ambassador to China. Harvey Feldman, Distinguished Fellow in China Policy at the Heritage Foundation, was once Director of the Office of the Republic of China Affairs and one of the architects of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. The ubiquitous China commentator John J. Tkacik, Jr., also at the Heritage Foundation, previously served with the US Foreign Service in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and mainland China. At the CSP, which is directed by former Pentagon official Frank Gaffney, on its Board of Directors was once Charles M. Kupperman, former vice president of Strategic Integration & Operations, Missile Defense Systems, at Boeing. Its Advisory Council, meanwhile, is regarded by some commentators as ‘a virtual Star Wars hall of fame’, almost entirely made up of former Star Warriors from the Reagan administration. 58 To highlight the symbiotic link between power and knowledge in a significant section of China watching is not to suggest that practitioners cannot make a worthy contribution to the scholarly field of China studies, or that all research on the China threat is necessarily tainted by the influence of the power apparatus. Harold Isaacs, the author of the classic study Scratches on Our Minds, was affiliated with the CIA-assisted Center for International Studies at MIT, but his proximity to the government, as Ido Oren notes, did not stop him producing a rigorous and high-quality study of American views of China and India.59 In some cases, close encounters with power may even make one a sharp critic of it, as in the case of Chalmers Johnson, author of Blowback and The Sorrows of Empire, who once worked as a consultant for the Office of National Estimates of the CIA.60 One aspect of such entanglement concerns research grants and donations. According to a 2002 report by the Association of American Universities (AAU), the DoD is the third largest funder (after the National Institutes of Health and the National Science Foundation) of university research, which accounts for more than 60 per cent of defence basic research. 61 Similarly, a significant share of the funding received by lobbying think tanks comes from hardline foundations and defence companies. In its 1998 annual report, where the CSP acknowledged the financial support it had received since its founding, virtually every weapons-maker made it to the list, ranging from Lockheed Martin (and before their merge, Lockheed and Martin), Boeing and TRW to General Dynamics, Rockwell International and Northrop Grumman (and in its pre-merge incarnations, Northrop and Grumman). As indicated in the report’s charts, about one quarter of the Center’s annual incomes flowed from corporations, of which half came from defence contractors.62 The military-industrial-academic nexus is evident also in many universitybased research projects on China. For example, after the end of the Cold War, studies on the strategic implications of China’s rise have benefited from sizeable grants from the largely conservative, anti-Communist foundations such as the Smith Richardson, Bradley, Scaife, and Olin Foundations.63 The John M. Olin Foundation, which funded the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University (Samuel Huntington was its Founding Director), was set up by a chemical and munitions manufacturer. Some more reputable social sciences foundations, which maintain a keen interest in sponsoring China-related studies, have been revealed as once cover organisations for the CIA. Their influence on the direction of disciplines is as important as that of government funding on research during the Cold War.64 The DoD’s Minerva Initiative provides another potential financial boon to the China-threat knowledge community. This initiative is modelled on the US National Defense Education Act introduced at the early stage of the Cold War. Initially coming with a $50 million research fund up for grabs, it calls upon university academics to offer their expertise on several Pentagon nominated security challenges such as religious and cultural changes in the Islamic world and the development of the Chinese military and technology.65 Co-administered by the National Science Foundation, the project states that it seeks a diverse range of views, but its aim is to ‘foster a new generation of engaged scholarship in the social sciences that seeks to meet the challenges of the 21st century’.66 It is too soon to tell how this Initiative, first launched in 2008, may come to shape the outcomes of its funded studies on China. Thus far, there is only one China-related project funded by this Initiative. However, if Project Camelot in the 1960s established by the US Army is anything to go by, it does not inspire much confidence in either its neutrality or promised intellectual diversity. 67 Consider, for example, the administrative setup of the Minerva Initiative. With the condition that Pentagon officials sit on each peer-review panel, this almost certainly guarantees that the funded proposals are as diverse as the worldview and strategic agenda of the military-industrial complex would allow, even though the Pentagon often keeps a low-profile in running those research projects. Where foreign sources share similar political interests in the politics of fear vis-à-vis China, the production of the China threat knowledge in the US often become a transnational joint venture. As Lawrence Soley notes, many China research programmes in the US have received grants from Taiwanese foundations and business leaders, ‘many of whom are also political leaders’.68 During his time as a senior vice president at the AEI, John Bolton was paid $30 000 over three years in the mid-1990s by Taiwan’s government for research papers on Taiwan’s UN membership issues.69

### Link — Pan [Monolithic Threat]

#### The construction of the Chinese Other is a discursive practice which marks China as a monolithic threat, denying Chinese subjectivities and creating a fixed dichotomy of the West and East.

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The China Threat as a Construction of Otherness

With its contribution to the Western/American self-imagination, the ‘China threat’ paradigm is also a construction of Otherness. This is not primarily because this paradigm portrays China as a threat. Rather, it is because in its quest for certain knowledge about China, it has sought to deny Chinese subjectivities, to impose upon China a fixed subjectivity, or to reduce its subjectivities to a singular, homogeneous whole. These discursive tactics of denial, imposition and reduction vis-à-vis Chinese subjectivities are some of the hallmarks of Othering. These ‘Othering’ strategies are easily identifiable in many common arguments of the ‘China threat’ paradigm. Capability-based arguments, for instance, openly bypass Chinese concerns and subjectivities by focusing squarely on its material capabilities, as if China as an international actor could be reduced to its defence spending and military hardware alone. From this perspective, China’s power status becomes the sole starting point for understanding its international relations. Its power—especially military power—metonymically passes as China per se. One of the most dominant components of the China debate has been predictably the ‘assessment of China’s overall future military power’. 52 The following questions, for example, ‘[Is] China a rising power, and if so, how fast and in what direction [is it headed]?’ 53 have been a standard opening gambit in numerous IR analyses on China. John Fairbank once told us that ‘as we phrase questions, so we get answers’. 54 Capability-based representations of China are not completely oblivious to intentions, but they insist that intentions are merely epiphenomenal to capabilities. As Bernstein and Munro claim, ‘China is so big and so naturally powerful that [we know] it will tend to dominate its region even if it does not intend to do so as a matter of national policy’. If one takes China’s military capabilities as a point of departure, it is no surprise that the built-in answer is the China threat. 55 Drawing on their assessment of China’s military power, they confidently declare what China’s ‘real’ goal is: ‘China is an unsatisfied and ambitious power whose goal is to dominate Asia…. Its goal is to ensure that no country in its region… will act without first taking China’s interests into prime consideration’.56 When it comes to China’s professed goals and objectives, they dismiss them as propaganda out of hand. As the argument goes, ‘China’s peace offensive was a tactical move’, which does not change the fundamental nature of its hegemonic ambition.57 Unlike capability-based discourses, intention-based approaches to China’s rise look at its civilisational characteristics and strategic culture, among other things. Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order and Johnston’s Cultural Realism, both examined briefly in the previous chapter, readily come to mind as representatives of the latter approaches. Departing from structural realists’ almost exclusive focus on military capabilities, Huntington’s book engages with the history, ideas, values, and customs of the Sinic civilisation. Yet, the conclusions of his culture-informed analysis turn out to be not much different to those of the capability-based discourses. His book treats civilisations as essentially distinctive, self-contained entities, and sees cultural differences between the West and China in essentialist, absolute and mutually exclusive terms. Based on Edward Friedman’s claim that ‘what is authentically Chinese’ is ‘patriarchal, nativistic, and authoritarian’, Huntington painted a stark contrast with what is ‘authentically’ Western, a unique combination of ‘universal’ values such as the rule of law, social pluralism, and individualism.58 In this way, cultural differences between China and the US become a fixed dichotomy of particularity versus universality. To the extent that he believed that ‘Civilizations are the biggest “we” within which we feel culturally at home as distinguished from all the other “thems” out there’, to invoke this kind of cultural identity, as he himself acknowledged, is to define ‘the state’s place in world politics, its friends, its enemies’. 59 In Cultural Realism, Johnston similarly promises to move beyond the structuralist, capability-based explanation of China’s strategic behaviour. With a close reading of ‘the classic texts in Chinese strategic thought’ and asking how its strategic culture may provide an insight into Chinese foreign policy, Thus, by drawing a cultural ‘fault line’ between self and Other, Huntington’s grand theory is nothing short of a more totalising construction of Otherness than the conventional state-centric argument is usually capable of. In his ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis, the threatening quality of the Sinic civilisation is not only imposed on China proper, but also on the so-called ‘Sinic cultural area’ of East Asia as a whole (though with the convenient exclusion of Japan). 60 his efforts are in many ways commendable, for rarely have Western scholars bothered to go to such great lengths to gauge China’s intentions. What is problematic with his analysis, though, is that he is convinced in advance that there is a single Chinese strategic culture.61 Even as his survey does come across two major strategic cultures, namely, the ConfucianMencian paradigm and the parabellum paradigm, Johnston views the former as essentially an ideal type of strategic culture with a largely symbolic role in influencing strategic options.62 Thus, despite Johnston’s worthy attempt to understand China on its own cultural terms, the quest for certainty rooted in the Western self-imagination remains at play. Such a quest, among other things, dictates that his notion of strategic culture be ‘empirically testable’. To that end, Johnston insists on positively specifying ‘what the scope and content of strategic culture is and what it is not’. Consequently, he suggests that there remains essentially one singular Chinese strategic culture, the parabellum paradigm, which then becomes the strategic culture in China. 63 Hence, he ends up with a conception of strategic culture defined by ‘questions about the role of war in human affairs, the nature of conflict with the enemy, and the efficacy of violence in dealing with the adversary’. 64 Certainly, these questions are both relevant and important to any study of strategic culture. But they beg another question: Why should strategic culture be reduced to those questions alone? By directing one’s attention to questions about war, conflict, and violence while brushing aside other kinds of questions (e.g., about peace, reconciliation, and benevolence) that are equally relevant and integral to strategic culture, one is not simply engaging in an objective study of strategic culture, but rather participating in a selective and reductionist discursive practice. In limiting his study to a narrow set of questions about war, conflict, and violence, Johnston both reduces Chinese strategic culture to the use of strategic force, and declares the ‘irrelevance (to behavior)’ of the Confucian-Mencian stress on benevolence, righteousness, and virtue as a basis for security and harmony.65 Indeed, he goes to some considerable lengths to count China’s use of force against Mongols raiding within Ming territory as evidence of Chinese realpolitik aggressiveness.66 As a result, for all his repeated qualification that strategic culture is historically contingent and may be (un)learned, Johnston’s interpretation of the historical records in the Ming dynasty does not leave much room for contingency. The reader is left with the impression that realpolitik thinking is intrinsic to Chinese strategic culture, which is precisely an impression China specialist Warren Cohen walks away with: If Johnston’s analysis of China’s strategic culture is correct—and I believe it is— generational change will not guarantee a kinder, gentler China. Nor will the ultimate disappearance of communism in Beijing. The powerful China we have every reason to expect in the twenty-first century is likely to be as aggressive and expansionist as China has been whenever it has been the dominant power in Asia.67 Aided in part by Johnston’s findings, Cohen was able to spend just ‘a few minutes’ lecturing a visitor from Singapore (who did not view Chinese foreign policy as so ‘aggressive and expansionist’) on the subject of ‘the history of the Chinese empire’ and ‘thousands of years of attacks on China’s neighbors’. To wrap up his lecture, he prescribed that visitor a reading: Johnston’s Cultural Realism. 68 Another, perhaps cruder, tactic of Othering in the ‘China threat’ paradigm involves neither an analysis of China’s military capabilities nor its intentions. Rather, it follows a deductive logic based more explicitly on an either/or dichotomy in the Western/American quest for absolute certainty and security: either China guarantees absolute peace for the United States, or it cannot but be treated as a threat. The reasoning of Betts and Christensen’s abovementioned article serves as a good example here: If the PLA remains second-rate, should the world breathe a sigh of relief? Not entirely…. Drawing China into the web of global interdependence may do more to encourage peace than war, but it cannot guarantee that the pursuit of heartfelt political interests will be blocked by a fear of economic consequences…. [And] U.S. efforts to create a stable balance across the Taiwan Strait might deter the use of force under certain circumstances, but certainly not all. 69 Of course, they could not get, nor do they expect, affirmative answers from China to any of those relentless quests for absolute certainty. Consequently, their conclusion has to be certainty in a negative form—the China threat: The truth is that China can pose a grave problem even if it does not become a military power on the American model, does not intend to commit aggression, integrates into a global economy, and liberalizes politically. Similarly, the United States could face a dangerous conflict over Taiwan even if it turns out that Beijing lacks the capacity to conquer the island…. This is true because of geography; because of America’s reliance on alliances to project power; and because of China’s capacity to harm U.S. forces, U.S. regional allies, and the American homeland, even while losing a war in the technical, military sense.70 At this point, neither China’s capabilities nor intentions seem to really matter; the China threat has already been predetermined by the either/or logic. Because of this, some ‘China threat’ theorists see no irony or paradox in justifying the policy of containing China not in spite of, but on the very basis of China’s current weakness. For instance, Mearsheimer wrote in 2001 that ‘China is still far away from having enough latent power to make a run at regional hegemony, so it is not too late for the United States to reverse the course and do what it can to slow China’s rise’. 71 In brief, by representing China as a monolithic whole, dismissing its subjectivities, and/or imposing onto it a singular, fixed subjectivity of power politics, the ‘China threat’ paradigm acts as a discursive construction of an objectified Other. Cast as an Other and threatening object, China by definition lacks the kind of rationality and subjectivity that are characteristic of the Western knowing subject. Nor is it eligible to have its own security concern, which may explain why there exists a ‘severe disproportion between the keen attention to China as a security concern and the intractable neglect of China’s [own] security concerns in the current debate’. Here, it is evident that the China threat is an Othering effect of Western/American colonial desire from which China cannot escape no matter what its capabilities or intentions might be. This China insight may have the much-prized virtue of analytical parsimony, but it does not occur to those theorists that such logic could be used to describe any country, including the US. 72 Even when it is allowed for some security interests, it is alleged that it often has no idea what those interests are. 73 Lucian Pye once argued that China is such an erratic state that it acts ‘in ways that seem perversely self-damaging in the eyes of those who believe they have that country’s interests at heart’.74 Perhaps it is at this level that the Othering effect of the ‘China threat’ paradigm is most devastating.

### Link — Pan [Self-Fulfilling Prophecy]

#### The 1AC’s “China threat’ construction is a self-fulfilling prophecy — war is not inevitable, but their securitization self-perpetuates a downward spiral of conflict.

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THE ‘CHINA THREAT’ PARADIGM AS A SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY

If changing Chinese public opinion and Beijing’s growing assertiveness in foreign policy are better understood in the context of mutual responsiveness, then threatening as they may appear, they at least partly reflect the self-fulfilling effect of the China threat theory as practice. That is, they are to some extent socially constructed by Western representations of the China threat. At this juncture, we may return to the question raised earlier—What’s the cost of having an enemy? The cost, simply put, is that perceiving China as a threat and acting upon that perception help bring that feared China threat closer to reality. Though not an objective description of China, the ‘China threat’ paradigm is no mere fantasy, as it has the constitutive power to make its prediction come true. If this China paradigm ends up bearing some resemblance to Chinese reality, it is because the reality is itself partly constituted by it. With US strategic planners continuing to operate on the basis of the China threat, this self-fulfilling process has persisted to the present day. For example, in July 2010, when China objected to the joint US-South Korean navy exercise in the Yellow Sea to no avail, it announced that its navy would conduct live fire drills in the East China Sea for the duration of the US-South Korean manoeuvres. 129 Meanwhile, a Global Times (a Chinese daily tabloid affiliated with the official People’s Daily) editorial opines that ‘Whatever harm the US military manoeuvre may have inflicted upon the mind of the Chinese, the United States will have to pay for it, sooner or later’.130 All such Chinese ‘belligerence’ seems to have provided fresh evidence to the ‘China threat’ paradigm, whose image of China has now been vindicated.131 Without acknowledging their own role in the production of the ‘China threat’, ‘China threat’ analysts thus play a key part in a spiral model of tit-for-tat in Sino-US relations. Mindful of this danger, some cool-headed observers have warned that a US attempt to build a missile defence shield could be reciprocated by China deploying more missiles.132 Even the highly classified US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) report Foreign Responses to U.S. National Missile Defense Deployment has hinted at this possibility. 133 In early 2006, Mike Moore, contributing editor of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, predicted that if the US continues to weaponise space by deploying a comprehensive space-control system, ‘China will surely respond’.134 And respond it did. In early 2007, it launched a ballistic missile to destroy an inoperational weather satellite in orbit. That test immediately caused a stir in the international press, even though it came after Washington’s repeated refusal to negotiate with China and Russia over their proposed ban on space weapons and the use of force against satellites. A Financial Times article noted that ‘What is surprising about the Chinese test is that anyone was surprised’.135 In a similar vein but commenting on the broader pattern of US strategy on China over the years, Lampton notes that ‘Washington cannot simply seek to strengthen ties with India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and central Asian states as an explicit offset to rising Chinese power and then be surprised when Beijing plays the same game’.136 Nevertheless, such surprise is commonplace in the China watching community, reflecting an intellectual blindness to the self-fulfilling nature of one of its time-honoured paradigms. This blindness, in turn, allows the justification of more containment or hedging. In this way, the ‘China threat’ paradigm is not only self-fulfilling in practice, but also self-productive and self-perpetuating as a powerful mode of representation. One might take comfort in the fact that neither Beijing nor Washington actually wants a direct military confrontation. But that is beside the point, for the lack of aggressive intention alone is no proven safe barrier to war. As in the cases of the Korean War and the Vietnam War, the outbreak of war does not necessarily require the intention to go to war.137 Mutual suspicion, as US President Theodore Roosevelt once observed of the Kaiser and the English, is often all that is needed to set in motion a downward spiral. 138 And thanks to the ‘China threat’ paradigm and its mirror image and practice from China, mutual suspicion and distrust has not been in short supply. 139 A war between these two great powers is not inevitable or even probable; the door for mutual engagement and cooperation remains wide open. Nevertheless, blind to its own self-fulfilling consequences, the ‘China threat’ paradigm, if left unexamined and unchecked, would make cooperation more difficult and conflict more likely. It is worth adding that my treatment of Chinese nationalism and realpolitik thinking is not to downplay their potentially dangerous consequences, much less to justify them. Quite the contrary, for all the apparent legitimacy of reciprocal counter-violence or counter-hedging, Chinese mimicry is dangerous, as it would feed into this tit-for-tat vicious cycle and play its part in the escalation of a security dilemma between the US and China. Thus, to emphasise Chinese responsiveness is not to deny Chinese agency or exonerate its responsibility. While the general nature of Chinese foreign policy may be responsive with regard to the US, its ‘contents’ are not simply passive, innocent mimicry of US thinking and behaviour, but inevitably come with some ‘Chinese characteristics’. That said, those ‘Chinese characteristics’ notwithstanding, there is no pregiven China threat both unresponsive to and immune from any external stimulus. To argue otherwise is to deny an important dimension of Chinese agency, namely, their response-ability. By examining the self-fulfilling tendency of the ‘China threat’ paradigm, we can better understand that Sino-American relations, like international relations in general, are mutually responsive and constitutive. Thus, both China and the US should be held accountable to the bilateral relationship of their mutual making. To the extent that this ‘China threat’ knowledge often denies such mutuality, and by extension, US responsibility in the rise of the China threat, it is all the more imperative to lay bare its intrinsic link with power practice.

### Link — Pan [Western Self-Image]

#### The “China threat” is not a reality but a narrative of self-reflection from the anxious Western self — that makes case a self-fulfilling prophecy as China encounters become a logical necessity to the story of strategic imagination.

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IN FEAR OF CHINA: THE ‘CHINA THREAT’ PARADIGM IN WESTERN/AMERICAN COLONIAL DESIRE

The West has been imagining itself in various ways for centuries, if not longer, a complex subject which no doubt warrants a separate study. 9 But here I argue that the West as a modern project is modelled ultimately on an image of the modern knowing subject, who is defined by a desire for certainty and a will to truth. With this fundamental self-understanding, the West could not only feel certain about itself, but also exercise its reason and authority over an objective and knowable world ‘out there’. As Charles William Maynes notes, the US, since the times of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, has been convinced ‘that we know the way—politically and economically—and that therefore we have an obligation, if not also a right, to lead others to a better future’.10 In this sense, the will to truth and certainty has been central to the West’s search for identity and power. The inevitable existence of uncertainty and inscrutability in nature and the outside world then becomes a standing threat to the identity and security of this modern self. At one level, the knowing subject may find refuge in fear as an emotional substitute for certainty. In other words, ‘What we do not know we fear’.11 Through fear, the unknown world becomes at least a known unknown (to borrow former US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s parlance), or a negative form of certainty in terms of Otherness, danger, and threat. Thus understood, threat is not an object out there, but a necessary corollary of the Western desire for absolute certainty and security. Even Kristol and Kagan readily admit that their much-feared ‘present danger’ ‘has no name. It is not to be found in any single strategic adversary…. It is a danger, to be sure, of our own devising’.12 The China Threat as a Reflection of the Western Self-imagination The self-imagination as the modern knowing subject affords the West a sense of scientific and moral authority. At the same time, it also justifies its need for imperial expansion and strategic dominance. Both the European Union’s (EU) self-identity as a ‘Normative Power Europe’ and the US’s God-given right to military supremacy and global leadership can be understood in this context. Indeed, for neoconservatives, the US, a quintessential Western society, is entitled to both moral clarity and military hegemony. However, as soon as the US stakes its self-identity on ‘universal dominion’ and absolute security worldwide, 13 The China threat is a product of precisely such encounters and selfimagination. Taking global hegemony in general and dominance in Asia in particular as part and parcel of American self-identity, one would ‘naturally’ treat China’s regional influence as a threat; it can hardly be otherwise. But this is a challenge above all to the latter’s expansionist strategic selfimagination and the certainty and continuity it entails. its ‘encounters’ with numerous threats becomes a logical necessity. 14 As Huntington reasoned, ‘Chinese hegemony will reduce American and Western influence [there] and compel the United States to accept what it has historically attempted to prevent: domination of a key region of the world by another power’.15 Thanks to this longstanding American self-imagery, it is fair to say that much of the China threat is imagined as well. The much-feared Chinese ‘string of pearls’ strategy is a case in point. Describing China’s alleged ambition of establishing a series of naval bases along various strategic choke points from Southeast Asia to eastern Africa, the term is nowhere to be seen in China’s military playbook. Rather, it is mostly the work of US strategic imagination, first used in an internal report titled Energy Futures in Asia commissioned by the US Department of Defense. 16 In Europe where collective self-identity is constructed less on the basis of military strength, the China threat does not figure as prominently as it does in the eyes of American strategic planners. Indeed, in 2009, Kagan expressed his displeasure at what he saw as Europe’s indifference to the proliferation of military threats. Though not explicitly acknowledging the central role of selfidentity in the construction of threat, he nevertheless correctly attributed their divergent threat perceptions to the different ways in which the US and Europe identify themselves. As he wrote: If Europe’s strategic culture today places less value on hard power and military strength and more value on such soft-power tools as economics and trade, isn’t it partly because Europe is militarily weak and economically strong? Americans are quicker to acknowledge the existence of threats, even to perceive them where others may not see any, because they can conceive of doing something to meet those threats.17 No longer primarily identifying itself in military terms, contemporary Europe now prides itself on being a normative or civic power, home to such universal values as human rights, democracy and good governance. As a result, it sees the China difference both as an opportunity for political change and an ideological challenge to the teleological certainty of the European self. Of course, moral clarity is not unique to Europe, but is integral to the US self-imagination as well. As such, in addition to the fear of China’s strategic ambition, Washington is similarly ambivalent about the opportunity and threat of the Chinese Other. Through the same prisms of democracy and modernisation, Americans constantly ‘found China lacking’ or even threatening. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker rightly argues that ‘Unless the United States changes [the moral parameters of its political self-imagination], that conclusion will not change’. 18 In other words, its fear of China has less to do with China’s difference per se than with the particular way in which the Western self is constructed. If there is a China threat, its menace lies primarily in its perceived psychological ‘disruption’ of the lingering Western/American colonial desire about how the world should be run and about how history should progress. 19 No doubt, some would protest that the ‘China threat’ conclusion stands on the firm ground of realism, and has nothing to do with the way the West identifies itself. For example, according to Mearsheimer, in a world of anarchy, ‘states can never be certain about the intentions of other states’, 20 and therefore have to treat each other as a potential threat. Yet, I would argue that such an insatiable demand for transparency from others is itself a telltale sign of the Western quest for certainty, security, and identity as the modern knowing subject. Similarly, the realist first-image of human nature, which is often implicitly invoked in the explanation of the China threat, has less to do with human nature per se than with the Western quest for scientific truth about human society. The Hobbesian ‘discovery’ of the first man and human nature, as C. B. Macpherson argues, was not the objective knowledge of man per se, but rather a conscious or unconscious autobiographical reflection of Western modern man and his living condition in a ‘bourgeois market society’.21 Insofar as the ‘China threat’ paradigm has been informed partly by the Hobbesian fear of every man against every man, this China threat representation is best seen as a mirror image of some historically specific and selective self-experience of the West. Two specific arguments in the ‘China threat’ discourse are illustrative of this point. The first is the widely-invoked Germany analogy. Former US Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, who was instrumental in the formation of Washington’s official view of China as a ‘strategic competitor’, 22 was convinced by the ‘obvious and disturbing analogy’ between Wilhelmine Germany and today’s China. Though briefly acknowledging the differences between the two powers, he insisted on their many ‘similarities’. For him, just as Germany’s transition from the statesmanship of Bismarck to the incompetence of his successors contributed to the tragedy of World War I, so too China, which is in the process of a similar transition ‘from two decades of extremely skilful management of its international relationships to a new leadership of uncertain quality’, poses a serious threat to the international order.23 In an influential piece published in The National Interest, Richard Betts and Thomas Christensen similarly argue that Like Germany a century ago, China is a late-blooming great power emerging into a world already ordered strategically by earlier arrivals; a continental power surrounded by other powers who are collectively stronger but individually weaker (with the exception of the United States and, perhaps, Japan); a bustling country with great expectations, dissatisfied with its place in the international pecking order, if only with regard to international prestige and respect. The quest for a rightful “place in the sun” will… inevitably foster growing friction with Japan, Russia, India or the United States.24 What this Germany analogy can tell us is that the Western knowledge of the China threat is based, more than anything else, on a fear of repetition of a European nightmare scenario. Its fear of China, situated in the broader sense of paranoia that Europe’s past may become Asia’s future,25 The America analogy tells a similar story. Kagan argues that ‘if Americans want to understand Chinese power and ambition today, they could start by looking in the mirror’. This is derived less from China’s rise or its uncertain intentions than from the self-righteous certainty about the universality of Western historical trajectory. 26 This is exactly what Mearsheimer has done. After extrapolating American history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to a status of the unchangeable ‘tragedy’ of great power politics in general, Mearsheimer insists that China will have to, almost slavishly, follow the same path: for sound strategic reasons, [China] would surely pursue regional hegemony, just as the United States did in the Western Hemisphere during the nineteenth century. So we would expect China to attempt to dominate Japan and Korea, as well as other regional actors, by building military forces that are so powerful that those other states would not dare challenge it. We would also expect China to develop its own version of the Monroe Doctrine, directed at the United States. Just as the United States made it clear to distant great powers that they were not allowed to meddle in the Western Hemisphere, China will make it clear that American interference in Asia is unacceptable.27 Clearly, Mearsheimer’s ‘China threat’ assessment is based not so much on what China does in the present as it is on what the US itself did in the past.28 His repeated anxious ‘expectations’ of China testify to a paranoia of both China’s Otherness and its emerging sameness. His fear reflects, in the final analysis, the lingering ambivalence of colonial desire towards the mimicry of the American self-experience by an Oriental Other. The autobiographical nature of the ‘China threat’ discourse is so obvious that many references to the ‘China menace’ (such as the ‘Beijing Consensus’ and ‘Chinese Lake’) are directly modelled on the Western/American self. Little wonder that Mel Gurtov, while reading a 2005 US Defense Department report on China’s military threat, found the report’s comments on China ironically more fitting to describe US power and intention than China’s.29 The US is certainly not unique in the projection of self-experience onto the understanding of others. As scholars of literary criticism and Australian colonial history have pointed out, Australia’s fixation with the fiction of an Asian invasion has been bound up with its self-consciousness as a settler country, which itself was born of invasion. Australia’s anxiety about its northern neighbours, in which China often looms large, has been sustained by the fear that a nation created by European invasion could subsequently be taken over by an Asian/Chinese invasion. 30 Thus, the anxiety and fear of China felt by the West does not stem primarily from what China is or what it does, but from an anxious Western self, or more precisely, from its own historical role in the production of anxiety and fear suffered by others. Perhaps unwittingly, the ‘China threat’ paradigm exhibits an unspoken fear of the logic of mutual responsiveness in international relations: with China’s rise, there is a danger that China might begin to imitate what ‘we’ have done to others, this time at ‘our’ expense.

## Author Indicts

### Indict — Think Tanks — T/L

#### Think tanks are not academics, but lobbying groups. Take their arguments with a grain of salt.

Rojansky & Shapiro ’21 — Matthew Rojansky is the director of the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute. He is an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and the U.S. executive secretary of the Dartmouth Conference, a track-two U.S.-Russian conflict resolution initiative begun in 1960. Jeremy Shapiro is research director at the European Council on Foreign Relations. May 28, 2021; "Why Everyone Hates Think Tanks"; *Foreign Policy*; https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/05/28/why-everyone-hates-think-tanks/; //CYang

All of these functions continue to varying degrees. But as our families seem to sense, none really describes the dominant reality of think tanks today. In point of fact, the think tank business model has evolved in troubling directions. As the industry has expanded, as society around it has become more polarized, and as the competition for funding has grown ever fiercer, some think tanks have become advocacy groups, or even lobbyists, by another name. Political parties want loyal propagandists, not niggling, equivocating academic hangers-on. And potential donors want veteran sharpshooters to fire their policy bullets into exactly the right target at precisely the right moment.

As a series of New York Times investigations in 2014-2017 revealed, the think tank business model has drifted disturbingly toward selling access and influence. For some, the point is no longer to generate new ideas or inform a deliberative process but rather to sell ideas that promote the interests of funders. It’s a straightforward transaction and hardly a new one. The Washington lobbying business has exploded over the past three decades, as the private sector, wealthy individuals, and even foreign governments turn to Washington’s revolving-door power brokers to help them purchase influence on issues that matter to them. Funders are essential for think tanks’ survival and success, but they could just as easily take their money elsewhere, so think tanks are under real pressure to give them what they want. Some funders have even cut out the middleman, so to speak, and created their own purpose-built think tanks.

### Indict — Atlantic Council

#### Atlantic Council’s paid off.

Boland ’20 — Barbara TAC’s foreign policy and national security reporter. Previously, she worked as an editor for the Washington Examiner and for CNS News. October 14, 2020; "Top 50 U.S. Think Tanks Receive Over $1B from Gov, Defense Contractors"; *American Conservative*; https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/swamp-report-top-50-u-s-think-tanks-receive-over-1b-from-gov-defense-contractors/; //CYang

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Stimson Center $1,343,753

### Indict — Bailey

#### Bailey is a climate denialist.

Richard 7 (Michael, full-time journalist, he has been interviewed, published, or cited by, among others, the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, CNN, Andrew Sullivan, Forbes, BoingBoing, the Independent, the LA Times, Wired, Rolling Stone, Harvard Business Publishing, Discovery News, Metro International, etc., 1-16-2007, "Ronald Bailey: "No one paid me to be wrong about global warming", <https://www.treehugger.com/corporate-responsibility/ronald-bailey-no-one-paid-me-to-be-wrong-about-global-warming.html>, MSCOTT)

Ronald Bailey is Reason Magazine's science correspondent, adjunct scholar at CATO and CEI, and editor of the 2002 book Global Warming and Other Myths: How the Environmental Movement Uses False Science to Scare Us to Death. He's been a high profile global warming "skeptic", attacking both the science and the possibility of dealing with greenhouse gas emissions, he also testified before the House Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources on "The Impact of Science on Public Policy" and said in 2004: "Finally, in the real world, absent transformative technological breakthroughs in energy production, whatever the chances that average temperatures may one day exceed 2 degrees Celsius, there is absolutely no chance that steep emissions reductions scenarios are even remotely possible."

### Indict — Brands

#### Brands is funded by the “world’s richest fascist”.

Johnson ’19 — contributing analyst for FAIR. March 19, 2019; "Bloomberg’s Armsmaker-Funded Columnist Wants You to Know: Military Spending Is Woke"; *FAIR*; https://fair.org/home/bloombergs-armsmaker-funded-columnist-wants-you-to-know-military-spending-is-woke/; //CYang

Bloomberg identifies Brands as the “Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, and senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.” “Kissinger” is ominous enough, but surely Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments is some innocuous, wonky academic institution, no?

In a piece explicitly defending bloated military budgets, however, perhaps it would be useful to know what exactly the “Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments” is. We can start by reading this section taken directly from their website (unabridged):

Below is a list of organizations that have contributed to our efforts over the past three years.

* Aerojet Rocketdyne
* Army Strategic Studies Group
* Army War College
* Austal USA
* Australian Department of Defence
* BAE Systems Inc.
* Carnegie Corporation of New York
* Chemring Group
* Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
* Department of the Navy
* Embassy of Japan
* Fincantieri/Marinette
* Free University Brussels
* General Atomics
* General Dynamics — National Steel and Shipbuilding Company (NASSCO)
* Harris Corporation
* Huntington Ingalls Industries
* Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies
* Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force
* Kongsberg Defense Systems, Inc.
* L3 Technologies, Inc.
* Lockheed Martin Corporation
* Maersk Line, Limited
* Metron
* National Defense University
* Navy League of the United States
* Northrop Grumman Corporation
* Office of the Secretary of Defense/Office of Net Assessment (ONA)
* Office of the Secretary of Defense/Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE)
* Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (AT&L)
* Polski Instytut Spraw Miedzynarodowych (PISM)
* Raven Industries
* Raytheon Company
* Sasakawa Peace Foundation
* Sarah Scaife Foundation
* SEACOR Holdings
* Secretary of Defense Corporate Fellows Program
* Smith Richardson Foundation
* Submarine Industrial Base Council
* Taiwan Ministry of National Defense
* Textron Systems
* The Boeing Company
* The Doris & Stanley Tananbaum Foundation
* The Lynde & Harry Bradley Foundation
* United Kingdom Royal Air Force

Brands is a senior fellow at an organization funded almost entirely by those with a clear interest in the upcoming $750 billion defense budget Brands is pushing for. While we don’t have a tax filings for CSBA since Brand was hired there, and thus we do not know his specific income, the average senior fellow at the organization, as of its last tax filing, makes just under $300,000 a year.

They can call it whatever they wish — “think tank,” “nonprofit,” “Center” — but by any objective metric, this organization is just a lobbying entity for the weapons industry and Western militaries. A cursory glance at their policy briefs reveals they, unsurprisingly, always support more spending on weapons systems. Unlike other weapons-funded lobbying groups such as Center for Strategic and International Studies (FAIR.org, 8/12/16), they don’t even bother throwing some banks or soda companies in there to give the appearance of being anything other than a weapons industry trade group. (Don’t be fooled by the “Sasakawa Peace Foundation” — that’s an organization founded by far-right Japanese business executive Ryoichi Sasakawa, who was jailed as a war crimes suspect after World War II, and who once described himself as the “world’s richest fascist”—Time, 8/26/74.)

### Indict — Brookings

#### Brookings is paid off.

Boland ’20 — Barbara TAC’s foreign policy and national security reporter. Previously, she worked as an editor for the Washington Examiner and for CNS News. October 14, 2020; "Top 50 U.S. Think Tanks Receive Over $1B from Gov, Defense Contractors"; *American Conservative*; https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/swamp-report-top-50-u-s-think-tanks-receive-over-1b-from-gov-defense-contractors/; //CYang

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Heritage Foundation $1,375,000

Stimson Center $1,343,753

#### Brookings is corrupt – funded by JP morgan

Johnson 16 [Adam Johnson is a contributing analyst for FAIR.org, 8-7-2016, NYT Reveals Think Tank It’s Cited for Years to Be Corrupt Arms Booster, FAIR, https://fair.org/home/nyt-reveals-think-tank-its-cited-for-years-to-be-corrupt-arms-booster/] Eric

This is true not just in the military field, but in every policy area that affects corporations’ bottom lines, as is suggested by the Times‘ reporting on the even more ubiquitous Brookings Institution promoting the JPMorgan bank’s image:

JPMorgan, [in a document](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2972643-Brookings-MetroDonors1203.html#document/p11/a307260) dated a month before the agreement was signed, said the pending donation to Brookings “deepens/extends relationships with important client base among business and civic leaders both in the US and abroad.”

And Brookings was ready to do its part.

“Our events, which in part target these audiences,” [said an internal 2014 Brookings memo](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2972643-Brookings-MetroDonors1203.html#document/p93/a307273), referring to the Global Cities Initiative and federal and state leaders, “have yielded 100+ media hits, with 97 percent of them referencing GCI and 90 percent referencing JPMorgan; by the end of this year, we will have held events in 13 domestic markets and nine international markets.”

At times, Brookings officials seemed worried they were not doing enough for the bank.

“No one wants to create overt marketing opportunities for JPMC, but we need to carve out roles and thought leadership opportunity for market presidents,” said a 2013 Brookings memo, referring to a dinner with the bank’s executives. “We need to do a better job tying it back to JPMC.”

These “media hits” would not be possible if the corporate agenda wasn’t laundered through the pseudo-academic credibility of a think tank, whether it’s a giant bank trying to improved its image via Brookings or an arms manufacturers trying to promote the war industry via CSIS.

#### Funded by authoritarian governments and led by military generals.

Schaffer 22 [Michael Schaffer is a senior editor at POLITICO. His Capital City column runs weekly in POLITICO Magazine, 06-17-2022, He Tried to Reform the Way a Top D.C. Think Tank Gets Money. Now the FBI Is Looking Into Him., https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/06/17/john-allen-brookings-institution-fbi-qatar-00040380] Eric

The establishing documents for the Brookings Doha Center may be uncomfortable reading for advocates of academic freedom.

Inked in 2007, the deal between the storied Washington think tank and Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs laid out the financial terms under which Brookings established a groundbreaking outpost in the Persian Gulf. The fantastically rich, autocratic emirate would put up $5 million, bankrolling the groundbreaking research facility — but also got a notable degree of contractual prerogatives for a government over a proudly independent organization. The center’s director, the [heretofore unreported document read](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/22062334-20070101-brookings-doha-center-establishment-agreement-memorandum-of-association?responsive=1&title=1), would “engage in regular consultation with [the foreign ministry],” submitting an annual budget and “agenda for programs that will be developed by the Center.” Any changes would require the ministry’s OK. (The document was obtained from Qatar by a U.S. source; a Brookings spokesperson did not dispute its validity.)

Brookings’s Doha presence was mothballed last year, but the history of chumminess between a Washington liberal bastion and a Middle Eastern monarchy is suddenly relevant again this week due to the abrupt resignation of Brookings’ president in a classic Beltway scandal involving allegations of improper lobbying for that very same country.

Ironically, the now-former president, retired Marine General John Allen, had worked during his four-year tenure to unwind the relationship, under which Qatar had become one of Brookings’ top donors, netting the institution millions of dollars — and no shortage of flak from critics of Qatar’s human-rights record and its friendships towards groups like the Muslim Brotherhood. In 2019, Allen announced that Brookings would phase out money from non-democracies. In 2021, the Doha facility was quietly disaffiliated from Brookings.

And yet it now turns out that Allen’s entire run atop the capital’s leading liberal think tank was shadowed by a trip he took to the emirate just months before ascending to the presidency.

The alleged details of that journey, which leaked out via [a federal search warrant application](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/22062338-allen-search-warrant?responsive=1&title=1) that was inadvertently [made public last week](https://apnews.com/article/politics-us-news-think-tanks-nato-ap-top-5c30827587d2295012549d5d65fc806e), have cost Allen his $1-million-a-year job, upended Brookings, and infuriated scholars who worry that they’ll again face suggestions that their work has been tarnished by unseemly foreign influence.

### Indict — CATO Institute

#### CATO is propaganda that ignores facts.

Robinson ’18 — Nathan; English-American journalist, political commentator, and editor-in-chief of Current Affairs magazine. October 13, 2018; "Never Trust The Cato Institute"; *Current Affairs*; https://www.currentaffairs.org/2018/10/never-trust-the-cato-institute/; //CYang

So, the Cato Institute: Never trust them. Because these sorts of people are just not going to represent the issues fairly. They’re not going to report the conclusions of experts accurately (Cannon cites the National Association of Insurance Commissioners to show that industry professionals agree with him, and ignores the many medical practitioners who don’t). They’re going to pick quotes from studies that sound good, and unless you have academic journal access and can check for yourself, you’ll never know whether the studies contained other important findings. In an academic setting, this would border on malpractice. These people may have charts and statistics and degrees, but they are just not scholars. They already think that laissez-faire capitalism is correct, and they think it because it’s what their economic theory tells them must be true, and so any empirical evidence to the contrary will be ignored. (Again, if you truly won’t be satisfied until I go through a dozen more of their publications and show all the same tendencies, I can do it. But just try it for yourself.)

Honestly, I’m just exhausted by the existence of these people. It’s so hard to figure out the truth in a complicated world. I wish I didn’t have to deal with a whole army of propagandists who couldn’t care less about neutral scholarly inquiry. They might be right, or they might be wrong, but I’m always going to have to investigate for myself since their publications are useless. So I generally don’t bother responding to the Cato Institute because it’s always going to require such a battle: They will do everything in their power, they will strain themselves to their limit, to prove that regulation is bad and laissez-faire is good. (This is, by the way, why Charles Koch has given them so much money, and the Institute used to be called the Charles Koch Foundation.) All these “economic liberty” places are the same. The Free Enterprise institutes, and the Economic Education funds. You could pile up mountainous evidence of market failures or regulatory success, and they’d die before they conceded the point.

I know everybody on the left will greet my conclusion here with a yawn: Breaking news — the Cato Institute care about their free market ideology more than they care about facts! But it’s still so unbelievable to me that this can be an influential think tank that anyone takes seriously. It’s worth remembering that the actual profession of economics is far less rigidly committed to laissez-faire than the “economistic” commentators who serve as the field’s public face. You can see the difference by looking at how Cato writes about these issues versus the scholars Cato actually cites. The real papers have nuance. They are scholarship. This is bullshit, and can never be trusted.

### Indict — CFR

#### CFR is paid off.

Boland ’20 — Barbara TAC’s foreign policy and national security reporter. Previously, she worked as an editor for the Washington Examiner and for CNS News. October 14, 2020; "Top 50 U.S. Think Tanks Receive Over $1B from Gov, Defense Contractors"; *American Conservative*; https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/swamp-report-top-50-u-s-think-tanks-receive-over-1b-from-gov-defense-contractors/; //CYang

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#### CSIS is funded by military contractors

Johnson 16 [Adam Johnson is a contributing analyst for FAIR.org, 8-7-2016, NYT Reveals Think Tank It’s Cited for Years to Be Corrupt Arms Booster, FAIR, https://fair.org/home/nyt-reveals-think-tank-its-cited-for-years-to-be-corrupt-arms-booster/] Eric

A recent New York Times article ([8/7/16](http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/08/us/politics/think-tanks-research-and-corporate-lobbying.html?_r=0)) detailed, in often scathing terms, what many media critics already knew: that think tanks are frequently not objective, neutral arbiters of information, but corporate- and government-funded agenda-promoters with an academic veneer to give the appearance of impartiality.

One of the two think tanks the Times’ Eric Lipton and Brooke Williams raked over the coals was the Center for Strategic and International Studies, which published a report advocating the expansion of drone sales while being funded by drone makers, namely General Atomics (emphasis added):

As a think tank, the Center for Strategic and International Studies did not file a lobbying report, but the goals of the effort were clear.

“Political obstacles to export,” read the [agenda of one closed-door](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2963994-CSIS-General-Atomics.html#document/p17/a307156) “working group” meeting organized by Mr. Brannen that included Tom Rice, a lobbyist in General Atomics’ Washington office, on the invitation lists, the emails show.

Boeing and Lockheed Martin, drone makers that were major CSIS contributors, were also invited to attend the sessions, the emails show. The meetings and research culminated with a report released in February 2014 that reflected the industry’s priorities.

“I came out strongly in support of export,” Mr. Brannen, the lead author of the study, wrote in an email to Kenneth B. Handelman, the deputy assistant secretary of State for defense trade controls.

But the effort did not stop there.

Mr. Brannen initiated meetings with Defense Department officials and congressional staff to push for the recommendations, which also included setting up a new Pentagon office to give more focus to acquisition and deployment of drones. The center also stressed the need to ease export limits at a conference it [hosted](http://csis.org/event/sustaining-us-lead) at its headquarters featuring top officials from the Navy, the Air Force and the Marine Corps….

“CSIS will not represent any donor before any government office or entity, including congressional lawmakers and executive branch officials,” Mr. Hamre, the chief executive, said in his statement to the Times. “We do not lobby.”

The result was a victory for General Atomics.

As the Times also notes, CSIS [is funded](https://www.csis.org/support-csis/our-donors/corporation-and-trade-association-donors) largely by Western and Gulf monarchy governments, arms dealers and oil companies, such as Raytheon, Boeing, Shell, the United Arab Emirates, US Department of Defense, UK Home Office, General Dynamics, Exxon Mobil, Northrop Grumman, Chevron and others.

Anyone with a seven-year-old’s understanding of causality can conclude that CSIS would, in the aggregate, promote the expansion of the military and surveillance state, since that’s who pays their bills; what the Times did was reveal a specific, rather direct example, using heretofore secret documents.

New York Times readers didn’t need a smoking gun in any event, since CSIS’s agenda can be seen with simple inference. Since it was the Times that broached the topic, let’s use what CSIS fellows have written or said in the Times over the past year, and see if they ever called for the defunding or de-escalation of the military state:

CSIS op-ed ([12/3/15](http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/12/03/does-motive-matter-in-mass-shootings-like-the-one-in-san-bernadino/in-mass-killings-islamist-terror-is-a-unique-concern)) hyping the threat of ISIS and by implication calling for more surveillance of Americans

CSIS op-ed ([2/18/16](http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/02/18/crimes-iphones-and-encryption/establish-an-international-precedent-for-sharing-encrypted-data)) calling for an “international precedent” for an encryption backdoor

CSIS op-ed ([2/23/16](http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/02/23/has-encryption-gone-too-far/a-lack-of-cooperation-between-tech-giants-and-the-us-on-encryption-makes-us-less-secure)) calling for an encryption backdoor

CSIS senior fellow ([5/17/16](http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/17/us/military-transgender-ash-carter.html)) helping the US military with its pro-LGBT (a/k/a “woke imperialism”) rebranding efforts

CSIS fellow ([5/27/16](http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/27/world/africa/us-increases-antiterrorism-exercises-with-african-militaries.html?_r=0)) saying that Africa was no longer seen by the US through a “peacekeeping lens” but was now a battlefield with enemies that could potentially threaten the US

CSIS “military budget expert” ([6/10/16](http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/10/us/politics/defense-secretary-seeks-to-find-and-keep-those-with-key-expertise.html)) criticizing Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter for not moving fast enough on its new cybersecurity recruitment initiative

CSIS op-ed ([7/5/16](http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/07/05/biometrics-and-banking/the-need-for-biometrics-goes-beyond-banks)) calling for more biometric security and dismissing privacy concerns as “irrational” “nervous dystopian projections”

CSIS fellow ([7/8/16](http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/08/world/europe/obama-nato.html)) saying the White House hasn’t “fully acknowledged” the shift in Europe and how it could damage NATO

CSIS senior fellow ([7/9/16)](http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/09/world/europe/nato-unity-tested-by-russia-shows-some-cracks.html) insisting nuclear weapons remain in Europe due to increased threats from Russia

CSIS fellow ([8/5/16](http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/05/world/africa/boko-haram-leader-speaks-on-youtube-deepening-signs-of-split.html)) insisting Boko Haram is “increasingly unstable”

One of the starkest examples, one that FAIR [noted at the time](https://fair.org/home/us-leads-world-in-credulous-reports-of-lagging-behind-russia/), was a New York Times article ([8/20/15](http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/30/world/united-states-russia-arctic-exploration.html?_r=0)) last year, warning about the US “lagging behind” Russia in the Arctic Ocean, that was based almost entirely on a [CSIS report](https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/150826_Conley_NewIceCurtain_Web.pdf) warning of “Russia’s strategic reach” near the north pole. As we noted in September, the piece failed to mention Russia has [14 times the Arctic coast](http://diplomatonline.com/mag/2012/10/the-arctic-country-by-country/) of the US, and thus it made sense it would have roughly that many more icebreaker ships. The “gap” was just asserted, based primarily on US military say-so and a CSIS report that breathlessly insisted Russia was getting the better of the US in the Arctic. The New York Times even helped out, using a wildly deceptive map implying Arctic parity where none existed:

n May, the torrent of media articles hyping the “Arctic gap” asserted by CSIS and the US military paid dividends, with Congress [allocating an additional $1 billion to the Navy’s budget](http://www.adn.com/politics/2016/05/24/congress-takes-a-big-step-toward-funding-a-new-1-billion-arctic-icebreaker/) to pay for icebreaker ships. Another bill, the [Icebreaker Recapitalization Act](https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/1386), calling for Congress to fully fund “six heavy-duty polar icebreaker ships,” has been introduced by Sen. Maria Cantwell (D.–Wash.).

While the contracts are not awarded yet, Lockheed Martin—one of CSIS’s [top donors](https://www.csis.org/support-csis/our-donors/corporation-and-trade-association-donors)–is [said](http://www.fool.com/investing/2016/07/24/navy-to-help-coast-guard-double-its-icebreaker-fle.aspx) by market analyst The Motley Fool to be an “obvious choice” to build the new fleet. Their runner up to build the new icebreakers? Huntington Ingalls Industries, who also [donated generously](https://www.csis.org/support-csis/our-donors/corporation-and-trade-association-donors) to CSIS.

No instances of CSIS calling for the defunding or de-escalation of the military state in the New York Times could be found by FAIR. FAIR reached out to CSIS spokesperson Andrew Schwartz, asking him to cite any examples of CSIS ever saying the threat of Russia or Islamic extremism was overestimated, or advocating for less surveillance or military spending. He did not respond at the time of publishing.

It could be a coincidence that CSIS always errs on the side of more military spending, more surveillance, more hyping of threats from Russia and ISIS, and that these conclusions were reached based on a dispassionate examination of the facts. Or the New York Times could read its own reporting, and treat deep-state think tank war-boosters as just that. At the very least, if they are to be cited, the paper could note that they are funded by interests heavily invested in promoting the expansion of a NATO/GCC-led military apparatus, so the reader can know that the bespectacled quasi-academic being interviewed or proffering charts and maps is not entirely without strings. (Noting that someone commenting on war is funded by those who profit from war seems entirely reasonable, no?).

The media would understandably be hard-pressed to drop think tanks altogether. Their insta-pundits lend gravitas to articles for writers on deadline and, just as they do for lawmakers, think tanks do much of the research heavy-lifting. But the think tank industry, as the internal emails New York Times revealed make clear, is often based on laundering influence through ostensibly neutral-sounding “institutes” or “centers,” with the fact that the average media consumer won’t know who funds them being part of the service offered to donors.

### Indict — Deudney & Ikenberry

#### Deudney & Ikenberry are wrong.

Morefield ’19 — Jeanne; Professor of Politics at Whitman College and will soon join the Department of Political Science and International Studies at The University of Birmingham. She is the author of Empires Without Imperialism: Anglo-American Decline and the Politics of Deflection and Covenants Without Swords: Idealist Liberalism and the Spirit of Empire. January 8, 2019; “Trump’s Foreign Policy Isn’t the Problem,” *Boston Review*, <https://bostonreview.net/politics/jeanne-morefield-trump%E2%80%99s-foreign-policy-isn%E2%80%99t-problem>; //CYang

In that reality, the United States has long been an imperial power with white nationalist aspirations. Given the racialized nature of U.S. imperial expansion, it makes sense that Alexis de Tocqueville predicted, in a chapter entitled “The Three Races of the United States,” that the United States would one day govern “the destinies of half the globe.” In its early days, while still a slave-holding country, the United States asserted its sovereignty through genocide on a continental scale and annexed large portions of northern Mexico. The country went on to overthrow the independent state of Hawaii, occupied the Philippines and Haiti, exerted its regional power throughout Latin America, expanded its international hegemony after World War II, and became what it is today: the world’s foremost military and nuclear power with a $716 billion “defense” budget that exceeds the spending of all other major global powers combined.

“Taking over from the British Empire in the early twentieth-century,” argues James Tully, the United States has used its many military bases located “outside its own borders” — now nearly 800 in over 80 countries — to force open-door economic policies and antidemocratic regimes on states throughout the formerly colonized world. An extremely partial list of sovereign governments that the United States either overthrew or attempted to subvert through military means, assassinations, or election tampering since 1949 includes Syria, Iran, Guatemala, Lebanon, the Congo, Cuba, Chile, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Grenada, Cuba, Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, Iraq, Yemen, Australia, Greece, Bolivia, and Angola. Such interventionist policies have contributed substantially to today’s inegalitarian world in which an estimated 783 million people live in profound poverty. In sum, for untold millions of humans in the Global South, the seventy years of worldwide order, security, and prosperity that Ikenberry and Deudney associate with Pax Americana has been anything but ordered, secure, or prosperous.

### Indict — German Marshall Fund

#### The German Marshall fund is paid off.

Boland ’20 — Barbara TAC’s foreign policy and national security reporter. Previously, she worked as an editor for the Washington Examiner and for CNS News. October 14, 2020; "Top 50 U.S. Think Tanks Receive Over $1B from Gov, Defense Contractors"; *American Conservative*; https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/swamp-report-top-50-u-s-think-tanks-receive-over-1b-from-gov-defense-contractors/; //CYang

The Top 10 Think Tanks by Amount Received from U.S. Government and Defense Contractors

RAND Corporation $1,029,100,000

Center for a New American Security (CNAS) $8,956,000

Atlantic Council $8,697,000

New America Foundation $7,283,828

German Marshall Fund of the United States $6,599,999

CSIS $5,040,000

Council on Foreign Relations $2,590,000

Brookings Institution $2,485,000

Heritage Foundation $1,375,000

Stimson Center $1,343,753

### Indict — Hausfather

#### Hausfather doesn’t know how to do math.

**Langridge ’21** — Nick Langridge, PhD researcher at the University of Bath, Universal Basic Income Researcher, studying degrowth; (May 18th, 2021; “Can we really grow our way out of the ecological crisis?”; *Center for Development Studies, University of Bath*; <https://blogs.bath.ac.uk/cds/2021/05/18/can-we-really-grow-our-way-out-of-the-ecological-crisis/>; //LFS—JCM)

The green growth strategy is reliant on absolute decoupling. This assumes that the pressures economies exert on the environment can and will decline as GDP continues to grow (Haberl et al., 2020). New research by Hausfather (2021), published by the Breakthrough Institute last month, now claims to have found evidence of such decoupling, sparking renewed debate among green growth and degrowth advocates. While yet to go through peer review, the research claims that the absolute decoupling of CO2 emissions from economic growth has occurred in a select number of (largely Global North) countries. Between 2005 and 2019, 32 countries managed to decouple their CO2 emissions, both territorial and consumption, from growth in GDP. Several prominent ecomodernists and green growth advocates have declared these findings to be proof that we can grow our way out of the ecological crisis.

But do such claims stand up to scrutiny? There are five reasons to doubt that they do. First, the emissions counted in the research do not provide the complete picture. While they cover both territorial and consumption-based emissions, those from land use changes, international shipping and aviation are not included. These are not trivial figures and, unlike other sectors, they are continuing to increase: international aviation emissions are up 140% since 1990 (Mattioli, 2020). Second, the research only considers emissions from CO2; other greenhouse gases – methane, nitrous oxide, and ozone – are not included. Emissions of methane – a greenhouse gas with 80 times the warming power of CO2 – began rising in 2007 after a seven-year period of stability. Since 2014, the rate of increase has more than doubled, with emissions from livestock production to satisfy the Global North’s demand for meat being the primary cause (Fletcher and Schaefer, 2019).

Third, the research also does not include the use of material resources more broadly, which are on the rise and still tightly coupled with GDP. In fact, the global economy has been rematerializing since the turn of the century, meaning an increase in the material intensity of the growth of GDP (Parrique et al., 2019). This is not likely to abate in the future. A World Bank report in 2017 showed that powering the global economy through renewables will require massive increases in material extraction – including a 2,700% increase in lithium. This is before any economic growth is taken into account (Hickel, 2020). Dittrich et al. (2012) estimated that global resource extraction would total 180 billion tons by 2050. The sustainable annual limit is 50 billion tons (Bringezu, 2015).

Fourth, and relatedly, the research provides no evidence of absolute decoupling - of CO2 or otherwise – yet occurring at the global level. Given that the ecological crisis is a global problem, and the timescales require a halving of greenhouse gas emissions by 2030, with total net zero to be achieved by 2050, this is a major obstacle. Green growth advocates therefore speak of negative-emissions technologies, such as the Bio-energy with Climate Capture and Storage (BECCS) which is present in the majority of IPCC scenarios. Unfortunately, this technology has never been shown to work at scale, and the land requirements total an area two to three times the size of India, the ecological implications of which would be devastating and fall disproportionately on the Global South (Hickel, 2020).

Fifth, the research has also been subject to several methodological critiques, the main one being the use of regression analysis rather than actual emissions figures, painting an overly optimistic impression. While both methods come with their own issues, this demonstrates the importance of waiting for peer review before making any sweeping assertions.

### Indict — Heritage Foundation

#### The Heritage Foundation’s paid off.

Boland ’20 — Barbara TAC’s foreign policy and national security reporter. Previously, she worked as an editor for the Washington Examiner and for CNS News. October 14, 2020; "Top 50 U.S. Think Tanks Receive Over $1B from Gov, Defense Contractors"; *American Conservative*; https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/swamp-report-top-50-u-s-think-tanks-receive-over-1b-from-gov-defense-contractors/; //CYang

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Brookings Institution $2,485,000

Heritage Foundation $1,375,000

Stimson Center $1,343,753

#### Heritage foundation is bought off.

Lazare ’21 — Sarah; web editor and reporter for In These Times. November 17, 2021; "Think Tank Funded by the Weapons Industry Pressures Biden Not To Regulate Military Contractors’ Emissions"; *In These Times*; https://inthesetimes.com/article/heritage-foundation-lockheed-martin-weapons-industry-climate-regulation-biden; //CYang

The Heritage Foundation, a prominent conservative think tank, is publicly opposing a new Biden administration regulation that would force the weapons industry to report its greenhouse gas emissions related to federal contracts. It turns out the Heritage Foundation also receives significant funding from the weapons industry, which makes the case worth examining — because it reveals how the arms industry pays supposedly respectable institutions to do its policy bidding at the expense of a planet careening toward large-scale climate disaster.

The regulation in question was first proposed in an executive order in May. It would require federal contractors to disclose their greenhouse gas emissions and their ​“climate-related financial risk,” and to set ​“science-based reduction targets.” In other words, companies like Lockheed Martin would have to disclose how much carbon pollution its F‑35 aircraft and cluster bombs actually cause.

In October, the Biden administration started the process to amend federal procurement rules to reflect these changes. ​“Today’s action sends a strong signal that in order to do business with the federal government, companies must protect consumers by beginning to mitigate the impact of climate change on their operations and supply chains,” Shalanda Young, acting director of the White House Office of Management and Budget, said at the time.

The Department of Defense is the world’s biggest institutional consumer of fossil fuels and a bigger carbon polluter than 140 countries. Yet its emissions (and those of other armed forces) are excluded from UN climate negotiations, including the recent COP26 talks. The Biden administration itself supports a massive military budget, initially requesting $753 billion for the 2022 National Defense Authorization Act, a number that has since ballooned, with the Senate set to vote on a $778 billion plan. Organizers and researchers argue that, to curb the climate crisis, it is necessary to roll back U.S. militarism and dismantle the military budget.

But according to the Heritage Foundation, even this modest proposal is a bridge too far. Earlier in November, Maiya Clark, research associate in the Heritage Foundation’s Center for National Defense, wrote an article blasting the proposed changes as harmful to the ​“defense industrial base” of the United States. ​“The additional expense of measuring, reporting, and reducing contractors’ greenhouse gas emissions would in turn be passed along to their customer: the Department of Defense,” she writes in the article, co-published in the conservative Washington Examiner. As a result, Clark argues, the Department of Defense wouldn’t be able to afford the items it needs to fortify itself, threatening America’s war-fighting ability.

“Defense industrial base” is a buzzword that has picked up steam during the pandemic: It sends the message that, whatever happens with the economy and pandemic, we need to make sure we are in ​“fighting shape” — by keeping military contractors afloat. This concept was invoked to explain why, at the beginning of the pandemic, factories that produce bombs and tankers should be allowed to stay open, even amid the outbreak risk to workers. And it was also used to justify subsidies to contractors during the hardship of the pandemic.

Clark’s framing could lead one to believe that the Department of Defense is forced to resort to bake sales to afford its F‑35s. In reality, the United States has the largest military budget in the world by far — greater than the next 11 countries combined. And that trend is poised to remain as Congress moves to pass another mammoth military budget. As Lindsay Koshgarian, program director for National Priorities Project, a research organization, tells In These Times: ​“The idea that the military industrial complex is in danger is laughable. This is an industry that took in $3.4 trillion in public funds in the last ten years, more than half of all military spending during that time. That kind of funding should at the very least come with some accountability.”

Ultimately, Clark’s piece argues that the regulations are unfair to companies. Clark writes that ​“adding burdensome regulations to the already onerous Federal Acquisition Regulation would create a difficult or even impossible task for contractors, leading some firms to simply exit the defense market. The largest defense contractors for the biggest programs, like Lockheed Martin for the F‑35 or Huntington Ingalls for the Ford-class aircraft carrier, would somehow have to collect emissions data for their tens of thousands of subcontractors and suppliers.”

Clark leaves unexplained why the financial well-being of a company that manufactured the bomb that killed 40 Yemeni children in a school bus in 2018 should be weighted more heavily than modest regulations aimed at staving off humanity-threatening climate change. What’s more, Lockheed Martin is doing just fine financially, and has received considerable help from the government during the pandemic.

Most importantly, Clark leaves out this critical detail: Lockheed Martin is just one of numerous weapons manufacturers that has directly funded the Heritage Foundation. According to a report by the think tank Center for International Policy (CIP), the Heritage Foundation ranks ninth among the top think tanks that received funding from military contractors and the U.S. government from 2014 to 2019. Lockheed Martin and Raytheon were two of those major funders, both of which are among the largest weapons companies in the world and would be impacted by the new regulation.

Ben Freeman, author of the CIP report, says, ​“Unfortunately, since that report was published, Heritage has moved towards full secrecy on donors, and doesn’t publish any specifics,” but adds he is ​“100%” certain the think tank still receives funding from the weapons industry. ​“If they had suddenly stopped, I’d be shocked,” he tells In These Times.

The Heritage Foundation did not respond to a request from In These Times for information about its funding sources, but even under the unlikely scenario that the Heritage Foundation decided to drastically halt its cash stream from weapons companies, the documented donations are recent enough that, likely, the programs or staffers that money funded are still around. Regardless, the article raises questions about what kind of advocacy the weapons industry might be doing behind closed doors. And the fact that it name-checks the hardships imposed on Lockheed Martin, which we know has provided funding to the Heritage Foundation, certainly raises eyebrows.

This case provides a window into the murky world of think tanks, which are often viewed as academic and above-the-fray institutions but operate more as lobbying outfits. If Lockheed Martin were to run its own public relations campaign against the Biden administration’s climate regulation, the public might rightfully be skeptical of a company that markets weapons; an influential and prominent think tank, with its long history of influencing government, is better positioned to take up such a cause.

### Indict — Kagan

#### Kagan’s an idiot.

Lind 19, Michael Lind is a visiting professor at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas, a contributing editor to the National Interest and author of “The American Way of Strategy.”, (Michael, “Robert Kagan’s big wrong idea”, The Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/03/26/robert-kagans-big-wrong-idea/) //CHC-DS

In Kagan’s world, Washington is to global ideology what Paris is to fashion. Because of America’s failure to somehow check the illiberal rule of Vladimir Putin, Kagan writes: “An authoritarian ‘backlash’ spread globally, from Egypt to Turkey to Venezuela to Zimbabwe, as the remaining authoritarian regimes, following Putin’s example, began systematically restricting the space of civil society, cutting it off from its foreign supporters, and curbing free expression and independent media.” But Egypt’s secular military did not need the permission provided by “Putin’s example” to overthrow the Islamist president of Egypt, Mohamed Morsi, any more than the Islamist president of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, needed Putin’s example to purge Turkey’s secular military.

Could any claim be more absurd than this? Yes — Kagan’s claim that Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump are American versions of the supposed global “authoritarian” backlash: “And, of course, the United States has been experiencing its own anti-liberal backlash. Indeed, these days the anti-liberal critique is so pervasive, at both ends of the political spectrum and in the most energetic segments of both political parties, that there is scarcely an old-style American liberal to be found.” Americans to the left of Clinton Democrats and the right of George W. Bush are “anti-liberals,” according to Kagan. This is red-baiting, or perhaps brown-baiting, by an adherent of the dead center in American politics.

Kagan repeatedly criticizes the Israeli scholar Yoram Hazony for arguing, in “The Virtue of Nationalism,” “that true democracy comes from nationalism, not liberalism.” Kagan’s distinction between liberalism and nationalism is common among Western academics and journalists, but it is confused. Liberalism, like democracy, refers to a form of government. Nationalism refers to a kind of state, a state identified with a cultural and linguistic (not necessarily an ethnic or religious) majority.

For two centuries, since the American and French revolutions, the most important contest of political models has been between the nation-state (democratic or undemocratic, liberal or illiberal) and the multinational state (democratic or undemocratic, liberal or illiberal). Most multinational empires, from the Habsburgs, Ottomans and Hohenzollerns to the Soviet Union, have crumbled into nation-states, democratic or otherwise. So have a number of dysfunctional multinational states such as the former Czechoslovakia, the former Yugoslavia and the former Sudan.

Few, if any, of the major conflicts in the world today are battles between liberalism and authoritarianism. Almost all involve nationalism, whether that of stateless nations that want their own nation-states, such as the Palestinians and Kurds and Catalans, or powerful nation-states such as China and Russia, which wish to increase their regional influence for nationalist reasons. To the extent that the European Union and the Pax Americana resemble liberal empires in the service of their own dominant nations — the Germans, French and Americans — the prospects for pan-Western anti-national liberalism are not bright. Giuseppe Mazzini, William Gladstone, Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt understood that liberalism and democracy are most likely to succeed when aligned with national self-determination rather than opposed to it.

As a former neoconservative foreign policy analyst like Kagan, I recognize the call-to-arms genre in which he writes. From the 1950s to the 1980s, Cold War liberals, later called neoconservatives, individually and through groups such as the Committee on the Present Danger sought to awaken their fellow citizens to the threat of communism without and within. Comparisons to the 1930s were common; among the neocons, it was always 1939.

These jeremiads seemed plausible at a time when there really was a hostile superpower promoting a universal secular creed. But even then the idea that the Cold War was a battle of -isms between democracy and communism was wrong. The United States fought two savage wars in Korea and Indochina supporting allied authoritarian dictatorships and defeated the Soviet Union in the 1980s as a de facto ally of communist China.

In today’s multipolar world of low-level, traditional great-power rivalries over regional spheres of influence, prosecuted more in trade and industrial policies and alliance diplomacy than on the military and propaganda fronts, what is needed is sober realism, not anachronistic, Manichean Cold War thinking that unites simple-minded dichotomies with crusading fervor. Realpolitik is back. In fact, it never went away.

#### Kagan’s logic is a Cold War paradigm that justifies never-ending wars.

Mitchell 19, Joshua Mitchell is a professor of Government at Georgetown University and a “1776 Unites” partner., (Joshua, “What Robert Kagan Gets Wrong about Liberalism and Authoritarianism”, Providence Magazine, https://providencemag.com/2019/05/what-robert-kagan-gets-wrong-about-liberalism-and-authoritarianism/) //CHC-DS

Few men are more dangerous than ones who have great authority in the field of foreign policy and who defend a bad theory. Robert Kagan is the former; his recent article “The Strongmen Strike Back” does the latter. In it, he declares that the great battle of our time has commenced—between the liberal democratic world and authoritarianism. Let us delight in simple, Manichean oppositions.

Our two great military failures since the post-World War II period—the Vietnam War and our ongoing, unsettling, and ill-defined military engagements in the Middle East—were justified on the basis of Manichean oppositions of the sort that Kagan offers his readers, which, without much imagination, justify yet more unproductive, bloodletting, treasury-depleting, military interventions in foreign lands in the years ahead. Vietnam? Our leading lights were so entranced by the opposition between “liberalism” and communism that the idea that Vietnam was a post-colonial war of national independence was inconceivable. The Middle East? Our leading lights were so enamored by the opposition between “liberalism” and Islamic fundamentalism that the idea that the nations of the Middle East are involved in an internal wrestling match with modernity that we cannot successfully referee was unthinkable. “Liberalism.” The abstract universal “idea” against which all the forces of darkness align, and because of which never-ending wars must be authorized—communism after World War II; Islamic fundamentalism after 2001; and now, authoritarianism in its various guises, without distinction, from Trump and his Deplorables, to Orban and his “White Christians.” Everyone who does not believe in the abstract universal “idea” of liberalism is an authoritarian at heart; they differ only with respect to the political power they have at their disposal to impose their wretched prejudices on others.

Let us take up Kagan’s “liberalism,” and see what it really amounts to. The deadly flaw of Manichean thinking is that it locks two opposing parties in endless and unresolvable struggle, not least because each party is a caricature that becomes substantive only in relationship to its caricatured opposite. Kagan’s “liberalism” is one of those parties. “Liberalism,” Kagan tells us, is the result of the Enlightenment, which is self-evidently synonymous with the French Revolution and the “all men are created equal” clause of the American Declaration of Independence. This is intellectually reckless and irresponsible. The Enlightenment was not one; it was many, each having distinct national characteristics. John Locke, Kagan’s liberal founder, wrote a century before the French Revolution, and never would have endorsed a revolution based on abstract and universal rights, as the French Revolution was. The French Revolution sought to overthrow everything, even the Gregorian calendar. Locke remained a Christian throughout his life and sought to defend property and the integrity of the (Christian) family. If Locke must be painted as a universalist, it is as a Christian universalist that it ought to be done. Later, purportedly secular, Enlightenment figures tried to strip away Locke’s Christianity, and to develop a universal theory of history based on the development of reason—as Kagan notes Hegel attempted to do. Have we forgotten Nietzsche, who in the 1870s demonstrated to the embarrassment ever afterward of German idealism that Hegel’s universal history was Christianity in disguise? The bitter fruit of Nietzsche’s revelation is the post-modern morass in which we now find ourselves, about which Kagan says nothing. Ironically, the depiction of Locke as a liberal, committed to abstract universals, is something the very conservatives for whom Kagan shows such contempt have asserted since the dawn of the Conservative Movement in the mid-1950s.

#### Kagan refuses to recognize that global antagonism is driven by US interventionism.

Coughlin 19, Richard W. Coughlin received a Ph.D. in Political Science from Syracuse University and has taught at Drury University and Florida Gulf Coast University. At this latter institution he is currently an Associate Professor of Political Science., (Richard H. “Review Feature – The US Foreign Policy Consensus in Crisis”, E-International Relations, <https://www.e-ir.info/2019/10/09/review-feature-the-us-foreign-policy-consensus-in-crisis/>) //CHC-DS

Kagan refuses to consider how differences are interactively produced. Consider a contemporary articulation of difference featured in Kagan’s text. Here is Bill Clinton contrasting the domain of liberal globalization associated with legitimate trade, investment and travel (of authorized persons) with a recalcitrant external environment of “outlaw nations…an unholy axis of terrorists, drug traffickers, and organized international criminals” (quoted in Kagan 2018, p. 97). Like all the other liberal elites Kagan cites, Clinton’s words are taken at face value. Kagan’s logic of difference locates aggression, violence and danger as forces that are external to liberalism and which, therefore, cannot have been produced by liberalism. We have not had a hand in creating any of the monsters that we seek to destroy. Never mind that the US led globalization has shaped the security environment in which all of these actors have emerged. This is a point demonstrated by Ioan Grillo’s (2016) account of gangster warlords in Latin America: they have emerged not as an exception to the good, decent liberal order championed by the US, but rather as a result of the violent exclusions that its implantation, via structural adjustment policies, free trade agreements and ongoing security cooperation policies, have engendered.

Kagan does not spend time worrying about peripheral regions of the global economy or about marginalized people. He is more concerned with the pacification of power politics, marked by the post-World War Two conversion of Germany and Japan into pacifist states that disavowed the struggle for power and national greatness to instead dedicate their national energies to liberal progress within the context of an open world economy, which US power would secure. When the Cold War ended, Russia and China were offered a similar deal. The Soviets could withdraw from Eastern Europe (and renounce communism) without worrying about German reunification because of the US capacity to contain power politics. China could follow the positive example of Japan (and not the negative example of inter-war imperial Japan) and reject the pursuit of state power and focus instead on getting rich. Too bad that they did not take the message to heart. For its part, Russia cares more about its power than its security and, in any event, Russian security perceptions, warped by its great power aspirations, ought not matter (Kagan 2018, p. 89). What is important is that NATO expansion made Europe whole and free (Never mind, as well, that George Kennan warned, correctly, that the US driven expansion into the Eastern Europe would antagonize Russia. Kennan is an unquestionable authority when his views coincide with Kagan’s, but otherwise, he is quite dispensable). Russia could have lived with that, but it chose not to for reasons of national pride (Kagan 2018, p. 111). Similarly, China’s dream of empire is also a manifestation of pride rather than acceptance of liberal order as a context for national development (Kagan 2018, p. 117). Apparently only the United States, suggests Kagan, can aspire to greatness because only its aspirations are worthwhile.

### Indict — McAfee

#### 1---His data set for dematerialization and green growth ignore resource extraction and production, disproves his entire thesis for sustainability.

Jason Hickel 20. He holds a bachelor's degree in anthropology from Wheaton College. Received his PhD in anthropology from the University of Virginia in August 2011. Taught at the London School of Economics from 2011 to 2017, where he held a Leverhulme Early Career Fellowship. He is currently senior lecturer in anthropology at Goldsmiths, University of London and a Visiting Senior Fellow at the International Inequalities Institute at the London School of Economics. “A RESPONSE TO MCAFEE: NO, THE "ENVIRONMENTAL KUZNETS CURVE" WON'T SAVE US.” <https://www.jasonhickel.org/blog/2020/10/9/response-to-mcafee>.

A number of people have asked me to respond to a piece that Andrew McAfee wrote for Wired, promoting his book, which claims that rich countries - and specifically the United States - have accomplished the miracle of “green growth” and “dematerialization”, absolutely decoupling GDP from resource use. I had critiqued the book’s central claims here and here, pointing out that the data he relies on is not in fact suitable for the purposes to which he puts it.

In short, McAfee uses data on domestic material consumption (DMC), which tallies up the resources that a nation extracts and consumes each year. But this metric ignores a crucial piece of the puzzle. While it includes the imported goods an economy relies on, it does not include the resources involved in extracting, producing, and transporting those goods. Because the United States and other rich economies have come to rely so heavily on production that happens in other countries, that side of resource use has been conveniently shifted off their books.

In other words, what looks like “green growth” is really just an artifact of globalization. Given how much the U.S. economy relies on globalization, McAfee’s data cannot be legitimately compared to U.S. GDP, and cannot be used to make claims about dematerialization. If McAfee wants to compare GDP to domestic resource consumption, then he needs to first subtract the share of US GDP that is derived from production that happens elsewhere. He does not. Nor is this possible to do.

Ecological economists have been aware of this problem for a long time. To correct for it, they use a more holistic metric called “raw material consumption,” or Material Footprint, which fully accounts for materials embodied in trade. When we look at this data, the story changes. We see that resource use in the United States hasn’t been falling at all; in fact, it has been rising along with GDP. The same is true of all other major industrial economies. There has been zero dematerialization. No green growth. And indeed when it comes to excess resource use, rich countries are the biggest problem - not the saviours that McAfee suggests they are.

#### 2---The EKC argument doesn’t account for other environmental variables.

Jason Hickel 20. He holds a bachelor's degree in anthropology from Wheaton College. Received his PhD in anthropology from the University of Virginia in August 2011. Taught at the London School of Economics from 2011 to 2017, where he held a Leverhulme Early Career Fellowship. He is currently senior lecturer in anthropology at Goldsmiths, University of London and a Visiting Senior Fellow at the International Inequalities Institute at the London School of Economics. “A RESPONSE TO MCAFEE: NO, THE "ENVIRONMENTAL KUZNETS CURVE" WON'T SAVE US.” <https://www.jasonhickel.org/blog/2020/10/9/response-to-mcafee>.

1. First, McAfee points to the fact that rich nations have reduced their air pollution. This is proof, he says, of the Environmental Kuznets Curve, where impacts rise with GDP up to a point, and then begin to decline as GDP continues to go up. McAfee says “The EKC is a direct refutation of a core idea of degrowth: that environmental harms must always rise as populations and economies do. It's not surprising that today's degrowth advocates rarely discuss the large reductions in air and water pollution that have accompanied higher prosperity in so many places around the world.”

In reality, degrowth scholarship is full of references to the EKC; it is widely acknowledged. McAfee would know this if he engaged with the degrowth literature. We note, however, that the EKC is known to apply to only a limited range of impacts (such as air pollution). It does not apply to impacts like resource use and energy use, which rise inexorably along with economic growth (and which are, for this reason, the focus of degrowth analysis). The spottiness of the EKC is well established in the empirical literature (see, for instance, Stern’s recent review, “The Environmental Kuznets Curve After 25 Years”). McAfee ignores this fact in order to create the impression (as in the quote above) that the EKC applies universally to all environmental harms. There is nothing to be gained by papering over the nuance in the EKC literature.

Moreover, even where the EKC does apply, the literature is increasingly clear that it’s not income growth itself that drives the reduction in pollution (as McAfee implies when he says “prosperity bends the curve”); rather, it is policy interventions, and specifically legal limits. London’s mayor Sadiq Khan has massively reduced the city’s air pollution over the past couple of years. Is this because London’s GDP has suddenly increased? No, it’s because Khan, unlike his predecessor, has introduced laws to reduce air pollution. This could have been done decades earlier with the same effect, regardless of how much GDP the city might have had at any given time.

Indeed, Stern’s conclusions about the relationship between GDP and pollution are worth noting: “The effect of economic growth on pollution is generally positive… The evidence shows that over recent decades economic growth has increased both pollution emissions and concentrations, ceteris paribus [i.e., when controlling for all other factors]... This reinforces the early concerns that the EKC literature might encourage policy-makers to incorrectly de-emphasize environmental policy and pursue growth as a solution instead.” And that’s exactly the error that McAfee has committed.

So, yes, air pollution can be decoupled from GDP, with policy. We have known this for a long time. But that has nothing to do with the question of dematerialization, which is the focus of McAfee’s book, and which is the specific claim I have critiqued. Nor does it have to do with the broader problem of ecological breakdown, or the broader question of whether “green growth” is possible. In other words, yes, it’s good news that air pollution is going down, but this is certainly no sign that everything is rosy.

### Indict — Mosseau

#### Mousseau’s database omits every Latin American intervention from 1816-1992

Ruben Gonzalez-Vicente 4-1-18. University Lecturer in Global Political Economy at the Universitet Leiden. Assistant Professor, Department of Asian and International Studies, City University of Hong Kong.  PhD in Geography, St. John's College, University of Cambridge. MPhil in Asian and International Studies, City University of Hong Kong. BA in Chinese Studies, Autonomous University of Madrid. BA in English Philology, University of A Coruña. "The liberal peace fallacy: violent neoliberalism and the temporal and spatial traps of state-based approaches to peace," Taylor & Francis, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21622671.2018.1550012

3 A closely aligned set of literature on the issue of ‘democratic peace’ demonstrates also the malleability of definitions, often tainted by US-friendly readings of history. For example, an article by Michael Mousseau based on the Militarized Interstate Dispute data set omits every US intervention in Latin America from 1816 to 1992 (except for a dispute with Ecuador in 1980), allowing the author to conclude that ‘joint highly democratic dyads are about 3 times more likely  …  to resolve their militarized conflicts with mutual concessions’ (Mousseau, [1998](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21622671.2018.1550012), p. 210; see also Bremer, [1993](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21622671.2018.1550012)).

### Indict — New America Foundation

#### The New America Foundation receives tons of money from defense contractors.

Boland ’20 — Barbara TAC’s foreign policy and national security reporter. Previously, she worked as an editor for the Washington Examiner and for CNS News. October 14, 2020; "Top 50 U.S. Think Tanks Receive Over $1B from Gov, Defense Contractors"; *American Conservative*; https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/swamp-report-top-50-u-s-think-tanks-receive-over-1b-from-gov-defense-contractors/; //CYang

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Stimson Center $1,343,753

### Indict — Pinker

#### **Pinker’s sexist, racist and promotes sxxual assault!!**

Yakushko et al. ‘18 — Oksana; Ph.D., Counseling Psychology, University of Missouri-Columbia. Dr. Yakushko’s training and interests span depth psychology, women and gender studies, and psychology. Dr. Yakushko has published over 50 peer reviewed articles, book chapters, and book reviews. She has received several awards for her scholarly work and activism including an APA Presidential Citations and the Oliva Espin Social Justice Award. Other Contributors: George Lipsitz, and Aranye Fradenburg Joy. October 11, 2018; “‘Enlightened’ Denials”; *Independent*; <https://www.independent.com/2018/10/11/enlightened-denials/>; //CYang

**[\*\*TW\*\* — this card has non-graphic descriptions of rxpe and sxxual assault]**

We urge you to look at the science and scientists Pinker promotes in his Enlightenment Now and his other works such as The Blank Slate (2002/2016), namely, F. Galton (founder of eugenics or “science of racial betterment”), E. O. Wilson (social biologist who explained racial inequality as based on evolution and not racism), Herrnstein & Murray (who claimed to supposedly empirically verify overall lower intelligence levels among African Americans), and Thornhill & Palmer (authors of the Natural History of Rape who claim rape is not a form of social violence but an evolutionary adaptive sex).

Pinker defends eugenic and racist studies, like the Tuskegee syphilis experiments, and recasts them as a “one-time failure to prevent harm to a few dozen people with the prevention of hundreds of millions of deaths per century in perpetuity.” Notably, Pinker (New Republic, 2005) was the key supporter of Lawrence Summers after Summers was dismissed from his post as president of Harvard University for claiming that men “outperform” women in sciences and mathematics because of gender-based biological differences and not social biases.

Many of Pinker’s assertions have been questioned by concerned scientists and social critics, including his statements that stereotypes are true because they are based on “census figures” (such as income, education, or crime statistics); that eugenic “breeding” of people based on “intelligence and character” is a good idea; that affirmative action is not only “discriminating against whites” but is wrong because minorities’/women’s under-representation reflects their lack of supposed inborn biological capacities in these areas; or that treating rape as a form of violence is “an example of extraordinary popular delusion and the madness of crowds.”

Pinker claims that because his views are supposedly based on scientific data, they must be the “truth” and “cannot be sexist” or support hate. In reality, the very same science and scientists Pinker often promotes are used by contemporary racist and misogynistic writers. For example, some of Pinker’s statements are an eerie echo of an introduction to David Duke’s My Awakening written by a “behavioral genetics” psychologist, who claimed that Duke, the KKK and white supremacy leader, provided “discoveries of honest truths that are politically incorrect. One of his honest truths is that from a thorough immersion in modern science [Duke] became convinced that racial egalitarianism is the scientific equivalent of the flat-Earth theory.”

### Indict — RAND

#### RAND is paid off.

Boland ’20 — Barbara TAC’s foreign policy and national security reporter. Previously, she worked as an editor for the Washington Examiner and for CNS News. October 14, 2020; "Top 50 U.S. Think Tanks Receive Over $1B from Gov, Defense Contractors"; *American Conservative*; https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/swamp-report-top-50-u-s-think-tanks-receive-over-1b-from-gov-defense-contractors/; //CYang

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#### RAND is literally employed to expand militarism

Abella 9 [Alex Abella is an American author and journalist best known for his non-fiction works Soldiers of Reason: The RAND Corporation and the Rise of the American Empire and Shadow Enemies: Hitler's Secret Terrorist Plot Against the United States, 6-30-2009, The Rand Corporation: The Think Tank That Controls America, Mental Floss, https://www.mentalfloss.com/article/22120/rand-corporation-think-tank-controls-america] Eric

Although President Truman passed on the space station, the military fell in love with RAND. Through Hap's connections, the Air Force quickly became the think tank's main contractor, and RAND began consulting on everything from propeller turbines to missile defense. Before long, the organization was so flush with contracts that it had to hire hundreds of additional researchers to keep up. In recruitment ads, RAND bragged about its intellectual genealogy, tracing a direct line from its president, Frank Collbohm, to Isaac Newton. Whether or not that claim was true, the institute secured a reputation as the place to dream up new ways to wage wars and keep enemies at bay.

By the 1960s, America's rivals were paying attention. The Soviet newspaper Pravda nicknamed RAND "the academy of science and death and destruction." American outfits preferred to call them the "wizards of Armageddon."

War Games

The Soviets had good reason to worry about RAND. In 1957, the Air Force hired the think tank to create spy satellites. Within two years, it developed CORONA—a covert system that aimed to send camera-carrying satellites into orbit on the backs of missiles. While the idea was genius, the design was flawed. It took 13 failed attempts before the system finally got off the ground in 1959. Once it did, however, the results were spectacular. The CORONA satellite returned with 161 lbs. of film about the Soviet Union, more footage than spy planes had recovered in the previous four years combined. For the following decade, CORONA became the backbone of American intelligence on the Soviet Union. Researchers watched troops march along the Russian border with China and spied on cities they'd never seen before. They could even count the fruit in Soviet orchards and analyze their crops.

By the early 1960s, RAND had established itself as a fixture of U.S. policy. Branching out from straight rocket science, the think tank had become the center of the nation's nuclear strategy.

#### Rand is fundamental to U.S militarism

Johnson 8 [Chalmers Johnson's latest book is Nemesis: The Last Days of the American Republic, now available in a Holt Paperback. It is the third volume of his Blowback Trilogy, 4-30-2008, The RAND Corporation: America's University of Imperialism, Global Policy, https://archive.globalpolicy.org/empire/intervention/2008/0430rand.htm] Eric

The RAND Corporation of Santa Monica, California, was set up immediately after World War II by the U.S. Army Air Corps (soon to become the U.S. Air Force). The Air Force generals who had the idea were trying to perpetuate the wartime relationship that had developed between the scientific and intellectual communities and the American military, as exemplified by the Manhattan Project to develop and build the atomic bomb.

Soon enough, however, RAND became a key institutional building block of the Cold War American empire. As the premier think tank for the U.S.'s role as hegemon of the Western world, RAND was instrumental in giving that empire the militaristic cast it retains to this day and in hugely enlarging official demands for atomic bombs, nuclear submarines, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and long-range bombers. Without RAND, our military-industrial complex, as well as our democracy, would look quite different.

### Indict — Rhonheimer

#### Rhonheimer is wrong—relies on a priori assumptions, ignores counter evidence, and his argument is tautological and ignores crises of capitalism.

Baruchello 16—Professor of Philosophy at the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences of the University of Akureyri, Iceland, Ph.D. in philosophy (Giorgio. “The Inconceivable Failure of Free-Market Liberalism.” *Romanian Review of Political Sciences and International Relations*, vol. XII, no. 1, 2015, pp. 122–24, <https://2c2e45e5-12d6-4ee7-81f3-41c6c611007c.filesusr.com/ugd/1c5576_b1eb2c551e814752adbee277548b4e38.pdf)//mgm>

The distance from concrete societies increases further whenever it is asserted, as Rhonheimer (2012) does, that the “free market” is an ideal (15), i.e. something that does not truly exist in reality (I shall not dwell on the contradiction entailed by his claim about free markets having existed worldwide only for a brief period of time in the 19th century). In other words, it is a purely theoretical construct, an empirical impossibility: the human being is actually incapable of operating according to it. Perfect **markets**, in whatever Hyperuranion they may be located, are therefore not to be **blamed** for crises, **unemployment** or any other misfortune that may befall upon us. **People are**. The former are not around. The latter are.

Rhonheimer (2012) seems not to notice the trouble some implications of such an approach, for not only does it mean that there is **no clear empirical evidence** that free markets are the **one**, necessary way to **prosperity**, but also that there cannot be any, for they have never been truly present, since they are not suited to “the human condition” (15). Moreover, he does not seem to notice that his approach is analogous to that of many 20th century Marxist zealots who, when confronted with the failures of Eastern Europe’s “real socialism“, argued that their theory was correct, since its practice alone had failed, given various and varying human flaws. In short, no amount of contrary evidence could disprove their stance.

6. Unfalsifiability The Marxist zealots’ case leads us to the most fundamental and most intractable conceptual knot of the liberal position with regard to the markets’ unique ability to generate prosperity. If (i) the genuine “free market” cannot be established, for it is a theoretical construct inconsistent with “the human condition”, and if (ii) the actual historical experience of what is commonly referred to as the “free market”, i.e. the history of mostly Western developed countries over the past three centuries, is one of considerably imperfect applications involving significant elements of State intervention (e.g. post-bellic Germany and USA), why is the market system necessarily responsible for wealth and, to some extent, wellbeing, whereas, say, significant State intervention and ownership are not? Why not the two of them together, on a par (cf. Rajan & Zingales, 2003)? Or why not either of them, or other factors (e.g. literacy, patriotism, military strength, science-technology), depending on the specific circumstances of each particular case, duly investigated by means of close historical, economic, legal, medical, sociological, anthropological, environmental and axiological analyses? Principled comparisons are possible, but they must rest on solid empirical ground (cf. Boldizzoni, 2011). Moreover, reality may well be messy, diverse and complex. Why should there be one necessary source of prosperity for all cases?33

By his own account and qualifications, Rhonheimer (2012) has no answer to these questions. Quite simply, he states his thesis and uses it to read history so as to be allowed to state it. In other words, Rhonheimer is **assuming a priori** that the “free market” produces **necessarily** wealth and, to some extent, **well being**. By means of that assumption he then proceeds to reading human history as its **verification** – State-led development, **recurrent crises**, **vast environmental degradation** and **social tragedies** notwithstanding.

This is not just a case of **rash oversimplification**, which it certainly is too, such that it would be necessary to pause and specify which forms of market transactions are beneficial in which ways to which groups of people under which circumstances. It is also a profound **methodological flaw**. It does not apply solely to Rhonheimer’s essay, but also to much political liberalism and mainstream economic thinking in general. In effect, it does begin with Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations and reaches its highest peak in laissez-faire economics, which argues that the “free market” is the necessary and sufficient condition for human prosperity. In all of its forms, it is an example of scientific **unfalsifiability**, or **pseudo-science**, for such an assumption, whereby “free markets” are **bound to generate prosperity**, admits of **no counter evidence34**:

First of all, insofar as it is assumed that unhindered markets bring about prosperity, **if we do not have prosperity now**, then we must simply wait and **abstain** from causing undue **hindrance**. As Christians and Marxists have long known, eschatology calls for patience; hence the recurrent phrases commonly attached to so-called “market reforms”: “transition”, “in the long run”, “long-term benefits”, “children and grandchildren”, etc. (e.g. Monti, 2013).

Secondly, if waiting is not a credible option, then we can always blame someone else, such as the government (e.g. “corruption”,“red tape”, “interference”, “distortion”), the trade unions (qua common example of “rent-seeking special interest group”) or some dishonest private actors (e.g. “**crony capitalism**”, “**State capture** by private interests”), for being **unfaithful** to the spirit of “free markets” and causing hindrance. Markets fail not; people do – although one can legitimately wonder what markets may be if not people transacting with one another within a certain normative setting (cf. Barden & Murphy, 2010).

Thirdly, insofar as Smith’s followers and ordoliberals à la Rhonheimer argue as well for the desirability of some State intervention (e.g. Smith’s progressive taxation, Presbyterian-style education of the youth, public regulation of banks and mentally destructive working conditions; Eucken’s redressing of socially detrimental market outcomes), they corner public authorities in a hopeless argumentative position. Given the starting point, growth and prosperity can always be seen as the result of the markets’ enduring degree of freedom – i.e. not of the State’s intervention – while **crisis and misery can** always be **blamed onto the State** – i.e. not onto the markets being actually **unable** to generate **growth** or genuine prosperity.35

(d) Operating under such an assumption, markets can never be wrong, whatever major environmental or social ills may have arisen. If things go well, it is because markets have been allowed to work out their “magic” (hence “rational agents” have responded to “incentives”, “entrepreneurship” has been “rewarded”, etc.): a textbook case. If things do not go well, then the guilty party is always someone or something else, including protectionism36, unpredictable “financial tsunamis”37 and excessive cocaine intake38. In short, the unintended consequences are such that, if they are positive, their intended premise is the free market; if negative, something else39.

### Indict — Smith

#### He’s a clown

**EJMR ’16** — Economics Job Market Rumors, Economist 8851, citing two school reports and professor data, so no, it’s not just a rumor that Noah Smith is not a qualified individual; (2016; “How Noah Smith got the Stony Brook offer”; *EJMR*; <https://www.econjobrumors.com/topic/how-noah-smith-got-the-stony-brook-offer>; //LFS—JCM)

I know most of you are puzzled by the fact that Noah Smith received an offer from Stony Brook. The university has a good reputation in the sciences and is a R1 or first tier research university. The economics department was also famous for game theory and even had Aumann. However, the econ department had no hand in his hiring and are embarrassed to be associated with him. The reason he got hired is because the business school is a complete clown fiesta. The bschool prior to 2010 pretty much only hired adjuncts and lecturers to teach classes and it is still not accredited (<http://www.stonybrook.edu/sb/plans/COB.pdf>, <http://www.usnews.com/education/online-education/stony-brook-university-suny-OBUS0595/business)>. The current Dean is a psychologist, and the applied mathematicians convinced the administration that applied math is how you build a good bschool.

### Indict — Stimson Center

#### The Stimson Center’s paid off.

Boland ’20 — Barbara TAC’s foreign policy and national security reporter. Previously, she worked as an editor for the Washington Examiner and for CNS News. October 14, 2020; "Top 50 U.S. Think Tanks Receive Over $1B from Gov, Defense Contractors"; *American Conservative*; https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/swamp-report-top-50-u-s-think-tanks-receive-over-1b-from-gov-defense-contractors/; //CYang

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### Indict — War on the Rocks

#### War on the Rocks is a literal tribe.

Owen ’17 — Laura Hazard; editor of Nieman Journalism Lab. March 30, 2017; "War on the Rocks is a national security site for a military “tribe” that knows what it’s talking about"; *Nieman Lab*; https://www.niemanlab.org/2017/03/war-on-the-rocks-is-a-national-security-site-for-a-military-tribe-that-knows-what-its-talking-about/; //CYang

The letter was published by War on the Rocks, a national security and foreign policy site that is attracting new audiences as a more general population becomes concerned about the country’s security under a volatile and impulsive president. But War on the Rocks isn’t changing the niche nature of its coverage; rather, it’s doubling down to provide content relevant to its “tribe.”

“Most of that Trump [letter] traffic was garbage traffic, not the people I want to be reading my website,” said Ryan Evans, the 33-year-old editor-in-chief of War on the Rocks. “I don’t want all the eyeballs in the world — I want the right eyeballs. If every guy that needs something to do for 30 seconds on his phone starts reading War on the Rocks, we’re doing something wrong. I want this to be a publication that you need if you work on national security.” Current and former military make up about 40 percent of War on the Rocks’ readership, he says; another bucket includes people in government as civilians, working on defense, diplomacy, and national security issues; there are also defense contractors, grad students, professional academics, and “people that are just very passionate about these topics,” including a number of journalists that cover them for the national media. (“You want to know a publication that is the worst at crediting? It’s The New York Times. They are shameless. They’ll pick us up, but it’s always an accident when I find it out, because they don’t link to us.”)

## Theory

### Theory — AT: Alt = Policy

#### FALSE CHOICE! Policy is neither predictable *nor* a useful starting point. Organizations are predictable AND overcome the absurdity of fiat.

David Graeber 18, former Prof at the London School of Economics, *Bullshit Jobs*, pp. 247-8, jy

Another reason I hesitate to make policy suggestions is that I am suspicious of the very idea of policy. Policy implies the existence of an elite group—government officials, typically—that gets to decide on something ("a policy") that they then arrange to be imposed on everybody else. There's a little mental trick we often play on ourselves when discussing such matters. We say, for instance, "What are we going to do about the problem of X?" as if "we" were society as a whole, somehow acting on ourselves, but, in fact, unless we happen to be part of that roughly 3 percent to 5 percent of the population whose views actually do affect policy makers, this is all a game of make-believe; we are identifying with our rulers when, in fact, we're the ones being ruled. This is what happens when we watch a politician on television say "What shall we do about the less fortunate?" even though at least half of us would almost certainly fit that category ourselves. Myself, I find such games particularly pernicious because I'd prefer not to have policy elites around at all. I'm personally an anarchist, which means that, not only do I look forward to a day sometime in the future when governments, corporations, and the rest will be looked at as historical curiosities in the same way as we now look at the Spanish Inquisition or nomadic invasions, but I prefer solutions to immediate problems that do not give more power to governments or corporations, but rather, give people the means to manage their own affairs.

It follows that when faced with a social problem my impulse is not to imagine myself in charge, and ponder what sort of solutions I would then impose, but to look for a movement already out there, already trying to address the problem and create its own solutions. The problem of bullshit jobs, though presents unusual challenges in this regard. There are no anti-bullshit job movements. This is partly because most people don't acknowledge the proliferation of bullshit jobs to be a problem, but also because even if they did, it would be difficult to organize a movement around such a problem. What local initiatives might such a movement propose? One could imagine unions or other worker organizations launching anti-bullshit initiatives in their own workplaces, or even across specific industries—but they would presumably call for the de-bullshitization of real work rather than firing people in unnecessary positions. It's not at all clear what a broader campaign against bullshit jobs would even look like. One might try to shorten the working week and hope things would sort themselves out in response. But it seems unlikely that they would. Even a successful campaign for a fifteen-hour week would be unlikely to cause the unnecessary jobs and industries to be spontaneously abandoned; at the same time, calling for a new government bureaucracy to assess the usefulness of jobs would inevitably itself turn into a vast generator of bullshit.

### Theory — AT: Private Actor Fiat

#### RECIPROCITY. The alt’s 3.5% of the domestic population — that’s 11.6 million. (3.5% × 331893745\*\* = 11616281.075)

David Robson 19, award-winning science writer specialising in the extremes of the human brain, body and behaviour, citing Erica Chenoweth, professor of public policy at Harvard and the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study, 5-13-19, "The '3.5% rule': How a small minority can change the world," https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20190513-it-only-takes-35-of-people-to-change-the-world, jy

There are, of course, many ethical reasons to use nonviolent strategies. But compelling research by Erica Chenoweth, a political scientist at Harvard University, confirms that civil disobedience is not only the moral choice; it is also the most powerful way of shaping world politics — by a long way.

Looking at hundreds of campaigns over the last century, Chenoweth found that nonviolent campaigns are twice as likely to achieve their goals as violent campaigns. And although the exact dynamics will depend on many factors, she has shown it takes around 3.5% of the population actively participating in the protests to ensure serious political change.

Chenoweth’s influence can be seen in the recent Extinction Rebellion protests, whose founders say they have been directly inspired by her findings. So just how did she come to these conclusions?

Needless to say, Chenoweth’s research builds on the philosophies of many influential figures throughout history. The African-American abolitionist Sojourner Truth, the suffrage campaigner Susan B Anthony, the Indian independence activist Mahatma Gandhi and the US civil rights campaigner Martin Luther King have all convincingly argued for the power of peaceful protest.

Yet Chenoweth admits that when she first began her research in the mid-2000s, she was initially rather cynical of the idea that nonviolent actions could be more powerful than armed conflict in most situations. As a PhD student at the University of Colorado, she had spent years studying the factors contributing to the rise of terrorism when she was asked to attend an academic workshop organised by the International Center of Nonviolent Conflict (ICNC), a non-profit organisation based in Washington DC. The workshop presented many compelling examples of peaceful protests bringing about lasting political change — including, for instance, the People Power protests in the Philippines.

But Chenoweth was surprised to find that no-one had comprehensively compared the success rates of nonviolent versus violent protests; perhaps the case studies were simply chosen through some kind of confirmation bias. “I was really motivated by some scepticism that nonviolent resistance could be an effective method for achieving major transformations in society,” she says

Working with Maria Stephan, a researcher at the ICNC, Chenoweth performed an extensive review of the literature on civil resistance and social movements from 1900 to 2006 — a data set then corroborated with other experts in the field. They primarily considered attempts to bring about regime change. A movement was considered a success if it fully achieved its goals both within a year of its peak engagement and as a direct result of its activities. A regime change resulting from foreign military intervention would not be considered a success, for instance. A campaign was considered violent, meanwhile, if it involved bombings, kidnappings, the destruction of infrastructure — or any other physical harm to people or property.

“We were trying to apply a pretty hard test to nonviolent resistance as a strategy,” Chenoweth says. (The criteria were so strict that India’s independence movement was not considered as evidence in favour of nonviolent protest in Chenoweth and Stephan’s analysis — since Britain’s dwindling military resources were considered to have been a deciding factor, even if the protests themselves were also a huge influence.)

By the end of this process, they had collected data from 323 violent and nonviolent campaigns. And their results — which were published in their book Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict — were striking.

Strength in numbers

Overall, nonviolent campaigns were twice as likely to succeed as violent campaigns: they led to political change 53% of the time compared to 26% for the violent protests.

This was partly the result of strength in numbers. Chenoweth argues that nonviolent campaigns are more likely to succeed because they can recruit many more participants from a much broader demographic, which can cause severe disruption that paralyses normal urban life and the functioning of society.

In fact, of the 25 largest campaigns that they studied, 20 were nonviolent, and 14 of these were outright successes. Overall, the nonviolent campaigns attracted around four times as many participants (200,000) as the average violent campaign (50,000).

The People Power campaign against the Marcos regime in the Philippines, for instance, attracted two million participants at its height, while the Brazilian uprising in 1984 and 1985 attracted one million, and the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia in 1989 attracted 500,000 participants.

“Numbers really matter for building power in ways that can really pose a serious challenge or threat to entrenched authorities or occupations,” Chenoweth says — and nonviolent protest seems to be the best way to get that widespread support.

Once around 3.5% of the whole population has begun to participate actively, success appears to be inevitable.

Besides the People Power movement, the Singing Revolution in Estonia and the Rose Revolution in Georgia all reached the 3.5% threshold

“There weren’t any campaigns that had failed after they had achieved 3.5% participation during a peak event,” says Chenoweth — a phenomenon she has called the “3.5% rule”. Besides the People Power movement, that included the Singing Revolution in Estonia in the late 1980s and the Rose Revolution in Georgia in the early 2003.

Chenoweth admits that she was initially surprised by her results. But she now cites many reasons that nonviolent protests can garner such high levels of support. Perhaps most obviously, violent protests necessarily exclude people who abhor and fear bloodshed, whereas peaceful protesters maintain the moral high ground.

Chenoweth points out that nonviolent protests also have fewer physical barriers to participation. You do not need to be fit and healthy to engage in a strike, whereas violent campaigns tend to lean on the support of physically fit young men. And while many forms of nonviolent protests also carry serious risks — just think of China’s response in Tiananmen Square in 1989 — Chenoweth argues that nonviolent campaigns are generally easier to discuss openly, which means that news of their occurrence can reach a wider audience. Violent movements, on the other hand, require a supply of weapons, and tend to rely on more secretive underground operations that might struggle to reach the general population.

By engaging broad support across the population, nonviolent campaigns are also more likely to win support among the police and the military — the very groups that the government should be leaning on to bring about order.

During a peaceful street protest of millions of people, the members of the security forces may also be more likely to fear that their family members or friends are in the crowd — meaning that they fail to crack down on the movement. “Or when they’re looking at the [sheer] numbers of people involved, they may just come to the conclusion the ship has sailed, and they don’t want to go down with the ship,” Chenoweth says.

In terms of the specific strategies that are used, general strikes “are probably one of the most powerful, if not the most powerful, single method of nonviolent resistance”, Chenoweth says. But they do come at a personal cost, whereas other forms of protest can be completely anonymous. She points to the consumer boycotts in apartheid-era South Africa, in which many black citizens refused to buy products from companies with white owners. The result was an economic crisis among the country’s white elite that contributed to the end of segregation in the early 1990s.

“There are more options for engaging and nonviolent resistance that don’t place people in as much physical danger, particularly as the numbers grow, compared to armed activity,” Chenoweth says. “And the techniques of nonviolent resistance are often more visible, so that it's easier for people to find out how to participate directly, and how to coordinate their activities for maximum disruption.”

\*\*Census 21, The United States Census Bureau, July 2021, “QuickFacts,” census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045221, jy

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| --- | --- |
| Population Estimates, July 1, 2021 (V2021) | 331,893,745 |

#### The aff fiats 21 million — insert chart of government employees that must uphold the plan.

Statista 21, data company, 2021, “Number of governmental employees in the U.S. from 1982 to 2021,” <https://www.statista.com/statistics/204535/number-of-governmental-employees-in-the-us/#:~:text=In%202021%2C%20around%2018.28%20million,million%20people%20in%20that%20year>., jy

[Number in millions. Blue represents federal employees. Black represents state and local employees]

Chart

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### Theory — AT: Utopian

#### The alt’s not utopian.

Kurki 22 [Milja Kurki; EH Carr Chair, Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University; 6-29-2022; "Relationality, Post-Newtonian International Relations, and Worldviews"; *Uncertainty and Its Discontents: Worldviews in World Politics*, Part I - Substantialism and Relationalism, Chapter 3; https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/uncertainty-and-its-discontents/4F8C9A81F97824652654F3BEC6E1F889; KL]

The relational perspective examined here, and relational perspectives more widely,Footnote57 do not come to IR or practical politics with disinterest. They come to it with a sense of deep disappointment and a certain level of anger and frustration about how our ways of doing and knowing international politics reproduce ways of “allowing” us to forget about how we must and could shift ways of doing politics. Relational perspectives, then, do not come to IR with a hope for an “invitation” into the IR parlor-game, but with a call for different kinds of dances altogether.

These new dances are not uninterested in the world, nor are they “theoretical,” “utopian,” or “impractical”; yet, they pull on our sensibilities, ways of being, and lifeways in some strange and uncomfortable ways. If you like, they pull us into the world differently; and encourage us to “commit” to world(s) around us differently. Crucially, within this (set of) worldview(s) who the communities are that matter are shifted, quite fundamentally, and, as a result, so are negotiating sites and modalities of politics. Instead of doing global governance of the humans and for the humans, engagement with politics might also entail immersion into marine communities or thinking with trees. And engagement with “humans” here too becomes less about modeling negotiations between abstract, autonomous humans and more about exploring various ways in which “humans” are made and cut the world around them, and not only as (abstract, universal) humans but also as “more-than-humans” (porously processing in mesh).

## Impact

### ! — Capitalism

#### Imperialism is the highest stage of capitalism — NATO’s an organization built for sustaining monopoly capitalism, a process that endlessly expands and divides territory for the market expansion.

Cheng Enfu and Lu Baolin 21, Enfu, Professor at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Baolin, writer, 5-1-2021, "Five Characteristics of Neoimperialism," https://monthlyreview.org/2021/05/01/five-characteristics-of-neoimperialism/, jy

The New Monopoly of the International Oligarchic Alliance

Lenin stated in Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism that “the epoch of the latest stage of capitalism shows us that certain relations between capitalist associations grow up, based on the economic division of the world; while parallel to and in connection with it, certain relations grow up between political alliances, between states, on the basis of the territorial division of the world, of the struggle for colonies, of the “struggle for spheres of influence.”31 Finance capital and its foreign policy, which is the struggle of the great powers for the economic and political division of the world, give rise to a number of transitional forms of state dependence. Two main groups of countries—those owning colonies and colonies themselves—are typical of this epoch, as are the diverse forms of dependent countries that, politically, are formally independent, but in fact are enmeshed in the net of financial and diplomatic dependence.32 Nowadays, neoimperialism has formed new alliances and hegemonic relations in the economic, political, cultural, and military fields.

Within the context of the new monopoly of the international oligarchs, the fourth characteristic of neoimperialism is the formation of an international monopoly capitalist alliance between one hegemon and several other great powers. An economic foundation consisting of money politics, vulgar culture, and military threats has been formed for them to exploit and oppress via monopoly both at home and abroad.

The G7 as the Mainstay of the Imperial Capitalist Core

Neoimperialism’s current international monopoly economic alliance and the framework of global economic governance are both dominated by the United States. The G6 group was formed in 1975 by six leading industrial countries, the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Japan, and Italy, and became G7 when Canada joined the following year. G7 and its monopoly organizations are the coordination platforms, while the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization are the functional bodies. The global order of economic governance that was set up under the Bretton Woods system after the Second World War is essentially a high-level international capitalist monopoly alliance manipulated by the United States to serve its strategic economic and political interests. In the early 1970s, the U.S. dollar was decoupled from gold and the Bretton Woods currency system collapsed. One after another, summits of the G7 countries then shouldered responsibility for strengthening the Western consensus, contending against the socialist countries of the East, and boycotting the demands made by the less developed countries of the South for reforms to the international economic and political order.33 Since neoliberalism became the set of concepts dominating global economic governance, these multilateral institutions and platforms have become the driving force for the expansion of neoliberalism throughout the world. In line with the wishes of the international financial monopoly oligarchy and its allies, these bodies spare no effort to induce the developing countries to implement financial liberalization, the privatization of production factors, marketization without prior supervision, and free exchange in capital projects so as to facilitate inward and outward flows of international “hot money.” These institutions are constantly ready to control and plunder the economies of developing countries, extracting huge profits by encouraging speculation and creating financial bubbles. As Zbigniew Brzezinski stated in The Grand Chessboard, “the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank can be said to represent ‘global’ interests, and their constituency may be construed as the world. In reality, however, they are heavily American dominated.”34

Since the 1980s, the IMF and World Bank have lured developing countries to implement neoliberal reforms. When these countries have fallen into crisis because of privatization and financial liberalization, the IMF and other institutions have forced them to accept the Washington Consensus by adding various unreasonable conditions to loans provided earlier. The effect is to further intensify the impacts of neoliberal reform. Between 1978 and 1992, more than seventy developing countries or former socialist countries implemented a total of 566 structural adjustment programs imposed by the IMF and the World Bank.35 In the early 1980s, for example, the IMF used the Latin American debt crisis to force Latin American countries to accept neoliberal “reforms.” In order to curb inflation, the U.S. Federal Reserve in 1979 pushed short-term interest rates up from 10 percent to 15 percent, and finally to more than 20 percent. Because the existing debt of the developing countries was linked to U.S. interest rates, every 1 percent rise in U.S. interest rates would result in developing-world debtor countries paying an additional $40 to 50 billion per year in interest. In the second half of 1981, Latin America was borrowing at the rate of $1 billion a week, mostly in order to pay the interest on existing debt. During 1983, interest payments consumed almost half of Latin American export earnings.36 Under pressure to repay their loans, Latin American countries were forced to accept neoliberal reform plans initiated by the IMF. The main content of these plans consisted of privatizing state-owned enterprises; liberalizing trade finance; implementing economic austerity policies, with the effect of reducing living standards; cutting the taxes on monopoly enterprises; and reducing government spending on social infrastructure. During the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the IMF attached numerous conditions to assistance provided to South Korea, including that the allowance for foreign shareholdings be relaxed from 23 percent to 50 percent, and then to 55 percent by December 1998. Moreover, South Korea was required to allow foreign banks to set up branches freely.37

NATO and the International Monopoly-Capitalist Military and Political Alliance

Established in the early days of the Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is an international military alliance for the defense of monopoly capitalism. It is led by the United States and involves other imperialist countries. During the Cold War, NATO was the main tool used by the United States to actively contain and counter the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe, as well as to influence and control the Western European countries. At the end of the Cold War, the Warsaw Treaty Organization was dissolved and NATO became the military organization through which the United States sought to achieve its strategic goals on a global level. A capitalist military oligopoly, involving one hegemon and several other great powers, had come into being. Former U.S. secretary of state Warren Christopher stated: “Only the United States can act as a leader.… For the United States to exercise leadership requires us to own a credible force threat as a backup for diplomacy.”38 The National Security Strategy for the New Century, published in the United States in December 1998, claimed unambiguously that the goal of the United States was to “lead the entire world” and that no challenge to its leadership, from any country or group of countries, would ever be allowed to come into being.39 On December 4, 2018, U.S. secretary of state Mike Pompeo declared in a speech to the Marshall Fund in Brussels: “The United States has not given up its global leadership. It reshaped the order after WWII based on sovereignty but not the multilateral system.… Under President Trump’s leadership, we will not give up international leadership or our allies in the international system.… Trump is recovering America’s traditional status as the world center and leadership.… The United States wants to lead the world, now and always.”40

To achieve leadership and domination over the world, the United States has made every effort to promote NATO’s eastward expansion, and has expanded its own sphere of influence to control Central and Eastern Europe and to compress Russia’s strategic space. Under the control of the United States, NATO has become an ideal military tool for U.S. global interests. In March 1999, a multinational NATO force led by the United States launched a large-scale air attack on Yugoslavia. It was the first time that NATO had launched a military strike against a sovereign country during the fifty years since its foundation. In April 1999, NATO held a summit meeting in Washington, formally adopting a strategic concept that can be summarized under two points. First, NATO was permitted to conduct collective military intervention outside its defense area in response to “crimes and conflicts involving common interests.” This effectively changed NATO from a “collective defense” military alliance into an offensive political and military organization with the so-called purpose of defending common interests and shared values. Second, NATO’s military actions did not require authorization from the UN Security Council.41

In addition to NATO, U.S. military alliances formed on the basis of bilateral treaties include pacts with Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines. There are U.S. military bases on the territory of all its military allies, and these comprise a major part of the neoimperialist military alliance. The United States and its allies make military threats and carry out provocations in many regions of the world, resulting in many “hot wars,” “warm wars,” “cool wars,” and “new cold wars,” intensifying the new arms race. The acts of “state terrorism” carried out by neoimperialism, and the double standard it applies to counter-terrorism, have caused other forms of terrorism to multiply.

#### It guarantees environmental devastation and tech can’t solve it.

Smith ‘21 — Tony; Professor emeritus of philosophy at Iowa State University, PhD State University of New York at Stony Brook, B.A. Boston College and additional graduate work at the University of Tübingen and University of Munich. March/April 2021; "The Deadly Metabolic Rift"; *Against the Current No. 211*; <https://againstthecurrent.org/atc211/the-deadly-metabolic-rift/>; //CYang

(1) There is indeed “an existential crisis in the human relation to the earth.” (1) Over the last 10,000 years planetary conditions fluctuated within relatively narrow and stable boundaries. The entire history of settled human civilizations has unfolded in this “Holocene” period of our planet’s life.

This period has now concluded. In a number of areas crucially important to humanity, these boundaries have been (or are about to be) transgressed: climate change, ocean acidification, stratospheric ozone depletion, nitrogen and phosphorus cycles, global freshwater use, changes in land use, biodiversity loss, atmospheric aerosol loading, and chemical pollution. (244)

Human activity is the main causal factor explaining this development, leading earth scientists to refer to the new period as the “Anthropocene.”

The authors of an important study cited by Foster and Clark warn that if the upper-range of projections of global warming were to occur it “would severely challenge the viability of contemporary human societies.”(1) When we recall how little has been done to prevent increased global warming, and how y-it is only one of the numerous planetary transformations imposing comparable risks on human societies, talk of an “existential threat” is fully warranted.

(2) There is no “technological fix” for this existential crisis. The more intelligent representatives of capital do not deny that serious environmental challenges must be faced. For them, however, this is best done by working with capitalist markets and not against them.

A carbon tax on polluting firms would give companies a strong market incentive to lower their costs by using technologies requiring fewer carbon emissions. Having to purchase rights to release carbon into the atmosphere in carbon markets would supposedly have the same effect, in their view.

There are also calls for the state to support firms undertaking massive geoengineering projects, such as sending aerosols into the upper atmosphere to reflect away the sun’s rays before they increase the planet’s surface temperature. Another proposal is to install technologies capable of extracting and sequestering significant amounts of carbon from the atmosphere.

As Foster and Clark remind us, technological change in capitalism tends to develop “greener” technologies without any special spur. Over the course of the industrial revolution, for example, each succeeding generation of steam engines became “greener” over time, burning less coal per unit of output than the one before. The total amount of coal burned in England increased nonetheless. (245)

This “Jevons paradox” (named after the British political economist who first brought it to attention) is easily explained: the increase in the number of units produced overwhelmed the reduction of coal use per unit, leading to more coal being burned overall.

Is there any reason to think that introducing technologies “greener” than those employed today won’t have a similarly paradoxical result? Investors in the stock market, whose pricing of oil companies’ stocks assumes that the last drop of oil in the ground will be profitably extracted, do not seem to think so. (243-4)

Engineering Disaster

Regarding geoengineering projects, Foster and Clark repeat the warning of many scientists that such unprecedented technological experiments would almost surely have pernicious consequences as harmful as the harms they are supposed to alleviate. (278)

Further, their massive scale would leave few resources for other social needs. An infrastructure capable of handling annual throughput 70 percent larger than that handled currently by the global crude oil industry would be required, along with ridiculous quantities of water — 130 billion tons annually just to capture and store U.S. emissions. (280)

Far from being a step towards socialism (as some techno-utopians of the left hold), government funded geoengineering would simply solidify an environmental industrial complex alongside the military industrial complex, the pharmaceutical industrial complex, and other complexes of big capital. (281-2)

Finally, once again, climate change is only one way in which present environmental trends will soon “severely challenge the viability of contemporary human societies.” In all the other cases too the sorts of technologies that have been developed, and the ways they have been used, have been part of the story of how we got to the present “existential crisis.”

Unless we figure out why that has been the case and eliminate that reason, to think we will be saved by technologies is to indulge in fantasy.

(3) Capitalism is the fundamental cause of the existential crisis in the relation between humans and the earth. All living beings appropriate resources from their environment and all generate wastes back into their surroundings. For a species to successfully occupy an environmental niche, the rate at which it depletes resources from its ecosystem must correspond to the rate they are replenished, and the rate it generates wastes must be aligned with the rate wastes can be processed.

When the social forms of capitalism are in place, neither condition is met, creating the metabolic rift between human society and its environment.

Capitalist market societies are distinguished from other societies in that products generally take the form of commodities sold for a profit. Any capitalist producers who do not attempt to make as much profit as possible, as fast as possible, will find themselves losing market share to those who do, if not forced out of existence altogether.

Making as much profit as possible, as fast as possible, generally means producing and selling as many commodities as possible, as fast as possible. This accelerated temporality is in tension with the temporality of our environment; resources tend to be depleted at a faster rate than they can be replenished, and wastes generated at a faster rate than they can be processed.

From this standpoint the “Jevons Paradox” is less a paradox than a general description of how capitalism works. Any environmental benefits from technologies using fewer natural resources or generating fewer wastes per unit of production necessarily tends to be overwhelmed by the increase in the number of commodities produced in response to the “Grow or die!” imperative so ruthlessly imposed by the demands of capital accumulation.

From Local to Global Destruction

In the early phases of capitalist development, environmental destruction was relatively localized. After a handful of centuries of global expansion, it has sucked in re­sources from the natural world and spewed out wastes on a global scale, creating a fundamental rift in the metabolic relationship between human beings and the earth that is our home.

#### Capitalism is factually incorrect — it misreads foundational human psychology as competitive which replicates the failures of 21st century IR!

Philipsen ‘20 — Dirk; economic historian and wellbeing economics advocate who teaches public policy and history at Duke University in North Carolina. He is also a senior fellow at the Kenan Institute for Ethics. October 22, 2020; "The challenge of reclaiming the commons from capitalism"; *Aeon*; <https://aeon.co/essays/the-challenge-of-reclaiming-the-commons-from-capitalism>; //CYang

A basic truth is once again trying to break through the agony of worldwide pandemic and the enduring inhumanity of racist oppression. Healthcare workers risking their lives for others, mutual aid networks empowering neighbourhoods, farmers delivering food to quarantined customers, mothers forming lines to protect youth from police violence: we’re in this life together. We — young and old, citizen and immigrant — do best when we collaborate. Indeed, our only way to survive is to have each other’s back while safeguarding the resilience and diversity of this planet we call home.

As an insight, it’s not new, or surprising. Anthropologists have long told us that, as a species neither particularly strong nor fast, humans survived because of our unique ability to create and cooperate. ‘All our thriving is mutual’ is how the Indigenous scholar Edgar Villanueva captured the age-old wisdom in his book Decolonizing Wealth (2018). What is new is the extent to which so many civic and corporate leaders — sometimes entire cultures — have lost sight of our most precious collective quality.

This loss is rooted, in large part, in the tragedy of the private — this notion that moved, in short order, from curious idea to ideology to global economic system. It claimed selfishness, greed and private property as the real seeds of progress. Indeed, the mistaken concept many readers have likely heard under the name ‘the tragedy of the commons’ has its origins in the sophomoric assumption that private interest is the naturally predominant guide for human action. The real tragedy, however, lies not in the commons, but in the private. It is the private that produces violence, destruction and exclusion. Standing on its head thousands of years of cultural wisdom, the idea of the private variously separates, exploits and exhausts those living under its cold operating logic.

In preindustrial societies, cooperation represented naked necessity for survival. Yet the realisation that a healthy whole is larger than its parts never stopped informing cultures. It embodies the pillars of Christianity as much as the Islamic Golden Age, the Enlightenment or the New Deal. In the midst of a global depression, the US president Franklin D Roosevelt evoked an ‘industrial covenant’ — a commitment to living wages and a right to work for all. During the 1960s, Martin Luther King, Jr gave voice to the broader idea when he said that no one is free until we are all free. On Earth Day 1970, the US senator Edmund Muskie proclaimed that the only society to survive is one that ‘will not tolerate slums for some and decent houses for others, … clean air for some and filth for others’. We should call these ideas what they are — central civilisational insights. Social and economic prosperity depends on the wellbeing of all, not just the few.

Cultures that fundamentally departed from this awareness usually did not, in the long run, fare well, from the Roman Empire to Nazism or Stalinism. Will neoliberal capitalism be next? Rather than acknowledge the endless variety of things that had to be in place to make our individual accomplishments possible, it is grounded in the immature claim that our privileges are ‘earned’, made possible primarily by private initiative.

But what a claim it is: where would we be without the work and care of others? Without the food from the farmer? Without the electricity and housing and roads and healthcare and education and access to information and hundreds of other things provided to us, day in and day out, often for free, and routinely without us knowing what went into their existence? Seeing ourselves as seemingly free-floating individuals, it’s both easy and convenient to indulge in the delusion that ‘I built it. I worked for it. I earned it.’

The painful flipside are the billions of those who, through no fault of their own, drew the short end of the stick. Those who were born in the wrong country, to the wrong parents, in the wrong school district — ‘wrong’ for no other reason than that their skin colour or religion or talents didn’t happen to be favoured. The limited focus on the individual can here be seen as nakedly serving power: if those who have privilege and wealth presumably earned it, so must those who have pain and hardship deserve it.

Standard economic thinking both seeds and feeds the underlying fear

Old and young, meanwhile, sense the loss of a cultural heritage that transcends the private, a purpose beyond the marketing of self. We likely fear, with good reason, that, in all the self-promotion, we can no longer rely on others to be there for us, to provide us with consistent work, a stable community, a bit of love and kindness. We are scared of climate change, the ultimate consequence of our voracious consumption. We dread loneliness and depression, too much work, the loss of jobs, debt. We sense, and often experience, that everyone looking out for themselves brings out the worst in us — me against you, one tribe against the other. Many experience it simply as a culture in distress.

Standard economic thinking both seeds and feeds the underlying fear by instructing that we’re all in a race to compete for limited resources. Most definitions of mainstream economics are based on some version of Lionel Robbin’s 1932 definition as the ‘efficient allocation of scarce resources’. The answer to scarcity coupled with people’s presumed desire for more is, of course: keep producing stuff. Not surprisingly, the guiding star for success, of both policymakers and economists around the world, is a crude, if convenient metric — GDP — that does nothing but indiscriminately count final output (more stuff), independent of whether it’s good or bad, whether it creates wellbeing or harm, and notwithstanding that its ongoing growth is unsustainable.

It’s circular logic: (1) scarcity makes people have endless needs, so the economy needs to grow; (2) for the economy to grow, people need to have ever more needs. Such thinking dominates the field of economics, and much of contemporary culture: Man (yes, those ideas overwhelmingly come from men) as the endless optimiser of self-interest; people reduced to producers and consumers; all aspects of life that go beyond the mere accumulation of stuff — morality, joy, care — confined to kindergarten, fiction and the occasional ethics course in high school or college. The result is what Nicholas Kristof in The New York Times calls a ‘moral myopia’ threatening to collapse under a mounting pile of stuff.

Dysfunctions such as climate change, racism and inequality are not unrelated and naturally occurring features of life. On the contrary, they are based on the fictions and failures of the ‘private’ that later turned into systems that now govern our lives.

In reality, we collaborate, organise together, show love and solidarity — as the Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom documented in her book Governing the Commons (1990) — in the process invariably creating common rules and values that organise communal life. We rely on society, community, family, day-in and day-out. And yet the tragic disconnect between our lived reality (however embattled at times) and the dominant ideology, celebrating ‘the private’ in textbooks, newspapers and Hollywood movies, often eludes us. When large corporations, run by people who preach the gospel of the market and private gain, need the public to bail them out, few in power raise the most obvious question: why do you need public money to bail you out if you are supposed to be pulling yourself up by your bootstraps?

A deeper question might be: why should wealth and privilege — largely built on the free work of nature and the cheap work of labourers — be rescued, when in trouble, by the very people otherwise deemed ‘disposable’?

The particular version of the ‘private as property’ likely has its origins in the Roman empire. It comes with the notion of absolute dominion — denoting one’s right to have full control over one’s property. Initially, such dominion was exercised by the male head of household, over both things and people — or, more precisely, over things, but also over people who, in what was possibly the first legal power grab in the name of the private, came to be defined as things (children, slaves).

When George Floyd was killed on 25 May 2020, it put on global display, once again, that most people — poor, younger, older, Black, Brown, non-male — remain disposable in the regime of private interest. All too often, they are violated in the scarcely disguised name of private property, perpetrated by those tasked to defend it, the police. The mistake of vandals in recent demonstrations, as satirists have pointed out, was that they didn’t loot in the name of private equity firms. Put differently: in order for the law not to put its boot on your neck, your theft has to come at white-collar scale and the sanction of power.

The tragedy of the private, in short, doesn’t come from the private as individual, but from the private as ownership, as control over land, resources and others. To own was always less about protection of the self than it was about exclusion of others. As such, it is a logical violation of the ‘other self’ or, really, other selves. You against me — your gain as my loss.

Over generations, open theft of common heritage became disguised as private property

To illustrate: no single event, short of war, created as much misery in a country like England as when those with access to violence (arms, laws, wealth) privatised and fenced in the land that people needed to stay alive. It came to be known as ‘enclosure of the commons’ but represented a largescale and bloody theft, allowing a tiny percentage of people to exclude the majority from access to a common heritage. The result has since been naturalised and replicated the world over and sanctified in law as ‘the rights of private property’.

No bodies were ever more violated than those brutalised as slaves or serfs, all in the name of profit and — as authors such as Kidada Williams have documented in painstaking detail — sanctified by a vicious regime of private property. Racism, as thinkers from C L R James to Angela Davis to Barbara and Karen Fields remind us, is an essential building block to the system of private capital.

No form of governance, social or economic, has plundered the resources provided by nature as much as private property (though the state ownership of communism came close).

No single circumstance undermines political rights and freedoms today more than poverty — the violent exclusion from essential human rights: access to work, income, vital resources.

The private as dominion over property thus inevitably violates the private as personal integrity and freedom. Humans become objects — my slave, my worker, my child — and are denied access to the essentials of life. Thus deprived of independence, the private reduces the freedom of the majority, all those without access to sufficient capital, to the narrow choices provided by the marketplace in service of private property — they are, in Amartya Sen’s words, effectively denied ‘the capability to realise one’s full potential as a human being’.

Over generations, open theft of common heritage became disguised as private property, hiding behind legal contracts and the cold fiction of money as wealth. One gets used to customs, this history suggests, even when they defy rational thought. The original freedom fighters against the enclosure of common land, groups such as ‘the Diggers’, were remarkably less mystified than their modern compatriots: no one is free, they declared in 1649, ‘till the Poor … have a free allowance to dig and labour the Commons’. Thomas Jefferson (the freedom fighter, not the slaveholder) would’ve understood the logic — as would’ve Toussaint L’Ouverture or Nelson Mandela.

Legally ‘set free’ to sell their labour power, the landless were instead reduced to a state of abject poverty where they became the unwilling ‘masses’ populating the satanic mills of early industrialisation — freedom as a choice between misery or death.

The excuse for the ruthlessness of the exclusion and exploitation of others in the name of private interest was always the same: the prospect of a better future for all. Today, we should ask: has it succeeded? It is a question far more difficult to answer than modern apologists such as Steven Pinker would have us believe. Yes, by any available measure, capitalism (based on private interest) has generated unprecedented wealth and knowledge.

This explosive creation of wealth, however, came, and continues to come, with a steep, and exponentially rising, price. Powered by fossil fuels, it is both depleting and burning up the planet. Grounded in extraction and exploitation, capitalist progress carries mounting violence and destruction in its wake. The flipside of civilisation, in Walter Benjamin’s words, appears to be ‘a document of barbarism’. Growth, expansion, development — the struggle to conquer scarcity both gave and took in large measure from those who populated our land. Perhaps it’s finally time to recognise the carnage that created the wealth.

At first, modern economies succeeded in providing more calories to a starving patient. Based on this initial success, the economics profession (no doubt based on sophisticated mathematical models) concluded that more calories will forever improve health. Now dealing with a lethally obese patient, our leaders and economic advisors stubbornly resist acknowledging the obvious question: if we continue on an exponentially increasing regimen of calories, won’t we incapacitate, if not kill, the patient — ourselves?

Much has been said about how the incessant race for more, bigger, faster has also led to a crisis of meaning and purpose, what King, Jr called a widening ‘spiritual death’ of living in a ‘thing-oriented’ rather than ‘a person-oriented society’, or what D H Lawrence simply labelled ‘the Mammon of mechanised greed’.

But whether the death is one of spirit or meaning, or the actual death of nature and people, all spring from a common root: the single story of self-interest, and its logical manifestation, the private. ‘We do not have to escape from the Earth,’ as the environmental activist Vandana Shiva exhorts us in Oneness vs the 1% (2019), ‘we have to escape from the illusions that enslave our minds …’

We produce and grow enough for every child, woman and man to have a good and dignified life wherever they live

We live in a different world now. Whatever might have been justified in the past to overcome poverty and scarcity no longer holds sway. Today, we face an entirely different challenge. Not too little, but too much. Not scarcity, but abundance.

In the modern world, more is actually less. Indeed, the costs of economic growth have begun to outpace their benefits, visible in the plunder of the environment and escalating inequality. We no longer need more, but rather better and more fairly distributed, in order to provide prosperity for all. Collectively, we produce and grow enough for every child, woman and man to have a good and dignified life wherever they live. As a world community, we know more and create more than we know how to process. It’s a huge accomplishment. We should celebrate and enjoy it together, rather than remain on the deplorable path of pitting one against the other in the race for ever more, one dying of too much, the other of too little.

And yet, our dominant economic systems continue to follow colonial extraction and brutal exclusion, in the process creating two organically related, existential problems: the perpetuation (and in some cases intensification) of poverty, and the violation of the biophysical limits of our planet. What a tragic irony that, in the early 21st century, higher education’s economics departments worldwide still instruct some of our brightest minds in simplistic economic models about the efficient allocation of scarce resources, rather than in how to sustainably build the good life based on an abundance of knowledge and resources.

To emphasise: chasing the bogeyman of scarcity, we are, by now, in the process of passing some frightening historic thresholds, altering the very makeup of life and creating an unsustainable future for our children and grandchildren. It’s Barbarism 3.0.

#### It’s code red for humanity – our only hope is an ecological revolution.

Foster 21 — John Bellamy, American professor of sociology at the University of Oregon and editor of the Monthly Review 12-1-2021, "Monthly Review," Monthly Review, https://monthlyreview.org/2021/12/01/against-doomsday-scenarios/, accessed 7-3-2022 //THS—OLW

John Molyneux and Owen McCormack: Given the extreme summer weather and the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report, just how bad are things now? What do you believe the time scale is for catastrophe and what do you think that catastrophe will look like? Are things worse than the IPCC report claims? Some, including Michael Mann, have warned against “doomsday scenarios” that might deter people from acting. In your view, are doomsday scenarios the truth that needs to be told?

John Bellamy Foster: We should of course avoid promoting “doomsday scenarios” in the sense of offering a fatalistic worldview. In fact, the environmental movement in general and ecosocialism in particular are all about combating the current trend toward ecological destruction. As UN general secretary António Guterres recently declared with respect to climate change, it is now “code red for humanity.” This is not a doomsday forecast but a call to action.

Still, the word catastrophe is scarcely adequate in the present age of catastrophe capitalism. Catastrophes are now ubiquitous, since extending to the scale of the planet itself. We are experiencing throughout the globe a series of extreme weather events due in large part to climate change, each of which rank as “catastrophic” by historical precedents, sometimes lying outside the range of what was previously thought to be physically possible. The extreme conditions experienced this summer in the Northern Hemisphere—including floods in Europe; Hurricane Ida in the United States, which not only devastated New Orleans, but also ended up killing people in floods in New York and New Jersey; and the worsening drought and wildfires in California and the entire Pacific Coast of the United States—clearly represent something qualitatively new.

The latest report of the IPCC, its Sixth Assessment Report: The Physical Science Basis, explains that the various climatic and extreme weather events will tend to compound, as in the case of droughts, desertification (dustbowlification), soil erosion, wildfires, and weakening monsoons, on the one hand, and a melting cryosphere, sea level rise, megastorms, and flooding, on the other—thereby intensifying and extending these catastrophic events, which will appear to come from **everywhere at once**. Moreover, the human consequences go deeper with temperature increases diminishing world grain production and putting strains on the world food supply; climate change contributing, along with the destruction of ecosystems by agribusiness, to the emergence of novel zoonoses, such as COVID-19 (along with numerous other health hazards); whole populations in cities throughout the planet exposed to unprecedented flooding; the prospect of climate refugees running into the hundreds of millions; and numerous other equally dire consequences, imposed on present and future generations.

The IPCC, which has a record of scientific reticence, tells us that we will see in the next couple of decades, and indeed throughout this century, growing cataclysms and a shift toward an Earth System that is increasingly unsafe for humanity, even in the most optimistic scenarios. Thus, in the most “rosy” scenario provided by the IPCC (SSP1-1.9)—the only one of its scenarios where the increase in average global temperature at the end of the twenty-first century is projected to be below 1.5°C—the best that can be hoped for is a situation where a 1.5°C increase is staved off until **2040** and global temperatures only increase by a tenth of a degree after that, so that by the end of the century or the beginning of the next century the increase in global average temperature over preindustrial levels can be reduced to 1.4°C, removing humanity from the extreme danger zone. The point is that even in the most optimistic scenario—which would require a global ecological revolution on the part of humanity in order to be achieved, leading to carbon emissions peaking halfway through this decade and net zero emissions being achieved by 2050—the overall climate catastrophe facing humanity will be **extremely dire.**

The second most optimistic scenario is one of staying below a 2°C increase (somewhere around 1.7°C). It too would require a global ecological revolution. The other three scenarios offered by the IPCC are basically unthinkable, for which the word apocalyptic is appropriate. In fact, we are currently headed toward the IPCC’s most apocalyptic scenario (SSP5-8.5), in which global average temperatures this century would, in the “best estimate,” rise by 4.4°C, which would, according to current scientific assessments, mean the collapse of industrial civilization, **raising questions of human survival**. In an ominous statement leaked from Part II of the Sixth Assessment Report, on “Impacts,” which will not be published until February, the IPCC says that if humanity is driven into extinction during the “sixth extinction” arising from **anthropogenic causes**, evolution will **not bring the human species back**.

The trouble is that if we go beyond a 1.5°C increase, and especially beyond a 2°C increase, more and more climate feedback mechanisms, such as the loss of arctic ice and thus the weakening of the albedo effect (the earth’s reflectivity), the release of methane and carbon dioxide from the melting tundra, the burning of the Amazon, and the degradation of the ocean as a climate sink will compound the climate problem and create an irreversible situation, increasing the possibility of runaway climate change that would in effect feed on itself, to the extent that the very existence of humanity would be in question.

**There is still a possibility** of avoiding absolutely catastrophic climate change on the level that would threaten human existence altogether. But to accomplish this would require revolutionary changes in social relations, as well as in technology and ways of living. Such a revolution would **need to begin within the capitalist system but would lead beyond capital.** **There is no other way**. As Karl Marx indicated, **the struggle against capitalism is not simply about human freedom, it is also about human survival.**

### ! — Imperialism

#### Imperialist alliances cause nuclear war.

Pha 21 [Anna Pha; journalist for *The Guardian*, the worker’s weekly published by the Communist Party of Australia. She has a widely acclaimed reputation for her research and presentation of many feature articles on a range of topics, particularly in the field of economics. She was a teacher and held a position on the Executive of the Victorian Trades Hall Council; 10-25-2021; "No to war!: nuclear is back"; Communist Party of Australia; https://cpa.org.au/guardian/issue-1984/no-to-war-nuclear-is-back/; KL]

Imperialism and war go hand in hand. According to the Canada-based Centre for Global Research the US has killed more than 20 million people in thirty-seven nations since World War II. It has engaged in 188 conflicts between 1992 and 2017 alone.

Wars mean big profits for the military industrial complex. They also provide the basis for regime change, new markets, access to cheap labour, forcible acquisition of resources, or counter-revolution.

In the past twenty years alone, the US has spent US$21 trillion (AU$28 trillion) on foreign and domestic militarisation. The human cost was and continues to be enormous. The number of people directly killed is over 900,000, and several times that indirectly due to war-induced famine, disease, blockades, and infrastructure destruction.

During the same period wars have forcibly displaced thirty-eight million people, principally in and from Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, the Philippines, Libya, and Syria. (Watson Institute, Brown University)

The military industrial complex requires never-ending wars to sustain its unquenchable appetite for mega-profits. Australia’s purchase of nuclear-powered submarines and missiles is part of the country’s emerging role as a merchant of death with its establishment as a manufacturer and supplier of weapons of mass destruction.

In the case of the US and Australia, the dangerous conflict with China brings out contradictions within the ruling class; for those sections whose profits depend on Chinese trade and investments and those who stand to benefit from the massive gains from the build-up to war. There are other capitalists who see China as providing an opportunity for massive investments and accumulation of capital following regime change, a reflection of the broader counter-revolutionary tactics led by US imperialism.

The US is an imperialist power in decline. Its massive expenditure on wars is taking its toll: such expenditure is unsustainable. It faces an economic crisis as a result of which its only means of asserting global hegemony is through war.

INTERNATIONAL REALIGNMENT

During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries up to the Second World War, Britain, Spain, Belgium, France, and Holland exploited the people and resources of their colonial possessions on the African, American, Asian and Pacific continents. Inter-imperialist wars resulted in changes in colonisers as these wealthy European nations attempted to expand their empires.

At the end of, and in the decades following the Second World War, national liberation movements saw India, Indonesia, Philippines, South Africa, Cuba, and China gain their independence. Britain, in particular, saw its once vast empire crumble. As the British empire was in decline, the US was on the rise in pursuit of global hegemony.

Capitalism with its global reach was threatened by socialist revolutions in Russia (1917), East Europe (1945), China (1949), and in Cuba (1959). These revolutions posed an ideological threat to imperialism as the working class took power, their people made gains, and their socialist governments pursued peace. A bipolar world emerged with two “superpowers” — imperialist US and the socialist Soviet Union. Following the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, the US saw itself as dominant in a unipolar world.

As the US continues to assert itself around the globe, there are other emerging forces that also seek to play an independent or leading role in a multi-polar world. The concept of a unipolar world, with one imperialist power at the helm is being challenged. In addition, the People’s Republic of China, with its rapid economic, social, and military development is perceived as a threat by US imperialism.

While the US has spent trillions of dollars on the military, at the expense of its people’s needs, China has lifted hundreds of millions of its people out of poverty. Today China is the world’s second largest economy set to overtake the US within a decade.

Shifting and at times contradictory alliances mark the realignment of international forces that is underway.

“GLOBAL BRITAIN”

Britain, once a global power with a vast empire spanning continents, is now in a war coalition aimed at China. AUKUS signals the UK’s shift to an increased participation in the Asia-Pacific as a junior partner to the US, and Australia as the launching pad for this strategy. The UK is a member of the Five Eyes intelligence sharing alliance with the US, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia.

In 2020, the British government released the report, Global Britain in a Competitive Age: the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy. In the introduction to the report, conservative Prime Minister Boris Johnson states:

“By 2030, we will be deeply engaged in the Indo-Pacific as the European partner with the broadest, most integrated presence in support of mutually beneficial trade, shared security and values. We will be active in Africa, in particular East Africa and with important partners such as Nigeria. And we will have thriving relationships in the Middle East and the [Persian] Gulf based on trade, green innovation and science and technology collaboration in support of a more resilient region that is increasingly self-reliant in providing for its own security.”

He continues: “We will remain a nuclear armed power with global reach and integrated military capabilities across all five operational domains. Our diplomacy will be underwritten by the credibility of our deterrent and our ability to project power.” (Emphasis added)

Military spending will be increased. The UK is already second only to the US in military spending in NATO.

The report also refers to “China’s increasing international assertiveness and the growing importance of the Indo-Pacific; systemic competition, including between states, and between democratic and authoritarian values and systems of government.”

“Russia will remain the most acute direct threat to the UK, and the US will continue to ask more from its allies in Europe in sharing the burden of collective security,” the report states.

Australia is also sharing the burden of US war plans with the purchase of nuclear submarines, long-range missiles and other materiel and a massive hike in military spending. The report does not shy away from the fact the UK is preparing for war.

EUROPE AND US RELATIONS

It is too soon to estimate what impact the departure of Chancellor Angela Merkel will have on Germany’s relations with the US. France’s President Macron has called for the formation of a European army, which could have consequences for NATO and the US. France and Germany are the most powerful countries in Europe.

A number of European countries have defied the US’s bans on trade with Russia and have also signed up to China’s Belt and Road Initiative in defiance of the US.

Nuclear-armed India, under the leadership of the reactionary Narendra Modi government, has been drawn into US war plans, and has held joint military exercises with the US and other countries in the Asia-Pacific region, including Australia.

CHINA’S STAND

The US’s targeting of China and Russia and attempts to contain both countries are drawing them closer together. They recently held joint military exercises on Chinese territory with unprecedented cooperation. China has repeatedly made its position clear. It was Australia that decided to abandon previously friendly relations with China by discriminating against Chinese investment and meddling in China’s internal affairs.

“There is no way for China to develop economic ties with a country that treats it as an enemy,” said the Global Times newspaper. “There is no path to future prosperity for an Australia which chooses to isolate itself from the region’s largest economy.” (Global Times, 16th September 2021)

At the recent UN General Assembly, China’s President Xi Jinping pledged that his country would never seek hegemony by attacking other countries. He emphasised that China was “a builder of world peace, a contributor to global development, defender of the international order and provider of public goods.”

The United States has around 800 military bases globally with around half of them at the borders of China or Russia.

NO WINNERS

The US has by far the largest nuclear arsenal of any country. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) it has an estimated 5,550 nuclear weapons — enough to destroy humanity many times over. It is constantly modernising its arsenal.

The AUKUS agreement provides for the sharing of nuclear submarine technology with Australia and paves the way for the establishment of a nuclear industry here and the development of nuclear weapons contrary to the international Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. It should be noted that Australia is not a signatory.

There would be no winners in a nuclear war.

The provocative actions of the US and its allies, including Australia’s in the Taiwan Straits and South and East China Seas pose a serious risk of escalating into war. The regular joint military exercises conducted by the US and South Korea off the coast of North Korea with live weapons are a further provocation.

The world faces numerous crises including climate change and the global pandemic. At the same time the US is preparing for war with the aim of enforcing a unipolar world with itself at the helm. It seeks to overthrow China’s socialist system, by war if necessary, and to defeat it economically.

ACT NOW!

The people of Australia and the Asia-Pacific region want peace and stability. The Quad and AUKUS military alliances are a catalyst for a new arms race, and are preparations for nuclear war, against China.

Say NO to war! Cancel AUKUS! Disband the Quad! No Nuclear Australia! Time for Action!

#### Hegemony is unsustainable. America’s capitalist imperialism makes nuclear war inevitable. Only the alternative solves.

Desai 22 [Radhika Desai; Department of Political Studies, University of Manitob; 2-10-2022; "The Long Shadow of Hiroshima: Capitalism and Nuclear Weapons"; *International Critical Thought*; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/21598282.2022.2051582?journalCode=rict20; KL]

Nuclear weapons early on became entwined with the pursuit of US imperial policy and remain there. US presidents have routinely expressed moral abhorrence of nuclear weapons privately. Eisenhower told a naval aide that “overkill . . . frighten[ed] the devil out of me”; Kennedy muttered to Dean Rusk, “and we call ourselves the human race” after a particularly nightmarish briefing; and Reagan even agreed with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 that, “A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” However, they never publicly renounced the “all-out” option or stopped planning for it. None said “A nuclear war must never be threatened, or prepared for.” Such preparation continued because nuclear weapons became central to imperialism from the mid-twentieth century onwards. That they “continuously benefitted our military-industrial-congressional complex” (Ellsberg 2017, 271, 324), not to mention a declining US economy ever more reliant on it, also helped.

Since US imperial policy predated the Cold War and survived it, the world did not march toward liberal capitalist prosperity under benign US “hegemony” with a peace dividend in its bank account after the Cold War. Rather, it entered an increasingly tense space bounded by growing pluripolarity thanks to US economic decline and rapid growth in China and some developing countries and increasing US military aggression in response. Beginning by bombing retreating soldiers and civilians in violation of international law and the Soviet-brokered peace in the Gulf war (Hudson 2018, 158–159; citing the Committee to Stop War in the Gulf), the US went on to wage a string of illegal wars in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria and hybrid wars against other countries that sought autonomous forms of development unsuited to the interests of US and Western corporations. Today, this aggression has culminated in the New Cold Wars against Russia and China and has set off a new nuclear arms race even as declining US capacities become clear in Afghanistan and are about to become clear once again in the hybrid war against Russia over Ukraine.

It is, therefore, difficult to overstate the dangers of the current situation. In the original Cold War, the US and the USSR were comparatively stable and prosperous countries. Today US economic decline appears unstoppable and its drive to compensate for it militarily can only be more and more volatile and unstable, as the ignominious drawdown from Afghanistan and impending debacle over Ukraine show. In recent years, the US has also lost its historic technological lead as Russian and Chinese military modernisation programmes develop hypersonic missiles, some capable of delivering bombs at 27 times the speed of sound and evading US anti-ballistic missile systems (The Economist 2020; The Guardian 2019). On the other hand, China, though considerably less prosperous (per capita US GDP remains over 5 times higher than China’s), is vastly more stable. It is also on the rise, increasingly influential over more and more US victims and even allies and determined to ensure its own defence and aid allies amid ever-louder US sabre-rattling. This only unsettles the US more. The pandemic and the war over Ukraine have only exacerbated this divergence, with the US’s shambolic and economically destructive responses and deepening economic and political disarray contrasting ever more sharply with China’s competence, resumption of economic growth and adherence to international norms making it a far superior model and partner to other countries (Desai 2020b). For the first time in the history of capitalism, a non-capitalist country will be the leading state in the world, powering its growth and increasingly providing leadership (Desai 2020a, 2020b, 2020c).

The economically declining US is losing influence in strategically important zones such as the Middle East, the South China Sea, South Asia, the Korean Peninsula and even Central and Latin America. It is also eroding the relative post-war unity of the core capitalist powers and reducing US and Western capacity for domination. With Iran and Russia, for instance, Continental Western European countries wish to take a more cooperative stance than the US. Japan and South Korea as well as the European Union (EU) have recently concluded important trade and investment treaties with China much to US chagrin. Moreover, while other core capitalist powers are increasingly acting independently to subordinate certain parts of the Third World—such as Canada in Latin America and France in Africa—their options are narrower as productive power spreads and they face rival powers. Finally, with China’s superior economic performance increasing its attractiveness as a model and partner for other countries and continuing US economic decline forcing the US to operate with ever fewer economic carrots and ever more military and financial sticks, more and more countries will be able and willing to defy the US and its corporations. The dangers of not accepting the peaceful co-existence of pluripolarity can only grow.

The threat of nuclear weapons will only fade, and a true dawn of nuclear arms control and elimination will only lighten the horizon, if one or both of two possibilities are realised. Either transformation in US politics leads the US to forsake, or the diminution of its power on the world stage forces it to relinquish, its obsession for exercising an impossible domination over the ever more pluripolar world and for keeping it capitalist against the currents of history. In effect, the real question is whether the US, and the West, are willing to accept with equanimity, if not enthusiasm, the co-existence of different socio-economic systems, that is, the world’s growing pluripolarity. Will the ongoing turmoil in US politics, of which Trump and the Black Lives Matter demonstrations were both equal and opposite symptoms, issue in a political force capable of giving up that drive for world primacy based on a more realistic assessment of US interests and capabilities, not to mention a commitment to popular rather than corporate well-being? Will the acceleration of US relative decline amid the pandemic administer a dose of geopolitical economic reality to US leaders? Can secondary capitalist powers, such as Germany and Japan, ally with those that have acquired nuclear weapons defensively, chiefly China, and NNWSs, to demand that the weapon states adopt serious disarmament measures— above all the US but also Israel? Equally importantly, can a popular movement for disarmament arise with a sophisticated understanding of the real drivers of the nuclear arms race, those rooted in capitalist imperialism and the US drive for domination? These are the questions we are left with.

### ! — Cognitive Warfare

#### The brain is the battlefield of the 21st century — social engineering makes you cognitively primed to unquestionably accept NATO decision-making.

Norton ’21 — Benjamin; is a journalist, writer, and filmmaker. He is the founder and editor of Multipolarista and is based in Latin America. “Behind NATO’s ‘cognitive warfare’: ‘Battle for your brain’ waged by Western militaries”; October 13, 2021; *Monthly Review*; <https://mronline.org/2021/10/13/behind-natos-cognitive-warfare-battle-for-your-brain-waged-by-western-militaries/>; //CYang

NATO is developing new forms of warfare to wage a “battle for the brain,” as the military alliance put it.

The US-led NATO military cartel has tested novel modes of hybrid warfare against its self-declared adversaries, including economic warfare, cyber warfare, information warfare, and psychological warfare.

Now, NATO is spinning out an entirely new kind of combat it has branded cognitive warfare. Described as the “weaponization of brain sciences,” the new method involves “hacking the individual” by exploiting “the vulnerabilities of the human brain” in order to implement more sophisticated “social engineering.”

Until recently, NATO had divided war into five different operational domains: air, land, sea, space, and cyber. But with its development of cognitive warfare strategies, the military alliance is discussing a new, sixth level: the “human domain.”

A 2020 NATO-sponsored study of this new form of warfare clearly explained,

While actions taken in the five domains are executed in order to have an effect on the human domain, cognitive warfare’s objective is to make everyone a weapon.

“The brain will be the battlefield of the 21st century,” the report stressed. “Humans are the contested domain,” and “future conflicts will likely occur amongst the people digitally first and physically thereafter in proximity to hubs of political and economic power.”

While the NATO-backed study insisted that much of its research on cognitive warfare is designed for defensive purposes, it also conceded that the military alliance is developing offensive tactics, stating,

The human is very often the main vulnerability and it should be acknowledged in order to protect NATO’s human capital but also to be able to benefit from our adversaries’s vulnerabilities.

In a chilling disclosure, the report said explicitly that “the objective of Cognitive Warfare is to harm societies and not only the military.”

With entire civilian populations in NATO’s crosshairs, the report emphasized that Western militaries must work more closely with academia to weaponize social sciences and human sciences and help the alliance develop its cognitive warfare capacities.

The study described this phenomenon as “the militarization of brain science.” But it appears clear that NATO’s development of cognitive warfare will lead to a militarization of all aspects of human society and psychology, from the most intimate of social relationships to the mind itself.

Such all-encompassing militarization of society is reflected in the paranoid tone of the NATO-sponsored report, which warned of “an embedded fifth column, where everyone, unbeknownst to him or her [themselves], is behaving according to the plans of one of our competitors.” The study makes it clear that those “competitors” purportedly exploiting the consciousness of Western dissidents are China and Russia.

In other words, this document shows that figures in the NATO military cartel increasingly see their own domestic population as a threat, fearing civilians to be potential Chinese or Russian sleeper cells, dastardly “fifth columns” that challenge the stability of “Western liberal democracies.”

NATO’s development of novel forms of hybrid warfare come at a time when member states’ military campaigns are targeting domestic populations on an unprecedented level.

The Ottawa Citizen reported this September that the Canadian military’s Joint Operations Command took advantage of the COVID-19 pandemic to wage an information war against its own domestic population, testing out propaganda tactics on Canadian civilians.

Internal NATO-sponsored reports suggest that this disclosure is just scratching the surface of a wave of new unconventional warfare techniques that Western militaries are employing around the world.

Canada hosts ‘NATO Innovation Challenge’ on cognitive warfare

Twice each year, NATO holds a “pitch-style event” that it brand as an “Innovation Challenge.” These campaigns–one hosted in the Spring and the other in the Fall, by alternating member states — call on private companies, organizations, and researchers to help develop new tactics and technologies for the military alliance.

The shark tank-like challenges reflect the predominant influence of neoliberal ideology within NATO, as participants mobilize the free market, public-private partnerships, and the promise of cash prizes to advance the agenda of the military-industrial complex.

NATO’s Fall 2021 Innovation Challenge is hosted by Canada, and is titled “The invisible threat: Tools for countering cognitive warfare.”

“Cognitive warfare seeks to change not only what people think, but also how they act,” the Canadian government wrote in its official statement on the challenge.

Attacks against the cognitive domain involve the integration of cyber, disinformation/misinformation, psychological, and social-engineering capabilities.

Ottawa’s press release continued:

Cognitive warfare positions the mind as a battle space and contested domain. Its objective is to sow dissonance, instigate conflicting narratives, polarize opinion, and radicalize groups. Cognitive warfare can motivate people to act in ways that can disrupt or fragment an otherwise cohesive society.

NATO-backed Canadian military officials discuss cognitive warfare in panel event

An advocacy group called the NATO Association of Canada has mobilized to support this Innovation Challenge, working closely with military contractors to attract the private sector to invest in further research on behalf of NATO — nd its own bottom line.

While the NATO Association of Canada (NAOC) is technically an independent NGO, its mission is to promote NATO, and the organization boasts on its website,

The NAOC has strong ties with the Government of Canada including Global Affairs Canada and the Department of National Defence.

As part of its efforts to promote Canada’s NATO Innovation Challenge, the NAOC held a panel discussion on cognitive warfare on October 5.

The researcher who wrote the definitive 2020 NATO-sponsored study on cognitive warfare, François du Cluzel, participated in the event, alongside NATO-backed Canadian military officers.

The panel was overseen by Robert Baines, president of the NATO Association of Canada. It was moderated by Garrick Ngai, a marketing executive in the weapons industry who serves as an adviser to the Canadian Department of National Defense and vice president and director of the NAOC.

Baines opened the event noting that participants would discuss “cognitive warfare and new domain of competition, where state and non-state actors aim to influence what people think and how they act.”

The NAOC president also happily noted the lucrative “opportunities for Canadian companies” that this NATO Innovation Challenge promised.

NATO researcher describes cognitive warfare as ‘ways of harming the brain’

The October 5 panel kicked off with François du Cluzel, a former French military officer who in 2013 helped to create the NATO Innovation Hub (iHub), which he has since then managed from its base in Norfolk, Virginia.

Although the iHub insists on its website, for legal reasons, that the “opinions expressed on this platform don’t constitute NATO or any other organization points of view,” the organization is sponsored by the Allied Command Transformation (ACT), described as “one of two Strategic Commands at the head of NATO’s military command structure.”

The Innovation Hub, therefore, acts as a kind of in-house NATO research center or think tank. Its research is not necessarily official NATO policy, but it is directly supported and overseen by NATO.

In 2020, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) tasked du Cluzel, as manager of the iHub, to conduct a six-month study on cognitive warfare.

Du Cluzel summarized his research in the panel this October. He initiated his remarks noting that cognitive warfare “right now is one of the hottest topics for NATO,” and “has become a recurring term in military terminology in recent years.”

Although French, Du Cluzel emphasized that cognitive warfare strategy “is being currently developed by my command here in Norfolk, USA.”

The NATO Innovation Hub manager spoke with a PowerPoint presentation, and opened with a provocative slide that described cognitive warfare as “A Battle for the Brain.”

“Cognitive warfare is a new concept that starts in the information sphere, that is a kind of hybrid warfare,” du Cluzel said.

“It starts with hyper-connectivity. Everyone has a cell phone,” he continued.

It starts with information because information is, if I may say, the fuel of cognitive warfare. But it goes way beyond solely information, which is a standalone operation–information warfare is a standalone operation.

Cognitive warfare overlaps with Big Tech corporations and mass surveillance, because “it’s all about leveraging the big data,” du Cluzel explained.

We produce data everywhere we go. Every minute, every second we go, we go online. And this is extremely easy to leverage those data in order to better know you and use that knowledge to change the way you think.

Naturally, the NATO researcher claimed foreign “adversaries” are the supposed aggressors employing cognitive warfare. But at the same time, he made it clear that the Western military alliance is developing its own tactics.

Du Cluzel defined cognitive warfare as the “art of using technologies to alter the cognition of human targets.”

Those technologies, he noted, incorporate the fields of NBIC–nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology, and cognitive science. All together, “it makes a kind of very dangerous cocktail that can further manipulate the brain,” he said.

Du Cluzel went on to explain that the exotic new method of attack “goes well beyond” information warfare or psychological operations (psyops).

“Cognitive warfare is not only a fight against what we think, but it’s rather a fight against the way we think, if we can change the way people think,” he said.

De Cluzel continued:

It’s crucial to understand that it’s a game on our cognition, on the way our brain processes information and turns it into knowledge, rather than solely a game on information or on psychological aspects of our brains. It’s not only an action against what we think, but also an action against the way we think, the way we process information and turn it into knowledge.

In other words, cognitive warfare is not just another word, another name for information warfare. It is a war on our individual processor, our brain.

The NATO researcher stressed that “this is extremely important for us in the military,” because “it has the potential, by developing new weapons and ways of harming the brain, it has the potential to engage neuroscience and technology in many, many different approaches to influence human ecology… because you all know that it’s very easy to turn a civilian technology into a military one.”

As for who the targets of cognitive warfare could be, du Cluzel revealed that anyone and everyone is on the table.

“Cognitive warfare has universal reach, from starting with the individual to states and multinational organizations,” he said.

Its field of action is global and aim to seize control of the human being, civilian as well as military.

And the private sector has a financial interest in advancing cognitive warfare research, he noted:

The massive worldwide investments made in neurosciences suggests that the cognitive domain will probably one of the battlefields of the future.

The development of cognitive warfare totally transforms military conflict as we know it, du Cluzel said, adding “a third major combat dimension to the modern battlefield: to the physical and informational dimension is now added a cognitive dimension.”

This “creates a new space of competition beyond what is called the five domains of operations–or land, sea, air, cyber, and space domains. Warfare in the cognitive arena mobilizes a wider range of battle spaces than solely the physical and information dimensions can do.”

In short, humans themselves are the new contested domain in this novel mode of hybrid warfare, alongside land, sea, air, cyber, and outer space.

NATO’s cognitive warfare study warns of “embedded fifth column”

The study that NATO Innovation Hub manager François du Cluzel conducted, from June to November 2020, was sponsored by the military cartel’s Allied Command Transformation, and published as a 45-page report in January 2021 (PDF).

The chilling document shows how contemporary warfare has reached a kind of dystopian stage, once imaginable only in science fiction.

“The nature of warfare has changed,” the report emphasized.

The majority of current conflicts remain below the threshold of the traditionally accepted definition of warfare, but new forms of warfare have emerged such as Cognitive Warfare (CW), while the human mind is now being considered as a new domain of war.

For NATO, research on cognitive warfare is not just defensive; it is very much offensive as well.

“Developing capabilities to harm the cognitive abilities of opponents will be a necessity,” du Cluzel’s report stated clearly.

In other words, NATO will need to get the ability to safeguard her [its] decision making process and disrupt the adversary’s one.

And anyone could be a target of these cognitive warfare operations: “Any user of modern information technologies is a potential target. It targets the whole of a nation’s human capital,” the report ominously added.

“As well as the potential execution of a cognitive war to complement to a military conflict, it can also be conducted alone, without any link to an engagement of the armed forces,” the study went on.

Moreover, cognitive warfare is potentially endless since there can be no peace treaty or surrender for this type of conflict.

Just as this new mode of battle has no geographic borders, it also has no time limit:

This battlefield is global via the internet. With no beginning and no end, this conquest knows no respite, punctuated by notifications from our smartphones, anywhere, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

The NATO-sponsored study noted that “some NATO Nations have already acknowledged that neuroscientific techniques and technologies have high potential for operational use in a variety of security, defense and intelligence enterprises.”

It spoke of breakthroughs in “neuroscientific methods and technologies” (neuroS/T), and said “uses of research findings and products to directly facilitate the performance of combatants, the integration of human machine interfaces to optimise combat capabilities of semi autonomous vehicles (e.g., drones), and development of biological and chemical weapons (i.e., neuroweapons).”

The Pentagon is among the primary institutions advancing this novel research, as the report highlighted:

Although a number of nations have pursued, and are currently pursuing neuroscientific research and development for military purposes, perhaps the most proactive efforts in this regard have been conducted by the United States Department of Defense; with most notable and rapidly maturing research and development conducted by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA).

Military uses of neuroS/T research, the study indicated, include intelligence gathering, training, “optimising performance and resilience in combat and military support personnel,” and of course “direct weaponisation of neuroscience and neurotechnology.”

This weaponization of neuroS/T can and will be fatal, the NATO-sponsored study was clear to point out. The research can “be utilised to mitigate aggression and foster cognitions and emotions of affiliation or passivity; induce morbidity, disability or suffering; and ‘neutralise’ potential opponents or incur mortality”–in other words, to maim and kill people.

The report quoted U.S. Major General Robert H. Scales, who summarized NATO’s new combat philosophy:

Victory will be defined more in terms of capturing the psycho-cultural rather than the geographical high ground.

And as NATO develops tactics of cognitive warfare to “capture the psycho-cultural,” it is also increasingly weaponizing various scientific fields.

The study spoke of “the crucible of data sciences and human sciences,” and stressed that “the combination of Social Sciences and System Engineering will be key in helping military analysts to improve the production of intelligence.”

“If kinetic power cannot defeat the enemy,” it said,

psychology and related behavioural and social sciences stand to fill the void.

“Leveraging social sciences will be central to the development of the Human Domain Plan of Operations,” the report went on.

It will support the combat operations by providing potential courses of action for the whole surrounding Human Environment including enemy forces, but also determining key human elements such as the Cognitive center of gravity, the desired behaviour as the end state.

All academic disciplines will be implicated in cognitive warfare, not just the hard sciences. “Within the military, expertise on anthropology, ethnography, history, psychology among other areas will be more than ever required to cooperate with the military,” the NATO-sponsored study stated.

The report nears its conclusion with an eerie quote:

Today’s progresses in nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology and cognitive science (NBIC), boosted by the seemingly unstoppable march of a triumphant troika made of Artificial Intelligence, Big Data and civilisational ‘digital addiction’ have created a much more ominous prospect: an embedded fifth column, where everyone, unbeknownst to him or her [themselves], is behaving according to the plans of one of our competitors.

“The modern concept of war is not about weapons but about influence,” it posited.

Victory in the long run will remain solely dependent on the ability to influence, affect, change or impact the cognitive domain.

The NATO-sponsored study then closed with a final paragraph that makes it clear beyond doubt that the Western military alliance’s ultimate goal is not only physical control of the planet, but also control over people’s minds:

Cognitive warfare may well be the missing element that allows the transition from military victory on the battlefield to lasting political success. The human domain might well be the decisive domain, wherein multi-domain operations achieve the commander’s effect. The five first domains can give tactical and operational victories; only the human domain can achieve the final and full victory.

Canadian Special Operations officer emphasizes importance of cognitive warfare

When François du Cluzel, the NATO researcher who conducted the study on cognitive warfare, concluded his remarks in the October 5 NATO Association of Canada panel, he was followed by Andy Bonvie, a commanding officer at the Canadian Special Operations Training Centre.

With more than 30 years of experience with the Canadian Armed Forces, Bonvie spoke of how Western militaries are making use of research by du Cluzel and others, and incorporating novel cognitive warfare techniques into their combat activities.

“Cognitive warfare is a new type of hybrid warfare for us,” Bonvie said.

And it means that we need to look at the traditional thresholds of conflict and how the things that are being done are really below those thresholds of conflict, cognitive attacks, and non-kinetic forms and non-combative threats to us. We need to understand these attacks better and adjust their actions and our training accordingly to be able to operate in these different environments.

Although he portrayed NATO’s actions as “defensive,” claiming “adversaries” were using cognitive warfare against them, Bonvie was unambiguous about the fact that Western militaries are developing these tecniques themselves, to maintain a “tactical advantage.”

“We cannot lose the tactical advantage for our troops that we’re placing forward as it spans not only tactically, but strategically,” he said.

Some of those different capabilities that we have that we enjoy all of a sudden could be pivoted to be used against us. So we have to better understand how quickly our adversaries adapt to things, and then be able to predict where they’re going in the future, to help us be and maintain the tactical advantage for our troops moving forward.

‘Cognitive warfare is the most advanced form of manipulation seen to date’

Marie-Pierre Raymond, a retired Canadian lieutenant colonel who currently serves as a “defence scientist and innovation portfolio manager” for the Canadian Armed Forces’ Innovation for Defence Excellence and Security Program, also joined the October 5 panel.

“Long gone are the days when war was fought to acquire more land,” Raymond said.

Now the new objective is to change the adversaries’ ideologies, which makes the brain the center of gravity of the human. And it makes the human the contested domain, and the mind becomes the battlefield.

“When we speak about hybrid threats, cognitive warfare is the most advanced form of manipulation seen to date,” she added, noting that it aims to influence individuals’ decision-making and “to influence a group of a group of individuals on their behavior, with the aim of gaining a tactical or strategic advantage.”

Raymond noted that cognitive warfare also heavily overlaps with artificial intelligence, big data, and social media, and reflects “the rapid evolution of neurosciences as a tool of war.”

Raymond is helping to oversee the NATO Fall 2021 Innovation Challenge on behalf of Canada’s Department of National Defence, which delegated management responsibilities to the military’s Innovation for Defence Excellence and Security (IDEaS) Program, where she works.

In highly technical jargon, Raymond indicated that the cognitive warfare program is not solely defensive, but also offensive:

This challenge is calling for a solution that will support NATO’s nascent human domain and jump-start the development of a cognition ecosystem within the alliance, and that will support the development of new applications, new systems, new tools and concepts leading to concrete action in the cognitive domain.”

She emphasized that this “will require sustained cooperation between allies, innovators, and researchers to enable our troops to fight and win in the cognitive domain. This is what we are hoping to emerge from this call to innovators and researchers.”

To inspire corporate interest in the NATO Innovation Challenge, Raymond enticed, “Applicants will receive national and international exposure and cash prizes for the best solution.” She then added tantalizingly,

This could also benefit the applicants by potentially providing them access to a market of 30 nations.

Canadian military officer calls on corporations to invest in NATO’s cognitive warfare research

The other institution that is managing the Fall 2021 NATO Innovation Challenge on behalf of Canada’s Department of National Defense is the Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM).

A Canadian military officer who works with CANSOFCOM, Shekhar Gothi, was the final panelist in the October 5 NATO Association of Canada event. Gothi serves as CANSOFCOM’s “innovation officer” for Southern Ontario.

He concluded the event appealing for corporate investment in NATO’s cognitive warfare research.

The bi-annual Innovation Challenge is “part of the NATO battle rhythm,” Gothi declared enthusiastically.

He noted that, in the spring of 2021, Portugal held a NATO Innovation Challenge focused on warfare in outer space.

In spring 2020, the Netherlands hosted a NATO Innovation Challenge focused on COVID-19.

Gothi reassured corporate investors that NATO will bend over backward to defend their bottom lines:

I can assure everyone that the NATO innovation challenge indicates that all innovators will maintain complete control of their intellectual property. So NATO won’t take control of that. Neither will Canada. Innovators will maintain their control over their IP.

The comment was a fitting conclusion to the panel, affirming that NATO and its allies in the military-industrial complex not only seek to dominate the world and the humans that inhabit it with unsettling cognitive warfare techniques, but to also ensure that corporations and their shareholders continue to profit from these imperial endeavors.

### ! — Sloterdijk

#### Models of warfare depersonalize the atmosphere of warfare into a quantitative game — it explains ecological degradation and economic unsustainability.

Grove 19 [Jairus Victor Grove is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Hawai'i Research Center for Future Studies at the University of Hawai'i at Mānoa; “Savage Ecology: war and geopolitics at the end of the world”; August 16, 2019]//eleanor

A mutation takes place in the martial arts of European states and the U.S. state. Great powers shift from the privileging of individual skill on the battlefield to a quantity theory of war in which numbers, at least for a time, matter more than tactical execution.10 In specific historical terms, one can see the difference in the episteme of skill versus the quantitative mode of warfare in the way leaders of the Gauls were chosen by performance in combat. One’s right to lead among the Gauls came from one’s ability to survive and excel in combat. The leader often actually led, in the physical sense, the troops into battle. The leaders were the front line or tip of the cannae or wedge shape that fighters formed as they raced toward their enemy. The metaphorical meaning of “leading” a battle in which verbal and later cybernetic commands or leadership replaces the physical presence of commanders on the field of battle tracks with the deskilling, depersonalization, and democratization of warfare into a quantitative enterprise.11 The faith in overwhelming force over strategic or limited ends explains a great deal about contemporary practices of combat wreaking havoc with little success around the globe. The quantitative and then annihilative mode of warfare also says something about the creeping entanglements between war and other ecological orders such as the economy, resource extraction, urbanization, and scientific innovation. These seemingly distinct modes of organization and relations making are increasingly bound up with and to war precisely because a quantitative approach to annihilation requires—as a contest—the full mobilization of production, whether demographic, economic, technological, or affective. Not surprisingly, each of these sectors becomes a target of war, resulting in an inseparable entanglement of arsenal and form of life. Using the example of gas warfare, Peter Sloterdijk argues that the environment itself became the operational space of warfare. Unlike targeting or fighting, gas changed the atmosphere of the lifeworld into a death world. The transition for Sloterdijk was a logical outcome of a form of war for which annihilation was analytically and materially practiced, and therefore, habituated as a preference, war became technological: “technology militarily encapsulates the nature of enmity: it is nothing other than the will to annihilate one’s opponent. Enmity made technologically explicit is exterminism. This explains why the mature style of warfare in the twentieth century was annihilation-oriented.”12 Therefore, for Sloterdijk, poison gas for crops, poison gas for troops, and poison gas for victims of the Holocaust, while not being indistinguishable, share a common heritage in the explication of the ecological order. The habitats of bugs, soldiers, Jews, queers, Roma, Communists, and other dissidents share an atmosphere; therefore, the annihilation of each can be accomplished by taking that atmosphere away. Rather than seeing gas as an aberration from other forms of war, Sloterdijk sees it as an extension of war becoming ecologically aware.13 War as a technological assemblage of making each relation more and more explicit, whether economy, combatant, or resource, also made each a target and each relation that sustained that target a potential weapon. Over four centuries of European development and expansion, violence capability and participation have undergone a process of radical democratization for both citizens and things. Everything is a target and the dependence of every target implies a weapon, a “new surface of vulnerability.” According to Sloterdijk, “no other epoch displayed such advanced expertise in the art of annihilating.”14

### ! — AT: Utilitarianism

#### Their utilitarian framework of “extinction first” understands the planet as a spatially cartographic whole, reducible to the sum of its parts — that makes violence against the periphery inevitable.

Grove 19 [Jairus Victor Grove is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Hawai'i Research Center for Future Studies at the University of Hawai'i at Mānoa; “Savage Ecology: war and geopolitics at the end of the world”; August 16, 2019]//eleanor

Rather than see these two career trajectories as opposed, I think Crutzen’s thinking displays a continuous concern for the Northern Hemisphere and a particular cartography, rather than a geography, of human survival.9 Crutzen, as well as the concept of the Anthropocene itself, cannot escape preceding geopolitical conceptions of the Earth. Crutzen and others who rush so quickly to the necessity to transition efforts from climate abatement to climate modification are unsurprisingly not moved by claims that artificial cooling will likely cause droughts and famines in the tropics and subtropical zones of the global south; nor are they moved by how such plans may accelerate ocean acidification.10 The utilitarian risk calculus that favors the greatest good for the greatest number has no geographical or historical sensibility of how unequally aggregate conceptions of the good are distributed around the planet. Global thinking, even in its scientific and seemingly universalist claims to an atmosphere that “we” all share, belies the geopolitics that enlivens scientific concern, as well as the global public policy agenda of geoengineering that seeks to act on behalf of it. Saving humanity as an aggregate, whether from nuclear war, Styrofoam, or climate turbulence, has never meant an egalitarian distribution of survivors and sacrifices. Instead, our new cosmopolitanism— the global environment—follows almost exactly the drawn lines, that is, the cartography or racialized and selective solidarities and zones of indifference that characterize economic development, the selective application of combat, and, before that, the zones of settlement and colonization. More than a result of contemporary white supremacy or lingering white privilege, the territorialization of who lives and who dies, who matters and who must be left behind for the sake of humanity, represents a five-hundred-year geopolitical tradition of conquest, colonization, extraction, and the martial forms of life that made them all possible through war and through more subtle and languid forms of organized killing. I am not suggesting that Crutzen and others are part of a vast conspiracy; rather, I want to outline how climate change, species loss, slavery, the elimination of native peoples, and the globalization of extractive capitalism are all part of the same global ordering. That is, all of these crises are geopolitical. The particular geopolitical arrangement of what others have called the longue durée, and what I am calling the Eurocene, is geologically significant but is not universally part of “human activity” despite the false syllogism at the heart of popular ecological thinking that a global threat to humanity must be shared in cause and crisis by all of humanity.11 Departing from Sloterdijk, I am hesitant to so easily locate modernity or explication as the root or cause of the global catastrophe. No single strategy, war, act of colonization, technological breakthrough, or worldview fully explains the apocalypse before us. However, there is something like what Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari call a refrain that holds the vast assemblage together, a geopolitical melody hummed along with the global expansion of a form of life characterized by homogenization rather than diversification. Accordingly, if we are to make some sense of such a vast world that is, even for Crutzen and Birks, “quite complex and difficult to model,” I think we must consider the particular refrain of geopolitics that is capable of, by scientific as well as more humbly embodied standards, destroying worlds along with the world.12 To eschew geopolitics simply because, as a refrain, it is too big, too grand, or too universal would ignore the conditions of possibility for nuclear weapons, power politics, and carbon-based globalization, and would greatly impoverish the explanatory capability of even the best climate models. So maybe it is not so strange that Crutzen and others’ attention to the nuclear threat of great powers has all but disappeared despite the fact that Russia and the United States still possess thousands of nuclear weapons, and as of late have been all too vocal about using them. Instead, the Anthropocene, as envisioned by Crutzen as a universal concern, requires with it a depoliticization of the causes of that concern. Therefore, Crutzen’s fascination with nuclear winter is geopolitical not because it is about nuclear weapons—although that does not hurt. Rather, Crutzen’s attention to nuclear winter is geopolitical because it is an image of the Earth system as a system with particular beneficiaries animating that interest. Sloterdijk’s diagnosis of what I am terming the Eurocene, or the space of what he calls European “earth-users,” is present in the very cybernetic understanding of the planet as a spatial and substantive whole.13 In the cases of both nuclear winter and climate change, the atmosphere is a model, or more accurately, the last model. The whole Earth becomes a single integer in a larger set of planet systems rather than a set of habitats, zones, or locales. The Earth is merely another system isomorphic as a unit of analysis with Mars or the exoplanet trappist-1f. The shift in scale from place to the planetary is much more than a pulling back from the ground upward. The integrated Earth as the representation of a system and as an actual material system is aided by a process of integration, proceeded by a few hundred years of Sloterdijk’s conception of explication where each part of each environment is disaggregated, described, and then reassembled to explain the whole. The process of integration is not merely a metaphoric or metaphysical geopolitics. It is the condition of possibility to understand the planetary as being political, as well as the condition of possibility for its charting as an economic and military cartography. Unlike the weltanschauung of Heidegger’s world image, the planetary “user space” requires five hundred years of conquest, fossil fuel extraction and exploitation, settlement, hundreds of expert fields from geography to chemistry to ecology, and the normative consolidation of cosmopolitanism as a right to the freedom of movement at least for those capable of the feat.14 The worldview or world image alone is a necessary but insufficient cause. The practices that habituated, expanded, and intensified that worldview are what is critical to its emergence. In this sense, the Anthropocene, like Crutzen’s award-winning models of climate change and nuclear winter, is much more than an explanatory model. These models are the outcome of five centuries of integration and homogenization such that the infrastructure capable of making the Earth as a system knowable could be built, and the circulation of knowledge and data could be amassed to even make the diagnosis of a geological epoch in the first place.15 Properly accounting for the origins of our ecological crisis is vital. No political project oriented toward the many possible futures stretching out before us can consider the questions of ecology and justice on a global, much less geological, scale unless we first take on the unfortunate historical generality of the Anthropocene. The continuing project of Europeanization, now led by U.S. imperial power (although perhaps not for much longer), is central to how the planet got to this point. Understanding this is essential for how any “we” worthy of the plurality of the planet can invent something less nasty and brutish than what currently counts as global order. A consideration of the Eurocene, a geological history and name that foregrounds the geopolitical confrontation that stands in the way of any such future, is required in order to take the scale of our predicament seriously, while also confronting the power politics that made that scale possible.

#### 2. Their framing sacrifices billions at the altar of extinction and elites

Torres 21, PhD candidate at Leibniz Universität Hannover. Previously studied at Harvard University and Brandeis University. Author of Morality, Foresight, and Human Flourishing: An Introduction to Existential Risks (Phil Torres, 7-28-2021, “The Dangerous Ideas of ‘Longtermism’ and ‘Existential Risk’,” Current Affairs, <https://www.currentaffairs.org/2021/07/the-dangerous-ideas-of-longtermism-and-existential-risk>, accessed: 10-27-2021)

It’s this line of reasoning that leads Bostrom, Greaves, MacAskill, and others to argue that even the tiniest reductions in “existential risk” are morally equivalent to saving the lives of literally billions of living, breathing, actual people. For example, Bostrom writes that if there is “a mere 1 percent chance” that 10^54 conscious beings (most living in computer simulations) come to exist in the future, then “we find that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one billionth of one billionth of one percentage point is worth a hundred billion times as much as a billion human lives.” Greaves and MacAskill echo this idea in a 2021 paper by arguing that “even if there are ‘only’ 1014 lives to come … , a reduction in near-term risk of extinction by one millionth of one percentage point would be equivalent in value to a million lives saved.”

To make this concrete, imagine Greaves and MacAskill in front of two buttons. If pushed, the first would save the lives of 1 million living, breathing, actual people. The second would increase the probability that 10^14 currently unborn people come into existence in the far future by a teeny-tiny amount. Because, on their longtermist view, there is no fundamental moral difference between saving actual people and bringing new people into existence, these options are morally equivalent. In other words, they’d have to flip a coin to decide which button to push. (Would you? I certainly hope not.) In Bostrom’s example, the morally right thing is obviously to sacrifice billions of living human beings for the sake of even tinier reductions in existential risk, assuming a minuscule 1 percent chance of a larger future population: 1054 people.

All of this is to say that even if billions of people were to perish in the coming climate catastrophe, so long as humanity survives with enough of civilization intact to fulfill its supposed “potential,” we shouldn’t be too concerned. In the grand scheme of things, non-runaway climate change will prove to be nothing more than a “mere ripple” —a “small misstep for mankind,” however terrible a “massacre for man” it might otherwise be.

Even worse, since our resources for reducing existential risk are finite, Bostrom argues that we must not “fritter [them] away” on what he describes as “feel-good projects of suboptimal efficacy.” Such projects would include, on this account, not just saving people in the Global South—those most vulnerable, especially women—from the calamities of climate change, but all other non-existential philanthropic causes, too. As the Princeton philosopher Peter Singer writes about Bostrom in his 2015 book on Effective Altruism, “to refer to donating to help the global poor … as a ‘feel-good project’ on which resources are ‘frittered away’ is harsh language.” But it makes perfectly good sense within Bostrom’s longtermist framework, according to which “priority number one, two, three, and four should … be to reduce existential risk.” Everything else is smaller fish not worth frying.

If this sounds appalling, it’s because it is appalling. By reducing morality to an abstract numbers game, and by declaring that what’s most important is fulfilling “our potential” by becoming simulated posthumans among the stars, longtermists not only trivialize past atrocities like WWII (and the Holocaust) but give themselves a “moral excuse” to dismiss or minimize comparable atrocities in the future. This is one reason that I’ve come to see longtermism as an immensely dangerous ideology. It is, indeed, akin to a secular religion built around the worship of “future value,” complete with its own “secularised doctrine of salvation,” as the Future of Humanity Institute historian Thomas Moynihan approvingly writes in his book X-Risk. The popularity of this religion among wealthy people in the West—especially the socioeconomic elite—makes sense because it tells them exactly what they want to hear: not only are you ethically excused from worrying too much about sub-existential threats like non-runaway climate change and global poverty, but you are actually a morally better person for focusing instead on more important things—risk that could permanently destroy “our potential” as a species of Earth-originating intelligent life.

#### Their framing causes genocide AND links

Santos 3, Professor of Sociology at the University of Coimbra (Boaventura de Souza Santos, 2003, “Collective Suicide?”, Bad Subjects, Issue # 63, http://www.ces.fe.uc.pt/opiniao/bss/072en.php)

According to Franz Hinkelammert, the West has repeatedly been under the illusion that it should try to save humanity by destroying part of it. This is a salvific and sacrificial destruction, committed in the name of the need to radically materialize all the possibilities opened up by a given social and political reality over which it is supposed to have total power. This is how it was in colonialism, with the genocide of indigenous peoples, and the African slaves. This is how it was in the period of imperialist struggles, which caused millions of deaths in two world wars and many other colonial wars. This is how it was in Stalinism, with the Gulag and in Nazism, with the holocaust. And now today, this is how it is in neoliberalism, with the collective sacrifice of the periphery and even the semiperiphery of the world system. With the war against Iraq, it is fitting to ask whether what is in progress is a new genocidal and sacrificial illusion, and what its scope might be. It is above all appropriate to ask if the new illusion will not herald the radicalization and the ultimate perversion of the western illusion: destroying all of humanity in the illusion of saving it. Sacrificial genocide arises from a totalitarian illusion that is manifested in the belief that there are no alternatives to the present-day reality and that the problems and difficulties confronting it arise from failing to take its logic of development to its ultimate consequences. If there is unemployment, hunger and death in the Third World, this is not the result of market failures; instead, it is the outcome of the market laws not having been fully applied. If there is terrorism, this is not due to the violence of the conditions that generate it; it is due, rather, to the fact that total violence has not been employed to physically eradicate all terrorists and potential terrorists. This political logic is based on the supposition of total power and knowledge, and on the radical rejection of alternatives; it is ultra-conservative in that it aims to infinitely reproduce the status quo. Inherent to it is the notion of the end of history. During the last hundred years, the West has experienced three versions of this logic, and, therefore, seen three versions of the end of history: Stalinism, with its logic of insuperable efficiency of the plan; Nazism, with its logic of racial superiority; and neoliberalism, with its logic of insuperable efficiency of the market. The first two periods involved the destruction of democracy. The last one trivializes democracy, disarming it in the face of social actors sufficiently powerful to be able to privatize the State and international institutions in their favour. I have described this situation as a combination of political democracy and social fascism. One current manifestation of this combination resides in the fact that intensely strong public opinion, worldwide, against the war is found to be incapable of halting the war machine set in motion by supposedly democratic rulers. At all these moments, a death drive, a catastrophic heroism, predominates, the idea of a looming collective suicide, only preventable by the massive destruction of the other. Paradoxically, the broader the definition of the other and the efficacy of its destruction, the more likely collective suicide becomes. In its sacrificial genocide version, neoliberalism is a mixture of market radicalization, neoconservatism and Christian fundamentalism. Its death drive takes a number of forms, from the idea of "discardable populations", referring to citizens of the Third World not capable of being exploited as workers and consumers, to the concept of "collateral damage" , to refer to the deaths, as a result of war, of thousands of innocent civilians. The last, catastrophic heroism, is quite clear on two facts: according to reliable calculations by the Non-Governmental Organization MEDACT, in London, between 48 and 260 thousand civilians will die during the war and in the three months after (this is without there being civil war or a nuclear attack); the war will cost 100 billion dollars, enough to pay the health costs of the world's poorest countries for four years. Is it possible to fight this death drive? We must bear in mind that, historically, sacrificial destruction has always been linked to the economic pillage of natural resources and the labor force, to the imperial design of radically changing the terms of economic, social, political and cultural exchanges in the face of falling efficiency rates postulated by the maximalist logic of the totalitarian illusion in operation. It is as though hegemonic powers, both when they are on the rise and when they are in decline, repeatedly go through times of primitive accumulation, legitimizing the most shameful violence in the name of futures where, by definition, there is no room for what must be destroyed. In today's version, the period of primitive accumulation consists of combining neoliberal economic globalization with the globalization of war. The machine of democracy and liberty turns into a machine of horror and destruction.

### ! — AT: Interventions Good

#### The 1AC views the world as the creation and the West as the creator, where the West is beyond the rules of the game — that renders the globe subject to violent reconfiguration.

Nyere 20, Chidochashe Nyere, PhD is a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the Institute for Pan African Thought and Conversation, University of Johannesburg., (Chidochashe, “NATO’s 2011 Invasion of Libya: Colonialism Repackaged?” in Reimagining Justice, Human Rights and Leadership in Africa, pp. 123-156, DOI:10.1007/978-3-030-25143-7\_7) //CHC-DS

Contextualising Coloniality of Power

To control is to induce/evoke in another a reaction/response, or take a course of action that they would not otherwise willingly choose. As such, control is the essential and primary currency of empire. Coloniality of power is a unit of analysis that unmasks the control patterns and of modernity. The architects of modernity and colonialism had in mind, control of the world, for the survival of their colonial project. The coloniser and the colonised are by design unequal. An inherent asymmetrical power relationship exists between the two. The design cannot be greater than the designer, neither a creation greater than the creator. A creator cannot be part of the creation or created. The creation is a product of the creator, so is the design a product of the designer. What (cause) limits and regulates (control) the design is the designer (agency). As such, the rules that apply to the design may not be applicable to the designer. The creator is above and beyond the creation. This scenario places the creator in an asymmetrical power relation with its creation, the two are incomparable. What are the implications of the asymmetrical power relations? The Euro-North American-centric civilisation is outside the global power structural configuration. It created this configuration, and it is the force that does the configuration. All other civilisations are the ones to be configured. Any deviant civilisation or perspective to the established ‘global order’ becomes a threat to the functioning of this global imperial design. In this paradigm, there can never exist more than one centre of power; the Euro-North American-centric civilisation views itself as the only legitimate seat of power and control. The designer regulates and controls the design. The design could have not existed without the designer. This is the bone of contention; since the design could have not been without the designer, how then can the same rules that regulate the design be applied to the designer? As such, coloniality of power perpetuates the patterns and designs of Euro-North American-centric modernity. The perpetuation of modernity’s designs, patterns and structures is the essence of coloniality. Coloniality is the vehicle that transports and transplants modernity. Coloniality of power is the vehicle that transports and transplants control of institutions of authority, the markets, sexuality and gender as well as what is acceptable as knowledge, from Europe to the rest of the world. What would be of value to the analysis that this chapter embarks on is the four levers of control that Quijano identified as core to understanding and unpacking the concept of coloniality of power. In analysing and assessing the events that occasioned the NATO invasion of Libya in 2011, this chapter will analyse how Libya was a threat to the current global power structural configuration on four levels—control of authority, control of knowledge and subjectivity, control of the economy and control of gender and sexuality. Going forward, this chapter will analyse how Libya’s stance on, and call to, forming a United Africa, as evinced by Koenig (2017: Online), went against the authority component of the current global power structural configuration. This work will also go on to demonstrate how Libya’s proposal for African countries to develop and adopt their own monetary currency that was to be backed by gold reserves, as submitted by Koenig (2017: Online), went against the economy and markets component of the Euro-North American-centric power structural configuration. Libya’s quest to develop a communication satellite that was to improve communication technologies in Africa, as averred by Bowen (2006: 14), went against the knowledge and subjectivity component of the global power structural configuration. At the time of Gaddafi’s demise, Libya was increasingly beginning to be seen as a good example of a decolonial state, as opined by Bowen (2006: 15), and that was a threat to the gender and sexuality component of the global power structural configuration. It is therefore conceivable that the NATO-led UNSC acted to consolidate the global power structural configuration. As such, this work will now go on to demonstrate and evince these assertions and convictions in the subsequent chapters.

#### Be skeptical of their claims to humanitarianism — private military contractors have been pulling the strings, supporting violent NATO interventions.

Campbell 11, Horace G. Campbell is a noted international peace and justice scholar and Professor of African American Studies and Political Science at Syracuse University in Syracuse, New York., (Horace, “Global NATO and the recolonisation of Africa”, Pambazuka News, <https://www.pambazuka.org/global-south/global-nato-and-recolonisation-africa>) //CHC-DS

A NEW KIND OF IMPERIAL INTERVENTION

It must be stated that the mobilisation of the international peace forces against NATO have always been a consideration for the planning of Operation United Protector. Within the United States, sections of the Congressional leadership had called on President Obama to invoke the War Powers Act in order to receive Congressional support for US participation in this war. However, the White House and the Pentagon did not want an open discussion of the role of the US military in this operation. The Pentagon had moved to a new form of warfare where special forces were linked to private military organisations. The Washington Post has reported that the United States had deployed special operations forces in 75 countries, from South America to Central Asia. It is now time to place the opposition to militarism with clear focus on these special forces and especially the private military corporations who act outside of the law. Inside the United States, the former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates told West Point cadets in March 2011 that, ‘In my opinion, any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should ‘have his head examined.’ The Pentagon was afraid of being bogged down in another war. With memories of the lack of popular support for the military during the war against the people of Vietnam, the top military planners wanted to limit opposition to the financial /military/industrial complex. Although the peace movement had the Obama administration on the defensive, some sections of this movement did not distance itself from Gaddafi and Libyans slaughter of sub-Saharan Africans, while they condemned the killing of innocent civilians by NATO jets.

European workers, faced with the double dip recession where the banks were calling on the governments to impose austerity measures, were lukewarm toward the Libyan operation, so the invaders had to find a novel way for intervening. This intervention then took the form of bombings by NATO, on the ground special forces from the French and British commandos with air and ground support from Qatar. The New York Times reported the coordination in this way, ‘The United States provided intelligence, refueling and more precision bombing than Paris or London want to acknowledge. Inevitably, then, NATO air power and technology, combined with British, French and Qatari ‘trainers’ working ‘secretly’ with the rebels on the ground, have defeated the forces of Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi.’ (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/04/sunday-review/what-libyas-lessons-mean...) Reuters news service reported that ‘former soldiers from an elite British commando unit, the Special Air Service, and other private contractors from Western countries were on the ground in the Libyan city of Misrata.’ In this same Reuters piece, it indicated that according to The Guardian, private military contractors were helping NATO identify possible targets in the heavily contested city and passing this information, as well as information about the movements of Gaddafi’s forces, to a NATO command center in Naples, Italy. The newspaper reported that a group of six armed Westerners had been filmed by the Al Jazeera TV network talking to rebels in Misrata; the men fled after realizing they were being filmed.

Initially, the United States Africa Command took credit for the NATO operations in Libya, but when it seemed as if the entire operation was bogged down, there were efforts to bring in special forces and private security personnel using Qatar as the front and paymaster. Indeed, the use of fronts such as the Emir of Qatar pointed to a new form of global militarism. Blackwater (now called Xe), the American private military firm for hire, had moved to establish its headquarters in the United Arab Emirates, specifically Abu Dhabi. In a compilation of articles on nytimes.com, entitled, ‘Blackwater Worldwide’ , new information was provided on the various front companies of Blackwater and the integrated nature of the CIA/Blackwater operations. The compilation further informed that Blackwater did not want to recruit Muslims because Muslims would be reluctant to kill other Muslims. When the rebels entered Tripoli, the same talking heads in Washington that were opposed to the intervention were now praising this new kind of cooperation between the US military and Global NATO. Future researchers on the ‘special operators on the ground’ in Libya will be able to list the names of the Private Military Contractors who were involved in this war. When the leaders of the National Transitional Council of Libya (the political body formed to represent Libya by anti-Gaddafi forces during the 2011 Libyan civil war) needed money to pay the private contractors and to bribe regional leaders, the Global NATO diplomats promptly called for the unfreezing of the assets of Libya, even while the African Union was protesting the killing of black Africans.

## Impact — NATO

### ! — AT: Russia

#### Russia’s inept AND the alliance causes more instability.

Chase Madar 22, lawyer in New York and a contributor to the London Review of Books and Le Monde diplomatique, 4-15-2022, "Should NATO Exist?" https://www.thenation.com/article/world/nato-ukraine-debate/, jy <3 BB [title inserted at the top for emphasis]

[ Should NATO Exist? ]

No

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was founded in 1949, and in the words of its first secretary general, Baron Ismay Hastings, it had three goals: Keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down. Nearly three-quarters of a century later, all of these rationales have run out of gas, and it is past time for Washington to exit and thereby dissolve NATO.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine does not change this, even if Moscow’s aggression has breathed new enthusiasm into the alliance. While the invasion has demonstrated Moscow’s bellicosity and recklessness, it has also laid bare the ineptitude of the Russian military. If the shambolic units that just hightailed it out of suburban Kyiv are the greatest threat facing our European allies, then the latter are plainly capable of defending themselves without US troops, subsidies, and micromanagement—in other words, without NATO.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the US could have wrapped up the alliance. But instead, the Clinton administration decided that NATO should take on new members from Moscow’s former satellite states. American foreign policy figures from across the political spectrum, from George Kennan to Jack Matlock to Daniel Patrick Moynihan, warned against expanding NATO eastward, predicting it would infuriate and bring out the worst in Russia’s government, many of whose own leaders stated the same in the clearest possible terms. But Washington’s elites have tended to see NATO membership, or at least the application process, as an inalienable legal right, not as a matter of earthly politics amenable to dealmaking and compromise, with the US-led alliance loudly declaring in 2008 that Ukraine and Georgia would someday join.

Two months into the Russian invasion, it is now taken for granted that Ukraine will never be a member of NATO. The best Ukraine can hope for is armed neutrality with political autonomy from Moscow, the goal that Washington should have been seeking for the past 20 years. We’ll never know how such a project might have worked out—negotiated Cold War neutrality did give Finland and Austria space to flourish, though they are not perfectly analogous to Ukraine—but we can very well see how things have turned out now, in no small measure thanks to promises to bring a US-led military alliance up to Ukraine’s 1,400-mile border with Russia.

Beyond its expansion from 12 initial members to 30, NATO has also strayed from its defensive mandate. Though its bombardment of Serbia in 1999 over the breakaway region of Kosovo is vaguely remembered as a humanitarian win, it shouldn’t be. Washington, which is to say NATO, lurched into its 78-day bombing of Belgrade without exhausting diplomatic alternatives, and the bombing campaign only accelerated the genocide of ethnic Serbs from Kosovo and the Serbian slaughter of some 10,000 Kosovars.

After Kosovo, the alliance looked outside Europe for its reasons for being. In 2011, NATO imposed a no-fly zone over Libya, and it soon stumbled into a regime-change war against Moammar Gadhafi. Now that nation is in its 11th year of civil war, and the operation is widely regarded as a disaster.

To the degree that this rudderless security pact has made war easier, more salable, and more attractive for Western leaders than diplomacy, the alliance has been a liability to peace and stability.

Bad wars aside, there is the issue of control. Can the defense of Europe be trusted to the Europeans? In 2022, the answer is yes. It is true that given its wealth and population, Germany may eventually wield outsize influence in a European security alliance. But that’s OK. Many Americans might find it painful to admit, but Germany is a more stable and functional democracy than the United States, with a more equitable system of representation, less polarization, and smoother transfers of power.

Far from garrisoning more troops in Europe—the US just added 20,000 troops to the 80,000 already deployed—the Biden administration should hold the new government in Berlin to its post-invasion pledge to increase defense spending to 2 percent of GDP, up from a lächerlich 1.53 percent. The US should also lean on other member countries to meet the 2 percent threshold. To make this happen, Washington’s first step should be to redeploy its forces out of Europe without formally leaving the alliance, a move outlined by Jasen Castillo, codirector of the Albritton Center for Grand Strategy at Texas A&M, in a 2019 report from the Center for a New American Security. Recent events have not changed Castillo’s mind. “Frankly, it’s time for the UK, France, and Germany to do the heavy lifting in NATO,” Castillo told me, “especially now that the Ukraine war has revealed that Russia is not 10 feet tall.”

Leaving NATO would not, of course, be sufficient to set hubristic Washington on a path of farsighted preventive diplomacy. But the entirety of the war in Ukraine, from the diplomatic missteps leading up to it to the underperformance of the Russian military, should show that the security pact’s liabilities continue to outweigh its benefits.

### ! — AT: Warming

#### This take is mort-cérébrale.

Jonathan Power 22, international foreign affairs columnist, 3-17-22, “Is Nato obsolete, or brain-dead?” <https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/oped/is-nato-obsolete-or-brain-dead--3749750>, jy <3 BB [brackets for translation]

What did ex-president Donald Trump think about Nato? Twice during his campaign, he rubbished it publicly as “obsolete”. Three years ago the French president Emmanuel Macron said Nato was “brain-dead.” Is it obsolete or brain-dead or both?

Nato’s job, as the British secretary-general, Lord Ismay, said in 1967 was to “keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down”. It certainly had success with the latter two. The first was unnecessary.

There are some- a few- influential people- much wiser than Trump or Macron- who have argued that Nato is indeed obsolete. One of these was William Pfaff, the late, much esteemed, columnist for the International Herald Tribune.

Another is Paul Hockenos who set out his views in a seminal article in World Policy Journal. Their words fell on deaf ears.

President George H.W. Bush (Senior), who presided over the end of the Cold War, wanted to see the Soviet Union more involved in Nato’s day-to-day work.

He travelled to Kiev and told Ukrainians in a public speech that they should keep their country as part of the Soviet Union. Bush preferred stability.

His successor, President Bill Clinton, had totally another agenda- and one that turned out to be dangerous one, triggering over time Russia’s present-day hostility towards the West- incorporating one by one Russia’s former east European allies, the so-called “expansion of Nato” eastwards.

His successors continued that approach with Barack Obama at one time raising a red rag to a bull by calling for the entry into Nato Ukraine and Georgia.

Nato countries thought that they had a role after the Berlin Wall came tumbling down in 1989 and the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. It led to “humanitarian” interventions in Bosnia in 1995, against Serbia in 1999 and in Kosovo later in 1999. But the latter two were done without the authority of the UN Security Council, thus breaking international law. Russia and Spain voted against the intervention in the UN Security Council. (Ironically, if Russia had got its way it would have set a precedent that would have made it very difficult for Russia later to justify its occupation of Crimea and Ukraine.) The final settlement made by the warring parties is unlikely to last.

In 2001 Nato countries led by the US started to bomb Afghanistan and later sent in troops. The war lasted 19 years and ended with Nato’s defeat. In 2003 Nato attacked Iraq and quickly overthrew its government but caused so much damage that the country is still struggling to get back on its feet. (Before that it was the most prosperous of all Arab countries.)

Let’s return to the founding of Nato in 1949, meant “to keep the Russians out”. A majority (yes, a majority) of top historians who have examined the evidence are convinced that Stalin had no intention of invading Western Europe. The Second World War was won.

The Soviet Union, perhaps understandably a bit neurotic after Napoleon and Hitler’s attempts to invade it, reaching within striking distance of Moscow, had a ring of friends around its borders, and Germany was divided.

The allies had been an invaluable helpmate during the war and the Soviet Union did not feel threatened by its former comrades-in-arms. It did not need to fight them for more territory.

Thorough searches by Western historians through the Soviet archives- they were opened during the years of President Boris Yeltsin- have revealed that Moscow had no plans to invade Europe.

Despite its deployments in the former ex-Yugoslavia and Afghanistan, Nato is not a truly multilateral institution of equals. The Europeans do not initiate military action (with the exception of the invasion Libya that led to the overthrow and killing of President Muammar Gadhafi in 2001, followed by chaos that still lives on). It is the Americans who do that and the Europeans, whatever their reservations, invariably follow.

Moreover, obeying America rather than following their own convictions in ex-Yugoslavia, they did not seek UN Security Council permission, and then are angry that Russia follows suit with its grabbing of Crimea.

Nato has no relevance to the problems that truly occupy Europe and the US today.

Its hands are tied in Ukraine because of the fear of nuclear war if they start to fight the Russians. Moreover, there are other examples of irrelevance to our most pressing problems.

It cannot help in dealing with the fact, as a European Union study concluded, that there will be an increase in tensions over declining water supplies in the Middle East that will affect Europe’s security and economic interests. It has no plans to deal with that.

Nor can it do anything to contribute to the fight against global warming, in the long run the most severe threat that confronts humanity.

## Impact — Capitalism

### ! — China

#### China’s driven by capitalist imperialism that brings it to conflict with the US.

IMT 22, International Marxist Tendency, communist party, 3-4-22, “Imperialism today and the character of Russia and China,” [https://www.marxist.com/imperialism-today-and-the-character-of-russia-and-china.htm,](https://www.marxist.com/imperialism-today-and-the-character-of-russia-and-china.htm,j) jy

Economic power begets political power

Lenin says, “the more capitalism is developed, the more strongly the shortage of raw materials is felt, the more intense the competition, and the hunt for raw materials throughout the world.” Is it not clear that China, having carried out the capitalist restoration, is compelled to pursue its interests on a global scale in its quest for markets and raw materials? And is it not equally clear that this quest is bringing it into conflict, not only with the neighbouring countries (Vietnam, Japan, Taiwan, etc.) but also with the main superpower, the United States?

The Chinese state apparatus is a product of the Chinese Revolution of 1949. This strong, well organised state, independent of imperialist influence, was able to carefully foster and protect a developing capitalist class. Over a few decades, it has presided over the creation of massive monopolies, both state owned and private, and a vast accumulation of capital. All history shows that the accumulation of economic power must express itself at a certain stage in the building of political and military power. At present the key nations in this region — Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Taiwan, the Philippines — are all American allies. The booming Chinese economy has made this region the key to world trade, but the USA controls the area.

China today not only has a powerful industrial base. It also has a powerful army. And what are they doing building islands in the Pacific? They are doing it in order to seize control of a very important sea on which one third of the world’s trade is transported. The Americans are furious about this, they denounce it. Is all this just theatre? The Americans send warships to sail close to these islands “to defend freedom of navigation.” This brings them into a very close confrontation with the Chinese. It probably will not lead to war, but the conflicts are real and very serious.

With the sole exception of Japan, the biggest trade partner for all these countries is China, not the USA. This contradiction will intensify as time goes on, and something will have to give. This process has even been seen as far afield as New Zealand and the UK, traditionally staunch US allies. New Zealand said it would not sign the TPP trade deal if it was designed to contain and isolate China.

The Financial Times (12.10.2015) comments: “While some neighbours will welcome the investment, it is less clear they will want China’s overcapacity. Many have unemployment and underperforming steel mills of their own, or ambitions to develop their own industry rather than import someone else’s.” Frictions have already surfaced over contracts with Sri Lanka, where the new government does not want to honour the deals made by the old.

And it concludes as follows:

Lenin’s theory that imperialism is driven by capitalist surpluses seems to hold true, oddly, in one of the last (ostensibly) Leninist countries in the world. It is no coincidence that the Silk Road strategy coincides with the aftermath of an investment boom that has left vast overcapacity and a need to find new markets abroad.

If the strategists of Capital are able to see that China is a new imperialist power that represents a growing threat to the West, surely Marxists ought to be able to see the same thing? Lenin pointed out that the international balance of forces is constantly changing and spheres of influence are shifting like the tectonic plates that lie beneath the continents. And just as the latter can produce earthquakes, so the jostling between the powers for influence can produce all kinds of crises and conflicts.

In 2000 China had 2.5 million troops to deter potential aggressors. But the history of war teaches us that defence can easily be transformed into offence. China is now the largest contributor of peacekeepers and observers among the permanent members of the UN Security Council. They have sent troops to Liberia, the Congo, Sudan, Haiti and even Lebanon. This is something like a practice run for more serious military interventions on foreign soil at a later date. China has recently passed a law allowing its soldiers to be posted in bases in other countries for the first time.

Xi Jinping has expressed the will to develop maritime capacity to become a true maritime power commensurate with China’s geostrategic standing. He lists the different local conflicts China has had and he refers to China’s slow tactic of small challenges in the Pacific and the region and eventually presenting countries with a fait accompli. He refers to China’s plans to build aircraft carriers, in which it is still far behind American technology, but it shows the direction in which they are going.

The level of military spending can be seen from the fact that for 17 years defence spending in China has increased by about 10 percent annually. China’s growing economic power must at a certain point find its expression in military terms. And we can see from these figures that it is building up its military power. The Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington says: “It [China] is using the centrality of its power to persuade other nations that to challenge China on territorial issues is simply not worth it.” This refers to the nations around the Pacific that swing between the US and China depending on the pressure. China is constantly testing the ground to see how far it can push against American power in the region.

The Chinese thrust for expansion in Asia brings it into conflict with Vietnam, Japan and the Philippines. The building of new islands to build bases on is a blatant provocation, not only to these countries but also to the USA. Can it be that China is building these military bases in the interest of US imperialism? Nobody who looks at the real concrete facts of the situation would think so.

Does this mean that there will be a war between America and China? Is it possible that China can take on the might of US imperialism, or perhaps supplant it as the dominant imperialist power in the world? We do not think so. It is clear that China bears all the hallmarks of an imperialist nation. But its rise has definite limits. If the perspective globally was a period of 20 or 30 years of world boom then China could challenge the USA for supremacy on a world scale, but that is not the perspective.

China was growing at a rapid rate, but now that process seems to have reached its limit. Growth is slowing down and the economy could even enter into recession in the coming period. China’s slowdown is in fact threatening to drag the world economy into a depression. It is therefore highly unlikely that on a capitalist basis US imperialism could be supplanted by China. The bourgeois “experts” said similar things about Japan in the past, until Japan entered a period of chronic economic stagnation, which has lasted until the present.

### ! — Disease

#### Capitalism causes extinction through disease and surpassing planetary boundaries — COVID proves unsustainability.

Duzgun ’20 — Eren; teaches Historical Sociology and International Relations at Leiden University, Netherlands. April 1, 2020; "Capitalism, Coronavirus and the Road to Extinction"; *Socialist Project*; https://socialistproject.ca/2020/04/capitalism-coronavirus-and-road-to-extinction/; //CYang

The Godzilla-like image of the virus Covid-19 has been haunting the world. Not only has the virus unraveled nightmarish possibilities leading to the extinction of millions of people, but it has also served as a quintessential case revealing the structural contradictions of and existential threats posed by capitalism on a global scale.

Several researchers agree that Covid-19 is quite an unprecedented virus. Unlike seasonal influenza, Covid-19 is ten times deadlier, and we have yet to develop a medical remedy or herd immunity to slow it down; the best estimates for the development of a vaccine are at least three to six months away.

The virus’s mortality rate seems much lower than earlier pandemics (such as Ebola [1994], Avian flu [1997], SARS [2002], MERS [2012]); yet the manner in which Covid-19 spreads, i.e., its mode of infectivity, seems radically different. Unlike earlier pandemics, the virus has proved infectious even before carriers display any symptoms, which renders it often undetectable during the 14-day incubation period.

Facts on the Ground

Given that we are unable to detect or cure it, we are completely helpless against the virus’s global march. Emergency measures such as compulsory quarantines, social-distancing and improved hygiene standards may temporarily slow down the virus’s pace, yet once these measures begin to be relaxed — as they surely will be — it is very likely that the virus will be at our door again. This grim picture gets even more complicated by the fact that the virus is likely to go through several mutations. The virus may increase its adaptability to new climatic and generational circumstances, hence targeting not only the elderly, but a broader age group even when summer arrives in the northern hemisphere.

Covid-19 is not the first ‘modern’ pathogen with global consequences. The Spanish Flu (1918), for example, was sweeping in terms of its geographical span as well as devastating in terms of its death toll. As Mike Davis notes, the Spanish flu broke out at a time when billions were still in the process of being (forcibly) incorporated into the capitalist world market. The expansion of markets eliminated the very basis of safety-first agriculture, undermining local reciprocities and solidarities that traditionally provided welfare to the poor during crises. Indeed, what prepared the ground for its outbreak and exacerbated the impact of this early 20th century pathogen was the deterioration of nutritional standards under market imperatives as well as the exigencies and scarcities caused by the Great War.

Covid-19, by contrast, has begun its journey and taken its biggest toll thus far in the most advanced and affluent parts of the world. This is to say, the contagion is no longer limited to the persistently undernourished, underdeveloped, and war-torn parts of the world; its impact is no longer restricted to a distant wet market or a third world country alone. Instead, it has emerged and expanded in the very heart of the capitalist world order at a time when capitalism has not only been already firmly established across the globe but has been testing the eco-biological limits of the entire planet.

Should things remain the same, Covid-19 and its future cousins are likely to claim the lives of not just ‘some’ people as they did in the past, but of humanity as a whole. In this sense, perhaps for the first time in modern history, the biological blitzkrieg activated by the coronavirus has thrown into sharp relief the immediately existential and undeniably global contradictions and consequences generated by capitalism.

Contradictions on a Global Scale

Critical biologists and epidemiologists have put the blame on industrial agriculture as the root cause of the emergence of new pathogens since the 1990s. According to Rob Wallace, giant agribusiness and resource extraction firms have now reached the last virgin forests and smallholder-held farmlands in the world, subordinating them to the logic of capitalist markets.

The loss of the ecological diversity and complexity of these huge tracts of land has increasingly forced wild food operators to hunt in previously untouched parts of the jungle, which, in turn, has increased “the interaction with, and spillover of, previously boxed-in pathogens, including Covid-19.” Likewise, global warming has forced or allowed pathogens to escape their natural habitat. As a result, new viruses against which we have no immunity “are being sprung free, threatening the whole world.” In short, as John Vidal writes, “we disrupt ecosystems, and we shake viruses loose from their natural hosts. When that happens, they need a new host. Often, we are it.”

That some agribusiness firms have been blatantly risking lives for profit would not come as a surprise to the critical reader. Even Bill Gates has been sounding the alarm about the potentially deadly consequences of irresponsible business practices and new viruses. Yet, what tends to remain underemphasized in these debates is that the blame belongs neither solely to ‘greedy’ firms that have driven viruses out of their natural habitat, nor to ‘short-sighted’ politicians who have not invested enough in vaccine technology or national health systems. Instead, the problem is rooted in the very structure and rationality of the system as a whole. That is, we may go extinct as a result of the ‘successes’ of the very system ‘we’ created in the first place, i.e., capitalism.

### ! — Foster

#### Foster, but longer.

John Bellamy Foster 15, professor of sociology at the University of Oregon and editor of the Monthly Review, 7-1-2015, "The New Imperialism of Globalized Monopoly-Finance Capital," https://monthlyreview.org/2015/07/01/the-new-imperialism-of-globalized-monopoly-finance-capital/, jy

Imperialism also involves the race for resources, particularly strategic energy sources, such as hydrocarbons, but extending to all key minerals, as well as vital germplasm, foods, forests, land, and even water. For the core capitalist countries the issue of environmental limits has signaled—if anything—the need to control resources in the global South. The most extreme case of ecological imperialism is what Richard Haass (president for the past twelve years of the Council of Foreign Relations, and before that director of policy planning in the State Department under Colin Powell during the 2003 invasion of Iraq) is calling The New Thirty Years’ War in the Middle East, aimed at the control of a significant portion of world oil supplies. Moreover, this New Thirty Years’ War is only part of the U.S-led NATO alliance’s grand strategy to bring the whole vast geopolitical arc, now known as the “arc of instability,” from Eastern Europe and the Balkans to the Middle East and North Africa to Central Asia, within the triad’s sphere of influence—viewing it all as up for grabs following the Soviet Union’s departure from the historical stage in the early 1990s.44 So aggressive has this imperial advance been in the not quite quarter-century since the demise of the USSR that what is now being called a Second Cold War with Russia appears to be developing.

The growing race for resources behind the current geopolitical struggle is feeding a new extractivism, extending to every corner of the earth, and increasingly to the Arctic—where melting sea ice from climate change is opening up new realms for oil exploration. According to energy analyst Michael Klare this scramble for global resources can only point in one direction:

The accumulation of aggravations and resentments among the Great Powers stemming from the competitive pursuit of energy has not yet reached the point where a violent clash between any pair or group of them can be considered likely…. Nevertheless, the conflation of two key trends—the rise of energy nationalism and accumulating ill will between the Sino-Russian and U.S.-Japanese proto-blocs—should be taken as a dangerous sign for the future. Each of these phenomena may have its own roots, but the way they are beginning to intertwine in competitive struggles over prime energy-producing areas in the Caspian Sea basin, the Persian Gulf, and the East China Sea is ominous…. [I]f national leaders fear the loss of a major field to a rival state and are convinced that global energy supplies may be inadequate in a “tough oil” era, they may act irrationally and order a muscular show of force—setting in motion a chain of events whose ultimate course no one may be able to control.

The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, and other more recent events, have given national leaders some experience in managing such inherently perilous encounters. But no one in recent times has had to contend with a world of many aggressive powers competing for increasingly scarce and valuable resources on a global basis—often in regions that are inherently unstable and already on the edge of conflict. Preventing a complex struggle of this sort from erupting into unimaginable slaughter calls for cool heads at the best of times; doing so when conditions begin to deteriorate may exceed the capabilities of even the most lucid and accomplished leaders.45

The rise of various unconventional sources of fossil fuels in recent years is part of the feverish search for hydrocarbons worldwide, and while temporarily easing supply concerns (especially due to fracking), it has not materially altered the frantic global scramble for fossil fuels.

Economically, the outward movement of generalized-monopoly capitalism is propelled primarily by the competitive struggle for low cost position via global sourcing of labor and increasingly scarce raw materials, and the monopoly rents that all of this generates. The result, as we have seen, is enormous cost savings in production for individual monopolistic enterprises, generating widening profit margins, which, coupled with more traditional forms of tribute, leads to a continual inflow of imperial rent to the center of the system. The full extent of extracted surplus is disguised by the enormous complexity of global value chains, exchange ratios, hidden accounts, and above all by the nature of capitalist GDP accounting itself.46 A part of the imperialist rent remains in the peripheral country and is not transferred to the center, but constitutes rather a payment to local ruling classes for their roles in the globalization game. About $21 trillion of this global tribute, meanwhile, is currently parked abroad in tax-haven islands, “the fortified refuge of Big Finance.”47

At the center of the capitalist economy the tendency to economic stagnation has been increasingly asserting itself since the mid-1970s. This induced repeated attempts to stimulate the system through military spending, with the United States as the engine.48 This strategy proved to be limited, however, since a big enough boost to the capitalist economy by these means in today’s environment would need to assume the dimension of a world war.

Under these circumstances, as corporations in the 1970s and ’80s sought to hold onto and expand their growing economic surplus in the face of diminishing investment opportunities, they poured their massive surpluses into the financial structure, seeking and obtaining rapid returns from the securitization of all conceivably ascertainable future income streams. Increased concentration (“mergers and acquisitions”) and its attendant new debt, securitizations representing the income stream of already-existing mortgages and consumer debt that piled new debt on old, and new issues of debt and equity that capitalized the potential future monopoly income of patent, copyright, and other intellectual property rights, all followed one another. The financial sector provided every sort of financial instrument that could arguably be serviced by a putative income stream, including from the trading in financial instruments themselves. The result, as Magdoff and Sweezy already documented in the early stages of the process from the late 1970s to the ’90s, was a vast increase in the financial superstructure of the capitalist economy.

This financialization of the economy had three major effects. First, it served to further uncouple in space and time—though a complete uncoupling is impossible—the amassing of financial claims of wealth or “asset accumulation” from actual investment, i.e., capital accumulation. This meant that the leading capitalist economies became characterized by a long-term amassing of financial wealth that exceeded the growth of the underlying economy (a phenomenon recently emphasized in a neoclassical vein by Thomas Piketty)—creating a more destabilized capitalist order in the center, manifested in the dramatic rise of debt as a share of GDP. Second, the financialization process became the major basis (together with the revolution in communications and digitalized technology) for a deepening and broadening of commodification throughout the globe, with the center economies no longer constituting to the same extent as before the global centers of industrial production and capital accumulation, but rather relying more and more on their role as the centers of financial control and asset accumulation. This was dependent on the capture of streams of commodity income throughout the world economy, including the increased commodification of other sectors—primarily services that were only partially commodified previously, such as communications, education, and health services. Third, “the financialization of the capital accumulation process,” as Sweezy called it, led to an enormous increase in the fragility of the entire capitalist world economy, which became dependent on the growth of the financial superstructure relative to its productive base, with the result that the system was increasingly prone to asset bubbles that periodically burst, threatening the stability of global capitalism as a whole—most recently in the Great Financial Crisis of 2007–2009. Given its financial ascendancy, the United States is uniquely able to externalize its economic crises on other economies, particularly those of the global South. As Yanis Varoufakis notes in The Global Minotaur, “To this day, whenever a crisis looms, capital flees to the greenback. This is exactly why the Crash of 2008 led to a mass inflow of foreign capital to the dollar, even though the crisis had begun on Wall Street.”49

The phase of global monopoly-finance capital, tied to the globalization of production and the systematization of imperial rent, has generated a financial oligarchy and a return to dynastic wealth, mostly in the core nations, confronting an increasingly generalized (but also highly segmented) working class worldwide. The leading section of the capitalist class in the core countries now consists of what could be called global rentiers, dependent on the growth of global monopoly-finance capital, and its increasing concentration and centralization.50 The reproduction of this new imperialist system, as Amin explains in Capitalism in the Age of Globalization, rests on the perpetuation of five monopolies: (1) technological monopoly; (2) financial control of worldwide markets; (3) monopolistic access to the planet’s natural resources; (4) media and communication monopolies; and (5) monopolies over weapons of mass destruction.51 Behind all of this lie the giant monopolistic firms themselves, with the revenue of the top 500 global private firms currently equal to about 30 percent of world revenue, funneled primarily through the centers of the capitalist system and the core financial markets.52 As Boron points out with respect to the world’s 200 largest multinational corporations, “96 percent…have their headquarters in only eight countries, are legally registered as incorporated companies of eight countries; and their boards of directors sit in eight countries of metropolitan capital. Less than 2 percent of their boards of directors’ members are non-nationals…. Their reach is global, but their property and their owners have a clear national base.”53

The internationalization of production under the regime of giant, multinational corporations thus follows a pattern first explained by Stephen Hymer, and recently underscored by Ernesto Screpatini, who writes that “the great multinational companies” are characterized by “decentralized production but centralized control…. As a consequence the process of expansion of foreign direct investments involves a constant flow of profits from the South to the North, that is, from the Periphery to the Center of the imperial power of multinational capital.”54

Today the threatened implosion of this system is everywhere apparent. U.S. hegemony in the military sphere—in which it retains the power to unleash untold destruction but has a diminishing power to control geopolitical events—is receding along with its economic hegemony. This is so well understood today within U.S. foreign policy circles that some of the sharpest establishment thinkers emphasize that U.S. global preeminence is giving way to an imperium based on the combined force (military, economic, and political) of the triad of the United States/Canada, Western Europe, and Japan. The United States, although still retaining global preeminence, is increasingly able to exercise its power as a “sheriff” only when backed up by the “posse” (represented by Western Europe and Japan)—as famously articulated by Haass in The Reluctant Sheriff and subsequent works.55 It is thus the U.S.-led triad, and not Washington itself directly, which increasingly seeks to establish itself as the new governing power, through such institutions as the G7 and NATO. The goal is to promote the interests of the old imperial powers of the capitalist core through political, economic, and military means, while containing threats to its rule by a rising China, a recovering Russia, emerging economies generally, and the global anti-neoliberal revolt based in Latin America’s movement toward socialism.

Haass describes the current world situation as “The Unraveling.” As evidence he points to the U.S. role in destabilizing the Middle East and North Africa, the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), the growing conflicts of the United States with China over the South China Sea and Africa, the return of Russia as a world power (manifested in the dispute over the Crimea and the Ukraine), the misdirection (in his terms) of states such as “Brazil, Chile, Cuba, and Venezuela,” as well as a whole failed set of regime changes initiated by Washington. He concludes: “The question is not whether the world will continue to unravel but how fast and how far.”56

All of this highlights, as István Mészáros tells us, “the potentially deadliest phase of imperialism.”57 It is perhaps a reminder of the seriousness of the world situation today that Soviet and U.S. climatologists alerted the world in the 1980s to the fact that a full-scale nuclear war would generate a nuclear winter, reducing the temperatures of whole continents by several degrees and possibly several tens of degrees, destroying much of the biosphere itself and with it humanity. It was this type of scenario that E.P. Thompson had in mind in his “Notes on Exterminism, the Last Stage of Civilization.”58 A war between the great powers does not appear to be an imminent danger at present. However, the instability generated by the hyper-exploitative and expansionist imperialist world system of today, led by the United States, which is now engaged in simultaneous military interventions and drone warfare in a half dozen countries (and which is planning to spend $200 billion dollars in the next decade modernizing its massive nuclear arsenal), suggests any number of ways in which a deadly confrontation could emerge. Climate change itself, with the continuation of business as usual, is expected to destabilize civilization, heightening the threat of a world war, which would quickly lead to a planetary level of destruction.59

The responsibility of the left under these circumstances is to confront, in Lenin’s terms, the “contradictions, conflicts, and convulsions—not only economical, but also political, national, etc.”—that increasingly characterize our era. This means fostering a more “audacious” global movement from below in which the key challenge will be the dismantling of imperialism, understood as the entire basis of capitalism in our time—with the object of creating a more horizontal, egalitarian, peaceful, and sustainable social-metabolic order controlled by the associated producers.60

### ! — Populism

#### Imperial nostalgia fuels populism.

John Narayan and Leon Sealey-Huggins 17, Narayan, Lecturer in European and International Studies, PhD sociology from the University of Nottingham; Sealey-Huggins, Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology; 8-28-17, “Whatever happened to the idea of imperialism?” <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2017.1374172>, jy

Why imperialism now?

Most analysts of imperialism locate the seat of imperial power as residing in the US for the majority of the post-World War Two period. Since then, the US has been engaged in a more or less overt project to project its power globally via military and financial dominance. Challenges to these efforts have existed in the form of both foreign and domestic opposition to US policy. The most obvious examples would likely be the opposition to US military intervention in Vietnam and Iraq in the 1960-1970s and 2000s respectively. Geopolitical and ideological opposition to US hegemony has persisted even since the decline of Soviet 'communism', emerging in South America, for instance, under the banner of ALBA (Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra America).

A number of signals point to ongoing challenges to US imperial hegemony. The US's own military strategists in the Strategic Studies Institute, aligned to the US Army and Department of Defence, recently published a paper lamenting what they saw as the US as an imperial power in decline. The report stops short of explicitly using the concept of Empire, instead speaking euphemistically of'a more competitive, post-primacy environment'.9 They suggest that this environment is being brought about by, on the one hand, 'the increasing vulnerability, erosion, and, in some cases, the loss of an assumed US military advantage vis-a-vis many of its most consequential defence-relevant challenges'.10 On the other hand, they point to the 'volatile and uncertain restructuring of international security affairs in ways that appear to be increasingly hostile to unchallenged US leadership. In light of these 'challenges; one of their objectives is to 'create, preserve, and extend US military advantage'.11 While not directly representing US foreign policy, the document provides an insight into understanding the US military elite's insecurities over their status. These insecurities must be borne in mind when trying to come to terms with recent attempts to reassert US power via spectacular military interventions, such as the dropping of the perversely named 'Mother of All Bombs'.12

It is also through the lens of an imperial power in decline that we can better understand the Trump project more broadly. A combination of imperial nostalgia, along with the perceived threat from China and others, helps to account for Trump's vow to 'Make America Great Again'. China, the US Right's main scapegoat in the story of its imperial decline, has itself enthusiastically adopted the mantle of an emerging imperial power. In a throwback to the heady days of the Han dynasty, China has embarked on the building of a 'new Silk Road' (One Belt One Road), as well as being implicated in various neo-colonialist land grabs across East Asia, Africa and the Caribbean.13

Imperial nostalgia and its attendant rhetoric is in vogue beyond the US and rival superpowers such as China, however. With 'Brexit' dominating the parochial policy agenda of the UK, civil servant talk has been of establishing 'Empire 2.0'.14 Meanwhile, survivors of Empire Version 1.0 are yet to have seen any form of reparatory justice for that phase of history.15 Elsewhere in Europe, France, lacking the imagination to think past neoliberalism, successfully avoided the authoritarian populism of the Front National by installing a centrist technocrat as President. President Macron promptly caused outrage by suggesting that Africa had 'civ-ilisational problems, continuing the unveiled racism long since accompanying French imperialism.16 That Macron's electoral success came against the openly racist authoritarian populist Marine Le Pen, only serves to further underscore the progressive deficit exhibited in the politics of so many post-, or neo-, imperial states.

Accompanying trends of imperial nostalgia and empire-building is the emergence, in some cases persistence, of a number of authoritarian populist projects, such as: Narendra Modi's BJP in India; Manuel Duterte in the Philippines; Recep Erdogan in Turkey; Victor Orban in Hungary; Yoweri Museveni in Rwanda; Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe; and Putin in Russia.17 These politics are often underpinned by a rhetoric of aggressive nationalism and, in some cases, expansionism. Hence the sentiment used to shore up these projects is frequently similar in tone to the rhetoric employed by the Great Imperial powers at the height of their racist colonisation projects. While it is unclear what the trends towards authoritarian populism will bring, it is fairly clear that progressive movements will need to retain, or indeed recall, the notion of imperialism in order to accurately understand and oppose them.

Globally, social movements sensitive to the interconnected dimensions of class, race, gender, ecology and empire are emerging. These include mobilisations in the US against White Supremacy, or against indigenous ecological genocide at Standing Rock; mass student uprisings in Chile; and the much-discussed Arab uprisings. Examples of encouraging state-level solutions to these questions are wanting, a fact that perhaps points to the inadequacies of the nation state as an entity through which empire might successfully be opposed. It is nevertheless clear that any serious political project to push for progressive alternatives must necessarily contain an analysis and critique of contemporary forms of imperialism, as well as attendant forms of global solidarity.

#### Populism causes nuclear war.

Meier & Vieluf ’21 — Oliver Meier; Senior Researcher at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy. Prior to this, he was Deputy Head in the International Security Division of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. Maren Vieluf; Researcher at Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy. December 16, 2021; "Upsetting the nuclear order: how the rise of nationalist populism increases nuclear dangers"; *The Nonproliferation Review*; <https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2020.1864932>; //CYang

Nationalist populists as leaders of states that possess nuclear weapons undermine the nuclear order and increase nuclear dangers in novel, significant, and persistent ways. Such leaders talk differently about nuclear weapons; they can put nuclear policy making and crisis management in disarray; and they can weaken international alliances and multilateral nuclear institutions. The rise of nationalist populists in nuclear-armed states, including some of the five nuclear-weapon states recognized under the 1968 Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, shatters the presumed distinction between responsible and irresponsible nuclear powers and complicates attempts to heal rifts in the international order. Policies to wait out populists or to balance their influence in multilateral institutions seem to have had limited success. A sustainable strategy to deal with the challenge posed by populists would need to start by recognizing that we can no longer assume that nuclear weapons are safe in the hands of some states but not in others’.

Introduction

The rise of nationalist populists1 to power in nuclear-armed states and their allies is undermining the nuclear order and raising the risks of nuclear war. That populists such as Boris Johnson, Narendra Modi, Vladimir Putin, and Donald Trump were able to take charge of nuclear arsenals, including in some of the nuclear powers recognized under the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), challenges the assumption that established nuclear-weapon states behave responsibly. Nationalist populism,2 understood as a nationalist, anti-elitist, illiberal, and anti-pluralist set of ideas and politics conducted in the supposed interests of “the people” — that is, the domestic constituencies of the nationalist-populist leaders—has been on the rise globally since the mid-2000s. It has come to include the leadership of a growing number of countries3 and has begun to influence the effectiveness of time-honored institutions of the nuclear order.

We argue that this rise of nationalist populists and their foreign and defense policies weakens the nuclear order in novel, significant, and persistent ways. Three characteristics are typical of nationalist populists’ nuclear policies: they talk differently about nuclear weapons; they have a specific way of getting involved in national decision making on nuclear-weapon issues; and their approach to international alliances and institutions is unique. The fact that nationalist-populist leaders have assumed control over nuclear weapons in countries at the core of the nuclear order shatters the presumed distinction between “responsible” and “irresponsible” nuclear powers. These leaders threaten the nuclear order built on the principled acceptance of a logic of restraint by the nuclear-weapon states.

### ! — Splintering

#### Splintering DA – capitalism breaks down resistance through endless exceptions, so the perm is a slippery slope.

Parr ’13 [Adrian; Assoc. Prof. of Philosophy and Environmental Studies @ U. of Cincinnati; THE WRATH OF CAPITAL: Neoliberalism and Climate Change Politics, pp. 5-6]

The contradiction of capitalism is that it is an uncompromising structure of negotiation. It ruthlessly absorbs sociohistorical limits and the challenges these limits pose to capital, placing them in the service of further capital accumulation. Neoliberalism is an exclusive system premised upon the logic of property rights and the expansion of these rights, all the while maintaining that the free market is self-regulating, sufficiently and efficiently working to establish individual and collective well-being. In reality, however, socioeconomic disparities have become more acute the world over, and the world's "common wealth,” as David Bollier and later Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri note, has been increasingly privatized.12 In 2010, the financial wealth of the world's high-net-worth individuals (with investable assets of $1 to $50 million or more [all money amounts are in U.S. dollars] ) surpassed the 2007 pre-financial crisis peak, growing 9.7 percent and reaching $42.7 trillion. Also in 2010 the global population of high-net­ worth individuals grew 8.3 percent to 10.9 million.13 In 2010, the global population was 6.9 billion, of whom there were 1,000 billionaires; 80,000 ultra-high-net-worth individuals with average wealth exceeding $50 mil­ lion; 3 billion with an average wealth of $10,000, of which 1.1 billion owned less than $1,000; and 2.5 billion who were reportedly "unbanked'' (without a bank account and thus living on the margins of the formal financial system) .14 In a world where financial advantage brings with it political benefits, these figures attest to the weak position the majority of the world occupies in the arena of environmental and climate change politics. Neoliberal capitalism ameliorates the threat posed by environmental change by taking control of the collective call it issues forth, splintering the collective into a disparate and confusing array of individual choices competing with one another over how best to solve the crisis. Through this process of competition, the collective nature of the crisis is restructured and privatized, then put to work for the production and circulation of capital as the average wealth of the world's high-net-worth individuals grows at the expense of the majority of the world living in abject poverty. Advocating that the free market can solve debilitating environmental changes and the climate crisis is not a political response to these problems; it is merely a political ghost emptied of its collective aspirations.

### ! — War

#### War is explained through militarized accumulation.

William Robinson 22, professor of sociology, global studies and Latin American studies at UC Santa Barbara, 4-24-22, "Global Capitalism Has Become Dependent on War-Making to Sustain Itself," https://truthout.org/articles/global-capitalism-has-become-dependent-on-war-making-to-sustain-itself/, jy

Militarized Accumulation

The Russian invasion — brutal, reckless and condemnable by any standard — has sparked debate on NATO’s proposed expansion into Ukraine and the role that it played in motivating the Kremlin. U.S. officials were keenly aware, in fact, that the drive to expand NATO to Russian borders would eventually push Moscow into a military conflict. “We examine a wide range of nonviolent measures that could exploit Russia’s actual vulnerabilities and anxieties as a way of stressing Russia’s military and economy and the regime’s political standing at home and abroad,” notes a 2019 study by the RAND Corporation, a Pentagon-affiliated think tank. “The steps we examine would not have either defense or deterrence as their prime purpose,” it states, but rather, “these steps are conceived of as elements in a campaign designed to unbalance the adversary, leading Russia to compete in domains or regions where the United States has a competitive advantage, and causing Russia to overextend itself militarily or economically.”

But the provocation could not be reduced to geopolitical competition, however important, as most observers were keen to do. Missing from the larger picture was the centrality of militarized accumulation — of endless low- and high-intensity warfare, simmering conflicts, civil strife and policing — to the global political economy. Militarized accumulation refers to a situation in which a global war economy relies on the state to organize war-making, social control and repression to sustain capital accumulation in the face of chronic stagnation and saturation of global markets. These state-organized practices are outsourced to transnational corporate capital, involving the fusion of private accumulation with state militarization in order to sustain the process of capital accumulation. Cycles of destruction and reconstruction provide ongoing outlets for over-accumulated capital; that is, these cycles open up new profit-making opportunities for transnational capitalists seeking ongoing opportunities to profitably reinvest the enormous amounts of cash they have accumulated. There is a convergence in this process of global capitalism’s political need for social control and repression in the face of mounting popular discontent worldwide and its economic need to perpetuate accumulation in the face of stagnation.

Wars provide critical economic stimulus. They have historically pulled the capitalist system out of accumulation crises while they serve to deflect attention from political tensions and problems of legitimacy. It took World War II to finally lift world capitalism out of the Great Depression. The Cold War legitimated a half century of expanding military budgets and the Iraq/Afghanistan wars, the longest in history, helped keep the economy sputtering along in the face of chronic stagnation in the first two decades of the century. From the anti-Communist fervor of the Cold War, to the “war on terror,” then the so-called New Cold War, and now the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the transnational elite, led by Washington, have had to conjure up one enemy after another to legitimate militarized accumulation and deflect crises of state legitimacy and capitalist hegemony onto external enemies and contrived threats.

The events of September 11, 2001, marked the start of an era of a permanent global war in which logistics, warfare, intelligence, repression, surveillance and even military personnel are more and more the privatized domain of transnational capital. The Pentagon budget increased 91 percent in real terms between 1998 and 2011, while worldwide, total state military budget outlays grew by 50 percent from 2006 to 2015, from $1.4 trillion to more than $2 trillion. (This figure does not take into account the hundreds of billions of dollars spent on intelligence; contingency operations; policing; bogus wars against immigrants, terrorism and drugs; and “homeland security.”) During this time, military-industrial complex profits quadrupled.

However, focusing just on state military budgets only gives us a part of the picture of the global war economy. As I showed in my 2020 book, The Global Police State, the various wars, conflicts and campaigns of social control and repression around the world involve the fusion of private accumulation with state militarization. In this relationship, the state facilitates the expansion of opportunities for private capital to accumulate through militarization, such as by facilitating global weapons sales by military-industrial-security firms, the amounts of which have reached unprecedented levels. Global weapons sales by the top 100 weapons manufacturers and military service companies increased by 38 percent between 2002 and 2016 and can be expected to escalate further in the face of a prolonged war in Ukraine.

Said one consultant to Boeing, General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin and Raytheon Technologies: “For the defense industry, happy days are here again.

By 2018, private for-profit military companies employed some 15 million people around the world, while another 20 million people worked in private security worldwide. The private security (policing) business is one of the fastest-growing economic sectors in many countries and has come to dwarf public security around the world. The amount spent on private security in 2003, the year of the invasion of Iraq, was 73 percent higher than that spent in the public sphere, and three times as many persons were employed in private forces as in official law enforcement agencies. In half of the world’s countries, private security agents outnumber police officers.

These corporate soldiers and police were deployed to guard corporate property, provide personal security for executives and their families; collect data; conduct police, paramilitary, counterinsurgency and surveillance operations; carry out mass crowd control and repression of protesters; run private detention and interrogation facilities; manage prisons and participate in outright warfare. Now, these same private military and security firms are pouring into Ukraine, with some mercenary companies offering between $1,000 and $2,000 a day for those with combat experience.

The Russian invasion has accelerated but did not originate the ongoing surge in military spending around the world. It is notable that state military spending worldwide skyrocketed in the wake of the 2008 global financial collapse even beyond the post-9/11 spending hike, rising from about $1.5 billion in 2008 to over $2 trillion in 2022. The fact that this explosion in spending coincides perfectly with continued worldwide stagnation following the Great Recession suggests that the heightened militarization of the global economy is as much or more a response to this chronic stagnation than to perceived security threats. If bursts of militarized accumulation (such as that unleashed by 9/11, then by the 2008 financial collapse, and now by the Russian invasion) help offset the overaccumulation crisis further into the future, they are also high-risk bets that heighten worldwide tensions and push the world dangerously towards all-out international conflagration.

The Crisis of Global Capitalism

This crisis of global capitalism is economic, or structural, one of chronic stagnation in the global economy. But it is also political: a crisis of state legitimacy and capitalist hegemony. The system is moving towards “a general crisis of capitalist rule” as billions of people around the world face uncertain struggles for survival and question a system they no longer see as legitimate. Historically, wars have pulled the capitalist system out of crisis while they serve to deflect attention from political tensions and problems of legitimacy.

Economically, global capitalism faces what is known in technical language as “overaccumulation”: a situation in which the economy has produced — or has the capacity to produce — great quantities of wealth but the market cannot absorb this wealth because of escalating inequality. Capitalism by its very nature will produce abundant wealth yet polarize that wealth and generate ever greater levels of social inequality unless offset by redistributive policies. The level of global social polarization and inequality now experienced is without precedent. In 2018, the richest 1 percent of humanity controlled more than half of the world’s wealth while the bottom 80 percent had to make do with just 5 percent. The international development agency Oxfam reported in January that during the first two years of the coronavirus pandemic, the 10 richest men in the world more than doubled their fortunes, from $700 billion to $1.5 trillion, while 99 percent of humanity saw a fall in their income and 160 million more people fell into poverty.

Such inequalities end up undermining the stability of the system as the gap grows between what is — or could be — produced and what the market can absorb. The extreme concentration of the planet’s wealth in the hands of the few and the accelerated impoverishment and dispossession of the majority means that the transnational capitalist class, or TCC, has increasing difficulty in finding productive outlets to unload enormous amounts of surplus it accumulated. In the years leading up to the pandemic, there was a steady rise in underutilized capacity and a slowdown in industrial production around the world. The surplus of accumulated capital with nowhere to go expanded rapidly. Transnational corporations recorded record profits during the 2010s at the same time that corporate investment declined. Along with militarized accumulation, the TCC has turned to unprecedented levels of financial speculation and to debt-driven growth to sustain profit-making in the face of the crisis. If left unchecked, overaccumulation results in crisis — in stagnation, recessions, depressions, social upheavals and war — just what we are experiencing right now.

But there is a related dynamic at work in the global war economy: the need for dominant groups to suppress mass discontent and deflect the crisis of state legitimacy. International frictions escalate as states, in their efforts to retain legitimacy, seek to sublimate social and political tensions and to keep the social order from fracturing. All around the world, a “people’s Spring” has taken off. From Chile to Lebanon, Iraq to India, France to the United States, Haiti to Nigeria, South Africa to Colombia, Jordan to Sri Lanka, waves of strikes and mass protests have proliferated and, in some instances, appear to be acquiring an anti-capitalist character. Wars and external enemies allow the ruling groups to deflect attention away from domestic malaise in their effort to maintain a grip on power as the crisis deepens.

In the U.S., this sublimation has involved efforts to channel social unrest towards scapegoated communities such as immigrants or other marginalized groups — this is one key function of racism and was a core component of the Trump government’s political strategy — or towards an external enemy such as China or Russia, which had clearly become a cornerstone of the Biden government’s strategy well before the Russian invasion of Ukraine. U.S. presidents historically reach their highest approval ratings when they launch wars. George W. Bush reached an all-time-high of 90 percent in 2001 as his administration geared up to invade Afghanistan, and his father George H.W. Bush achieved an 89 percent approval rating in 1991, right as the U.S. declared the end of its (first) invasion of Iraq and the “liberation of Kuwait.”

It is unlikely that an increasing militarization of the world economy can in the long run offset either the economic or the political dimensions of the crisis of global capitalism. Global capitalism is emerging from the coronavirus pandemic with more inequality, more authoritarianism, more militarization, and more civic and political strife. In the U.S., class struggle is heating up, with a wave of strikes and of unionization drives in Amazon, Starbucks, and elsewhere in the gig economy. The current inflationary spiral and the escalation of class struggle in the United States and around the world point to the inability of the ruling groups to contain the expanding crisis. The drive by the capitalist state to externalize the political fallout of the crisis increases the danger that international tensions and localized conflicts such as in Ukraine will snowball into broader international conflagrations of unforeseen consequences.

As the Ukraine crisis continues to drag on and the global revolt escalates, there will be a radical reconfiguration of global geopolitical alignments to the drumbeat of escalating turbulence in the world economy that will feed new political upheavals and violent conflicts, making global capitalism all the more volatile. While it is hard to imagine a return to the status quo antebellum in Eastern Europe, in the larger picture, the Ukraine crisis is not the cause but a consequence of the general crisis of global capitalism. That crisis will only get worse. Fasten your seat belts; it will get much worse.

### ! — Unsustainable — T/L

#### Sustainable capitalism is an oxymoron: *No decoupling, cost internalization’s impossible, and the law of the resource pyramid negates benefits of innovation.*

Luiz Marques 20, associate professor at the Department of History, University of Campinas (Unicamp), Brazil, “The Illusion of a Sustainable Capitalism,” in *Capitalism and Environmental Collapse*, August 2020, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-47527-7\_13

13.3 Three Aspects of the Impossibility of a Sustainable Capitalism

The logic of the impossibility of a sustainable capitalism is concretely proven in numerous aspects of its modus operandi. Let us isolate three aspects of this impossibility.

But before that, it is best to start by giving voice not to pure and staunch liberals like Milton Friedman, but to those who believe that capitalism has nothing to fear from environmental regulation. Many of them reject a defensive stance and put themselves on the offensive, claiming that environmental sustainability and increased profits are not only compatible but reciprocally strengthen each other in a virtuous circle.

If I am not mistaken, the advocates of this thesis prefer the following argument: adopting innovative solutions to increase the efficiency of the input/product or product/waste ratio and improve environmental safety in the production process increases the company’s competitiveness (as opposed to reducing it) because it is a value-generating process, be it in terms of risk management, brand image, and, finally, effective financial results. If this is true, then taking the lead and being at the forefront of economic processes with lower environmental impact and risk will ensure a better profitability than the average profit rate. I hope to not underestimate the literature on the business and sustainability binomial by saying that it limits itself to elaborating variations on this theme while offering several case studies on the direct relationship between sustainability and profitability. There are a growing number of economists and NGOs committed to encouraging companies to embrace this belief. They naturally render a tremendous service to society and to the companies themselves through their work. However, their success is limited by the three aspects that render an environmentally sustainable capitalism impossible, as stated in the title of this section.

(1)

Decoupling and Circular Economy

Decoupling is the hope that eco-efficient technologies and production processes in industrialized countries with mature economies will enable the miracle of increased production and consumption with less pressure (or at least no corresponding increase in pressure) on ecosystems (Jöstrom and Östblom 2010). It is true that a greater efficiency in the production process may allow for relative decoupling, meaning that it enables a reduction in pressure per product or per unit of GDP. But it does not decrease this pressure in absolute terms, since the number of products does not cease to increase on a global scale. The mechanism known as the “Jevons paradox” or rebound effect describes how increasing demand for energy or natural resources always tends to offset the eco-efficiency gain of technological innovation. Thus, although energy efficiency per product has doubled or even tripled since 1950, this gain is offset by the expansion of production at a greater rate than the eco-efficiency gain.

The actions of institutions and business foundations that advocate for an eco-efficient and circular economy based on reverse engineering, recycling, reuse, and remanufacturing are certainly positive. We know, however, that there is no circular economy. No economy, let alone a global economy trapped in the paradigm of expansion, can evade the second law of thermodynamics, whose relationship with economics has been analyzed by Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen since the 1970s (1971, 1975 and 1995). Here we must state the obvious: even though the surplus energy supplied by oil and other fossil fuels in relation to the energy invested to obtain them is declining (for this declining EROI, see Chap. 5, Sect. 5.5), low-carbon renewable energies are not yet, and may never be, as efficient as oil. This means that the energy transition, while urgent and imperative, will further distance us from a circular economy. According to calculations by Dominique Guyonnet, “to provide one Kw/h of electricity through land-based wind energy requires about 10 times more reinforced concrete and steel and 20 times more copper and aluminum than a coal-fired thermal power plant” (Madeline 2016). The only way, therefore, to lessen the environmental impact of capitalism is to reduce, in absolute terms, the consumption of energy and goods by the richest 10% or 20% of the planet. This is incompatible with capitalism’s basic mechanism of expansive functioning and with the worldview that it sells to society.

(2)

The Law of Resources Pyramid

The increasing scarcity of certain inputs and the need to secure their large-scale and low-cost supply nullify the potential benefits of various green initiatives taken on by companies. These cannot, in fact, evade the law of the resources pyramid, described by Richard Heinberg (2007):

The capstone [of the pyramid] represents the easily and cheaply extracted portion of the resource; the next layer is the portion of the resource base that can be extracted with more difficulty and expense, and with worse environmental impacts; while the remaining bulk of the pyramid represents resources unlikely to be extracted under any realistic pricing scenario

This law of the resources pyramid can be stated in an even simpler form: in capitalism, the logic of capital accumulation and surplus, together with the growing scarcity of finite natural resources, necessarily exacerbates the negative environmental impact of economic activity.

(3)

The Impossibility of Internalizing the Environmental Cost

What makes it specifically impossible for corporations to submit themselves to the environmental imperative is the impossibility of “internalizing” the costs of increasing environmental damage that they bring about. Methodologies to “price” nature are now multiplying. But whatever the methodology (always based on the assumption that the value of nature is reducible to a market price), the result is the same: it is impossible for corporations to internalize their environmental cost because the total value generated by their activity is often less than the monetary expression of the value of the natural heritage that was destroyed by that activity.4 A report was prepared for The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB), titled Natural Capital at Risk. The top 100 externalities of business (2013) show that:

The estimated cost of land use, water consumption, GHG emissions, air pollution, land and water pollution and waste for the world’s primary sectors amounts to almost US$7.3 trillion. The analysis takes account of impacts under standard operating practices, but excludes the cost of, and risk from, low-probability, high-impact catastrophic events. (…) This equates to 13% of global economic output in 2009. Risk to business overall would be higher if all upstream sector impacts were included.

#### Green growth is fake! It can’t scale up fast enough.

Hickel ‘18 — Jason; anthropologist, author, and a fellow of the Royal Society of Arts. September 12, 2018; “Why Growth Can’t Be Green”; *Foreign Policy*; <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/12/why-growth-cant-be-green/>; //CYang

Warnings about ecological breakdown have become ubiquitous. Over the past few years, major newspapers, including the Guardian and the New York Times, have carried alarming stories on soil depletion, deforestation, and the collapse of fish stocks and insect populations. These crises are being driven by global economic growth, and its accompanying consumption, which is destroying the Earth’s biosphere and blowing past key planetary boundaries that scientists say must be respected to avoid triggering collapse.

Many policymakers have responded by pushing for what has come to be called “green growth.” All we need to do, they argue, is invest in more efficient technology and introduce the right incentives, and we’ll be able to keep growing while simultaneously reducing our impact on the natural world, which is already at an unsustainable level. In technical terms, the goal is to achieve “absolute decoupling” of GDP from the total use of natural resources, according to the U.N. definition. It sounds like an elegant solution to an otherwise catastrophic problem. There’s just one hitch: New evidence suggests that green growth isn’t the panacea everyone has been hoping for. In fact, it isn’t even possible.

Green growth first became a buzz phrase in 2012 at the United Nations Cosnference on Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro. In the run-up to the conference, the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the U.N. Environment Program all produced reports promoting green growth. Today, it is a core plank of the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals.

But the promise of green growth turns out to have been based more on wishful thinking than on evidence. In the years since the Rio conference, three major empirical studies have arrived at the same rather troubling conclusion: Even under the best conditions, absolute decoupling of GDP from resource use is not possible on a global scale.

A team of scientists led by the German researcher Monika Dittrich first raised doubts in 2012. The group ran a sophisticated computer model that predicted what would happen to global resource use if economic growth continued on its current trajectory, increasing at about 2 to 3 percent per year. It found that human consumption of natural resources (including fish, livestock, forests, metals, minerals, and fossil fuels) would rise from 70 billion metric tons per year in 2012 to 180 billion metric tons per year by 2050. For reference, a sustainable level of resource use is about 50 billion metric tons per year — a boundary we breached back in 2000.

The team then reran the model to see what would happen if every nation on Earth immediately adopted best practice in efficient resource use (an extremely optimistic assumption). The results improved; resource consumption would hit only 93 billion metric tons by 2050. But that is still a lot more than we’re consuming today. Burning through all those resources could hardly be described as absolute decoupling or green growth.

In 2016, a second team of scientists tested a different premise: one in which the world’s nations all agreed to go above and beyond existing best practice. In their best-case scenario, the researchers assumed a tax that would raise the global price of carbon from $50 to $236 per metric ton and imagined technological innovations that would double the efficiency with which we use resources. The results were almost exactly the same as in Dittrich’s study. Under these conditions, if the global economy kept growing by 3 percent each year, we’d still hit about 95 billion metric tons of resource use by 2050. Bottom line: no absolute decoupling.

Finally, last year the U.N. Environment Program — once one of the main cheerleaders of green growth theory — weighed in on the debate. It tested a scenario with carbon priced at a whopping $573 per metric ton, slapped on a resource extraction tax, and assumed rapid technological innovation spurred by strong government support. The result? We hit 132 billion metric tons by 2050. This finding is worse than those of the two previous studies because the researchers accounted for the “rebound effect,” whereby improvements in resource efficiency drive down prices and cause demand to rise — thus canceling out some of the gains.

Study after study shows the same thing. Scientists are beginning to realize that there are physical limits to how efficiently we can use resources. Sure, we might be able to produce cars and iPhones and skyscrapers more efficiently, but we can’t produce them out of thin air. We might shift the economy to services such as education and yoga, but even universities and workout studios require material inputs. Once we reach the limits of efficiency, pursuing any degree of economic growth drives resource use back up.

These problems throw the entire concept of green growth into doubt and necessitate some radical rethinking. Remember that each of the three studies used highly optimistic assumptions. We are nowhere near imposing a global carbon tax today, much less one of nearly $600 per metric ton, and resource efficiency is currently getting worse, not better. Yet the studies suggest that even if we do everything right, decoupling economic growth with resource use will remain elusive and our environmental problems will continue to worsen.

Preventing that outcome will require a whole new paradigm. High taxes and technological innovation will help, but they’re not going to be enough. The only realistic shot humanity has at averting ecological collapse is to impose hard caps on resource use, as the economist Daniel O’Neill recently proposed. Such caps, enforced by national governments or by international treaties, could ensure that we do not extract more from the land and the seas than the Earth can safely regenerate. We could also ditch GDP as an indicator of economic success and adopt a more balanced measure like the genuine progress indicator (GPI), which accounts for pollution and natural asset depletion. Using GPI would help us maximize socially good outcomes while minimizing ecologically bad ones.

But there’s no escaping the obvious conclusion. Ultimately, bringing our civilization back within planetary boundaries is going to require that we liberate ourselves from our dependence on economic growth — starting with rich nations. This might sound scarier than it really is. Ending growth doesn’t mean shutting down economic activity — it simply means that next year we can’t produce and consume more than we are doing this year. It might also mean shrinking certain sectors that are particularly damaging to our ecology and that are unnecessary for human flourishing, such as advertising, commuting, and single-use products.

But ending growth doesn’t mean that living standards need to take a hit. Our planet provides more than enough for all of us; the problem is that its resources are not equally distributed. We can improve people’s lives right now simply by sharing what we already have more fairly, rather than plundering the Earth for more. Maybe this means better public services. Maybe it means basic income. Maybe it means a shorter working week that allows us to scale down production while still delivering full employment. Policies such as these — and countless others — will be crucial to not only surviving the 21st century but also flourishing in it.

### ! — Unsustainable — Law of Profitability

#### 1) LAW OF PROFITABILITY. Newest studies confirm it.

Michael Roberts 22, economist and author of author of *The Long Depression: Marxism and the Global Crisis of Capitalism*, 1-22-22 via carbon dating, “A world rate of profit: important new evidence,” https://thenextrecession.wordpress.com/2022/01/22/a-world-rate-of-profit-important-new-evidence/, jy

But now Marxist economists at the University of Massachusetts Amherst led by Deepankur Basu have delivered new evidence using data compiled by Brazilian Marxist economist Adalmir Marquetti. Marquetti has expanded and modified the Penn World Tables developed by the Groningen Growth and Development Centre into what he calls the Extended Penn World Tables (EPWT). The EPWT was first developed by Marquetti back in 2004 and I have used that database since then for my world rate of profit calculations. But now Marquetti has issued an updated series EPWT 7.0. And this series can be used to calculate a world rate of profit-based on a large number of countries going back to 1960.

Basu et al use the new EPWT data to construct a world rate of profit as a weighted average of country-level profit rates, where a country’s share in the world capital stock is used as the weighting. Of course, this world rate is only an approximate world average. A proper world average would involve aggregating all the s, C and v in the world. Basu et al make the point that it is incorrect to aggregate country-level profit rates using the gross domestic product (GDP) as weights. So previous studies like Maito’s and mine have used an incorrect weighting scheme when country capital stock should be used. I agree and in my latest version of the world rate of profit I went further and aggregated the s, the C and the v for the G20 countries using the Penn World Tables 10.0 going to back to 1950. So no country weighting was necessary.

So much for method. Let’s look at Basu et al’s results. They are compelling in support of Marx’s law. Here is the key graphic using all the countries with data going back to 1960.

Basu et al conclude that: “The country-aggregated world profit rate series displays a strong negative linear trend for the period 1960-1980 and a weaker negative linear trend from 1980 to 2019. A medium run decomposition analysis reveals that the decline in the world profit rate is driven by a decline in the output-capital ratio. The industry-aggregated world profit rate shows a negative linear trend for the period 2000-2014, which, once again, is driven by a fall in the output-capital ratio.”

So Marx’s law is emphatically vindicated empirically at a world level. On the Amherst figures there has been a secular decline in the world rate of profit over the last 80 years of -25%, starting with the huge profitability crisis from 1966, leading to the major global slump of 1980-82. That was followed by the so-called ‘neoliberal’ revival in profitability up to 1996 (+11%). After that, the world economy entered what I have called ‘a long depression’ when profitability slipped back, turning up briefly in the credit boom of the 2000s until 2004, before slipping again into the Great Recession of 2008-9. Since then, the world rate of profit has stagnated and was near its all-time low in 2019, before the global pandemic slump of 2020. Each post-war global slump has revived profitability, but not for long.

How does the Basu calculation compare with my own made in 2020? Bearing in mind that my last calculation was only for the top 19 economies in the world (the EU is a separate G20 member) and my method of calculation is somewhat different, my results show a striking similarity. There is the same secular decline and the same turning points. Perhaps this is not too surprising as both Basu et al and I are using the same underlying database.

Marx’s LTRPF argues that the rate of profit will fall if the organic composition of capital (OCC) rises faster than the rate of surplus value or exploitation of labour. That is the underlying reason for the fall. Basu et al have decomposed the components of the world rate of profit to ascertain whether that is correct. They find that the world rate of profit declined at a rate of about 0.5% a year from 1960 to 2019, while the output-capital ratio declined by 0.8% a year (this is a reciprocal proxy for the OCC), and the profit share (a proxy for rate of surplus value) rose about 0.25% a year. So this supports Marx’s law that the OCC will outstrip the rate of exploitation of labour most of the time and so lead to a fall in the rate of profit. I found a similar result in my 2020 paper.

Ahmet Tonak, the world’s greatest Marxist expert on national accounts, had some concerns on using the Penn Tables as the raw data source for calculation because it does not distinguish between productive (value creating) labour and unproductive (value using) labour in an economy. And that can lead to diverging results on the rate of profit in national economies — which he found for Turkey.

We can go some way to dealing with this possible divergence by considering the rate of profit in the non-financial, non-residential property sectors of an economy. It does not solve the problem of delineating unproductive and productive labour within a sector, but it does provide some greater precision. For more on this issue, see the excellent work by Tsoulifis and Paitaridis.

Basu and Wasner have also produced a profitability dashboard for the rate of profit in the US which distinguishes non-financial corporate profitability from corporate profitability. I compared the Basu et al (global) results for the US rate of profit against their results for the US non-financial corporate rate of profit. Both series follow the same trend and turning points so the divergence at this level is not a significant problem.

However, during the neo-liberal period, the US rate of profit based on the global data (which does not distinguish productive and unproductive sectors) rises much more than the rate of profit on just the non-financial sector using the Basu-Wasner calculations. That suggests that the neo-liberal recovery in profitability was mostly based on a switch into the financial sector by capital — another explanation for the fall in productive investment exhibited in the US in that period.

In sum, the Basu et al study has added yet more empirical evidence in support of Marx’s law on a world level. The evidence is overwhelming and yet the sceptics continue to ignore it and deny its relevance. The sceptics of Marx’s law of profitability are increasingly becoming like the climate change sceptics.

### ! — Unsustainable — AI

#### 2) AI. It will create unemployment and rational allocation of resources.

Feng Xiang 18, professor of law at Tsinghua University, 5-3-2018, "AI will spell the end of capitalism," https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/05/03/end-of-capitalism/, jy

BEIJING — The most momentous challenge facing socio-economic systems today is the arrival of artificial intelligence. If AI remains under the control of market forces, it will inexorably result in a super-rich oligopoly of data billionaires who reap the wealth created by robots that displace human labor, leaving massive unemployment in their wake.

But China’s socialist market economy could provide a solution to this. If AI rationally allocates resources through big data analysis, and if robust feedback loops can supplant the imperfections of “the invisible hand” while fairly sharing the vast wealth it creates, a planned economy that actually works could at last be achievable.

The more AI advances into a general-purpose technology that permeates every corner of life, the less sense it makes to allow it to remain in private hands that serve the interests of the few instead of the many. More than anything else, the inevitability of mass unemployment and the demand for universal welfare will drive the idea of socializing or nationalizing AI.

Marx’s dictum, “From each according to their abilities, to each according to their needs,” needs an update for the 21st century: “From the inability of an AI economy to provide jobs and a living wage for all, to each according to their needs.”

Even at this early stage, the idea that digital capitalism will somehow make social welfare a priority has already proven to be a fairytale. The billionaires of Google and Apple, who have been depositing company profits in offshore havens to avoid taxation, are hardly paragons of social responsibility. The ongoing scandal around Facebook’s business model, which puts profitability above responsible citizenship, is yet another example of how in digital capitalism, private companies only look after their own interests at the expense of the rest of society.

One can readily see where this is all headed once technological unemployment accelerates. “Our responsibility is to our shareholders,” the robot owners will say. “We are not an employment agency or a charity.”

These companies have been able to get away with their social irresponsibility because the legal system and its loopholes in the West are geared to protect private property above all else. Of course, in China, we have big privately owned Internet companies like Alibaba and Tencent. But unlike in the West, they are monitored by the state and do not regard themselves as above or beyond social control.

It is the very pervasiveness of AI that will spell the end of market dominance. The market may reasonably if unequally function if industry creates employment opportunities for most people. But when industry only produces joblessness, as robots take over more and more, there is no good alternative but for the state to step in. As AI invades economic and social life, all private law-related issues will soon become public ones. More and more, regulation of private companies will become a necessity to maintain some semblance of stability in societies roiled by constant innovation.

I consider this historical process a step closer to a planned market economy. Laissez-faire capitalism as we have known it can lead nowhere but to a dictatorship of AI oligarchs who gather rents because the intellectual property they own rules over the means of production. On a global scale, it is easy to envision this unleashed digital capitalism leading to a battle between robots for market share that will surely end as disastrously as the imperialist wars did in an earlier era.

For the sake of social well-being and security, individuals and private companies should not be allowed to possess any exclusive cutting-edge technology or core AI platforms. Like nuclear and biochemical weapons, as long as they exist, nothing other than a strong and stable state can ensure society’s safety. If we don’t nationalize AI, we could sink into a dystopia reminiscent of the early misery of industrialization, with its satanic mills and street urchins scrounging for a crust of bread.

The dream of communism is the elimination of wage labor. If AI is bound to serve society instead of private capitalists, it promises to do so by freeing an overwhelming majority from such drudgery while creating wealth to sustain all.

If the state controls the market, instead of digital capitalism controlling the state, true communist aspirations will be achievable. And because AI increasingly enables the management of complex systems by processing massive amounts of information through intensive feedback loops, it presents, for the first time, a real alternative to the market signals that have long justified laissez-faire ideology — and all the ills that go with it.

Going forward, China’s socialist market economy, which aims to harness the fruits of production for the whole population and not just a sliver of elites operating in their own self-centered interests, can lead the way toward this new stage of human development.

If properly regulated in this way, we should celebrate, not fear, the advent of AI. If it is brought under social control, it will finally free workers from peddling their time and sweat only to enrich those at the top. The communism of the future ought to adopt a new slogan: “Robots of the world, unite!”

### ! — Unsustainable — Carbon Bubble

#### Carbon bubble, peak oil

Jeremy Rifkin 19. Honorary Doctorate in Economics at Hasselt University. Recipient of the 13th annual German Sustainability Award in December 2020. BS in Economics at UPenn – Wharton School. Founder of People’s Bicentennial Commission. The Green New Deal: Why the Fossil Fuel Civilization Will Collapse By 2028, and the Bold Economic Plan to Save Life on Earth. St Martin’s Press. P7-8. Google Book. //shree]

The Carbon Tracker Initiative, a London-based think tank serving the energy industry, reports that the steep decline in the price of generating solar and wind energy “will inevitably lead to trillions of dollars of stranded assets across the corporate sector and hit petro-states that fail to reinvent themselves,” while “putting trillions at risk for unsavvy investors oblivious to the speed of the unfolding energy transition.”19 “Stranded assets” are all the fossil fuels that will remain in the ground because of falling demand as well as the abandonment of pipelines, ocean platforms, storage facilities, energy generation plants, backup power plants, petrochemical processing facilities, and industries tightly coupled to the fossil fuel culture. Behind the scenes, a seismic struggle is taking place as four of the principal sectors responsible for global warming—the Information and Communications Technology (ICT)/telecommunications sector, the power and electric utility sector, the mobility and logistics sector, and the buildings sector—are beginning to decouple from the fossil fuel industry in favor of adopting the cheaper new green energies. The result is that within the fossil fuel industry, “around $100 trillion of assets could be ‘carbon stranded.’”20 The carbon bubble is the largest economic bubble in history. And studies and reports over the past twenty-four months—from within the global financial community, the insurance sector, global trade organizations, national governments, and many of the leading consulting agencies in the energy industry, the transportation sector, and the real estate sector—suggest that the imminent collapse of the fossil fuel industrial civilization could occur sometime between 2023 and 2030, as key sectors decouple from fossil fuels and rely on ever-cheaper solar, wind, and other renewable energies and accompanying zero-carbon technologies.21 The United States, currently the leading oil-producing nation, will be caught in the crosshairs between the plummeting price of solar and wind and the fallout from peak oil demand and accumulating stranded assets in the oil industry.22

### ! — Unsustainable — Minerals

#### Mineral scarcity dooms “green growth” and the planet.

Nafeez Ahmed 20 M.A. in contemporary war & peace studies and a DPhil (April 2009) in international relations from the School of Global Studies at Sussex University. Capitalism Will Ruin the Earth By 2050, Scientists Say. Vice. 10-21-2020. https://www.vice.com/en/article/v7m48d/capitalism-will-ruin-the-earth-by-2050-scientists-say

Endless growth will generate minerals scarcity within decades

The EV transition is, in short, a massive industrial project. Electrification of roads and rail will require upgraded smart grids, complex routes connected to high power lines, and regular battery-swap stations. The paper explores several scenarios to explore how such a transition would take place.

In a continuing GDP growth scenario, the authors note that the economy begins to stagnate “due to peak oil limits at around 2025-2040,” but GDP is able to continue growing thanks to the EV transition. This shows that the reduction in liquid fuels in transportation can play a powerful role in avoiding “energy shortages in the economy as a whole.”

But then the economy hits the limits of mineral and material production to sustain this electric transition—in just three decades. And this is even with high levels of minerals recycling.

By 2050, in this scenario, the EV transition will “require higher amounts of copper, lithium and manganese than current reserves. For the cases of copper and manganese the depletion is mainly due to the demand from the rest of the economy,” but most lithium demand “is for EV batteries,” and this alone “depletes its estimated global reserves.”

Mineral depletion takes place even with “a very high increase in recycling rates” in a continuing GDP growth scenario.

In one such scenario, the authors apply what they consider to be realistic upper level recycling rates of 57 percent, 30 percent and 74 percent to copper, lithium and manganese respectively. These are based on extremely optimistic projections of recycling capabilities relative to their costs.

But still they find that even these high recycling rates wouldn’t prevent depletion of all current estimated reserves by 2050. The conclusion corroborates findings of other studies, estimating an expected bottleneck for lithium by 2042-2045 and for manganese by 2038-2050.

Actual bottlenecks could come even earlier because existing studies—including the MEDEAS model—don’t account for material requirements needed for internal wiring, the EV motor, EV chargers, building and maintaining the grid to connect and charge EV batteries, the catenaries to electrify the railways, as well as inherent difficulties in recycling metals.

### ! — AT: CCS

#### CCS fails — our study uses the largest data sample ever compiled, empirical models and expert assessment!

Trendafilova ’21 — Petya; Writer for Carbon Herald. She covers the topics related to carbon capture development and the transition of energy companies. Petya holds a bachelor degree in business and financial management from the University of Salford, the UK and has over four years of experience in company valuations and reporting and analyzing financial trading instruments. March 24, 2021; "A New Advanced Study Answers Why Most Carbon Capture Projects Fail"; *Carbon Herald*; https://carbonherald.com/a-new-advanced-study-answers-why-most-carbon-capture-projects-fail/; //CYang

Scientists from the University of California, San Diego published a study investigating a diverse portfolio of successful and failed carbon capture and storage projects in the US. It concluded that while many projects essential to commercializing the technology have been started, more than 80% of them have ended in failure.

The study entails the largest sample of US CCS projects ever examined, with the input from the people who managed them in the past. The researchers came up with 12 crucial traits that describe why commercial carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) projects become a failure or a success.

Reality Assessment

According to the study, commercial CO2 capture that is deployed in power plants to separate CO2 for use in EOR has been here since the 1970s. The technology is mature now, yet CCS project developments are moving at an overwhelmingly slow pace.

The US saw a big push in the 2000s to commercialize CCS with billions of dollars invested in dozens of industrial and power plant capture projects. However, most ended in failure — largely before the final investment decision (FID).

According to the US National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL), more than 300 CCUS projects of all types have been proposed or built globally. Half of these (149) intended to store some or all of the captured CO2.

However, more than 100 of the 149 CCS projects have been terminated or placed on indefinite hold. They were also originally scheduled to be operational by 2020. The projects were planned to capture more than 130 million tons of CO2 per annum which is more than three times the amount of CO2 captured today.

One important highlight is that the projects in the power sector experienced around 90% failure. For comparison, more than 70% of the proposed gas processing projects with CCS have succeeded and are still operational today. That points to the conclusion that the probability of failure depends on the type of project.

Carbon Capture Projects 12 Determinants

The study uses empirical models and expert assessment to determine the 12 main factors determining the project results. The factors are diverse, including engineering economics, finance, and political economy. They are as follows:

* Plant siting
* Capture technology readiness level
* Capital cost
* Employment impact
* Credibility of revenue
* Credibility of incentives
* Population proximity
* Institutional setting
* Burden of CO2 disposal
* Regulatory challenges
* Public opposition
* Industrial stakeholder opposition

The experts, whose opinions were obtained, only put an emphasis on the significance of the credibility of incentives and revenues. The projects had to obtain unconditional incentives upfront to provide a safe financial footing. That is the main reason why the majority of effective projects used their captured CO2 gas for enhanced oil recovery.

#### CCS causes corporate free-riding and increases emissions!

Kusnetz ’21 — Nicholas; reporter for Inside Climate News. Before joining ICN, he worked at the Center for Public Integrity and ProPublica. His work has won numerous awards, including from the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the Society of American Business Editors and Writers, and has appeared in more than a dozen publications, including The Washington Post, Businessweek, The Nation, Fast Company and The New York Times. August 17, 2021; "Fossil Fuel Companies Are Quietly Scoring Big Money for Their Preferred Climate Solution: Carbon Capture and Storage"; *Inside Climate News*; https://insideclimatenews.org/news/17082021/carbon-capture-storage-fossil-fuel-companies-climate/; //CYang

Some environmentalists say that is exactly what is happening. They argue that the money being appropriated by Congress is likely to allow polluting power plants and petrochemical facilities to continue operating longer into the future, while doing little to reduce the nation’s emissions. They also say that, even if the technology is able to cut carbon pollution from petrochemical plants or refineries, it won’t address other toxic chemicals those operations send into communities that are home to many people of color. Electrifying industry and reducing the use of plastics and petrochemicals, these advocates argue, would be far cheaper and safer.

The most powerful forces pushing for carbon capture have been fossil fuel companies, which have promoted CCS for decades but have increased their lobbying and marketing for the technology in recent years as they have fallen under increased pressure to address climate change.

Soon after launching a new business line that it said will deploy carbon capture technology, ExxonMobil in April proposed a $100 billion mega-project in Houston that would capture emissions from the region’s heavy industry and store it underground.

But there’s a catch: The company said it would need substantial government funding to move forward. With the two major pieces of legislation working their way through Congress, Exxon may get what it wants.

A Politically Appealing Opportunity

Nearly three years ago, a major United Nations’ climate report fundamentally altered the public discourse on climate change by highlighting the far-reaching effects expected if the world warmed just 1.5 degrees Celsius (2.7 degrees Fahrenheit). Advocates and scientists spoke with new urgency about the need to rapidly reduce emissions. Governments and corporations began announcing plans to reach “net-zero” emissions. And carbon capture and storage started to receive renewed attention, with the growing realization that every emissions-cutting tool might be needed to get there.

In the United States, CCS has also offered a politically appealing opportunity to reach consensus on climate change: The energy industry and many Republicans who oppose other solutions support carbon capture and storage, as do unions that represent people who work in the fossil fuel sector.

Lee Beck, international director for carbon capture at the Clean Air Task Force, an environmental nonprofit, said carbon capture and storage could help reduce emissions faster and more cheaply in some parts of the world, particularly in Asia, home to many newly-built fossil fuel power plants that could continue spewing greenhouse gases for decades.

“We need to deploy as many solutions as fast as possible,” she said.

But just as carbon capture and storage has drawn increased attention, the plummeting costs of wind and solar energy have eroded the case for using the technology in the power sector. In most parts of the United States and much of the rest of the world, renewable power sources are already competitive with or cheaper than burning fossil fuels to generate electricity. Adding expensive carbon capture equipment to a fossil power plant would only tilt the balance further in favor of renewable sources.

The federal government has poured billions of dollars into carbon capture demonstration projects that were never completed. The only commercial power plant in the country to use carbon capture and storage shut its emissions-cutting operations last year during the pandemic, and later announced it would suspend them indefinitely. This hasn’t stopped some companies from continuing to try to implement the technology.

“CCS for power plants is something of a boondoggle,” Nicholson said.

As the case for carbon capture power plants has collapsed, supporters have argued that the technology is still worthy of support because of the role it could play in decarbonizing industry or in removing carbon dioxide from the air. The bipartisan infrastructure bill provides $3.5 billion to direct air capture technology, according to recent drafts.

But many environmental advocates warn that much of the rest of the money in the infrastructure bill is likely to go toward expanding some of the more problematic uses of the technology.

There are about a dozen carbon capture plants operating in the United States, most of which are attached to natural gas processing, ethanol or fertilizer plants, which produce emissions that are high in carbon dioxide and therefore relatively cheap to capture. The vast majority of that captured carbon dioxide is then sold to oil companies, which pump the gas into depleted oil reservoirs to squeeze more petroleum out of the ground. The companies say most of the carbon dioxide stays underground permanently, though long-term monitoring is limited. Either way, the gas serves as a tool to produce oil that would otherwise be left underground.

Exxon and other companies have already received hundreds of millions of dollars for capturing carbon dioxide and selling it for use in oil fields through a federal CCS tax credit, which was created in 2008 and then expanded in 2018. At the same time, Exxon led an ultimately successful lobbying campaign to strip the requirement that the Environmental Protection Agency oversee the operations of companies that claim the credit, to ensure the greenhouse gas is not escaping into the atmosphere.

In December, after lobbying from industry, Congress extended how long companies could claim that credit, as part of an omnibus budget bill. Now, energy and industrial companies are pushing lawmakers to take advantage of the reconciliation bill to further expand the tax credit and increase the amount of money that companies can claim for capturing emissions, whether or not the gas is used to produce more oil.

“The last thing that U.S. taxpayers should be doing is subsidizing fossil fuels, especially subsidizing drilling for oil,” said Jim Walsh, senior energy policy analyst at Food and Water Watch, an environmental group.

A New Interdependency?

The December omnibus bill and the bipartisan infrastructure bill currently moving through Congress include numerous other measures that support carbon capture technology, including fast-tracked environmental reviews, billions of dollars for demonstration projects and loan guarantees and billions more to fund projects that make hydrogen from natural gas with carbon-capturing equipment. One section of the infrastructure bill encourages states to waive property taxes for carbon capture projects for at least 10 years. Axelrod, of the Natural Resources Defense Council, said these are the latest in a series of policies that industry has won.

“What happened over the course of a decade of legislation is all these little individual pieces and policy mechanisms have been passed into law that basically subsidizes industry,” he said, “and the industry in this case is pretty overwhelmingly the fossil fuel industry.”

Other provisions in the infrastructure bill would pour billions into building carbon dioxide pipelines and funding research into making plastics and other products out of the gas. Walsh said the funding could make it harder to phase out fossil fuels, by creating new jobs and economies that depend on their emissions.

“It’s creating this new interdependency on fossil fuels,” he said.

Many environmentalists also warn that, even if carbon capture and storage proves successful, it fails to address other damage caused by the industry and its products.

“What we’re talking about is essentially allowing environmental injustice to continue, and in fact doubling down on it,” said Kendall Dix, policy lead at the Gulf Coast Center for Law and Policy, a climate justice-focused nonprofit. He said many Gulf Coast communities face unacceptable toxic pollution from petrochemical plants that could continue to operate for longer if fitted with carbon capture equipment.

### ! — AT: Geoengineering

#### Geoengineering fails — it’s more likely to backfire.

Hamilton ’19 — Clive; Australian public intellectual and Professor of Public Ethics at the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics and the Vice-Chancellor's Chair in Public Ethics at Charles Sturt University. June 5, 2019; "Could geoengineering cause a climate war?"; *BBC Science Focus*; <https://www.sciencefocus.com/planet-earth/could-geoengineering-cause-a-climate-war/>; //CYang

Some atmospheric scientists, like Dr Alan Robock at Rutgers University, argue that the complexity of the climate system means that it’s difficult to draw firm conclusions about the consequences of such a radical intervention. They point out that the chemistry of the upper atmosphere — including the ozone layer — is complicated and poorly understood. Reducing the amount of sunlight reaching the Earth in a computer model may give little clue as to what would happen in the actual climate system if a layer of sulphate aerosols were injected into it.

One worry is that, combined with increased water vapour as a result of global warming, adding sulphates to the upper atmosphere could be a lethal cocktail for ozone loss, speeding up chemical reactions that destroy this crucial gas. Other studies indicate that, depending on the kind of aerosol spraying programme, the South Asian and East Asian monsoons could be disrupted. Tropical rainfall depends on differences between temperatures on land and sea, and some models show that by changing the temperature ratio between land and sea, solar geoengineering could suppress monsoon rains, affecting food supplies for millions of people.

However, global warming itself is changing precipitation patterns around the world (broadly speaking, dry regions are becoming drier and wet ones wetter) so a solar shield may improve rainfall in some regions that are drying out. It’s here we get to some of the most difficult issues associated with geoengineering.

Unknown unknowns

If the most sophisticated models cannot provide a firm answer regarding how solar geoengineering would affect the actual global climate, nor can experiments. Only full-scale implementation would provide a clear idea of its impacts.

Even then, we’d need at least 10 years of global climate data before we had enough information to separate out the effects of sulphate aerosol spraying from natural climate variability and, indeed, from the effects of human-induced climate change. To compound the risks, if after 10 years we had accumulated enough data to decide that our intervention was not a good idea, it may be impossible to terminate the solar shield. Why should this be so?

For some time, ecologists have known that the rate at which the globe warms is a greater threat to ecosystems than the amount of warming, because a slower rate of warming gives plants and animals more time to adapt. If the solar shield causes some nasty unintended effects (including conflict between nations), removing it suddenly would cause the suppressed warming ‘rebound’. It’s been estimated that if warming occurs at a rate of 0.3°C per decade (well within the estimated rebound range) then only 30 per cent of ecosystems could adapt and survive.

So we may find that, once deployed, removing the shield becomes too risky; we’d be stuck with it. The danger would be multiplied if we failed to take the opportunity to cut greenhouse gas emissions sharply while the shield was in place. This is perhaps the greatest hazard of going down this path.

Politics, politics

Some technologies are inherently political in the sense that they increase the power of those who control it and reduce the power of those excluded from it. Imagine if the US government decided to install a solar shield that allowed it to regulate the climate. The government would wield great power over all those US industries that depend on the weather, while also being able to influence the climate in other parts of the world, creating immediate strategic tension.

Paradoxically, solar geoengineering can also be seen as a means of preserving social and political structures that are threatened by measures to cut carbon emissions. Instead of taxing fossil fuels, banning coal mining and restricting air transport, those profiting from these activities might welcome a technofix like sulphate aerosol spraying.

Indeed, in the US, conservative think tanks that have been at the forefront of climate science denial have shown an interest in solar geoengineering. It’s cheap and protects any vested interests. Geoengineering promises to turn a drastic failure of the free enterprise system into a triumph of human ingenuity. And they are more inclined to agree with Prof David Keith that an artificial Earth shaped by humans is not intrinsically inferior to a natural one.

#### And causes global nuclear war — and counter-geoengineering which makes the environment worse!

Hamilton ’19 — Clive; Australian public intellectual and Professor of Public Ethics at the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics and the Vice-Chancellor's Chair in Public Ethics at Charles Sturt University. June 5, 2019; "Could geoengineering cause a climate war?"; *BBC Science Focus*; [edited for gendered language] <https://www.sciencefocus.com/planet-earth/could-geoengineering-cause-a-climate-war/>; //CYang

When hit by a devastating flood, drought or storm, a community will tend to see it as an act of God — a natural event that it just has to cope with. But what if we believed that the death and destruction were caused not by nature but by someone manipulating the weather? If another nation were engineering the climate, its politicians’ denials would fall on deaf ears, and not just because humans naturally look for someone to blame. If a nation had embarked on a system-altering form of climate engineering like sulphur dioxide spraying, it would be virtually impossible to work out whether an extreme weather event somewhere in the world was due to natural variability, human-induced climate change or climate manipulation. And climate manipulation would quite likely get the blame.

The government of China, faced with a catastrophic drought in the north of the country, might decide its survival demanded rapid global cooling. But sending up planes to spray sulphur dioxide might deprive India and Pakistan of their monsoon rains, bringing on famine. Three nuclear-armed nations would then be in conflict over weather patterns that affect the survival of millions of their citizens.

It’s hard to know who might first be tempted to regulate the global climate. Given the severe environmental and geopolitical risks, and the deep ethical divide over whether humans should ‘play God’, governments in democratic countries may be hamstrung. Authoritarian leaders who do not need public approval to act may have a freer hand. Do we want Vladimir Putin or Xi Jinping controlling our weather?

A dictator with ~~his~~ [their] hand on the global thermostat is a scary prospect. But imagine if several poorer nations (let’s say Bangladesh, Tuvalu, the Maldives and Ethiopia) clubbed together and declared: “The rich countries that caused global warming promised to cut their emissions, but they have not done so. Our people are dying, so we must take unilateral action. We are sending up a fleet of planes to spray sulphur dioxide.”

Now the moral calculus leaves us uncertain what to think. Don’t they have the right to save themselves from an existential threat, even if by risky means? What would it mean for floods and storms in other countries? Would the United States or China be entitled to shoot down their planes?

Reaching a consensus to regulate the Earth’s climate would, in the words of a 2013 study, “pose immense challenges to liberal democratic politics”. But then, liberal democratic politics does not have a great record responding to climate change, either. The elected president of the US, Donald Trump, has announced that his country will be pulling out of the Paris Agreement, an action that will slow emissions reductions and expose millions of people, especially poorer individuals, to the devastating effects of a warming world.

In the circumstances, the only acceptable answer is a global agreement to regulate research into geoengineering. If it ever comes to deployment, conflict could be avoided only if an inclusive international institution makes the decision. Without it, one nation would control the climate of others, and those others will be tempted to engage in their own ‘counter-geoengineering’. And then we really are in trouble.

### ! — AT: Green Tech

#### “Green capitalism” is a rouse:

#### 1) JEVON’S PARADOX. Tech will fail and we’ll move towards geoengineering.

Jeremy Lent 21, author of *The Patterning Instinct*, founder of Liology, 10-9-2021, "Solving the Climate Crisis Requires the End of Capitalism," https://patternsofmeaning.com/2021/10/11/solving-the-climate-crisis-requires-the-end-of-capitalism/, jy

The primary reason for this derives ultimately from the nature of capitalism itself. Under capitalism — which has now become the default global economic context for virtually all human enterprise — efficiency improvements intended to reduce resource usage inevitably become launchpads for further exploitation, leading paradoxically to an increase, rather than decrease, in consumption.

This dynamic, known as the Jevons paradox, was first recognized back in the nineteenth century by economist William Stanley Jevons, who demonstrated how James Watts’ steam engine, which greatly improved the efficiency of coal-powered engines, paradoxically caused a dramatic increase in coal consumption even while it decreased the amount of coal required for any particular application. The Jevons paradox has since been shown to be true in an endless variety of domains, from the invention in the nineteenth century of the cotton gin which led to an increase rather than decrease in the practice of slavery in the American South, to improved automobile fuel efficiency which encourages people to drive longer distances.

When the Jevons paradox is generalized to the global marketplace, we begin to see that it’s not really a paradox at all, but rather an inbuilt defining characteristic of capitalism. Shareholder-owned corporations, as the primary agents of global capitalism, are legally structured by the overarching imperative to maximize shareholder returns above all else. Although they are given the legal rights of “personhood” in many jurisdictions, if they were actually humans they would be diagnosed as psychopaths, ruthlessly pursuing their goal without regard to any collateral damage they might cause. Of the hundred largest economies today, sixty-nine are transnational corporations, which collectively represent a relentless force with one overriding objective: to turn humanity and the rest of life into fodder for endlessly increasing profit at the fastest possible rate.

Under global capitalism, this dynamic holds true even without the involvement of transnational corporations. Take bitcoin as an example. Originally designed after the global financial meltdown of 2008 to wrest monetary power from the domination of central banks, it relies on building trust through “mining,” a process that allows anyone to verify a transaction by solving increasingly complex mathematical equations and earn new bitcoins as compensation. A great idea — in theory. In practice, the unfettered marketplace for bitcoin mining has led to frenzied competition to solve ever more complex equations, with vast warehouses holding “rigs” of advanced computers consuming massive amounts of electricity, with the result that the carbon emissions from bitcoin processing are now equivalent to that of a mid-size country such as Sweden or Argentina.

An economy based on perpetual growth

The relentless pursuit of profit growth above all other considerations is reflected in the world’s stock markets, where corporations are valued not by their benefit to society, but by investors’ expectations of their growth in future earnings. Similarly, when aggregated to national accounts, the main proxy used to measure the performance of politicians is growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Although it is commonly assumed that GDP correlates with social welfare, this is not the case once basic material requirements have been met. GDP merely measures the rate at which society transforms nature and human activity into the monetary economy, regardless of the ensuing quality of life. Anything that causes economic activity of any kind, whether good or bad, adds to GDP. When researchers developed a benchmark called the Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI), which incorporates qualitative components of well-being, they discovered a dramatic divergence between the two measures. GPI peaked in 1978 and has been steadily falling ever since, even while GDP continues to accelerate.

In spite of this, the possibility of shifting our economy away from perpetual growth is barely even considered in mainstream discourse. In preparation for COP26, the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) modeled five scenarios exploring potential pathways that would lead to different global heating outcomes this century, ranging from an optimistic 1.5°C pathway to a likely catastrophic 4.5°C track. One of their most critical variables is the amount of carbon reduction accomplished through negative emissions, relying on massive implementation of unproven technologies. According to the IPCC, staying under 2°C of global heating — consistent with the minimum target set by the 2015 Paris agreement — involves a heroic assumption that we will suck 730 billion metric tonnes of carbon out of the atmosphere this century. This stupendous amount is equivalent to roughly twenty times the total current annual emissions from all fossil fuel usage. Such an assumption is closer to science fiction than any rigorous analysis worthy of a model on which our civilization is basing its entire future. Yet, even as the IPCC appears willing to model humanity’s fate on a pipe dream, not one of their scenarios explores what is possible from a graduated annual reduction in global GDP. Such a scenario was considered by the IPCC community to be too implausible to consider.

This represents a serious lapse on the part of the IPCC. Climate scientists who have modeled planned reductions in GDP show that keeping global heating below 1.5°C this century is potentially within reach under this scenario, with greatly reduced reliance on speculative carbon reduction technologies. Prominent economists have shown that a carefully managed “post-growth” plan could lead to enhanced quality of life, reduced inequality, and a healthier environment. It would, however, undermine the foundational activity of capitalism — the pursuit of endless growth that has led to our current state of obscene inequality, impending ecological collapse, and climate breakdown.

The profit-based path to catastrophe

As long as this elephant in the room remains unspoken, our world will continue to careen toward catastrophe, even as politicians and technocrats shift from one savior narrative to another. Along with the myth of “green growth,” we are told that a solution lies in putting monetary valuations on “ecosystem services” and incorporating them into business decisions — even though this approach has been shown to be deeply flawed, frequently counterproductive, and ultimately self-defeating. A wetlands, for example, might have value in protecting a city from flooding. However, if it were drained and a swanky new resort built on the reclaimed land, this could be more lucrative. Case closed.

The new moniker arising from the corporate titans at the World Economic Forum is “stakeholder capitalism”: an inviting term that seems to imply that stakeholders other than investors will play a role in setting corporate priorities, but actually refers to a profoundly anti-democratic process whereby corporations assume increasingly large roles in global governance. This month, the UN Food Systems Summit was essentially taken over by the same giant corporations, including Nestlé and Bayer, that are largely responsible for the very problems the summit was intended to grapple with — which led to a widespread boycott by hundreds of civil society and Indigenous groups.

As net-zero targets decades away are formally announced at COP26, built implicitly on a combination of corporate procrastination and speculative technologies, we can only expect the climate crisis to continue to worsen. Ultimately, as negative emissions technologies fail to meet their grandiose expectations, the same voices that currently promote reliance on them will lend support to the techno-dystopian idea of geoengineering — vast, planet-altering engineering projects designed to temporarily manipulate the climate to defer a climate apocalypse. A leading geoengineering candidate, financed by Bill Gates, involves spraying particles into the stratosphere to cool the Earth by reflecting the Sun’s rays back into space. The risks are enormous, including the likelihood of causing extreme shifts in precipitation around the world. Additionally, once begun, it could never be stopped without immediate catastrophic rebound heating; it would not prevent the oceans from further acidifying; and may turn the blue sky into a perpetual dull haze. In spite of these concerns, geoengineering is beginning to get discussed at UN meetings, with publications such as The Economist predicting that, since it wouldn’t disrupt continued economic growth, it’s more likely to be implemented than the drastic, binding cuts in emissions that would head off climate disaster.

#### 2) BEST DATA goes aff. Here’s line by line.

Rob Dietz 18, Program Director at Post Carbon Institute, 11-7-2018, "The Secret of Eternal Growth? It’s Wishful Thinking," https://www.resilience.org/stories/2018-11-07/the-secret-of-eternal-growth-its-wishful-thinking/, jy

I want to believe in eternal economic growth. Given what humanity is facing with climate change and other consequences of our collective consumption, it must be awfully comforting to have faith in a cornucopian future where no one ever goes wanting. Especially if all we have to do is more of the same, sticking to capitalism’s exploitative playbook. I used to have that faith. I was a worshipper of technological progress and its potential to overcome all the social and environmental problems that accompany exponentially increasing population and consumption. I also used to believe in the Easter Bunny. Unlike Michael Liebreich (author of “The Secret of Eternal Growth,” the article I’m rebutting), however, I paid enough attention to the evidence to put aside such fantasies.

I intend to provide a blow-by-blow analysis of Liebreich’s contentions, but I feel compelled to start with a gem near the end of his article. In a one-sentence paragraph that summarizes his thesis, he writes, “The bottom line here is that the world’s most feted scientists and economists have shown that economic growth is consistent with environmental protection and the mitigation of climate change.” Here’s a small point: his use of a financial metaphor (“bottom line”) may reveal something about how much the culture of money influences his thinking. But here’s the bigger point. Really?!? What the hell is he talking about?

Let’s start with his claim about scientists. It’s a safe bet he hasn’t read the World Scientists’ Warning to Humanity. This article appeared in the peer-reviewed journal BioScience in December 2017. In the article, which was endorsed by more than 15,000 scientists at the time it was published, the authors write, “We are jeopardizing our future by not reining in our intense but geographically and demographically uneven material consumption and by not perceiving continued rapid population growth as a primary driver behind many ecological and even societal threats.” These scientists are saying very specifically that economic growth (which consists of growth in consumption and population) is inconsistent with environmental protection and mitigation of climate change. They also conclude that it is “time to re-examine and change our individual behaviors, including limiting our own reproduction (ideally to replacement level at most) and drastically diminishing our per capita consumption of fossil fuels, meat, and other resources.”

Perhaps Liebreich doesn’t feel like the scientists behind the BioScience article qualify as “our most feted.” On that front, though, it’s worth noting that the article is an update to the original warning to humanity that was published in 1992 and endorsed by the majority of living Nobel laureates in the sciences. And how about Stephen Hawking — does he count? In 2017, he made headlines when he said that humans need to find a new planet to inhabit within 100 years, given the risks we face from climate change, population growth, epidemics, and the potential for asteroid strikes. Maybe Liebreich meant “fetid” instead of “feted.”

Among economists, you can certainly find plenty who are celebrated for promoting infinite exponential growth. Captains of industry love these guys, because proclamations from economists (who often have little or no training in physics or ecology) give them the rationale they need to continue their programs of profiteering. Neoclassical economists from universities around the world have repeatedly claimed that economic growth is consistent with environmental protection, but “claiming” and “showing” are two different things. In fact, economic growth has been tightly correlated with biodiversity loss, and the theorized inverse relationship between per capita GDP and environmental damage has been debunked. More on economists as I get into my blow-by-blow below.

Liebreich gets his thesis rolling in the first paragraph with this doozy: “…the award of the Nobel Prize in Economics to Paul Romer and William Nordhaus, in the same week, can only be interpreted as a huge slap in the face for the champions of ‘degrowth’.” So what? It’s not an out-of-the-blue slap in the face. The Nobel Prize in Economics is actually the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, established in 1968 by Sweden’s central bank. The prize, which was tacked onto the original slate of Nobel Prizes, is rooted in growth-based economics and has regularly been awarded to neoclassical economists, including Milton Friedman, Robert Solow, and now Romer and Nordhaus, all of whom are on board with the capitalist growth paradigm.

Over the next few paragraphs, Liebreich enters the realm of physics and energy. I give him props — most growth-obsessed businessmen don’t bother with such topics. But he quickly goes off the rails. His claim is that scientifically literate economists and engineers, such as Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, Jay Forrester, Herman Daly, Jeremy Rifkin, and Tim Jackson, have all misunderstood the laws of thermodynamics and their effect on economic processes. He thinks that because the Earth receives a daily dose of energy from the sun that we can have endless growth, which may be bolstered or sped up by nuclear fission and fusion. He calls the notion of a limit to growth “pure fake science” (This is “fake science” in the same way the New York Times is “fake news”.). Well, how about checking in with a scientist?

Tom Murphy, a professor of physics at the University of California, San Diego, has done the math on energy growth and limits. He exposes just how ridiculous it is to pine for ongoing exponential growth in energy consumption. In his scenario, we maintain the rate of growth of energy use at 2.3% per year, which is less than the 2.9% rate we’ve been able to achieve over the last few centuries. And just for fun, he has us using solar panels that are 100% efficient at turning sunlight into electricity — a physical impossibility (solar photovoltaics’ efficiency is currently about 1/5th of that). Given the 2.3% growth rate, we would have to cover the whole surface of the Earth, land and water, with solar panels in just 400 years. Murphy doesn’t stop there, though. He also analyzes fusion as a source of energy. At 2.3% annual growth, fusion or any source of energy would produce as much energy as the sun within 1,400 years, a virtual drop in the bucket of human history, so the surface of the Earth would have to be hotter than the surface of the sun.

I can almost hear Liebreich’s protests right now: economic growth isn’t the same thing as energy growth! He and Murphy agree on this point. At first the economy grew more or less together with energy, but since 1950 economic growth has outpaced energy growth by a couple of percentage points. Murphy points out that the difference between economic and energy growth can be split into two categories: efficiency gains and “everything else” which he classifies as finance, real estate, innovation, and other aspects of the service economy (note: Liebreich heaps praise on Romer’s Endogenous Growth Theory that explains how accumulated knowledge contributes to economic growth — Romer’s “knowledge” component of growth corresponds with Murphy’s “everything else” category).

Murphy quickly discredits the possibility of endless efficiency growth with a little bit of thermodynamic expertise and some arithmetic. He then asks the practical question, “In a future world where energy growth has ceased, and efficiency has been squeezed to a practical limit, can we still expect to grow our economy through innovation, technology, and services?” He again runs the numbers to test the idea. He assumes 5% economic growth over the long term and calculates what fraction of economic activity has to come from the non-energy-demanding sector. In just a hundred years, that fraction gets close to 100%. Expenditures on food, energy, and manufactured goods would be negligible. But how massive of a service sector can be supported on top of a relatively small agricultural and industrial sector? Just how many people will be engaged in trading commodity futures, orchestrating credit default swaps, and writing blogs when the limits of food production have been reached?

Liebreich surprises again by departing from most other critics who deny the reality or dismiss the seriousness of climate change. He understands that climate change is “real, serious, and urgent,” and goes on to say that we need to apply technology, “both new and yet-to-be-developed, on a heroic scale” to avert climate change. Notice how he’s proposing we rely on the same game plan—economic growth plus technology—to solve the very problem it caused (but at least he concedes we need to do something). With this unoriginal game plan of more growth and more technology, he hands the ball to his star player, William Nordhaus. Nordhaus’s work on climate change and economic growth, which won him the Nobel, is questionable when applied to the real world. In 1991 he said, “Agriculture, the part of the economy that is sensitive to climate change, accounts for just 3% of national output. That means that there is no way to get a very large effect on the US economy.” Hmm, so if there’s a significant reduction in access to food in this country, there will be little effect on the economy? And what about all the economic transactions that occur in coastal areas — might there be a substantial effect on the economy when those areas are part of the ocean? Give him another Nobel — maybe he can share it with this guy.

After Nordhaus, Liebreich continues on his tour of Nobel laureates with Simon Kuznets, who won the prize for his work on national income accounting. Kuznets found that income inequality tended to increase as economic activity grew in a given nation, but at some point inequality would level off and then decrease. This relationship became known as the Kuznets curve. Liebreich brings up Kuznets so he can drop a reference to the concept of the environmental Kuznets curve, which has very little to do with Kuznets’s actual work. Kuznets came up with the idea of tracking economic output at the national scale — he invented what would evolve into the king of all economic statistics, gross domestic product (GDP). Kuznets himself was very concerned with how his work might be misapplied. In a 1934 report to the US Congress, Kuznets said, “The welfare of a nation can scarcely be inferred from a measure of national income.” He went on to advise, “Goals for more growth should specify more growth of what and for what.” What a refreshing sentiment, but also a sad one, given how Liebreich and other “growthists” in charge of the economy have completely ignored Kuznets’s warning. Two more points about the oddity of Liebreich’s decision to use Kuznets in support of his contentions:

He states that “Environmental Kuznets Curves has [sic] been shown to govern most forms of local pollution.” That’s great for local pollution, but if too much growth causes widespread global pollution (e.g., climate change) or other global environmental calamities (e.g., biodiversity loss, including the loss of species we depend upon for pollination, loss of topsoil, degradation of ecosystem services), there’s not much to celebrate in theoretical environmental Kuznets curves.

Liebreich is aware of the flaws in GDP, and he wants to replace it with a different measure that adds up natural capital (nature’s bounty), human capital (knowledge), and manmade capital (infrastructure). I share this perspective, but let’s be clear: growing the economy means growing GDP. Growth is about quantity — it’s an increase in the number of people, or per capita consumption, or both. If we were to change GDP to reflect “wellbeing” or “true wealth” (something very different from the dollar value of economic output), and then we set a goal of optimizing the economy based on this indicator, we wouldn’t prescribe continuous growth. We would balance economic production and its consequences with preservation of natural ecosystems and the services they provide.

From Nordhaus, Liebreich continues on his weird journey of Nobel worship and selects Ilya Prigione (awarded the prize in chemistry in 1977) as his next stop. His interpretation of Prigogine’s work is downright bizarre. I’m no expert in Prigogine’s research on non-equilibrium dissipative structures, but I’ll take at face value Liebreich’s description of it. He notes that Prigogine observed “how a flow of energy across a closed system can drive the creation of ‘order out of chaos’.” Here’s the bizarre part. From that single observation, Liebreich stunningly concludes, “This is a real scientific expert on entropy proving that the economy can grow for as long as there is still a sun in the sky (which would give us about another five billion years).” Wait, what?!? “Order out of chaos” is not the same thing as “unending growth out of chaos.” Take, for instance, a snow globe as an example of a closed system. Applying energy across the snow globe could produce order from the chaos — maybe you could get the snowflakes to line up in neat little rows. But it doesn’t mean you could produce an exponentially growing number of snowflakes for the next five billion years! If I wanted to make a similar argument, I’d point out that Einstein won the Nobel Prize in physics for his work on the photoelectric effect. Then I’d say, “This is a real scientific expert on matter and energy proving that the economy will infinitely shrink as long as Captain Kirk and Spock remain pals.”

If Liebreich wants to apply the work of a “real scientist” who won the Nobel Prize in chemistry, why does he select Prigogine, anyway? He should be reporting the work of Frederick Soddy. Soddy won his prize in 1921, but then he changed course. Disillusioned with how his work and the work of his colleagues in chemistry was being repurposed for immoral uses in war, he decided to apply his scholarly skills to economic questions. In studying economic growth, money creation, and finance, Soddy noted, “You cannot permanently pit an absurd human convention, such as the spontaneous increment of debt (compound interest), against the natural law of the spontaneous decrement of wealth (entropy).” To borrow Liebreich’s argumentative structure again, this is a real scientific expert who understands that a reliable flow of energy is the key to economic activity, and that the flow is finite. It’s worth pointing out that Soddy’s economics career wasn’t a delusion of grandeur born of a midlife crisis — he generated original, insightful, and useful ideas. He proposed five economic policies that were dismissed at the time as outlandish. Four of the five have since been adopted as standard practice. The fifth — remove the power granted to banks to create money out of thin air — is still waiting in the wings, because this policy is antithetical to the pursuit of continuous growth.

The tour of “Nobel-ity” continues. Liebreich unexpectedly highlights the work of Elinor Ostrom. I say “unexpectedly” because many supporters of ecological economics and degrowth turn to Ostrom for insight. Liebreich summarizes her work with this paradoxical statement: “It turns out that with effective governance and social structures, groups of individuals are quite capable of managing shared resources without relying on top-down government edicts.” I don’t know what he means by “top-down government edicts,” but he is arguing for effective governance and social structures, an argument which directly opposes his call for unlimited economic growth. Here’s why: the economy grows when shared resources are removed from the commons and brought into the realm of economic transactions. If a community publicly owns a lake and shares the resources it provides (recreation, fish, etc.), no money changes hands and the economy doesn’t grow. But if one enterprising capitalist gains ownership of the lake and starts charging a price for access, then he has monetized the activity around the lake and set the economy to growing. Everyone, except the one capitalist, may be worse off, but we’ve got growth — hooray!

Along with his strange interpretations of the work of selected Nobel laureates, Liebreich also makes strange pronouncements about the left/right political division. He seems to think there’s a sinister leftist agenda to impose a draconian global governing body and wreck the economy by preventing perpetual exponential growth. But many people concerned about the tradeoff between growing the economy and protecting the life-support systems of the planet aren’t all that keen on global governance. Instead they want stronger, more resilient local economies, which amounts to greater abilities and power residing in communities. Even ecosocialists, who are on the opposite side of the political spectrum from Liebreich, see small farms (not global bodies) as seats of sustainable governance. The wicked problem of overshoot (overpopulation combined with overconsumption) is not a left versus right problem; it’s a problem for every single human being on Earth.

I’ve poked holes in Michael Liebreich’s arguments, and along the way I’ve poked fun at him. He seems like a smart man, and I actually think his heart’s in the right place — he wants good things for humanity. And unlike most growthists, he even wants each country to preserve a substantial portion of natural ecosystems. The trouble is that he’s got conflicting goals. Continuous economic growth (increasing population and consumption) is incompatible with both preservation of natural ecosystems and long-term sustainability of human society. You don’t solve overshoot by overshooting further! He is willing to bend facts to fit his economic-growth-at-all-costs ideology. I used to fall into the same trap, but I’m not waiting around for the Easter Bunny to deliver some sort of magical eggs that’ll save us. And unlike Liebreich, I’m certainly not betting the future of humanity or the planet on Ronald Reagan’s Disneyesque “there are no limits” rhetoric.

If Leibreich is so keen on scientists and Nobel laureates, why leave the last line to a president whose main gig was playing make believe in Hollywood? He could have chosen a president with a Nobel Prize and a background in science (including nuclear physics), farming, and business — Jimmy Carter. Carter said, “…too many of us now tend to worship self-indulgence and consumption. Human identity is no longer defined by what one does, but by what one owns. But we’ve discovered that owning things and consuming things does not satisfy our longing for meaning. We’ve learned that piling up material goods cannot fill the emptiness of lives which have no confidence or purpose.” We desperately need an economy that can meet humanity’s needs without risking environmental meltdown and undermining the basis for civilization. It’s a smaller economy, but one concerned with meaning and purpose rather than growth. In the end, there is no “secret of eternal growth.” The secret is that we need to let go of the obsession with growth.

#### 3) EVEN IF, renewables come from exploitation in Africa — causes horrors unimaginable AND war with China — extinction.

T.J. Coles 21, director of the Plymouth Institute for Peace Research, 12-7-2021, "Backed by AFRICOM, Corporations Plunder DR Congo for “Climate-Friendly” Materials and Blame China," https://blackagendareport.com/backed-africom-corporations-plunder-dr-congo-climate-friendly-materials-and-blame-china, jy

[tw: sexual assault, violence]

Cobalt, a key metallic element used in lithium batteries and other "green" technology, is sourced from exploited labor in the Democratic Republic of Congo. As the West points the finger at China, the US Africa Command is indirectly policing mining operations that profit US corporations.

Ever since Belgium’s King Leopold II (1835-1909) established the Congo Free State in 1885, international powers have exploited the region’s vast resources. Leading a regime that went on to kill an estimated eight million people to plunder their gold, ivory, and rubber, Leopold reportedly described Congo as “a magnificent African cake.”

More recently, US President Biden’s International Trade Administration declared: “With total mineral wealth estimated in the tens of trillions of dollars,” what is now called the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) “offers opportunities for American firms with a high tolerance for risk.” The role of the Africa Command is to reduce that risk. The US Department of Defense says that Africa “has a plethora of strategic materials, such as cobalt, chromium, tantalum and more. African resources are critical to 21st century progress” (read: US corporate dominance).

From the late-1990s to the present, Euro-American mining, processing, and financial corporations have relied on the slave-labor of miners and the muscle of armed gangs to export rare earth metals, such as coltan and tantalum, to the West for vital components in computers, phones, missiles, etc. The rush to renewables ushers in a new era of competition for the rare metal, cobalt.

The US sets its sights on a mineral rich Congo

DRC has an estimated population of 93 million. The country’s entire gross domestic product is around $50 billion , making it one of the poorest countries in the world. As trillion-dollar companies like Apple, Microsoft and Tesla rely on DRC’s materials, seven in 10 Congolese survive on less than $1.90 a day. Life expectancy is 60 years, compared to 78 in the US, and infant mortality is 66 deaths per 1,000 live births compared to 5.6 in the US.

The Pentagon’s main interest in Congo began during the Second World War (1939-45). Owned by Belgium’s Union Minière, the Shinkolobwe mine in the southern Katanga province contained the purest known uranium ore, which the US Army Corps of Engineers used in the Manhattan Project launched in 1942 to construct the world’s first nuclear weapon. Ore from the mine was used in the subsequent manufacture of nuclear weapons.

By the 1950s, the US State Department planned to invest $660 million (around $7 billion today) to “develop” Congo’s infrastructure for corporate exploitation. In 1960, Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba declared independence from Belgium, naming the country the Republic of the Congo (RoC), and making relatively mild overtures to the USSR. The politician Moïse Tshombé declared Katanga’s independence from RoC.

MI6 murdered Lumumba and the CIA replaced him with its asset, General Mobutu Sese Seko, who later renamed the country Zaire and ruled until his overthrow in 1997.

Throughout the 1960s, the CIA essentially created and managed the Zairian Armed Forces (Forces Armées Zaïroises, ZAC), training special air units and hiring mercenaries to bolster Mobuto’s forces. Tshombé’s secession was crushed, as were intermittent struggles, such as the Simba Rebellion from 1963 to ’65; one of whose leaders was future President, Laurent-Désiré Kabila. The US reluctantly tolerated small Cuban and Chinese military contingents in Zaire because they did not affect mining operations. By the 1980s, Belgian, French, German, and Israeli personnel were also training the ZAC.

Washington plays innocent bystander while fueling intrigues

Geographical considerations, the involvement of neighboring states, international interference, the role of specific ethnic groups in particular conflicts, and shifting paramilitary alliances make the Congo Wars extremely complicated. What follows is a basic outline focusing on the largely-overlooked US role.

Since at least 1990, the US has used Uganda as a conduit to arm Zaire/DRC. Until Uganda’s role in the wars was exposed, the Bill Clinton administration’s African Crisis Response Initiative saw an initial round of US military training for the Uganda People’s Defense Force. Clinton’s International Military Education and Training programs continued regardless. Both programs worsened the Congo crises, as we will see.

The centerpiece of the First Congo War that began in 1996 was the overthrow of Gen. Mobutu, led by Kabila’s Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre, AFDL). The AFDL was supported by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), whose Maj. Gen. Paul Kagame, now the president of Rwanda, had been trained by the US at Fort Leavenworth. RPF personnel were trained by the Green Berets.

Described as a “visionary” by US Gen. George Joulwan, Kagame had honed his craft murdering Hutu during the Rwanda Genocide in 1994. Hundreds of thousands of Hutu fled into DRC, settling in the eastern regions where the mineral resources happened to be located. The RPF and its allied paramilitaries occupied DRC, initially to help build up Kabila’s Armed Forces, but also to avenge massacres of Tutsi and secure the mines.

We can plausibly assume based on chronicles of events that Washington’s role was to play innocent bystander while benefiting from the mining and supply-chain operations of the RPF, Ugandan military, and related gangs.

Foreign demand for rare earth minerals drives an unprecedented death toll

Even before Kabila seized power, international mining and infrastructure giants were negotiating contracts with his AFDL party.

American Mineral Fields landed a $1 billion deal to mine DRC. Bechtel hired NASA to provide satellite images of mineral-rich regions and allegedly acquire information on rebel movements for Kabila’s military. As Anglo-American, Barrick Gold, DeBeers, and other corporations signed mining contracts, Kabila created the Banque de Commerce, du Developpement et de l’Industrie to finance mining operations. The bank was based in Rwanda, from which untraceable coltan sourced from DRC conflict areas was exported to Western corporations, including Afrimex, Banro-Resources, and Union Transport.

The Second Congo War, from 1998-2003 and de facto to the present, has led to the deaths of an estimated 5.4 million people: most of them civilians who perished from war-related hunger and disease. The war was, in large part, an effort by different powers and factions to back or depose the Kabila family dynasty, seize control of resource-rich areas, and to settle long-standing rivalries. Unlike the first war, this one was explicitly driven by demand in Asia, Europe, and North America for rare materials.

The Wall Street Journal reported at the time that Kabila’s nationalizations “sent a worrying signal … to foreign companies that are eager to do business in this mineral-rich country.” Kabila soon fell out with his Ugandan and Rwandan backers, who in 1998 helped to form a new party: the Rally for Congolese Democracy (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie, RCD). The anti-Kabila RCD splintered into militant rebel groups and advanced across the country. Troops from Angola, Chad, Libya, and Zimbabwe entered DRC to back Kabila, who was assassinated in 2001, leaving his son Joseph (b. 1971) to rule from 2003 until 2019.

As far as international investors were concerned, the myriad rebel factions were crucial for maintaining the supply lines of rare materials. Typically, they were smuggled to Europe-bound cargo planes via Rwanda.

Kony 2012: a US psy-war op aimed at protecting a key proxy

Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni was one of America’s top proxies in DRC, and a UN report describes Uganda as a main sponsor of the conflict. In his effort to remove Museveni, the so-called Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) led by the cultist Joseph Kony attacked Uganda from DCR. In 2006, the UN backed Uganda’s invasion of DRC to hunt for Kony. The newly-formed US Africa Command (AFRICOM) provided covert assistance to Uganda, including training and satellite phones, in a failed counterinsurgency war which caused the LRA to exacerbate their killings in DRC.

From 2011 to 2017 , the US initiated the anti-Kony operation, Observant Compass. As part of the mission, the US Special Operations Command Africa established a task force “to command and control the operation that stretched from Uganda, through the eastern [DRC] into the Central African Republic, and across South Sudan.” Personnel from the fabled A-Team “served as advisors to [the] African Union Regional Task Force.”

Released in the eponymous year, the documentary Kony 2012 brought the atrocities of the LRA to international attention. But US Special Operations Command documents suggest that the film’s producer, the NGO Invisible Children, was unwittingly part of a US psychological warfare operation. Army Special Operations Forces name the Congolese and Ugandan militaries, as well as several NGOs including Invisible Children, as “partners” in their operations.

Unlike the first attempt, Observant Compass reduced the LRA’s numbers and notoriety.

As China fears rise, AFRICOM enters the fray — and atrocities ensue

Washington and various European “former” colonial powers shifted policy from indirectly backing proxies, like the Uganda and Rwanda-supported rebels, to “professionalizing” the central Armed Forces (Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo, FARDC). The George W. Bush administration introduced a DRC “security sector reform” program, which included hiring the private “contractor,” Camber Corporation.

The Bush administration’s urge to “professionalize” and “legitimize” the FARDC coincided with China’s growing activities in the country. A Fort Benning Training and Doctrine Command document bemoaned the fact that in 2007 “China signed an agreement with [DRC] in which China provides $5 billion for infrastructure improvements in exchange for rights to DRC’s natural resources.”

Now that China was in DRC, human rights and traceable supply lines suddenly became a concern for Washington. US advanced training of the FARDC coincided with the passing of Dodd-Frank 2010, which required the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to mandate companies to verify supply chains.

In the same year, AFRICOM facilitated the US-DRC military partnership. The objective was “to transform the [FARDC],” among other things for “internal security operations.” A new Light Infantry Battalion was inaugurated by US Ambassador William Garvelink at the Kisangani Base Camp in north-central DRC. Training was provided under AFRICOM’s Special Operations Command, led by Brig. Gen. Christopher Haas, and unnamed State Department “contractors.”

By September, 750 soldiers had graduated in what AFRICOM describes as “a model for future reforms within the Congolese armed forces” and reveals the creation of a new 391st Commando Battalion. Commander of training at Camp Base, Maj. John Peter Molengo, said: “In 2006 our president [Bush] promised a transformation of the [DRC] armed forces. I see this as an important step.”

Within a few years, the “important step” was revealed for what it was. Members of the Battalion had been exposed by the UN looting villages, murdering civilians, and raping dozens of women and girls, some as young as six. Stars and Stripes reported: “AFRICOM declined to comment …, referring questions to the U.S. State Department.”

Uganda’s military spreads chaos

If adding to chaos is the goal, AFRICOM’s strategy is working. To date, there are 4.5 million internally displaced Congolese, over one million of whom lost their homes during fighting in 2016-17 alone.

Like the LRA, another rebel group — this time, Islamic — called the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), bolted from the Ugandan military and based itself in DRC where it is now attempting to establish a caliphate. The UN Organization Stabilization Mission DRC is helping the FARDC. Operations that began in North Kivu in November 2019 wound up displacing 400,000 people. In a repeat of botched US efforts to conquer the LRA, FARDC tactics caused the ADF to enter previously peaceful territory.

Founded in the 1970s, the Cooperative for Development of the Congo (Coopérative de développement économique du Congo, CODECO) is an umbrella of militia based in Ituri province in the northeast. CODECO mainly consists of ethnic Lendu whose are engaged in long-standing conflict with the Hema people. Despite the July 2020 peace agreement, FARDC operations have exacerbated the violence.

Founded in 1969, the ethno-federalist Kongo-majority Bundu Dia Kongo (BDK) is a Christian cult that encourages violence against non-Kongo peoples, even setting up roadblocks to divide communities. The BDK faces crackdowns by the police and FARDC, which in April 2020 launched anti-BDK operations in Kongo Central and in the capital, Kinshasa.

Greenwashing the race for trillions in renewables profits

As the violence continues across much of the country, so do the exports to most of the world. Corporate profiteering from the global climate emergency has triggered a cobalt rush. The unreliability of DRC supply chains has also triggered a move to design cobalt-free renewables.

Concentrated among 3,000 companies, the so-called global green economy is worth $4.5 trillion ; more than the international oil and gas sector. The renewables market alone is worth over $600 billion . Electric vehicles (EV) are valued at around $170 billion and expected to growth to $700 billion within the next five years.

Cathodes are an essential part of the lithium ion batteries (LiBs) that, until recently, had been ubiquitous but tiny, hitherto requiring small amounts of cobalt. The emerging EV market means that large 100 kilowatt-per-hour LiBs contain 20 kg of cobalt in their cathode components. The US Department of Energy explains that in addition to being mined, cobalt (Co) is obtained as a by-product of other materials and almost entirely sourced from abroad, making US businesses dependent on metal markets and exporting countries. American corporations are therefore “looking to secure sources of Co, to drastically reduce the Co content in LiBs, or both.”

At present, 255,000 Congolese mine for cobalt, mainly in the conflict-free south, earning less than $2 per day with no benefits in conditions that are both immediately hazardous (e.g., collapsing tunnels, dangerous tools) and carry long-term risk (e.g., respiratory, orthopedic). Some 40,000 cobalt miners are children.

Bolstered by their legal obligations to report to the Securities and Exchange Commission, numerous US corporations have attempted to greenwash their supply chains by claiming that they are sourced ethically. The Anglo-Swiss mining giant, Glencore, has a market capitalization roughly equal to DRC’s entire GDP. In recent years, it has signed partnership pledges with renewables customers to ethically source cobalt.

Other initiatives include Apple’s Supplier Responsibility Progress reports. BMW, Samsung, and others, meanwhile, have launched the Cobalt for Development Project. Tesla says that it will phase out cobalt from its lithium batteries and, in the meantime has, joined the Fair Cobalt Alliance. But a recent class action lawsuit on behalf of several injured Congolese miners alleges that Alphabet (Google), Apple, Dell, Microsoft, and Tesla are “aiding and abetting the cruel and brutal use of young children … to mine cobalt.”

Playing the blame China game

Despite the greenwashing, the cobalt mining, refining, smelting, and exportation industries remain dangerous, exploitative, polluting, and terrible for public relations. On the other hand, these conditions help to keep production costs low and profits high. The informal solution for many Western businesses and governments is to deploy media, NGOs, and the intelligentsia to point the moral finger of blame at China, whose corporations operate extensively in southern, cobalt-rich DRC.

For example, a recent Guardian article exposes the cruel working conditions in the town of Fungurume imposed on small and “artisanal” miners contracted by the big, so-called legitimate companies, like China’s Molybdenum. Describing a “slave and master” relationship, one of thousands of miners revealed how he works for $3.50 a day, eating two tiny bread rolls, with wages deducted for missing work.

The report was funded by Humanity United, an NGO founded by eBay billionaire and Intercept owner Pierre Omidyar’s wife, Pam. Humanity United has received grant money from numerous sources, including the William J. Clinton Foundation. “This grant funded Humanity United’s continued contribution and membership to the 2011 Clinton Global Initiative.”

But such reports omit that China’s Molybdenum is owned by US institutional investors: JPMorgan Funds, Vanguard Total International, Vanguard Emerging Markets, BlackRock, and others. Amnesty International traces the “downstream” supply chain of Chinese-acquired cobalt to Asian, European, and US corporations.

Cobalt is typically smelted and refined by China’s Huayou and its CDM subsidiary, put into batteries by Amperex, BYD, LG, Samsung, Sony, and others, and sold as components in Apple, BMW, Dell, Fiat-Chrysler, GM, Microsoft, Tesla, and other Western products.

Weaponizing space to win the “Great Power Competition”

DRC is directly linked to Washington’s long-term efforts to rule the world by force. Just as King Leopold II described Congo as a “magnificent African cake,” ex-US Naval Intelligence Officer, Dr. Mir Sadat, Policy Director of the National Security Council, says:

“Great Power Competition in space is in some ways analogous to the Great Game of the 19th and early 20th centuries between Great Britain and Russia, which competed over access to resources and geostrategic positioning in Central and South Asia. Today, there is a similar great game brewing between China and other spacefaring nations led by the United States over access to potential cislunar [between Earth and Moon] resources and overall space dominance.”

But it wasn’t China that first declared its intention to rule space and therefore the world. In 1997, the US Space Command published its “full spectrum dominance” doctrine: to weaponize space by the year 2020 “to protect U.S. interests and investment” (read: corporate profits). Endangering us all, “full spectrum dominance” includes hypersonic missile drones and high-altitude craft that can strike Russia and/or China with “low-yield” nuclear weapons.

Like other products that emerged from taxpayer funding under the cover of military research and development (satellites, computers, the internet, etc.), space exploration is now commercialized through companies like Jeff Bezos’s Blue Origin company, while serving the Pentagon by, for instance, launching military satellites, as Elon Musk’s SpaceX has done. The Pentagon and other federal agencies describe this arrangement as the Space Industrial Base.

Sadat helped to establish the Space Force, which largely took over from the Space Command. Specifically naming cobalt and other rare materials as the “greatest” supply risks, a fear-mongering report about supposed lack of US influence, co-authored by Sadat and sponsored by the Space Force, says: “The United States must compete for global market share and leadership — currently dominated by China, Russia over terrestrial commodities — basic and manufactured — into the space economy.”

It may turn out that the millions of destitute Congolese sitting on tantalum and coltan, and the hundreds of thousands of slave-like and child miners toiling in hazardous conditions to extract these products are not the only victims. If the “Great Game” for “full spectrum dominance” continues without grassroots pressure to end it, escalating geopolitical “competition” between nuclear powers could annihilate the rest of the world as well.

#### Wrong — AND, causes ozone, biodiversity, water, and food loss.

Linda Schneider 22, MA in International Relations from the Free U of Berlin,1-3-2022, Senior Programme Officer for International Climate Policy, "High-risk geoengineering technologies won’t reverse climate breakdown," https://www.climatechangenews.com/2022/03/01/high-risk-geoengineering-technologies-wont-reverse-climate-breakdown/, jy

Stronger than ever before, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has warned that climate change is already causing severe and permanent loss and damage to human and natural systems.

Exceeding 1.5C of warming would cause further irreversible harm — from which full recovery is impossible.

The devastating impacts over shooting 1.5C include species extinction, loss of entire ecosystems on land and in the oceans, and ever more extreme weather events such as droughts, floods, heatwaves and fires that endanger water resources, ecosystems, and livelihoods.

It also poses the risk of triggering tipping points and feedbacks in the climate system that would accelerate the climate crisis.

Some in the scientific community are grasping for technological fixes in the field of climate geoengineering — unproven, high-risk technologies: carbon dioxide removal (CDR) and solar radiation management (SRM).

Interest in such high-risk technologies has grown in some government circles and, even more notably, in polluting industries such as the fossil fuel industry, mining, aviation — as well as in Silicon Valley.

However, the latest IPCC report finds they could trigger catastrophic events, particularly in vulnerable parts of the world and would introduce a range of new, egregious hazards to people and ecosystems.

Large-scale technological CDR jeopardises ecosystems, biodiversity, food and water security, livelihoods and land rights, in particular for indigenous people and local communities. The 2018 special report on 1.5C cautioned against heavy reliance on CDR, strongly questioning its social and environmental feasibility.

CDR also faces limitations to its effectiveness: the last IPCC report, published in August, found that CO2 removals will partially be counteracted by CO2 release from oceans and land reservoirs, and only a smaller fraction actually remains out of the atmosphere. Uncertainties around permanent storage further undercuts CDR’s effectiveness in reversing temperature overshoot.

Risks of triggering tipping points and feedbacks, such as permafrost thawing and forest ecosystem degradation, drastically increase at warming levels beyond 1.5C, further reducing the ability to return from an overshoot.

Finally, other dramatic changes in the global climate system would not be reversed, but continue for centuries to millennia, such as rising sea levels that threaten the existence of small island states and low-lying coastal areas, and the millions of people in those areas.

IPCC: Five takeaways from the UN’s 2022 climate impacts report

Some are proposing to deploy solar geoengineering (SRM) to reduce temperature overshoot.

The IPCC has consistently warned about the severe risks and potentially catastrophic impacts of a large-scale manipulation of the climate system. The most recent IPCC report warns in its summary for policymakers that SRM approaches “introduce a widespread range of new risks to people and ecosystems, which are not well understood”.

SRM comes with severe risks of disrupting regional and seasonal rainfall patterns, ozone depletion, ocean acidification, and other known and unknown adverse side-effects.

Because SRM would only “mask” temperature rise and not address the root cause of the problem, a sudden termination would induce a rapid acceleration of climate change — a so-called “termination shock.” Adaptation would be impossible for many species and ecosystems.

Opposition to SRM continues to grow outside of the IPCC: over 240 leading international scientists have called for a solar geoengineering non-use agreement that would effectively prevent SRM from being further developed.

Opposition is also building on the ground: a recent SRM equipment test over indigenous territory in Kiruna, Sweden, was cancelled after vocal opposition by the Saami Council and environmental groups, who deem climate manipulation to be fundamentally incompatible with indigenous cosmology.

Revealed: How rich and at-risk nations fought over science of climate impacts

The only sensible conclusion to be drawn is that we must, by all means possible, urgently embark on trajectories that avoid an overshoot of 1.5C and climate breakdown.

No doubt, time is running out: IPCC working group I stated that the 1.5C limit is going to be breached in the early 2030s under most emissions scenarios. Yet, the 1.5C limit is imperative, and bold, resolute, swift measures to embark on climate-just pathways can limit the climate crisis and its deleterious impacts.

This means a rapid and comprehensive phase-out all fossil fuels — oil, gas, and coal — led by rich producing countries in the global north, and needs to happen much earlier than projected in many mitigation scenarios.

Further pathways to social and climate justice will include democratic energy systems running 100% on solar and wind, public transportation, agroecological transformations of our food systems, reductions in energy and resource consumption in the affluent global north, and a restoration and regeneration of the world’s vitally important ecosystems, protecting communal land rights, in particular by indigenous peoples and local communities.

Dangerous fantasies for hacking the climate is the epitome of climate injustice: They distract from the urgency to act on safe, proven, and viable strategies now. It’s a diversionary tactic for the fossil fuel industry to continue polluting, and it risks exacerbating climate chaos.

### ! — AT: Innovation

#### Capitalism is the death knell of innovation – try or die for the K.

Bee 18 — Vanessa A, 10-24-2018, Senior Litigation Counsel at the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau with a JD from Harvard Law, "Innovation Under Socialism," No Publication, https://www.currentaffairs.org/2018/10/innovation-under-socialism, accessed 7-3-2022 RECUT//THS—OLW

The profit motive and exclusive proprietary rights are central to capitalist innovation. By law, private firms must prioritize the interest of their shareholders, which tends to be interchangeable with making as much money as possible. Accordingly, investments in any stage of the innovative process must eventually produce profits. To maximize profit, private firms jealously guard the value of their invention through regulations and restrictive contracts. Statutes and regulations help protect their trade secrets. The U.S. Patent and Trademarks Office routinely grants them utility and design patents that “exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling … or importing the invention” for 20 years after the patent is issued. They enforce licensing agreements that can limit the uses and dissemination of all or part of their inventions. To further frustrate efforts to innovate on the back of their inventions, private firms subject their former employees to non-compete agreements that can severely limit them from using their knowledge and skills on competing projects for a period following their departure. Breaches carry dire consequences like expensive lawsuits, big money judgments, and other enormous hassles.

### ! — AT: Nuclear Power

#### Nuclear power fails.

SC ‘17 — Sierra Club; most enduring and influential grassroots environmental organization in the United States. We amplify the power of our 3.8 million members and supporters to defend everyone’s right to a healthy world April 2017; “How Nuclear Power Worsens Climate Change”; <https://www.sierraclub.org/sites/www.sierraclub.org/files/program/documents/Fact%20Sheet%20Sierra%20Nuclear%20Climate.pdf>; //CYang

The nuclear industry has been selling the world a story that nuclear power is a solution to climate change because it does not generate carbon dioxide (CO2), a major greenhouse gas. While this is true of the nuclear chain reaction itself, the front and back ends of nuclear power generate a large volume of CO2 and leave a trail of endlessly dangerous radioactivity along the way.

Nuclear power has a big carbon footprint. At the front end of nuclear power, carbon energy is used for uranium mining, milling, processing, conversion, and enrichment, as well as for transportation, formulation of rods and construction of nuclear reactors (power plants). At the back end, there is the task of isolation of highly radioactive nuclear waste for millennia — a task which science has so far not been able to address. Large amounts of water are also used, first in mining and then in cooling the reactors. All along the nuclear fuel chain, radioactive contamination of air, land and water occurs. Uranium mine and mill cleanup demands large amounts of fossil fuel. Each year 2,000 metric tons of high-level radioactive waste and twelve million cubic-feet of low-level radioactive waste are generated in the U.S. alone. None of this will magically disappear. Vast amounts of energy will be needed to isolate these dangerous wastes for generations to come.

Nuclear power takes too long to deploy. Construction of the 1500 new reactors that the nuclear industry claims are needed to address global warming would mean opening a new reactor once every 2 weeks for the next 60 years. Reactors can take 10-15 years to build with an estimated cost of $12-15 billion each. In the past, cost and time needed for construction have each more than doubled from original estimates. We need to supply low-carbon energy sources NOW.

Nuclear power is not suited for warming climates. Nuclear reactors need enormous amounts of cool water to continually remove heat from their cores. Reactors have been forced to close during heat waves due to warmth of sea, lake or river water — just when electricity is being used most. Low water levels during heat and drought have also forced reactors to shut down. In addition, cooling causes serious damage to aquatic life, killing millions of fish and untold numbers of macroinvertebrates, aquatic eggs and larvae.

Six times as much carbon can be saved with efficiency or wind. Benjamin Sovacool from the Institute for Energy and Environment at Vermont Law School averaged the high and low estimates of carbon pollution from nuclear power. His study revealed that nuclear power’s carbon emissions are well below scrubbed coal-fired plants, natural gas-fired plants and oil. However, nuclear emits twice as much carbon as solar photovoltaic and six times as much as onshore wind farms. Energy efficiency and some of the other renewables also beat nuclear by sixfold or more.

Nuclear power is not flexible. Nuclear is all-or-nothing power. A reactor can’t be geared to produce less power when electricity from renewables (like wind and solar) increases on the grid. This can make it challenging to increase renewables past a certain point. When a reactor shuts down due to accident, planned upgrade or permanent closure, a large amount of power has to be found elsewhere. And nuclear plants are being closed, not opened — some because they no longer are making a profit. It’s important to develop renewables NOW to be able to replace the electricity when utilities announce plans to close reactors.

#### Nuclear energy causes extinction — creates nuclear explosions every month, proliferation and mineral shortages.

Trainer et al. ’20 — Ted; a Conjoint Lecturer in the School of Social Sciences, University of New South Wales, University of New South Wales. PhD from University of Sydney. Dr Samuel Alexander; Research Fellow with the Melbourne Sustainable Society Institute and a lecturer with the Office for Environmental Program. Jonathan Andrew Rutherford; an academic who was formerly a Professor of Cultural Studies at the University of Middlesex. 2020; “The Simpler Way: Collected Writings of Ted Trainer”; *Degrowth*; <https://www.degrowth.info/en/catalogue-entry/the-simpler-way-collected-writings-of-ted-trainer/>; //CYang

There are several reasons why nuclear energy is not likely to solve the energy problem and/or should not be adopted even if it could.

• Abbott (2012: p. 26) calculates that if nuclear energy were expanded to provide all current electricity use (15,000 Twh) it would require building 15,000 1-gigawatt nuclear reactors and all estimated high-grade uranium reserves would be used up in less than five years (and electricity makes up only one-fifth of world energy use). Even at the present moderate rate of use, the Energy Watch Group estimates (Zittel et al, 2013) that, peak supply will occur sometime from 2020 to 2045. Uranium resources could be extended significantly if breeder or fusion reactors were developed — but on the viability of these technologies see further below.

• Apart from uranium scarcity, Abbott (2012) points out that a nuclear renaissance would also run into other major resource constraints such as the exotic rare metals (hafnium, beryllium, 50 zirconium etc.) used to control and contain nuclear reactions, which will either be exhausted or become very costly in a nuclear expansion scenario. Also, such a scenario is likely to run into the limit of suitable land sites for nuclear plants, which need to be located away from major population centers and disasters zones, and located near large bodies of water for cooling. Abbott (2012: p. 24) estimates that a nuclear renaissance would require 4,000 nuclear reactors in the US alone but he says finding 100 suitable sites would be challenging.

• Nuclear accidents can have catastrophic consequences. Abbott (2012: p. 26) points out that to date about 580 nuclear reactors have operated for a total of 14,000 reactor years and resulted in 11 accidents involving ‘full or partial core melt’ (writing prior to the Fukushima Daiichi accident). But if nuclear energy were expanded to meet all electricity needs as per the Abbott scenario above, at this rate, ‘we might expect a major accident somewhere in the world every month’. While it’s true that the industry has worked to improve on reactor safety design, as Mark Jacobson (2019) notes ‘these designs are generally untested, and there is no guarantee that the reactors will be designed, built and operated correctly or that a natural disaster or act of terrorism, such as an airplane flown into a reactor, will not cause the reactor to fail, resulting in a major disaster.’ No matter how well designed, reactors are operated by humans, so it is always possible for mistakes to be made, or for operators to over-ride automatic safety systems, as happened at Chernobyl.

• The ‘proliferation’ problem. A nuclear era would increase the chances of access to dangerous elements by criminals and terrorists, or governments seeking to produce nuclear weapons.

• There is no agreed solution to the problem of waste disposal. It is not possible to be sure that a site that has been very stable and dry for a long time will remain dry or earthquake free for hundreds of thousands of years into the future, through ice ages and greenhouse effects on hydrology. Even the reprocessing of spent fuel might give terrorists access to highly radioactive elements. However, breeder reactors might be able to ‘burn’ wastes.

• We have no idea what the total long-term health, genetic and mortality effects of nuclear energy will be. These effects will accumulate over hundreds of thousands of years as radioactive materials are constantly cycled through organisms and food chains. Even without accidents, small quantities of long-lived radioactivity are released. There is no threshold level below which we can be sure there will be no biological effect. If we do not have confident estimates of the magnitude of these long-term biological costs, then it is not possible to say that the benefits will outweigh the costs in illnesses, mutations and deaths.

• The moral problem: the people living in a nuclear era would get all the benefit, but many future generations would pay the biological costs without getting any of the benefit after the fuel has been used up.

• It is uncertain whether fusion reactors will ever become viable but if they do, they will not be scaled up sufficiently to make much difference before 2050. They will be very costly. They require lithium, and resource estimates indicate that there will not be enough to meet demand for electricity storage and electric vehicles.

### ! — AT: Space Col

#### Space col’s impossible — laundry list.

Porter ’19 — Greg; one of the leading government relations' professionals in his field. September 18, 2019; “Colonization Of Mars Is An Impossible Dream”; *The Sized*; <https://www.thesized.com/colonization-mars-impossible-dream/>; //CYang

But why exactly is living on Mars completely out of the question?

There are so many reasons, all of which have been eloquently laid out by George Dvorsky of Gizmodo. In summary:

The atmosphere of Mars is considerably thinner than that of Earth. What little air is available is packed with carbon dioxide, too. Basically, it will be impossible to breathe without a helmet. Your $200 haircut will be completely wasted.

The average temperature on Mars is minus 80 degrees, and it can get as low as minus 200. For the record, temperatures of minus 40 can leave a human with hypothermia inside five minutes.

Mars has very limited gravity. This will make for appealing reading if we step on the scales, as we’ll drop around a third of our body weight. That will have devastating long-term effects on our health, though.

Mars is coated with a thick field of radiation. The cancer risk will be through the roof from the moment we set foot on the planet’s surface.

Practically nothing grows on Mars, thanks to the hostile environment. Agriculture will be next to impossible to cultivate. It would be like living in the harshest desert conditions imaginable.

If you’ve been prepping for a new life on the Red Planet, adjust your expectations. There is a slim chance that we may visit Mars within our lifetime, but humankind will not be creating a new civilization there.

At best, Mars will be a short-term vacation destination. We’d need to remain inside at all times, and wear appropriate protective clothing. That might be appealing in the short-term. It could even be an adventure, like traveling under the sea.

#### Capabilities – space might have more resources, but they’re too hard to get.

Daly 17 [Herman Daly, emeritus professor at the School of Public Policy of University of Maryland, College Park, “Green Economy Reader | A Further Critique of Growth Economics,” 2017, Springer, pp. 64-65, EA]

Of course many technical space accomplishments are real and amazing. But how do they free us from the finitude of the earth and open up unlimited resources for growth? Space accomplishments have been extremely expensive in terms of terrestrial resources, and have yielded few extraterrestrial resources – mainly those useless moon rocks that incited thievery by a NASA intern. As for new services, space tourism has provided orbital joy rides to a few billionaires. On the truly positive side of the ledger we can list communications satellites, but they are oriented to earth, and while they provide valuable services, they do not bring in new resources. And apparently some orbits are getting crowded with satellite carcasses.

Robotic space exploration is a lot cheaper than manned space missions, and may (or may not) yield knowledge worth the investment to a society that has not yet provided basic necessities and elementary education for most of its inhabitants. In such a world political willingness to finance the expensive curiosity of a scientific elite might be less, were it not for the heavy military connection (muted in the official NASA propaganda). Cuts in NASA’s budget have led to the hyped reaction by the “space community” in proclaiming a pseudo religious technical quest to discover “whether or not we are alone in the universe”. Another major goal is to find a planet suitable for colonization by earthlings. The latter is sometimes justified by the claim that since we are clearly destroying the earth we need a new home – to also destroy?

The numbers – astronomical distances and time scales – effectively rule out dreams of space colonization. But another consideration is equally daunting. If we are unable to limit population and production growth on earth, which is our natural and forgiving home, out of which we were created and with which we have evolved and adapted, then what makes us think we can live as aliens within the much tighter and unforgiving discipline of a space colony on a dead rock in a cold vacuum? There we would encounter limits to growth raised to the hundredth power.

#### Metabolic rift and overaccumulation– our problem isn’t the amount of resources, it’s how we use them.

Ray & Parson 20 [Emily Ray and Sean Parson, \* Assistant Professor in the Political Science department at Sonoma State University, \*\* Associate Professor in the departments of Politics and International Affairs and Sustainable Communities at Northern Arizona University, “Limits to Terrestrial Extraction | Star power: Outer space mining and the metabolic rift,” 2020, Routledge, pp. 58-60, EA]

The work that best explores the dialectical metabolic relationship is Foster, York, and Clark’s work on the metabolic rift, which is useful for thinking through this attempt to loop outer space into the metabolic relationship between production and the environment.

For Marx, the metabolic rift—the alienated mediation between humanity and nature—was a product of the ‘robbing’ or expropriation of the soil, and thus of nature, thereby hindering the operation of the eternal natural condition for the lasting fertility of the soil.10

Here, Marx argues that ecological crisis is, in part, due to the geographic separation of production and consumption. Capitalism takes massive amounts of resources and nutrients from the land and concentrates them in dumps and urban areas. The metabolic rift is also a product of urbanization and increase in population density. The ecological rift shatters the relationship within a local environment by creating an imbalance. Either there are too many nutrients being taken from the land or too much material being added to it. That fissure is the ecological crisis. The ecological crisis is not simply about inputs or outputs, about extraction or production, but is instead an issue of relationality.

Marx also argued that humans are innately driven to produce; that there is a need to creatively use that capacity for labor, and this accounts for a distinction between humanity and other animals. Non-use of the environment is therefore not an alternative to the ruptured metabolic rift. Rather, non-alienated use of the environment, governed by a different set of values than those of neoliberal capitalism, can provide the foundation for a sustainable, just, and responsible relation between human productive energy and the foundation of production in the form of the environment. Steven Vogel has similarly argued that the problem is not that humans engage the environment for resource use, but how they do so that is problematic.11 Is it possible to see the cold, hard rocks floating in a freezing vacuum as part of the environment that requires a new, non-capitalist approach to managing the conditions for human life? These same rocks are already considered part of the available environmental resources for Earth-based needs, and including them in the movement of the metabolism on Earth, or even off-Earth but in conjunction with on-Earth resources, such as space exploration missions, only answers the question of their place in the environment from the perspective of capital. As the private sector gains more control over the governing of these NEAs, the task of social theory is to determine if, and how, outer space should be ideological and practically linked into the metabolic relationship between production and the sustenance of life.

The process of taking resources from the extra-planetary environments of asteroids would only further exacerbate this crisis. One of the primary narratives of contemporary capitalism is around resource scarcity, which claims that the limits of human advancement are linked to the amount of resources on this planet. Defenders of such practices argue that adding resources from an outside system would address the crisis of environmental degradation from terrestrial resource extraction. Looking to the stars to address the issue of resources and growth is simply a means to circumvent political discussions around resource allocations and radical shifts to human, economic, and social systems that are conducive to human survival. In order to avoid addressing the contradictions of capitalism, or the ecological limits that bind the human species, these arguments require magical thinking and grandiose technological innovation. This sleight of hand distracts from an analysis of the root problem of the crisis by focusing on scarcity – which Marcuse decades ago had already shown is illusory.12 As Marcuse shows, the problem is not one of scarcity but one of over-abundance. Adding additional resources into the closed system that is the ecosystem would exacerbate the metabolic rift, not solve it. Looping NEOs into the industrial metabolism not only adds additional materials to an already overburdened planetary metabolism but also overlooks the troubling relationship between neoliberalism and outer space, reconceived as a frontier for capital expansion, and fraught with difficult questions about national sovereignty. What is at stake in extending the planet beyond Earth itself?

#### Only public programs have the incentives and resources.

Szocik 19 [Konrad Szocik, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Information Technology and Management in Rzeszow, “The Human Factor in a Mission to Mars | Human Place in the Outer Space: Skeptical Remarks,” 2019, Springer, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-02059-0\_14, EA]

The human place in outer space should be discussed also in financial terms, because the main sponsor of space programs is the public budget of space agencies. Private investors are not considered here for a couple of reasons. First, their budget is well below the minimal safe level needed for pre-launch research and development, launching the mission, and maintenance of the mission. It is worth mentioning that failure or catastrophe may slow down or even cancel private space projects, while public space agencies are not financially limited in this sense. Second, a human space program—at least in regard to interplanetary missions—does not offer commercial applications, which would be able to justify an expensive investment. Private investors by definition require profits, at least in the capitalistic, free-market sense of this term. This remark relates to the third counterargument: the space program is a long-term effort and is not compatible with short-term policies of private investors. Fourth, the level of risk and unpredictability is too high for private investors. While private investors may—and they really do—invest in low Earth orbit activities or try to go beyond, like in the case of planned space tourism around the Moon, private interplanetary plans like, for instance, the Mars One initiative are technologically and financially infeasible (Do et al. 2016). In this case, technological infeasibility is the effect of financial insufficiency. Financial insufficiency works like a vicious circle. Private investors meet the funding wall because their starting budget, which is too small to finance a space program, cannot be supported by the lack of expected benefits. No future benefits are able to provide incentives to invest in these space projects.

#### Every second of no space colonization outweighs.

Torres ’18 [Phil; April 20; Affiliate Scholar at the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, and founder of the X-Risks Institute; Futures, “Space Colonization and Suffering Risks: Reassessing the ‘Maxipok Rule’,” vol. 100 p. 74-85; kp]

Abstract: This article argues that, contra Bostrom (2003), every second of delayed space colonization could be immensely desirable; indeed, the longer the delay, the better, with the best outcome being no colonization at all. The argument begins by hypothesizing that expansion into space will generate a wide variety of distinct species, many having their own cultural, political, religious, etc. traditions. Next, the paper offers reasons for expecting catastrophic conflicts between different civilizations, both near and far, to be the default outcome. Third, it examines some strategies for mitigating conflict, including (i) the establishment of a “cosmic Leviathan” that is capable of imposing law and order within the cosmopolitical arena, and (ii) the implemen- tation of policies of deterrence to prevent one civilization from attacking another. Both of these strategies appear problematic, though, due to (a) fundamental physical limitations on the speed of space travel and the transfer of information, and (b) the advanced weaponry that future civili- zations will almost certainly have at their disposal. The conclusion is that colonizing our solar system, galaxy, and beyond will engender a Hobbesian predicament in which all actors are perpetually in fear of being destroyed—that is, when they aren’t engaged in devastating wars with their neighbors.

#### Harms outweigh benefits.

Kovic ’21 [Marko; February 2021; independent researcher and PhD at Institute of Mass Communication and Media Research, University of Zurich; Futures, “Risks of space colonization,” vol. 126; kp]

Space colonization, the establishment of permanent human habitats beyond Earth, has an enormous potential moral value because successful space colonization is the necessary condition for trillions of future people to come into existence. At the same time, however, space colonization is not risk-free. The risks of space colonization are so grave that, in a bad-case scenario, successful space colonization could create more moral disvalue than value; possibly even orders of magnitude more.

#### Surveying deep space wakes up sleeping, unseen Great Old Ones – extinction

Anders Sandberg∗ , Stuart Armstrong† , and Milan Cirkovic ´ ‡ May 10, 2017 (∗Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford. †Future of Humanity Institute. ‡Future of Humanity Institute and Astronomical Observatory of Belgrade, Volgina), “That is not dead which can eternal lie: the aestivation hypothesis for resolving Fermi’s paradox,” Journal of the British Interplanetary Society.

If a civilization wants to maximize computation it appears rational to aestivate until the far future in order to exploit the low temperature environment: this can produce a 1030 multiplier of achievable computation. We hence suggest the “aestivation hypothesis”: the reason we are not observing manifestations of alien civilizations is that they are *currently* (mostly) inactive, patiently waiting for future cosmic eras. This paper analyzes the assumptions going into the hypothesis and how physical law and observational evidence constrain the motivations of aliens compatible with the hypothesis. Keywords: Fermi paradox, information physics, physical eschatology, extraterrestrial intelligence 1 Introduction Answers to the Fermi question (”where are they?”) typically fall into the groups “we are alone” (because intelligence is very rare, short-lived, etc.), “aliens exist but not here” (due to limitations of our technology, temporal synchronization etc.) or “they’re here” (but not interacting in any obvious manner). This paper will examine a particular version of the third category, the aestivation hypothesis. In previous work [1], we showed that a civilization with a certain threshold technology could use the resources of a solar system to launch colonization devices to effectively every solar system in a sizeable part of the visible universe. While the process as a whole would last eons, the investment in each bridgehead system would be small and brief. Also, the earlier the colonization was launched the larger the colonized volume. These results imply that early civilizations have a far greater chance to colonize and pre-empt later civilizations if they wish to do so. If these early civilizations are around, why are they not visible? The aestivation hypothesis states that they are aestivating1 until a later cosmological era. The argument is that the thermodynamics of computation make the cost of a certain amount of computation proportional to the temperature. Our astrophysical and cosmological knowledge indicates that the universe is cooling down with cosmic time. Not only star formation within galaxies winds down and dies out on timescales of 109 - 1010 yrs but even the cosmic background radiation temperature is becoming exponentially colder. As the universe cools down, one Joule of energy is worth proportionally more. This can be a substantial (1030) gain. Hence a civilization desiring to maximize the amount of computation will want to use its energy endowment as late as possible: using it now means far less total computation can be done. Hence an early civilization, after expanding to gain access to enough raw materials, will settle down and wait until it becomes rational to use the resources. We are not observing any aliens since the initial expansion phase is brief and intermittent and the aestivating civilization and its infrastructure is also largely passive and compact. The aestivation hypothesis hinges on a number of assumptions that will be examined in this paper. The main goal is to find what physical and motivational constraints make it rational to aestivate and see if these can be met. If they cannot, then the aestivation hypothesis is not a likely answer for the Fermi question. This paper is very much based on the physical eschatology research direction started by Freeman Dyson in [2] combined with the SETI approach dubbed “Dysonian SETI” [3]. Physical eschatology attempts to map the long-term future of the physical universe given current knowledge of physics [4, 5]. This includes the constraints for life and information processing as the universe ages. Dysonian SETI takes the approach to widen the search to look for detectable signatures of highly advanced civilizations, in particular megascale engineering. Such signatures would not be deliberate messages, could potentially outlast their creators, and are less dependent on biological assumptions about the originating species (rather, they would stand out because of unusual physics compared to normal phenomena). It should be noted that in the physical eschatology context aestivation/hibernation has been an important issue for other reasons: Dyson suggested it as a viable strategy to stretch available energy and heat dissipation resources [2], and Krauss and Starkman critiqued this approach [6]. 1“Hibernation” might be a more familiar term but aestivation is the correct one for sleeping through too warm summer months. 2 Aestivation The Old Ones were, *the Old Ones are*, *and* the Old Ones *shall be*. Not in the spaces we know, but between them. They walk serene and primal, undimensioned and to us unseen. H.P. Lovecraft, The Dunwich Horror and Others An explanation for the Fermi question needs to account for a lack of observable aliens given the existence of human observers in the present (not taking humans into account can lead to anthropic biases: we are not observing a randomly selected sample from all possible universes but rather a sample from universes compatible with our existence [7]). The aestivation hypothesis makes the following assmptions: 1. There are civilizations that mature much earlier than humanity. 2. These civilizations can expand over sizeable volumes, gaining power over their contents. 3. These civilizations have solved their coordination problems. 4. A civilization can retain control over its volume against other civilizations. 5. The fraction of mature civilizations that aestivate is non-zero 6. Aestivation is largely invisible. Assumption 1 is plausible, given planetary formation estimates [8]. Even a billion years of lead time is plenty to dominate the local supercluster, let alone the galaxy. If this assumption is not true (for example due to global synchronization of the emergence of intelligence [9]) we have an alternative answer to the Fermi question. We will assume that the relevant civilizations are mature enough to have mastered the basic laws of nature and their technological implications to whatever limit this implies. More than a million years of technological development ought to be enough. Assumption 2 is supported by our paper [1]. In particular, if a civilization can construct self-replicating technological systems there is essentially no limit to the amount of condensed matter in solar systems that can be manipulated. These technological systems are still potentially active in the current era. Nonexpanding aestivators are entirely possible but would not provide an answer to the Fermi question. If assumption 2 is wrong, then the Fermi question is answered by a low technology ceiling and that intelligence tends to be isolated from each other by distance. Assumption 3: This paper will largely treat entire civilizations as the actors rather than their constituent members. In this regard they are “singletons” in the sense of Nick Bostrom: having a highest level of agency that can solve internal coordination problems [10]. Singletons may be plausible because they provide a solution to self-induced technological risks in young technological civilizations (preventing subgroups from accidentally or deliberately wiping out the civilization). Anecdotally, humanity has shown an increasing ability to coordinate on ever larger scales thanks to technological improvements (pace the imperfections of current coordination). In colonization scenarios such as [1] coordinating decisions made before launch could stick (especially if they have self-enforcing aspects) even when colonies are no longer in contact with each other. However, the paper does not assume all advanced civilizations will have perfect coordination, merely very good coordination. Assumption 4 needs to handle both civilizations emerging inside the larger civilization and encounters with other mature civilizations at edges of colonization. For the first case the assumption to some degree follows from assumption 2: if desired the civilization could prevent misbehavior of interior primitive civilizations (the most trivial way is to prevent their emergence, but this makes the hypothesis incompatible with our existence [11]). Variants of the zoo hypothesis work but the mature civilization must put some upper limit to technological development or introduce the young civilizations into their system eventually. The second case deals with civilizations on the same level of high technological maturity: both can be assumed to have roughly equal abilities and resources. If it can be shown that colonized volumes cannot be reliably protected against invasion, then the hypothesis falls. Conversely, if it could be proven that invasion over interstellar distances is logistically unfeasible or unprofitable, this could be regarded as a (weak) probabilistic support for our hypothesis. Assumption 5 is a soft requirement. In principle it might be enough to argue that aestivation is possible and that we just happen to be inside an aestivation region. However, arguing that we are not in a typical galaxy weakens the overall argument. More importantly, the assumption explains the absence of non-aestivating civilizations. Below we will show that there are strong reasons for civilizations to aestivate: we are not arguing that all civilizations must do it but that it is a likely strategy. Below we will discuss the issues of civilizational strategies and discounting that strengthen this assumption. Assumption 6 is the key assumption for making the hypothesis viable as a Fermi question answer: aestivation has to leave the universe largely unchanged in order to be compatible with evidence. The assumption does not imply deliberate hiding (except, perhaps, of the core part of the civilization) but rather that advanced civilizations do not dissipate much energy in the present era, making them effectively stealthy. The main empirical prediction of the hypothesis is that we should observe a strong dampening of processes that reduce the utility for far future computation. 3 Civilizational goals While it may be futile to speculate on the values of advanced civilizations, we would argue that there likely exists convergent instrumental goals. What has value? Value theories assign value to either states of the world or actions. State value models require resources to produce high-value states. If happiness is the goal, using the resources to produce the maximum number of maximally happy minds (with a tradeoff between number and state depending on how utilities aggregate) would maximize value. If the goal is knowledge, the resources would be spent on processing generating knowledge and storage, and so on. For these cases the total amount of produced value increases monotonically with the amount of resources, possibly superlinearly. Actions also require resources and for actions with discernible effects the start and end states must be distinguishable: there is an information change. Even if value resides in the doing, it can be viewed as information processing. The assumption used in this paper is that nearly all goals benefit from more resources and that information processing and storage are good metrics for measuring the potential of value creation/storage. They are not necessarily final goals but instrumentally worth getting for nearly all goals for nearly all rational agents [12, 13]. As we will see below, maintaining communication between different parts of an intergalactic civilization becomes impossible over time. If utility requires contact (e.g. true value is achieved by knowledge shared across a civilization) then these limits will strongly reduce the utility of expanding far outside a galactic supercluster. If utility does not require contact (e.g. the happiness or beauty of local entities is what is valuable in itself) then expanding further is still desirable. There may also be normative uncertainty: even if a civilization has a convincing reason to have certain ultimate values, it might still regard this conclusion as probabilistic and seek to hedge its bets. Especially if the overall plan for colonization needs to be formulated at an early stage in its history and it cannot be re-negotiated once underway it may be rational to ensure that alternative value theories (especially if easily accommodated) can be implemented. This may include encountered alien civilizations, that might possibly have different but valid ultimate goals. 4 Discounting Another relevant property of a civilization is the rate of its temporal discounting. How much is the far future worth relative to the present? There are several reasons to suspect advanced civilizations have very long time horizons. In a dangerous or uncertain environment it is rational to rapidly discount the value of a future good since survival to that point is not guaranteed. However, mature expanding civilizations have likely reduced their existential risks to a minimum level and would have little reason to discount strongly (individual members, if short-lived, may of course have high discount rates). More generally, the uncertainty of the future will be lower and this also implies lower discount rates. Specific policies that take a long time to implement such as megascale engineering or interstellar travel also favor low discount rates. There could be a selection effect here: high discount rates may prevent such long-range projects and hence only low-discount rate civilizations will be actors on the largest scales. It also appears likely that a sufficiently advanced civilization could regulate its “mental speed”, either by existing as software running on hardware with a variable clock speed, or by simply hibernating in a stable state for a period. If this is true, then the value of something after a period of pause/hibernation would be determined not by the chronological external time but how much time the civilization would subjectively experience in waiting for it. Changes in mental speed can hence make temporally remote goods more valuable if the observer can pause until they become available and there is no alternative cost for other goods. This is linked to a reduction of opportunity costs: advanced civilizations have mainly “seen it all” in the present universe and do not gain much more information utility from hanging around in the early era2 There are also arguments that future goods should not be discounted in cases like this. What really counts is fundamental goods (such as well-being or value) rather than commodities; while discounting prices of commodities makes economic sense it may not make sense to discount value itself [14]. This is why even a civilization with some temporal discounting can find it rational to pause in order to gain a huge reward in the far future. If the subjective experience is an instant astronomical multiplication of goods (with little risk) it is rational to make the jump. However, it requires a certain degree of internal coordination to overcome variation in individual time preferences (hence assumption 3). 5 Thermodynamics of extreme future computation Computation is a fundamentally physical process, tied into thermodynamic considerations. Foremost for our current purposes is Landauer’s limit: at least E ≥ kT ln(2) J (1) need to be dissipated for an irreversible change of one bit of information [15]. Logically irreversible manipulation of information must be accompanied by an entropy increase somewhere. It should be noted that the thermodynamic cost can be paid by using other things than energy. An ordered reservoir of spin [16] or indeed any other conserved quantity [17] can function as payment. The cost is ln(2)/λ where λ is related to the average value of the conserved quantity. However, making such a 2Some exploration, automated or crewed, might of course still occur during the aestivation period, to be reported to the main part of the civilization at its end. negentropy reservoir presumably requires physical work unless it can be found naturally untapped. 5.1 Reversible and quantum computation There exists an important workaround for the Landauer limit: logically reversible computations do not increase entropy and can hence be done in principle without any need of energy dissipation. It has been shown that any logically irreversible computation can be expressed as a reversible computation by storing all intermediate results, outputting the result, and then retracing the steps leading up to the final state in reverse order, leaving the computer in the original state. The only thermodynamic costs would be setting the input registers and writing the output [18]. More effective reversible implementation methods are also known, although the number of elementary gates needed to implement a n-bit irreversible function scales somewhere between n2 n/ log n and n2 n [19]. Quantum computation is also logically reversible since quantum circuits are based on unitary mappings. While the following analysis will be speaking of bits, the actual computations might occur among qubits and the total reversible computational power would be significantly higher. If advanced civilizations do all their computations as reversible computations, then it would seem unnecessary to gather energy resources (material resources may still be needed to process and store the information). However, irreversible operations must occur when new memory is created and in order to do error correction. In order to create N zeroed bits of memory at least kT ln(2)N J have to be expended, beside the work embodied in making the bit itself. Error correction can be done with arbitrary fidelity thanks to error correcting codes but the actual correction is an irreversible operation. The cost can be deferred by transferring the tainted bit to an ancilla bit but in order to re-use ancillas they have to be reset. Error rates are suppressed by lower temperature and larger/heavier storage. Errors in bit storage occur due to classical thermal noise (with a probability proportional to e −Eb/kT where Eb is the barrier height) and quantum tunneling (probability approximately e −2r √ 2mEb/~ where m is the mass of the movable entity storing the bit and r is the size of the bit). The minimum potential height compatible with any computation is E min b ≈ kT ln(2) + ~(ln(2))2 /8mr2 (2) [20]. If a system of size R has mass M divided into N bits, each bit will have size ≈ R/N1/3 . If a fraction of the mass is used to build potential barriers, we can approximate the height of the barrier Eb in each bit as the energy in all the covalent bonds in the barrier. If we assume diamond as a building material, the total bond energy is 1.9 kJ/mol = 1.6 · 105 J/kg. Using a supercluster r = 50 Mpc, M = 1043 kg, it can be subdivided into 1061 bits without reaching the limit given the current 3K background temperature. For the future TdS temperature (see below) the limit is instead near 1075 bits (each up to 13 cm across); here the limiting factor is tunneling (the shift occurs around T = 10−8 K). However, this would require bits far lighter than individual atoms or even electrons3 . In practice, the ultimate limiting capacity due to matter chunkiness would be on the order of 1069 bits. However, these “heavy” bits would have 15 orders of magnitude of safety margin relative to the potential height and hence have minuscule tunneling probabilities. So while error correction and repair will have to be done (as noted by Dyson, over sufficiently long timescales (1065 years) matter is a liquid), the rate can be very low. Quantum computing is also affected by environmental temperature and quantum error correction can only partially compensate for this [21]. In theory there might exist topological quantum codes that are stable against finite temperature disturbances [22] but again there might be thermal or tunneling events undermining the computing system hardware itself. Hence, even civilizations at the boundary of physical feasibility will have to perform some dissipative computational operations. They cannot wait indefinitely (since slow cosmological processes will erode their infrastructure and data) and will hence eventually run out of energy. 5.2 Cooling While it is possible for a civilization to cool down parts of itself to any low temperature, the act of cooling is itself dissipative since it requires doing work against a hot environment. The most efficient cooling merely consists of linking the computation to the coldest heat-bath naturally available. In the future this will be the cosmological background radiation4 , which is also conveniently of maximal spatial extent. The mean temperature of the background radiation is redshifted and declines as T (t) = T0/a(t) where a(t) is the cosmological scale factor [24]. Using the long term de Sitter behavior a(t) = e Ht produces T (t) = T0e −Ht. This means that one unit of energy will be worth an exponentially growing amount of computations if one waits long enough. However, the background radiation is eventually redshifted below the constant de Sitter horizon radiation temperature TdS = p Λ/12π 2 = H/2π ≈ 2.67 · 10−30 K [24, 6]. This occurs at time t = H ln(T0/TdS), in about 1.4 · 1012 years. There will be some other radiation fields (at this point there are still 3 In theory neutrinos or very light WIMPs such as axions could fulfill the role but there is no known mechanism for confining them in such a way that they could store information reliably. 4The alternative might be supermassive black hole horizons at T = ~c 3/8πGMk, which in the present era can be far colder than the background radiation [23]. Supermassive 109M⊙ black holes will become warmer than the background radiation in 520 Gyr (assuming constant mass). 8 active stars) but the main conclusion is that there is a final temperature of the universal heat bath. This also resolves a problem pointed out in [6]: in open universes the total number of photons eventually received from the background radiation is finite and all systems decouple thermally from it. In this case this never happens. One consequence is that there will always be a finite cost to irreversible computations: without infinite resources only a finite number of such computations can be done in the future of any civilization. This factor also avoids the “paradox of the indefinitely postponed splurge”, where if it is always beneficial to postpone exploitation. Hence, it is rational at some point for aestivating civilizations to start consuming resources. The limiting temperature of T = 10−8 K where error correction stops being temperaturelimited and instead becomes quantization-limited might be another point where it is rational to start exploitation (this will occur in around 270 billion years). Had the temperature decline been slower, the limit might have been set by galactic evaporation (1016 years) or proton decay (at least 1034 years). 5.3 Value of waiting A comparison of current computational resources to late era computational resources hence suggest a potential multiplier of 1030! Even if only the resources available in a galactic supercluster are exploited, later-era exploitation produces a payoff far greater than any attempt to colonize the rest of the accessible universe and use the resources early. In fact, the massenergy of just the Earth itself (5.9 · 1024 kg) would be more than enough to power more computations than could currently be done by burning the present observable universe! (6 · 1052 kg)5 In practice the efficiency will be lower but the multiplier tends to remain astronomical. A spherical blackbody civilization of radius r using energy at a rate P surrounded by a TdS background will have an equilibrium temperature (neglecting external and internal sources) T = [P/(4πσr2 ) + T 4 dS] 1/4 . (3) For a r = 50 Mpc super-cluster sized civilization this means that maintaining a total power of P = 1 W would keep it near 2.8 · 10−11 K. At this temperature the civilization could do 3.8 · 1033 irreversible computations per second. The number P/kT ln(2) bit erasures per second increases as P 3/4 . At first this might suggest that it is better to ignore heat and use all resources quickly. However, a civilization with finite energy E will run out of it after time E/P and the 5This might suggest that “stay at home” civilizations might hence abound, content to wait out the future in their local environment since their bounded utility functions can be satisfied eventually. Such civilizations might be common but they are not a solid explanation for the Fermi question since their existence does not preclude impatient (and hence detectable) civilizations. However, see [25]. In addition, this strategy is risky since expansive civilizations may be around. total amount of erasures will then be E/kT ln(2): this declines as P −1/4 . Slow energy use produces a vastly larger computational output if one is patient. As noted by Gershenfeld, optimal computation needs to make sure all internal states are close to the most probable state of the system, since otherwise there will be extra dissipation [26]. Hence there is a good reason to perform operations slowly. Fortunately, time is an abundant resource in the far future. In addition, a civilization whose subjective time is proportional to the computation rate will not internally experience the slowdown. The Margolus-Levitin limit shows that it takes at least time π~/2E to move to a new orthogonal state [27]. For E = kTdS this creates a natural “clock speed” of 3.8 · 1011 years. However, some of the energy will be embodied in computational hardware; even if the hardware is just single electrons the clock speed would be 2.0 ·10−21 s: this particular limit is not a major problem for this style of future computation. A stronger constraint is the information transmission lags across the civilization. For this example the time to send a message across the civilization is 326 million years. Whether this requires a very slow clock time or not depends on the parallelizability of the computations done by the civilization, which in turn depends on its values and internal structure. Civilizations with more parallelizable goals such as local hedonic generation would be able to have more clock cycles per external second than more “serial” civilizations where a global state needs to be fully updated before the next step can be taken. However, external time is of little importance given the paucity of external events. Even if proton decay in 1034 years puts a final deadline to the computation, this would still correspond to 1025 clock cycles. Heat emission at very low temperature is also a cause of slowdown. The time to radiate away the entropy of a single bit erasure scales as trad = k ln(2)/4πσr2T 3 . For a 50 Mpc radius system this is 5.6 · 10−66T −3 s: for 10−8 K the time is on the order of 10−42 s but at 10−30 K it takes 1017 years. If the civilization does have a time limit tmax, then it is rational to use P = E/tmax and the total number of operations will be proportional to t 1/4 max. Time-limited civilizations do have a reason to burn the candle at both ends. Time-limited civilizations still gain overall computational success by waiting until the universe cools down enough so their long-term working temperature T is efficient. At least for long time limits like proton decay a trillion years is a short wait. The reader might wonder whether starting these computations now is rational since the universe is quickly cooling and will soon (compared to the overall lifespan of the civilization) reach convenient temperatures. The computational gain of doing computations at time t is ∝ exp(Ht): it increases exponentially until the temperature is dominated by the internal heating rather than the outside temperature. Since most of the integrated value accrues within the last e-folding and the energy used early was used exponentially inefficiently, it is not worth starting early even if the wait is a minuscule fraction of the overall lifespan. A civilization burning through the baryonic mass of a supercluster before proton decay in 1033 years has a power of 5.7 · 1021 W (similar to a dim red dwarf star) and a temperature of 7.6·10−6 K, achieving 1080 erasures. The most mass-limited version instead runs close to 10−30 K, has a power of somewhere around 10−75 W and achievs 10115 erasures – but each bit erasure, when it happens causes a 100 quadrillion year hiatus. A more realistic system (given quantization constraints) runs at 10−8 K and would hence have power 1010 W (similar to a large present-day power plant), running for 5.7 · 1044 years and achieving 1093 erasures. 6 Resources The amount of resources available to advanced civilizations depends on what can ultimately be used. Conservatively, condensed molecular matter such as planets and asteroids are known to be useful for both energy, computation, and information storage. Stars represent another form of high density matter that could plausibly be exploited, both as energy sources and material. Degenerate stars (white and black dwarfs, neutron stars) are also potential high density resources. Less, conservatively, there are black holes, from which mass-energy can be extracted [28, 29] (and, under some conditions, can act as heat sinks as mentioned above). Beyond this, there is interstellar gas, intergalactic gas, and dark matter halos. For the purposes of this paper we will separate the resources into energy resources that can power computations and matter resources that can be used to store information, process it or (in a pinch) be converted into energy. Massenergy diffused as starlight or neutrinos, and stars lost from galaxies are assumed to have become too dilute to be useful. Dark energy appears to be unusable in principle. Dark matter may be useful as an energy resource by annihilation even if it cannot sustain information processing structures. Not all resources in the universe can be reached and exploited. The lightspeed limit forces civilizations to remain within a light-cone and the accelerating expansion further limits how far probes can be sent. Based on the assumptions in [1] the amount of resources that can be reached within a 100 Mpc supercluster or by traveling at 50%, 80% or 99% c are listed in table 1. 6.1 Changes over time 6.1.1 Stellar fusion Stellar lifetime energy emissions are proportional to mass (with high luminosity stars releasing more faster), Elife = LT = L⊙(M/M⊙)3.16 · 1017 J, leading to a lifetime mass loss through energy emission of Mloss = 1.35 · 1027(M/M⊙) kg = 6.79 · 10−4M⊙(M/M⊙). (4) Lighter stars loose less mass but since the mean mass star is 0.7M⊙ this is on the order of a typical value. Table 1: Resources available to civilizations expanding at different speeds, or within a single supercluster. Estimates based on [30] and [31]. Distances measured in co-moving coordinates, mass in kilograms. Hence stellar fusion is not a major energy waste if mass can be converted into energy. This is important for the aestivation hypothesis: had stellar fusion been a major source of mass loss it would had been rational to stop it during the aestivation period, or at least to gather up the lost energy using Dyson shells: both very visible activities that can be observationally ruled out (at least as large-scale activities). Fusion processes also produce nuclei that might be more useful for computation without any need for intervention. Long term elemental mass fractions approach 20% hydrogen, 60% helium and 20% other elements over 1012 year timescales [5]. 6.1.2 Black hole formation Stellar black holes permanently reduces the amount of baryonic matter available even if their mass-energy is exploitable. At present a mass fraction ≈ 2.5% of the star formation budget is lost this way [31]. To prevent this star formation of masses above 25M⊙ needs to be blocked. This could occur by interventions that cause extra fragmentation of clouds condensing into heavy stars. Adding extra dust to the protostellar cloud could induce rapid cooling and hence fragmentation. This would require dust densities on the order of 10−5ρgas and for a stellar formation rate ≈ 1M⊙ per year would require seeding galactic clouds with ≈ 10−5M⊙ per year. Average nucleosynthetic yields are ≈ 0.0025, so there would be enough metals produced per year to seed the clouds by about two orders of magnitude. Other ways of inducing premature fragmentation might be to produce radiation bursts (from antimatter charges or directed illumination from Dyson-shell surrounded stars) or pressure waves, while magnetic fields might slow core collapse. The energies involved would be of the order of the cloud potential energy; for a Bok globule this might require (3G/5)(50M2 ⊙/1 ly) = 4.2·1036 J, about 103 sun-years of luminosity. Given that cloud collapse is a turbulent process it might be possible to prevent massive star formation through relatively energy-efficient chaos control. While these methods might be invisible over long distances their effects ought to be noticeable due to a suppression of starbursts and heavy blue-white stars. 6.1.3 Galactic winds While stars can lose significant amount of mass by outflows, this gas is recycled through the interstellar medium into new stars. However, some of this medium may be lost due to galactic winds and may hence become long-term inaccessible. Galactic winds are likely proportional to the stellar formation rate (M′/SF R around 0.01-10) plus contributions from active galactic nuclei, and may have significantly depleted early galaxies. Starbursts can lose 105 − 106M⊙ in dwarf galaxies and 108 − 1010 in ULIRGs, partially by entraining neutral matter. [32] However, for large galaxies the actual escape fractions may be low due to dark matter halos keeping the gas bound and dampening the outflow through drag, keeping it below 4% [33]. There can also be ongoing infall due to the halo that more than compensates for the loss. Due to the uncertainty about the wind budget it is not clear whether a civilization prioritizing baryonic matter might want to prevent galactic winds. A few approaches may be possible. One way, as described above, is to prevent too vigorous star formation. Such a civilization would also be interested in keeping the galactic nucleus quiescent, perhaps using the “stellar billiards” method suggested in the next section to manipulate orbits near the central black hole. These methods would likely be hard to detect, except for the reduction in hot stars6 . 6.1.4 Galaxy collisions Galactic “splashes” and mergers may lose significant amount of gas, stars and halos to intergalactic space. Can collisions be prevented? Typical galactic peculiar velocities are on the order of 200-300 km/s: in order to avoid a collision the velocity of one or both galaxies need to be changed by this amount by expelling some mass-energy. The rocket equation hence implies a final mass m1 = m0e −∆v/ve . If ve ≈ 1000 km/s, such as in the case of deliberate ejection of hypervelocity stars7 , the mass loss 6Another, somewhat extreme, approach would be to bag the galaxy: at a surface density of 0.77 · 10−6 kg/m2 a graphene balloon encompassing a Milky Way-sized galaxy (r = 20 kpc) would weigh 1.8 · 106M⊙. Given a current carbon mass fraction of 0.0046 this would require mining 0.4 · 109M⊙ stars or gas clouds, or fusing several million solar masses. Since the saved gas mass would be just one order of magnitude larger than the balloon weight, it is likely that this approach is not effective. 7This can be achieved in a step-wise process. First, Shkladov thrusters [34] are built around many stars. While these thrusters are unable to change stellar velocities significantly over a Gyr, they are enough to engineer close encounters with passing stars within a few million years. This allows a bootstrap process where gravity assists can bring velocity changes of stars up to the average stellar velocities of 100 km/s as well as allow course corrections. Stars are then sent on slingshot orbits past the central black hole, ejecting them and accelerating will be 10%. For an optimal exhaust velocity of c (using some form of massenergy conversion) the loss is around 3.5%. While this is a small fraction of the entire galactic mass, most of it (> 95%) is in the form of a dark matter halo: if only baryonic matter can be used to power the evasive maneuver practically all of it would be lost in the process. Hence, if a civilization seeks to retain significant amounts of baryonic matter it is not rational in general to prevent galactic collisions. Civilizations that instead care about overall mass-energy may be more motivated to prevent splashes of halo material by sacrificing some mass-energy in a very visible maneuver. If the maneuver takes one Gyr and uses mass-energy conversion, the average luminosity will be 3.5% · 1012M⊙c 2/(109 yr) = 2 · 1041 W = 5 · 1014L⊙. Streams of 1010 hypervelocity stars would also likely be very noticeable. 6.1.5 Expansion Given the current ΛCDM model of the universe, the expansion rate is increasing and approaching a de Sitter expansion. This leads to the eventual separation of all gravitationally bound systems from each other by insurmountable distances, leaving each an “island universe” within their cosmological horizon. The local group of galaxies will likely be separated from the Virgo supercluster and in 100 Gyr entirely separate [35]. Busha et al. find a criterion for structures remaining bound, Mobj/1012M⊙ > 3h 2 70(r0/ 1Mpc)3 (5) where h70 = H0/70 km/s/Mpc. The paper also gives an estimate of the isolation time, about 120 Gyr for typical clusters [36]. This expansion dynamics is a key constraint on the ambitions of far-future civilizations. Most matter within not just the observable but the colonizable (at least given assumptions as in [1]) universe will be lost. While no doubt advanced civilizations might wish to affect the expansion rate it seems unlikely that such universal parameters are changeable8 . Depending on the utility function of the civilization, this either implies that there is little extra utility after colonizing the largest achievable bound cluster (utilities dependent on causal connectedness), or that future parts of the civilization will be disconnected from each other (utilities not valuing total connectedness). Civilizations desiring guaranteed separation – for example, to prevent competitors from invading – would also value the exponentially growing moats. Is it possible to gather more mass into gravitationally bound systems? In order to move mass, whether a rocket or a galaxy, energy or reaction mass need to the galaxy. This scheme mainly converts stellar kinetic and potential energy into thrust. 8A civilization will by necessity be spatially local, so any change in Λ or dark energy parameters would have to be local; beside the inherent problem of how it could be affected, any change would also likely merely propagate at light-speed and hence will not reach indefinitely far. Worse, even a minor change or gradient in the 68.3% of the total mass-energy represented by dark energy would correspond to massive amounts of normal energy: the destructive effects may be as dramatic as vacuum decay scenarios. be ejected at high velocity to induce motion9 . This is governed by the relativistic rocket equation ∆v = c tanh((Isp/c) ln(m0/m1)) (we ignore the need for slowing down at arrival). The best possible specific impulse is Isp = c. The remaining mass arriving at the destination will then be m1 = m0 exp(− tanh−1 (∆v/c)). In order to overcome the Hubble flow ∆v > H0r (we here ignore that the acceleration of the expansion will require higher velocities). Putting it together, we will get the bound m(r) < 4πρr2 exp(− tanh−1 (H0r/c)) (6) for a concentric shell of radius r. Setting k = H0/c, this can be integrated from r0 (the border of the supercluster) to 1/k (the point where it is just barely possible to send back matter at lightspeed): Mcollect = (2πρ/3k 3 ) hp 1 − k 2x 2(2k 2x 2 − 3kx + 4) + 3 sin−1 (kx) i1/k r0 (7) If we use r0 = 50 Mpc (typical supercluster size) we get Mcollect = 3.8 · 1078ρ kg, where ρ is the collectable mass density. For ρ = 2.3 · 10−27 kg/m3 this is 8.9 · 1051 kg. The ratio to mass inside the supercluster (here densities are assumed to be 20 times larger inside) is Mcollect/Mcluster = 12, 427. The collected mass is 35% of the entire mass inside the reachable volume; the rest is used up. Another approach would be to convert mass into radiant energy locally, beaming half of it (due to momentum conservation) inwards to a receiver such as a black hole from which it could be extracted later. The main losses would be due to redshift during transmission. However, this ignores the problem that in order to reach remote locations to send back matter home the civilization needs to travel there. If colonization occurs at lightspeed the colonies will have to deal with an expansion factor e H0r/c larger, producing the far tighter bound m(r) < 4πρr2 exp(− tanh−1 (H0e H0r/cr/c)). (8) Integrating numerically from r0 to the outer limit W(1)/k ≈ 2.52 Gpc (where W is Lambert’s W function) produces a more modest Mcollect = 8.32 ·1077ρ and Mcollect/Mcluster = 2, 705. Of the total reachable mass, only 7.7% remains. This calculation assumes all mass can be used; if diffuse gas and dark matter cannot be used to power the move, not only does the total mass yield go down by two orders of magnitude but there are going to be significant energy losses in climbing out of cluster potential wells. Nevertheless, it still looks possible to increase the long-term available mass of superclusters by a few orders of magnitude. 9 In principle gravitational wave propulsion or spacetime swimming [37] are possible alternatives but appear unlikely to be useful in this case. If it is being done it would be very visible, since at least the acceleration phases would convert a fraction of entire galaxies mass-energy into radiation. A radial process would also send this radiation in all outward directions, and backscatter would likely be very noticeable even from the interior. 6.1.6 Galactic evaporation Over long periods stars in galaxies scatter from each other when they have encounters, causing a large fraction to be ejected and the rest are swallowed by the central supermassive black hole. This occurs on a timescale of 10 19 years [5]. However, due to the thermodynamic considerations above, it becomes rational to exploit the universe long before galactic evaporation becomes a problem. The same applies to the other forms of long-term deterioration of the universe, such as proton decay, black hole decay, quantum liquefaction of matter etc. [5] 7 Interactions with other civilizations The aestivation hypothesis at first appears to suffer the same cultural convergence assumption as many other Fermi question answers: they assume all sufficiently advanced civilizations – and members of these civilizations – will behave in the same way. While some convergence on instrumental goals is likely, convergence strong enough to ensure an answer to the Fermi question appears implausible since it only takes one unusual civilization (or group within it) anywhere to break the explanation. Even if it is rational for every intelligent being to do something, this does not guarantee that all intelligent beings are rational. However, cultural convergence can be enforced. Civilizations could coordinate as a whole to prevent certain behaviors of their own constituents, or of younger civilizations within their sphere of influence. While current humanity shows the tremendous problems inherent in achieving global coordination, coordination may both be important for surviving the emergence of powerful technologies (acting as a filter, leaving mainly coordinated civilizations on the technologically mature side). Even if coordination leading to enforcement of some Fermi question explaining behavior is not guaranteed, we could happen to live inside a domain of a large and old civilization that happens to enforce it (even if there are defectors elsewhere). If such civilizations are very large (as suggested by our intergalactic colonization argument [1]) this would look to us like global convergence. The aestivation hypothesis strengthens this argument by implying a need for protecting resources during the aestivation period. If a civilization merely aestivates it may find its grip on its domain supplanted by latecomers. Leaving autonomous systems to monitor the domain and preventing activities that decrease its value would be the rational choice. They would ensure that parts of the originating civilization do not start early but also that invaders or young civilizations are stopped from value-decreasing activities. One plausible example would be banning the launch of self-replicating probes to do large-scale colonization. In this scenario cultural convergence is enforced along some dimensions. It might be objected that devices left behind cannot survive the eons required for restarting the main civilization. While the depths of space are a stable environment that might be benign for devices constructed to be functional there, there are always some micrometeors, cosmic rays or other mishaps. However, having redundant copies greatly reduce the chance of all being destroyed simultaneously. It is possible to show that by slowly adding backup capacity (at a logarithmic rate) a system can ensure a finite probability of enduring for infinite time10 [38]. The infrastructure left behind could hence be both extremely long-lasting and require a minuscule footprint, even if it is imperfect. One can make the argument that defenders are likely to win since the amount of materiel they have at home can easily dwarf the amount of materiel that can be moved into place, since long-range transport is expensive. However, an interior point in an aestivator domain can be targeted with resources rising quadratically with time as the message goes out. Which effects wins out depends on the relative scaling of the costs and resources11 . One interesting observation is that if we are inside an aestivating civilization, then other aestivators are also likely: the probability of intelligence arising per spacetime hypervolume is high enough that the large civilization will likely encounter external mature civilizations and hence needs to have a strategy against them. Two mature large-scale civilizations encountering each other will be essentially spherical, expanding at the same rate (set by convergence towards the limits set by physics). At the point of contact the amount of resources available will be the intersection of an expanding communications sphere and the overall colonization sphere: for large civilizations this means that they will have nearly identical resources. Given the maturity assumption they would hence be evenly matched12. They have several choices: battle each other for resources, maintain a tangential hyperboloid boundary, or, if their utilities are compatible, join. Given the intention of using resources later, expending them in the present is only rational if it prevents larger losses in the long run. If both civilizations are only interested in resources per se, it may be possible to make any invasion irrational by scorched earth tactics: the enemy will not gain anything from invading and merely expend its resources. This is no guarantee that all 10In practice physics places a number of limitations on the durability such as proton decay or quantum tunneling but these limitations are largely outside of the timescales considered in this paper. 11For example, using the Lanchester square law model of warfare [39] for a spherical defender domain (of value ∝ r 3 ) and quadratically arriving attackers it will resist for time t ∝ α 1/2r 2/3η−1/2 , where α is the defender firepower and η is the resource efficiency of transporting attack materiel. The cost to the attacker will scale as t 3 ∝ α 3/2 r 2η −3/2 . For sufficiently large α or low η it may hence be rational to overlook small emergent civilizations – or ensure that they do not appear in the first place. 12The smaller civilization would have a slight disadvantage due to the greater curvature of its surface but if interaction is settled early this might not come into play. possible civilizations will be peaceful vis-´a-vis each other, since there might be other value considerations (e.g. a negative utilitarian civilization encountering one planning to maintain a large amount of suffering: the first civilization would have a positive utility in reducing the resources of the second as much as possible, even at the expense of future computation). However, given the accelerating expansion maintaining borders could in principle be left to physics. 8 Discussion This paper has shown that very big civilizations can have small footprint by relocating most of their activity to the future. Of the 6 assumptions of the aestivation hypothesis, 1 (early civilizations) and 2 (broad expansion) are already likely (and if not true, provide alternative answers to the Fermi question). The fifth assumption, that many civilizations wish to aestivate, is supported by the vast increases in computational ability. The third assumption, that coordination problems can be resolved, remains hard to judge. It should be noted that planning for aestivation is something that is only rational for a civilization once it has solved urgent survival issues. A species that has not reduced its self-generated existential risk enough has good reason to discount the far future due to uncertainty. Conversely, the enormous potential value of a post-aestivation future makes the astronomical waste argument [40] stronger: given the higher stakes, the importance of early risk mitigation – and hence coordination – increases. The fourth assumption is at present also hard to judge. It seems likely that the technology allowing long-range expansion (automation, interplanetary manufacturing, self-replication and long-lived autonomous devices) would enable maintaining arbitrarily large local stockpiles of equipment to fend off incursions. Assumption six, the invisibility of aestivation may at first appear hard to test – nearly any number of advanced civilizations with nearly no energy usage could easily hide somewhere in the galactic halo [13]. However, in order for it to make sense to aestivate the amount of resources lost during the wait must be small enough that they are dwarfed by the resource costs of efforts to prevent them. Are there reasons to perform visible megascale engineering to preserve resources? This depends primarily on whether baryonic matter “construction material” or mass-energy is regarded as the limiting factor for future computation. If baryonic matter is the key factor considerations of stellar activity, galactic wind or galactic collision mass loss do not seem to imply much utility in megascale engineering to preserve matter. However, if dark matter halos represent significant value (the mass-energy case) reduction of collision loss would be rational, likely doable and very visible. The lack of such galactic engineering hence puts a limit on the existence of such energy-concerned aestivating civilizations in the surveyed universe. Engineering large-scale galactic movement to prevent separation of super clusters would also be highly visible and the lack of such activity implies that there are no civilizations seeking to optimize long-term causally connected massenergy concentrations. Together, these considerations suggest that if there are aestivating civilizations in our vicinity they are either local (no interest outside their own galaxies or supercluster, utility functions that place no or little value extra matter or energy) or they have utility functions that may drive universal expansion but hold little interest in causal connectedness. From a Dysonian SETI perspective, the aestivation hypothesis makes a very clear prediction: look for inhibition of processes that permanently lose matter to inter-cluster or inter-galactic space or look for the gravitationally bound structures more massive than what the standard ΛCDM cosmology predicts for a given lengthscale. 8.1 Cosmology/physics assumptions What if we are wrong about the model of the universe used in this paper? A few “nearby” models have clear implications. In Big Rip scenarios where the scale factor becomes infinite at some point due to phantom energy it is rational to use up available energy before this point. For plausible values of w this is likely far in the future and hence aestivation still makes sense. If there is no horizon radiation, then it is rational to delay until proton or black hole decay, or when the heating due to the civilization becomes on par with the universe. Again aestivation makes sense. More fundamentally there is the uncertainty inherent in analysing extreme future scenarios or future technology: even when we base the arguments on well-understood and well-tested physics, there might exist unexpected ways of circumventing this. Unfortunately there is little that can be done about this. The aestivation hypothesis assumes that the main driver of advanced civilizations is computations whose cost are temperature dependent. More philosophically, what if there are other forms of value that can be generated? Turning energy straight into value without computation would break the temperature dependency, and hence the scenario. This suggests an interesting line of investigation: what is the physics of value? Until recently the idea that information was physical (or indeed, a measurable thing) was exotic but currently we are seeing a renaissance of investigations into the connections between computation and physics. The idea that there are bounds set by physics on how much information can be stored and processed by one kilogram of matter is no longer strange. Could there exist similar bounds on how much value one kilogram of matter could embody? 8.2 Anthropics Does the aestivation hypothesis have any anthropic implications? The main consequence of the physical eschatology considerations in this paper is that future computation could vastly outweigh current computation and we should hence expect most observers to exist in the far future rather than the early stelliferous era. The Self-Indication Assumption (SIA) states that we should reason as if we were randomly selected from the set of all possible observers [7]. This is normally assumed to support that we are in a world with many observers. We should expect aliens should exist (since a universe with humans and aliens have more observers, especially if the aliens become a very large post-aestivation civilization). The aestivation hypothesis suggests that initially sparse worlds may have far more observers than worlds that have much activity going on early (and then run out of resources), so the SIA suggests we should believe in the hypothesis. The competing Self-Sampling Assumption states that we should reason as if we were randomly selected from the actually existent observers (past, present, future). This gives a more pessimistic outcome, where the doomsday argument suggests that we may not be going to survive. However, both the SIA and SSA may support the view that we are more likely to be a history simulation [41] running in the post-aestivation era (if that era is possible) than the sole early ancestor population. 8.3 Final words The aestivation hypothesis came about as a result of physical eschatology considerations of what the best possible outcome for a civilization would be, not directly an urge to solve the Fermi question. However, it does seem to provide one new possible answer to the question: That is not dead which can eternal lie. And with strange aeons even death may die. H.P.

## Alternatives

### Alt — Anti-Colonial Historiography

#### The 1AC/1NC is an anti-colonial historiography of NATO – an epistemic interrogation of Western chronopolitical narratives that shifts debate’s pedagogical paradigm towards subaltern knowledge production.

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The writing of history has long been a privileged calling undertaken within the church, royal court, landed estate, affluent town house, government agency, university and corporate funded foundation. Michael Parenti (2003, p. 13) History is alive. It is neither static nor fixed. History is the subjective construction of what and how, people and groups remember. It is the totality of lived experience. While often perceived as an immovable sort of record, history is better understood as a site of struggle. There is strategic importance in the who, why, where and how of knowledge production. The struggle is that of a prolonged interrogation of competing versions of events, as well as the power relations implicit in those versions. This paper is an attempt to begin, inspire and facilitate an interrogation of dominant history. Included below is, first, a theoretical framework for anti-colonial historiography. Second, an analytical case study of the history textbooks used in Ontario, Canada, from 1866 to 2006. And third, a case specific example of curricular synthesis, demonstrating one way in which dominant education can be subverted. Upon beginning this piece, I unconsciously presumed I had license to write about whatever I pleased. Sadly, this ignorance is the inbred sense of entitlement of the White (usual male) scholar. As I worked through the project, I came to better understand the responsibility of all writers and researchers to never presume inclusion or entitlement when approaching a topic or community. I am a White teacher in Ontario. I have been asked as well as required, to teach a colonizer’s history. I was educated in Ontario – inundated with the tautology of Canada’s multiculturalism while taught the glories of only certain peoples’ ideas, struggles, epistemologies and ontological perspectives. Further, my child, as I write this, sits in an Ontario classroom with (in the Toronto District Schools Board’s tribute to empire) a picture of England’s queen, always in view. My people and my society have cultured within me a racism and a comfort with White supremacy. The racism is a quiet one, understood best not through my words or actions – for I have long spoken anti-racism – but through the instincts and reactions that I have come to interrogate and have attempted to change in the last half of my life. It is understood through my ignorance – meaning I rarely know the little pieces are there, until they are gone. One result is that I must G.J.S. Dei and A. Kempf (eds.), Anti-Colonialism and Education: The Politics of Resistance, 129–158. © 2006. Sense Publishers. All rights reserved. KEMPF continue to look at myself and my contextual underpinnings, with a critical eye. This process does not end with the completion of one paper, book or coversation. It is something with and through which I must work for as long as inequity is configured in its current state. To contest dominant history is for me a professional, personal, academic and family undertaking. It affects and has meaning in all parts of my life – be it playing “castle” with my daughter, or designing courses that subvert the dominant curricula for my classes. This for me is not a solitary pursuit. History is not mine to find or document: it is a conversation in which I may, at times, participate. One of my responsibilities as a White person within a White supremacist society is to recognize and respect the places and pursuits best left alone by the dominant. This is not to say that Whites have no role in the anti-colonial struggle, but rather that those roles are often best assigned and designed by the oppressed. It is relevant here to make a distinction between being White (as a subject location and site of difference) and Whiteness (as a system of privilege) (see Ruttenberg, 1993). Such distinctions must not obfuscate the role all White people play in White supremacy – be it often or rare, intentional or unintentional. With this said, White people have a crucial role to play in contesting White privilege. Production and reproduction of knowledge are ideally, collective pursuits, which recognize and work to dissolve power inequities – pedagogically and epistemologically. This work is thus not prescriptive, but interrogative. It aims to support an anti-colonial project, theoretically and practically, by providing both a framework and examples for and of, anti-colonial historiography. The anti-colonial framework casts a critical gaze wherever imposition occurs. It rejects the etymological implication of the “post” in post-colonialism and asserts that the colonial encounter is trans-historical rather than historical – it persists in colonized and colonizing nations. As far as education, we may look to the myriad ways that difference is ignored, suppressed or taken up in classrooms and curricula. It is not only under the tutelage of invading colonizing regimes that people find themselves excluded from the format and content of their education. The anti-colonial stance posits that not only are indigenous people made foreigners in their own lands by way of the colonial encounter, but also that immigrants and racialized minorities are similarly excluded from/by dominant pedagogical practices. The international socio-political processes of displacement, impoverishment and migration (forced and voluntary) are thus relevant here. So when analyzing colonialism in the contemporary context, we must relate the legacy of Spanish colonialism in Mexico, to the lives of Mexicans fighting for health care in California and Texas. When looking at the legacy of French imperialism in Africa, we must look at the struggle for representation by North Africans in Southern France. How do the educational practices in these regions (the US and France, as well as Mexico and Northern Africa) reflect power and competing histories in these multifaceted colonial encounters? These are but two examples, not of a new colonialism, but of the internationalization and extension of colonialism. This can be understood as one very important aspect of globalization/imperialism. In the Canadian context, imposition is thus understood not simply as it affects the indigenous people who continue to fight for autonomy under the yolk of Canadian colonialism, but as it affects all those marginalized by the content and contexts of schooling. Anti-colonial education interrogates the Euro-American/Canadian lens and philosophy through which such practices are developed and invoked. Those who teach history do not simply convey knowledge, but go much further and construct it through conscious and unconscious inclusion and exclusion of historical perspectives, contributions and events. To teach history well is to question and teach questioning, at every turn. A critical approach to teaching and learning cannot be taken up merely for the sake of being critical. Our questioning should be both strategic and compassionate. The history instructor should not only address historical events, but also the history of how events in question have been taught hitherto. Historical events exist in transhistorical contexts and can have transhistorical relevance. An awareness of these contexts is crucial to understanding (a) regional power discrepancies, as Said (1993) argues, and (b) local power inequities and inequalities current and historical. History is a responsibility; an imperfect pursuit with specific interests and intentions in play at every turn. Zinn writes: My argument cannot be against selection, simplification, emphasis, which are inevitable for both cartographers and historians. . . . [T]he mapmaker’s distortion is a technical necessity for a common purpose shared by all people who need maps. The historian’s distortion is more than technical, it is ideological; it is released into a world of contending interests, where any chosen emphasis supports (whether the historian means to or not) some kind of interest, whether economic or political or racial or national or sexual. (1999, p. 8) The error we must avoid in the telling and teaching of history is thus not subjectivity, but the denial thereof. To claim that any perspective is complete and/or neutral, is erroneous. To claim that history is told or taught without specific objectives (conscious or unconscious) is inaccurate. We must then acknowledge the purpose and perspective of our teaching and telling of history – we must identify the subjectivities at play in the narratives we convey, lest we fall prey to the Eurocentric claim of objectivity and its corresponding mask of universality. Formal curricula, at all levels of study (elementary, high school and college/university) serve to construct meaning for students as far as self-identification, cultural belonging and school engagement. History, with its philological, cultural, economic, geographic, political and social strands is perhaps unique among so-called “disciplines” in that the implications for the learner are so broad. In the case of popular representations of Aboriginal Peoples and perspectives in dominant Canadian history, not only are the people and perspectives largely absent, but so too is the story of the attempted genocide of the People of Turtle Island and their history. A reconsideration of such history is thus not only a strategic examination, but also one that quite simply, seeks greater accuracy and thoroughness in order to combat the removal of so much from the history of Turtle Island.1 Historical analyses and the creation of the “other”, either as backward or as outside of history, are present throughout colonized and colonizing societies currently and historically. The dominant has for centuries, written the dominated out 131 KEMPF of the historical material process. The works of leading European thinkers (like Bacon, Descartes, Hume, Rousseau, Kant, Smith, Ricardo and others) from a variety of fields (such as politics, mathematics, science, philosophy, economics and others) serve as a modern foundation and prescription for othering non-dominant knowledges and peoples (see Shiva, 1997; Wolff, 2000; Bishop, 1990; Joseph, 1987; and others). The effects of such thinkers are present in educational practises in almost all colonial contexts. Educational imperialism is a crucial element of colonialism, with profound effects on the colonized and colonizer. Fanon writes: . . . [C]olonialism is not content to impose its rule upon the present and the future of a dominated country. Colonialism is not satisfied with holding a people in its grip and emptying the native’s brain of all form and content. By a kind of perverted logic, it turns to the past of the oppressed people, and distorts, disfigures and destroys it. This work of devaluing colonial history takes on a dialectical significance today. (1963, p. 210). Fanon’s work speaks to the mental effects of colonialism and colonial education. The uni-focal history of dominant/colonial education serves to amputate marginalized people from their past and consequently from their present. In Canada today, the histories of Aboriginal people are excluded from dominant education. Spivak’s (1996) work with community groups and scholars on the historiography of the Subaltern in India, is a relevant example not only of historical interrogation, but of the creation of a revised popular history. The subaltern can be loosely understood in the Gramscian sense as comprised by “non-elite or subordinated social groups” (Landry and MacLean, 1996, p. 203). The knowledge and practices of these groups are understood for the purposes of an anti-colonial historiography, as relevant in and of themselves, as well as informative for positive (action-oriented) social change. The anti-colonial critique must be pointed at all thinkers and philosophies, on the left and the right. Two hundred years ago, even revolutionary European thinkers partook of the oppressive practice of “othering”. In the Introduction to A Critique of Political Economy, Marx writes: “Tribes living exclusively on hunting or fishing are beyond the boundary line from which real [historical] development begins” (from Eze, 2000, p. 234). The telling, or omission, of the history of the colonized by the colonizer, is part of the reproduction and preservation of what Eze calls the “neocolonial setup” (2000, p. 242). He writes: They speak of the colonized or of the subjects of neocolonial exploitation in biological terms and declare them to be the antagonists of history. The native, or the neocolonial peasantry is said to be inferior and have no appreciation of values . . . Thus the settler, or neocolonial elite, has no regrets or qualms of conscience for he does violence not to humans but to strange entities located between humanity and undifferentiated history. (2000, p. 242) When students see neither themselves nor their histories reflected in their education, disengagement understandably follows. In Decolonizing Methodologies, Smith writes: “Schooling is directly implicated in this process. Through the curriculum and its underlying theories of knowledge, early schools redefined the world and where indigenous people were positioned within the world” (1991, p. 33). In many cases, Aboriginal people have been located outside of the world: the world of progress, the world of goodness, the world of history. In the capitalist epoch, history decidedly begins and ends with capitalism. For orthodox Marxists, history begins and ends with class struggle. Cabral says in a 1966 speech: [T]his leads us to pose the following question: does history begin only with the development of the phenomenon of ‘class’, and consequently of class struggle? To answer in the affirmative would be to place outside history the whole period of life of human groups from the discovery of hunting, and later of nomadic and sedentary agriculture, to the organization of herds and the private appropriation of land. It would also be to consider . . . that various human groups in Africa, Asia and Latin America were living outside of history. (1969, p. 77) Although Cabral is speaking in the African context almost forty years ago, his words are true today in many colonial settings and speak to the global nature of the oppression implicit in so much colonial pedagogy – currently and historically. The education system in Ontario, Canada for example, ignores the content and practice of Aboriginal history and epistemology. It instead provides compulsory Canadian settler history that preserves the salience of settler domination. Inaccurate and oppressive histories are thus thrust upon Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Peoples alike. Edward Said (1997) argues that although Marx was sympathetic to non-EuroAmerican peoples suffering under the yolk of European imperialism, he saw the suffering as the beginning of the reorientation of a backward society, toward the possibility of a better future. Marx was concerned with oppressed people but was guilty of the paternalistic western discursive position that “they” need civilising, if only on an economic level, by “us”. Marx was content to form his understanding of the non-European Subaltern from problematic symbols of Orientalism, created and maintained by the dominant political project; a project which Marx himself purported to reject (Said, 1997). Said quotes Marx and his racist conclusion about Asian Peoples, “they cannot represent themselves; they must be represented” (1997, p. 93). Marx falls into the trap of essentializing the non-dominant world by assigning a false homogeneity to all of its peoples. Aboriginal Peoples struggle against not only a western view of history, but also against a western presentation of history, which ignores among other things, oral histories and the value of story telling (Smith, 1991). A failure to contest this approach allows for the continued amputation of people from their cultures and histories. Fanon writes: Every people in whose soul an inferiority complex has been created by the death and burial of its cultural originality – finds itself face to face . . . with the culture of the [dominant] mother country. The colonized is elevated above his jungle status in proportion to his adoption of the mother country’s cultural standards. (1967, p. 18) Fanon’s analyses are as relevant today in colonial educational settings globally, as they were to the Caribbean and Africa (about which he was writing) in 1967. As many authors have argued, a multicentric approach to knowledge and learning is possible and I would add necessary, in a number of different contexts (see Agrawal, 1995; Yakubu, 1994; Dei, 2000; Hodson, 1998). Similarly, a number of applications of this knowledge are possible. It is necessary then, that teachers operate pedagogically only on a multicentric understanding and articulation of principles, strategies and goals. This multi-focal approach can contribute to what Dei has called a “complete history of ideas which have shaped and continue to shape human growth and development” (2000, p. 17). Raising these issues in the Canadian context sheds light on broader questions of knowledge production, the validation and dissemination of information, and roles of power and representation in education. Canada’s failure to teach and value accurate and inclusive history must not be understood as benign omission, but rather as part of its ongoing colonial project in which the power of representation is paramount. Anticolonial historiography differs from typical historical re-telling in that it takes an overtly strategic approach to the telling of things past. Its focus is two pronged, working to interrogate and rupture dominant history on one hand, while focusing on the achievements, practices and resistance of oppressed peoples to colonial imposition on the other. It is not the existence of a political project within anticolonial historiography that distinguishes it from mainstream history, but rather its unabashed articulation of its political aims from the start. This does not mean that we should dispense with accuracy as a goal or direction for study. It means that we must contextualize the telling of history as well as history itself so the why, who, where and how of knowledge production are brought into focus. Objectivity is better sought through an interrogation of subjectivities than through a denial that such competing perspectives exist. In Discourse on Colonialism, Césairé (1972) problematizes the subversive notion of history as a monologue. I argue here that history must be a dialogue – a continually evolving contestation of perspectives, versions and memories. History must move beyond the notion of fractious divisions of time into past, present and future. In place of such a partition, a continuum of knowledge must be fostered wherein knowing itself is understood as embodied as well as temporal, and both as an individual and communal path and practice, which identifies and values the subjectivities of learners. The aim here is not a post-structuralist one, wherein all perspectives are valued equally, but one in which light can be shed on all experiences to reveal the bad and celebrate the good; one in which invalid histories are exposed as such. On an individual level this can assist in the development of what Freire has called “complete humanism” (1997, p. 25). On a community level, it can help to facilitate the empowerment of marginalized groups.

### Alt — Anti-Imperial

#### The alternative is an anti-imperial international.

Amin ’19 — Samir; Egyptian-French Marxian economist, political scientist and world-systems analyst. He is noted for his introduction of the term Eurocentrism in 1988 and considered a pioneer of Dependency Theory. 2019; “The Long Revolution of the Global South”; *Monthly Review Press*; Accessed Online via University of Michigan Libraries; //CYang

8. Reconstructing a “front of countries and peoples of the South” is one of the fundamental conditions for the emergence of “another world” not founded on imperialist domination.

Without underestimating the importance of all kinds of transformations originating in the societies of the North in the past and present, it should be emphasized that they have remained, up to now, tied to imperialism. It should not be surprising, then, that the great transformations on the world scale originated in the revolt of peoples in the peripheries, from the Russian Revolution (the weak link of that time) to the Chinese Revolution and the Non-Aligned Movement (Bandung) that, for a time, forced imperialism to “adjust” to demands that conflicted with the logic of its expansion. The page of the Bandung Conference and the Tricontinental (1955–1980), of a globalization that was multipolar, has turned.

The conditions of existing globalization prohibit a remake of the Bandung Conference. The current ruling classes in the countries of the South are attempting to be part of this globalization, which they sometimes hope to bend in their favor, but which they do not fight. These can be divided into two groups: those who have a “national” project, the nature of which — mainly capitalist, but nuanced by concessions (or not) to the working classes, yet in open or muted conflict with imperialism — should be discussed on a case-by-case basis, such as China or the emergent countries of Asia and Latin America; and those who do not have such a project and accept having to adjust unilaterally to imperialist requirements (these, then, are comprador ruling classes).

Various kinds of alliances are emerging between states (governments), some of which can be seen within the WTO. We should not spurn the possibilities that such alliances might open for movements of the working classes (without, of course, having any illusions).

Is a front of the peoples of the South possible, one that goes beyond the rapprochements between the ruling classes? The construction of such a front is difficult since it is set back by the “culturalist” deviations mentioned above, and results in confrontations between peoples of the South (on pseudo-religious or pseudo-ethnic bases). It will be less problematic if and insofar as the states that have a project could — under pressure from their peoples — move in a more resolutely anti-imperialist direction. But that implies that their projects set aside any illusions that “national capitalist” governments are resolutely and exclusively able to modify imperialist globalization in their favor and become active agents in that globalization, participating in forming the world system (and not unilaterally adjusting to it). These illusions are still widespread and reinforced by the rhetoric that flatters the “emergent countries,” on the way to “catching up,” developed by institutions in the service of imperialism. But insofar as facts come to contradict these illusions, national popular and anti-imperialist blocs might once again pave the way to an internationalism of peoples. We can only hope that progressive forces in the North will understand and support this

#### **The alternative is collective action.**

D’Arcangelis ’21 — Gwen Shuni; associate professor of gender studies at Skidmore College. 2021; “Bio-imperialism: disease, terror, and the construction of national fragility”; *Rutgers University Press*; Accessed Online via University of Michigan Libraries; //CYang

Collective action had brought about a profound restructuring in global health governance, allowing significantly less powerful actors to be relatively successful against more powerful ones. Discourse-making, moreover, was vital to their accomplishments. The strategic displacement of “virus sharing” to “benefits sharing” destabilized the entire discursive scaffolding of “global health security.” Benefits sharing reversed the construction of vulnerability: if the existing view was a Eurocentric one premised on the notion that the Global North needed to be protected from the diseases of the Global South, the new paradigm highlighted that it was the Global South that was made vulnerable through the North’s biocolonial extraction of disease data and samples.

This was a hard-won paradigm shift, as illustrated by the U.S. pushback in the struggle to obtain MTAs for originating countries. The United States had a strong stake in a system that gave global powers prime access to the data and samples furnished to the WHO. Accordingly, the United States rejected the Global South’s attempt to redistribute power through the MTA regime. At the World Health Assembly meeting in May 2007, the United States presented its draft resolution, which argued that adding MTAs would hinder the unfettered, immediate transfer of materials, and thus negatively impact vaccine production (Franklin 2009; Khor 2007; WHO 2008). In essence, the United States stuck to the notion that vaccine production was the sole goal, ignoring the crucial step that followed — how those vaccines would be distributed.

The paradigm shift to benefits sharing also challenged another fundamental premise of global health security — that international authorities should supersede national ones. Benefits sharing repositioned national sovereignty over biological resources as the key mechanism for giving impacted nations control over their health outcomes. The focus on national sovereignty was, in the terms of sociocultural anthropologist Aihwa Ong (2008), a strategic insertion of “the nation as a scale of ethical exception to the global commodification of health” (126). The concept of national sovereignty prioritized the well-being of peoples actually affected by H5N1, and interrupted the predatory extraction of samples from the Global South. Thus, national sovereignty was articulated not as selfish or provincial, but as key to ensuring the health of those most impacted.

The discourse of national sovereignty also chipped away at the rhetorics of security that had helped justify pandemic preparedness as a security imperative. It was certainly a difficult battle: the discourse of global health security had not only diminished national autonomy, but also coded nations such as China and Indonesia, who asserted their authority, as security threats. At a March 2007 WHO meeting held in Jakarta, for example, a WHO press release called Indonesia’s withholding of viruses a “threat to global public health security” (WHO 2007). This married false universalism (a disaggregated globe) with alarmist security rhetoric to sideline the equity issues that had been highlighted by Indonesia and its allies.

U.S. government officials, along with much of the U.S. popular press, had also frequently deployed these security frames in response to Indonesia’s actions. Prominent public health journalists Richard Holbrooke and Laurie Garrett, in their denouncement of Indonesia’s position, published an article in August 2008 in the Washington Post that described Indonesia’s failure to provide viruses as posing a “pandemic threat to all the peoples of the world.” The authors followed this with further security discourse: “Disturbingly, however, the notion [of viral sovereignty] has morphed into a global movement, fueled by self-destructive, anti-western sentiments” (Holbrooke and Garrett 2008; emphasis added). This characterization invoked the trope of the West-hating terrorist, but also the post-9/11 frame that was its complement—U.S. vulnerability, here aimed at cowing Global South nations that refused to comply with the North-led international system. The authors ended their article by calling on Indonesia to conform to the demands of “globally shared health risk,” further coding Indonesia’s challenge to the international health system as a global threat and upholding the myth that the international pandemic preparedness regime — and its fortification — benefited all nations. Indonesia finished what China had started when the latter briefly staged a flu sample sharing stoppage. The shift to benefits sharing and national sovereignty, and away from the rhetorics of global health security, diminished both the discursive and the institutional power of the North-led international system.

Indonesia, along with its allies, interrupted the biocolonial extraction of resources from the Global South and altered the system itself, institutionalizing a redistribution of power to give the Global South a greater role in global health governance.

#### The alternative is anti-imperialism.

Amin ’19 — Samir; Egyptian-French Marxian economist, political scientist and world-systems analyst. He is noted for his introduction of the term Eurocentrism in 1988 and considered a pioneer of Dependency Theory. 2019; “The Long Revolution of the Global South”; *Monthly Review Press*; Accessed Online via University of Michigan Libraries; //CYang

Affirm the solidarity of the people of the North and the South in the construction of an internationalism on an anti-imperialist basis. The solidarity of all the peoples — of the North and of the South — in the construction of a universal civilization cannot be founded on the illusory notion that it is possible simply to ignore the conflicts of interest that separate different classes and nations that make up the real world. Such genuine solidarity must necessarily transcend the antagonisms inherent to capitalism and imperialism. The regional organizations behind the alternative globalization movement must seek to strengthen the autonomy and the solidarity of nations and of peoples on the five continents. This perspective is in contradiction to that of the present dominant model of regionalization, conceived as consisting of mere building blocks of neoliberal globalization. Fifty years after Bandung, the Bamako Appeal calls for a Bandung of the peoples of the South, victims of really existing capitalism, and the rebuilding of a peoples’ front of the South able to hold in check both the imperialism of the dominant economic powers and U.S. military hegemony. Such an anti-imperialist front would not oppose the peoples of the South to those of the North. On the contrary, it would constitute the basis of a global internationalism associating them all together in the building of a common civilization in its diversity.

### Alt — Decolonial Security Study

#### The decolonization of transnational security governance necessitates disruption on the level of representational politics – we repurpose this resolution towards a methodological reorientation that spills up to recenter academic praxis of neocolonial African experience.

Honke and Muller ’12 -- (Jana Honke and Markus-Michael Muller, 10-2012, "Governing (in)security in a postcolonial world: Transnational entanglements and the worldliness of 'local' practice," Security Dialogue Vol. 43, No. 5, Special issue on "Governing (in)security in the postcolonial world" (OCTOBER 2012), pp. 383-401, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26301927?saml\_data=eyJzYW1sVG9rZW4iOiI1Y2EzNWE3MC00OWFkLTRiNzctOTVlOC02MjA0ZDlhNWRlNjgiLCJlbWFpbCI6InVtMTkzNTM1QHVtaWNoLmVkdSIsImluc3RpdHV0aW9uSWRzIjpbImJhYzI1OTdlLTI3YzMtNGIyNy04YzJhLTE3NDlkOWUyYjI1NSIsIjM2MjdjZWE2LTM1YmItNDJkNS04M2ZmLTY4ZmY5ZDc4NDhiZCJdfQ, accessed 7-2-2022) -- nikki

Transnational (in)security governance through the lens of postcoloniality We claim that the point of departure for any research endeavour sensitive to the postcolonial condition of contemporary forms of transnational (in)security governance consists in what authors in other fields have called ‘provincializing’ (Chakrabarty, 2000) or ‘decolonizing’ (Rodríguez et al., 2010) security studies. This means avoiding practices of analytical othering by emphasizing the analytical ‘limits of the European experience’ (Wong, 1997). Seth (2009) contrasts two strategies in this regard: One consists in providing a different account of history through the lens of historical sociology. The other, informed by postcolonial theory, implies showing the limitations and non-universality of European analytical categories. While the latter tradition thus sensitizes us to the fact that ‘the central categories of the social sciences are the product of a European history and are not necessarily adequate everywhere, even in their amended versions’ (Seth, 2009: 336), historical sociology, according to Seth, can provide original accounts of subaltern or non-European history. Seth, however, is more in favour of the postcolonial approach and argues that non-Eurocentric historical sociology is mainly about ‘producing “better” knowledge on the grounds that it more accurately re-presents what really happened’. By missing the fact that knowledge is not only about re-presenting the world but also about creating it, historical sociology, according to Seth (2009: 336), tends to produce an external relationship between knowledge and object, a situation that, in contrast to postcolonial studies, the discipline seems incapable of overcoming. In contrast to such a rather rigid juxtaposition, we think that taking historical sociology seriously is indispensable for a postcolonial security studies research programme, but that in order to unfold its anti-Western-centric potential, historical sociology, national as well as international, must engage more deeply with postcolonial studies. As Boatcă and Costa (2010: 14) have argued in their call for a ‘decolonized’ sociology, it is through such an approximation between sociology and postcolonial studies that the epistemological limits of sociology that are the result of a particular academic and epistemological institutionalization of the discipline, and ‘that so far have prevented the emergence of a global sociology of colonial, neocolonial and postcolonial contexts’, can be overcome. It is such a ‘decolonized’ historical sociology through which ‘historical contextualization as a postcolonial method’ (Boatcă and Costa, 2010: 17) can be productively integrated into a postcolonial security studies research programme,2 by highlighting subaltern knowledge and entangled histories of non-Western societies. Decolonized historical sociology can also call our attention to phenomena that, while frequently considered to be occurring only beyond the West, characterize Western societies themselves, including, for example, areas hardly reached by the state and where the state’s monopoly of force is absent or strongly compromised (e.g. marginalized urban spaces, such as the banlieues in France, ETA strongholds in Basque country, and urban and rural spaces controlled by the mafia in Italy or with forms of vigilante justice in the United States). Taking such insights seriously illustrates the limitations of analytical categories bound to the idea of a Western-centric methodological nationalism for understanding (in)security governance even in our contemporary world more generally. Consequently, our critique of Western-centric analytical categories does not imply a call for abandoning all Western theory. Without denying that much, if not most, European theory is marked by the above-mentioned problems stemming from Occidentalism and Western-centrism, instead of simply abandoning these theories, we share Bhabha’s (1994: 18–28) ‘commitment to theory’. While challenging the ‘fictitious universalism’ (Bourdieu, 2000: 65) of Western theories, such a commitment, in our understanding, enhances their analytical scope through what Jackson, following Hall, called ‘theoretical transculturation’. This implies ‘demonstrating that such [Western] theory does not in fact describe or map the entire planet, and that despite pretensions to universalism it suffers from gaps and lacunae, and for this reason needs to be revised in the light of local empirical conditions’ (Jackson, 2003: 73). But the argument for provincializing security studies can even be pushed further. Writing from an African perspective, Mbembe and Nutall (2004: 348) argue that our task is not simply to demonstrate the fallacies of knowledge derived from a particular European experience, but rather to engage in a ‘worlding’ of the African experience. Africa is fraught as an idea and object of academic research, as it has become a sign in public debates for the ‘other’, the ‘failed’, the ‘incomplete’ and something apart from the world, probably more so than Latin America and Asia. Constructed as ‘out of the world’ by policymakers and academics, a postcolonial security studies perspective would require ‘reinscribing’ African (in)security knowledge, experiences and practices into the world and thereby depicting these as ‘normal’ and relevant parts of the human experience, not an exotic exception. This would imply recognizing the African experience of ‘indeterminancy’, ‘provisionality’, ‘contingency’ and uncertainty as a basic condition of life, and as a reality that requires analytical lenses and gives rise to relevant research questions in its own right (Mbembe and Nutall, 2004: 349). Recent scholarship in urban studies has not only stressed the ‘ordinary’ character of (postcolonial) urban experiences across the world (Robinson, 2006) but also suggests that postcolonial cities like Shanghai, Dubai or Lusaka, rather than Western cities, might be the avant-garde of global metropolitan developments (Myers, 2011; Roy and Ong, 2011) – including the governance of (in)security. Postcolonies might in fact offer ‘privileged insight into the workings of the world at large’ (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2012: 1). This calls for an engagement with site specific modernities and ways of constructing security governance in ‘ex-centric sites’ (Bhabha, 1994: 6) in the peripheries of world society in which the Western narrative of modernity is but one among others informing people’s ways of imagining and constructing the world. Taking such a perspective seriously produces new understandings of the dynamics of peacekeeping, state-building and anti-terror interventions – which security studies often deals with as though an innocent division could be drawn between interveners and intervened, a liberal ‘us’ and another ‘them’, or as though these interventions are the only privileged sites for the globalization of security knowledge and technologies in our contemporary world. However, security interventions also take place in indirect ways. Dominant (in)security discourses constitute situations and particular actors as transnational security risk, with important repercussions for individual security. A case in point is the ‘discovery’ of diaspora communities as partners in conflict prevention in ‘developing countries’, highlighted in Laffey and Sutharan’s article in this issue with reference to the international engagement with the Tamil diaspora. Considering the above-mentioned entangled histories of (in)security governance, the analytics of postcoloniality also remind us that security practices are globalized through borrowing and emulation by local elites – be that through forced geopolitical pressures or as a result of instrumental calculation – as well as through indirect effects of hegemonic discourses and practices in transnational fields (Bilgin, 2010: 618; 2009: 340). Jacobsen’s article in this issue on the introduction of the Unique Identity Number biometrical identification system for Indian citizens, which is inseparable from globally dominant discourses on technology, knowledge and development, is illustrative in this regard. Postcoloniality pervades security knowledge and practices in all these spaces in which security governance is strongly shaped by external actors and/or transnational discourses and practice fields. However, few studies have looked into the de facto effects of these transnational influences on local (in)security governance and on the agency of those people involved and affected – both in and beyond the postcolony. Where such agency has been taken seriously, such efforts have mostly focused on the hybrid nature of the outcomes of external security interventions at the local level (e.g. Mac Ginty, 2010). By localizing the scope and effects of local agency to the local arena, such a perspective, however, downplays how ‘local’ agency and security practices may transform the transnational security field itself. While security studies has thus dealt with the transnational entanglements of (in)security governance in postcolonies and the ‘local’ repercussions of transnational security governance, much of the literature buys into the research objects, binary categories and unidirectional travelling of knowledge and institutions established in Eurocentric narratives of security governance. In the remainder of this article, we will therefore highlight three methodological moves that in our view provide the basis for overcoming these deficits and rendering security studies research more sensitive to the postcolonial condition.

#### This resolution holds radical potential – vote affirmative to transform debate into a decolonial site of study for technological security governance – challenging the power relations of debate as an academic practice should frame your ballot.

Adamson ’19 -- (Fiona B Adamson, 12-21-2019, "Pushing the Boundaries: Can We “Decolonize” Security Studies?," OUP Academic, https://academic.oup.com/jogss/article/5/1/129/5682795, accessed 7-2-2022) -- nikki

Is it possible to create a field of security studies that is “decolonized,” so to speak, and attuned to the multiple forms of power relations that affect everyday security practices—beyond those embedded in powerful states? In this essay, I have suggested that it is worth exploring “decolonial” perspectives as an alternative means of shedding light on dynamics of inclusion and exclusion in global security. Decolonial approaches focus on transforming structures, rather than simply diversifying them, and provide an alternative to more “problem-solving” approaches to inclusion and exclusion. The literature on decolonial theory and its application is vast, and this brief commentary has only touched on some representative arguments in a somewhat superficial manner. Nevertheless, it is worth asking to what extent incorporating principles of decoloniality could open up broader discussions on “inclusion” and “exclusion” in ways that might help transform the field. Security studies, perhaps more than any other field, has had a close link with the policy interests (and worldviews) of the most powerful. Decolonial approaches provide a means of shedding further light on this, by examining how and why the field legitimizes some voices while silencing others. A decolonial lens provides the means of excavating the history of such exclusions, by pointing to their connection with unresolved colonial, racial, and imperial histories. A number of decolonial scholars have provided practical guidance on how to promote more inclusive conversations in IR and security studies in ways that would expand who “speaks” in the discipline (see, e.g., Sabaratnam 2011). Yet, decolonial approaches have also been criticized for the way they can also reproduce the very colonial categories and hierarchies that they challenge, rather than move beyond them (Murray 2019). This has led some to connect decolonial approaches with the need to move to a more planetary form of politics and collective solidarity, in which the underlying logic is one of entanglement, interdependence, and dialogue, rather than binary forms of inclusion and exclusion (Stengers 2010; Burke et al. 2016; Conway 2019). Such strategies may be increasingly necessary under rapidly changing conditions of technological change and planetary environmental destruction. For example, the rise of big data and the increased role that algorithms play in shaping the lifeworlds of individuals lead to a type of universal “colonization” of life by technology in ways that decolonial approaches can help to shed light on.3 Similarly, the notion of the Anthropocene can be seen as being characterized by the colonization of nature by humans, in ways that actively exclude and threaten the security of many of the nonhuman inhabitants of the planet. Clearly, there is still a long way to go in the task of theorizing dynamics of inclusion and exclusion in global security studies. This special issue, however, has made an important step forward in raising the question, and in bringing to the fore cases that address issues of gender, religion, national identity, and refugees. The question the special issue ultimately leaves us with is: What other forms of exclusion may we still be blind to, and how can we begin the process of excavating and addressing them?

### Alt — Dedev

#### Surprise! We are blowing it up.

John Feffer 21, director of Foreign Policy In Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, 11-1-21, “CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LIMITS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH,” [https://fpif.org/climate-change-and-the-limits-of-economic-growth/,](https://fpif.org/climate-change-and-the-limits-of-economic-growth/,j) jy

Impact

Given the centrality of economic growth in the mainstream, degrowth has largely hovered on the margins of debate. That seems to be changing.

“I noticed a shift in mood two or three years ago,” reports Simon Michaux. “Instead of hitting my head against the wall, all of a sudden I started to get results. I’m not sure how this happened, but now I’m getting my work in front of senior policy decisionmakers. I’m presenting to ministers and parliaments in multiple countries.”

But, he cautions, that hasn’t yet translated into altered policies, either at a political level or even in terms of technological research. “The best and brightest are working on things that, I won’t say they won’t work, they do work, but they are not the ultimate solution. We are forced to work on lithium-ion battery chemistry when there are other chemistries. I’ve shown that there are not enough minerals in the ground to make those batteries. I’ve used their data. They have no choice but to see it.”

When a financial crisis happens or a sympathetic political party takes power, the terms of reception can change dramatically. Peter Victor remembers when a social democratic government took over in Ontario after a surprise election result in 1991. “I was given a job there, and just being able to work with a government that was interested in social change was incredible,” he says. “You couldn’t give them enough ideas! They didn’t accept them all, but they listened.”

Fifteen years later it was a crisis that gave his ideas more prominence. “My book Managing Without Growth came out in 2008 at the time of the financial crisis,” he recalls. “What otherwise would have been a marginal document published by an academic publisher and sold at a high price became more well-known. The media was looking for an economist who could say something positive about no-growth. I was invited all over the world. I got a sense that I was being listened to. But 99 percent of the time, the audience already agreed with me.”

Victor adds, “It takes a chorus. If lots of us do these things, it will make an impact.”

Degrowth is often associated with doom-and-gloom scenarios. “No one wants to hear that everything is going to go poorly,” Simon Michaux notes. “They want a solution. If you can’t promote a solution, they are not prepared to hear the problem.” As the economist Herman Daly used to say, “If you’re falling out an airplane, it’s not an altimeter you need but a parachute.”

Finland, Michaux continues, sits on a lot of minerals integral to battery production such as cobalt, nickel, lithium, and graphite. “If I’m right, in a few years’ time, the global production of minerals will not be sufficient to meet demand. The captains of industry will then turn to the geological surveys in Europe and say, ‘why didn’t you tell us?’ The Geological Survey of Finland (GDK) manages a battery portfolio and they will be first in the firing line. I can have a frank discussion with their executive board members about hyperinflation, peak oil, currency default. They are enlightened, but they don’t understand the implications.” Still, GDK is giving him the opportunity to develop his ideas about the circular economy and cooperate with other Finnish research groups in the industrial sectors.

“It’s pretty clear that we don’t have enough resources to go around,” Michaux concludes. “If we do the conventional, each nation for itself, it will give war a chance until the population reduces. If we actually have a transparency of information and we all agree to share those resources, we’ll have a form of socialism to distribute those resources and a form of capitalism to exploit those resources.”

To help generate and test new ideas, Joshua Farley recommends creating a knowledge commons. “Any university can unilaterally declare that all the knowledge we create to address social ecological problems is freely available to all on the condition that any improvements to it are also freely available to all,” he suggests. Even geopolitical rivals like the United States, Iran, and North Korea could be part of this commons. Small-scale knowledge commons, like this working group, can provide help in developing certain ideas and marshalling the defense of such ideas in the public sphere.

### Alt — Difference

#### The alternative is a rejection of unified culture — that makes a new international system that accommodates cultural difference possible.

Reus-Smit ‘19 — Christian; Professor of International Relations at the University of Queensland, in Brisbane Australia. March 21, 2019; "International Relations Theory Doesn’t Understand Culture"; *Foreign Policy*; [edited for ableist language] <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/21/international-relations-theory-doesnt-understand-culture/>; //CYang

Far from seeing culture as complex and contradictory, Martin Wight, one of the school’s founders, held in Systems of States that an international society “will not come into being without a degree of cultural unity among its members.” Modern international society, he argued, had its origins in European civilization, and when decolonization admitted a host of non-Western states, international society had “outrun cultural and moral community.” The idea that pragmatism could only ever sustain a thin social order — and that a common culture was needed to undergird robust bonds, institutions, and practices — focused much of the school’s post-decolonization research on the possibility of international society in a culturally diverse world.

IR’s failure to integrate contemporary conceptions of culture is more than an academic curiosity — it has far-reaching implications for how we understand today’s global politics of culture. Take one critical issue: the impact of rising non-Western powers on the modern international order. At present, debate is dominated by culturalists, who think that the order will collapse as its Western cultural foundations erode, and liberals, who deny that cultural differences matter, holding that liberal institutions can accommodate states and peoples of diverse cultural complexions.

But what if we take seriously the insight that there is no such thing as a unified culture, that all culture is complex and contradictory? We would have to assume, first of all, that the modern order arose under conditions of cultural diversity, not unity. And we would then have to ask how these heterogeneous conditions shaped the order’s evolution and, in turn, how the order’s institutions were constructed to govern and order that diversity.

Doing so would bring the conquest of the Americas, the Protestant Reformation, the post-Versailles division of Europe into ethnically defined nation-states, and decolonization into new focus. Most importantly, it would lead us to ask not whether sudden onset diversity will destroy a formerly Western order, but whether post-decolonization practices for governing global diversity can accommodate new arrangements of power and expressions of cultural difference.

### Alt — Failed IR

#### Vote negative to affirm the night side of IR theory — circulating pessimistic readings IR as a failed project is a generative practice that refuses the violence of the Eurocene.

Grove 19 [Jairus Victor Grove is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Hawai'i Research Center for Future Studies at the University of Hawai'i at Mānoa; “Savage Ecology: war and geopolitics at the end of the world”; August 16, 2019]//eleanor

Why would I bother with the “night side” of ir theory?47 In part, I wish to move away from the rationalist fallacy among both defenders and critics of empire. There is a shared belief in the strategic competence of nations like the United States. Even those most vocally critical often see in the covert operations and vast military occupations a kind of purpose or conspiracy. The debate about empire then becomes about its moral virtue rather than the factual question of the strategic competence of imperial states. However, the lives of millions annihilated in Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan, and now increasingly throughout the continent of Africa do not reflect an amoral strategic competence. The mass murder in pursuit of the war on terrorism and its vision of nation-building is the result of lethal [ignorance] ~~stupidity~~.48 In some sense, the investigative journalism of Jeremy Scahill and Glen Greenwald attributes too much reason and order to the catastrophic floundering of the American empire.49 To see even a dark vision of order in the last thirty years of U.S. policy is itself a form of optimism. No one is in control, there is no conspiracy, and yet the killing continues. A pessimistic reading of U.S. empire and the geopolitical history that precedes it is neither tragedy nor farce. It is a catastrophic banality lacking in any and all history, a pile of nonevents so suffocating that we often hope for a conspiracy, punctuating event, or villain worthy of the scale of violence.50 For those of us who continually rewatch the reruns of The Walking Dead and Jericho on our laptops in bed, we are waiting for relief in our privileged but increasingly fragile bubble. I know I am not the only one who finds respite from the weight of politics’ “cruel optimism” by watching fantasies of cruel pessimism. A pessimistic understanding of global politics helps explain how we could come to a place where there is a sense of relief in watching everything come to an end.51 Failed ir affirms the power of this kind of negative thinking as an alternative to the endless rehearsing of moralizing insights and strategic foresight. The negative is not “against” or reacting to something. Rather, it is the affirmation of a freedom beyond the limits of life and death. That is, it is making a life by continuing to think about the world, even if that thinking is not recuperative, and even if nothing we think can save us. In the face of it all, one celebrates useless thinking, useless scholarship, and useless forms of life at the very moment we are told to throw them all under the bus in the name of survival at all costs. This is a logic referred to lately as hope and it is as cruel as it is anxiety inducing. Hope is a form of extortion. We are told that it is our obligation to bear the weight of making things better while being chided that the failure of our efforts is the result of not believing in the possibility of real change. In such an environment, pessimism is often treated as a form of treason, as if only neoliberals and moral degenerates give up—or so goes the op-ed’s insisting upon the renewed possibility of redemption. In response to these exhortations, pessimism offers a historical atheism, both methodologically and morally. The universe does not bend toward justice. Sometimes the universe bends toward the indifference of gravity wells and black holes. Affirming negativity, inspired by Achille Mbembe, is grounds for freedom, even if that freedom or relief is only fleeting and always insecure. I am not arrogant enough to think a book can attain freedom of this sort, but this book is inspired by refusals of critique as redemption in favor of useless critique and critique for its own sake. That the pursuit of knowledge without immediate application is so thoroughly useless, even profane, is a diagnosis of our current moment. The neoliberal assault on the university is evidence of this condition, as is the current pitch of American politics. Our indifference as intellectuals to maximizing value has not gone unnoticed. We are still dangerous, worthy of vilification, of attack, sabotage, and derision because we fail so decadently. We are parasites according to Scott Walker, Donald Trump, and the rest. So be it. We are and shall remain irascible irritants to a worldwide assault on thinking that is well underway and facing few obstacles in other jurisdictions. What would failed scholarship do? Learn to die, learn to live, learn to listen, learn to be together, and learn to be generous. These virtues are useless in that they do not prevent or manage things. They do not translate into learning objectives or metrics. Virtues of this order are selfsame, nontransferable experiences. They are meaningful but not useful. These are luxurious virtues. Like grieving or joy, they are ends unto themselves. But how will these ideas seek extramural grants, contribute to an outcomes-based education system, or become a policy recommendation? They will not, and that is part of their virtue. Even if there is no straight line to where we are and where we ought to be, I think we should get over the idea that somehow the U.S. project of liberal empire is conflicted, or “more right than it is wrong,” or pragmatically preferable to the alternatives. I hope this book can contribute to the urgent necessity to get out of the way by reveling in the catastrophic failure that should inspire humility but instead seems to embolden too many to seek global control yet again. Demolition may be an affirmative act if it means insurgents and others can be better heard. And yet this may fail too. If we can accomplish nothing at all, we can at least, as Ta-Nehisi Coates and other pessimists have said, refuse to suborn the lie of America any longer. Telling the truth, even if it cannot change the outcome of history, is a certain kind of solace. In Coates’s words, there is a kind of rapture “when you can no longer be lied to, when you have rejected the dream.”52 Saying the truth out loud brings with it the relief that we are not ~~crazy~~. Things really are as bad as we think. If there are those of us who want to break from this one-hundred-year-old race to be the next Henry Kissinger, then why do we continue to seek respect in the form of recognizable standards of excellence? I am not sure where the answer finally lies, but I do know that professionalization will not save us. To appear as normal and recognizably rigorous will not be enough to stave off the neoliberal drive to monetize scholarship, or to demand of us strategically useful insights. The least we can do in the face of such a battle is to find comfort in meaningful ideas and the friendships they build rather than try to perform for those we know are the problem. Some will ask, who is this “we” or is that “they”—where is your evidence? More will know exactly what I am talking about. The virtues I seek are oriented toward an academy of refuge, a place we can still live, no matter how dire the conditions of the university and the classroom. It is not the think tank, boardroom, or command center. We are, those of us who wish to be included, the last of the philosophers, the last of the lovers of knowledge, the deviants who should revel in what Harney and Moten have called the undercommons. 53 In one of his final lectures, Bataille speaks of the remnants of a dif­ferent human species, something not quite so doomed, something that wasted its newly discovered consciousness and tool-being on the art that still marks the walls of prehistoric caves.54 This lingering minor or vestigial heritage is philosophy’s beginning. Philosophy survives war, atrocity, famine, and crusades. Thinking matters in a very unusual way. Thinking is not power or emancipation. Thinking matters for a sense of belonging to the world, and for believing in the fecundity of the world despite evidence to the contrary. How do you get all this from pessimism, from failure? Because willing failure is a temptation, a lure to think otherwise, to think dangerous thoughts. Pessimism is a threat to indifferentism and nihilism in the sense of the phenomenon of Donald Trump. Pessimism is a provocation and an enemy of skepticism, particularly of the metaphysical variety. It is not redemption from these afflictions, but in pessimism there is solace in the real. To put it another way, to study the world as it is means to care for it. The exhortation that our care or interest should be contingent on how useful the world is and how much of it conforms to our designs is as much opposed to care as it is to empiricism. We can study airports, poetry, endurance races, borders, bombs, plastic, and warfare, and find them all in the world. To consider the depth of their existence can be an invitation to the world rather than a prelude to another policy report. One cannot make a successful political career out of such pursuits, but you might be able to make a life out of it, a life worth repeating even if nothing else happens. At the end of Jack Halberstam’s The Queer Art of Failure, we are presented with the Fantastic Mr. Fox’s toast as an exemple of something meaningful in these dark times of ours. They say all foxes are slightly allergic to linoleum, but it’s cool to the paw—try it. They say my tail needs to be dry cleaned twice a month, but now it’s fully detachable—see? They say our tree may never grow back, but one day, something will. Yes, these crackles are made of synthetic goose and these giblets come from artificial squab and even these apples look fake—but at least they’ve got stars on them. I guess my point is, we’ll eat tonight, and we’ll eat together. And even in this not particularly flattering light, you are without a doubt the five and a half most wonderful wild animals I’ve ever met in my life. So let’s raise our boxes—to our survival. Halberstam says of this queer moment: Not quite a credo, something short of a toast, a little less than a speech, but Mr. Fox gives here one of the best and most moving—both emotionally and in stop-motion terms—addresses in the history of cinema. Unlike Coraline, where survival is predicated upon a rejection of the theatrical, the queer, and the improvised, and like Where the Wild Things Are, where the disappointment of deliverance must be leavened with the pragmatism of possibility, Fantastic Mr. Fox is a queerly animated classic in that it teaches us, as Finding Nemo, Chicken Run, and so many other revolting animations before it, to believe in detachable tails, fake apples, eating together, adapting to the lighting, risk, sissy sons, and the sheer importance of survival for all those wild souls that the farmers, the teachers, the preachers, and the politicians would like to bury alive.55 Although not as much fun as Halberstam’s monument to low theory, Savage Ecology is for all the other wild animals out there studying global politics. May we be buried alive together.

### Alt — Relationism

#### The alternative is relationalism.

Grove 22 [Jairus Victor Grove; Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Hawai'i Research Center for Future Studies at the University of Hawai'i; 6-29-2022; "The President as Mascot: Relations All the Way Down"; *Uncertainty and Its Discontents: Worldviews in World Politics*, Part I - Substantialism and Relationalism, Chapter 4; https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/uncertainty-and-its-discontents/4F8C9A81F97824652654F3BEC6E1F889; KL]

The occasion of this collection is the problem of worldviews for the field of international relations (IR). I want to invoke this problem in more than one sense. First, I am interested in how the kinds of worldviews we inhabit change the way we study international relations. In my case, I will try to present the reasoning behind my methodological decision to adopt a relational world view as opposed to a mechanistic world view made up of discrete objects with specific and stable essences. Second, I want to show the way that worldviews function in our relational world — that is, in practice.

In an attempt to create a conversation across the different chapters, I offer an account of what I think relationalism is and its origins within the tradition of international relations. As is often the case of adherents to a particular position, I want to show that we are all relationalists, just some better and more explicit than others. I also want to dispel a few presumptions about what I think relationalism can and cannot do, and give a sketch of what a relational approach could look like in addressing a seemingly straightforward legal or technical question about nuclear authority.

4.1 What is Relationalism, for Me?

First and foremost, relationalism is an is, not a should. I mean it as a claim to how I believe the world actually works. For me, it comes primarily from the radical empiricist tradition of William James, C.S. Pierce, Alfred North Whitehead, John Dewey, and Gabriel Tarde. Second, the goal of a relational approach is to figure out how things — including people, states, and technological systems — actually work, rather than to make claims about how things should work or predictive claims about how things will continue to work. Therefore, it is in the philosophical sense a realist position not primarily interested in questions of representation or interpretation, but also not indifferent to them. Relationalism sees problems of human access to the world (representation) and problems of meaning-making and communication (hermeneutics) as being horizontal with other relations, such as those we think of as biological or technological. This has been described by Manuel Delanda as a “flat ontology.”1 Human observation and interpretation is on the ground floor with everything else, rather than above it, apart from it, or looking down at the world.

Although it certainly has a strong claim to ontology — how things are — relationalism is an ontology of becoming. Process is privileged over structure or fixity in the traditional sense. Highly dynamic and transversal ecosystems are privileged over equilibrium systems such as those imagined by Talcott Parsons or other Hegelian inheritors who see the world as turgid and therefore only open to gradual and often purposive change.

The correlate to an emphasis on becoming or the dynamic evolutionary character of change within systems and of systems directs us to investigate processes — stories about distributed formations and deformations — rather than agents or variables which could be said to be the “effect” of a process. In part, the so-called “flat ontology” of relational worldviews renders distinctions between independent and dependent variables, and agents and structures, somewhat arbitrary. As an aside, arbitrary here does not mean meaningless. It simply means not essential — that is, not bearing an essence. What is causally significant, what is an agent, what is a system instead is most often an effect of investigation. At what scale one asks the question, and the scale of the investigator, radically alters what appears as a part and what appears as a whole. For instance, from this perspective, the methodological individualism of social theory and many other theories is not a natural unit of analysis. Instead, the focus on the individual as a causal principle comes from the unity we “feel” as an “I.”

We rarely experience ourselves as disaggregated (although drug-induced effects, bouts of madness, dreaming, etc., are exceptions most people experience over the course of their lives). However, we are disaggregated. From William James’ Principles of Psychology, in which we are a “bundle of affects and perceptions,”2 through to contemporary neuroscience investigations of mood-altering gut bacteria, preconscious decision-making, and increasingly compelling philosophical accounts of a subjectless human by Galen Strawson and others, we have strong reason to believe that even this most basic unit quickly begins to come apart at the seams as we zoom in for closer investigation.3 <<<FOOTNOTE 3 BEGINS>>> 3 Many philosophers of mind, neuroscientists, and political theorists have given compelling, data-rich accounts of human action and will that do not require a knowing, prospective subject. Consciousness is for many contemporary neuroscientists perpetually late to the party. We act and experience and reflect in that order not the other way around. Of the many claims for which Nau is most concerned, this issue raises a serious conundrum for his world view. Nau wants a world of realist, rigorous science to act as a foundation for scholarship and a self-possessed, autonomous scholar to conduct that rigorous science that is in contradiction with the findings of science and much of contemporary philosophy of mind. For me, whether we are free in the way that Nau discusses mind and agency is an empirical question long since discounted by the modernist western scientific culture he seeks to defend. See Strawson 2018; Edelman 2007; Connolly 2002. <<<FOOTNOTE 3 ENDS>>>

As we zoom out, the litany of parts reveals more and more wholes. Consider group behavior in the form of riots and crowds, which exhibit flocking behavior even in humans. Extending the view just a little further, communities and then societies appear in which the lack of central planning (and even contrary to central planning) there is repetitive behavior, cooperation, and transactions of all kinds. An aerial view of a major highway system exhibits behavioral phenomena vastly beyond the conscious coordinating capability of individual humans or the technology they are interfacing with. Despite the high number of auto fatalities, that there are not more is astounding. The average daily commute is more than an hour a day of barely conscious muscle memory playing out amongst thousands of actors with little to no communication beyond turn signals and the occasional horn. And what about zooming out much further? If we occupy the space between the earthrise and Carl Sagan’s little blue dot, the entire planet becomes something like James Lovelock’s Gaia. The earth from this perspective is a kind of superorganism of feedback mechanisms, from the carbon cycle to the birth, death, and reabsorption of all of the necessary chemical and mineral components, as well as the creative drive to incorporate them into newly innovative forms of life. Scale as a spacetime, how close and for how long, drives the units of analysis and not the “natural” or “essential” unity of those units. Instead, there are relations at every scale crossing into every other scale. Which relations are most important, most operative, and most determinative of change or stability depends upon the region investigated.

Finally, we have the very strange and exotic wholes which make up much of international relations. So far, the descriptions of parts have been in some sense mechanical, or could be interpreted as such (i.e. brains or weapons, etc.). However, what about Benedict Anderson’s imagined communities? Collectivities can feel history and connection with those they have never met, and will show up to fight a war for the injury of those anonymous brethren. Even the strange magic of memory and consciousness scales very differently when considered at different scales. However, we should not separate consciousness or memory from the networks of neurons, perceptions, gut bacteria, print media, and social network platforms that make it possible for consciousness to travel, imitate, innovate, and reaffirm conceptual habits.

At all scales, relationalism describes a multitude of relay and feedbacks constitutive of the processes that give form to what we experience as part— whole relationships in time. Many endure at different scales (plate tectonics for eons, species differences for shorter durations, fashion trends or diplomatic crisis for durations of hours or days) but they only exist, in some sense, solely in their process. When the relations change, the process is over or altered, and the only thing that remains is the impression left on the new arrangement by the arrangements that preceded it. This is true, according to relationalism, from the intimacy of identity all the way to the formation of stars.

While I follow a relational and primarily historical and interpretive approach, I do depart from many other adherents of relationalism in two significant ways.4 The first involves the assumption of an ethical or normative content to what Milja Kurki calls the “relational cosmology” of the “relational revolution” (Chapter 3, this volume). Kurki believes an ethical impulse is “baked into” a relational worldview. There are a number of examples of this in contemporary theory inside and outside of IR. Two variants are those following Judith Butler and her debt to Emmanuel Levinas and Hannah Arendt, who account for violence as an abrogation of relations and a possibility of nonviolence in relations themselves. Here, violence is in some sense the ignoring of a fundamental relationality among human beings that would, if recognized, create an understanding mutuality opposed to violence. From these accounts, consciousness-raising about the fact of relationality is a solution to global violence just as “realizing” and “experiencing” relationality makes us open or indebted to “the other,” to use Levinas’ terms. The second variant focuses more on the natural environment and violence against nonhuman others. From this perspective on relationality, environmental destruction and extreme cruelty toward nonhuman animals is, like the Levinasian/Arendtian account, the result of a loss of relationality often attributed to modernist accounts of mind/body and nature/culture dualisms, or, more generally, of anthropocentrism. Like normative relationalism, the environmental strand believes that an awareness of this fact, or a cultivation of an ethos of interdependence beyond the human species, will reduce violence and possibly may make planetary life more sustainable. It is not unusual to take as evidence of this position the confluence of environmental protections by indigenous peoples with relational cosmologies.

Both variants conflate the methodological insights of relationalism with a relational worldview. One is empirical while the other is aspirational. The risk, I believe, in this conflation is a confusion of expectations and a false sense that one has solved more philosophical questions than are possible to solve. It is enough to have an account of the world that integrates ideational and material forces into a single substance and ontology. We ought not expect that this, in addition, restores the world to some perfect order, or that striving for a more universal notion of the good escapes somehow the deep problems of competing interests, relativism, or incommensurable worldviews. Too often the appeal to relationalism’s debt to science or fundamental, ancient ontologies is used to depoliticize its normative commitments. However, the ambivalent relationship between relationalism’s cosmological and scientific origin stories ought to demand the inverse. Rather than seeing relationality as an ethical exit from particularity and the divisions in politics, it ought to insist upon both as the beginning of inquiry.

While an ethics can be built within a relational ontology, it does not necessarily follow from the ontological insights. After all, seals and great white sharks are deeply relational and aware of each other, and yet could not easily arrive at a common sense of the good. If any interspecies consensus could be reached between predator and prey, it would be minimal (maybe a consensus value on saving the ocean, for instance) and not as a mere result of their relationality, which is mostly characterized by teeth and blood. Could such a relationship be at least free of violence? Even that seems far-fetched given the findings of animal behaviorists that predators enjoy their hunt; killing for fun has been observed in orcas, dolphins, and cats.

In fact, rather than say that relationality and violence are opposed, I believe that the opposite claim can and should be made. If everything is relational — from our cells to our consciousness — then certainly violence is relational too. To go a step further, violence — a thoroughly human concept — only distinguishes itself from force or change because of the particular relationships of attention and intimacy which make cruelty possible. What makes an earthquake tragic — that is, unavoidable and indebted to no misanthropy or purposive end — is precisely what makes an act of war violent. Malice, sadism, cruelty, cultivated indifference — all of these extra characteristics are what change the ecological and political relations of actions such that they are violent as opposed to something else.

The second error of many relational approaches is to treat relations as a metaphor, or an independent substance. This is a common error of network theories and assemblage theories. In both cases relations are abstracted from the environment, resulting in an image of “nodes” which fall back into the original trap of agents — that is, unified, essential entities, independent of relations and surrounded by a “web” of connectors. This image is often borrowed from the internet existence we all live amidst. The vast series of “tubes” connecting things are either thought of as an independent substance, like the wires and fiberoptic cables of the network society, or as a kind of metaphor for communication across the ether between nodes.

Either way, treating relations as a “thing” misses the entire point of the ecological approach. We are not constituted by relations. We are relations. Or, more accurately, everything is an unfolding and refolding process of relations. There are no solid inputs or outputs. All of life is origami. The differences are in the folds, not the substance. A relational approach does not study relations instead of actors or instead of parts. A relational approach studies the folds and processes that make differences, hence the ability to differentiate the therapeutic cut of a scalpel to remove a gangrenous hand, the punitive surgical removal of a hand because someone has been convicted of theft, and the horror of having your hand blown off by an adversary trying to kill you. Mechanistically they are all similar at one level, in that they all involve pain, a missing hand, or another actor creating the condition of losing a hand, a weapon, or a tool. At another level — that of the psycho-social economy, the chances of survival, the character of the trauma, and the feelings of gratitude or revenge — it is the variability of the relations of the process which will be the basis for creating these differences. This is what I mean by an ecological approach. There are not entities with relations; it is relations all the way down.

For me, relationalism is an entry point into the complexities of global violence rather than an exit from or prophylactic against it. Similarly, the highly complex and dispersed systems which make violence possible, from breathable air to enmity to the technological systems of enacting violence on larger and larger scales, to the rich histories of national belonging as well as forms-of-life which form the basis of legible differences, suggest to me that a relational approach is incredibly productive for studying such the variable and unstable arrangement of the things that constitute global orders. In what follows, I will present one example of how a relational approach would alter our discussion and research. The example focuses on nuclear weapons, particularly the relationship between constitutional authority and command, and control capability, which are often treated as completely separate questions. My discussion of nuclear weapons command and control is not meant to offer comprehensive accounts of the vast literatures on this question. Instead, I want to show what kinds of questions or research might become visible with a shift to a relational ontology and an ecological research agenda.

### Alt — Revolution

#### The alternative is a tactical ecological revolution against capitalism. When faced with “ruin or revolution” side with the ecological proletariat.

Foster 21 — John Bellamy, American professor of sociology at the University of Oregon and editor of the Monthly Review 12-1-2021, "Monthly Review," Monthly Review, https://monthlyreview.org/2021/12/01/against-doomsday-scenarios/, accessed 7-3-2022 //THS—OLW

(4) Whatever one may think of his particular stance—which derives from a view that we must now be prepared to consider using all the means necessary to save the earth as a home for humanity—Malm has done the movement a favor in How to Blow Up a Pipeline (a work that is more reasonable than its provocative title suggests), by raising some of the most difficult concrete issues of tactics and militancy. Specifically, Malm asks us to consider to what extent and in what ways the climate movement will respond to the violence of ecocide/omnicide with its own tactics, including sabotage and violence against property. Nonviolent mass protest is obviously to be preferred. Still, we live in the context of a capitalist state, which defines itself in terms of a self-referential system of law, designed to protect and legitimize the existing exploitative order and, as Max Weber stressed (only a decade and a half before the rise of the Nazi regime), confers on itself “the monopoly of the legitimate use of force.” It often responds to threats to established authority with the use of force and violence, including—where necessary to preserve the existing property order—martial law/states of emergency and imperial war, which today has become permanent. There is a dialectic of violence in how the system operates and through which it constitutes itself.

Sabotage (which of course derives etymologically from the French sabot, wooden shoe, and from workers throwing shoes in machines) will necessarily be part of an ecological revolution, and so will attacks on private property, given that the owners of the means of production (the wealthy and corporations) are destroying the earth itself so as to expand their financial holdings. Malm quotes Nelson Mandela, in the struggle against Apartheid, in which he declared: “‘I called for non-violent protest as long as it was effective’ as ‘a tactic that should be abandoned when it no longer worked.’” It seems inevitable to me that as the stakes for humanity rise, more and more people will inevitably take this general stance, recognizing that human survival (as well as human freedom) is at issue. How could it be otherwise, if the system refuses to respond to human needs to the point of endangering human survival? I think Kim Stanley Robinson was quite realistic in his recent novel The Ministry for the Future in making the recourse to violent resistance by some revolutionary ecological groups part of the mix and helping people develop a sympathetic understanding of why and how this could happen, while not actually advocating it.

One example of a tactic that I do support at present is that of the valve turners in North America. On October 11, 2016, five climate activists closed the valves on four of the pipelines carrying tar sands oil from Canada into the United States. A full 15 percent of U.S. crude oil imports were closed down for nearly a day. To make sure worker safety was not violated, a call was made to each company’s emergency response around fifteen minutes before the valve turners entered the sites, giving the corporations plenty of time to shut each pipeline down. The valve turners were charged with felonies, including criminal sabotage. They are being defended by Lauren Regan, one of the foremost environmental and civil rights lawyers in the United States, as well as an MR author. Regan and her organization, the Civil Liberties Defense Council, where I am an advisory board member, has relied, with considerable success, on employing the necessity defense, not used for many years in U.S. law, arguing that the valve turners had no choice, since their actions were not only necessary but morally and legally justified in order to avoid catastrophic harm to humanity and all life on Earth. Juries several times refused to convict the valve turners, agreeing with their necessity defense.

JM/OM: What do you think should be the immediate demands, goals, and tactics of the climate movement?

JBF: This is a very big question. Since we have been talking already about tactics, I will focus on demands and goals.

Clearly the goal, at a minimum, has to be to stay below a 1.5°C increase in global average temperatures, which is the most optimistic scenario of the IPCC, which will then, it is hoped, allow a return to a 1.4°C increase by the end of the century or into the next century. This until 2040, as the IPPC says in its leaked Part III report, however, requires facing the fact that fundamental structural change in the present socioeconomic system is needed and that capitalism, as a system, is “unsustainable.” Here, the IPCC cites figures like Hickel and Malm. The only real hope in the years immediately ahead, the leaked “Mitigation Report” suggests, is low-energy strategies, which can reduce energy use by 40 percent, while at the same time improving the human condition. It is this, and not the technology, which now cannot be introduced fast enough. (Solar and wind account for only 7 percent of total energy consumption worldwide at present; direct air capture and Bioenergy and Carbon Capture and Sequestration do not exist on an adequate scale as technologies today; nuclear with all its attendant problems cannot fill the gap, nor should it.) Negative emissions, the science tells us, are necessary on a supplemental basis, if we are to not break the climate budget, but this can be achieved by improved forestry, agricultural and soil methods, such as maintaining soil organic matter, without geoengineering. Basically, humanity needs a quick transition, and this can only occur by the self-mobilization of populations and fundamental alterations in social relations.

Whatever way we look at it, it means an ecological revolution, affecting social relations, on a scale beyond anything humanity has ever seen before—or we will not make it. As Marx said when confronted with the severe ecological problems in Ireland, it is a question of “ruin or revolution.” Moreover, the burden in our time has to be put primarily on the rich countries, since they are the ones that have used up most of the global carbon budget, have higher per capita wealth, the highest per capita energy consumption, the highest carbon footprints per capita, and also monopolize much of the technology. The core capitalist system in the Global North is primarily responsible for most of the increases in carbon dioxide accumulated in the atmosphere since the Industrial Revolution. Today, the bulk of worldwide carbon dioxide emissions are concentrated in a few hundred global corporations and military spending. All of this underscores that the rich capitalist countries at the center of the world system owe an ecological debt to the rest of the world. They thus have the main responsibility for fixing the problem by bringing their economies more in line with the world average energy consumption. This requires going against the logic of capitalism in order to save the planet as a safe home for humanity.

Part III of the leaked IPCC report explicitly supports climate strikes, a just transition, environmental justice, mass movements, protecting the vulnerable, and fundamental, “transformative change” in society. It says no new coal-fired plants can be started up from now on and that all existing ones have to be eliminated in a decade; sports utilities have to go; we need “new cities” that are not engines of ecological destruction; public transportation has to be expanded; pipelines have to be removed; fossil fuels have to stay in the ground, made possible by low-carbon pathways. Our whole production and consumption system has to change and to do this people will have to change it, going against corporations.

However, mitigation itself is no longer enough, because catastrophe is at our doorsteps at present, even if we still have time to avoid the point of no return if we act decisively enough and on a big enough scale. Humanity needs to mitigate the problem, that is, to stop global heating and reach net zero carbon emissions by 2050 (net zero is significant because we no longer have the possibility of meeting the below-1.5°C or even the below-2°C targets without negative emissions). But we are also facing the reality that, even in the most optimistic scenario, climate conditions will deteriorate for most of this century. We have to act to protect what Marx called “the chain of human generations,” reconstituting society on an ecosocialist basis—not just for the future, but also now for the present. This can help the cause of ecological revolution, propelling people into action.

#### The alternative accelerates history – this leads to a radical transformation of relations and cracks the class-power edifice

Foster 21 — John Bellamy, American professor of sociology at the University of Oregon and editor of the Monthly Review 12-1-2021, "Monthly Review," Monthly Review, https://monthlyreview.org/2021/12/01/against-doomsday-scenarios/, accessed 7-3-2022 //THS—OLW

JM/OM: You often say, “it is ruin or revolution.” What do you think that revolution will look like, and how can and should we work toward revolution today?

JBF: A revolution—as the cultural theorist Jacob Burckhardt said in the nineteenth century—is an enormous “acceleration of history.” The only way to address capitalism’s disruption of the ecological cycles of the planet is such an acceleration of history, one in which humanity mobilizes on the largest scale possible, based on a new environmental proletariat, encompassing the full range of material needs (environmental and economic, productive and reproductive), aimed at the radical transformation of existing social relations and the creation of a socialist ecological society. Such a movement will have to take place globally and at numerous levels, with breaks within the existing order not simply at the bottom, but cracking the entire class-power edifice and its political-economic hegemony, reflecting that this is an existential crisis. It will need simultaneously to be a cultural, ecological, social, and economic revolution. In my 1994 book The Vulnerable Planet, I argued that the economic impact on the earth due to capitalism was accelerating to the point that the economy was now rivaling the ecological cycles of the entire planet. In the second edition of the book, in 1999, I argued that the only answer was to accelerate history beyond the current mode of production through a social and ecological revolution—so as to transcend the accumulative society of capitalism and create a community with the earth. The issues remain the same, but we are much further down the garden path.

#### There’s a paradigm shift now towards the alt.

CJ Atkins 21. Managing Editor at People’s World with a Ph.D. in political science from York University in Toronto. Neoliberalism’s in trouble: A Marxist look at the American Rescue Act. People's World. 3-11-2021. https://www.peoplesworld.org/article/neoliberalisms-in-trouble-a-marxist-look-at-the-american-rescue-act/

Change from below Many analysts are taking notice of this paradigm change. Paul McCulley, a business professor at Georgetown, told the New York Times earlier this week, “Having the tools of economic stabilization work a whole lot more through the fiscal channel and a whole lot less through the monetary channel is a profound, pro-democracy policy mix.” In plainer language: It’s better to have elected representatives rather than unelected bankers making the call on how public money is spent. Some media commentators are seeing the shift, but they’re missing the real reasons for why it’s happening. Times opinion writer Neil Irwin, for instance, characterizes it as a battle between “pointy-headed technocrats” and lawmakers, or as the headline of his article earlier this week put it, “Move over, nerds. It’s the politicians’ economy now.” Without the insights that come from a class analysis of the situation, Irwin and other commentators in the bourgeois press continue to look only at the differences among those at the top of society to explain social change. The truth, however, is that the pressure now being applied to neoliberal ideology is the result of class struggle from below. Since the last recession, working-class action has been steadily building and gaining strength. The first sparks came in the Occupy Wall Street movement that emerged in the wake of the financial crisis. There were the two Bernie Sanders campaigns for president as well as that of Elizabeth Warren, which inserted explicitly social democratic demands like Medicare for All into public conversation. The trade union movement has begun to reverse its decades-long decline, with new organizing efforts like the campaign by Alabama Amazon workers showing that more and more workers are looking to collective action as the way to improve their lives. The Black Lives Matter national uprising, with its demand to defund policing and militarization and redirect funds toward human needs, has melded together the fights to end racism and economic inequality. Opinion polls have shown interest in the ideas of socialism gaining steam for several years already, showing up also in the fact that left-wing organizations like Democratic Socialists of America and the Communist Party USA have seen explosive growth. The 2018 and 2020 elections were further proof, as the caucus of progressive legislators swelled. Bold women of color leaders like Reps. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Ayanna Pressley, Ilhan Omar, and Pramila Jayapal now lead the charge in Washington on everything from the Green New Deal to the Fight for $15 and more. The mass death and destruction experienced in the past year because of coronavirus have only accelerated the trend of people questioning the status quo and looking for alternatives. The pandemic has accelerated class struggle trends that were already becoming apparent. Increasingly, millions are questioning capitalism, as shown by this message spray-painted onto a wall in Toronto. | C.J. Atkins / People’s World All this simmering of organized working-class activity and political growth—driven by the material conditions workers and oppressed people find themselves living in—is having an impact at the national level of policy and debate. In Marxist terms, changes in the economic foundation of society are affecting mass consciousness and therefore prodding change in the superstructure—the legal, political, and philosophical ideas of our times. Old ideologies like neoliberal capitalism are under pressure from new ones arising out of class struggle. Those new ideas are not yet fully formed, though, and the forces pushing them are not yet strong enough to assert their power at all times. The new is still in conflict with the old, and the outcomes are uneven. Allies (like politicians) will at times waver. Victories will be real, but incomplete (like the dropping of the $15 minimum wage from the ARA). Defeats are not unavoidable. As Frederick Engels wrote, “History makes itself in such a way that the final result always arises from conflicts…there are innumerable intersecting forces.” So the American Rescue Plan, despite whatever we didn’t get out of it, is a big win for the working class. The people have been demanding a change in how our economy operates and whom it benefits. Organization and unity are making it happen—the 2020 election was proof of that as well.

#### Conceded try-or-die framing de-fangs utopian fiat AND is an independent disad to the perm

Foster 21 — John Bellamy, American professor of sociology at the University of Oregon and editor of the Monthly Review 12-1-2021, "Monthly Review," Monthly Review, https://monthlyreview.org/2021/12/01/against-doomsday-scenarios/, accessed 7-3-2022 //THS—OLW

All of this may sound utopian, but the negative sense of utopian as an ideal dream, reflecting the original Latin meaning of nowhere that Thomas More played on, has no real meaning in our time—nor can we afford to dwell on dystopia—when the world scientific consensus tells us that we either make fundamental, rapid, social-structural change on a global basis or industrial civilization and the future of humanity is crushed. There is only human struggle in an increasingly harsh environment, the product of the Capitalinian Age of the Anthropocene Epoch. The planetary environment as a whole is rapidly changing around us as a result of the system that we have created and there is no standing still. None of our existing social institutions will survive existing trends, which, if we continue much longer on the present path during this century, will almost certainly, the world scientific consensus suggests, bring down industrial civilization itself.

Capitalism is rapidly carrying out environmental changes that have already compromised the planet as a safe space for humanity during this century. Its famous creative destruction is now undermining the earth itself. There is no option left but ecological revolution, which means simply that the people, in their endless numbers, will once again be compelled to take history into their own hands, in a struggle that is likely to be stormy and chaotic, but that will also demonstrate the power and endless creativity of humanity, offering the possibility of a new ecological renaissance. There is no guarantee, of course, that in such a struggle we will succeed. Marx once said no attempt at world-historical change is ever undertaken on the basis of infallible guarantees. All that we know for certain, is that, with whole generations seeing their future being stripped away, and humanity’s existence imperiled, it is inevitable that hundreds of millions of people, if not reaching into the billions, will resist, leading to what will undoubtedly be the greatest series of revolts in history, taking place throughout the planet. We can already see this in the farmers’ revolt in India, the school climate strikes in Europe, and the battle over Standing Rock in North America. This points to a new environmental proletariat, responding to the material needs that are equally economic and ecological, productive and reproductive. It is there that our hope lies: the creation of a whole new geological (and historical) age of the earth, the Communian.

### Alt — Quantum

#### The alternative is quantum holography. That challenges the tautological ontology of the Newtonian narrative.

Chengxin Pan 20, Faculty of Arts and Education, Deakin University, Australia, 2020, “Enfolding wholes in parts: quantum holography and International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations 2020, Vol. 26(S1) 14–38

Despite its name, International Relations (IR) has long been predicated on a Newtonian substantialist ontology of things, rather than an ontology of relations, which are “the important missing dimension in most theories of IR” (Wight, 2006: 296). In recent years, IR’s “deep Newtonian slumber” (Ruggie, 1998: 194) has been disturbed by a “relational turn” (Bousquet and Curtis, 2011; Jackson and Nexon, 1999; Kavalski, 2018; McClurg and Young, 2011; Neumann, 2013; Nexon, 2010; Nordin et al., 2019; Nordin and Smith, 2018; Qin, 2018; Shih, 2016; Trownsell et al., 2019). Challenging two versions of Newtonian substantialism: atomism (individualism) and structuralism (structuralistsubstantialism) (Zanotti, 2017; see also Wendt, 1999: 26), the gist of this turn is that the fundamental reality is not independent things, but relations. Focusing on “a relation between entities” (Jackson and Nexon, 2019: 584–585, emphases in original), the relational scholarship also departs from the agent-structure and level-of-analysis debates. Yet, despite this significant and welcome development, IR’s relational turn suffers several drawbacks. First, it lacks a clear conception of relations/relationality beyond often tautological definitions. Second, insisting on the temporal priority of relations over entities, much of the literature sidesteps an implicit “chicken-egg” dilemma between entities and relations. Further and more importantly, the relational turn has not yet seriously engaged with another important development in the social sciences in general and IR in particular, namely, the “quantum turn” (Keeley, 2007; Wendt, 2015), or according to Der Derian and Wendt (2020), a permanent quantum revolution. This neglect is both surprising and lamentable. Both turns share an anti-Newtonian stand, and as a “momentous shift in metaphysical outlook” (Seager, 2018: 5), quantum mechanics espouses a doctrine of relational holism “in an all pervasive way” (Teller, 1986: 71), which would make quantum theory a valuable source in IR’s relational quest. To be fair, at least in the IR context the neglect seems mutual. With few exceptions and some general references to relational ontology (e.g. Wendt, 2015; Fierke, 2017; Zanotti, 2017), the burgeoning quantum turn literature in IR has not focused extensively on relations either. Wendt’s pioneering work on quantum theory, for example, is driven primarily by the need to “reconcile consciousness and meaning with the material world” (Wendt, 2006: 218), though he acknowledges that quantum mechanics’ holistic and relational contribution is “a thematic that needs to be developed down the road” (Wendt, 2015: 35). Therefore, the gap between these two turns in IR calls for an explicit quantum relational perspective. This is what this article sets out to do, by offering, more specifically, a quantum holographic approach. The basic notion of holography is that an “object” is “part of the whole while it simultaneously contains the whole” (Van Daele, 2018: 651, emphases added).1 In quantum theory, the holographic principle promises a solution to the well-known tensions between atomic-level quantum physics and Albert Einstein’s planet-level theory of gravity by suggesting that the universe is a holographic projection: what appears on the surface (event horizon) of a black hole is encoded information about what is inside, “just as a two-dimensional hologram encodes a three-dimensional image” (Merali, 2013: 517). So far still largely alien to this field (few exceptions include Pan, 2018; Wendt, 2015), quantum holography adds value to IR in several important ways. First, as a specific form of relationality, quantum holography helps mitigate the existing definitional vagueness about relations. Second, instead of asserting relations’ priority over entities, quantum holography accentuates the ontological duality of relations and things. Avoiding the ontological chickenegg dilemma over which comes first, the duality proposition suggests that relations do not exist either before or after things; rather, relations are from the outset implicated or embodied in things. Relations-in-things are implicate relations that can be better understood through quantum mechanics, whereas things-in-relations (and relations-between-things) represent more classical understandings of relations as something external, compositional, and derivative. Third, quantum holography provides a deeper and more sophisticated understanding of relations, including whole-part relations and internal relations, which have not been adequately theorized in IR. Furthermore, its differentiation between explicate and implicate relations enables us to incorporate mainstream IR’s Newtonian ontology as a limiting case in a broader quantum relational ontology, rather than simply brush it aside.

### Alt — Transmedial Storytelling

#### Thus we affirm a methodology of transmedial storytelling – an academic pedagogy that disrupts the linearity and universality of Western thought and travels across time and space to unearth the hidden histories of coloniality – rather than invest in liberal techno-futurity we seek radical possibility by shifting our gaze to the past.

Dernikos and Thiel ‘19 (Dr. Bessie P. Dernikos, Assistant Professor, joined the Department of Curriculum and Instruction in Florida Atlantic University’s College of Education in August 2015. She teaches courses in reading and language arts. Dr. Dernikos brings her experience and expertise in literacy education to the Department of Teaching and Learning. She has previously developed curricula and syllabi to introduce pre– and in-service teachers to educational theory, reading and writing development, practitioner research, curriculum design and assessment-based literacy instruction. Jaye Johnson Thiel, PhD. University of Alabama; 11 December 2019, “Literacy learning as cruelly optimistic: recovering possible lost futures through transmedial storytelling,” https://doi.org/10.1111/lit.12207; accessed 7/2/2022) ng

While the research on reader response has accounted for the ways that colonial histories shape the present, there has been, to date, little exploration of the ways that reading practices can, at times, keep us stuck in an affective time warp – that is, how the past continually merges with the present and future in potentially threatening ways. We are especially interested in how transmedial storytelling might function as a relational and ethical process of disruption in order to make visible that which “cannot be easily seen in the conventional methodological sense” (Blackman, 2019, p. 18). As such, we explore literacies/reader responses as a queer form of storytelling and time-travel: “not queer as in strange, but queer as undoing, queer as ‘trans/ formation’” (p. 247). Using the postqualitative approach of thinking with theory (Jackson and Mazzei, 2012), we think with theories of affect – specifically, cruel optimism (Berlant, 2011) alongside transmediality (Blackman, 2019, p. 23) – as methodological and analytical tools. Thinking with theory is an embodied engagement that calls on researchers to read data through particular theoretical lenses. While difficult to capture with words (Jackson and Mazzei, 2012), this process involves “poring over the data, annotating, describing, linking, bringing theory to bear, recalling what others have written and seeing things from different angles” (MacLure, 2013, p. 174). Rather than treating data here as a still object to code, dissect and examine for conclusive patterns, we see it as agential matter that calls forth new and different possibilities. In other words, the ongoing and open-endedness of thinking with data/theory open us up to multiple ways of engaging with literacy learning and instruction, as well as different times and spaces. Less concerned, then, with representational fidelity (Dernikos, 2018; Niccolini, 2016), we position transmedial storytelling as a radical politics that invites us to consider moments within educational spaces as affective “scenes of entanglement”: “disjointed, emotional, bent and other wordly” (Blackman, 2019, p. 57) scenes that serve to highlight the “normalised” fantasies we have created in terms of who counts as literate and what counts as proper aesthetic responses to text which, in turn, become enmeshed with what counts as proper personhood. According to Blackman (2019), science is a “storytelling machine” with the propensity to “sanitise, excise or even exorcise narratives, actors, agents and entities” (p. 41). This machine furthers a dominant narrative that not only decontextualises time and space, but also affectively circulates to re/produce student bodies in myriad ways, for example, as “struggling,” “unsuccessful” and even learning “disabled” (see e.g. Dernikos, 2018; Souto-Manning, Dernikos, and Yu, 2016). As a larger destructive force, it has the potential to violently impact our capacity to read, write, think, imagine and respond otherwise, thereby closing off other ways of knowing, being and doing. Yet, as Blackman argues, there is always more than one story being told at a time, as any narrative is “multiplatform” (p. 19): It does not exist in one place, is distributed across time and space and is enacted by multiple agents, actors, agencies, entities and objects … the history of storytelling is one that is transmedial … .transmedial storytelling is a form of storytelling that sets in motion fugitive and fossilised times and that allows new visibilities to be shaped …(pp. 22, 51) Through transmedial storytelling, we seek to unearth the dominant stories that are often held as truths so as to create moments of possibilities, or different narratives, that “enliven rather than report, to render rather than represent, to resonate rather than validate, to rupture and reimagine rather than to faithfully describe” (Vannini, 2015, p. 15). In this way, we think with data/theories of affect as “scenes of entanglement” (Blackman, 2019, p. 23) so as to reimagine standardised understandings and taken for granted notions of what it means to be successfully literate. The data that we explore here derived from a larger 6-month post/ qualitative study examining the affective encounters that impacted the making of first grade students as “un/successful” readers (see Dernikos, 2015, 2018). As we share these scenes of entanglement, we offer a glimpse of two young people who are considered “good” readers and explore the affective potentialities that social, political and economic forces unknowingly impose on their reading lives.

#### Reject the techno-liberal dream of the resolution -- we take refuge in forgotten narratives, venture into the affective terrain of the unknown and the unseen, in order to create decolonial futures.

Dernikos and Thiel 19 (Dr. Bessie P. Dernikos, Assistant Professor, joined the Department of Curriculum and Instruction in Florida Atlantic University’s College of Education in August 2015. She teaches courses in reading and language arts. Dr. Dernikos brings her experience and expertise in literacy education to the Department of Teaching and Learning. She has previously developed curricula and syllabi to introduce pre– and in-service teachers to educational theory, reading and writing development, practitioner research, curriculum design and assessment-based literacy instruction. Jaye Johnson Thiel, PhD. University of Alabama; 11 December 2019, “Literacy learning as cruelly optimistic: recovering possible lost futures through transmedial storytelling,” https://doi.org/10.1111/lit.12207; accessed 7/2/2022) ng

Since most of us have been conditioned to think of literacy as “power,” a “state of grace”, or a necessary skill needed to function in the modern world (Scribner, 1984, p.8), it might seem odd to think about literacy as a problematic object of attachment – as cruelly optimistic. Yet here we are. It is clear in the case of both Carl and Beth that being a “good” reader comes with fraught decisions and the ability to navigate relations of attachment that are either “impossible, sheer fantasy, or too possible, and toxic” (Berlant, 2011, p. 24). Take reading standards. They are supposed to be helpful, fill in gaps and open a world of possibilities, but for both Carl and Beth –both considered “good” readers– these standards produced something else, something cruel. According to Ahmed (2011), forces mold and shape us, where any given moment can be impressive and/ or oppressive. But interestingly enough, this pressing – in whatever form it takes – is often meant as good will. Perhaps this is what is most cruel (Berlant, 2006) about mainstream literacy policies/practices and national efforts to standardise literacy education – they are actually meant to help students, like Carl and Beth, achieve the dream of a “good” or “better life” (Jones and Vagle, 2013). However, this promise will never be achieved if we ignore the precarities of the past: The aftermath of colonialism and the ways our reading practices are shaped in relation to other times, spaces, people and places (Sharpe, 2016). As literacy educators and researchers committed to other ways of knowing/being/doing, transmedial storytelling helps us to mediate “possible (lost) futures in the present” (Blackman, 2019, p. 53). Mediating disrupts the rigid normativity of dominant stories that keep us affectively stuck in time(s). That said, our intent here is not to forward a prescriptive approach to literacy, as we imagine engaging in transmedial storytelling involves zigzagging unknowable pedagogical terrain, thereby opening up multiple possibilities for practice and for bodies read as un/successful. We would, nevertheless, like to offer the following questions as provocations for educators to consider so that things might be otherwise (see also Dernikos, 2018; Thiel and Kuby, 2019): • In what ways do affective forces (social, political, economic, racial, gendered, etc.) shape and re/orient pedagogical acts? • What hidden histories are lodged in the present to make certain identities im/possible for students, both as literacy learners and human beings?3 • What do certain literacy pedagogies produce? Who do they serve – at what cost and to whom? • How can transmedial storytelling guide curricular choices –e.g. by inviting educators to expand their idea of the classics (see also Dernikos, 2018; McNair, 2010) so as to embrace literature written by and about people from varied racial and ethnic backgrounds?4 • How else might literacy and teaching be practiced if we remember literacy as affective time-traveling? Questions like these provide small openings for displaced, devalued and/or simply forgotten narratives and possibilities to unfold. Attending to affect, then, reminds us that matter is not only lively but also historical; this historicity makes time-travel possible by displacing the binary logic that strictly separates the past, present and future. In other words, transmedial storytelling “sets in motion fugitive and fossilised times … that allow[s] new visibilities to be shaped” (p. 51) and offers different insights into literacy practices. As Beth’s scene of entanglement teaches us, engaging in critical literacy practices by simply introducing a book with diverse characters is not enough. We must also address the larger affective forces (e.g. social, historical, political and economic) that shape children’s interpretative responses to literature in both expected and unexpected ways. Ultimately, attachments to happy objects such as fairytales often operated to compromise Ms. Rizzo’s students, while at the same time, promising to help them become successfully literate bodies who can have “the good life” if they just follow the rules. But for Carl, Beth and other young people in this first grade classroom, learning to read was, in large part, tied to Core Knowledge read alouds and the kinds of information that presumably made for a “culturally literate” somebody: a subject aligned with a “White [middle class] and heterosexually normative narrative of the world” (Muñoz, 2000, p. 75). The problem is, as Carl suggested, that this narrative of the world is in direct opposition to the social worlds these young children lived and breathed. The hope, then, or promise of a happier “better life” inevitably begins to crumble as happy objects cling to other relational forces (e.g., gender, sexuality, race and heteronormativity) that work to limit capacities to think and feel differently – to move throughout the social in cruelly optimistic ways. We call on educators to recognise that standardised literacy policies (such as Common Core), practices and pedagogies often cruelly privilege colonial histories and dominant narratives circulating within classroom spaces – impacting students in ways we may not even be aware. Transmedial storytelling offers possibilities to not only notice but also unsettle these histories and narratives. And while histories cannot be erased, futures are yet to be written.

# Aff Answers

## Aff

### FW — Jarvis

#### Epistemology is secondary to the plan.

**Jarvis ’0** [Darryl; 2000; Former Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Sydney; *International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism*, *University of South Carolina Press*, “Continental Drift,” p. 128-129]

More is the pity that such irrational and obviously abstruse debate should so occupy us at a time of great global turmoil. That it does and continues to do so reflect our lack of judicious criteria for evaluating theory and, more importantly, the lack of attachment theorists have to the real world. Certainly, it is right and proper that we ponder the depths of our theoretical imaginations, engage in epistemological and ontological debate, and analyze the sociology of our knowledge. But to support that this is the only task of international theory, let alone the most important one, smacks of intellectual elitism and displays a certain contempt for those who search for guidance in their daily struggle as actors in international politics. What does Ashley’s project, his deconstructive efforts, or valiant fight against positivism say to the truly marginalized, oppressed, and destitute? How does it help solve the plight of the poor, the displaced refugees, the casualties of war, or the émigrés of death squads? Does it in any way speak to those whose actions and thoughts comprise the policy and practice of international relations?

On all these questions one must answer no. This is not to say, of course, that all theory should be judged by its technical rationality and problem-solving capacity as Ashley forcefully argues. But to support that problem-solving technical theory is not necessary—or in some way bad—is a contemptuous position that abrogates any hope of solving some of the nightmarish realities that millions confront daily. As Holsti argues, we need ask of these theorists and their theories the ultimate question, “So what?” To what purpose do they deconstruct, problematize, destabilize, undermine, ridicule, and belittle modernist and rationalist approaches? Does this get us any further, make the world any better, or enhance the human condition? In what sense can this “debate toward [a] bottomless pit of epistemology and metaphysics” be judged pertinent, relevant, helpful, or cogent to anyone other than those foolish enough to be scholastically excited by abstract and recondite debate.

### FW — Fiat Good

#### Fiat is good — foreign policy simulations teach students how allies and adversaries respond to U.S. policy — fosters ideological reflexivity, accurate policy prediction, and argumentative agency.

**Esberg and Sagan ’12** [Jane and Scott; 2012; Special assistant to the Director at New York University’s Center on International Cooperation; Professor of Political Science and Director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation; *The Nonproliferation Review*, “NEGOTIATING NONPROLIFERATION: Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Nuclear Weapons Policy,” p. 95-96]

These government or quasi-government think tank simulations often provide very similar lessons for high-level players as are learned by students in educational simulations. Government participants learn about the importance of understanding foreign perspectives, the need to practice internal coordination, and the necessity to compromise and coordinate with other governments in negotiations and crises. During the Cold War, political scientist Robert Mandel noted how crisis exercises and war games forced government officials to overcome ‘‘bureaucratic myopia,’’ moving beyond their normal organizational roles and thinking more creatively about how others might react in a crisis or conflict. The skills of imagination and the subsequent ability to predict foreign interests and reactions remain critical for real-world foreign policy makers. For example, simulations of the Iranian nuclear crisis\*held in 2009 and 2010 at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center and at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, and involving former US senior officials and regional experts\*highlighted the dangers of misunderstanding foreign governments’ preferences and misinterpreting their subsequent behavior. In both simulations, the primary criticism of the US negotiating team lay in a failure to predict accurately how other states, both allies and adversaries, would behave in response to US policy initiatives.

By university age, students often have a pre-defined view of international affairs, and the literature on simulations in education has long emphasized how such exercises force students to challenge their assumptions about how other governments behave and how their own government works. Since simulations became more common as a teaching tool in the late 1950s, educational literature has expounded on their benefits, from encouraging engagement by breaking from the typical lecture format, to improving communication skills, to promoting teamwork. More broadly, simulations can deepen understanding by asking students to link fact and theory, providing a context for facts while bringing theory into the realm of practice. These exercises are particularly valuable in teaching international affairs for many of the same reasons they are useful for policy makers: they force participants to ‘‘grapple with the issues arising from a world in flux. Simulations have been used successfully to teach students about such disparate topics as European politics, the Kashmir crisis, and US response to the mass killings in Darfur. Role-playing exercises certainly encourage students to learn political and technical facts\* but they learn them in a more active style. Rather than sitting in a classroom and merely receiving knowledge, students actively research ‘‘their’’ government’s positions and actively argue, brief, and negotiate with others. Acts can change quickly; simulations teach students how to contextualize and act on information.

#### Fiat teaches empathy.

**Craps ’12** [Steph; 2012; Professor of English at Ghent University, Director of Centre for Literature and Trauma; *Postcolonial Witnessing: Trauma Out of Bounds*, *Palgrave*, “Conclusion,” p. 126-127; GR]

Cogent though these various critiques are in their own terms, it seems to me that they unduly homogenize and simplify different forms of interest in and inquiry into trauma. While it is true, of course, that trauma research does not in and of itself lead to political transformation, I would argue that a trauma theory revised along the lines I have suggested is not destined to serve as the handmaiden of the status quo or a mere academic alibi for the indulgence of voyeuristic inclinations. On the contrary, it can help identify and understand situations of exploitation and abuse, and act as an incentive for the kind of sustained and systemic critique of societal conditions called for by Berlant and Brown. In fact, the expanded model of trauma I have proposed, based on the work of Laura Brown, Frantz Fanon, and others, bears a close resemblance to the model of suffering that Berlant puts forward as an alternative to the (traditional) trauma model, which she finds inadequate: "a model of suffering, whose etymological articulation of pain and patience draws its subject less as an effect of an act of violence and more as an effect of a general atmosphere of it, peppered by acts, to be sure, but not contained by the presumption that trauma carries, that it is an effect of a single scene of violence or toxic taxonomy" (338). Berlant's observation that "the pain and suffering of subordinated subjects in everyday life is an ordinary and ongoing thing that is underdescribed by the (traumatic) identity form and its circulation in the state and the law" (344) is perfectly in line with the argument I have presented in this book.

That trauma research can act as a catalyst for astute political analysis and meaningful activism would seem to be borne out by the [END PAGE 126] development in Fanon's writing, from Black Skin, White Masks, which describes the psychological impact of racial and colonial oppression, to the overtly political The Wretched of the Earth, which confronts the source of the mental strife he saw in the clinic.3 Since Douglas Crimp's plea for "[m]ilitancy, of course, then, but mourning too: mourning and militancy" (18) in relation to the AIDS movement back in 1989, several scholars have argued that an interest in issues of trauma, loss, and mourning is in fact compatible with a commitment to radical activism. A desire to make visible the creative and political-rather than pathological and negative-aspects of an attachment to loss is the thread that binds together the essays gathered in David Eng and David Kazanjian's volume Loss: The Politics of Mourning (2003), which seeks to "extend[] recent scholarship in trauma studies by insisting that ruptures of experience, witnessing, history, and truth are, indeed, a starting point for political activism and transformation" (10). Eng and Kazanjian see their collection as moving "from trauma to prophecy, and from epistemological structures of unknowability to the politics of mourning" (10). As one of the contributors, Ann Cvetkovich, puts it, trauma can be "the provocation to create alternative lifeworld’s" ("Legacies of Trauma" 453).

Recognition of suffering serves as a necessary first step towards the amelioration of that suffering. In Judith Butler's words, "The recognition of shared precariousness introduces strong normative commitments of equality and invites a more robust universalizing of rights that seeks to address basic human needs for food, shelter, and other conditions for persisting and flourishing" (28-29). Without wishing to overstate its likely impact, I believe that rethinking trauma studies from a postcolonial perspective and providing nuanced readings of a wide variety of narratives of trauma and witnessing from around the world can help us understand that shared precariousness. By fostering attunement to previously unheard suffering and putting into global circulation memories of a broad range of traumatic histories, an inclusive and culturally sensitive trauma theory can assist in raising awareness of injustice both past and present and opening up the possibility of a more just global future-and, in so doing, remain faithful to the ethical foundations of the field.5

### FW — Scenario Planning

#### Scenario planning is good – a model of dialectical negation enables the transcendence of entrenched political ideologies and trains debaters to imagine radical alternative worlds guided by pragmatic strategy – their author concedes we’re right.

Ossewaarde ’17 -- Associate professor in governance, society and technology, University of Twente (Marinus Ossewaarde, 7-21-2017, “Unmasking scenario planning: The colonization of the future in the ‘Local Governments of the Future’ program”, Futures, Volume 93, pg. 80-88, <http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1016/j.futures.2017.07.003>, accessed 7-4-2022) -- nikki

Scenario planning can be understood as a dialogical enterprise or ‘dialectical negotiation’ (Bowman 2016: 90). It therefore involves the ‘art of friendly dispute’ or ‘clash of minds’, which in turn enables the critique, negation, and transcendence of established ideologies, imaginaries and frames that determine the present and future. Scenario planning is a quest for alternative, still to be decided, open futures, in which different understandings of the world are reconciled through compromises. Chosen courses of actions informed by various (conflicting) possible scenarios reflect such compromises. As Habegger (2010: 51) emphasizes, in scenario planning ‘there is no such thing as “the future”.’ Clashes between ideologies, imaginaries and frames, accordingly, are not problems a scenario planning must get rid of; instead, they must be embraced as a sine qua non for advancing the knowledge of futures, if only because such contradictions or different intellectual orientations increase the awareness of possible future worlds (cf. Mannheim 1954: 241). There is no one necessary or inevitable path to one future. A scenario planning is a dialectical process involving the creative quest for futures (Barber 1998). Contemporary scholars therefore draw a parallel between scenario planning and the writing of futuristic stories (Korte and Chermack 2007). Science fiction, for instance, is widely recognized as a valuable asset for envisioning undetermined or undecided futures and stimulating utopian (or, dystopian) enquiries (Birtchnell and Urry 2013). Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World and George Orwell’s 1984 are examples of literary works that provide the imaginative component of scenario planning (cf. Schulz, 2015: 133). The purpose of scenario planning is, of course, not to produce science fiction-like stories as such; ‘scenarios are far more than stories’ (Chermack and Coons 2015: 189). Instead, scenario planning generates scenarios that are not simply linear extrapolations of the present. It involves reckoning with – imagining – unpredictable or possible events. The resulting scenarios, in turn, entail and demand a wide range of policies hitherto unheard of (Volkery and Ribeiro 2009; Habegger 2010). The imaginative part of scenario planning is therefore intimately connected to world-making, to decisions and strategic actions, which are directed to changing the course of history (Korte and Chermack 2007; MacKay and McKiernan 2010; Amer, Daim and Jetter 2013). Along this line, scenario planning always involves and requires (1) new imagination of future worlds, (2) debate about alternative futures, and (3) the creation of manoeuvring room for strategic actions that correspond to different scenarios (Chermack 2004; Korte and Chermack 2007; Volkery and Ribeiro 2009). The imagination of future worlds is enabled by literary methods that evoke distrust of fixed images and iconic representations (Shapiro 2016). Hence, parables, the articulation of paradoxes, allegories, symbolisms, and metaphors make it possible to understand and reckon with ambiguous, elusive, or latent (not yet fully manifest) phenomena in scenario planning (Levine 1985: 29; 218). Literary methods, and writers (poets in particular) can inspire truly new insights and strengthen the belief in different possible worlds, past, present and future. In other words, in these works, the reader comes to the realization that what is, or what has passed, could have been different; or what possibilities have been missed (MacKay and McKiernan 2010; Dufva and Ahlqvist 2015; Shapiro 2016). From such literary angle, futures unfold when events – which may be the results of strategic decisions – rupture ongoing trends and disrupt established patterns. In contrast with trends, events happen suddenly and can evoke shocks (MacKay and McKiernan 2010; Schulz 2015). A scenario planning has to include the possibility of such surprising historical moments through organizing so-called ‘what if’ scenarios, and must, accordingly, be organized in ‘an atmosphere detached from daily routines’ (Dufva and Ahlqvist 2015: 265). In this way, the enthusiasm for and openness to unexpected events, for ungrounding the present and the emergence of newness and radical transformations, is not stifled. The imagination of futures beyond current trends require a particular kind of radicalism from participants in the scenario planning process, namely, the transcendence of their current assumptions regarding the world. In other words, their capacity to invent new futures depends on their willingness and capacity to critically re-examine what they conceptualized as trends that would continue into the future (Chermack 2004; Korte and Chermack 2007; Van Wijck and Niemeijer 2016; Bowman 2016). They must, accordingly, abandon any pretence of knowing the ’laws’ of the world, thereby leaving open the possibility that the world might have been very different if other power constellations had been in place. Concretely, such attitude requires giving up biases, dogmas, ideological distortions, and compulsive identifications with a particular (well-known) order, stereotypes, and clichés. Indeed, it is only through the critique, negation and transcendence of established conceptual frameworks, practices and current policies that it is possible to generate new ways of seeing the world, and hence to envision alternative worlds (Amer, Daim and Jetter 2013). Ideological discourses freeze (reify) established patterns (typically described as ‘progress,’ ‘development,’ or ‘transformation’) and obscure ambiguities. Scenario planning results in increased scope for strategic action to realize undetermined possible futures. Though it tends to limit itself to descriptions of alternative futures (Amer, Daim and Jetter 2013; Van Wijck and Niemeijer 2016; O’Brien 2016), without prescriptive claims, it is a powerful instrument that can serve or undermine democracy and its future (Barber 1998). Its liberating potential depends on the range of different accounts of the world and of possible future worlds that is taken into account during the process. The exclusion of alternative images of the future on the basis of current assumptions and beliefs – for instance, the salvation of the world lies in technology – from scenario planning makes the latter a sham. Since the inclusion of conflicting worldviews is the hallmark of democracy, a pseudo-scenario planning that presumes and legitimizes one desirable future clearly undermines the democratic ideal of debate or of the publics (cf. Ravetz, 2011).

### FW — IR Scenario Planning Good

#### IR scenario planning and probabilistic forecasting is pedagogically valuable — it’s accurate, breaks down biases and solves any Ks of non-rigorous approaches.

Scoblic & Tetlock ’20 — Peter J. Scoblic; Co-Founder of Event Horizon Strategies, a Senior Fellow in the International Security Program at New America, and a Fellow at Harvard’s Kennedy School. Philip E. Tetlock; Leonore Annenberg University Professor at the University of Pennsylvania. October 13, 2020; "A Better Crystal Ball: The Right Way to Think About the Future"; *Foreign Affairs*; [edited for gendered and ableist language] https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-10-13/better-crystal-ball; //CYang

Every policy is a prediction. Tax cuts will boost the economy. Sanctions will slow Iran’s nuclear program. Travel bans will limit the spread of COVID-19. These claims all posit a causal relationship between means and ends. Regardless of party, ideology, or motive, no policymaker wants ~~his or her~~ [their] recommended course of action to produce unanticipated consequences. This makes every policymaker a forecaster. But forecasting is difficult, particularly when it comes to geopolitics — a domain in which the rules of the game are poorly understood, information is invariably incomplete, and expertise often confers surprisingly little advantage in predicting future events.

These challenges present practical problems for decision-makers in the U.S. government. On the one hand, the limits of imagination create blind spots that policymakers tend to fill in with past experience. They often assume that tomorrow’s dangers will look like yesterday’s, retaining the same mental map even as the territory around them changes dramatically. On the other hand, if policymakers addressed all imaginable threats, the United States would need so large and expensive a national security establishment that the country could do little else. By many measures, it is nearing this point already. The United States has military bases in more than 70 countries and territories, boasts more than four million federal employees with security clearances, and fields 1.3 million active-duty troops, with another million in reserve. According to one estimate, the United States spends $1.25 trillion annually on national security. When it comes to anticipating the future, then, the United States is getting the worst of both worlds. It spends untold sums of money preparing yet still finds itself the victim of surprise — fundamentally ill equipped for defining events, such as the emergence of COVID-19.

There is a better way, one that would allow the United States to make decisions based not on simplistic extrapolations of the past but on smart estimates of the future. It involves reconciling two approaches often seen to be at philosophical loggerheads: scenario planning and probabilistic forecasting. Each approach has a fundamentally different assumption about the future. Scenario planners maintain that there are so many possible futures that one can imagine them only in terms of plausibility, not probability. By contrast, forecasters believe it is possible to calculate the odds of possible outcomes, thereby transforming amorphous uncertainty into quantifiable risk. Because each method has its strengths, the optimal approach is to combine them. This holistic method would provide policymakers with both a range of conceivable futures and regular updates as to which one is likely to emerge. For once, they could make shrewd bets about tomorrow, today.

PLANNING FOR UNCERTAINTY

Although widely used in business today, the first element of this duo — scenario planning — grew out of post–World War II national security concerns, specifically the overwhelming uncertainty of the nuclear revolution. Previously, martial experience was thought to offer some guidance through the fog of war. Nuclear weapons, however, presented a novel problem. With the newfound ability to destroy each other as functioning societies in a matter of minutes or hours, the United States and the Soviet Union faced an unprecedented situation. And unprecedented situations are, by definition, uncertain. They lack any analogy to the past that would allow decision-makers to calculate the odds of possible outcomes.

Still, early U.S. efforts at nuclear-war planning sought to turn that problem into a calculable one. During World War II, the Allies had great success with the new field of operations research, the application of statistical methods to improve the outcome of tactical engagements. After the war, the RAND Corporation — a “think factory” that the U.S. Air Force established as a repository for leading researchers — hoped to parlay this success into a new, more rational approach to war, based less on the intuition of generals and more on the quantification afforded by models and data.

Unfortunately, methods that worked at the tactical level proved nearly farcical at the strategic level. As the historian David Jardini has chronicled, RAND’s first attempt to model a nuclear strategy ignored so many key variables that it nonsensically called for deploying a fleet of aging turboprop bombers that carried no bombs because the United States did not have enough fissile material to arm them; the goal was simply to overwhelm Soviet air defenses, with no regard for the lives of the pilots. In the wake of such failures, it became clear that analysts could not entirely banish uncertainty. In 1960, even Charles Hitch, a man predisposed to calculation by dint of being RAND’s top economist and president of what was then the Operations Research Society of America, cautioned, “No other characteristic of decision-making is as pervasive as uncertainty.”

That, of course, raised the question of how to formulate sensible strategy. Unexpectedly, it was a RAND mathematician and physicist, Herman Kahn, who offered an answer. If the lived past could not shape strategy, perhaps the imagined future could. Frustrated with RAND’s attempts to scientize war, Kahn devoted himself to crafting scenarios in the pursuit of “ersatz experience” that would prepare the United States for the future through what were essentially thought experiments. Policymakers could use these scenarios as “artificial ‘case histories’ and ‘historical anecdotes,’” Kahn wrote, thus making up for a lack of actual examples or meaningful data. They would provide analogies where there were none.

Early methods of generating scenarios were often freewheeling and discursive. But after scenario planning migrated to the business world, it took on more structured forms. The most recognizable is a two-by-two matrix in which planners identify two critical uncertainties and, taking the extreme values of each, construct four possible future worlds. Regardless of the specific shape they take, rigorous scenario-planning exercises all involve identifying key uncertainties and then imagining how different combinations could yield situations that are vastly different from what mere extrapolation of the present would suggest. By then “backcasting” — taking one of these imagined futures as a given and asking what conditions produced it — scenario planners derive both a story and a system. They come up with a plausible narrative of how a future happened and an internal logic that describes how it operates. Scenarios are not supposed to be predictive. They are meant to be provocative, challenging planners’ assumptions, shaking up their mental models of how the world works, and giving them the cognitive flexibility to better sense, shape, and adapt to the emerging future.

The pandemic has occasioned a renaissance in the use of scenarios, as organizations from think tanks to technology companies grapple with the question of what a “new normal” might look like and how soon it might arrive. But the national security community has long used scenarios to address some of its most wicked problems — particularly high-stakes issues that are in flux, such as the U.S.-Chinese relationship. This past summer, RAND released a report on Chinese grand strategy. It concluded with four scenarios that offered brief vignettes of China’s possible place in the world 30 years from now. “Triumphant China” dominates the world stage in most domains, with a modern military and an innovative economy. “Ascendant China” is the preeminent power not only in Asia but in other regions, as well. “Stagnant China” has suffered from low growth and faces social unrest. And “Imploding China” experiences a crisis of existential proportions, in which domestic instability undercuts the country’s international influence.

Although comprehensive, the wide range of these scenarios highlights the chief challenge of the method: If China’s potential futures encompass rise, fall, and everything in between, how can they aid in the formulation of strategy and policy? Although this cornucopia of scenarios could lead policymakers to develop strategies that would improve the United States’ position no matter which future comes to pass, in practice, having too many different versions of the future can make it nearly impossible to act. Good scenario planning puts boundaries on the future, but those limits are often not enough for decision-makers to work with. They need to know which future is most likely.

TURNING UNCERTAINTY INTO RISK

Probabilistic forecasting — the second element of the duo — tries to address that shortcoming. Forecasters see scenario planning as maddeningly vague or, worse, dangerously misleading. They not only point to the lack of consistent evidence to support the alleged benefits of scenario planning; they also argue that the compelling nature of a good story can trigger a host of biases. Such biases fuel irrationality, in part by tricking decision-makers into making basic statistical errors. For example, even though a detailed narrative may seem more plausible than a sparse one, every contingent event decreases the likelihood that a given scenario will actually transpire. Nevertheless, people frequently confuse plausibility for probability, assigning greater likelihood to specific stories that have the ring of truth. They might, illogically, consider a war with China triggered by a clash in the Taiwan Strait more likely than a war with China triggered by any possible cause.

In contrast to scenario planning’s emphasis on imagination, forecasting tends to rely on calculation. Deductive approaches use models or laws that describe the behavior of a system to predict its future state, much like Newtonian mechanics allows astronomers to anticipate the position of the planets. Inductive approaches do not require such understanding, merely enough data and the assumption that the future will in some way reflect the past. This is how Netflix anticipates what you might like to watch or Amazon what you might want to buy, based purely on your previous actions. Increasingly, thanks to advances in artificial intelligence and machine learning, analysts use hybrid approaches. Meteorology is a good example, in which researchers combine sophisticated models and big data collection, which feed into each other and enable ever-better weather forecasts.

International politics poses a challenge for these methods because the laws governing the system are elusive or highly debatable, relevant data points are often unavailable or unprecedented, and thousands of variables interact in countless ways. History functions as a series of unfolding events, with highly contingent branching paths sometimes separated by mere happenstance. Tectonic shifts can hinge on seemingly mundane occurrences. That makes it hard to deduce future events from theoretical principles or to induce them from past experience.

As a result, historians and foreign policy experts are often bad forecasters. In 2005, one of us, Philip Tetlock, published a study demonstrating that seasoned political experts had trouble outperforming “dart-tossing chimpanzees” — random guesses — when it came to predicting global events. The experts fared even worse against amateur news junkies. Overconfidence was the norm, not the exception. When experts expressed 100 percent certainty that events would occur, those events materialized only 80 percent of the time. Yet there were pockets of excellence amid this unimpressive performance. Those who were surest that they understood the forces driving the political system (“hedgehogs,” in the philosopher Isaiah Berlin’s terminology) fared significantly worse than their humbler colleagues, who did not shy from complexity, approaching problems with greater curiosity and open-mindedness (“foxes”).

This distinction caught the eye of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, which set up a geopolitical “forecasting tournament,” in which Tetlock participated. He recruited a team of volunteers to provide probabilistic answers to sharply defined questions, such as “Will the euro fall below $1.20 in the next year?” or “Will the president of Tunisia flee to exile in the next six months?” By measuring the difference between estimates and the actual occurrence of events, Tetlock and his colleagues could calculate a score showing how “well-calibrated” the expectations of any given forecaster were with reality. By analyzing these data, Tetlock discovered that the key to more accurate geopolitical forecasting was to take people who were naturally numerate and open-minded, train them to think probabilistically and avoid common biases, and then group them so they could leverage the “wisdom of the crowd.” The best forecasters would approach seemingly intractable questions by decomposing them into parts, researching the past frequency of similar (if not precisely analogous) events, adjusting the odds based the uniqueness of the situation, and continually updating their estimates as new information emerged. By the end of the tournament, Tetlock’s top performers had achieved scores that were 30 percent better than those of career CIA analysts with access to classified information. Somehow, they had transmuted uncertainty into measurable risk.

The advantages of being able to put realistic odds on possible futures are obvious. It gives you a peek into the future. But even the best forecasters have their limits. If asked to predict events three to five years out, their performance becomes increasingly indistinguishable from random guessing. Still, many critical policy questions are short term: perhaps the most famous recent example concerned whether Osama bin Laden was in the Abbottabad compound in May 2011. Highly consequential short-term questions now include when a COVID-19 vaccine will be widely available. As of this writing, the smart money (68 percent probability) is on or before March 31, 2021.

But to the extent that leaders need to make consequential, difficult-to-reverse decisions that will play out over the long run — the strategic choices that will give the United States an advantage over time — it becomes more difficult to link forecasts to policymaking. Well-calibrated forecasters, for instance, can estimate the likelihood that a skirmish with the Chinese navy in the South China Sea will result in at least two American deaths by December 31. But what policymakers really want to know is the extent to which China will threaten U.S. interests in the coming years and decades.

Answers to that type of inquiry are beyond the reach of forecasters because it is impossible to define precisely what constitutes an interest or a threat. To provide forecasts, questions must pass the “clairvoyance test,” which is to say that were it possible to pose the question to a genuine clairvoyant, that omniscient seer must be able to answer it without having to ask for clarification. “Will I fall in love?” is not a forecasting question. “Will I marry Jane Smith by this time next year?” is.

From a policy perspective, then, the greatest challenge to forecasts is that although they can clarify slices of the future, they do not necessarily provide enough information to inform decision-making. Indeed, making a decision based on one specific forecast would be a mistake: the estimated probability of an event is a poor proxy for the significance of that event. “Will Vladimir Putin relinquish power within the next two years?” is a far different question from “What would Vladimir Putin’s abdication of power mean for U.S.-Russian relations?” The problem with forecasting is thus the exact opposite of the problem with scenarios: if the latter often provide too panoramic a view of the future to be useful, the former provides too narrow a glimpse.

AN ANSWER FOR THE FUTURE

How should these different approaches to anticipating the future be linked? The answer lies in developing clusters of questions that give early, forecastable indications of which envisioned future is likely to emerge, thus allowing policymakers to place smarter bets sooner. Instead of evaluating the likelihood of a long-term scenario as a whole, question clusters allow analysts to break down potential futures into a series of clear and forecastable signposts that are observable in the short run. Questions should be chosen not only for their individual diagnostic value but also for their diversity as a set, so that each cluster provides the greatest amount of information about which imagined future is emerging — or which elements of which envisioned futures are emerging. As a result, the seductiveness of a particular narrative will not tempt decision-makers into mistaking plausibility for probability. Instead, preliminary answers to specific questions can provide a simple metric for judging in advance how the future is most likely to unfold — a metric that analysts can then refine once the event in question takes place or not.

Consider the scenarios RAND produced as part of its analysis of China’s grand strategy. The four scenarios envisioned for 2050 — “Triumphant China,” “Ascendant China,” “Stagnant China,” and “Imploding China” — can be roughly placed on a classic two-by-two matrix, with the strength of China’s political leadership on one axis and the strength of China’s economy on the other. A cluster of questions that would give a heads-up that history is on a “Triumphant China” trajectory might include “On December 31, 2020, will China exercise de facto control over Itu Aba (or Taiping Island) in the South China Sea (which is currently under the de facto control of Taiwan)?” “Will China’s GDP growth in 2023 exceed ten percent?” and “Among African audiences, when will the China Global Television Network have a higher weekly viewership than Voice of America?”

These questions are useful both individually and collectively. Knowing that top forecasters see an increased chance of China controlling the island (from, say, a ten percent probability to a 20 percent probability), for instance, would provide immediate tactical value to the U.S. Navy. It should not necessarily tip the balance in the debate over whether China will be “triumphant,” but if all the forecasts resulting from the question cluster are trending in the same direction, the United States may want to recalibrate its strategy. As forecasts change and individual questions are answered by the course of events, the view of the far-off future becomes a little bit clearer. Analysts can then update their scenarios and generate new clusters of questions. They can thus develop a continually evolving sense of plausible futures, as well as a probabilistic estimate of which policies will yield the most bang for the buck today.

This method resembles the U.S. defense and intelligence community’s use of indications and warnings. In the early 1960s, for example, the National Intelligence Council developed a list of actions — large troop maneuvers, for instance — that might precede an attack by the Sino-Soviet bloc. The idea was that tactical changes might provide an early warning of future strategic shifts. Indications and warnings have come to play an important role in many national security scenarios. Unfortunately, there are potential problems with scouring today’s environment for hints of tomorrow. For one thing, as psychological research shows, having envisioned a particular scenario, humans are not only inclined to consider it more likely; they are also more prone to see evidence of its emergence—a form of confirmation bias that U.S. intelligence has battled for decades. For another, analysts are not particularly good at discerning in real time which events matter—which signposts are actually indicative of a particular future. Developments initially considered to be earthshattering may turn out to be significantly less important, whereas a story buried well beneath the day’s headlines can end up changing the course of history. In a statistical analysis of nearly two million State Department cables sent in the 1970s, for instance, one recent study demonstrated that U.S. diplomats were often bad at estimating the historical importance of contemporaneous events.

Linking scenarios to clusters of forecasting questions mitigates these problems. First, because the questions must be precise enough to pass the clairvoyance test, there is no wiggle room about what constitutes, say, large troop maneuvers. Second, because questions that disprove hypotheses often yield the greatest information, selecting questions for their diagnostic value decreases forecasters’ susceptibility to confirmation bias. Third, much as diversified stock portfolios spread risk through multiple, uncorrelated investments, the diversity of question clusters prevents forecasters from overweighting a potentially unimportant signpost and mistakenly concluding that a particular scenario is coming to pass. Finally, and most important, because question clusters yield forecasts, one can attach meaningful probabilities to the likelihood that particular events will occur in the future. This provides a sort of advance early warning system. An event does not need to actually transpire for the United States to have actionable information. That, more than anything else, gives question clusters an advantage over traditional indications and warnings.

PLANNING IN PRACTICE

To be useful, any vision of the future must be connected to decisions in the present. Scholars and practitioners often claim that scenario planning and probabilistic forecasting are incompatible given their different assumptions and goals. In fact, they mesh well. A scenario planner’s conviction that the future is uncertain need not clash with a forecaster’s quest to translate uncertainty into risk. Rather, the challenge lies in understanding the limits of each method. Question clusters make it possible to leverage the strength of each approach, transforming the abstract long term into the concrete short term so that leaders can understand the future quickly and act to stave off danger, seize opportunity, and strengthen national security.

The greatest barrier to a clearer vision of the future is not philosophical but organizational: the potential of combining scenario planning with probabilistic forecasting means nothing if it is not implemented. On occasion, the intelligence community has used forecasting tournaments to inform its estimates, but that is only a first step. Policymakers and consumers of intelligence are the ones who must understand the importance of forecasts and incorporate them into their decisions. Too often, operational demands — the daily business of organizations, from weighty decisions to the mundane — fix attention on the current moment.

Overcoming the tyranny of the present requires high-level action and broad, sustained effort. Leaders across the U.S. government must cultivate the cognitive habits of top forecasters throughout their organizations, while also institutionalizing the imaginative processes of scenario planners. The country’s prosperity, its security, and, ultimately, its power all depend on policymakers’ ability to envision long-term futures, anticipate short-term developments, and use both projections to inform everything from the budget to grand strategy. Giving the future short shrift only shortchanges the United States.

#### Nuanced debates about the merits of hegemony are uniquely valuable — creates effective advocates to counter public apathy.

Brands 18 — (Hal Brands, PhD, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies; “AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY IN THE AGE OF TRUMP”; Brookings Institution Press; D.A. July 5th 2020, [Published 2018]; <https://www.brookings.edu/book/american-grand-strategy-in-the-age-of-trump/>)

Fifth and finally, sustaining America’s post–Cold War strategy entails persuading the American public to recommit to that strategy and the investments it requires. The state of American opinion on that subject is currently ambiguous. Polling data indicates that public support for most key aspects of American internationalism has recovered somewhat from where it was in 2012–13, and is again at or near postwar averages.[32](javascript:void(0)) But the 2016 election cycle and its eventual outcome revealed strong support for candidates who advocated rolling back key elements of post–Cold War (and post–World War II) grand strategy, from free trade to U.S. alliances. This atmosphere reflects discontent with the failures and frustrations of U.S. grand strategy in the post–Cold War era, no doubt, yet it also reflects the fact that American strategy seems at risk of becoming a victim of its own success.[33](javascript:void(0)) By helping to foster a comparatively stable and congenial environment, American policies have made it more difficult for Americans to remember why significant investments in the global order are needed in the first place.

Today, this ambivalence is becoming increasingly problematic, for the simple reason that properly resourcing American strategy requires making politically difficult trade-offs with respect to entitlements and other ballooning domestic costs. It is also becoming problematic, of course, because even if the American public seems to support particular aspects of American grand strategy, the public has shown itself willing to elect a president who appears to care little for the successful postwar and post–Cold War tradition, even if he has, so far, maintained more aspects of that tradition as president than his campaign rhetoric might have led one to expect. In the future—and indeed, looking beyond Trump’s presidency—sustaining American grand strategy will thus require more intensive political efforts.

American leaders will need to more effectively make the case for controversial but broadly beneficial policies such as free trade, while also addressing the inevitable socioeconomic dislocations such policies cause.[34](javascript:void(0)) They will need to more fully articulate the underlying logic and value of alliances and other commitments whose costs are often more visible—not to say greater—than their benefits. They will need to remind Americans that their country’s leadership has not been a matter of charity; it has helped produce an international order that is exceptional in its stability, liberalism, and benefits for the United States. Not least, they will need to make the case that the costs that the country has borne in support of that order are designed to avoid the necessity of bearing vastly higher costs if the international scene returned to a more tumultuous state. After all, the success of American statecraft is often reflected in the bad things that don’t happen as well as in the good things that do. Making this point is essential to reconsolidating domestic support now and in the future—and to preserving a grand strategy that has delivered pretty good results for a quarter century.

#### Researching and debating IR is good.

Ettinger, 20—Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Carleton University (Aaron, “Scattered and Unsystematic: The Taught Discipline in the Intellectual Life of International Relations,” International Studies Perspectives (2020) 0, 1–24, dml)

The first benefit is generating a well-trained pipeline of future IR scholars and practitioners. Today’s students are the scholars and practitioners of tomorrow, and sparking curiosity in students, especially undergraduates, has the potential to rejuvenate the field from within. As Hagmann and Biersteker (2014, 292–293) argue, IR scholars should “take a more direct interest in how world politics is explained to students in everyday schooling practices.” This is eminently sensible. International relations’ preoccupation with “the cult of research intensivity” (Nossal 2006, 737), and to a lesser extent political practice, misleads the professoriate into believing that the very people who sustain universities as institutions and who are the future of the discipline—student subscribers—can be ignored. It has also led the IR professoriate to undervalue the contribution that the taught discipline makes to disciplinary renewal through the training of international relations’ next generation.

For future practitioners, whether in government or elsewhere, an IR education provides the conceptual architecture needed to make decisions about policy and its place in the world. In his memoirs, Henry Kissinger emphasizes this point: “The convictions that leaders have formed before reaching high office are the intellectual capital they will consume as long as they continue in office. There is little time for leaders to reflect” (as quoted in Desch 2019, 153). While Kissinger is talking about the highest level of elected office, it is equally true that policymakers throughout government come in equipped with the intellectual capital and technical skills learned in the classroom (Biswas and Paczynska 2015). For future scholars, early lessons have downstream effects on the very content of IR knowledge. After all, the classroom is where IR theory gets reproduced “for the first time” to future generations of IR scholars. As Newsom (1995, 64–65) put it, “[t]eachers plant the seeds that shape the thinking of each new generation; this is probably the academic world’s most lasting contribution.” It is also a place where the durability and centrality of the field’s major theories are reinforced as a matter of course and not necessarily for the better (Vitalis 2015, 6). Early undergraduates carry the assumptions they are taught throughout their undergraduate and graduate careers, and beyond. A discipline that cannot connect with students or is inward-looking and esoteric risks putting off its next generation. Thus, the classroom needs to be treated with greater regard as a site of knowledge production and dissemination in the intellectual life of the field. In this sense, curiosity can be provoked among students that may continue beyond an undergraduate career. Take, for example, the observation of one student on her intellectual awakening in the classroom:

Despite a Eurocentric and male-dominated ethos, what ultimately convinced me to stay in IR was my exposure and inability to detach from what was first described to me as the politics of the “postcolonial.” A lecturer holding up a roughened paperback copy of Edward Said’s 1979 acclaimed work Orientalism originally introduced me to postcolonialism…Hearing Said’s words being reiterated back to me in my predominately white and conservative-leaning lecture theater was a defining moment in my education. Orientalism provided an experience that I could finally connect with: one where political power was not about who had the most weaponry or democracy, but instead about who held political control over the reality of the racialized person (Abu-Bakare 2017).

The moment captured in this tableau is the intellectual awakening that is possible when pedagogy is carefully considered. From the student perspective, well-taught courses prepare them better for the next stage in their education, starting with superior foundational training at the early undergraduate levels and progressing to improved research capabilities and substantive knowledge at the higher undergraduate levels, and then to advanced skills training in graduate school. Well-trained cohorts coming up the ranks will be highly proficient in a wider range of IR topics, theories, ideas, and methods and will be well prepared to make the jump to fluency. Similarly, future practitioners will be equipped with superior substantive and technical training. This is especially true with “experiential learning.” Done in purposeful ways, learning through experiences outside the classroom generates employable skills for students.

Social and Institutional Context of Teaching and Disciplinary Reproduction

Directly related to the question of the future of international relations is the social context of teaching and the discipline’s reproduction in the classroom. IR scholars must recognize that the IR classroom is the site of ideational preferences, clashes of favored or disfavored paradigms, of personal authority, generational difference, social privileges, and prejudices. At every point in professional international relations, there are implications for how knowledge is produced, taught, and passed on (Ettinger 2016; Colgan 2017; Fattore 2018; Knight 2019). Indeed, the intellectual output of IR scholars does not exist independent of the lived context in which it is produced. Gaining insight into the social context of international relations’ taught discipline can help begin to correct the pathologies that are affecting the way the next generation of IR scholars are being taught right now and how future scholars and practitioners will be taught next year and beyond.

It begins by addressing the social identity of the instructor and how it contributes to the reproduction of IR knowledge. After all, the instructor does not speak from a position of nowhere and an account of IR pedagogy should address the personal features of the instructor, her place within the discipline’s division of labor, and its effect on the delivery of course content (Biswas and Deylami 2017). For international relations especially, it is the site of entrenched male and Euro-Atlantic dominance with cascading implications within the classroom and beyond. The 2014 TRIP survey shows that the global IR professorate is two-thirds male (Maliniak et al. 2014). In the United States and British IR “core” and in the Anglo “noncore” (Cox and Nossal 2009), the professoriate is overwhelmingly white and male. Australia is 72.11 percent male and 76.87 percent white. Canada is 70.83 percent male and 83.4 percent white. The United Kingdom is 64.83 percent male and 85.23 percent white, while the United States is 68.33 percent male and 85.21 percent white non-Hispanic. New Zealand, a slight outlier, is 81.82 percent male but only 34.78 percent identifying as NZ European (Maliniak et al. 2014). Given what has been shown about the American dominance of the discipline, the insularity of national IR communities, and the gender gap in citations, it is reasonable to conclude that the bulk of the most influential IR scholarship is produced and disseminated by white men in the West (Maliniak et al. 2018; Maliniak et al 2013).

Understanding this relationship can improve IR pedagogy by recognizing how diverse student populations interact with an overwhelmingly white Euro-Atlantic intellectual tradition and by remedying some of the attending limitations such as geohistorical narrowness, state-centrism, epistemological positivism, and phallocentric authorship (Fonseca 2019). In this regard, the taught discipline of international relations should be intellectually responsive to a diversifying discipline and to a diversifying student population. Such circumstances call for a broader approach to teaching courses in a field whose heavy Euro-American centrality can alienate students when their backgrounds are not reflected in the course material. This is not simply a matter of curriculum design that tries to mirror or “look like” the students (Appiah 2019, SR7). Rather, it is one that balances disciplinary foundations with broadened ontological scope of what “matters” in IR in order to generate betterinformed teaching. It is widely recognized that international relations is a very traditional field of scholarship, but this should not preclude perspectives beyond the canon or case studies from outside the empirical mainstream. More ambitious and, especially, diverse content helps adapt teaching to changing student audiences. This is especially true at the undergraduate level. What is important to avoid is the “pipeline problem” that has discouraged women and minorities from progressing through the scholarly ranks in STEM fields (Brown et al. 2016; Branch 2016). By the same token, bringing more and more diverse young students into the discipline of international relations and encouraging their growth can bear intellectual fruit down the line. At very least, we avoid artificially restricting the development of the next generation of scholars.

By no means is this a call to jettison the classics. To the contrary, the field’s canon is irreplaceable as a foundation, as the intellectual inheritance of the present, as the prevailing ideas of foreign policymakers, and as points of disagreement for critical traditions. However, the scope of IR pedagogy can be expanded to make it relevant for a twenty-first century classroom. Primarily, this means expanding the theoretical and empirical scope of international relations beyond its traditional Eurocentric and male-dominated parameters (Acharya 2016). This is discussed below. Granted, there will be no singular population to which an IR curriculum will be pitched. Variation in student population profiles based on race, gender, class, geography, and other identity markers complicate the decisions that an instructor has to make. The point is that there are intellectual gains to be had when the taught discipline takes seriously the social context of international relations’ disciplinary reproduction. With a more diverse pedagogy in place, it is possible that, with more eyes on the subject matter and more minds from different backgrounds at work, the IR classroom can generate greater interest in fundamental theoretical questions for the next generation of scholars to solve.

Institutional context of teaching matters too. The vast majority of IR practice takes place in university institutions. Therefore, the material institutional setting must enter in as a condition of international relations’ intellectual life. Consider first, the matter of basic institutional survival. In an era where public universities around the world face funding problems, there are immediate economic imperatives for taking the taught discipline of international relations seriously. In the short term, survival in unforgiving economic times requires student enrollment and retention (Conley 2019). Systematic accounts of US undergraduate enrollment since the Great Recession of 2008 show majors in the “traditional disciplines” declining by 21 percent (philosophy) to 30 percent (history). Political science and international relations fare less badly, declining “only” by 11 percent and 15 percent over ten years (Schmidt 2018). Put differently, the classroom is on the front line in the battle for resources. Student recruitment and retention are essential to the economic viability of academic departments including political science and international relations. Turning students off the subject matter through an unreflexive pedagogy, boring classes, or mediocre lecturers has real economic implications for the future. Without students prepared to part with tuition dollars, or governments prepared to unlock activity-based funding, no department can thrive, even with a roster of productive researchers. Concretely, this means no new hiring and reduced budgets— a recipe for contraction. In this context, the systematic neglect of the classroom by IR stocktakers is entirely inexplicable given the parlous financial state of most public universities. Trends in expanded enrollment compound or create new problems. Universities that pack classrooms with hundreds, if not thousands, of more students—many of whom are international and pay exorbitant tuition fees—put revenue generation above pedagogy (Schulmann 2019).

The disciplinary division of university labor must be factored into an understanding of the context of IR teaching and its implications for the intellectual life of international relations. In this sense, debate about the taught discipline must grapple with question of resources, division of university labor, teaching assignments, pressures of the tenure track, the precarity of contract faculty, and other aspects of university governance as conditions that influence the classroom. One of the most striking trends in university governance is the increasing role of contingent instructors. In the United States, some 73 percent of instructional positions were nontenure track in 2016 (AAUP 2018). This is consistent with longer-term trends. The percentage of postsecondary instructional positions filled by contingent faculty increased from 57.6 percent in 1995 to 71.6 percent in 2011. In that time, the number of full-time tenure-track positions increased by 10 percent while the number of full- or part-time contingent positions doubled (GAO 2017, 8–9). This is not to say that contingent faculty are worse teachers, but the contingent nature of the work creates impediments to teaching. Fewer institutional resources, the constant need to reapply for jobs, and the need for part-time work outside the university are all matters that detract from time dedicated to students, improving pedagogy, or learning new content. Downstream, the design of an IR class or the delivery of an IR curriculum may not be nearly as effective as it could be.

Intellectual Reflection and Renewal from the Inside Out

Taking teaching seriously as part of the intellectual life of international relations can lead to intellectual renewal and self-reflection for individual professors and for the discipline as a whole. At the individual level, teaching has the ability to catalyze an intellectual renewal in the mind of the individual professor. The intellectual challenges of the classroom can provoke new avenues of research for the instructor. The classroom is a much more permissive intellectual environment than academic publishing. It affords the professor a degree of freedom to explore topics, ideas, and arguments, outside of their research expertise. Making use of the opportunity to teach beyond one’s comfort zone permits thinking out loud, working through ideas, and entanglement in analytical puzzles. Doing so is demanding, and it is much easier to fall back on existing teaching content. But an ambitious teaching agenda can lead to new research questions, new and unexpected intellectual horizons, and better background context for existing expertise. Indeed, there is truth to the aphorism that there is no better way to learn than to teach.

This kind of renewal turns on the “eureka” moment when research ideas flows directly from classroom activities. A more systematic approach to renewal that is less reliant on serendipity begins by asking discipline-wide questions. The first is this: what is the purpose of teaching international relations? It is a variation on a core concern to the discipline and one that remains unresolved (Dyvik, Wilkinson, and Selby 2017)? Is it for disciplinary self-reproduction, to train future practitioners, or more broadly, citizens and knowledge workers in the twenty-first century economy (Darling and Foster 2012; Szarejko and Carnes 2018; Zartner et al. 2018)? Arriving at an official “purpose” for international relations is probably pointless, and it is best left to the decentralized community of scholars to decide. IR scholars have debated this question widely within the published discipline but far less so in the taught discipline. This is a shame because the answers matter for the nature of the design of individual courses and entire degree programs.

Just like the published discipline, the taught discipline is radically decentralized in universities around the world, subnational variations, department-level programs, and individual scholar’s preferences. Thus, it is incumbent on individual professors to give an answer in their own teaching programs. At the individual level, answering the question about the purpose of teaching international relations should outfit students with an answer to what they are about to encounter and why this topic, course, or degree program is worth pursuing. Students, especially early undergraduate students, need to know why they are about to be presented with the complicated theory and obscure events that are core (or peripheral) to the IR discipline. Answers are generously supplied in the introduction chapters to IR textbooks but the suite of options betrays a lack of focus that is symptomatic of the wider field (Albert 2010). However, this permissive intellectual environment is beneficial for wide-ranging intellectual pursuits, teaching styles, and pedagogical agendas. It may, though, come at the cost. The institutional underpinnings of the discipline—faculty administrators, editorial boards, funding agencies, hiring committees, and so on— may end up doing as much to shape the boundaries of the discipline as the substantive output (Albert and Buzan 2017, 908). The alternative, though, is subjecting intellectual and academic freedom to an institutionalized orthodoxy. In teaching, decentralization may be intellectually permissive but may come at the expense of disciplinary coherence.

This concern, though, may be overstated. TRIP data on curriculum design gives an indication of the competing and sometimes overlapping pedagogical priorities among the IR professoriate. In a question on introduction to IR classes, respondents were asked whether their introductory courses are designed more to introduce IR scholarship within the discipline or to prepare students to be informed about foreign policy and international issues. The result favors a mix of both with 80.83 percent incorporating scholarship and issues in some balance. The remaining 19.17 percent come down in favor of one to the exclusion of the other. At the master’s level, the ratio is a bit narrower (73 to 27 percent) but still overwhelmingly embraces a mixture of academic scholarship and international issues (Maliniak et al. 2014). Respondents are a bit more divided on what undergraduate courses should be mandatory in an IR program. They overwhelmingly agree (73.25 percent) that IR theory should be a required subject. However, they differ on other options. The next most popular candidates for a required course are international/global political economy (45.37 percent), international security (38.87 percent), and research methods (35.22 percent), followed by international organizations (27.59 percent), comparative foreign policy (22.86 percent), home country foreign policy (19.95 percent), international law (19.85 percent), diplomatic history (19.11 percent), and international economics (15.17 percent) (Maliniak et al. 2014). The point is that resolving what IR teaching is supposed to accomplish is hardly settled, but there is some convergence on certain issues.

So, what then, is the purpose of teaching international relations? Ultimately, it is up to the individual instructor to answer and to enact a program accordingly. But it is up to the community of scholars to debate. It may well be that the enormous variation in the purpose of teaching international relations and the radical decentralization is an inescapable feature of the taught discipline. Though IR teaching may be wildly divergent around the world, there is always some purpose to it, and, however defined, this is an intrinsic feature of an international relations education. Here, Cox’s (1981, 128) famous admonition that “theory is always for someone and for some purpose” serves as the anchor concept for such pedagogical framing. It frames IR theories as political things and not just abstractions to be memorized or an analytical template to be applied uncritically. Similarly, it helps to frame thematic and empirical cases in the classroom so that course material is not merely a reflection the professor’s unexamined preference. In the classroom, it is up to the professor to articulate. Beyond the classroom in administrative meetings, academic conferences, and in print, it is up to the field to debate.

The next question asks what is the proper scope of IR teaching? This question has also been asked before of the field but not directly about the IR classroom (Albert and Buzan 2017, 898). The answer to this question connects different themes of this article: intellectual rejuvenation and disciplinary renewal, diversity, and the future of international relations as an intellectual project. In substance and in design, the scope of IR teaching should embrace pluralism in paradigm, empirical remit, and criticism. A great deal has been made of pluralism in international relations (Levine and McCourt 2018; Eun 2016), but pluralism in the taught discipline is far different from pluralism in the published discipline, where differences accrue over the merits of accumulation and diversity. Here, the scope of possibility in the classroom is far more intellectually permissive. Teaching international relations can be theoretically and empirically promiscuous. It can respect the canon, its inner logic, and its external life, as well as contemporary alternatives (Ferguson 2015). This is an “integrative pluralism” (Dunne, Hansen, and Wight 2013, 416) that embraces diversity as a means of “providing more comprehensive and multidimensional accounts of complex phenomena” and a pedagogical engagement with the world that includes, but hardly limited to the Euro-Atlantic theater, that has dominated generations of IR thinking (Dunne, Hansen, and Wight 2013, 416).

Pedagogical pluralism in international relations flows from intuitions about balancing theory and empirics, the canon and its alternatives, being current while eschewing presentism, being “useful” without being instrumentalist, and drawing on instructor expertise without being constrained by the hyperspecialized knowledge attendant to the published discipline. Of course, this is easy to say. But operationalizing these intuitions into a pluralistic teaching program is much more difficult. Complicating the matter is the relative absence of explicit theoretical guidance for making IR pluralism work in the classroom. The insights of proponents of a “Global IR” can help, including some critiqued above for their neglect of the classroom. In particular, Acharya and Buzan’s (2019, 300–308) program for developing a Global IR provides concrete steps toward curriculum design as much as is does for research.

Regarding the IR theoretical parts of their program, Acharya and Buzan (2019, 301) say that Global IR respects existing theories while “giving due recognition to the places, roles, and contributions of non-Western peoples and societies,” which entails “pluralization within theories, rather than just between them.” There are issues here. First, pluralization between theories requires expanding the remit of IR theory beyond the grand IR paradigms to include non-Western contributions to international thought (Acharya and Buzan 2010; Acharya 2011). But this is not easy. Tickner and Wæver (2009) make it clear that Anglo-American IR looms impossibly large around the world. Without jettisoning this intellectual inheritance, Thinking International Relations Differently (Tickner and Blaney 2012) provides a route to pluralism. That volume interrogates alternative meanings to some of international relations’ central concepts—security, state, sovereignty and authority, globalization, secularism, religion, and the international. A professor committed to this kind of pluralism can expand the conceptual vocabulary of international relations in a way that encourages undergraduate conversancy in multiple IR vernaculars within and beyond the Anglo-American core.

There is also the matter of what do with the existing, Western-centric canon. Acharya and Buzan (2019, 301) also say that a global international relations would subsume rather than supplant existing IR theories and methods. The purpose here is not to displace Western-dominated IR knowledge but to situate it within the global context. This is an entirely attainable objective for an IR theory instructor. IR teachers should have full command of some IR theories while being conversant in nearly all anyway. Integrating a fuller slate of intellectual content into teaching IR theory permits a cognitive pluralism that is rarely available in the published discipline. The point here is that teaching narrowly and to the expertise of professors may suit their interests, but it puts blinders on the students. Upper-year and graduate studies can explore specific pathways, but only after international relations’ map has been presented. This likely means instructors must venture out of their preferred intellectual comfort zones and teach to their weaknesses as well as their strengths. Doing so, however, requires breaking through disciplinary walls and should not be underestimated. It requires breadth of knowledge, disciplinary literacy beyond the scholar’s training, and language skills (usually beyond English) that can take many years to develop, while the imperatives of the published discipline stress specialization.

Regarding the empirical subject matter, a pluralistic IR agenda would ground its empirics in world history rather than just Western history (Acharya and Buzan 2019, 301) This is demanding on an instructor whose subject-matter expertise will be narrow (by dint of academic training) and whose time will be short given other professional and personal commitments. Without considerable effort, this is more of an ideal than a reality. But a good start would be to follow Acharya and Buzan’s (2019, 303) admonition to integrate the study of regions, regionalism, and area studies into the curriculum. In particular, this means offering case studies, examples, and illustrations drawn from parts of the world outside the Euro-Atlantic zone. To this we can add Buzan and Lawson’s (2015) case for expanding the temporal remit of international relations to the nineteenth century. This would break free of the apocryphal founding myths (Carvalho, Leira, and Hobson 2011) and temporal myopia of the orthodox discipline (Buzan and Lawson 2014) in order to draw upon a richer and more global context for the emergence of the modern world. A worldly curriculum will likely begin rather thin, but over time become much deeper and more inclusive. Perhaps more attainable in the short-term is a pluralistic pedagogy that recognizes multiple forms of agency beyond the state and material power. Such an approach would entail a pedagogy addressing a diverse constellation of actors in world politics that offers a faithful representation of an overwhelmingly complex environment without reducing it exclusively to a handful of Western powers.

#### IR Scenario analysis unlocks an intellectual openness to overcome cognitive biases

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Added-value of scenario analysis for IR scholarship

As Tomé and Açıkalın (2019) point out, in order to fill the gap between IR theory and real-world problems, “an increasing number of scholars have come to embrace a spirit of intellectual openness, recognizing both the need for greater flexibility in the theoretical formulations and the possibility of complementarity by other theories and approaches” (p. 12). This section discusses the added value of scenario analysis as a complementary approach to traditional IR methods. The most obvious advantage of scenario analysis as a methodology, grounded in the reservoir of foresight studies, lies by definition in its ability to tackle future events. As mentioned before, there are no specified instruments within traditional IR methods which would allow scholars to go beyond past and present. The only exception is forecasting, one of the formal methods in IR, which is, however, distinctly different from foresight.

The underlying logic of forecasting is to provide predictions about the future by drawing on mathematical models and big data-sets based on known patterns. Thus, it is not particularly suitable to accommodate discontinuities. Foresight, as described above, aims at going beyond existing patterns by developing alternative futures based on an innovative combination of multiple driving forces. Its goal is to capture a set of possible futures and learn from them by examining the causal relations between driving forces and their different evolutions. By applying scenario approaches, scholars can thus account for evolving dynamics and discuss such timely issues as the consequences of Brexit for both British and EU-security, economics and politics (Brakman, Garretsen, & Kohl, 2018; Martill & Sus, 2018; Musolff, 2017; Verschueren, 2017; Ziv et al., 2018). Yet, scenario analysis offers more than the possibility to talk about the future. We see a fourfold merit of adding scenario analysis to the range of methods applied by IR scholars.

Confronting enduring assumptions

As we presented in the previous section, the main feature of explorative scenarios, which are the subject of this paper, is to stimulate creative thinking by challenging the deeply held assumptions of their authors. In other words, this method is helpful for overcoming enduring cognitive biases—mental errors such as linearity, presentism, and group think caused by the subconscious and simplified information processing of humans (Heuer, 1999, pp. 111– 112). Humans have the tendencies to focus on the present at the expense of the future and to think about the future in linear terms by extrapolating past trends into the future. As Gaddis (1992) points out, “we tend to bias our historical and our theoretical analyses too much toward continuity (…) we rarely find a way to introduce discontinuities into theory, or to attempt to determine what causes them to happen” (p. 52). Even if Gaddis does not explicitly mention scenarios, he refers to the concepts underlying scenario approaches (Han, 2011, p. 51). Scenario analysis attends to “deeper, otherwise left implicit, assumptions about continuous and linear patterns of development” (Wilkinson et al., 2013, p. 707). The process of scenario development invites the participants to reveal and question convictions which have so far remained unchallenged, and to question the linearity of world developments.

The ability of reexamining one’s own assumptions and going beyond linear patterns of development is essential for IR scholarship. To illustrate it with two examples: IR scholars and historians did not think that the Soviet Union could collapse and were startled by its fall, the peaceful resolution of the Cold War and the transformation of the bipolar system (Davis, 2005; Gaddis, 1992). In a similar vein, United States scholars were for decades so convinced of China’s economic, political, and cultural limitations that they neglected the possibility of its sudden ascent and were taken by surprise when it happened (Hundley, Kenzer, & Peterson, 2015). Interestingly, since the rise of China became evident, the United States debate on its future has been marked by a similar linearity of thought, leading to single-outcome predictions of China’s long-term future (Kerbel, 2004). In both cases, the discipline proved incapable of anticipating events of such importance, because scholars took for granted the status quo instead of confronting their bias towards linearity and detect manifestations of upcoming change. As a result, two major geopolitical surprises—the end of the Cold War and the rise of China have at first been neglected, forcing academia to catch up.

Against this backdrop, foresight helps IR scholars to exit the tunnel vision on world affairs and discover potentially valuable nonlinear lines of development. These can be both innovative in terms of scholarship, and policy-relevant by offering a reflection on unexpected discontinuities. Thus, it can facilitate the intellectual capability to think the unthinkable (Porter, 2016, p. 259).

Bringing forward new research questions

Scenario analysis starts with confronting one’s enduring assumptions and developing multiple causal possibilities, through which scholars can potentially discover topics that have not been examined before. One of the greatest challenges for any scholar is to identify innovative venues for research that might bring the discipline forward and advance publicity for one’s work. In Lakatosian terms, such an ability is often considered an evidence of a progressive research program.10 Since the prime feature of scenario analysis is to detect rapid and significant shifts in trajectories, or the forces behind them, this method succors when defining new pressing topics for academia. In particular, as mentioned in the previous section, scenario analysis enables the detection of both weak signals and wild cards. By drawing attention to these hitherto overlooked but potentially pressing issues, scenario analysis can identify research agendas for further investigation (Barma et al., 2016). Therefore, scenario analysis seems to be the right tool to advance innovative research since it helps scholars drive their research into new areas, away from moribund topics that have been followed for many decades. By “identifying questions of likely future significance” (Barma et al., 2016, p. 6), scenario analysis can contribute to combatting the proliferation of researchers in fields occupying the political status quo, such as Soviet or Japan studies in the United States in the 1980s. At the same time, innovative research topics confront the uncertainties that are crucial for policymakers to be monitored closely.

Dealing with the complexity and interdisciplinarity of real-world issues

Another added value of the scenario analysis for IR scholarship lies in its ability to provide comprehensive causal reasoning and thus to tackle complex issues. As mentioned in the introduction, the world’s complexity combined with abrupt shifts poses a challenge for IR scholarship. The possibility to accommodate multiple driving forces, to take into account different values they might take and finally to combine them with each other and see how they affect the dependent variable, makes the scenario approach quite unique. Traditional IR methods work with a limited number of independent variables, formulate and test hypotheses usually based on the relation between a single causal variable and the dependent variable. Investigating complex causal trajectories is therefore not possible. Against this background, we agree with Barma et al. (2016) and his colleagues who argue that scenarios are highly apt for dealing with complexity and uncertainty and providing academia with a tool for “actionable clarity in understanding contemporary global issues” (p. 1).

Moreover, the scenario approach helps to tackle the challenges of interdisciplinarity that is tied to complexity. By drawing on the active participation of people from different disciplines, backgrounds, and with different expertise in the scenario development process, it brings interdisciplinarity to the table by default. The key advantage of the approach is that this interdisciplinary conversation takes place prior to and during the research phase, rather than after it. This distinguishes the scenario approach from other methods that bring interdisciplinary perspectives together but do not facilitate a discussion between them, rather letting them passively co-exist. By exploring the dynamics between seemingly unrelated vectors of change (key drivers), scenario analysis can be useful for shedding light on developments that would have been overlooked by narrower research designs. In security studies, for example, scenario analysis can connect the dots between hard, soft, traditional and non-traditional understandings of security and capture the interplay of economic-societalenvironmental and technological changes. Imposing interdisciplinarity also helps to counter the “hyper-fragmentation of knowledge” that “makes it difficult for even scholars in different disciplines to understand each other, much less policy-makers and general public” (Desch, 2015, p. 381).

Complex real-world issues that were tackled using scenario analysis include the Israel-Palestine conflict (Stein et al., 1998), Turkey’s geopolitical environment (Çelik & Blum, 2007), the prospects of the United States– China conflict (Friedberg, 2005) and the consequences of Brexit for EU foreign and security policy (Martill & Sus, 2018). An examination of these topics without the application of interdisciplinary approaches would not be possible precisely due to their multifaceted character.

Stepping out of the ivory tower

Finally, scenario analysis also enables IR scholars to establish a channel of communication with policy-makers other than conducting interviews for their own research or providing ad-hoc consultations. A participatory scenario process forges “deep and shared understanding between its participants” (Ramírez & Wilkinson, 2016, p. 21). In scenario workshops, academics and policy-makers work together, confront their world visions and assumptions and arrive at an agreement upon which they develop narratives for alternative futures. Hence, scenario analysis can be perceived as a tool towards more exchange between academia and policy-making that can contribute to a better understanding between the two worlds. For policymakers, it provides the opportunity to consider long-term trends (an occasion not often found in the day-to-day nature of politics). For academics, it provides insight into which trends are most concerning for policy-makers, allowing them to check and ultimately enhance the relevance of their research agendas.

We acknowledge the difficulty to engage policy-makers in foresight exercises caused by their time-constrains and possible lack of interest. Yet, in our experience, this problem mostly refers to high-level policy-makers. Mid-level and former officials and policy-makers have more time and willingness to participate in foresight exercises and contribute equally valuable perspectives. The participatory character of foresight exercises facilitates the exchange of views from different stakeholders on an equal level. In our case, as the evaluation has shown, it has proven to be stimulating for each of the engaged groups.

Moreover, the policy dialogue benefits from scenarios’ accessibility to a broader audience. Scenario publications tend to be shorter and easier to read than the average academic publication and as Nye (2008) rightly notes “a premium on time is a major difference between the two cultures” of academia and policy-making. Since scenario publications are more suitable to the time- and attention-constraints of many policy-makers, they improve the accessibility of research findings for the policy world (Cairney & Kwiatkowski, 2017). An illustrative example is offered by a foresight exercise conducted by the Aspen Institute Berlin in 2017. A group of academics, think tank experts and policy-makers developed scenarios on the future of the liberal world order that served as raw material for a newspaper from the future titled “The Aspen Insight” and dated October 21, 2025. Not only did the presentation of the newspaper catch the attention of many Berlin-based policy-makers but the “The Aspen Insight” was also attached as a supplement to the Berlin daily Tagesspiegel, and reached more than 300,000 readers.11

We acknowledge that the four aspects of the added value of scenario analysis for IR scholarship are interrelated and that their boundaries are not clear-cut. Yet, we believe, they highlight distinct benefits of this approach for academics that want to tackle the challenges of today’s world via their research.

### Perm

#### The perm uses NATO as a force for good. Rejecting NATO enslaves the world under Russia and China’s gangster mafia totalitarianism.

Riggio 20 [Adam Riggio; professor of Communications and Globalization at ILAC & Georgian College; 5-7-2020; "Adam Riggio: Why we must fight for a socialist NATO — The Canada Files"; Canada Files; https://www.thecanadafiles.com/articles/so; KL]

Admitting NATO’S crimes and anti-democratic effects is, however, only the first step to understand the actual bind in which we progressives are stuck. Too many among progressives and radical socialists are trapped in this stunted way of thinking because of how we understand neoliberal capitalism as a uniquely American project.

Movements for social progress around the world grow precarious in the shadow of the geopolitical games of our great state powers jockeying for military and economic influence and domination. The socialist left has long been well aware of the brutality and rapaciousness of capitalism.

Decades of research and journalism have demonstrated the central role of American military and economic policy in pressing capitalist development around the world. The intellectual tradition of studying how capitalism began with Karl Marx himself and continues through generations across a variety of disciplines. Many well-educated progressives have studied these traditions, whether in the formal settings of universities to our own learning. But much of this tradition focuses on the American role in promoting global capitalism.

We progressives today must face a terrifying truth: the American state is not alone in enforcing the brutal innovations in capitalism that have developed over the last generation.

Monstrosities of Mafia Fascism and Absolutism

Russia was once an ally of socialist liberation movements around the world, though their own revolution under Josef Stalin had collapsed into state-controlled capitalism and government by secret police.

Now, Vladimir Putin has restored totalitarian principles of government to Russia, as their domestic policy is the economic and political devastation of the Russian people. In other words, Putin facilitated the wholesale theft of hundreds of billions of dollars in wealth from the Russian state and its industries to a clique of former bureaucratic and secret police apparatchiks, of which is he leader. Those oligarchs are also leaders and financiers in Russia’s international mafia. Putin has explicitly built his new Russian totalitarianism with significant influence from the fascist political philosophy of Ivan Ilyin.

Russia is emerging again as a major power in our century’s geopolitics, but the collapse and corruption of much of the American government under Trump, as well as their homicidal approach to COVID, has made China the most powerful military and economic state in the world.

For decades, the Chinese state has governed its people with brutal police enforcement of regime loyalty, even deploying concentration camps and ethnic cleansing to its conquered territories of East Turkestan and Tibet. More recently, Xi Jinping’s regime has been especially devoted to institutionalizing his absolute rule over China, and the country’s highest political leaders are themselves embedded in corrupt relationships with their most powerful billionaire businessmen.

One need only count the many murdered journalists in Russia who have investigated the details of Putin’s gangster regime to know that this geopolitical enemy of America is no friend of the progressive. The same goes for dissidents and whistleblowers who have defied Xi’s official truth: they rot in prison like Liu Xiaobo or disappear from humanity like Li Wenliang.

Three Militaries Against Democracy, Not Just One

Despite the destruction that the NATO military alliance has caused in Europe and Asia, we progressives face an uncomfortable truth: we need a military powerful enough to stand against the many threats that Russia and China pose to democracy around the world. As well, we must never let our opposition to the threat that America poses to global democracy make us patsies for Russian or Chinese control.

The most potent threat to our own democracies is the destabilization of our democratic societies. A foundation of modern Russia’s foreign policy is to aflame social conflicts inside of democratic polities, and use weapons of cyber-warfare, such as viruses and disinformation.

China has taken a more traditional route to global dominance. Chinese investments in massive resource extraction projects across Africa follow the model of the old British East India Company. Take almost all profit from mines and oil wells, while trapping their African partner states in unsustainable debt from project financing.

How do we progressive and other ordinary people escape this triple squeeze between three militarized, aggressive superpower states run by mafiosi and billionaire power brokers? Anti-capitalist, socialist, and democratic organization and agitation across the world is really our only answer.

We need NATO, but only because socialist and democratic movements are closer to taking some measure of control away from the corrupt in Europe and the Americas, pessimistic though even these prospects often feel. A socialist Europe and North America would stand against Russia and China as the weapons of war move to the internet and public political movements themselves.

If the NATO states of Europe and North America could unite in an aggressive cyberwar to encourage popular resistance to the brutal mafia totalitarianism of Russia and China, then we will have a chance for global democracy, socialism, a green economy, and a sustainable civilization on Earth.

Until those revolutions happen, we remain in our triple bind. But collapsing our military entirely, while geopolitical enemies expand and consolidate theirs, is a recipe for our enslavement. We remain slaves under neoliberal capitalism, our opportunities ground to dust.

### Perm [Postcolonial IR]

#### Perm solves best – prioritizing postcolonial theories of IR above realist predictive models reproduces the binaristic logics they criticize.

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Conclusion: the paucity of ‘better’ It seems appropriate to conclude by commenting on why it would be futile to attempt to provide a justification for why postcolonial approaches offer a “better” explanation of world politics in comparison to other IR theories. The analysis has shown that traditional IR theories, and even critical theories such as poststructuralism and Marxism, operate within the limitations of an epistemology that is inherently Eurocentric and attached to a vision of world politics that is excessively temporal, with ontological categories that reflect this point of view. Even when the European vision of modernity is criticised from within, this criticism is prone to falling back on these same categories in order to do so. Instead, a decolonial epistemology can create space for a universal that incorporates rather than excludes difference, while ontological concepts derived from this epistemology and the non-Western experience can elaborate a vision of world politics that is more holistic and nuanced. Yet to say that such an explanation is “better” seems to negate the very purpose of postcolonial approaches to IR; to draw attention to the hierarchies embedded in the international sphere through the past and ongoing practices and discourses of colonialism and imperialism. Describing these approaches as “better” merely engages in the same tendency towards hierarchy, binaries, and reductionism critiqued in other approaches. It is for this reason that this essay has argued strongly for the importance of postcolonial approaches to explaining world politics but refuses to reduce these attributes to a better or worse distinction. Suffice it to say that postcolonial approaches encourage an understanding of world politics that truly merits the name.

#### Bridging the gap between postcolonial theorizations of IR and normative ones produces a comprehensive analytic of power -- that solves best.

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Bull notwithstanding, there have been attempts in international re- lations to address the cultural realm.32 Ali Mazrui confronts interna- tional relations head-on by claiming that "culture is at the heart of the nature of power in International Relations. "33 Mazrui sees ideol- ogy, political economy, and technology as deeply rooted in the cul- tural realm, and views the North-South divide as an increasingly cultural one. Cultural identity is held to be an issue of increased sig- nificance in the contemporary world - so much so that, according to Mazrui, we may be witnessing the "gradual unravelling of identities based on the state, a declining of identities based on political ideol- ogy - and the revival of identities based on culture."34 Peter Worsley's earlier account of world development makes similar claims.35 The in- ternationalization of culture - youth cults, religious revivalism, con- sumerism, feminism - are seen as "powerful evidence that a sense of common identity and a shared culture can give rise to social move- ments that quickly transcend the boundaries of any particular soci- ety."36 Both Mazrui and Worsley thus see culture as a key determinant of political and economic processes. Even the generally econocentric Immanuel Wallerstein has shifted ground to view culture as "the key ideological battleground" of the opposing interests within the mod- ern world capitalist system.37 These attempts to engage culture seemingly amount to a re- spectable interest on the part of international relations, and it is in- structive to consider the intellectual background of the three writers discussed. Wallerstein is a sociologist, and the essay cited above was published in a collection of sociological articles on nationalism, glob- alization, and modernity. Mazrui has always cut a distinctive path in international relations, and his concerns have had more to do with the problems of Third World justice and identity than with main- stream issues. Worsley, similarly, has been steeped in the problems of development and dependency in the Third World. We thus see that many of the perspectives that have enlivened the discipline have come from outside it and draw on different source material. Something similar may be said of R. B. J Walker. Certainly he ha ried a consideration of culture with the issues of order, power states, but his bearings have been taken from broad modernity.38 Without belaboring the point, such an analysis is very much the exception. Walker himself recognizes as much: 'This kind of literature . . . has emerged largely on the margins of International Relations as an institutionalized discipline. It remains obscure, even alien to those whose training has been primarily within the positivis- tic, realist, or policy-oriented mainstreams.'139 The contrast with postcolonialism could not be starker. Where in- ternational relations has ignored culture, or at most grudgingly con- ceded it a minor role, postcolonialism has elevated culture to an extraordinary degree. Although the understanding of culture has changed as the discourse has evolved, culture has been at the heart of postcolonialism from the outset. In the first phase of postcolonial- ism, culture was grounded in the literary context and understood very much in terms of the clash of values engendered by the colonial encounter. Following postcolonialism's move away from specific texts to a more generalized account of domination and resistance between North and South, culture has attained larger explanatory significa- tions. It has come to encapsulate the very site of struggle and differ- ence between the so-called margin and the center; the pivot upon which an emergent postcolonial identity develops. On one view, how- ever, culture has been overdone. In its attempt to be at the cutting edge of academic discourse, postcolonialism can be accused of hav- ing overstretched the analytical utility of culture. Yet such a perspec- tive underplays the significance of the cultural reorientation; it is precisely through culture that postcolonialism mounts a fundamental challenge to the epistemological bases of established regimes of thinking such as international relations. In this respect its effect has been overwhelmingly positive. To this point, the burden of our analysis has been to suggest that international relations and postcolonialism pass like ships in the night. We have highlighted possible intersections and potential sites of engagement, the idea being that both discourses might be en- riched through a process of cross-fertilization. Such enrichment would follow partly from the very fact of difference. We now want to direct attention to three key areas of difference in which engagement might have real significance, not only for each discourse but more generally for our broader concern with approaches to the North- South divide. The first relates to power and representation, the sec- ond to modernity, and the third to emotional commitment and radicalism. In the process of contestation and comparison, the hope is that we can get a better handle on understanding issues such as power and modernity as they bear upon the relationship between the North and South. Both discourses have distinct strengths and weak- nesses and bring different perspectives to bear on the issues at hand. In seeking a dialogue and making assessments about what we might learn from their diferences, we can begin to bridge the discourses to their mutual benefit.

### Perm [Pan]

#### The perm solves — representations aren’t static and including deconstructive self-reflection allows us to re-think our relationship with China.

\*Also an alt card if you frame self-reflection as the alt.

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CHINA KNOWLEDGE AND SELF-REFLECTION

Until now, my focus seems to have been mainly on how not to understand China’s rise. While deconstruction is all well and good, one cannot help but wonder: How to study China? If those paradigms are problematic or less than adequate, what are the alternative ways of knowing this important country? These questions sound reasonable enough. Be it scholars or practitioners, when faced with an apparently unprecedented transition from a transatlantic century to a transpacific century led by the ‘rise’ of China (and India), one is naturally anxious to know what China is up to and how to best respond to it. Yet, however understandable this desire may be, this book has hesitated to directly volunteer answers to those questions, or at least its implicit answers would be unlikely to satisfy those demands on their own terms. There are several reasons for this. To begin with, I am sceptical of some of their underlying ontological and epistemological premises about what China is and what China knowledge should mean. For example, those questions seem to assume that this book is merely a study of China studies (or a particular section of China studies), rather than a study of China per se. Hence their insistence on knowing how we might go about studying China proper. Yet, from the beginning, this knowledge/reality dichotomy has been problematised. Since there is no China-in-itself outside knowledge, representation or discourse, what we refer to as ‘China’ must already be coloured by such representations. Without reference to representations we cannot for a moment speak of China or do China studies. Given that China does not exist independently of discourse and that any study becomes part of its object of study, I should say that this analysis of Western discourses of China is already a study of China in the proper sense of the word. Also, underlying those question is the belief that deconstruction is essentially destructive and thus has little constructive to contribute to China studies. However, as Derrida notes, deconstruction is ‘a way of taking a position’ rather than merely ‘a flourish of irresponsible and irresponsiblemaking destruction’. 8 By way of deconstruction, this book has hoped to generate both critical and constructive reflections on the way we think about the nature of China knowledge as well as the way such knowledge can be better produced. To the extent that methodology is always implied in ontology and epistemology, my ontological and epistemological critique is not an exercise of esoteric verbal incantation, but carries important methodological messages for China watching, even though such messages could well be dismissed as hollow, mystifying or even alien by conventional standards. One message from this study is that it is no longer adequate for us to be merely ‘China’ specialists who are otherwise blissfully ‘ignorant of the world beyond China’.9 Self-watching, I suggest, requires at once discarding this positivist self-(un)consciousness and cultivating a critically reflective, philosophising mind. ‘The philosophizing mind’, wrote Collingwood, ‘never simply thinks about an object, it always, while thinking about any object, thinks also about its own thought about that object’. China watching needs autoethnography or ‘self-watching’ to consciously make itself part of its own object of critical analysis whereby the necessary but often missing comparative context can help us put China in perspective. All research, to be sure, must already contain some level of reflectivity, be it about methods of inquiry, hypothesis testing, empirical evidence, data collection, or clarity of expression. And the Western representations of China’s rise, predicated on some particular ways of Western selfimagination, are necessarily self-reflective in that sense. And yet, such narrow technical reflectivity or narcissistic posturing is not what I mean by ‘self-watching’. In fact, the unconscious Western self-imagination as the modern knowing subject (who sets itself apart from the world and refuses to critically look at itself) is the very antithesis of self-watching. 10 This position is similar to that of ‘ironists’. According to Richard Rorty, ironists are ‘never quite able to take themselves seriously because always aware that the terms in which they describe themselves are subject to change, always aware of the contingency and fragility of their final vocabularies, and thus of their selves’.11 In the concluding chapter of his Scratches on Our Minds, Harold Isaacs seemed to have endorsed such ‘ironist’ approaches to China studies: ‘we have to examine, each of us, how we register and house our observations, how we come to our judgments, how we enlarge our observations, how we describe them, and what purposes they serve for us’.12 Back in 1972, John Fairbank put such reflection in practice by suggesting that America’s Cold-War attitude towards China was based less on reason than on fear, a fear inspired not by China but by America’s experience with Nazi and Stalinist totalitarian regimes. 13 These examples clearly show the possibility of reflective China watching, but alas, as noted from the beginning, such reflectivity is hardly visible in today’s ‘China’s rise’ literature. Indeed, without the trace of a single author, the two dominant China paradigms hinge onto a ubiquitous collective psyche and emotion that is often difficult to see, let alone to criticise from within. Yet it is imperative that such self-criticism should occur, which entails problematising China watchers’ own thought, vocabularies and taken-forgranted self-identity as disinterested rational observers. It requires us to pause and look into ourselves to examine, for example, why we constantly fear China, rather than taking that fear as given: ‘We are wary of China because we are wary of China’. Self-watching demands an ironist awareness of the contingency, instability, and provinciality of mainstream China knowledge, its intertextual and emotional link to the fears and fantasies in the Western self-imagination, the political economy of its production, and the attendant normative, ethical and practical consequences both for dealing with China and for serving the power and special interests at home. Put it differently, it requires a deconstructive move of intellectual decolonisation of the latent (neo)colonial desire and mindset that, despite the formal end of colonialism decades ago, continues to actively operate in Orientalism knowledge and China watching, facilitated by its various scientific, theoretical, and pedagogical guises. In this context, self-reflection cannot be confined to individual China watchers or even the China watching community. Never a purely personal pursuit or even a disciplinary matter, China knowledge is always inextricably linked with the general dynamism of Western knowledge, desire and power in global politics. Its self-reflection should thus extend to the shared collective self of the West, its assumed identity and associated foreign policy (China policy in particular). If China can be seen as a being-in-the-world, these issues are part and parcel of the world in which China finds itself and relates to others. But until now they have largely escaped the attention of China watchers. Maybe it is because these are primarily the business of scholars of Western/American culture, history and foreign relations, rather than that of China scholars. After all, there is a need for division of labour in social sciences. True, for various reasons it is unrealistic to expect China scholars to be at the same time experts on those ‘non-China’ issues. Nevertheless, since China watchers both rely on and contribute to their collective Western self-imagination in their understanding of China, it is crucial that they look at their collective Western self in the mirror. Take the negative image of China’s brutal Soviet-style sports system for example. Every now and then, such an image will be reliably brought up to reinforce China’s Otherness more generally. But if the ways American young talents are trained are put under the same spotlight, the difference between the US and China is no longer as vast as it appears. 14 In doing so, the previous China image is no longer as defensible as it seems. In brief, the broader point here is that the same China may take on quite different meanings when we are willing to subject ourselves to similar scrutiny. We may better appreciate why China looks the way it does when we are more self-conscious of the various lenses, paradigms, and fore-meanings through which we do China watching. Conversely, we cannot fully comprehend why the Chinese behave in a certain way until we pay attention to what we have done (to them), past and present. Such self-knowledge on the part of the West is essential to a better grasp of China. Without the former, China knowledge is incomplete and suspect. Yet, to many, self-reflection is at best a luxurious distraction. At worst it amounts to navel-gazing and could turn into ‘a prolix and self-indulgent discourse that is divorced from the real world’. 15 Such concern is hardly justified, however. The imagined Western self is integral to the real world, and critical self-reflection also helps reconnect China watching to the ‘real’ world of power relations to which it always belongs. By making one better aware of this connection, it helps open up space for emancipatory knowledge. As Mannheim notes: The criterion of such self-illumination is that not only the object but we ourselves fall squarely within our field of vision. We become visible to ourselves, not just vaguely as a knowing subject as such but in a certain role hitherto hidden from us, in a situation hitherto impenetrable to us, and with motivations of which we have not hitherto been aware. In such a moment the inner connection between our role, our motivations, and our type and manner of experiencing the world suddenly draws upon us. Hence the paradox underlying these experiences, namely the opportunity for relative emancipation from social determination, increases proportionately with insight into this determination. 16 Still, there may be a lingering fear that excessive reflectivity could undo much of the hard-won China knowledge. But again to quote Mannheim, ‘the extension of our knowledge of the world is closely related to increasing personal self-knowledge and self-control of the knowing personality’.17 Even when that does expose our lack of knowledge about China, all is not lost. Such revelation is not a sign of ignorance, but an essential building block in the edifice of China knowledge. Confucius told us that ‘To say that you know when you do know and say that you do not know when you do not know— that is [the way to acquire] knowledge’. 18 Thus, the knowing subject can emancipate itself from its delusion about its own being; 19 the real meaning of ignorance is that one claims to know when one does not or cannot know.

### Perm [Space]

#### Integrating the alt’s discourse into space colonization is possible.

Renstrom 21, Boston University Senior Lecturer, Rhetoric; Joelle Renstrom maintains an award-winning blog, Could This Happen, about the relationship between science and science fiction., (Joelle, “We Shouldn’t Invoke Colonialist Language To Justify Missions To the Cosmos”, The Wire: Science, <https://science.thewire.in/aerospace/why-should-we-invoke-colonialist-language-to-justify-missions-to-the-cosmos/>) //CHC-DS

In Kennedy’s words, space exploration is our species’ most “dangerous and greatest adventure.” It makes sense to address factors that influence human behaviour in space – and that will ultimately determine our odds of success there – sooner rather than later. That includes asking everyone, not just NASA or Elon Musk, what we want an interplanetary future of humanity to look like. Would we want futuristic Mars settlements to operate like modern-day Earth towns, or could we do better?

Crafting a code of ethics for space exploration may seem daunting, but our words offer a potential starting point. Space is one of few places humans have gone that thus far remains peaceful. Why, then, use the language of war, imperialism, or colonialism to describe human actions there? Eliminating the language of genocide and subordination from the space discourse is one easy step anyone can take to encourage the great leaps for humankind that we dream of for the future, on Earth and beyond.

### Top — AT: Afropess K

#### Two L/T –

#### [a] Russian Propaganda

#### Russian propaganda explicitly targets black people. They are extremely good at doing it.

Ackerman 18 [Spencer Ackerman is a contributing editor at the Daily Beast. From 2017 to 2021, he was senior national security correspondent for The Daily Beast. He is the author of forthcoming [REIGN OF TERROR](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/622555/reign-of-terror-by-spencer-ackerman/): How The 9/11 Era Destabilized America and Produced Trump, 11-4-2018, How Russia Is Exploiting American White Supremacy, Daily Beast, https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-russia-exploits-american-white-supremacy-over-and-over-again] Eric

The cynical brilliance of Vladimir Putin’s propaganda campaign is that it exploited America’s foundational commitment to white supremacy. The term itself is so raw and so hideous that it inspires an allergy to its usage within mainstream political discourse. But no other term—racism, white privilege, etc.—better captures the dynamic at issue. White supremacy is exactly what it says on the label: a social structure by which whites, a pseudoscientific grouping with [a definition that changes over time as is convenient](https://www.amazon.com/dp/B003HQ3XHQ/ref=dp-kindle-redirect?_encoding=UTF8&btkr=1), dominate America’s complex and often informal hierarchies of power.

American history is many things, but among them is a catalog recording the mutating shape of a white power structure and how that structure responds to various challenges to its existence. Amongst white supremacy’s greatest contemporary triumphs is its portrayal of racism as individual prejudice rather than maintenance of the social order. Our schools teach children that racism is about hatred, and hatred is disreputable—not that racism is about power, with hatred merely one downstream effect amongst many. And so, nearly every day, the public discourse shows another white person objecting that the definitions have changed on them in a dizzying way. Those objections predictably run a gamut from [left](http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/09/donald-trump-white-supremacy-and-the-discourse-of-panic.html) to [right](https://money.cnn.com/2018/08/09/media/fox-news-laura-ingraham-tucker-carlson-white-nationalism/index.html), since white supremacy’s roots sink deeper in America than any mere political persuasion. Putin's trolls wisely selected a fuel source that white Americans of all political stripes, consciously or not, ensure is inexhaustible.

With every tweet, Facebook post, YouTube video and Tumblr page, Russia showed that it understands America with a depth that prompts much of white America to avert its eyes. Russian propaganda expertly grasped that even the most meager challenges to white supremacy prompt a politically powerful and useful white resistance, and that this dynamic is a persistent feature of American life. All Russia—or any foreign power, or no foreign power at all—needs to do is breathe on the embers until they ignite. White supremacy murders millions of people, steals their wealth to distribute it up the social ladder, and denies untold millions their true human potential. America does this to itself, and left undisturbed, will continue doing it. Russia’s only unique contribution in 2016, and beyond, was to underscore the threat white supremacy poses to U.S. national security.

The reactionary Russian political theorist [Alexander Dugin](https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-far-right-book-every-russian-general-reads) has written explicitly on the benefits of operationalizing American white supremacy for Russian benefit. While Dugin’s true influence on Putin remains a subject of debate, his 1997 tome The Foundations of Geopolitics presaged the Russian active-measures campaign of the past three years.

“It is especially important to introduce geopolitical disorder into internal American activity, encouraging all kinds of separatism and ethnic, social and racial conflicts, actively supporting all dissident movements—extremist, racist, and sectarian groups, thus destabilizing internal political processes in the U.S.,” Dugin [wrote](https://bigthink.com/paul-ratner/the-dangerous-philosopher-behind-putins-strategy-to-grow-russian-power-at-americas-expense). His clarity might have benefitted the 2017 CIA-FBI-NSA intelligence assessment.

To credibly put that into practice 20 years later, Russians merely needed to be ready online. They observed the idioms adopted by left and right online political subcultures and repurposed them, using “cultural, linguistic and identity markers in their Twitter profiles to align themselves with the shared values and norms of either the left- or right-leaning clusters,” write University of Washington researchers Ahmer Arif, Leo G. Stewart and Kate Starbird in a [paper](http://ahmerarif.com/papers/BLM-IRA.pdf) to be presented at an academic conference in November.

IRA stereotypes were crude, speaking to how Russians understood the social currency of their marks. One fake profile, hilariously titled @USA\_Gunslinger, read: “They won’t deny us our defense! Whether you’re agree [sic] with me or not, you’re welcome here! If you don’t want to be welcomed, go f\*ck yourself.” Another, anticipating Atlantic writer Adam Serwer’s thesis that contemporary white supremacy portrays itself as[disgusted by racism](https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/11/the-nationalists-delusion/546356/), included “Anti Racism” in its profile alongside “Southern. Conservative. Pro God.” IRA Tumblrs attempting to portray themselves as black were titled such things as [Hustle In A Trap and Ghetta Blasta](https://www.thedailybeast.com/trump-believes-there-is-a-conspiracy-to-submarine-the-kavanaugh-nomination?ref=scroll). But the accounts, whether left or right, showed more sophistication—at least on a level analogous to what a machine could spit out, given enough data—in their appropriation of how authentic accounts within the targeted groups spoke to one another.

“What really struck me in studying the activities of these accounts up close, was the level of knowledge they demonstrated of American culture,” Arif told The Daily Beast. “They talked about the movies, they talked about specific holidays and things like that, so it speaks to an organized, kind of a digital marketing operation, almost, knowing your audience really thoroughly … [For] a country that is already divided in some ways by things like race and politics, this is a case of someone coming along and giving us just a little nudge.”

Arif and his colleagues didn’t set out to study the IRA. As academics examining human-computer interaction, they wanted to examine the online discourse around Black Lives Matter. But last year, after Twitter and Facebook began shuttering accounts associated with the IRA, they noticed Russian accounts popping up with sufficient frequency in Black Lives Matter discussions that they studied that phenomenon on its own. Their preliminary work has already attracted coverage in [Mother Jones](https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2018/01/russian-trolls-hyped-anger-over-black-lives-matter-more-than-previously-known/), [The Atlantic](https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/01/trump-russia-twitter/551093/) and [Mashable](https://mashable.com/2018/01/22/drawing-lines-of-contention-study-twitter-university-of-washington/#zUuNBZbpbmq8), but their final product has more information about, among other things, “what content they were propagating,” Arif said.

What they found matched a series of 2017 exclusives from The Daily Beast that showed white supremacy was never far from the surface of surreptitious Russian propaganda. The fake group SecuredBorders urged a real-life rally in Idaho in August 2016 under the cry, “[We must stop taking in Muslim refugees!](https://www.thedailybeast.com/exclusive-russia-used-facebook-events-to-organize-anti-immigrant-rallies-on-us-soil)” The IRA Twitter account Being Patriotic called on followers to actually kill Black Lives Matter activists: “[Arrest and shoot every sh\*thead taking part in burning our flag! #BLM vs #USA](https://www.thedailybeast.com/russians-appear-to-use-facebook-to-push-pro-trump-flash-mobs-in-florida).”

It’s true that the Russians also impersonated what they saw as left-wing and nonwhite American audiences. Arif and his colleagues have documented the IRA pretending to be both #BlackLivesMatter and its white-backlash antagonist #AllLivesMatter. But a look at the substance of the messaging the Russians geared to an ostensibly non-white audience looks distinctly congruent with the prejudices reflected by its white right-wing one. When the IRA pretended to be non-white, it portrayed its fabricated in-group as threatening, provocative or anti-American.

A Facebook page [impersonating the United Muslims of America](https://www.thedailybeast.com/exclusive-russians-impersonated-real-american-muslims-to-stir-chaos-on-facebook-and-instagram) pushed memes falsely claiming the U.S., and particularly the Russian adversaries Hillary Clinton and John McCain, created ISIS—before claiming that Clinton was the guardian of Muslim interests. Arif’s paper notes that the IRA impostor group BlackMatters pushed a series of inflammatory gifs purporting to show police officers sexually assaulting a black teenage girl—which participants in the #BlackLivesMatter hashtag subsequently debunked. “[T]he video incident functioned both to further stoke anti-police sentiments on the left and, once it was debunked, increase anti-BlackLivesMatter sentiments on the right,” Arif, Stewart and Starbird write.

The Russians posturing as Black Lives Matter “favored an uncompromising and adversarial stance towards law enforcement,” they found. “This activity feeds directly into attempts to frame #BlackLivesMatter as an anti-police hate group. From prior research we know that such framings were actively resisted and addressed by #BlackLivesMatter activists… [T]hese accounts did not just speak to the communities that they were pretending to be a part of, but also aimed to communicate an antagonistic representation of those communities to others.”

That strategy is on display in Europe as well as America. According to a knowledgeable European Union official who was not cleared to talk to a journalist, social media accounts strongly suspected of being Russian cutouts are waving digital red flags to ideologically contrary audiences. In the run-up to the September 9 election in Sweden, the EU official noticed pro-refugee messaging emanating from suspected Russia-controlled accounts, aimed this time at audiences expected to feel anxious about immigration. “You strengthen the grievances, and then exploit” them, the official told The Daily Beast.

While each surreptitious Russian influence campaign is distinctly tailored to its particular audience, continuities amongst them point to the particular sort of chaos in the West that the Kremlin considers beneficial. It inflames a sense of grievance amongst a white overclass which fears the collapse of its social, political and economic supremacy. It inflates even the most modest challenge to that supremacy as an attack on its fundamental way of life, essentializing entire national histories to nothing more than white prerogatives. This is how immigration becomes perceived as an invasion, Black Lives Matter becomes a “[domestic terror outfit](https://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2018/01/25/vermont-high-school-fly-black-lives-matter-flag/),” and the [poor white masses feel besieged into silence](https://www.breitbart.com/london/2018/03/07/people-tiny-irish-town-taking-hundreds-migrants-no-say-scared-called-racist/) before crying out for a champion to make them feel great again.

#### Russian government’s primary incentive is to alienate black groups and create increased animosity.

Barnes and Goldman 20 [Julian E. Barnes is a national security reporter for The New York Times covering the intelligence agencies and Adam Goldman reports on the F.B.I. for The New York Times and was part of a team that won a Pulitzer Prize in 2018 for national reporting on Russia’s meddling in the presidential election, 3-10-2020, Russia Trying to Stoke U.S. Racial Tensions Before Election, Officials Say (Published 2020), NYT, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/10/us/politics/russian-interference-race.html] Eric

WASHINGTON — The Russian government has stepped up efforts to inflame racial tensions in the United States as part of its bid to [influence November’s presidential election,](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/22/us/politics/cia-russian-election-interference.html) including trying to incite violence by white supremacist groups and to stoke anger among African-Americans, according to seven American officials briefed on recent intelligence.

[Russia](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/11/world/europe/russia-school-shooting.html)’s lead intelligence agency, the S.V.R., has apparently gone beyond 2016 methods of [interference](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/16/us/politics/election-interference-russia-2020-assessment.html), when operatives tried to stoke racial animosity by creating fake Black Lives Matter groups and spreading disinformation to [depress black voter turnout](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/17/us/politics/russia-2016-influence-campaign.html). Now, Russia is also trying to influence white supremacist groups, the officials said; they gave few details, but one official said federal investigators are examining how at least one neo-Nazi organization with ties to Russia is funded.

Other Russian efforts, which American intelligence agencies have tracked, involve simply prodding white nationalists to more aggressively spread hate messages and amplifying their invective. Russian operatives are also trying to push black extremist groups toward violence, according to multiple officials, though they did not detail how.

Russia’s more public influence operations, like state-backed news organizations, have continued to push divisive racial narratives, including stories emphasizing allegations of police abuse in the United States and highlighting racism against African-Americans within the military.

And as social media companies more vigilantly monitor for foreign activity than they did in 2016, Russia has also adjusted its methods to evade detection. Rather than disseminate messages as widely as possible, as in 2016, Russian operatives are using private Facebook groups, posts on the online message board 4chan and closed chat rooms that are more difficult to monitor, according to intelligence officials.

Russia’s primary goal, according to several officials briefed on the intelligence who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive information, is to foster a sense of chaos in the United States, though its motivations are under debate and difficult to decipher in the absence of high-level intelligence sources inside Moscow.

The direct effect of its interference on presidential politics is less clear, though some American officials said that Russia believed that acts of violence could bolster President Trump’s re-election bid if he could argue that a response to such an episode demanded continuity and that he represented a law-and-order approach.

The F.B.I. and other intelligence agencies declined to comment on specific Russian activities.

“We see Russia is willing to conduct more brazen and disruptive influence operations because of how it perceives its conflict with the West,” David Porter, a top agent on the F.B.I.’s Foreign Influence Task Force, said last month at an election security conference in Washington.

He added, “To put it simply, in this space, Russia wants to watch us tear ourselves apart.”

Because Russia is trying to amplify the messaging of existing groups, its interference is difficult for American officials to combat given First Amendment protections for speech. The government does have the legal authority to stop hate speech that explicitly advocates violence, and social media companies continue to take down accounts linked to Russian intelligence or disinformation groups.

Attempts to exacerbate racial divisions are only one strand of Russia’s influence operations in 2020; Moscow’s intelligence agencies promote a variety of narratives and divisive issues. But perhaps no more difficult issue exists in the United States than racial justice and privilege, and officials expressed worry that amplifying divisions among races could do the most damage to the country’s social fabric.

The Russian intelligence services took note of the divisive nature of the 2017 white supremacist march in Charlottesville, Va., which led to the death of a counterprotester, and concluded that promoting hate groups was the most effective method of sowing discord in the United States, according to American intelligence reports described by the officials.

Some American officials believe that Russia is trying to undermine American democracy and the nation’s standing in the world by driving debate to the extremes.

“One of Russia’s goals is weakening institutions and the weaponization of race is a way they can do that,” said Laura Rosenberger, the director of the Alliance for Securing Democracy. “A divided America is a weaker America. When we are unable to solve our challenges together, Russia is more able to flex its power around the world.”

#### Red Pill movement proves — it creates material violence

Spaulding 18 [Suzanne Spaulding is a senior adviser for homeland security with the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Devi Nair is a program manager and research associate with the CSIS International Security Program. Arthur Nelson is an intern with the CSIS International Security Program, 12-21-2018, Why Putin Targets Minorities, CSIS, https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-putin-targets-minorities] Eric

Historically, oppressed minorities may be more likely to gravitate towards a certain group identity. It is unsurprising that Russia identifies these individuals as targets of disinformation. What is also concerning, however, is that Russia has been using social media platforms to track the progress of emerging cultural movements and has worked to infiltrate and fortify an identity-consciousness among members of these groups.

The Kremlin exploits social media platforms like Facebook, Twitter, Alphabet, and Instagram by turning them into dual-use tools. First, they use these platforms to capture the “pulse” of political discourse and gauge the content spectrum of conversations surrounding certain topics or groups. The Russians then use social media as a joiner tool, bringing together like-minded individuals under the banner of a shared interest or idea.

This is precisely how Russian operatives imbedded within the “Red Pill” movement—an internet culture rooted in male supremacy and white nationalism. Southern Poverty Law Center [recently classified](https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/ideology/male-supremacy)the Red Pill movement as an extremist ideology. A number of online communities affiliated with the Red Pill movement have a history of [encouraging hatred and violence towards women](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/09/world/americas/incels-toronto-attack.html). A 2016 study on online extremism found [overlap between online Nazi networks and Red Pill networks](https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2371/f/downloads/Nazis%20v.%20ISIS%20Final_0.pdf#page=21). While Russia did not start the movement, it helped amplify the extreme messaging of this group, which helped it develop a sizeable audience. According to the New Knowledge report, the IRA-run Instagram account, “the.red.pill,” had approximately 3.5 million total interactions. Additionally, our analysis shows that thousands of IRA tweets attempted to attract people to the Red Pill movement by co-opting hashtags like #RedPill, #FollowTheWhiteRabbit, and #BlackPill.

It should not go unrecognized that a few young men exposed to Red Pill ideology have committed atrocious domestic acts of terror. For instance, in [Santa Barbara](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2014/05/27/inside-the-manosphere-that-inspired-santa-barbara-shooter-elliot-rodger/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.d9a251bd6ed0), a young man associated with the movement murdered six individuals. Just two months ago, another follower of the Red Pill movement shot and killed 11 people in a Pittsburgh synagogue. The shooter was also an [active participant on Gab](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/28/us/gab-robert-bowers-pittsburgh-synagogue-shootings.html), a nascent social networking platform and, according to New Knowledge, a [known hotbed](https://disinformationreport.blob.core.windows.net/disinformation-report/NewKnowledge-Disinformation-Report-Whitepaper.pdf#page=5)of Russian disinformation.

The Russian accounts promoting the Red Pill movement did not directly instruct the men to commit violent crimes, but the account moderators are guilty of investing time and resources into fostering communities of people bound together by shared hate. By actively promoting movements like Red Pill, the Russians are making clear their intent to fan the flames of fear and hate in society.

#### [b] EU populism — it massively expands anti-black violence through strengthening radical institution

Rattansi 20 [Ali Rattansi is Visiting Professor of Sociology, City, University of London, 3-23-2020, The Runnymede Trust, https://www.runnymedetrust.org/blog/racism-and-the-rise-of-populist-movements] Eric

Unprecedented growth in the number and influence of right-wing nationalist populist movements and political parties have characterised the first two decades of the 21st century.

Brexit and the election of Trump represent only the tip of this global iceberg. Brazil has seen the election of Bolsonaro, a vocal opponent of same-sex marriage and race equality initiatives; in France islamophobic National Front leader Marine Le Pen was the runner up in the 2017 presidential election; Austria’s Freedom Party, which has vowed to ban free distribution of the Koran, has won over 25 per cent of the national vote and has been part of a coalition government.

Meanwhile, in Germany, the Alternative for Germany, a party with distinct neo-Nazi overtones, now has 94 seats in the Bundestag (parliament) and is the largest opposition party. Likewise, in Switzerland, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Norway, right-wing national populists have gained a significant share of votes and parliamentary representation. In Italy the xenophobic Legal Nord has been in government, while in Hungary and Poland authoritarian populist parties have been in government and have begun to dismantle independent judiciaries, repress dissent and even explicitly call for illiberal democracy. And so on.

But how and in what ways is racism involved in the phenomenal growth of this nationalist right-wing populism? First, it helps to define populism. At a minimum, populist ideology posits an opposition between a ‘pure’ people and a ‘corrupt’ political elite which is out of touch and is responsible for the damage caused to the nation or people. Populist electoral strategy is then based on a promise to rein in the power of this elite, rid it of corruption, and restore the fortunes of the people. There is usually a crucial element in which populists argue that there are internal or external ‘others’ who are involved in the downward fortunes of the genuine ‘people’ of the nation. It is in this way that racism can be inserted as an important part of the message. These others may be the EU, minorities, recent or even third generation immigrants, refugees or economic migrants, such as the Mexicans so strongly evoked by Trump as posing a strong economic and cultural threat to white Americans. Even the EU has created an external, xenophobic and racialised threat by a short-lived attempt to rebrand the head of the EU’s migration policy as ‘the commissioner for protecting the European way of life’.

Sociologists and political scientists have argued that there are four main causes that explain the rise of nationalist right-wing populism, some aligned with the definition above. The four components are: a distrust of corrupt or out of touch power elites; a fear of the destruction of national cultures and identities; relative deprivation; and a dealignment between mainstream parties and electorates. This last issue is a phenomenon particularly reflected in the poor showing of social democratic, labour parties which have seen their working- class voter base eroded by the nationalist populists.

Each of these four main causes are intertwined with racism or racialisation in one form or another. The distrust of political elites is partly related to the unwillingness or inability of national elites to curb immigration, especially Muslim immigration. Muslims are racialised as practising a distinctly non-white way of life that is supposedly completely at variance with the ‘Western’ or ‘European’ culture. Relative deprivation in the form of a fall in living standards is easily blamed on the arrival of immigrants and refugees, and this is indeed what right-wing populists tend to do. The restructuring of the usual pact between working-class electorates and social democratic parties has occurred in the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis in which social democratic parties, rather than the financial sector and its elites, are blamed for profligacy and being supposedly ‘soft’ on welfare ‘scroungers’, especially non-white immigrants (although white Eastern Europeans have also been caught up in a form of racialised, xenophobic framing).

What brings all these elements together is what has been called the ideology of ‘nativism’. “Britain first”, as the murderer of the British MP Jo Cox shouted as he killed her,  echoes Trump’s ‘America first’, and ‘Germany for Germans’ or ‘Sweden for the Swedes’, always with the strong sense that the ‘true’ or ‘genuine’ natives who are being defended are white. Trump’s rallying cry ‘Make America Great Again’ has been perceived as a thinly veiled call for making America ‘white again’, notwithstanding the fact that the earliest Americans we know were non-white indigenous peoples (formerly labelled ‘Red Indians’). In the case of Britain (and this might be extended to the whole of Western Europe), the fantasy of an original, pure white population is belied by the fact that the earliest Briton discovered so far (the so-called ‘Cheddar Man’ whose remains were found in the Cheddar gorge) would today be identified as black.

Right-wing national populism, then, is a thoroughly racialised phenomenon. Not all those who support nativism would see themselves as racist, but the consequences of adopting a nativist stance draws one into territory that is certainly stained with racism.

### Top — AT: Colonialism K

#### Colonialism is not constant, but variable.

Lightfoot ’20 — Sheryl; associate professor in Indigenous Studies at University of British Columbia. 2020; “The Pessimism Traps of Indigenous Resurgence”; Chapter 10 in *Pessimism in International Relations*, pp 162-170; <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21780-8_10>; //CYang

Pessimism Trap 2: The State is Unified, Deliberate and Unchanging in Its Desire to Dispossess Indigenous Peoples and Gain Unfettered Access to Indigenous Lands and Resources

In other words, colonialism by settler states is a constant, not a variable, in both outcome and intent. Further, the state is not only intentionally colonial, but it is also unified in its desire to co-opt Indigenous peoples as a method and means of control.

In 2005's Wasase, Alfred presents the state as unitary, intentional and unchanging in its desire to colonise and oppress Indigenous peoples noting, 'I think that the only thing that has changed since our ancestors first declared war on the invaders is that some of us have lost heart'.22 Referring to current state policies as a 'self-termination movement', Alfred states, 'It is senseless to advocate for an accord with imperialism while there is a steady and intense ongoing attack by the Settler society on everything meaningful to us: our cultures, our communities, and our deep attachments to land'.23

Alfred's Peace, Power, Righteousness (2009) also argues that the state is deliberate and unchanging, stating quite plainly that 'it is still the objective of the Canadian and US governments to remove Indians, or, failing that, to prevent them from benefitting, from their ancestral territories'.24 Contemporary states do this, he argues, not through outright violent control but 'by insidiously promoting a form of neo-colonial self-government in our communities and forcing our integration into the legal mainstream'.25 According to Alfred, the state 'relegates indigenous peoples' rights to the past, and constrains the development of their societies by allowing only those activities that support its own necessary illusion: that indigenous peoples today do not present a serious challenge to its legitimacy'.26

Linking back to the aim of co-option, Alfred argues that while the state's desire to control Indigenous peoples and lands has never changed, the techniques for doing so have become subtler over time. 'Recognizing the power of the indigenous challenge and unable to deny it a voice', due to successful Indigenous resistance over the years, 'the state has (now) attempted to pull indigenous people closer to it'.27 According to Alfred, the state has outwitted Indigenous leaders and 'encouraged them to reframe and moderate their nationhood demands to accept the fait accompli of colonization, (and) to collaborate in the development of a "solution" that does not challenge the fundamental imperial lie'.28

In a similar vein, Coulthard's central argument is centred on his understanding of the dual structure of colonialism. Drawing directly from Fanon, Coulthard finds that colonialism relies on both objective and subjective elements. The objective components involve domination through the political, economic and legal structures of the colonial state. The subjective elements of colonialism involve the creation of 'colonized subjects', including a process of internalisation by which colonised subjects come to not only accept the limited forms of 'misrecog-nition' granted through the state but can even come to identify with it.29 Through this dual structure, colonial power now works through the inclusion of Indigenous peoples, actively shaping their perspectives in line with state discourses, rather than merely excluding them, as in years past. Therefore, any attempt to seek 'the reconciliation of Indigenous nationhood with state sovereignty is still colonial insofar as it remains structurally committed to the dispossession of Indigenous peoples of our lands and self-determining authority'.30

Concerning the state in relation to Indigenous peoples on the international level, Corntassel argues that states and global organisations, for years, have been consistently framing Indigenous peoples' self-determination claims in ways that 'jeopardize the futures of indigenous communities'.31 He claims that states first compartmentalise Indigenous self-determination by separating lands and resources from political and legal recognition of a limited autonomy. Second, he notes, states sometimes deny the existence of Indigenous peoples living within their borders. Thirdly, a political and legal entitlement framing by states deem-phasises other responsibilities. Finally, he claims that states, through the rights discourse, limit the frameworks through which Indigenous peoples can seek self-determination. Like Alfred and Coulthard, Corntassel has concluded that states are deliberate and never changing in their behaviour. With this move, Corntassel limits and actually demeans Indigenous agency, overlooking the reality that Indigenous organisations themselves chose the human rights framework and rights discourse as a target sphere of action precisely because, as was evident in earlier struggles like slavery, civil rights or women's rights, these were tools available to them that had a proven track record of opening up new possibilities and shifting previous state positions and behaviour. Indigenous advocates also cleverly realised, by the 1970s, that the anti-discrimination and decolonisation frames could be used together against states. States did, in no way, nefariously impose a rights framework on Indigenous peoples. Rather, Indigenous organisations and savvy Indigenous political actors deliberately chose to frame their self-determination struggles within the human rights framework in order to bring states into a double bind where they could not credibly claim to adhere to human rights and claim that they uphold equality while simultaneously denying Indigenous peoples' human rights and leaving them with a diminished and unequal right of self-determination. But, because he is caught in the pessimism trap of seeing the state only as unified, deliberate and unchanging, Corntassel overlooks and diminishes the clear story of Indigenous agency and the potential for positive change in advancing self-determination in a multitude of ways.

Pessimism Trap 3: Engagement with the Settler State is Futile, if Not Counter-Productive

Since the state always intends to maintain, if not expand, colonial control, and is seeking to co-opt as many Indigenous peoples as possible in order to maintain or expand its dispossession and control, it is therefore futile, at best, and actually dangerous to Indigenous existence to engage with the state. Furthermore, all patterns of engagement will lead to co-optation as the state is cunning and unrelenting in its desire to co-opt Indigenous leaders, academics and professionals in order to gain or maintain control of Indigenous peoples.

Alfred argues, in both his 2005 and 2009 books, that any Indigenous engagement with the state, including agreements and negotiations, is not only futile but fundamentally dangerous, as such pathways do not directly challenge the existing colonial structure and 'to argue on behalf of indigenous nationhood within the dominant Western paradigm is self-defeating'.32 Alfred states that a 'notion of nationhood or self-government rooted in state institutions and framed within the context of state sovereignty can never satisfy the imperatives of Native American political traditions'33 because the possibility for a true expression of Indigenous self-determination is 'precluded by the state's insistence on dominion and its exclusionary notion of sovereignty'.34 Worst of all, according to Alfred, when Indigenous communities frame their struggles in terms of asserting Aboriginal rights and title, but do so within a state framework, rather than resisting the state itself, it 'represents the culmination of white society's efforts to assimilate indigenous peoples'.35

Because it is impossible to advance Indigenous self-determination through any sort of engagement with the state, Coulthard also advocates for an Indigenous resurgence paradigm that follows both his mentor Taiaiake Alfred but also Anishinaabe feminist theorist Leanne Simpson.36 As Coulthard writes, 'both Alfred and Simpson start from a position that calls on Indigenous peoples and communities to "turn away" from the assimilative reformism of the liberal recognition approach and to instead build our national liberation efforts on the revitalization of "traditional" political values and practices'.37 Drawing upon the prescriptive approach of these theorists, Coulthard proposes, in his concluding chapter, five theses from his analysis that are intended to build and solidify Indigenous resurgence into the future:

1. On the necessity of direct action, meaning that physical forms of Indigenous resistance, like protest and blockades, are very important not only as a reaction to the state but also as a means of protecting the lands that are central to Indigenous peoples' existence;

2. Capitalism, No More!, meaning the rejection of capitalist forms of economic development in Indigenous communities in favour of land-based Indigenous political-economic alternative approaches;

3. Dispossession and Indigenous Sovereignty in the City, meaning the need for Indigenous resurgence movements 'to address the interrelated systems of dispossession that shape Indigenous peoples' experiences in both urban and land-based settings'38;

4. Gender Justice and Decolonisation, meaning that decolonisation must also include a shift away from patriarchy and an embrace of gender relations that are non-violent and reflective of the centrality of women in traditional forms of Indigenous governance and society; and

5. Beyond the Nation-State. While Coulthard denies that he advocates complete rejection of engagement with the state's political and legal system, he does assert that 'our efforts to engage these discursive and institutional spaces to secure recognition of our rights have not only failed, but have instead served to subtly reproduce the forms of racist, sexist, economic, and political configurations of power that we initially sought.to challenge'.39 He therefore advocates expressly for 'critical self-reflection, skepticism, and caution' in a 'resurgent politics of recognition that seeks to practice decolonial, gender-emancipatory, and economically non-exploitative alternative structures of law and sovereign authority grounded on a critical refashioning of the best of Indigenous legal and political traditions'.40

Corntassel also demonstrates the third pessimism trap, that all engagement with the state is ultimately futile. For the most part, however, Corntassel's observation is that the UN system operates like a reverse Keck and Sikkink 'boomerang model' and 'channels the energies of transnational Indigenous networks into the institutional fiefdoms of member countries', by which an 'illusion of inclusion' is created.41 He argues that, in order to be included or their views listened to, Indigenous delegates at the UN must mimic the strategies, language, norms and modes of behaviour of member states and international institutions. Corntassel finds that 'what results is a cadre of professionalized Indigenous delegates who demonstrate more allegiance to the UN system than to their own communities'.42 In his final analysis, he charges that the co-optation of international Indigenous political actors is highly 'effective in challenging the unity of the global Indigenous rights movement and hindering genuine dialogue regarding Indigenous self-determination and justice'.43

Finding that states deliberately co-opt and provide 'illusions of inclusion' to Indigenous political actors in UN settings, Corntassel comes to the same conclusion as Alfred concerning the futility of engagement, arguing that because transnational Indigenous networks are 'channeled' and 'blunted' by colonial state actors, 'it is a critical time for Indigenous peoples to rethink their approaches to bringing Indigenous rights concerns to global forums'.44

Imagining a Post-Colonial Future: Pessimistic 'Resurgence' Versus the Optimism and Tenacity of Indigenous Movements on the Ground

All of these writers advocate Indigenous resurgence, through a combination of rejecting the current reconciliation politics of settler colonial states, coupled with a return to land-based Indigenous expressions of governance as the only viable, 'authentic' and legitimate path to a better future for Indigenous peoples, which they refer to as decolonisation. While inherently critical in their orientation, these three approaches do make some positive and productive contributions to Indigenous movements. They help shed light on the various and subtle ways that Indigenous leaders and communities can become co-opted into a colonial system. They help us to hold leadership accountable. They also help us keep a strong focus on our traditional, cultural and spiritual values as well as our traditional forms of governance which then also helps us imagine future possibilities.

As I have pointed out here, however, all three theorists are also caught in the same three pessimism traps: authenticity versus co-option; a vision of the state as unified, deliberate and never changing in its desire to colonise and control; and a view of engagement with the state as futile, if not dangerous, to Indigenous sovereignty and existence. When combined, these three pessimism traps aim to inhibit Indigenous peoples' engagement with the state in any process that could potentially re-imagine and re-formulate their current relationship into one that could be transformative and post-colonial, as envisioned by the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The pessimism traps together work to foreclose any possibility that there could be credible openings of opportunity to negotiate a fairer and just relationship of co-existence with even the most progressive state government.

This pessimistic approach is not innocuous. By overemphasising structure and granting the state an enormous degree of agency as a unitary actor, this pessimistic approach does a remarkable disservice to Indigenous resistance movements by proscribing, from academia, an extremely narrow view of what Indigenous self-determination can and should mean in practice. By overlooking and/or discounting Indigenous agency and not even considering the possibility that Indigenous peoples could themselves be calculating, strategic political actors in their own right, and vis-a-vis states, the pessimistic lens of the resurgence school unnecessarily, unproductively and unjustly limits the field of possibility for Indigenous peoples' decision-making, thus actually countering and inhibiting expressions of Indigenous self-determination. By condemning—writ large—all Indigenous peoples and organisations that wish to seek peaceful co-existence with the state, negotiate mutually beneficial agreements with the state, and/or who have advocated on the international level for a set of standards that can provide a positive guiding framework for Indigenous-state relations, the pessimistic lens of resurgence forecloses much potential for new and improved relations, in any form, and is very likely to lead to deeper conflicts between states and Indigenous peoples, and potentially, even violent action, which Fanon indicated was the necessary outcome. The pessimism traps of the resurgence school are therefore, likely self-defeating for all but the most remote and isolated Indigenous communities. Further, this approach is quite out of step with the actions and vision of many Indigenous resistance movements on the ground who have been working for decades to advance Indigenous self-determination, both domestically and globally, in ways that transform the colonial state into something more just and may eventually present creative alternatives to the Westphalian state form in ways that could respect and accommodate Indigenous nations. Rather, it aims to shame and blame those who wish to explore creative and innovative post-colonial resolutions to the colonial condition.

The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (the Declaration or UN Declaration) was adopted by the General Assembly in 2007 after 25 years of development. The Declaration is ground-breaking, given the key leadership roles Indigenous peoples played in negotiating and achieving this agreement.45 Additionally, for the first time in UN history, the rights holders, Indigenous peoples, worked with states to develop an instrument that would serve to promote, protect and affirm Indigenous rights, both globally and in individual domestic contexts.46

Many Indigenous organisations and movements, from dozens of countries around the world, were involved in drafting and negotiating the UN Declaration and are now advocating for its full implementation, both internationally and in domestic and regional contexts. In Canada, some of the key organisational players — the Grand Council of the Crees (Eeyou Istchee), the Assembly of First Nations, and the Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs, or their predecessor organisations — were involved in the drafting and lengthy negotiations of the UN Declaration during the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. In the United States, organisations like the American Indian Law Alliance and the Native American Rights Fund have been involved as well as the Navajo Nation and the Haudenosaunee Confederacy, who represent themselves as Indigenous peoples' governing institutions. From Scandinavia, the Saami Council and the Sami Parliaments all play a key role in advancing Indigenous rights. In Latin America, organisations like the Confederation de Nationalidades Indfgenas del Ecuador (CONAIE) and the Consejo Indio de Sud America (CISA) advocate for implementation of the UN Declaration. The three, major transnational Indigenous organisations — the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, the International Indian Treaty Council and the Inuit Circumpolar Council — were all key members of the drafting and negotiating team for the UN Declaration, and the latter two, which are still in existence, continue their strong advocacy for its full implementation.

Implementation of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples requires fundamental and significant change, on both the international and domestic levels. Because implementation of Indigenous rights essentially calls for a complete and fundamental restructuring of Indigenous-state relationships, it expects states to enact and implement a significant body of legal, constitutional, legislative and policy changes that can accommodate such things as Indigenous land rights, free, prior and informed consent, redress and a variety of self-government, autonomy and other such arrangements. States are not going to implement this multifaceted and complex set of changes on their own, however. They will require significant political and moral pressure to hold them accountable to the rhetorical commitments they have made to support this level of change. They will also require ongoing conversation and negotiation with Indigenous peoples along the way, lest the process becomes problematically one-sided. Such processes ultimately require sustained political will, commitment and engagement over the long term, to reach the end result of radical systemic change and Indigenous state relationships grounded in mutual respect, co-existence and reciprocity. This type of fundamental change requires creative thinking, careful diplomacy, tenacity, and above all, optimistic vision, on the part of Indigenous peoples. The pessimistic approaches of the resurgence school are ultimately of little use in these efforts, other than as a cautionary tale against state power, of which the organisational players are already keenly aware. Further, by dismissing and discouraging all efforts at engagement with states, and especially with the blanket accusations that all who engage in such efforts are 'co-opted' and not 'authentically' Indigenous, the resurgence school actually creates unnecessary negative feelings and divisions amongst Indigenous movements who should be pooling limited resources and working together towards better futures.

### Top — AT: Cybernetics K

#### Putin’s disinformation is disguising food crisis in Africa

Sguazzin 7-4 [Antony Sguazzin is a senior managing editor at Bloomberg, 07-04-2022, Putin’s media blitz on Africa food crisis sparks alarm in Europe, Japan Times, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/07/04/world/putin-africa-food-crisis-europe/] Eric

European governments have been alarmed by a Russian disinformation campaign that seeks to deflect criticism that President Vladimir Putin’s war with Ukraine risks leaving millions of people in Africa facing famine.

Russian diplomats have gone on a media offensive in recent months to push the narrative that sanctions, rather than Russian blockades, are causing shortages of grains and fertilizer in Africa. The public-relations onslaught shows how the monthslong war in Ukraine is becoming a global propaganda battle as food, fuel and crop-nutrient prices surge.

EU and U.K. officials who’ve recently met their African counterparts at meetings in New York and Rwanda expressed concern that the Russian message is gaining traction, said senior European diplomats who asked not to be identified. In response, European governments are increasing their engagement with leaders on the continent and boosting their own information campaigns to counter the Russian narrative, the diplomats said.

A senior European intelligence officer said the Kremlin had manufactured the debate as a means to get sanctions lifted and was intent on using the threat of global hunger as a bargaining tool in any future peace talks. Moscow has focused much of its influence operations on Africa and the Middle East, the official said.

#### Russian scientific colonialism outweighs

Kagan et al. 19 [Frederick; 2019; PhD in Russian and Soviet military history @ Yale, Director of the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute, Associate Professor of Military History at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, “Confronting the Russian Challenge: A New Approach for The U.S.,” http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISW%20CTP%20Report%20-%20Confronting%20the%20Russian%20Challenge%20-%20June%202019.pdf]

The Ideals of the American Republic

The stakes in the Russo-American conflict are high. Russian leader Vladimir Putin seeks to undermine confidence in democratically elected institutions and the institution of democracy itself in the United States and the West.1 He is trying to interfere with the ability of American and European peoples to choose their leaders freely and is undermining the rules-based international order on which American prosperity and security rest. His actions in Ukraine and Syria have driven the world toward greater violence and disorder. The normalization of Putin’s illegal actions over time will likely prompt other states to emulate his behavior and cause further deterioration of the international system.

Moscow’s war on the very idea of truth has been perhaps the most damaging Russian undertaking in recent years. The most basic element of the Russian information strategy, which we will consider in more detail presently, is the creation of a sense of uncertainty around any important issue. Russia’s strategy does not require persuading Western audiences that its actions in Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula or the Kerch Strait, which connects the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, for example, were legal or justified.3 It is enough to create an environment in which many people say simply, “who knows?” The “who knows?” principle feeds powerfully into the phenomena of viral “fake news,” as well as other falsehoods and accusations of falsehoods which, if left unchecked, will ultimately make civil discourse impossible. The Kremlin’s propaganda does not necessarily need its target audiences to believe in lies; its primary goal is to make sure they do not believe in the truth.

### Top — AT: Fem IR K

#### Russian misinformation causes sexism

Jankowicz 17 [Nina Jankowicz is an American researcher and writer. She is the author of How to Lose the Information War, on Russian use of disinformation as geopolitical strategy, and How to Be a Woman Online, a handbook for fighting against online harassment of women, 12-11-2017, How disinformation became a new threat to women, Coda Story, https://www.codastory.com/disinformation/how-disinformation-became-a-new-threat-to-women/] Eric

She is far from alone. Female politicians and other high profile women worldwide are facing a deluge of what you could call sexualized disinformation. It mixes old ingrained sexist attitudes with the anonymity and reach of social media in an effort to destroy women’s reputations and push them out of public life.

Several female politicians in the small Caucasian nation of Georgia were the victims of a sexualized disinformation campaign last year, in the run-up to parliamentary elections. A series of videos purportedly showing them having sex were released online, with intimidating messages. The goal was to spread “fear” among women involved in politics, says Tamara Chergoleishvili, a prominent journalist and activist, whose husband is a well-known opposition politician. Georgia is a very conservative country where patriarchal attitudes remain strong, so that made the attack more potent. To underline the point, the message was accompanied by doctored images purporting to show her totally naked.

Chergoleishvili was targeted too, in a video supposedly showing her engaged in sex with two other people. But Chergoleishvili says it was a fake. “They didn’t know I’ve had a huge tattoo on my back since, like, 2000,” she laughs.

Though it backfired in her case, another female politician implicated in an extramarital affair as a result of the videos has all but retreated from Georgian political life.

By contrast, the men who featured have not suffered, “because male adultery is a common thing,” says Chergoleishvili. “Maybe the family suffered, but society would be less judgemental, whereas women are supposed to be the Virgin Mary. They’re not supposed to have sex.”

There was one exception. A man who appeared in the video aimed at Chergoleishvili was labelled as “gay,” which put him at extreme risk because of deep-seated homophobic attitudes in Georgia. “It took a long time for him to get over that,” she recalls.

Like Chergoleishvili, Zalishchuk has withstood the attacks against her, and continues to maintain a high profile. But she can’t escape her naked doppelganger. “Whenever I speak publicly somewhere abroad, someone will comment on it [on social media],” the Ukrainian MP says, often adding a link to the photo. “I have no resources to fight that.” “It was all intended to discredit me as a personality, to devalue me, and what I’m saying.” Ukrainian MP Svitlana Zalishchuk

Zalishchuk suspects a pro-Kremlin hand in the abuse she has experienced, as it started at the height of the conflict with Russia. And the fake claims and doctored images first appeared on pro-Kremlin platforms. But whatever the case, it has become a worldwide problem for any women who takes a position online.

The use of realistic pictures — which is easy to achieve with modern software — adds to the potency of these misogynistic disinformation campaigns, says Sandra Pepera, director of Gender, Women, and Democracy programs at the National Democratic Institute, in Washington, D.C. “Obscene harassment is bad enough, but the visualization of it is what tips the balance.”

Such abuse is becoming almost part of the job for female politicians. But logging off to try to escape is not really an option, as being on social media is such a crucial part of being a modern-day politician.

In Georgia, the government eventually condemned the release of the sex tapes, and they were removed from YouTube. But that could not mitigate the damage entirely, as the names of those shown in the videos spread widely. And intimidation like this can have a smothering effect on female engagement in politics, says the NDI’s Pepera, “limiting both the number of women able to participate online and the range of issues discussed.”

And in countries where violence against women is common, online slurs can quickly translate into direct physical threats. “If it happens to you and you’re Hillary Clinton that’s one thing,” says Pepera. “If that happens to you and you’re in Indonesia, Malaysia, or Pakistan, you could pay for it with your life.”

There is more awareness now of the the threat of sexualised abuse online, but both governments and the social media giants have yet to come up with an effective response. Sexualized disinformation mixes old ingrained sexist attitudes with the anonymity and reach of social media in an effort to destroy women’s reputations and push them out of public life.

### Top — AT: Grove K

#### Grove agrees with NATO deterrence!

Kamanā 22, ABC News, (Lia, “As tensions rise in Ukraine, impacts will be felt in Hawai'i”, ABC News, February 22, <https://www.kitv.com/news/local/as-tensions-rise-in-ukraine-impacts-will-be-felt-in-hawaii/article_75d9e806-945d-11ec-80ad-474101021af2.html>) //CHC-DS

President Joe Biden announcing major economic sanctions against Russia on Tuesday, following Russian president Vladimir Putin's move of troops into the eastern region of Ukraine. While Putin called it a peacekeeping mission, the U.S. calls it a flagrant violation of international law. In Hawaii, Ukraine may seem like a world away, but the impacts of the situation in eastern Europe will be felt on its shores. "When you are in a place like Hawaii and you are thinking thank goodness we aren't right next door to the war, you need to start questioning what does it mean, what kind of precedent does it mean that international boundaries don't matter," said Jairus Grove, associate professor of international studies at the University of Hawaii Grove says how the situation in Ukraine plays out, could have lasting consequences. "This is calling into question what NATO is for, this is calling into question what the U.S. can do without firing shots," Grove said.

Using an example from Thomas C. Schelling's, 'Arms and Influence,' Grove says there are two different things that military power does. "First it deters, it prevents another state from attacking you," said Grove. "Then, there is having so much power because of military might you can have compellence which means without firing a shot you can compel a state to do what you would like it to do." Grove says for most of our lifetimes, we have lived with the belief that the United States has compellence. Now, he thinks Putin has kind of called the bluff on that belief, and how the U.S. continues to react will be watched closely by other adversaries. "Once one state calls your bluff, you kind of wait for the next one to do it and the United States will be put to a choice, when do we decide that it’s not a bluff, when are we actually willing to fight and that is the conversation we need to have," said Grove. Among the sanctions issued Tuesday, Feb. 22: cutting off Russia's government from western finances, which means the country can no longer trade in its new debt on U.S. or European markets. But Grove was quick to point out, sanctions only work if they are painful and if they are a painful they are probably working in a way we aren't going to like. One example is at the gas pump where Hawai'i will continue to see prices rise. "We are market takers and so we tend to purchase the oil on the market where we can get it cheapest and over the last few years, 34% or about 1/3 of all oil comes from Russia so from that stand point it has a major impact on us," said Chris Yunker, Managing Director, Resiliency, Clean Transportation, and Analytics, with the Hawai'i State Energy Office. According to Grove, the problem lies in if the sanctions don't work though. "That means we don't have a way to constrain Russia without using military force," said Grove. Grove says he thinks Putin over the last several years has built a large enough counter financial network outside of the sanctions that he can keep investment and capital coming in. "He has a lot to lose politically by kowtowing to the sanctions," said Grove. "I would be surprised. The domestic costs would be high for him and I don’t know if he will even feel the pinch." Only time will tell whether or not sanctions work to deter Russia, but Grove says this will be a period of tremendous uncertainty and rapid change.

He does believe the probability of a direct war between the U.S. and Russia is less than zero, saying he doesn't see Biden committing U.S. troops to this particular conflict. "But what this can do, is this conflict can spread and that poses the question of if Russia takes Ukraine too easily, will Putin set his eyes elsewhere," said Grove.

#### He thinks Russia’s revisionist!

Van Dyke 22, journalist for Spectrum News Hawaiʻi, (Michelle Broder, “A Ukrainian living on Oahu reacts with shock to Russia’s invasion”, Spectrum News, March 9, https://spectrumlocalnews.com/hi/hawaii/human-interest/2022/03/08/a-ukrainian-living-on-oahu-reacts-with-shock-to-russia-s-invasion) //CHC-DS

“We … have a lot of anti-war activists in the state who watch these kinds of humanitarian catastrophes very closely,” said Grove. “We have a lot of people who are uniformed members of the U.S. military, who I'm sure are already thinking, ‘Is this a conflict that the United States is going to become involved in? Are we going to be sent to Europe to reinforce NATO allies?’” He also encouraged anyone who might feel Ukraine is far away to take the time to engage, as everyone's participation is important for a flourishing democracy. “That’s what makes us different than Russia … our foreign policy is shaped by our discourse and our elections and who represents us,” Grove said.

Russia’s Fake News

Olga Sousa moved to San Francisco when she was 19 years old, after growing up in the city Zaporizhzhia in southeastern Ukraine, where Russian forces have been fighting and seized a large nuclear power plant on March 4. Sousa has now lived in Hawaii for the last eight years. After learning that Russia had invaded Ukraine, Sousa told Spectrum News Hawaii that she called her mom, who currently lives in San Francisco, and they talked about their worry for Sousa’s 33-year-old brother. He lives in Hawaii, but had returned to Zaporizhzhia the week before the war started, trying to help his wife get out of Ukraine. “She was just crying,” said Sousa about her mother. “I have such a heavy guilt that I'm here safe. I'm thankful that I'm here, but at the same time I feel guilty that I'm here.” Sousa is half Ukrainian and half Russian, as her Russian mother moved to Ukraine in the 1980s, where she met her Ukrainian father. Her mom’s sister and her cousins still live in Russia, but she said her mom and aunt stopped speaking five years ago, because her aunt claimed Russia is helping Ukraine and the country should surrender. Sousa said Russian President Vladimir Putin’s rhetoric has brainwashed people. “It's very heartbreaking,” said Sousa about her family’s division. Grove said that Russia is good at defining the narrative of what’s taking place through strategic communications and fake news, including perpetuating the false claim that “this is a defensive invasion (and) that (attacking) Ukraine is about protecting Russia.” “Russia is very good at building stories, which draw people in and they can be conspiratorial (or) they can merely go with people's already existing political preferences, but they're very good at inflaming differences,” said Grove. Still, Grove said Putin can’t control all the information that comes into the country, especially with the internet. This is part of the reason some Russians are protesting the war in Ukraine.

War crimes

When Sousa first found out that Russia was attacking Ukraine, she said she was in disbelief; despite Russia’s escalation of troops, she never thought they would attack. She checked news reports, but information was just starting to come in, so she called a friend in Ukraine, who told her the apartment building next to her had just been bombed. “It was so surreal. I felt like I was watching a movie,” said Sousa. Sousa's grandparents and some of her other friends still live in Ukraine. “I have a lot of family and friends pretty much all over Ukraine and have my grandparents in Kharkiv, which has been heavily attacked for the last two days,” said Sousa in an interview with Spectrum News Hawaii on Feb. 28. Kharkiv is the second-largest city in Ukraine, with a population of 1.5 million, and Russia has been attacking the city with airstrikes and rockets. Residential buildings have been damaged and a missile hit the city’s central square on March 1. The city has put up a resistance to Russia’s fighting, with Russian planes shot down and advancing troops slowed. “Ukraine is so little compared to Russia on the map. Yet, we're sticking up to Russia,” Sousa said. “The strongest feeling I have right now is definitely pride. I'm proud for my people.” “I'm sad to see people dying, to be honest, on either of the sides,” Sousa added. Grove, the university professor, told Spectrum News Hawaii that it is clear Russia is committing war crimes in Ukraine right now. “I think whenever you move heavy artillery, and you're bombing in civilian areas, that is by definition, a war crime,” said Grove. “We may be seeing unprecedented dangerous events unfolding before us.” The 1949 Geneva Convention Article 8, 2.b defines war crimes, in part, as “intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities; intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects which are not military objectives…” and “intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such an attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects …” The International Criminal Court launched an investigation on March 2 into whether Putin is committing war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide as the civilian death toll rises and widespread destruction is inflicted on Ukraine.

#### And China!

Fawcett 22, Journalist for Honolulu Civil Beat News, (Denby, “Denby Fawcett: Why Hawaii Should Care About The Russia-Ukraine War”, Civil Beat, March 1, <https://www.civilbeat.org/2022/03/denby-fawcett-why-hawaii-should-care-about-the-russia-ukraine-war/>) //CHC-DS

University of Hawaii associate professor Jairus Grove says many in the islands view the war in Ukraine as a far away crisis, and that makes him sad. He thinks more people should be shocked. “It is a watershed moment for global order. It is no coincidence that China sent nine warplanes into Taiwan’s secure airspace the same day that Russian tanks rolled into Ukraine. He says Russia’s naked aggression could embolden China to go after disputed land it claims it owns and wants to take back. And it could make China more eager in the future to test agreed-upon international boundaries. Grove is chairman of the political science department at UH Manoa and the director of the Hawaii Research Center for Future Studies. He thinks that even the increased support from Germany and other Western allies for swift sanctions still may not be enough to change what Russia has in mind. He says even stronger sanctions may push Russia closer to China, which already signaled it might bail out Russia with economic support behind the scenes as it has done in the past. “It is a different kind of world when China and Russia no longer see each other as competitors,” says Grove.

#### Their theory is wrong, and the case outweighs.

Mott, 20—PhD in Political Science from St. Andrews, Master’s degree from London Metropolitan in IR, former Scholar in Residence at the Helmerich Center for American Research at the Gilcrease Museum (Christopher, “Savage Ecology: War and Geopolitics at the End of the World, A Book Review,” <https://geotrickster.com/2020/01/01/savage-ecology-war-and-geopolitics-at-the-end-of-the-world-a-book-review/>, dml) [typo correction denoted by brackets]

Where I disagree with the author, however, is his very concept of the ‘Eurocene.’ If the present international state system wasn’t working for states across the globe it would be dying out, but it seems to strengthening. There is no way we are getting through what I will remain calling the anthropocene without some level of a command economy for resources and research direction for technologies. Many of these resources will be scare and will be competed over. The competitive nature of the state system means something Darwinistic is occurring, which is good as we do not yet have the answer for surviving our current era and so multiple approaches must be tried and the best will serve as models for others and the worst will die out.

I also do not see anything particularly European about modernity anymore. While a new era did begin with the biological and demographic takeover of the western hemisphere and its forceable wedding to Europe-previously a minor and not particularly important subcontinental peninsula of Asia-any Eurasian actor could have potentially done the same thing. The bureaucratic state was first born in China and the agricultural state came from the Middle East, and those strike me as just as relevant to where we are now than the maritime-industrial states of post medieval Europe. Furthermore, as India and China move their way into full industrialization on their own terms and countries like Japan have long held that position dating back to the colonial era, I find little to argue for something called specifically ‘The Eurocene.’ That being said, the author is entirely correct that our currently unsustainable methods of development are a type of self-replicating virus imposed by force. But so too will any solutions have to follow that path.

It may come as no surprise that I, a person very into geopolitics (and making speculative realist geopolitics in particular) also take a more neutral tone on the field than this author. I think geopolitics are as likely to get us out of this mess as they are to dig us deeper. Aside from general environmental goals, I see little universal in how we will escape from pollution and mass extinction and more a variety of paths which depend on the varying ecologies of different countries. As it is, some countries will benefit from climate change and their interests cannot be said to be comparable with those who will suffer. A stateless world is a de facto neoliberal world in practice and the author’s fear of political homogenization is not caused by realism or geopolitics but rather prevented by those same actors. Diversity can only thrive in the absence of grand universal projects.

So our approaches are very clearly different as I see realist geopolitics as the garuntor [guarantor] of ideological, economic, and ecological diversity, not its foe. But Grove is an excellent writer so I enjoyed his take on it anyway.

#### Grove is too pessimistic about modernity’s potential — means at best they solve nothing and at worst “martial empiricism” actively empowers fascists.

Tallis, 20—senior researcher, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, University of Hamburg (Benjamin, “Un-cancelling the future,” New Perspectives, OnlineFirst, July 8, 2020, dml)

Examples of this way of thinking are plentiful but, for convenience, one need to look no further than Jairus Grove’s scintillatingly pessimistic keynote at the Hamburg Sessions (forthcoming as an essay in NP and based on his 2019 book, Savage Ecology).3 It is not that Grove doesn’t make compelling critical arguments – he does and in brilliant, imaginative ways – but that they lack balance. And balance matters, whether we are reckoning with horrendous pasts or trying to boldly imaging new futures.

To see, or certainly to dwell on, only the bad in what we in the West have collectively done (however, Grove or anyone else defines who we are), over the entire course of our past and present is grossly unfair. It also amounts, in effect, to a counsel of despair, however much Grove protests to the contrary or claims to eschew nihilism. In his keynote, having written off our past and present, Grove also explicitly urged us in Europe and the West to stop imagining better, progressive futures, arguing that this has led to precisely the problems he identified. Grove’s critique thus not only leaves us out of time (without an avowable past, present or future) but also leaves us without space for contesting negative, regressive and repressive political trends. In his book, he laments the ‘debilitating stupor’ in which the work of thinkers like Theodor Adorno and Giorgio Agamben leaves us (Grove, 2019: 238). But Grove’s own pessimism, if we took it seriously, would leave Europeans without a political leg to stand on. It would leave us in just such a stupor – or worse – with no solid ground and no lever: no way to move the world and no platform for positive, progressive change.

Why bother, if everything we do only makes things worse?

However much harm we Europeans and Westerners have done, we haven’t done, don’t and won’t only do harm. The real danger of Grove’s type of timelessly pessimistic and literally hopeless critique is that (again, if taken seriously) it breeds only damaging inertia, inaction and resentment – its hopelessness makes it a debilitating critique; its timelessness offers no possibility of salvage, let alone progress. It cedes the ground of action to those who many of us (including Grove) would explicitly disagree with – whether to exponents of ‘traditional’ approaches to IR who are more than happy to offer policy advice or, worse, to authoritarians and populists in practical politics (as ably described in Johanna Sumuvuori’s essay in this issue). Critical scholars too rarely see it as their task to construct positive visions of better worlds. Instead, too often they content themselves (if no one else) with evermore thoroughgoing deconstructive critique – including of other critical academics. Whether totalising or parasitic, even some of its leading proponents admit that IR’s critical project has, thus far, had insufficient impact on the world at large (Austin, 2017, 2019).

Few critical scholars will thank me for this comparison, but, in their pessimistic, misanthropic zeal, they echo what French President Emmanuel Macron called the ‘sad passions’ of the author Michel Houellebecq4 (Carre`re, 2017). They may not share Houellebecq’s politics, but many critical scholars certainly share his exhaustive (and exhausting) disenchantment with contemporary (neo)liberal societies, the state of Europe and of the West. Too often they also share his miserabilist outlook on the impossibility of change for the better and the futility or harm of even trying to improve things.

Grove does propose several forms of political action: micro-kindnesses, however vague (e.g. ‘the impossible generosity and affirmation of deconstruction’, 2019: 231); resistant acts by brave individuals (e.g. ‘William ‘‘Fox’’ Fallon, who sacrificed his prestigious position as head of [US Military] Central Command because he would not go along with the plan to attack Iran’, 2019: 232); embracing entirely new ‘forms of life 5 ’; or welcoming apocalypse as driver of change (2019: 229–248). Grove will not be confused with Goldilocks anytime soon – these forms of action each seem either too little or (much) too much.

Few of us would question the value of and need for kindness and, indeed, the most hopeful part of Grove’s book is the touching introduction where he details many of the kindnesses he has himself benefitted from, mainly from people in the West where he has spent most of his life. There is also, clearly, a role for resistance and for the kinds of acts that Grove notes have prevented executions and even nuclear war. Yet without a wider programme, without a bigger positive vision, kindness and resistance cannot sufficiently change our world for the better. Apocalypse, on the contrary, changes too much, junks too much that is good and is rarely likely to be an appealing option, or something we can all get behind. The apocalyptic aspect of Grove’s position, like that of many critical scholars, seeks to inflict destructive harm on Western institutions rather than constructively reform them – something Houellebecq would also relish. Apocalyptic change also smacks of the recklessly callous, negative sides of early 20th-century futurism (Marinetti, 1909), as Grove acknowledges when asking ‘How do we go wild without the cruelty of indifference?’ (2019: 280). Again, a more balanced approach to boldness would help.

To be clear, major change is needed – that was the whole point of the Hamburg Sessions and the motivation behind giving it the theme of ‘Un-Cancelling the Future’. I’ve argued elsewhere that the kind of socio-economically regressive, technocratic, defensive liberalisms that have dominated large parts of the last 40 years in the West have a lot to answer for (Tallis, 2018). So too, of course, does the type of narrowly, teleological individually atomising (neo)liberalism that neither saw (Fukuyama, 1992) nor allowed (Fisher, 2009) alternative visions of politics, societies and economies. Mark Fisher (2009), echoing the artist Gerhard Richter (Elger, 2009), called this myopic liberalism ‘Capitalist Realism’. You don’t have to be a Marxist or even a leftist to see that a mandated lack of alternatives and a commensurate narrowing of possibilities and horizons is a bad thing. As noted above, both climate change and sociotechnical upheavals in the ways we work and live need bold visions to address the challenges they pose while also seizing the opportunities they present.

It is, however, eminently possible to recognise the full horrors of Europe’s (colonial) pasts and presents without immediately discounting the possibility of improvement coming from the West, from Europe. Similarly, one can recognise the myriad problems that Europeans have caused while also celebrating the many positive things they have also achieved. Moreover, it is possible to use those achievements as inspirations for better ways of doing things – as catalysts to new, progressive creativity and to positive visions of the future. Just as Kraftwerk did in the fragile yet fertile Germany of the second half of the 20th century when they acknowledged the abyss yet still sought a better future, including as atonement for that past.

The cancellation of the future

William Gibson recently tweeted ‘‘In the 1920s, the phrase ‘the 21st Century’ was already popubiquitous. How often do we see the phrase ‘‘the 22nd Century’’, now?’’. And it’s true – we don’t have these dates anymore. As a boy, as a young man, I had mental pictures of the 21st Century. But I don’t have any sense of 2050 or 2100 – except as a deterioration or a collapse. (Simon Reynolds, Hamburg Sessions 2019, see essay in this issue)

I return to Kraftwerk below but first, a little more is needed on the ramifications of contemporary hopelessness. Rather than striving to create new and compelling positive, progressive visions, many thinkers content themselves with critique (Austin, 2017) while others, like Grove, see positive, progressive visions and futures – especially those coming from Europe or the wider West – as being necessarily harmful in themselves.

This is postmodernism as hangover. The depressed – and depressing – aftermath of the shortcomings, broken promises and unintended consequences of modernisms of different kinds, in which strange connections are made and selective, guilty memory runs amok (Fisher, 2014). Forgetting the good, it fuses the bewitchingly pertinent aspects of the post-positivist critical project (which influenced many of us, myself very much included), with more zealously (self-)destructive and paralysing tendencies. As Fisher puts it: ‘Deconstruction [is] a kind of pathology of scepticism, which induced hedging, infirmity of purpose and compulsory doubt’ (2014: 16). In this mode, scholarship no longer seeks to invent the train but fixates on the train crash or even pre-empts and precludes the train’s invention for fear of the seemingly inescapable imagined train crash to come.

Like Grove’s denunciation of the future, many of the critiques of (popular) modernisms are not so much wrong as imbalanced (although some are wrong of course, others not even). They take insufficient account of modernisms’ multiple and meaningful successes (there’s no time here, but see, e.g. Fisher, 2014: 22; or Meades, 2014, for a flavour). This leaves us in an odd situation where many of the scholars, commentators and others who criticise neoliberalism, capitalist realism and so on, find themselves in de facto agreement with its notion that there should be no alternative. In this view, we simply shouldn’t do big vision politics because our ‘schemes to improve the human condition’ have not only ‘failed’ but will always, inevitably, do more harm than good (Scott, 2008). This approach, all post and no modern, will take us nowhere, even as it fast-forwards the academic careers of its exponents.

The future visions that are left, on the left, tend to be Marxist ones (see, e.g. Grove, 2019: 198– 202). Tarred not only by the brush of the communisms that actually existed (and their distinctly less balanced ledger than that of modernism more widely) they understandably fail to inspire mass enthusiasm. Many of their proponents are still really more interested in explaining the failure to bring about the inevitable (full communism) in the past and present than in imagining new futures that go beyond the narrow world view and limiting subjectivity of too many Marxist approaches (see, e.g. Scribner, 2003; Sˇitera, 2015). This has done little to address the crisis of hope or to countervail prevalent contemporary pessimism.

The loss of the belief in the progressive future – that tomorrow can be better than yesterday and today – and the related erosion of faith in our ability to positively shape our own destiny are what Berardi (2011: 13) called ‘the slow cancellation of the future’. As Simon Reynolds noted in his Hamburg Sessions keynote (included in this issue of NP), the cancellation may have started slowly in the 1970s, but, by the 2000s, it had picked up speed and its effects could start to be seen. The first of these – its more (neo)liberal variant – was the feeling of living in an endless present. For a lot of people in the West, this has been comfortable in many ways (although often unevenly and unfairly) and has had distinct advantages over the past (the extension of rights and opportunities to broader swathes of the population) but without much hope, optimism or greater purpose. Unless it provokes the nostalgic responses outlined below, this endless present can lead to a sense of ennui, a lack of direction and loss of momentum.

The second, more overtly sinister, variant that fills the vacuum left by the dearth of positive, progressive visions for the future takes the form of darker re-enchantments focused on the (imagined) past (e.g. Campanella and Dassu`, 2019). Whether ‘making America great again’, ‘taking back control’ in the United Kingdom or claiming to offer an ‘alternative for Germany’, these movements are fundamentally premised on a backward-looking politics of nostalgia. The pessimism about the present and worries about the future on which these movements have each capitalised have given rise to an increasingly defensive politics of closing down and protecting, at the expense of opening up and integrating. Nativism and pessimism tend to go hand in hand: shrinking pies bring narrowed horizons and hasten the circling of wagons around exclusive and chauvinistic visions of national communities. Too often, this retro-rightism has been met only with retro-leftism or a tired centrism that merely seeks more of the same, to smooth the endless present. But that can change ...

Reclaiming the spirit of Kraftwerk

COVID-19 has cancelled the endless present6 – or at least it can if we make the best of it. The scale of the response to the pandemic highlights the degree to which radical change is possible if people are persuaded of the need. This crisis will be (and is already being) used politically. The challenge for those of us who want a more progressive future is to ensure that the disruption caused by COVID-19 is put to positive effect – to ensure that it is creative rather than wanton disruption – and to spur the kind of action that can address our biggest challenges but also to create new opportunities to make a better ‘Post-Coronial’ world (Tallis and Renic, 2020).

From climate change to the changing world of work, bold action is needed to address the causes of our biggest problems rather than simply alleviating their symptoms. But also seeing these issues as possibilities to be seized for progressive improvement, rather than just seeing them as problems to be managed will be key. As Merje Kuus was at pains to emphasise in her Hamburg Sessions keynote, perspective is vital (see her essay in this issue). Building resilient societies and a more equitable global order calls for the political will to formulate and make the case for positive proactive policy, not the piecemeal passivity, timid tinkering or (critical) conservatism that have characterised too much of European politics and public debate in recent times.

#### Grove says we should replace calculative rationality with a focus on affect. Don’t do that.

Boler and Davis, 18—Department of Social Justice Education, OISE/University of Toronto (Megan and Elizabeth, “The affective politics of the “post-truth” era: Feeling rules and networked subjectivity,” Emotion, Space and Society Volume 27, May 2018, Pages 75-85, dml)

While the attention to affective attunement is potentially useful, in deploying a definition of affect as quantitative, pre-personal, non-conscious, and non-signifying, one is left with myriad questions about how particular emotions are targeted, produced and manipulated within the affective politics of digital media. Papacharissi characterizes affective transmission as follows: “So digital, among other media, invite and transmit affect but also sustain affective feedback loops that generate and reproduce affective patterns of relating to others that are further reproduced as affect — that is, intensity that has not yet been cognitively processed as feeling, emotion, or thought” (23). Following the popular reification of affect, Papacharissi sharply distinguishes affect from emotion (2015, 13). “Affect explains the intensity with which something is experienced; it refers to just that: intensity” (2015, 135). For her, affect is a central component of how stories are formed and circulated within media flows, and affect helps provide an index of how some stories end up being salient in social media, and thus potentially have more or less political impact. While this account of affect resonates prima facie with Hochschild's concept of “deep stories” and felt truths which shape the feeling rules we see defining partisan polarization, readers are left wanting a full articulation of the significance (rather than simply the alleged presence) of affect as it circulates in and through digital media. This reflects a more widespread tendency in much scholarship to invoke “affect” in Massumi's “autonomous” sense with little exploration of the complex relational manifestations of emotions.

Affect all too often becomes a mystified idea akin to force or energy and intimates an abstract celebration of the uncontainable:

Disorder, marginality, and anarchy present the habitat for affect, mainly because order, mainstreaming, and hierarchy afford form that compromises the futurity of affect. Because marginal spaces support the emergence of change, affect is inherently political, although it does not conform to the structures we symbolically internalize as political. Thus, per affect theory, empowerment lies in liminality, in pre-emergence and emergence, or at the point at which new formations of the political are in the process of being imagined but not yet articulated. The form of affective power is pre-actualized, networked, and of a liquid nature.(2015, 19)

“Affect” so understood pales in analytical resonance or utility in contrast with earlier feminist analyses of emotion, which, as in the bitterness example above, describe the actual shape and flow of social life as it is intersubjectively produced in specific micro- and macro-political contexts of power relations. The qualitative descriptions of “affect” in social media are conceptually overshadowed by the language of emotion — and yet emotions are presented as simply what people “express”, not a web of intersubjectively produced sociality (see, e.g., Papacharissi, 2015, 15, 22, 53–54). As a result, the account is able only to suggest broad quantitative measures of the rate and flow of retweets as exemplifying affect.10 Affect understood as “intensity” all too often gestures at something it does not explain, while using rhetorical strategies that further mystify the term.

#### Their critique is essentialist.

Audrey Alejandro 19, Assistant Professor at the Department of Methodology, London School of Economics and Political Science, “Western Dominance in International Relations?”, Routledge Publishing, forthcoming

Since the 1970s, a ‘critical’ movement has been developing in the humanities and social sciences denouncing the existence of ‘Western dominance’ over the worldwide production and circulation of knowledge. However, thirty years after the emergence of this promising agenda in International Relations (IR), this discipline has not experienced a major shift. This volume offers a counter-intuitive and original contribution to the understanding of the global circulation of knowledge. In contrast to the literature, it argues that the internationalisation of social sciences in the designated ‘Global South’ is not conditioned by the existence of a presumably ‘Western dominance’. Indeed, although discriminative practices such as Eurocentrism and gatekeeping exist, their existence does not lead to a unipolar structuration of IR internationalisation around ‘the West’. Based on these empirical results, this book reflexively questions the role of critique in the (re)production of the social and political order. Paradoxically, the anti-Eurocentric critical discourses reproduce the very Eurocentrism they criticise. This book offers methodological support to address this paradox by demonstrating how one can use discourse analysis and reflexivity to produce innovative results and decentre oneself from the vision of the world one has been socialised into.

### Top — AT: Security K

#### No impact to securitization.

Stacie E. Goddard & Ronald R. Krebs 15, Goddard, Jane Bishop Associate Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College; Krebs, Beverly and Richard Fink Professor in the Liberal Arts and Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota, “Securitization Forum: The Transatlantic Divide: Why Securitization Has Not Secured a Place in American IR, Why It Should, and How It Can,” Duck of Minerva, 9-18-2015, http://duckofminerva.com/2015/09/securitization-forum-the-transatlantic-divide-why-securitization-has-not-secured-a-place-in-american-ir-why-it-should-and-how-it-can.html

Securitization theory has rightly garnered much attention among European scholars of international relations. Its basic claims are powerful: that security threats are not given, but require active construction; that the boundaries of “security” are malleable; that the declaration that a certain problem lies within the realm of security is itself a productive political act; and that “security” issues hold a trump card, demanding disproportionate resources and silencing alternative perspectives. Securitization thus highlights a familiar, even ubiquitous, political process that had received little attention in the international relations or comparative foreign policy literatures. It gave scholars a theoretical language, if not quite a set of coherent theoretical tools, with which to make sense of how a diverse set of issues, from migration to narcotics flows to global climate change, sometimes came to be treated as matters of national and global security and thereby—and this is where securitization’s critical edge came to the fore—impeded reasoned political debate. No surprise that, as Jarrod and Eric observe, securitization has been the focus of so many articles in the EJIR—and even more in such journals as the Review of International Studies and Security Dialogue. But there are (good) substantive and (not so good) sociological reasons that securitization has failed to gain traction in North America. First, and most important, securitization describes a process but leaves us well short of (a) a fully specified causal theory that (b) takes proper account of the politics of rhetorical contestation. According to the foundational theorists of the Copenhagen School, actors, usually elites, transform the social order from one of normal, everyday politics into a Schmittian world of crisis by identifying a dire threat to the political community. They conceive of this “securitizing move” in linguistic terms, as a speech act. As Ole Waever (1995: 55) argues, “By saying it [security], something is done (as in betting, a promise, naming a ship). . . . [T]he word ‘security’ is the act . . .” [emphasis added]. Securitization is a powerful discursive process that constitutes social reality. Countless articles and books have traced this process, and its consequences, in particular policy domains. Securitization presents itself as a causal account. But its mechanisms remain obscure, as do the conditions under which it operates. Why is speaking security so powerful? How do mere words twist and transform the social order? Does the invocation of security prompt a visceral emotional response? Are speech acts persuasive, by using well-known tropes to convince audiences that they must seek protection? Or does securitization operate through the politics of rhetorical coercion, silencing potential opponents? In securitization accounts, speech acts often seem to be magical incantations that upend normal politics through pathways shrouded in mystery. Equally unclear is why some securitizing moves resonate, while others [are ignored] ~~fall on deaf ears~~. Certainly not all attempts to construct threats succeed, and this is true of both traditional military concerns as well as “new” security issues. Both neoconservatives and structural realists in the United States have long insisted that conflict with China is inevitable, yet China has over the last 25 years been more opportunity than threat in US political discourse—despite these vigorous and persistent securitizing moves. In very recent years, the balance has shifted, and the China threat has started to catch on: linguistic processes alone cannot account for this change. The US military has repeatedly declared that global climate change has profound implications for national security—but that has hardly cast aside climate change deniers, many of whom are ironically foreign policy hawks supposedly deferential to the uniformed military. Authoritative speakers have varied in the efficacy of their securitizing moves. While George W. Bush powerfully framed the events of 9/11 as a global war against American values, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, a more gifted orator, struggled to convince a skeptical public that Germany presented an imminent threat to the United States. After thirty years as an active research program, securitization theory has hardly begun to offer acceptable answers to these questions. Brief references to “facilitating conditions” won’t cut it. You don’t have to subscribe to a covering-law conception of theory to find these questions important or to find securitization’s answers unsatisfying. A large part of the problem, we believe, lies in securitization’s silence on the politics of security. Its foundations in speech act theory have yielded an oddly apolitical theoretical framework. In its seminal formulation, the Copenhagen school emphasized the internal linguistic rules that must be followed for a speech act to be recognized as competent. Yet as Thierry Balzacq argues, by treating securitization as a purely rule-driven process, the Copenhagen school ignores the politics of securitization, reducing “security to a conventional procedure such as marriage or betting in which the ‘felicity circumstances’ (conditions of success) must fully prevail for the act to go through” (2005:172). Absent from this picture are fierce rhetorical battles, where coalitions counter securitizing moves with their own appeals that strike more or less deeply at underlying narratives. Absent as well are the public intellectuals and media, who question and critique securitizing moves sometimes (and not others), sometimes to good effect (and sometimes with little impact). The audience itself—whether the mass public or a narrower elite stratum—is stripped of all agency. Speaking security, even when the performance is competent, does not sweep this politics away. Only by delving into this politics can we shed light on the mysteries of securitization. We see rhetorical politics as constituted less by singular “securitizing moves” than by “contentious conversation”—to use Charles Tilly’s phrase. To this end, we would urge securitization theorists, as we recently have elsewhere, to move towards a “pragmatic” model that rests on four analytical wagers: that actors are both strategic and social; that legitimation works by imparting meaning to political action; that legitimation is laced through with contestation; and that the power of language emerges through contentious dialogue. We are heartened that our ambivalence about securitization—the ways in which we find it by turns appealing and dissatisfying—and our vision for how to move forward have in the last decade been echoed by (mostly) European colleagues. These critics have laid out a research agenda that would, if taken up, produce more satisfying, and more deeply political, theoretical accounts. In our own work, both individual and collective, we have tried to advance that research agenda. So long as securitization theorists resist defining the theory’s scope and mechanisms, and so long as it remains wedded to apolitical underpinnings, we think it unlikely to gain a broad following on this side of the pond. Second, securitization has been held back by another way in which it is apolitical—this time thanks to its Schmittian commitments and political vision. Successful securitization, in seminal accounts, replaces normal patterns of politics with the world of the exception, in which contest has no place. They imagine security as the ultimate trump card. But, in reality, the divide is not nearly so stark. Security does not crowd out all other spending priorities—or states would spend on nothing but defense and “securitized” issues. Nor does simply declaring something a matter of national security guarantee its funding—or global climate change counter-measures, including research on renewable energies, would be well-funded. Nor are security issues somehow aloof from politics: politics has never truly stopped “at the water’s edge.” Securitization considers only the politics of security. Its strangely dichotomous optic cannot see or make sense of the politics within security. In ignoring the politics within security, securitization is of course in good company. Realists of all stripes have paid little attention to domestic political contest, except as a distraction from structural imperatives. But while realism is unquestionably a powerful first-cut, this inattention to the politics within security is also among the reasons so many have found it wanting. As Arnold Wolfers long ago observed, some degree of insecurity is the normal state of affairs. But “some may find the danger to which they are exposed entirely normal and in line with their modest security expectations while others consider it unbearable to live with these same dangers.” And states, he further argues, do not actually maximize security—almost ever. “Even when there has been no question that armaments would mean more security, the cost in taxes, the reduction in social benefits, or the sheer discomfort involved have militated effectively against further effort” (1962:151, 153). A securitization perspective renders all this politics within security inexplicable. And yet, as Wolfers saw half a century ago, it is crucial.

#### Alt fails---not working within the system results in rhetoric changing but not policy.

**McCormack, 9** (Tara McCormack, PhD in International Relations from University of Westminster, 2009, accessed on 3-22-2022, Routledge, Taylor & Francis, “Critique, Security and Power: The Political Limits to Emancipatory Approaches”, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/290784999\_Critique\_Security\_and\_Power\_The\_Political\_Limits\_to\_Emancipatory\_Approaches, HBisevac)

In chapter 7 I engaged with the human security framework and some of the problematic implications of ‘emancipatory’ security policy frameworks. In this chapter I argued that the **shift away** from the pluralist security framework and the elevation of cosmopolitan and emancipatory goals has served to **enforce** international **power inequalities** rather than lessen them. Weak or unstable states are subjected to greater international scrutiny and international institutions and other states have greater freedom to intervene, but the citizens of these states have no way of controlling or influencing these **international institutions** or powerful states. This shift away from the pluralist security framework has **not challenged** the **status quo**, which may help to explain why major international institutions and states can **easily adopt** a more **cosmopolitan rhetoric** in their **security policies**. As we have seen, the shift away from the pluralist security framework has entailed a shift towards a more openly hierarchical international system, in which states are differentiated according to, for example, their ability to provide human security for their citizens or their supposed democratic commitments. In this shift, the old pluralist international norms of (formal) international sovereign equality, non-intervention and ‘blindness’ to the content of a state are overturned. Instead, international institutions and states have more freedom to intervene in weak or unstable states in order to ‘protect’ and emancipate individuals globally. Critical and emancipatory security theorists argue that the goal of the emancipation of the individual means that security must be reconceptualised away from the state. As the domestic sphere is understood to be the sphere of insecurity and disorder, the international sphere represents greater emancipatory possibilities, as Tickner argues, ‘if security is to start with the individual, its ties to state sovereignty must be severed’ (1995: 189). For critical and emancipatory theorists there must be a shift towards a ‘cosmopolitan’ legal framework, for example Mary Kaldor (2001: 10), Martin Shaw (2003: 104) and Andrew Linklater (2005). For critical theorists, one of the fundamental problems with Realism is that it is unrealistic. Because it prioritises order and the existing status quo, Realism attempts to impose a particular security framework onto a complex world, ignoring the myriad threats to people emerging from their own governments and societies. Moreover, traditional international theory serves to obscure power relations and omits a study of why the system is as it is: [O]mitting myriad strands of power amounts to exaggerating the simplicity of the entire political system. Today’s conventional portrait of international politics thus too often ends up looking like a Superman comic strip, whereas it probably should resemble a Jackson Pollock. (Enloe, 2002 [1996]: 189) Yet as I have argued, contemporary critical security theorists seem to show a marked lack of engagement with their problematic (whether the international security context, or the Yugoslav break-up and wars). Without concrete engagement and analysis, however, the **critical project** is **undermined** and critical theory becomes **nothing more** than a **request** that people behave in a **nicer** way to each other. Furthermore, whilst contemporary critical security theorists argue that they present a more realistic image of the world, through exposing power relations, for example, their **lack of concrete analysis** of the problematic considered renders them actually unable to engage with existing power structures and the way in which power is being exercised in the contemporary international system. For critical and emancipatory theorists the central place of the values of the theorist mean that it cannot fulfil its promise to critically engage with contemporary power relations and emancipatory possibilities. Values must be joined with engagement with the material circumstances of the time.

#### A single instance of securitization isn’t totalizing---it’s a process, not an event!

**Ghughunishvili, 10** (Irina Ghughunishvili, CEU IR masters, 2010, accessed on 3-19-2022, Securitization of Migration in the United States after 9/11: Constructing Muslims and Arabs as Enemies, “Securitization of Migration in the United States after 9/11: Constructing Muslims and Arabs as Enemies”, https://www.etd.ceu.edu/2010/ghughunishvili\_irina.pdf, HBisevac)

As provided by the Copenhagen School **securitization theory** is **comprised** by **speech act**, acceptance of the audience and facilitating conditions or other non-securitizing actors contribute to a successful securitization. The causality or a one-way relationship between the speech act, the audience and securitizing actor, where politicians use the speech act first to justify exceptional measures, has been criticized by scholars, such as Balzacq. According to him, the one-directional relationship between the three factors, or some of them, is not the best approach. To fully grasp the dynamics, it will be more beneficial to “rather than looking for a one-directional relationship between some or all of the three factors highlighted, it could be profitable to focus on the degree of congruence between them. 26 Among other aspects of the Copenhagen School’s theoretical framework, which he criticizes, the thesis will rely on the criticism of the lack of context and the rejection of a ‘one-way causal’ relationship between the audience and the actor. The process of threat construction, according to him, can be clearer if external context, which stands independently from use of language, can be considered. 27 Balzacq opts for more context-oriented approach when it comes down to securitization through the speech act, where a single **speech does not create the discourse**, but it is **created** through a **long process**, where **context is vital**. 28 He indicates: In reality, the **speech act itself**, i.e. literally a **single security articulation** at a particular point in time, will **at best** only **very rarely explain** the entire social process that follows from it. In most cases a security scholar will rather be confronted with a process of articulations creating sequentially a threat text which turns sequentially into a securitization. 29 This type of approach seems more plausible in an empirical study, as it is more likely that a single speech will not be able to securitize an issue, but it is a lengthy process, where a the audience speaks the same language as the securitizing actors and can relate to their speeches.

### Link — T/L

#### **IR and foreign policy are more complex than culture war debates — reject sweeping prescriptions that guarantee ineffective foreign policy.**

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The reality is that foreign policy has always been contested — and, more often than not, linked to questions of identity and ideology. But debates about war are so interwoven with our larger culture-war politics now that most questions of how to handle military conflict have been largely reduced to partisan scoring. And that’s a problem — not because we need to get back to some bygone bipartisan era, but because real dissension is vital in a democracy, especially in matters of foreign policy.

The seeds of war politics’ merging with culture-war politics arguably date back to the late 1960s, when anti-Vietnam War protests overlapped with civil rights protests and other social movements that challenged the existing social order. Over time, conservatives and liberals diverged in their attitudes toward the war, especially as liberal elites began to criticize it. Starting with the 1968 presidential election, being anti-war became more closely associated with being a liberal Democrat. And the accusation that George McGovern, the 1972 Democratic presidential nominee, was all for “acid, amnesty1 and abortion” helped solidify this cultural connection.

And this larger cultural split between the two parties came to a head during the Iraq War. In many ways, it’s connected to the political discourse we’re seeing with Russia and Ukraine now. Unlike now, though, the discourse during the Iraq War — in the beginning at least — exemplified the idea that politics stops at the water’s edge. Critics of then-President George W. Bush rallied behind him after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and public opinion on the war was initially quite favorable, even though Democrats were far more split than Republicans.

That national unity turned out to be short-lived, though. As political communications scholar Mary Stuckey has observed, it was during the Iraq War that the two parties began to make very distinct arguments about what it meant to be an American in relation to the war. Bush, for instance, often framed the war on terror, including the U.S. invasion of Iraq, in terms of good and evil as he tried to establish the GOP as the party of faith and strength. Democrats, meanwhile, in their 2004 party platform accused Bush and the Republicans of having an “insufficient understanding of our enemy” and a failure to comprehend the complexity of the situation in the Middle East.

While the Iraq War was not directly related to Bush’s religious faith, both supporters and opponents alike depicted his approach to war as reflective of his overall philosophical approach: The president relied on gut and instinct, not expertise, to make decisions. Likewise, Bush’s 2004 presidential campaign portrayed his Democratic opponent, then-Sen. John Kerry of Massachusetts, as a waffling intellectual who lacked conviction and patriotic dedication.

In other words, the debate over the Iraq War quickly became an extension of the debates Democrats and Republicans were already having in the 2000 presidential election — and even earlier — about religion, culture and Bush’s intellect and qualifications.

Ultimately, the Bush administration’s justification for the Iraq War became the subject of widespread criticism across the ideological spectrum since the rationale for invasion was shaky at best. But the narratives Democrats and Republicans employed during the invasion of Iraq and the war on terror were still powerful for the ways in which they preyed on domestic and cultural disagreements and anxieties.

These arguments also had important implications for debates over presidential war powers. While many Republicans embraced an expansive role for the president — a strong leader asserting U.S. dominance on the world stage — Democrats said in their 2008 presidential platform that they “reject[ed] the sweeping claims of ‘inherent’ presidential power,” and that their candidate, then-Sen. Barack Obama of Illinois, would better grasp intercultural nuance and policy detail.

But as president, Obama struggled with questions of war and war powers as well. Although his administration was committed to a less interventionist approach, world events still demanded attention. There were new questions to answer about American intervention in the Middle East and North Africa, as civil wars broke out in Libya and Syria. And like Bush, Obama often found himself the subject of criticism — first for going too far in Libya and then for not going far enough in Syria.

In other words, the debate around the Iraq War didn’t help either Democrats or Republicans create a coherent set of ideas about how to engage with foreign conflict, how to prepare for the aftermath of one, or when it makes the most sense to avoid getting involved at all. Obama was different from Bush, but the foreign-policy questions he faced were still difficult — and domestic culture-war disputes were not especially useful in resolving them. Yet, because of the Iraq War, the country was now set on a political course that undermined the goal of meaningful, reasoned dissent on foreign policy.

Figuring out the role the U.S. should play following the Russian invasion of Ukraine requires answering a completely different set of questions than the global war on terror or the U.S. response to the war in Syria required, but as we saw in Vietnam, Iraq and elsewhere, culture-war politics are once again overshadowing the discussion of what to do. Instead of debating the extent to which Americans should intervene in Ukraine, Republicans have attacked Biden as a weak leader — and that’s the PG-rated stuff: Many attacks from the far right have veered into even uglier culture-war territory and praise for the Russian president.

So far, most rank-and-file Republicans have unfavorable views of the Russian invasion, not sympathy toward Putin. (Instead, a partisan divide is emerging over whether the U.S. should be “doing more.”) Still, it’s not hard to figure out why the discussion of whether and how America gets involved in armed conflict has devolved into partisan point-scoring. Nearly everything has. But this has a real cost, and the answer isn’t for politics to stop at the water’s edge.

Dissenting viewpoints and serious debate are crucial in a democracy, and foreign policy is not an exception. Politics can and should be a place for real debate and multiple viewpoints. It is imperative to hold public officials accountable for their decisions. When we treat foreign policy as an extension of domestic cultural politics, we lose almost as much as we do when we act as though it’s not up for debate at all.

### Link — AT: Authors Biased

#### The blob is fake, and restraint cannot solve

**Mazarr ’20** — Michael; senior political scientist at the RAND corporation. Summer 2020; “Rethinking Restraint: Why It Fails in Practice”; *The Washington Quarterly*, Volume 32, Article 2; <https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2020.1771042>

There is No Sinister National Security Elite

Many restraint proponents use a second major claim to buttress their argument that US strategy is fundamentally invalid and should be radically scaled back: US overreach reflects the malign influence of a devious national security elite fired with dangerous visions of primacy and liberal hegemony. Not all restraint advocates make this argument, but it is a dominant theme in some of the literature’s most important works. Stephen Walt’s 2018 book The Hell of Good Intentions, for example, is an extended indictment of this group—including current and former US officials, congressional staff, think tank experts, and others—which he describes as a “dysfunctional elite of privileged insiders who are frequently disdainful of alternative perspectives.” 35 According to Walt, promoting an interventionist foreign policy provides jobs, status, and access to high-paid consultancies and political power to this group, which comprises an exclusive clique of insiders who attend the same schools and clubs and believe, for the most part, the same things about US power.

The historian and writer Andrew Bacevich denounces the same alleged cabal, agreeing that “the ideology of national security … serves the interests of those who created the national security state and those who still benefit from its continued existence”—interests that include “status, influence, and considerable wealth.” 36 The result is an addiction to global hegemony and military force, a tendency to seek out unnecessary enemies and commitments, and a ~~crippling~~ conformism that quashes dissent.37 US national security elites at the end of the Cold War, he argues in his most recent book, coalesced around primacy with “something close to unanimity.” 38

It is not clear how to treat such sprawling assertions when the reality—the jumble of motivations, views, relationships, and ambitions of the tens of thousands of people who comprise the national security community—is obviously so much more complex. Do all US foreign policy officials or experts support global engagement because it grants them jobs or speaking opportunities? How many actually attended the same schools or even know one another, and what effect does this have on their views? Do all of them embrace primacy, and to the same degree? Apart from collections of anecdotes, those convinced of the existence of such a homogenous elite offer no objective evidence—such as surveys, interviews, or comprehensive literature reviews—to back up these sweeping claims. “By and large,” Bacevich insists in just one example, “members of the national security elite hold the public in remarkably low regard,” citing as proof a single, dated quote from Dean Acheson.39

The real “national security elite,” of course, comprises individuals with starkly opposing opinions. Some favor nuclear arms control, some oppose it; some want more US forces in Europe, some fewer; some continue to support humanitarian interventions, whereas most are now skeptical of them. As a result, profound arguments have erupted within this group over every major foreign policy issue of the last half-century. The scholars and former government officials Hal Brands, Peter Feaver, and William Inboden explain that “intense disputes over the Korean War, the Vietnam War, détente and arms control, the opening to China, and policies in Central America and the Middle East were followed by battles over the Gulf War, NATO expansion, military interventions in Haiti, Somalia, and the Balkans, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq—not to mention heated arguments over positions toward China, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and other issues today.” 40 Few officials or experts may rail against the broad principle of US global engagement. But on specific policy questions—whether to go to war or conduct a humanitarian intervention, or what policy to adopt toward China or Cuba or Russia or Iran— debates in Washington are deep, intense, and sometimes bitter.

To take just a single example from recent history, the Obama administration’s decision to endorse a surge in Afghanistan came only after extended deliberation and soul-searching, and it included a major, and highly controversial, element of restraint—a very public deadline to begin a graduated withdrawal.41 If one were to choose the less aggressive or interventionist side of this and a dozen other recent debates, in fact, one could assemble a reasonable facsimile of the more circumscribed foreign policy that proponents of restraint themselves suggest.

It is true that groupthink often grips tighter, and dissent ebbs, during times of crisis or war— during the crucial escalation years in Vietnam, for example, or in the weeks after 9/11. The national security community has closed ranks to an unhealthy degree at such moments. But these are exceptions, and they deeply complicate the argument for restraint: if US foreign policy excesses tend to emerge during emotionally charged crises or periods of rabid threat perception, the problem is not a relentless hegemonic impulse. It is overreaction at specific, desperate moments—something a general commitment to restraint is unlikely to cure.

#### This card is long, but your argument is fake

Inboden et al. ’20 — William Inboden, William Powers, Jr., Executive Director of the Clements Center for National Security and an Associate Professor at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin, served at the State Department in 2002-2005 and as senior director for strategic planning on the National Security Council staff in 2005-2007; Hal Brands, PhD, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies; Peter D. Feaver is a professor of political science and public policy at Duke University, where he heads the Program in American Grand Strategy and the Triangle Institute for Security Studies; April 29, 2020; “In Defense of the Blob”; *Foreign Affairs*; <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-04-29/defense-blob>

Blob theorists view the establishment as a club of like-minded elite insiders who control everything, take care of one another, and brush off challenges to conventional wisdom. In reality, the United States actually has a healthy marketplace of foreign policy ideas. Discussion over American foreign policy is loud, contentious, diverse, and generally pragmatic—and as a result, the nation gets the opportunity to learn from its mistakes, build on its successes, and improve its performance over time.

In both absolute and relative terms, the expert community dealing with foreign policy and national security in the United States is remarkably large and heterogeneous. Inside government, cadres of professionals make vast amounts of technocratic knowledge and institutional memory available to policymakers. Every department and agency with an international role has distinctive regional or functional expertise it can bring to bear. This in-house knowledge is complemented by an even larger and more diverse network of experts in the many hundreds of think tanks and contract research institutions that surround the government and offer views ranging from right to left, hawk to dove, free trader to protectionist, technocratic to ideological. Pick any policy issue and you can put together a lively debate with ease. Should the United States [engage with China](https://www.brookings.edu/research/u-s-policy-toward-china/) or contain it? Negotiate with Iran or squeeze it? [Withdraw from the Middle East](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2020-02-10/price-primacy) or redouble its efforts? Reasoned arguments on all sides are widely available, in any form you want—all supplied from within the supposedly monolithic establishment.

Moreover, unlike such communities in other leading powers, the American foreign policy establishment is connected to society rather than cut off from it, because the top several layers of U.S. national security bureaucracies are staffed by political appointees rather than civil servants. The Blob comprises government officials, outside experts, and many people who go back and forth between the two. Insiders know how government works and what is practical. Outsiders think independently. And in-and-outers bridge the gaps. Other countries simply do not have comparably large, diverse, permeable, expert communities that encourage vigorous debate over national policy—which is why, say, the caliber of U.S. debate about nuclear policy is more nuanced and better informed than in other nuclear powers, and which is why other countries would love to have such a Blob of their own.

The American foreign policy establishment, finally, is generally more pragmatic than ideological. It values prudence and security over novelty and creativity. It knows that thinking outside the box may be useful in testing policy assumptions, but the box is usually there for a reason, and so reflexively embracing the far-out option is dangerous. Its members have made many mistakes, individually and collectively, but several features of the system enforce accountability over time. Foreign policy failures, for example, are politically toxic and often spur positive change. The monumental intelligence failures that allowed the September 11 attacks to happen were followed by policy and institutional reforms that have helped prevent other mass-casualty terrorist attacks on U.S. targets for almost two decades. Early [misjudgments in the Iraq war](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iraq/2003-09-01/stumbling-war)led to the adoption of a new counterinsurgency strategy that restored stability, at least for a while. The international economic imbalances and financial procedures that led to the 2008 global financial crisis were addressed by policies that contributed to a decade-long recovery.

Taken together, these virtues reinforce one another and help the United States tackle the countless national and global challenges that confront a superpower. Blob critics claim there are no meaningful arguments over U.S. foreign policy. But this is just not true. Intense disputes over the Korean War, the Vietnam War, détente and arms control, the opening to China, and policies in Central America and the Middle East were followed by battles over the Gulf War, NATO expansion, military interventions in Haiti, Somalia, and the Balkans, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq—not to mention heated arguments over positions toward China, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and other issues today. It is true that beneath all this controversy lies a relatively stable consensus on the value of power, alliances, and constructive global engagement. Most members of the establishment believe that global problems usually improve when the United States engages responsibly and worsen when the United States retreats. Yet that reflects not some nefarious groupthink but the wisdom of professional crowds, arrived at through painful trial and error over more than a century.

WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN

If the Blob is not a cabal, neither is its record one of dismal failure. Critics argue that the United States entered the 1990s in a position of great power and prestige and squandered that legacy through misguided wars and interventions, geopolitical hubris, and the aggressive pursuit of a global liberal order at the expense of the nation’s economic and security interests. But the story they tell doesn’t match what actually happened. American grand strategy did not change radically after the Cold War, because it was developed not just as a response to the Soviet challenge but to the foreign policy disasters of the 1930s and 1940s. After World War II, U.S. officials decided to maintain the nation’s primacy, thwart dangerous aggressors, and build a secure, prosperous international order in which the United States could thrive. After the Cold War, they decided to keep this strategy going, even in the absence of an immediate peer competitor.

From George H. W. Bush to Barack Obama, post–Cold War presidents worked hard to further the efforts their predecessors started, shaping an environment conducive to American interests and ideas. They promoted free trade and globalization, maintained and even expanded the country’s global network of alliances and military bases, policed the global commons, and tried to stabilize regional conflicts and promote human rights. Unchecked by great-power rivals, Washington did become more willing to use military force in the periphery on behalf of national ideals. But even then, it hardly ran amok in search of monsters to destroy, abstaining from interventions in Rwanda, the African Great Lakes, Sudan, the Caucasus, Ukraine, Myanmar, and other potential cases. The basic outlines of recent American strategy would be recognizable to officials stretching back generations, because its goal has remained constant: fostering a world guided by American leadership, rooted in American values, and protected by American power.

Have there been disappointments and even disasters along the way? Absolutely. Globalization and democratization were supposed to [mellow China and Russia](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-02-10/new-spheres-influence) and help them fit easily into the U.S.-led order. That hasn’t worked out as well as hoped. North Korea went nuclear despite a series of U.S. presidents swearing they would never let it happen. Before 9/11, Washington didn’t take terrorism seriously enough; afterward, it became obsessed with stopping it at all costs. And far too many military interventions—from Somalia to Afghanistan, Iraq to Libya—have been misconceived and mishandled.

As serious as these failures were, however, they were no worse than those occurring during other periods in U.S. history. The quarter century after World War II saw the loss of China, the end of a nuclear monopoly, the erection of the Iron Curtain and the Berlin Wall, a bloody stalemate in Korea, a communist takeover in Cuba, and a catastrophic war in Vietnam. The following two decades witnessed the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, an energy crisis and OPEC oil embargo, anti-American revolutions in Iran and Nicaragua, a bungled intervention in Lebanon, dirty wars in Central America, the Iran-contra scandal, and the Tiananmen Square massacre. Some degree of failure, even tragedy, is inescapable in foreign policy. What matters most is not the presence of individual triumphs or disasters but the collective balance between them. From this perspective, the post–Cold War era looks significantly better, for set against the failures is a giant success—the emergence of a far more peaceful, prosperous, and liberal international system, with a prosperous and secure United States at its center.

Critics count the problems that have occurred but ignore the problems that have been avoided. There were plenty of ways the world could have gone haywire after 1989. Leading scholars, for example, foresaw a descent into vicious instability. Germany and Japan would turn hungry and revisionist again, security vacuums would emerge in Central Europe and East Asia, and nationalism, aggression, and nuclear proliferation would run rampant. “We will soon miss the Cold War,” John Mearsheimer [predicted](https://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/politics/foreign/mearsh.htm) in 1990. “The prospect of major crises, even wars . . . is likely to increase dramatically.”

Not quite. The long peace continued, as great-power relations remained relatively calm. German and Japanese revisionism never materialized—because those countries remained tightly embraced within a strong U.S. alliance system and a broader liberal international order. An outbreak of nationalism and ethnic aggression was contained in the Balkans. The countries of the former Warsaw Pact did not descend into chaos but embarked on political and economic reform, relaxing into a newly secure environment inside NATO. Asia did not collapse into vicious rivalries; under U.S. guidance, it continued its remarkable post-1979 stretch of peace as billions of people benefited from decades of sustained economic growth. The number of democracies in the world rose dramatically. Even nuclear proliferation has remained relatively [limited](https://www.atomicheritage.org/history/non-proliferation-limitation-and-reduction), as Washington continued to provide security guarantees to allies so they would not pursue independent nuclear arsenals, orchestrated a campaign to secure loose nuclear materials, and punished rogue states that tried to buck the nonproliferation regime. In short, after 1989, the deep global engagement favored by the Blob kept the world moving forward on a generally positive track, rather than regressing to the historical mean of tyranny, depression, and war.

Yes, instability is returning in both Asia and Europe, globalization and democracy are currently in retreat, [intense competitions](https://www.brookings.edu/research/china-and-the-return-of-great-power-strategic-competition/) with China and Russia loom, and the new coronavirus pandemic has reminded the world of the downsides of connectivity. But the return of great-power rivalry in recent years has been fueled less by U.S. overreach than by questions about its stamina. Had Washington followed the recommendations of the Blob’s critics and retrenched from its global commitments after 1989, rather than leaning into them, things would look even worse now. If the United States had pursued a strategy of offshore balancing, say, by winding down its overseas obligations, would it be sitting pretty now? It is hard to see how withdrawing from Europe in the 1990s or not expanding NATO would have encouraged less bullying from Moscow. More likely, it would simply have given a resurgent Russia greater freedom to reassert its influence. Pulling back from the Asia-Pacific region, similarly, would likely have undermined the United States’ ability to hedge against the negative consequences of China’s rise. And less engagement by Washington on a global liberal agenda in trade, politics, and human rights would not have improved the world or prepared it institutionally to handle global challenges, such as pandemics and climate change.

In retrospect, it is easy to identify specific policies and decisions one would want to change. It is harder to identify an alternative strategy that would have delivered clearly superior results—and that is the true standard by which real-world foreign policies deserve to be judged.

THE RETURN OF THE BLOB

How about the critics’ third argument, that escaping the influence of the Blob would make American policy more effective and the country more secure? As it happens, a real-time test of that proposition has been running for over three years. The Trump administration has sidelined national security professionals, and professionalism, to a degree unprecedented in the modern era. The president has routinely disregarded the advice of apolitical career officials, accused them of disloyalty and even [treason](https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/10/appalling-attack-alexander-vindman/601000/), and purged the top ranks of the administration of anybody unwilling to toe the official line of the day (whatever that may be). The results of this experiment are not encouraging. So far it has produced poor policy, poor execution, and poor outcomes.

Unforced errors are one of the hallmarks of the Trump administration’s foreign policy.

The administration launched an overdue effort to confront China on its trade practices, only to hobble the approach by withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and starting simultaneous trade wars with American allies. It punished Russia for its territorial aggression and electoral sabotage, only to be undercut by the president’s embrace of Russian President [Vladimir Putin](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2019-08-12/putin-great)and by his personal vendettas relating to Ukraine. The president twice announced, and twice partially reversed, a decision to withdraw troops from Syria, thereby battering U.S. credibility without actually leaving the conflict. Thanks to diplomatic bungling and presidential credulity, North Korea is no more contained than it was three years ago, and Japan, South Korea, and the United States are all at odds. Because of arbitrary White House interference with military justice and other issues, civil-military relations have cratered. What links these cases is not ideology but competence—all involved basic mistakes that were pointed out by experts inside and outside government, only to be contemptuously ignored by the White House.

Even when the administration’s policy choices have been defensible in conception, they have often been botched in execution, due to a disregard for expert advice and a disdain for the details of implementation. The administration could have tried to [remedy the defects](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2019-11-15/better-iran-deal-within-reach) of the Iran nuclear deal, for example, in a way that included European powers rather than alienating them. It could have increased pressure on Tehran with a plan for converting that pressure into lasting results. It could have gotten something in return for diplomatic concessions given to Israel and Saudi Arabia. And it could have reformed NAFTA without gratuitously harming relations with Canada and Mexico.

As for results, the current pandemic shows just what happens when national policy is driven by amateur improvisation rather than professional planning. Pandemics have been a known danger for decades, and the Blob has a suggested playbook for handling them—constant vigilance, early detection and monitoring, a unified national response in coordination with global partners, and much more. Coming into office, the Trump administration was fully briefed on the challenge—and chose to look the other way, downgrading the relevant technocrats and pushing for deep cuts in global health and disease programs. At the crucial early stages of the crisis, when a[robust multilateral effort](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-04-18/pandemic-and-toll-transatlantic-discord) might have had maximum effect, the administration’s disorganization and denial left Washington on the sidelines. As the disease raced around the world and took hold in the United States, officials desperate to sound the alarm and begin preventive measures were silenced by a president unwilling to hear bad news. And once the direness of the medical situation was finally recognized, the administration tried to shift blame, going so far as to cut funding for the World Health Organization in the midst of the pandemic, simply in order to create a politically useful scapegoat.

The establishment makes mistakes, often big ones. But in its collective capacity, it learns from them and changes course—which is why the liberal international order has not only lasted for generations but deepened and broadened over time. [Purging experience and disinterested expertise](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/2020-04-06/few-good-men) from U.S. foreign policy has already caused problems. The longer it continues, the worse things will get. And the more many will hope for the return of the Blob.

#### No bias or ‘echo chamber’ – hegemony persists because it works. Our authors or reflexive and unbiased – critiques of primacy don’t withstand statistical scrutiny.

Feaver & Brands, 19 – Peter D. Feaver is a professor of political science and public policy at Duke University, where he heads the Program in American Grand Strategy and the Triangle Institute for Security Studies. Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. (Spring 2019; “Correspondence: The Establishment and U.S. Grand Strategy;” *International Security*; 43(4); pg. 197–204; doi:10.1162/isec\_c\_00347; //GrRv)

In his article “Why America’s Grand Strategy Has Not Changed: Power, Habit, and the U.S. Foreign Policy Establishment,” Patrick Porter argues that the continuity of U.S. grand strategy since World War II has resulted from a group-think mentality fostered by a powerful foreign policy elite—”the Blob”—that stifles debate and prevents needed course corrections.1 Porter’s provocative argument is ultimately unpersuasive, because it overstates the degree of conformity and consensus in U.S. strategy while slighting the most obvious explanations for the strategy’s endurance. Below we highlight several problems with his argument.

First, Porter exaggerates the degree of consensus in U.S. foreign policy since World War II. In fact, despite a bipartisan consensus on the necessity of U.S. global leadership in support of a congenial international order (what Porter calls “primacy”), intense debates about how that strategy should be operationalized have been common in U.S. foreign policy circles. Policymakers, elected officials, and policy commentators argued heatedly over such fundamental issues as whether to pursue a Europe-first or Asia-first strategy in the 1950s, whether and how aggressively to combat Soviet and communist influence in the developing world, whether to make or avoid defense commitments on the Asian mainland, whether to pursue détente or confrontation with the Soviet Union in the 1970s, whether to use force to reverse Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990–91, whether to expand the North Atlantic Treaty Organization after the Cold War, and whether to invade Iraq in 2003. These debates reflected genuine intellectual disagreements that pitted members of the Blob against one another. Porter would likely respond that such debates were essentially about tactics, but the fact that the foreign policy community has engaged in knock-down, drag-out debates over issues of such enormous strategic importance shows that it is not as unified, and the marketplace of ideas not as limited, as Porter claims.

Second, although Porter argues that dissenting foreign policy views advocating an approach he calls “restraint” tend to be marginalized, departures from a strategy of U.S. leadership have time and again received a hearing at the highest levels of government. In the 1950s and 1960s, Presidents Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy repeatedly considered withdrawing U.S. troops from Europe.2 Similar debates occurred in Congress in the late 1960s and early 1970s. When Jimmy Carter took office, he strongly favored withdrawing U.S. troops from South Korea.3 In the early 1990s, the George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton administrations initially delegated management of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia to the European NATO allies. In 2011, Barack Obama withdrew U.S. troops from Iraq as part of a broader move toward an offshore balancing strategy in the Middle East.4 In other words, presidents and other political leaders in the United States have often been willing to consider significant changes in U.S. strategy, and they have sometimes even implemented policies that represented a meaningful shift toward retrenchment and restraint.

Third, the reason that many of these departures were not ultimately undertaken—or proved fleeting—is not because policymakers denied them a fair, open hearing. It is because they were judged—or later shown—to be substantively inferior to more assertive policies. Eisenhower never withdrew U.S. troops from Europe, because he understood that doing so would have threatened to destabilize the interlocking series of arrangements that deterred the Soviet Union while pacifying Germany and Western Europe.5 Carter never withdrew U.S. troops from South Korea, for fear that doing so would have risked incentivizing South Korean nuclear proliferation and destabilizing the fragile balance in a critical part of the world.6 The United States ultimately took the lead in addressing the crackup of Yugoslavia when the inability of the Europeans to deal with the crisis had become clear. Obama did draw down U.S. forces in Iraq, but large swaths of that country (and Syria) were subsequently overrun by the [ISIL] Islamic State, compelling a reassertion of U.S. military and diplomatic engagement.7 In these and other cases, an emphasis on U.S. leadership has persisted, because that approach has been deemed—after significant debate or hard experience—superior to the alternatives.

Fourth, and related, Porter slights the simplest explanation for why there has been substantial consistency in U.S. strategy: because it works. As scholars have demonstrated, the past seventy years have been among the best in human history in terms of rising global and U.S. prosperity, the spread of democracy and human rights, the avoidance of great power war, and the decline of war in general.8 It has also been a period when the world’s leading power consistently pursued a grand strategy geared explicitly toward achieving those goals. To prove that U.S. grand strategy persists for reasons other than utility, Porter would have to show that U.S. leadership has not been necessary to those outcomes or that it is no longer necessary. But he does not do so (or even really try to do so), and his article does not engage the relevant social science scholarship and historical literature establishing a causal connection between U.S. engagements and key aspects of the relatively benign global order.9

Finally, critics of primacy consistently argue, as Porter does, that their ideas are censored or excluded from policy debates. Yet, critics of U.S. grand strategy are prominent within the academy, including at prestigious institutions such as the University of Chicago, Harvard, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Their op-eds and essays appear in the New York Times, Foreign Policy, and Foreign Affairs, among other prominent “mainstream” outlets, and their work receives generous funding. Leading critics of primacy are regular participants in U.S. government–sponsored outreach initiatives such as the National Intelligence Council’s Intelligence Associates program. Not least, although Porter and many other realists in the academy deplore key aspects of the current president’s foreign policy, that president’s own core critique of the foreign policy elite echoes those made by academic realists.10 If this is censorship, it is a remarkably ineffective form of censorship. Perhaps the reason primacy endures is not that the marketplace of ideas is broken, but that it is working fairly well.

### Link — AT: Experts

#### Expertise good.

Skylar-Mastro ’19 — Oriana; assistant professor of security studies at Georgetown University and a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. December 2, 2019; "The Surest Way to Lose to China Is to Disparage Expertise"; *Defense One*; https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/12/surest-way-lose-china-disparage-expertise/161598/; //CYang

In the White House, university halls, and op-eds pages, experts are under siege. President Trump calls them “terrible,” and so it is little surprise that most of the individuals driving his China policy are not China specialists, do not speak Mandarin, and have little in-country experience.

The most recent critique of area specialists came in the form of an op-ed by my colleague Hal Brands. The piece argues that “great power gurus” — those primarily well-versed in international relations theory — have a better track record at predicting Chinese behavior than China hands. Brands is not alone; many generalists believe their positions are somehow less biased and reflect better analysis and strategic thinking because they are not, in the words of Aaron Friedberg, “a card-carrying member of the China-watching fraternity.”

Is Hal Brands correct? The evidence he offers does not make an open-and-shut case. Robert Kagan predicted in 1997 that China would challenge the United States in the region and perhaps globally, but it didn’t happen for at least a decade and a half. Beijing’s strategy of reassuring smaller countries and prioritizing positive relations with great powers created a relatively stable and peaceful environment in Asia until, arguably, 2012. Also, whether generalists admit it or not, they have relied on the hard work of China hands in their own research. In making his argument that China will “struggle for mastery in Asia,” Friedberg relies on specialists’ assessments of Chinese history and strategic culture, as well as numerous Chinese sources translated for him by Chinese speakers. Lastly, you have to evaluate predictions as a whole. In 2014, John Mearsheimer predicted great power rivalry with proxy wars between American allies and Chinese allies and attempts by Beijing to forge ties with Canada and Mexico to weaken U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere. Neither have happened.

To state the obvious, there are people on both sides who got it wrong. All experts should be humble about their assessments and open to the ways that Chinese interests, behavior, and strategy may change. Also, the knowledge of history, strategy and theory continues to be useful tools in research, analysis and advocacy. For this reason, many foreign-policy China hands of this generation invest in building equally strong theoretical backgrounds as they do in country knowledge. But for whatever reason, we are seeing a trend of discounting area expertise. Because of this, many of us couch our research agendas in language that appeals to generalists and downplay our strong China backgrounds for the sake of publishing in political science journals or scoring tenure.

Creating a political culture that values China experts is about more than just ego. As Brands also argues, the United States needs a good strategy if is to prevail. Developing such a strategy is only possible by including China experts whose bread and butter is deciphering what motivates Chinese behavior as well as how to shape and constrain it. Even some generalists admit they are less proficient at the “how” and “why” than those with area expertise. It is one thing to predict that Chinese military power will grow, it is quite another to predict the anti-access area denial strategy that China initially adopted; or to predict that China would rely primarily on coercive diplomacy, information operations and lawfare to promote its claims in the South China Sea. China specialists can tell us why China still only has one overseas base, and why it is in Djibouti; why China has chosen to expand its power globally initially through One Belt, One Road and not a global military presence like the United States; or why China was unlikely to liberalize as it became richer.

### Link — AT: Hegemony/Exceptionalism

#### **Their Ks slide into the politics they criticize — their unconditional anti-Americanism lacks academic rigor and causes fascism — our alternative worse arguments are accurate.**

Walzer ’18 — Michael; Professor Emeritus of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton University. He received his B.A. from Brandeis University in 1956 and received his Ph.D. from Harvard University in 1961. 2018; “A Foreign Policy for the Left”; *Yale University Press*; Accessed Online via University of Michigan Libraries; //CYang

The second shortcut, perhaps more popular than the first, is to stand up always against “imperialism”—or, a shortcut inside the shortcut, always to oppose American policies abroad. Anti-Americanism is a common left politics, which, again, sometimes gets things right and sometimes doesn’t. I believe that it got things right in Vietnam in 1967; it mostly got things right from the beginning to the end of the twentieth century in Central and South America; it got Iran right in 1953, when leftists criticized the anti-Mossadegh coup, and it got Iraq right in 2003. But that’s not enough to make the shortcut a reliable one. The defeat of Nazism and Stalinism, the two most brutal political regimes in world history, was in significant ways American work. Many people on the left supported that work, as we should have.

In 1967, Dwight Macdonald wrote to Mary McCarthy that the American war in Vietnam proved “that despite all the good things about our internal political-social-cultural life, we have become an imperialist power, and one that, partly because of these domestic virtues, is a most inept one.”37 We are still inept: in December 2005, with 100,000 American soldiers in Iraq, we organized an election there — and our man came in third. This result may be without precedent in imperial history. (It might suggest that we were less interested in imperial control than in promoting democracy, though the Iraqi politician who came in first wasn’t much of a democrat.) Macdonald’s understanding of US imperialism reflects a political intelligence and a moral balance that are mostly missing in contemporary anti-American writing.

Another often used shortcut is to oppose everything Israel does and to blame it for much that it hasn’t done, since it is the “lackey” of American imperialism or, alternatively, the dominant force shaping American foreign policy. The policies of recent Israeli governments require strong criticism — the occupation, the settlements, the refusal to suppress Jewish thugs and terrorists on the West Bank. But much of the left attack on Israel has little to do with its policies and more to do with its existence, which is taken to be the root cause of all evils in the Middle East. This view violates all the requirements of realism — by which I mean simply a readiness to see the world as it really is.

The last shortcut is to support every government that calls itself leftist or anti-imperialist and sets itself against American interests. This is different from the old Stalinist shortcut: support the Soviet Union, whatever it does, because it is the first proletarian dictatorship and the first workers’ paradise. That kind of politics is, I think, definitively finished, though it had a brief afterlife focused on China and then, with very few believers, on Albania and North Korea. The more recent version celebrates Maximal Leaders like Gamal Nasser, Fidel Castro, or Hugo Chávez; there are also short-lived infatuations, such as Michel Foucault’s affair with the future Ayatollah Khomeini. Leftist enthusiasm for populist dictatorships is one of our sad stories, which ends when resources run out, the failure to build the economy suddenly becomes undeniable, and the military takes over. But often the Maximal Leader is a military ~~man himself~~ [person themselves], and the repressive role of the army simply becomes more obvious over time. In Latin America today, the better left is represented by socialists and social-democrats in countries like Chile, Brazil, and Costa Rica who reject demagogic populism and struggle to produce economic growth, greater equality, and a stronger welfare state — and who attract less enthusiasm from American leftists than they deserve.38

There is a lot to be said for the default position. We should work in the place we know best to make things better. The improvement of humanity begins at home. This argument has special force for Americans, who live in an increasingly unequal society that is also a near-hegemonic world power. We need to be wary of adventures abroad that make our work at home more difficult.

Still, good leftists can’t avoid internationalism. We will be engaged again and again in arguments about what we should do or what we should urge the United States to do to help people in trouble or comrades abroad. Sometimes there is nothing that the United States can do, at least nothing it is likely to do right. But even when we oppose American action in other countries, we can be active ourselves — providing moral, political, and financial support to [people] ~~men and women~~ fighting in self-defense or in defense of others. There is no magic answer to the question, What should we do? But the ideological shortcuts I’ve just described, lazily adopted and rigidly held, have served us badly in the past and are almost certain to serve us badly in the future. Sticking with them means that we will get things right only by accident.

Political intelligence and moral sensitivity work much better than ideology, and they are what should guide our choice of comrades and our decisions about when and how to act abroad. Dictators and terrorists are never our comrades. We should embrace only those ~~men and women~~ [people] who really believe in and practice democracy and equality. We should act abroad only with those who share our commitments and then, only in ways consistent with those commitments. This is the politics that I want to call left internationalism.

#### Aligning with China against the US because of ‘human rights’ is academic garbage propagated by Chinese media.

Hung ’20 — Ho Fung; Henry M. and Elizabeth P. Wiesenfeld Professor in Political Economy at the Sociology Department and the Paul H Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University. They received their bachelor degree from the Chinese University of Hong Kong, MA degree from SUNY-Binghamton, and PhD degree in Sociology from Johns Hopkins. June 5, 2020; “As U.S. Injustices Rage, China’s Condemnation Reeks of Cynicism”; *Foreign Policy*; <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/05/us-injustice-protests-china-condemnation-cynical/>; //CYang

Beijing’s criticism of the United States, however, differs from that seen around the globe. China’s critique does not stem from a genuine concern for universal human rights and the well-being of African Americans. The Chinese people have not been given any opportunity to protest in solidarity with Americans — or against the abuses of black residents in China itself. Anti-black racism remains rampant on the Chinese internet, untouched by censors who seek to crush opinions the government dislikes. Its motivation is simply to tell the United States, and everybody else, to stop criticizing China over its own human rights abuses. Underneath Beijing’s commentary on the U.S. unrest is a deeply cynical voice that asks: If the U.S. authorities can do it, why shouldn’t we?

Last Friday afternoon, Trump held a press conference to denounce China’s plan to devise a national security law to crack down on Hong Kong’s dissents. He threatened to end U.S. recognition of Hong Kong’s special trading status and to sanction Chinese officials hurting Hong Kong’s freedom. It is going to bring real damage to Chinese companies and wealthy elites who have been using Hong Kong as a back door to gain access to foreign capital, sensitive technology, and channels to relocate their wealth overseas.

That night, after Trump’s speech, major cities across the United States were engulfed in flames, National Guards were mobilized, and protesters clashed with riot police near the White House. The president reportedly hid briefly in a bunker. The Chinese authorities have been heavily criticized for their crackdown on Hong Kong protests, for the Uighur concentration camps, and for the arrests of rights lawyers. Beijing must be delighted to see the U.S. global reputation tarnished as its problems of racism and police brutality are brought into the spotlight. It would be surprising if Beijing did not seize the moment to criticize the double standards of the White House. This cynicism underlines Beijing’s response to criticism of its bullying behavior in the international arena. When an international tribunal in The Hague ruled in favor of the Philippines against Chinese claims of sovereignty over the South China Sea in 2016, Beijing made it clear it would not abide by the ruling. It pointed out that the United States violated international law all the time and, hypocritically, hadn’t even acceded to the relevant U.N. convention itself.

Such rhetoric has grown common over the last few decades, as the Chinese Communist Party gradually abandoned its appeal for a more just social system and world order. Instead, the party has become increasingly explicit in referring to the global domination by Western powers as a license for its own imperial ambition. Jiang Shigong, an influential official scholar who advises the Chinese government on Hong Kong policy and global governance, even wrote recently that China should “absorb the skills and achievements” of the British and American empires to construct its own “world empire” for the sake of the Chinese people and the world.

For those in the United States and elsewhere who aspire for more equality, justice, and liberty, it is a mistake to see Beijing as an exotic progressive force with which to ally. Beijing points to the violence and injustice of the United States to exonerate itself from its own egregious violence and injustices. Police brutality and racism in the United States are unimaginably horrific. But U.S. authorities today are not using these protests as an excuse to arrest dissenting legislators and professors, to wholly outlaw peaceful assembly and rights organizations, to pressure companies and universities to fire employees sympathetic with the protesters, to arrest people for criticizing the government on social media, or to lock up 1 million minorities in reeducation camps. These abuses are routine in China and becoming routine in Hong Kong.

#### Russia’s worse.

Siegle & Smith ’22 — Joseph Siegle; the director of research at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies. Jeffrey Smith; the founding director of the pro-democracy nonprofit organization Vanguard Africa. May 30, 2022; "Putin’s World Order Would Be Devastating for Africa"; Foreign Policy; https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/30/russia-war-africa/; //CYang

But African leaders should have a more fundamental concern than these — at least, those who are committed to advancing peace and democracy. Putin is attempting to undermine the global order that has guided international relations for the better part of the last century. Building on Russia’s previous annexation of Crimea and parts of northern Georgia as well as its prior occupation of Ukraine’s Donbas region, Putin is taking a sledgehammer to the foundation of the once stable post-World War II order.

This attempt to normalize expansionist ambitions will have profound consequences for Africa. Would-be tsars across the continent — who, like Putin, have evaded term limits to stay in power indefinitely while eliminating their political opposition — are watching closely, asking if Putin can get away with this brazen overreach and flout the rules-based order, then why can’t they. It is a reasonable question to ask. At stake are established notions of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the independence of member states, which suddenly become more temporal, arbitrary, and open to violent contestation.

Perhaps the most eloquent defense of the existing order, premised on these foundational principles, came from Kenya’s permanent representative to the United Nations: ambassador Martin Kimani, who warned Putin and the Russian military to respect its border with Ukraine, using Africa’s own colonial past to highlight the dangers of stoking the “embers of dead empires.”

So what does a Russian-shaped international order look like for Africa?

A primary feature is the challenge to the inviolability of established boundaries. There are currently some 100 contested borders on the continent, most of them stemming from arbitrarily drawn colonial boundaries. These have, for the most part, been managed peacefully by successive African governments, rooted in a respect for the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity that were enshrined in the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity in 1963 and later reaffirmed in the Constitutive Act of the African Union in 2001. Established during the postcolonial independence period, many African states were born out of a commitment to self-determination. Ironically, this is the central issue being contested today by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

If the lesson from Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is that might makes right, then Africa’s political geography could be perpetually in dispute. In other words, if the overlapping security guarantees provided by both the U.N. and AU charters can be violated with impunity, then what is to stop African leaders who envy Putin’s aggressive brand of authoritarianism from following suit?

Already, we see this happening in some parts of Africa.

The volatile African Great Lakes region stands out for the fragility of its borders. The eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, has become a target for exploitation by authoritarian leaders in neighboring Rwanda and Uganda. Rwandan President Paul Kagame, officially in power since 2000, and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, in power since 1986, have routinely marched their troops and proxies as well as directed their allied rebel groups to seize Congolese territory, loot natural resources, and kill citizens with alarming impunity. In October 2021, Congolese authorities reported clashing with Rwandan troops, who allegedly occupied several villages before retreating. And as recently as March, the Congolese army presented evidence that the Kagame regime was actively backing a rebellion in eastern Congo. Disregarding borders is particularly precarious in the Great Lakes region because it carries with it the potential to reignite one of the most cataclysmic conflicts in recent history.

Similarly, Moscow has played a destabilizing role in Africa. Recent years have illuminated a “new scramble for Africa” as external actors seek to aggressively plant their politics, governance, and economic flags across the continent. Russia has been at the forefront of this predatory behavior by repeatedly propping up isolated and authoritarian leaders — most notably in Libya, Central African Republic, Mali, and Sudan — to advance Moscow’s patently anti-democratic influence.

Through the deployment of shadowy and unaccountable mercenary groups, polarizing disinformation campaigns, election interference, and arms-for-resource deals, Russia has gained influence while fostering instability and the increased human rights abuses that ultimately result from it.

Russia has also fomented — both covertly and overtly — and been quick to support the many unconstitutional seizures of power recently witnessed in Africa. The spate of coups and increasing instances of African leaders scrapping term limits, for example, better suit Moscow’s vision of remaking the international order in its autocratic mold.

That a Russian-shaped order in Africa would be more oppressive is crucial to note since most of the 16 ongoing internal conflicts on the continent have deep roots in authoritarian forms of governance. None of Africa’s established democracies, in contrast, are in conflict. More authoritarianism, then, can be expected to yield more conflict.

Tolerance for predatory interstate behavior globally, moreover, will embolden elevated forms of repression domestically in African states. After all, if the enshrined principles of self-determination and popular participation are not respected in a high-profile instance, such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, then what international actors can be compelled to penalize the intimidation or jailing of opposition leaders, the shuttering of independent media outlets, and the brazen rigging of elections in Africa? Growing autocracy would do a grave injustice to the 75 percent of Africans who regularly state that democracy is their preferred form of government. The inevitable repression that will result from an unfettered international order would also lead to a spike in refugee flows and internally displaced populations.

It took the trauma of World War II to compel the international community to unite, recognize, and sign onto the principles outlined in the U.N. Charter. Intrinsic to this global system — forged from hard-learned and costly experiences — was the importance of collective security to deter and push back against authoritarian bullies in Europe and elsewhere.

The Organisation of African Unity and later the AU adopted many of these core values. Indeed, drawing on its own hard-earned lessons from colonialism, the challenges of securing peace following the brutal wars of the 1990s, and the aftermath of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsis, the AU rightly recognized the importance of action when faced with violations of such universal principles.

While often underappreciated and unevenly applied, the U.N. and AU frameworks provide a layer of international accountability against extralegal actions as well as a critical starting point to build the solidarity that is needed to address the challenges that the global community faces.

As Africans grapple with the more present and disastrous aftershocks of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it is important to recognize the threat this form of authoritarian expansion will have on the continent if it is normalized. History shows us that impunity is contagious. And apathy in the face of imminent threat is foolhardy. The clear threats emanating from Putin’s worldview defy the principles that are central to an international order that both the U.N. and AU helped foster.

#### **Analyzing and rejecting hegemonic missteps is consistent with affirming hegemony as a net force for good.**

Dubowitz & Schanzer ‘20 — Mark Dubowitz is the chief executive of FDD, a Washington, D.C.-based nonpartisan policy institute. Jonathan Schanzer is senior vice president for research at FDD, where he oversees the work of the organization’s experts and scholars. December 15, 2020; “Retain American Power, Do Not Restrain It”; *Foundation for Defense of Democracies*; <https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2020/12/15/defending-forward-retain-american-power-do-not-restrain-it/>; //CYang

Today’s restrainers similarly seek to capitalize on the suffering and difficulties associated with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the broader fight against terrorism, when they argue for the withdrawal of the remaining U.S. forces from these and other conflicts.11 Restrainers, however, often conflate the initial decision to intervene at all with how a conflict is subsequently managed or how eventually to withdraw. These are different policy decisions. Indeed, one can be critical of the 2003 invasion of Iraq and how the war was managed – while also believing that Washington should retain a modest U.S. military presence to help prevent a return of the Islamic State and to counter the influence of Iran.

Restrainers have also attempted to leverage the Great Recession and the current economic crisis resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic to incite populist passions.12 They do this by falsely suggesting that defense spending is the primary source of the federal deficit and debt.13 Defense spending is near post-World War II lows in terms of percentage of U.S. gross domestic product and percentage of federal spending.

Restrainers consistently paint existing and potential conflicts and U.S. military deployments with the same brush, warning of another “forever war.”14 However, not every conflict leads to an interminable quagmire. Even the so-called War on Terror, despite its headaches, so far has helped prevent another major foreign terrorist attack on the United States, which many had predicted to be inevitable after 9/11.

The term “forever war” is itself curious. History, unfortunately, is a forever war — the chronicle of states’ struggles with their enemies. To be sure, one can write a truly wondrous history of human achievement. But sadly, as the Spanish writer George Santayana observed, “only the dead have seen the end of war.”15

Restrainers operate under the mistaken assertion that the world would be a safer or better place if U.S. influence would simply recede.16 The 20th century tells another story. As the historian Robert Kagan argued in his 2012 book The World America Made, the U.S.-led world order has heralded a global rise in liberalism and human rights, better education and health, greater wealth, and more access to information.17

Equally puzzling is the notion that the world’s problems and conflicts are of little consequence to the United States.18 What happens abroad inevitably affects Americans at home. Al-Qaeda launched the 9/11 attacks despite America’s best efforts to steer clear of Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, where al-Qaeda was and is based. The Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor despite Washington’s best efforts to stay out of the fray. Isolationists initially blocked then-President Franklin D. Roosevelt from providing greater support to an embattled Britain, and millions of lives were lost from not confronting German leader Adolf Hitler sooner.19

The best way to protect American interests is to engage internationally and maintain a well-designed, forward-deployed military presence alongside allies and partners. As Jakub J. Grygiel and A. Wess Mitchell have noted, U.S. deployments of varying magnitude along what they call the “unquiet frontier” that stretches from the Baltic Sea to the South China Sea counter the rise of revisionist powers such as China, Russia, and Iran.20 Support for U.S. allies, coupled with a U.S. military presence in forward bases, helps deter gathering threats.21

When Washington plays an outsized role in shaping and maintaining the international rules-based order, Americans and people around the world are safer and more prosperous. That is what the United States has done, for the most part, since World War II. And that leadership role has helped ensure that global conflicts such as the Cold War did not erupt into devastating military confrontations.

Admittedly, the U.S.-led international order certainly has not prevented all wars. There have been costly mistakes along the way. But responding to those mistakes by ignoring persistent threats and drawing down U.S. military posture for its own sake would be shortsighted and dangerous.

Those who welcome the retreat of U.S. power have yet to fully answer one important question: What happens after the United States goes home? When the British Empire unraveled after World War II, the United States stepped into the void, promoting an international system based on the rule of law. Who will follow the United States? The alternatives are frightening.

Russia is far less equipped to become a superpower but would be a particularly predatory, corrupt, and avaricious one under Russian President Vladimir Putin. China, for its part, actively seeks global leadership. The Chinese Communist Party’s authoritarian hostility to democracy; weaponization of data;22 human rights abuses;23 support for rogue states such as Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan;24 threats to Hong Kong and Taiwan;25 militarization of the South China Sea;26 and massive theft of intellectual property27 should all serve as warnings about a Chinese-led world order. And let us all dispense with the fiction that the European Union could be an alternative to the United States in defending democracies.

#### US military presence is non-coercive and a force for good — allies welcome our troops because of the security and economic benefits. Large-N studies prove that hegemony ensures peace and prosperity.

Timothy Kane ‘19. JP Conte Fellow in Immigration Studies at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University; PhD in economics from UC San Diego. "The United States as a Promethean Power." Hoover Institution. 6-17-2019. <https://www.hoover.org/research/united-states-promethean-power>

The global scope of American military power has been described in many ways: hegemony, primacy, and unipolarity. Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth (2012)1 cover the nuances of the terminology well, and I agree with their preference for the term “Deep Engagement” that Joseph Nye coined in a 1995 article.2 The complex patterns and nuances of engagement remain poorly understood, with a focus on conflict that ignores the preponderance of cases, where U.S. forces have been peacefully based for decades. In short, foreign policy has focused on the heat instead of the light — countless studies, essays, and books on Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq stand in contrast to the negligible attention given to countries where the U.S. maintained large-scale and long-term troop basing such as Belgium, Korea, Turkey, and Kuwait.

Is the United States an empire? We may just as well debate whether an elephant most closely resembles a Tyrannosaurus Rex or Triceratops. Some will point to the imperial characteristics that are reflected in the United States force posture. But characteristics of dinosaurs or empires (size, martial strength, breadth) really have no meaning in a world where that entire order is extinct. The 21st century is filled with a new order of nation-states, markedly different from eras prior to 1945.

American power is best understood not by its type: hard, soft, or smart, but its motivation. This is not to say the “imperial” motivation has disappeared from human affairs; self-preservation and domination are instinctive human qualities. But there is a new aspect to international relations that has been in place for more than a century, a form of altruism, illustrated by the widespread support that exists in the U.S. and other countries for universal human rights. For many decades now, nations have routinely sought to advance something beyond their narrow national interests. I call this a Promethean motivation, and America a Promethean power.

The phrase is rooted in the myth of Prometheus, the rebellious god of ancient Greek mythology who stole fire from Zeus and gave it to the human race, sparking the beginning of technology, growth, civilization, and prosperity. Zeus was the ruler of the Gods of Olympus, archetype of the emperor/king. The Gods were rulers, and humans were mere subjects. Prometheus represents rebellion, the trickster God, undercutting the authority of the imperial order. Legend has it that Prometheus tricked Zeus — repeatedly — in order to help uplift the human race.

Critics of American intervention reflexively use the term “imperial” when discussing foreign affairs. By far the dominant theme of imperialism in American foreign policy has been voiced by Leftist thinkers such as Howard Zinn, Gabriel and Joyce Kolko, and Gore Vidal. But since 1990, the end of the Cold War, neo-isolationists on the right have adopted the term as well, notably Pat Buchanan and Congressman Ron Paul. Thus the tendency is for thinkers on the political extremes — globalists on the left, nationalists on the right — to find common cause, whereas centrists tend to view American power more favorably, as do many foreign scholars.

Following the 9/11 attacks and concerns about state failure abroad, proponents of American intervention began suggesting American empire in explicit and favorable ways. Such voices included Richard Haas, Sebastian Mallaby, and Max Boot. The fullest expression of this new theme is found in Colossus, a 2004 book by Niall Ferguson3 (now a colleague at the Hoover Institution), who argued “not merely that the United States is an empire, but that it always has been an empire” and that the ultimate threat to the nation is its own “absence of a will to power.” The book is an unappreciated gem, but one wonders if Ferguson and his intellectual opponents share the same framework, which refuses to draw a line between imperial states of the 15th-19th centuries and the modern states of the 21st.

Ferguson wonderfully skewers the slipperiness of the term hegemon, which remains “the most popular term among writers on international relations.” Hegemony refers to a coercive state, like an empire, but one that aims to create mutually beneficial relationships. Trying to define the nature of state power by the distribution of benefits (exploitative or shared) misses the point. The point is: what are first principles that motivate foreign action?

America on the world stage should be understood in the context of its revolutionary founding. The republic’s anti-imperial birth and its sense of manifest destiny have colored foreign affairs from early on. Consider again Thomas Jefferson’s “Empire of Liberty,” which was more than a poetic phrase. In 1809 Jefferson wrote to his successor James Madison, “I am persuaded no constitution was ever before so well calculated as ours for extensive empire & self-government.” In one of his final letters, written in 1824, Jefferson wrote, “where this progress will stop no-one can say. Barbarism has, in the meantime, been receding before the steady step of amelioration; and will in time, I trust, disappear from the earth.”

To simplify matters, let’s accept the framework of definitions on the Left (and also popularly understood by Americans throughout history). Define an empire as a nation that exploits foreign peoples, aiming to colonize them and/or extract their resources for the advantage of the empire and at the cost of the foreigners. And for the sake of clarity, recognize a bright line that distinguishes imperial relationships as those where subjugated peoples do not want but are forced to abide by foreign intervention. To be specific, the U.S. role in South Korea fails the imperial test, as does the post-1955 role of the U.S. in Germany and Japan. Those three countries accounted for nearly three-quarters of U.S. troop deployments since 1950. Not to mention Spain, Turkey, Taiwan, and Kuwait. All of these are voluntary alliances, and qualitatively distinct from forces based in Iraq.

For the Leftist criticism of American empire to hold, evidence of domination should be easy to see. One would expect to see the countries of the world that are occupied by American troops suffering economic decline as a result, or at a minimum a relative decline. Here the critique falls apart. The countries of the world that have hosted the greatest number of American troops since 1950 have grown the fastest economically. Furthermore, host countries have experienced faster declines in child mortality, faster increase in overall longevity, faster growth in infrastructure, and even greater improvements in the broadly measured human development index (HDI). Consider as evidence the average economic growth rates presented in table 2, reproduced from Jones and Kane (2012).4

The record shows that America’s engagement with allied nations is unequivocally beneficial for those countries. But the context is what matters for future policy choices. Public perceptions of world affairs are dominated by negatives: bombings in Iraqi cities, AIDS rampant in Africa, genocides, earthquakes. Foreign policy experts focus on negatives of a subtler nature: the dilemma over Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, the poppy trade and corruption in Afghanistan, the strategic mystery that is China. Yet despite real and looming crises, the underlying theme of the American century is a patient march of human prosperity, deepening and broadening as economic growth unfolds in the free world.

The American strategy of patient, forward deployment of U.S. troops, even and especially when it is not self-interested, has benefitted our allies and the world. America’s engagement in Asia and Europe since 1945 created a security umbrella fostering peace and unprecedented prosperity. If this model were applied to the Middle East — supporting allies rather than hunting monsters — it would reshape the region’s future for the better. On this point, Fallows might agree.

The question that haunts contemporary foreign policy is not whether the U.S. military is a force for good around the globe. It is. The question is: Can Promethean power be sustained? Does the United States have the willpower to maintain a forward force posture?

#### Russia and China’s “new world order” would be a nightmare for African decolonial sovereignty.

Mhaka ’22 -- Johannesburg-based social and political commentator (Tafi Mhaka, 4-7-2022, "Russia’s new world order is bad news for Africa," Al Jazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/4/10/russias-new-world-order-is-bad-news-for-africa, accessed 7-5-2022) -- nikki

On March 30, just a day after a Russian missile hit an administrative building in the port city of Mykolaiv in southern Ukraine, killing at least 12 people, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov made the case for the establishment of new world order. In a videotaped message to his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi, Lavrov claimed the world is “living through a very serious stage in the history of international relations”. He added, “We, together with you, and with our sympathisers will move towards a multipolar, just, democratic world order”. Lavrov’s sentiments echoed Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping’s February 4 joint statement announcing the beginning of a new era in international relations. In that statement, the two leaders not only called for a new, multipolar order but lamented the West’s “unilateral approaches to addressing international issues”, claiming such attitudes “incite contradictions, differences and confrontation” and hamper “the development and progress of mankind”. Without a doubt, this is a credible observation, especially regarding the United States’ policies across the world. For example, Washington has sanctioned Zimbabwe’s government – and rightfully so – for committing gross human rights abuses, but continues to support the equally repressive Ugandan government with military hardware, cash and training. Last month, the US Senate passed a resolution urging “international criminal courts to investigate Putin, his security council and military leaders for possible war crimes” in Ukraine. Nevertheless, Washington still refuses to recognise the International Criminal Court (ICC), or cooperate in any way with its investigation into possible war crimes committed by US troops in Afghanistan. The hypocrisy of the US is also apparent in its approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Despite Israel’s countless, well-documented human rights and international law violations, decades-long illegal occupation of Palestinian territories, and apartheid policies against the Palestinian population, the US has blocked 53 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions critical of Israel in the last five decades. And it is not only Russia and China that are disturbed by the West’s apparent hypocrisy in the international arena. Africa too has grave concerns about the current global order, and has long been calling for the UN to undergo substantial reform to address the deep-rooted injustices in its handling of international affairs. In 2005, for instance, the African Union (AU) adopted the Ezulwini Consensus, calling for a more representative and democratic UNSC, in which Africa, like all other world regions, is represented. And speaking at the 35th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly in February, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed renewed the call for Africa to be granted a larger role in the UN. In this context, it may seem understandable for Africa to support the multipolar world order Russia claims to be building with the help of China. However, Beijing and Moscow are not calling for any reform that would diminish the enormous sway they readily have over world affairs. They are also not acting in a way that demonstrates under this new order they would hold themselves to the same standards as everyone else or that less powerful states and peoples would have better access to justice. Indeed, as recently as in 2021, China blocked a UN Security Council statement condemning the military coup in Myanmar. And between 2011 and 2019, Russia vetoed no less than 14 UNSC resolutions on Syria. These great powers are evidently selective and casual proponents of democracy and human rights – just like their nemesis, the US. But African nations now appear hell-bent on ignoring the hypocrisy demonstrated by Russia and China, and eagerly awaiting the emergence of their new world order. The dangers of idolising Putin’s Russia, Xi’s China Putin’s popularity is at an outstandingly irrational and possibly dangerous high in Africa. Despite the illegality and brutality of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, for example, Putin’s name adorns long-distance buses in Zimbabwe. And African leaders also seem reluctant to punish or even caution the Russian leader for its destructive “special military operation” in Ukraine. At the recent UN General Assembly vote on a resolution calling for Russia’s suspension from the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), for example, the majority of African states either abstained – such as South Africa – or outright voted no – like Ethiopia. Meanwhile, South Africa’s influential opposition leader Julius Malema has urged Putin to “teach” Ukraine and NATO a lesson because “we need a new world order”. He has also claimed that Putin has given the Russian army clear instructions to avoid “civilian casualties” in Ukraine. This is despite the UN’s Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights recording 1,900 civilian casualties – with 726 people killed, including 52 children – mostly caused by the use of explosive weapons in populated areas. In light of the disdain for territorial integrity, humanity and the right to life Putin’s Russia is currently showing in Ukraine, Africans should stop and think how the Russian leader’s proposed new world order would likely work out for them. And it is not only the carnage caused by Russia in Ukraine that should make Africa think twice about supporting the new world order promoted by Moscow and Beijing. Under Putin, Russia has been inundated by state-affiliated and state-sponsored political filth and terror. Putin’s political rivals and anyone daring to act against the interests of the Kremlin, including journalists, have faced assassination attempts both in Russia and abroad. Many, including former Federal Security Service agent Alexander Litvinenko and journalist Anna Politkovskaya, have been killed. Human rights groups and independent media organisations have been targeted and shut down. Elections have been turned into a sham and private enterprise has been all but killed. Under Putin’s orders, the Russian military waged many immoral wars across the world – Russia’s indiscriminate shelling of residential areas in Syria and Georgia claimed thousands of lives. Similarly, China under Xi is a hotbed of repression. His administration has arbitrarily detained, tortured and mistreated millions of Turkic Muslims in the northwestern Xinjiang region. It has also frequently targeted intellectuals, civil rights activists and journalists and moved to restrict LGBTQ and women’s rights. Thus, Malema and other African leaders who look forward to Putin’s new world order should stop and consider what they are wishing for. An illiberal world order led by despots with blood-soaked histories cannot help Africa fulfil its democratic aspirations. Africa must chart its own path Africa does not need to subscribe to Chinese, Russian or American interpretations or manifestations of democracy and multilateralism. It simply needs to secure equal rights and representations in a genuinely progressive multipolar international system that safeguards its democratic and economic interests as enshrined in the Constitutive Act of the AU. The ill-advised and misplaced enthusiasm for Putin’s strongman politics is a sombre reflection of Africa’s failures and imprecise trajectory under the toothless AU. Almost 21 years after its establishment, the AU carries very little weight on the continent and it has almost no voice on the global stage. And while its pursuit of permanent representation on the UNSC is an extremely praiseworthy and essential exercise, it has gradually turned into an expedient and intermittently expressed soundbite. Be that as it may, Africa should focus on establishing a world order that is defined by strong, independent and democratic multilateral institutions. Undoubtedly, that is what China and Russia are eager to avoid or destroy, because they want the licence to intimidate, repress, silence and kill, both at home and abroad.

#### The best studies go aff — err on the side of a consensus of empirical research — our evidence assumes every skeptic.

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Consistency with influential relevant theories lends credence to the expectation that US security commitments actually can shape the strategic environment as deep engagement presupposes. But it is far from conclusive. Not all analysts endorse the theories we discussed in chapter 5. These theories make strong assumptions that states generally act rationally and focus primarily on security. Allowing misperceptions, emotions, domestic politics, desire for status, or concern for honor into the picture might alter the verdict on the strategy’s net expected effects. And to model the strategy’s expected effects we had to simplify things by selecting two mechanisms— assurance and deterrence— and examining their effects independently, thus missing potentially powerful positive interactions between them.

This chapter moves beyond theory to examine patterns of evidence. If the theoretical arguments about the security effects of deep engagement are right, what sort of evidence should we see? Two major bodies of evidence are most important: general empirical findings concerning the strategy’s key mechanisms and regionally focused research.

General Patterns of Evidence Three key questions about US security provision have received the most extensive analysis. First, do alliances such as those sustained by the United States actually deter war and increase security? Second, does such security provision actually hinder nuclear proliferation? And third, does limiting proliferation actually increase security?

Deterrence Effectiveness The determinants of deterrence success and failure have attracted scores of quantitative and case study tests. Much of the case study work yields a cautionary finding: that deterrence is much harder in practice than in theory, because standard models assume away the complexities of human psychology and domestic politics that tend to make some states hard to deter and might cause deterrence policies to backfire. 1 Many quantitative findings, mean- while, are mutually contradictory or are clearly not relevant to extended deterrence. But some relevant results receive broad support:

* Alliances generally do have a deterrent effect. In a study spanning nearly two centuries, Johnson and Leeds found “support for the hypothesis that defensive alliances deter the initiation of disputes.” They conclude that “defensive alliances lower the probability of international conflict and are thus a good policy option for states seeking to maintain peace in the world.” Sechser and Fuhrmann similarly find that formal defense pacts with nuclear states have significant deterrence benefits. 2 3
* The overall balance of military forces (including nuclear) between states does not appear to influence deterrence; the local balance of military forces in the specific theater in which deterrence is actually practiced, however, is key. 4
* Forward- deployed troops enhance the deterrent effect of alliances with overseas allies. 5
* Strong mutual interests and ties enhance deterrence. 6
* Case studies strongly ratify the theoretical expectation that it is easier to defend a given status quo than to challenge it forcefully: compellence (sometimes termed “coercion” or “coercive diplomacy”) is extremely hard.

The most important finding to emerge from this voluminous research is that alliances— especially with nuclear- armed allies like the United States— actually work in deterring conflict. This is all the more striking in view of the fact that what scholars call “selection bias” probably works against it. The United States is more inclined to offer— and protégés to seek— alliance rela- tionships in settings where the probability of military conflicts is higher than average. The fact that alliances work to deter conflict in precisely the situations where deterrence is likely to be especially hard is noteworthy.

More specifically, these findings buttress the key theoretical implication that if the United States is interested in deterring military challenges to the status quo in key regions, relying only on latent military capabilities in the US homeland is likely to be far less effective than having an overseas military posture. Similarly, they lend support to the general proposition that a forward deterrence posture is strongly appealing to a status quo power, because defending a given status quo is far cheaper than overturning it, and, once a favorable status quo is successfully overturned, restoring the status quo ante can be expected to be fearsomely costly. Recognizing the significance of these findings clearly casts doubt on the “wait on the sidelines and decide whether to intervene later” approach that is so strongly favored by retrenchment proponents.

The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation Matthew Kroenig highlights a number of reasons why US policymakers seek to limit the spread of nuclear weapons: “Fear that nuclear proliferation might deter [US leaders] from using military intervention to pursue their interests, reduce the effectiveness of their coercive diplomacy, trigger regional instability, undermine their alliance structures, dissipate their strategic attention, and set off further nuclear proliferation within their sphere of influence.” These are not the only reasons for concern about nuclear proliferation; also notable are the enhanced prospects of nuclear accidents and the greater risk of leakage of nuclear material to terrorists. 9 8

Do deep engagement’s security ties serve to contain the spread of nuclear weapons? The literature on the causes of proliferation is massive and faces challenges as great as any in international relations. With few cases to study, severe challenges in gathering evidence about inevitably secretive nuclear programs, and a large number of factors in play on both the demand and the supply sides, findings are decidedly mixed. Alliance relationships are just one piece of this complex puzzle, one that is hard to isolate from all the other factors in play. And empirical studies face the same selection bias problem just discussed: Nuclear powers are more likely to offer security guarantees to states confronting a serious threat and thus facing above- average incentives to acquire nuclear weapons. Indeed, alliance guarantees might be offered to states actively considering the nuclear option precisely in order to try to forestall that decision. Like a strong drug given only to very sick patients, alliances thus may have a powerful effect even if they sometimes fail to work as hoped. 10

Bearing these challenges in mind, the most relevant findings that emerge from this literature are:

* The most recent statistical analysis of the precise question at issue concludes that “security guarantees significantly reduce proliferation proclivity among their recipients.” In addition, states with such guarantees are less likely to export sensitive nuclear material and technology to other nonnuclear states. 12 11
* Case study research underscores that the complexity of motivations for acquiring nuclear weapons cannot be reduced to security: domestic politics, economic interests, and prestige all matter. 13
* Multiple independently conceived and executed recent case studies nonetheless reveal that security alliances help explain numerous allied decisions not to proliferate even when security is not always the main driver of leaders’ interest in a nuclear program. As Nuno Monteiro and Alexandre Debs stress, “States whose security goals are subsumed by their sponsors’ own aims have never acquired the bomb. … This finding highlights the role of U.S. security commitments in stymieing nuclear proliferation: U.S. protégés will only seek the bomb if they doubt U.S. protection of their core security goals.” 15 14
* Multiple independently conceived and executed recent case research projects further unpack the conditions that decrease the likelihood of allied proliferation, centering on the credibility of the alliance commitment. In addition, in some cases of prevention failure, the alliances allow the patron to influence the ally’s nuclear program subsequently, decreasing further proliferation risks. 17
* Security alliances lower the likelihood of proliferation cascades. To be sure, many predicted cascades did not occur. But security provision, mainly by the United States, is a key reason why. The most comprehensive statistical analysis finds that states are more likely to proliferate in response to neighbors when three conditions are met: (1) there is an intense security rivalry between the two countries; (2) the prospective proliferating state does not have a security guarantee from a nuclear- armed patron; and (3) the potential proliferator has the industrial and technical capacity to launch an indigenous nuclear program. 18 19 16

In sum, as Monteiro and Debs note, “Despite grave concerns that more states would seek a nuclear deterrent to counter U.S. power preponderance,” in fact “the spread of nuclear weapons decelerated with the end of the Cold War in 1989.” Their research, as well as that of scores of scholars using multiple methods and representing many contrasting theoretical perspectives, shows that US security guarantees and the counter- proliferation policy deep engagement allows are a big part of the reason why. 20

The Costs of Nuclear Proliferation General empirical findings thus lend support to the proposition that security alliances impede nuclear proliferation. But is this a net contributor to global security? Most practitioners and policy analysts would probably not even bring this up as a question and would automatically answer yes if it were raised. Yet a small but very prominent group of theorists within the academy reach a different answer: some of the same realist precepts that generate the theoretical prediction that retrenchment would increase demand for nuclear weapons also suggest that proliferation might increase security such that the net effect of retrenchment could be neutral. Most notably, “nuclear optimists” like Kenneth Waltz contend that deterrence essentially solves the security problem for all nuclear- armed states, largely eliminating the direct use of force among them. It follows that US retrenchment might generate an initial decrease in security followed by an increase as insecure states acquire nuclear capabilities, ultimately leaving no net effect on international security. 21

This perspective is countered by “nuclear pessimists” such as Scott Sagan. Reaching outside realism to organization theory and other bodies of social science research, they see major security downsides from new nuclear states. Copious research produced by Sagan and others casts doubt on the expectation that governments can be relied upon to create secure and controlled nuclear forces. The more nuclear states there are, the higher the probability that the organizational, psychological, and civil- military pathologies Sagan identifies will turn an episode like one of the numerous “near misses” he uncovers into actual nuclear use. As Campbell Craig warns, “One day a warning system will fail, or an official will panic, or a terrorist attack will be misconstrued, and the missiles will fly.” 22 23

Looking beyond these kinds of factors, it is notable that powerful reasons to question the assessment of proliferation optimists also emerge even if one assumes, as they do, that states are rational and seek only to maximize their security. First, nuclear deterrence can only work by raising the risk of nuclear war. For deterrence to be credible, there has to be a nonzero chance of nuclear use. If nuclear use is impossible, deterrence cannot be credible. It follows that every nuclear deterrence relationship depends on some probability of 24 nuclear use. The more such relationships there are, the greater the risk of nuclear war. Proliferation therefore increases the chances of nuclear war even in a perfectly rationalist world. Proliferation optimists cannot logically deny that nuclear spread increases the risk of nuclear war. Their argument must be that the security gains of nuclear spread outweigh this enhanced risk.

Estimating that risk is not simply a matter of pondering the conditions under which leaders will choose to unleash nuclear war. Rather, as Schelling established, the question is whether states will run the risk of using nuclear weapons. Nuclear crisis bargaining is about a “competition in risk taking.” Kroenig counts some twenty cases in which states—including prominently the United States—ran real risks of nuclear war in order to prevail in crises. As Kroenig notes, “By asking whether states can be deterred or not … proliferation optimists are asking the wrong question. The right question to ask is: what risk of nuclear war is a specific state willing to run against a particular opponent in a given crisis?” The more nuclear- armed states there are, the more the opportunities for such risk- taking and the greater the probability of nuclear use. 27 26 25

#### Russia’s worse.

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That Africa is the first among the world’s regions to feel the devastating human effects of climate change is now widely acknowledged. Arguably more significant than the economic boons Russia stands to realize from the aforementioned deals are the adverse environmental effects that resource mining could have on the populations of these countries.

Putin’s promise to help bring stability to the Central African Republic also invites a human approach to the analysis of Russia’s Africa policy. According to the UN, the protracted conflict has displaced more than 642,000 people. During the past year, the actions of Putin’s associate Yevgeny Prigozhin and Prigozhin’s private military company, Wagner Group, in the CAR have faced increasing scrutiny. Columbia University professor Kimberly Marten, for example, has highlighted the group’s mercenary interests in CAR’s mineral-rich mines. Discerning exactly what Putin’s promise entails therefore has a particular humanitarian urgency.

Foreign policy and domestic policy are inextricably connected. For this reason, it is important also to examine the impact of foreign policy on domestic social attitudes. Russia has a notoriously poor record on racism, particularly when it comes to African migrants, as the Los Angeles Times highlighted back in 2014. Since the country hosted the FIFA World Cup in 2018, these problems have been exacerbated by the presence of many Africans who outstayed their Fan Visas in hope of seeking asylum or finding work. In March of this year, Interior Ministry official Andrei Krayushkin confirmed that 5,500 of these individuals remained in Russia.

Mixed race African Russians also continue to face discrimination and abuse, as this Calvert Journal report shows. In the case of Russia’s “pivot to the East,” official foreign policy has fostered positive attitudes among the Russian population toward China and its people. To what extent the Kremlin’s pivot to Africa will have an analogous effect remains to be seen, but attention should be paid to whether Putin’s overtures to African leaders have any tangible effect on the lives of Russia’s own African population.

Africa is not, as Belgium’s King Leopold contemptuously called it, a “magnificent cake” that exists purely to sate the appetites of great powers—Russia among them. Rather, it is an umbrella term that includes a plethora of independent actors with their own agendas distinct from those of Moscow, Beijing, or indeed Washington. As the South China Morning Post recently reported, Russia is playing catch-up to China and the West in terms of developing economic ties with the continent. With African nations—and the continent as a whole—in ascendance on the international stage, it is time to rethink the way we analyze great powers’ Africa policies. And Russia’s policy is a good place to start.

#### Russia will interfere with African elections to support unstable autocracies.

Gathara 19, Communications consultant, writer, and award-winning political cartoonist based in Nairobi., (Patrick, “Russia has joined the ‘scramble’ for Africa”, Aljazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2019/11/10/russia-has-joined-the-scramble-for-africa) //CHC-DS

However, as it seeks to reassert itself on the world stage, Africa is still seen as providing “low-cost, high-profile” opportunities to burnish its prestige.

Still, the Africa of today is very different from that of the 1970s and 1980s and while maintaining some of the tactics that were successful in yesteryears, such as the use of proxy forces in places like the Central African Republic and the sale of light and heavy weapons to regimes with dubious human rights records, Russia has evolved others more in tune with the times.

According to Proekt (The Project), an independent Moscow-based online investigative news outlet, Kremlin-linked teams have used social media “troll farms” and spin doctors to interfere in politics and elections in 20 countries on the continent, particularly in Francophone Africa, but with mixed success so far. In 2018 they failed in their attempt to engineer the re-election of President Erie Radzaunarimampianina in Madagascar and have been linked to interference in elections in Zimbabwe.

According to the Financial Times “across Africa, Moscow has deployed teams of military instructors to train elite presidential guards, sent arms shipments and assisted shaky autocrats with election strategies. It has also promised to build nuclear power plants and develop oil wells and diamond mines.”

The Guardian has also reported on leaked documents showing a wide-scale Russian effort “to bolster its presence in at least 13 countries across Africa by building relations with existing rulers, striking military deals, and grooming a new generation of ‘leaders’ and undercover ‘agents’.”

The goal of Russian efforts seems largely unchanged from the Soviet days – essentially to counter and limit the influence of others on the continent. The benefits for autocrats seeking to hang on to power on the continent is similarly easy to ascertain. However, for their youthful subjects, many of whom have little experience or recollection of the Soviet Union, the renewed Russian interest is likely to be viewed with scepticism.

#### Russia’s just as capitalist in Africa.

Adibe 19, Jideofor Adibe is a Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Nasarawa State University, Keffi, Nigeria, (Jideofor, “What does Russia really want from Africa?”, Brookings, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2019/11/14/what-does-russia-really-want-from-africa/>) //CHC-DS

Russia’s interest in Africa

It will be simplistic to frame the just-concluded Russia-Africa summit as a copy-cat jamboree organized by Russia to latch on the bandwagon of the increasingly fashionable trend of organizing and institutionalizing Africa summits by countries like China, India, Japan, France, and the United States. The truth is that, since the 2000s, there has been a noticeable re-awakening of Russia’s interest in Africa. Indeed, between 2005 and 2015, Africa’s trade with Russia grew by 185 percent, and Russia has several reasons to engage Africa more intensely.

Goal 1: Projecting power on the global stage

In supporting African countries—who, notably, constitute the largest voting bloc in the United Nations—Russia is cultivating allies in its challenge to the current United States and Euro-Atlantic-dominated security order. This strategy is not going unnoticed: Indeed, in 2018 former U.S. National Security Adviser John Bolton accused Russia of selling arms to African countries in exchange for votes at the United Nations, among other nefarious motivations.

Goal 2: Accessing raw materials and natural resources

Russia—just like other major world powers—also covets many of Africa’s raw materials and is creating joint projects and investments in order to access them. From the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the Central African Republic, Russian companies are scaling up their activities in the mining of resources such as coltan, cobalt, gold, and diamonds. In Zimbabwe, for instance, a joint venture between Russia’s JSC Afromet and Zimbabwe’s Pen East Ltd is developing one of the world’s largest deposits of platinum group metal. In Angola, Russian mining company Alroser recently increased its stake in local producer Catoca to 41 percent, in a deal that provides the diamond giant with a production base outside Russia. Despite joint ownership with Angola, Catoca operates under Russian management. Remarkably, about one-third of Russia’s African imports are agricultural, including fruit, cocoa, coffee, and potatoes.

Goal 3: Arms exports and security

In recent years, Russia had become the largest supplier of arms to Africa, accounting for 35 percent of arms exports to the region, followed by China (17 percent), United States (9.6 percent), and France (6.9 percent). Since 2015, Russia has signed over 20 bilateral military cooperation agreements with African states. A Russian citizen, Valeriy Zakharov, has even been appointed to be a national security advisor to the president of the Central African Republic (CAR), Faustin-Archange Touadéra.

Russian arms are attractive to African leaders because, besides being relatively cheap, deals with Russia are not often held up by human rights concerns cited by other countries like France and the U.S. For instance, when the U.S. was dilly-dallying on selling arms to Nigeria to fight Boko Haram in 2014 upon allegations of human rights abuses by Nigerian soldiers, Nigeria turned to Russia and was able to place an order for 12 attack helicopters.

Goal 4: Supporting energy and power development in Africa through Russian companies

Lack of affordable, reliable electricity in Africa makes the region a prime and lucrative location for Russia’s energy and power industry. Several state-owned Russian companies such as Gazprom, Lukoil, Rostec and Rosatom are active in Africa, with activities largely concentrated in Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Nigeria, and Uganda. So far, Rosatom has signed memorandums and agreements to develop nuclear energy with 18 African countries, including Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Zambia, Rwanda, Nigeria, and Ethiopia. In 2018 alone, Rosatom agreed to build four 1200 MW VVER-type nuclear reactors in Egypt—with construction and maintenance valued at $60 billion—with a Russian loan of up to $25 billion at an annual interest rate of 3 percent.

Russia also wants to use its mostly state-owned oil and gas companies to create new streams of energy supply. In 2018, for instance, Nigerian oil and gas exploration company Oranto Petroleum announced that it would be cooperating with Russia’s largest oil producer, Rosneft, to develop 21 oil assets across 17 African countries. Several Russian companies have also made significant investments in Algeria’s oil and gas industries and in Libya, Nigeria, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, and Egypt.

### Link — AT: Imperialism

#### **The U.S. has been the cause of anti-imperialism globally — four waves of empire building, and dismantlement are intrinsically US driven.**

Ikenberry & Deudney ‘15 — John Ikenberry is a theorist of international relations and United States foreign policy, and the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. Daniel Deudney is an American political scientist and Associate Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University. August 2015; “America’s Impact: The End of Empire and the Globalization of the Westphalian System”; *Princeton Scholar*; [http://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/gji3/files/am-impact-dd-gji-final-1-august-2015.pdf; //CYang](http://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/gji3/files/am-impact-dd-gji-final-1-august-2015.pdf;%20//CYang) **[\*\*NOTE\*\* — this card was the subject of an ethics challenge in a college debate because the original cutting (original card cutter unknown) omitted paragraphs — this card was then recut from scratch]**

In contemporary debates, this argument undercuts, modifies, and qualifies characterizations held by so many of the United States as essentially imperial, and the American order as an empire. In our rendering, the United State is not the last Western empire, but the first anti-imperial and post-imperial great power in the global system. Our argument is thus focused on the consequences of American foreign policy for the evolution of the international system, and we do not in this confined treatment offer an explanation for the origins of U.S. foreign policy. In short, we offer an argument about impacts rather than the sources of America’s antiimperial and pro-Westphalian role.

Empires and State Systems: Historical Patterns

Empire has been the historically predominant form of order in world politics. Looking at a time frame of several millennia, there was no global anarchic system until the European explorations and subsequent imperial and colonial ventures connected desperate regional systems, doing so approximately five hundred years ago.7 Prior to this emergence of a globalscope system, the pattern of world politics was characterized by regional systems. These regional systems were initially very anarchic, and marked by high levels of military competition. But almost universally, they tended to consolidate into regional empires which had fairly limited interactions with polities outside their regions.8 Thus, it was empires – not anarchic state systems – that typically dominated the regional systems in all parts of the world.

Within this global pattern of regional empires, European political order was distinctly anomalous because it persisted so long as an anarchy. Despite repeated efforts to consolidate Europe into one empire – or what the Europeans referred to as “universal monarchy” – this region remained a plural, multi-state political order. After the Peace of Westphalia ending the Thirties Year War, this plural anarchic system, the Westphalian system, and was sustained by a rough balance of power among its autonomous states and the weakness of the claimants of European empire. This Westphalian system was based on a roughly equal distribution of power among its major units, sustained by various balancing practices that thwarted a succession of regional European empire-builders, and had an elaborate system of public international law and ideological justification.9 While this system rested on a balance of power, it was juridically crystallized into a system of mutually recognized sovereigns.

Outside of Europe, however, the European states, including those that were most active in preventing empire within Europe, were extraordinarily successful in conquering and colonizing vast areas across oceanic distances.10 The Europeans did not invent empire, but they were spectacularly successful at empire building on a global scope, largely because of the imbalance of power that stemmed from European innovations in technology and organization.11 The Europeans conquered and dominated empires, states, and peoples in every previously loosely coupled or isolated regional system across the world. The Europeans also successfully planted numerous colonies of settlers, mainly in the temperate zones in North and South America, Oceania, and the southern tip of Africa.12 States from the Western European core of the Westphalian system thus brought into existence a global-scale political system made up of vast multi-continental empires of conquered peoples and a scattering of colonial “new Europes.”13

This pattern of European empire building was different from its predecessors, not just in its global scope, but also because the European states were continuously warring against one another for dominance within Europe. These struggles between states within Europe against empire in Europe were fought on a global scale. Thus the first “world war,” defined as a war fought across multiple continents, occurred in the later 18th century. In this struggle Britain sought to thwart French attempts to dominate Europe and the battle lines were in Europe, North America, South Asia, and across the global oceans. This pattern of the globalization of intraEuropean warfare continued in the 20th century with the wars triggered by German efforts to dominate Europe. The growing imbalance of power between the Europeans and the rest of the world during the 18th and 19th century enabled the Europeans to easily expand their empires at the expense of non-Europeans. But during the same periods, the Europeans found it very difficult to conquer each other within Europe. Thus vast armies wrought great destruction fighting over tiny parcels of land in Europe, while comparatively small European imperial expeditionary forces readily mastered non-European armies in the Americas, Africa, and Asia. Thus a balance of power underpinned the Westphalian system in Europe, while an imbalance of power between Europe and the world underpinned imperial expansion.

Anti-imperial and anti-colonial rebellions and resistance are as old as empires, but successful rebellion against European imperial rule outside Europe began in the 18th century with the revolt of the colonial settler colonies in the Americas – first in North America and then in South America. This first wave of settler-colony rebellion marked the end of what historians refer to as the “first British empire,” as well as the first great European empire in the Americas, that of Spain. The success of this first wave of anti-imperial rebellion in Spanish America was crucially facilitated by the weakening of Spain during the Napoleonic wars for domination within Europe.

In the later-19th century, European empire building outside of Europe entered a second wave, enabled by the new industrial technologies that further amplified the imbalance of power between Europeans and non-Europeans, which in turn allowed the Europeans to extend their imperial domination into the large interior spaces of the continents, particularly in Africa and Asia.14 In the 20th century, further wars among the core European states weakened Britain, France, and Holland, the leading European colonial powers, thus creating opportunities for antiimperial independence movements in Asia and Africa. Paradoxically, the fact that the Europeans were continuously fighting one another fueled their imperial ambitions and successes, while at the same time, such wars weakened them and helped enable the success of rebellions against their empires.15 Thus as the British empire was reaching its territorial zenith in the early years of the 20th century, Britain was critically weakened by the world wars in Europe and Asia against the aspiring German and Japanese empire builders.

The territorial aggression of the Axis Powers constitute a third wave of empire building which was short lived and thwarted by the successful mobilization of the “United Nations,” a coalition led by the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China. A fourth wave of empire building, by the Soviet Union and the international communist movement in the second half of the 20th century, was thwarted and dismantled by the United States and its allies.

The Pattern of American Anti-Imperial, Anti-Colonial, and Pro-Westphalian Impacts

Against the backdrop of this evolution of the international system and the four waves of empire building and dismantlement, it becomes possible to see more clearly the many ways in which the United States played important anti-imperial, anti-colonial, and pro-Westphalian roles. 16

In each of the four waves of empire building and dismantlement, the United States had an impact. The United States was the first “new nation” to emerge from a rebellion against European imperial rule during the first wave of modern empire. The United States also supported the independence of other European settler colonies throughout the Americas and, with the Monroe Doctrine, helped sustain their independence against European efforts to recolonize parts of the Americas. In the second wave of late 19th century empire-building, the United States, despite its great relative power, did not establish an empire of its own of any significance or duration. And during the latter part of the 20th century, the United States pushed European decolonization, thus facilitating the breakup of second wave empires. In the great world wars in the 20th century, the United States played an important role in thwarting a third wave of imperial projects of Germany, Japan, and Italy. In the second half of the 20th century, the United States played decisive roles, both ideological and military, in thwarting the fourth wave of empire building, the expansion of the communist great power, the Soviet Union, as well as communist coups and revolutions in many weak and small independent states.

The United States also played a variety of important roles in building and strengthening Westphalian institutions, moderating inter-state anarchy, and facilitating the ability of states to survive as independent members of international society. From its inception, the United States was precocious in its support for the law of nations, the institutions of the society of states, particularly the laws of war and neutrality, and public international law, as a means of restraining war and aggression. In both the 19th and 20th centuries, the United States, first regionally and then globally, inspired and helped legitimate anti-colonial and anti-imperial independence movements and national liberation struggles among peoples struggling against empires all over the world. In the 20th century, the United States led the efforts to institutionalize Westphalian norms of non-aggression and sovereign independence, first with the League of Nations and then with the United Nations Charter. In the second half of the 20th century, the American-led liberal international order institutionalized free trade and multilateral cooperation, thus providing the infrastructure for a global economic system, thus enabling smaller and weaker states to sustain their sovereign. Also in the second half of the 20th century, the American system of military alliances contributed to the dampening of violent conflicts among allied states, particularly in Europe and East Asia, thus protecting the Westphalian system from the return of violent conflict and empire-building.

### Link — AT: IR

#### IR is great --- leads to better decisions which help avoid war.

Reiter 15—Professor of Political Science at Emory University [Dan, “Scholars Help Policymakers Know Their Tools,” *War on the Rocks*, 27 Aug, <https://warontherocks.com/2015/08/scholars-help-policymakers-know-their-tools/>, accessed 11 Jan 2017]

This critique is both narrowly true and narrow in perspective. Context is of course important, but foreign policy choices are not sui generis, there are patterns across space and time that inform decision-making. Policymakers recognize this and routinely draw lessons from history when making foreign policy decisions. As noted below, policymakers in other areas such as development and public health routinely rely on broader, more general studies to craft policy. And, broader scholarship can improve foreign policy performance, as evidenced by the ability of IR academics to build on their own work to predict outcomes, including for example forecasting the lengths of the conventional and insurgency phases of the U.S.–Iraq conflict in the 2000s.

But, even if one were to accept the limits of general work, there is a growing body of academic work that evaluates foreign policy tools as applied to a specific country or region. These studies ask questions such as whether:

Development projects reduced insurgent violence in Afghanistan; Drone strikes reduced insurgent violence in Pakistan; Development programs increased civic participation and social capital in Sudan; Building cell phone towers in Iraq reduced insurgent violence; Attempts to reintegrate combatants into society in Burundi succeeded; Security sector reform in Liberia increased the legitimacy of the government there; Road projects in India reduced insurgent violence; We can understand peacekeeping’s failure in Congo; Israel’s targeted assassinations reduced violent attacks from militants.

This is not by any means a dismissal of professional intelligence work. Academics are not intelligence analysts: They do not have access to contemporary intelligence data, nor are they generally trained to do things like examine the latest satellite photos of North Korean nuclear activities and make judgments about North Korea’s current plutonium production. And certainly, academic IR work can never replace professional intelligence work. But the best policy decisions marry timely, specific intelligence with academic work that has a more general perspective.

A third critique is that much of this academic work on foreign policy tools is unusable by policymakers because it is too quantitative and technically complex. Here, echoing a point made by Erik Voeten, there is a danger in not appreciating the importance of rigorous research design, including sophisticated quantitative techniques, for crafting effective policy. Sophisticated research design is not the enemy of effective policy, it is critically necessary for it. Certainly, the current academic focus on building research designs that permit causal inference speaks exactly to what policymakers care about the most: if implementing a certain policy will cause the desired outcome.

Or, put differently, bad research designs make for bad public policy. A classic example is school busing. In the 1960s and early 1970s, some cities adopted voluntary integration programs for public schools, in which families could volunteer to bus their children to schools in neighborhoods with different racial majorities. Policymakers used the favorable results for the voluntary programs to make the improper inference that mandatory busing policies would also work. The result was bad public policy and violence in the streets.

Sophisticated technical methods can improve our ability to make causal inferences, and can help solve other empirical problems. Consider that the heart of successful counterinsurgency is, according to U.S. military doctrine, winning the support of the population. Assessing whether certain policies do win public support requires collecting opinion data. A conventional method for measuring popular opinion is the survey, but of course, individuals in insurgency-stricken areas may be unwilling to reveal their true opinions to a survey-taker out of fear for their personal safety. Methodologists have crafted sophisticated techniques for addressing this issue, improving our ability to measure public support for the government in these areas. These techniques have been used to assess better the determinants of public support in insurgency-affected countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India.

Going forward, we will continue to need advanced methodologies to address pressing policy questions. Consider the U.S. military’s commitment to gender integration. The implementation of this commitment will be best informed if it rests on rigorous social science that address outstanding questions. Is there a Sacagawea effect, in which mixed gender units engaged in counterinsurgency are more effective than male-only units? How might mixed gender affect small unit cohesion in combat? How might mixed gender units reduce the incidence of sexual assault, both within the military and of assault committed by troops against civilians?

Certainly, other areas of public policy understand the importance of rigorous research design. Economic and development policy communities read the work of and employ economics Ph.D.s. Policymakers incorporate the findings of sophisticated studies on policy areas such as microfinance, gender empowerment, and foreign aid, knowing the best policy decisions must incorporate these studies’ findings.

Or consider public health policy. Lives are literally on the line as decision-makers must make decisions about issues such as vaccinations, nutritional recommendations, and air quality. Policymakers know they must use sophisticated technical studies executed by epidemiologists and other public health academics to craft the best policies.

Critics will argue that some U.S. policymakers remain alienated from contemporary academic IR work, with the suggestion that if IR academics let go of an obsession with technique, they will then be better able to connect with policymakers and help them craft better policy. I agree that IR academics need to find ways to communicate their results in clear, non-technical language. But the technical components of the work need to be there. Stripping them out directly undermines the ability of the research to give the right kinds of policy recommendations.

Let me conclude by noting that I am sympathetic to the concern that IR academics should think about the big picture as well as smaller questions, the forest of grand strategy as well as the trees of foreign policy tools. IR academics have the potential to make real contributions to big picture debates, to think hard about the essence of grand strategy by assembling a framework that effectively integrates foreign policy means and ends. The nature of the IR subfield and its integration of political economy and security, and its ability to think about structure as well as units, make it especially well positioned to consider these broad questions. The ability of IR academics to contribute to contemporary foreign policy debates is one of many reasons why political science should retain the subfield of IR and resist the temptation to replace the traditional empirical subfields of IR, comparative, and American with new subfields of conflict, political economy, behavior, and institutions.

Like good carpenters, foreign policymakers need to know their tools. Rigorous IR research is the only way to evaluate them effectively.

### Link — AT: Predictions

#### Predictions are inevitable and accurate.

Ward & Metternich 13 [Michael D. Ward received his B.S. degree in Chemistry from the William Paterson College of New Jersey in 1977 and his Ph.D. degree at Princeton University in 1981. He was a Welch postdoctoral fellow at the University of Texas, Austin, between 1981 and 1982. He joined the research staff at Standard Oil of Ohio in Cleveland in 1982, and in 1984 he became a member of the research staff at the Dupont Central Research and Development Laboratories in Wilmington, Delaware. Ward joined the faculty of the Department of Chemical Engineering and Materials Science at the University of Minnesota in 1990, where he held a joint appointment in the Department of Chemistry. Ward was named a Distinguished McKnight University Professor in 1999, and he was the Director of the University of Minnesota Materials Research Science and Engineering Center (MRSEC) from 1998 — 2005. Dr Nils W. Metternich is an Associate Professor in International Relations at the School of Public Policy. He joined the Department in 2013 and holds a PhD in political science from the University of Essex. Prior to joining UCL he was a postdoctoral research fellow at Duke University (2011-12). "Learning from the Past and Stepping into the Future: Toward a New Generation of Conflict Prediction." https://experts.syr.edu/en/publications/learning-from-the-past-and-stepping-into-the-future-toward-a-new-]

Political events are frequently framed as unpredictable. Who could have predicted the Arab Spring, 9/11, or the end of the cold war? This skepticism about prediction reflects an underlying desire to forecast. Predicting political events is difficult because they result from complex social processes. However, in recent years, our capacity to collect information on social behavior and our ability to process large data have increased to degrees only foreseen in science fiction. This new ability to analyze and predict behavior confronts a demand for better political forecasts that may serve to inform and even help to structure effective policies in a world in which prediction in everyday life has become commonplace.

Only a decade ago, scholars interested in civil wars undertook their research with constrained resources, limited data, and statistical estimation capabilities that seem underdeveloped by current standards. Still, major advances did result from these efforts. Consider “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War” by Fearon and Laitin (2003), one of the most venerated and cited articles about the onset of civil wars. Published in 2003, it has over 3,000 citations in scholar.google.com and almost 900 citations in the Web of Science (as of April 2013). It has been cited prominently in virtually every social science discipline in journals ranging from Acta Sociologica to World Politics; and it is the most downloaded article from the American Political Science Review. 2 This article is rightly regarded as an important, foundational piece of scholarship. However, in the summer of 2012, it was used by Jacqueline Stevens in a New York Times Op-Ed as evidence that political scientists are bad forecasters. That claim was wildly off the mark in that Fearon and Laitin do not focus on forecasting, and Stevens ignored other, actual forecasting efforts in political science. Stevens’ funding point—which was taken up by the US Congress—was that government on quantitative approaches was being wasted on efforts that did not provide accurate policy advice. In contrast to Stevens, we argue that conflict research in political science can be substantially improved by more, not less, attention to predictions through quantitative approaches.

We argue that the increasing availability of disaggregated data and advanced estimation techniques are making forecasts of conflict more accurate and precise, thereby helping to evaluate the utility of different models and winnow the good from the bad. Forecasting also helps to prevent overfitting and reduces confirmation bias. As such, forecasting efforts can be used to help validate models, to gain greater confidence in the resulting estimates, and to ultimately present robust models that may allow us to improve the interaction with decision makers seeking greater clarity about the implications of potential actions.

#### imperfect predictions are better than the alternatives — even if things are complex

Ulfelder 11 – Research Director at Political Instability Task Force

(Jay, “Why Political Instability Forecasts Are Less Precise Than We’d Like (and Why It’s Still Worth Doing)”, 5-5, dartthrowingchimp.wordpress.com/2011/05/05/why-political-instability-forecasts-are-less-precise-than-wed-like-and-why-its-still-worth-doing/)

If this is the best we can do, then what’s the point? Well, consider the alternatives. For starters, we might decide to skip statistical forecasting altogether and just target our interventions at cases identified by expert judgment as likely onsets. Unfortunately, those expert judgments are probably going to be an even less reliable guide than our statistical forecasts, so this “solution” only exacerbates our problem. Alternatively, we could take no preventive action and just respond to events as they occur. If the net costs of responding to crises as they happen are roughly equivalent to the net costs of prevention, then this is a reasonable choice. Maybe responding to crises isn’t really all that costly; maybe preventive action isn’t effective; or maybe preventive action is potentially effective but also extremely expensive. Under these circumstances, early warning is not going to be as useful as we forecasters would like. If, however, any of those last statements are false–if responding to crises already underway is very costly, or if preventive action is (relatively) cheap and sometimes effective–then we have an incentive to use forecasts to help guide that action, in spite of the lingering uncertainty about exactly where and when those crises will occur. Even in situations where preventive action isn’t feasible or desirable, reasonably accurate forecasts can still be useful if they spur interested observers to plan for contingencies they otherwise might not have considered. For example, policy-makers in one country might be rooting for a dictatorship in another country to fall but still fail to plan for that event because they don’t expect it to happen any time soon. A forecasting model which identifies that dictatorship as being at high or increasing risk of collapse might encourage those policy-makers to reconsider their expectations and, in so doing, lead them to prepare better for that event. Where does that leave us? For me, the bottom line is this: even though forecasts of political instability are never going to be as precise as we’d like, they can still be accurate enough to be helpful, as long as the events they predict are ones for which prevention or preparation stand a decent chance of making a (positive) difference.

### Link — AT: Realism

#### Realists did not justify imperialism, their evidence is in the context of colonial NOT post-colonial realism. People understand immoral actions and the plan wouldn’t actively increase war.

Karkour 22 [Haro L Karkour is an IR theorist and a Lecturer in International Relations at Cardiff University, 4-1-2022, Realist Variations on Imperialism and Race, SpringerLink, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-99360-3\_2] Eric

It is common for post-colonial scholarship in IR to present sweeping generalisations about realist analysis of imperialism. In a famous paper, for instance, Enrol Henderson argues that Realism (with capital R to encompass all strands), ‘roots its conception of anarchy in the Hobbesian view of the state of nature’ (Henderson, 2013, 80). Echoing Charles Mills, Henderson argues that this conception was not applicable to ‘the general state of mankind’ but rather intended to describe the state of affairs of ‘non-whites’ to rationalise imperialistic violence against them and the appropriation of their land. Thus, ‘a non-white people, indeed the very non-white people upon whose land his fellow Europeans were then encroaching, is his only real-life example of people in a [Hobbesian] state of nature’ (Mills, 1997, 65; cited in Henderson, 2013, 80). It follows that, the concerns among realists and idealists with anarchy are grounded in a racist discourse that is concerned with the obligations of superior peoples to impose order on the anarchic domains of inferior peoples in order to prevent the chaos presumed to be endemic in the latter from spilling over into the former’s territories or self-proclaimed spheres of interest. Similarly, the realist and idealist concern with power was grounded in a racist discourse concerned largely with the power of whites to control the tropics, subjugate its people, steal its resources and superimpose themselves through colonial administration. (Henderson, 2013, 85)

There are two problems with Henderson’s generalisation about realism. First, the ‘Hobbesian’ state of nature Henderson associates with realism has been rejected by classical realists. For example, in response to Martin Wight’s Hobbesian interpretation of his work, Morgenthau replied in a letter to International Affairs: To say that a truth is “hidden” in an “extreme” dictum can hardly be called an endorsement of the dictum. To call a position “extreme” is not to identify oneself with the position but to disassociate oneself from it … I was trying to establish the point, in contrast to Hobbes’s, that moral principles are universal and, hence, are not created by the state. (Morgenthau, 1959; on Carr’s rejection of Hobbesianism see, for instance, Linklater, 2000; Molloy, 2021)

Secondly, the concept of anarchy was indeed central to neo-realists such as Waltz (whom Henderson cites most extensively), but not to classical realists. In response to those who take it as ‘a matter of course that anarchy [is] a basic assumption of Morgenthau’s “realist’ theory” for instance, Hartmut Behr and Amelia Heath argue that ‘although this may be true for Waltz, it is not the case for Morgenthau’ (Behr & Heath, 2009, 332). Since ‘the term anarchy is mentioned in Politics Among Nations only three times; and when Morgenthau refers to it, it is in a critical dissociation from Hobbes’ (Behr & Heath, 2009, 332). Importantly, Behr and Heath note that Politics Among Nations originated as a reflexive attempt to critique the ideological rationalisation of power. It was only later that ‘a plethora of neo-realists became cooks in the “kitchen of power”’ (Behr & Heath, 2009, 345). In this sense, Morgenthau’s (classical) realism and Waltz’s (neo)realism are diametrically opposed in their aims and methodologies: the former rejects the ‘value free’ social science of the latter and pursues instead a normative critique of power (Karkour & Giese, 2020; Roesch, 2014; Williams, 2013). Morgenthau’s critique of power runs counter to any social science that proceeds on the basis of its rationalisation, let alone the rationalisation of empire. Akin to Morgenthau, in The Structure of Nations and Empires, Niebuhr presents a critique of power as an instrument of imperialism. The ‘pretentions’ of power, according to Niebuhr, ‘are the source of evil, whether they are expressed by kings and emperors or by commissars and revolutionary statesmen’ (Niebuhr, 1959, 298).

It is thus simply not true, pace Henderson and other post-colonial IR theorists (as cited below), that classical realists such as Morgenthau and Niebuhr either justified or omitted imperialism from their analyses of international politics. Morgenthau, as well as Niebuhr (but unlike Carr), rejected the Marxist explanation of imperialism as rooted in laissez faire capitalism and the social question in Western democracies. Instead, they presented a long durée explanation of imperial domination: imperial domination, according to Morgenthau and Niebuhr, was a political problem that pre-dated the capitalist structure of the global economy. ‘The economic interpretation of imperialism’ that Marxism proposes, according to Morgenthau, ‘erects a limited historic experience, based on a few isolated cases, into a universal law of history’ (Morgenthau, 1978, 53). The notion that ‘capitalist societies’ wage wars in search of ‘markets for their products and sufficient investments for their capital’ did not stand to empirical scrutiny according to Morgenthau (1978, 52). For ‘during the entire period of mature capitalism’ Morgenthau observed, ‘no war, with the exception of the Boer War, was waged by major powers exclusively or even predominantly for economic objectives’ (Morgenthau, 1978, 53). Furthermore, ‘the main period of colonial expansion which the economic theories tend to identify with imperialism precedes the age of mature capitalism’ and ‘Louis XIV, Peter the Great, the Napoleon I were the great imperialists of the modern pre-capitalist age’ (Morgenthau, 1978, 54). ‘What the precapitalist imperialist, the capitalist imperialist, and the “imperialistic” capitalist want’ thus Morgenthau concluded, ‘is power, not economic gain’ (Morgenthau, 1978, 55). To counter imperialism, therefore, the scholar ought to address the problem of power—namely to limit power, through an ethic of humility. Morgenthau incorporated such an ‘ethic of humility’ into his, largely misunderstood among post-colonial scholars, conception of the national interest. This ‘ethic of humility’ calls for the acknowledgement of the deceptive nature of power and acceptance of the ‘lesser evil’. It is based on the premises, which Morgenthau summarises in Scientific Man Versus Power Politics as follows, Neither science nor ethics nor politics can resolve the conflict between politics and ethics into harmony. We have no choice between power and the common good. To act successfully, that is, according to the rules of the political art, is political wisdom. To know with despair that the political act is inevitably evil, and to act nevertheless, is moral courage. To choose among several expedient actions the least evil one is moral judgment. In the combination of political wisdom, moral courage, and moral judgment, man reconciles his political nature with his moral destiny. (Morgenthau, 1946, 173)

#### Realism is the most ethical paradigm for international relations — it accepts the inherent insecurity of the nuclear age as a precondition for genuine hospitality. Rejecting national sovereignty and borders lapses into liberal interventionism and global nuclear civil war.

Lundborg, 19—Swedish Defence University (Tom, “The ethics of neorealism: Waltz and the time of international life,” European Journal of International Relations, Volume: 25 issue: 1, page(s): 229-249, dml)

Conditioned by the trace, survival is thus inseparable from finitude and the constant threat of erasure (Derrida, 1976: 167). According to Derrida (1984b: 65, emphasis added): ‘it belongs to the trace to erase itself, to elude that which might maintain it in presence’. In this way, the trace also points to the elusiveness of life, and to the fact that nothing can ever guarantee the infinite existence of anything. It tells us that life is nothing but a ‘play of traces’, which lacks an absolute origin and is inherently mortal (Derrida, 1984a: 15). This play of traces brings us back to Hägglund’s notion of the ‘time of life’, which highlights the central importance of temporal finitude for grasping the general conditions of life. As he puts it: ‘This radical finitude of survival is not a lack of being that is desirable to overcome. Rather, the finitude of survival opens the chance for everything that is desired and the threat of everything that is feared’ (Hägglund, 2008: 1–2). There is, then, an important ‘double bind’ to the tracing of time. On the one hand, it is because nothing is infinite, immortal or present in itself that new life can emerge. On the other hand, the lack of self-presence means that life can never be immune to alteration, contamination and death. In order for anything to live, it must consequently be mortal and open to unpredictable change (Derrida, 1976: 143). Even if an infinite and immortal life, free from dangers, might seem desirable, it would be a self-refuting desire since it implies desiring the end of the possibility to desire anything at all. More precisely, it would be the same as desiring the end of the continuous flow of time that allows new life to emerge while exposing everything that lives to the threat of coming to an end. Immortality cancels out the time of mortal life and renders survival obsolete. Counterintuitively, Hägglund (2008: 32–33) thus notes, mortality can be seen as the ‘best’ or most desirable, while immortality is the ‘worst’ or least desirable. While this may seem like a rejection of life, it is, in fact, an affirmation of life. It positively affirms the chance to live precisely on the condition that inherent in any movement of survival is the risk of life coming to an end. Refusing this risk would be the same as refusing to live, since to live is to negotiate the relationship between life and death. Temporal finitude is significant, moreover, not only for grasping the general conditions of life, but for explaining why any act of survival must encounter the uncertainty of the future. Returning to Waltz for a moment, it is precisely this uncertainty that makes it impossible to know if today’s friend will stay a friend or suddenly turn into an enemy: ‘In the absence of an external authority, a state cannot be sure that today’s friend will not be tomorrow’s enemy’, writes Waltz (2000: 10). If we were able to acquire full knowledge of if and when a friend becomes an enemy, we would bring the future under our control. However, then the future would no longer be a genuinely open future, in which the chance of survival is inseparable from finitude and mortality. Survival would then lose its value and become redundant as life turns into nothing but a calculable formula. So, what are the implications of Derrida’s notion of survival and his critique of the ‘calculable’ for our understanding of ‘ethics’? First of all, it means that ethics cannot be translated into static ethical ideals. As Derrida has elaborated on in relation to a wide array of issues, including justice, responsibility, hospitality, friendship and the gift, ethics rather depends on maintaining openness to the perpetual coming of the future. This openness means that none of these issues can ever be linked to something pure, uncontaminated and incorruptible that is immune to unexpected alterations. To take one specific example, hospitality is, for Derrida, crucial for thinking about ethics (see Derrida, 2000). This is because an act of hospitality suggests that the self does not simply exist in pure isolation of what lies ‘outside’ the self, but must always negotiate its relation with the non-self, that is, the other. Ethics is, for this reason, inseparable from hospitality since both terms highlight the necessity of relating to and opening up space for others. At the same time, hospitality cannot be ‘absolute’ or ‘pure’ in the sense of conforming to a static metaphysical ideal. For Derrida, not only would such an ideal be impossible to achieve in the Kantian sense11, it would be essentially undesirable. This is because the very aspiration towards a pure metaphysical ideal would have as its aim the closure of the uncertainty that makes the self–other encounter possible in the first place. The welcoming of strangers must therefore always involve a chance as well as a threat: the chance of some sort of positive and friendly transformation, and the threat that the other turns into an enemy doing harm to the host (Derrida, 2000: 15; Hägglund, 2008: 103–105). The only way to eliminate the potential threat inherent in any act of hospitality would be to make the self completely immune to the other. Such immunity, however, would close down the self–other encounter before it could happen at all. Derrida (2003: 129) thus rhetorically asks: The visit might actually be very dangerous, and we must not ignore this fact, but would a hospitality without risk, a hospitality backed by certain assurances, a hospitality protected by an immune system against the wholly other, be true hospitality? Derrida’s point here is that hospitality categorically cannot correspond to something pure, like a universal ideal situation beyond violence. This is because without the threat of violence, the very act of welcoming the other would not be possible in the first place. In order for this act to be ‘possible’, it must simultaneously be ‘impossible’, in the pure metaphysical sense (see also Bulley, 2017: 12; Vaughan-Williams, 2007: 121). While ethics is often linked to a seemingly self-evident desire to reach an absolute metaphysical ideal, Derrida’s philosophy contests the desirability of such ideals altogether and offers a stark warning against any attempt to immunize the ‘good’ from the ‘bad’, ‘peace’ from ‘violence’, ‘friends’ from ‘enemies’, and so on. This is why, in Derrida’s view, there has to be a violent or non-ethical opening of ethics (Derrida, 1976: 140; 1978: 128). To desire the closure of this opening would be the same as desiring the elimination of that which makes any ethics possible at all: its exposure to the uncertainty of the future, and the indestructible threat that inheres in all encounters with others. Rather than linking ethics to a desire for the purely good, ethics in the Derridean sense is therefore tied to an affirmation of the uncertainty of the future, which opens up to the ‘good’ as well as the ‘bad’. The ethics of neorealism Derrida’s notion of the violent opening of ethics fits remarkably well with the two core assumptions of Waltz’s theory of international politics: the anarchic structure of the international political system and states’ desire to survive within this system. On this basis, it can be argued that there is, indeed, an ethics of neorealism. It is found in the ‘Waltzian baseline’ rather than in attempts to use that baseline to establish law-like patterns of behaviour.12 To grasp the ethics of neorealism, it is therefore necessary to shift focus from causal laws and testable hypotheses, to the structural conditions that shape and affect the behaviour of states in a non-deterministic manner.13 Hence, the ‘structure’ in Waltz’s theory has to be grasped as an open structure that leaves ample room for chance and contingency. Crucially, if we could know for certain what states will do on the basis of either the structure of the system or some predetermined motives of the subjects within the system, the uncertainty of international life would disappear and the ‘politics’ of international politics would lose its meaning.14 Rather than trying to rectify the lack of certainty by creating a stronger sense of certainty, it is therefore imperative to affirm the uncertainties created by the system. It is important, moreover, to oppose the distinction between ethical desirability and political possibility, since the reproduction of this distinction blocks from view the conditions of international life that make ethical thinking and action possible in the first place. Positivist social science and liberal interpretations of Kant are thus, very crudely put, the main obstacles to grasping the ethics of international life. In resisting both moves, neorealism does not seek to close down the violent opening of ethics inherent in the structure of anarchy, for example, by formulating metaphysical ideals informing states how they should act or how they ought to become friends rather than enemies. There can be no absolute friendship between states, and no state can ever offer absolute hospitality to another state. At the heart of every inter-state relation, there is mistrust, uncertainty and incalculability. To positively affirm the latter is not to say that uncertainty or incalculability is good per se. Rather, it implies that they are seen as basic and irrefutable conditions of international life, which, consequently, are not even desirable to overcome. Hence, it also implies that as long as there is international life, there must be ‘the ominous shadow of the future [that] continues to cast its pall over interacting states’ (Waltz, 2000: 39). Crucially, Waltz’s reference to this shadow should not be read as an expression of determinism. It expresses rather an affirmation of uncertainty: the ‘uncertainty of each about the other’s future intentions and actions’ (Waltz, 1979: 105). In order to give friendship in international politics a chance, so to speak, the possibility that a friend suddenly becomes an enemy must never be eliminated. Attempts to create absolute trust in inter-state relations are therefore not only impossible to achieve in the practical sense, but essentially undesirable.15 Along similar lines, Derrida explains how friendship is possible only if one remains open to the deception of the other, since it is precisely the unconditional openness to whatever may happen in the encounter between self and other that makes it possible to develop any sort of friendship in the first place (Derrida, 2005: 219). Even if we were to accept Alexander Wendt’s (1999) distinction between different ‘cultures of anarchy’, some of which are more ‘friendly’ than others, it is not self-evident that a culture in which friendship is prioritized over enmity is actually a better one. This is because in order to exclude the possibility that a friend may suddenly become an enemy, one must first eliminate the time of international life that makes the self–other encounter possible in the first place. For the same reason, the key message of democratic peace theory — that all states should become democracies in order to minimize or eliminate the possibility of wars — is not only practically impossible, but also ethically undesirable. It is impossible to verify because there is no democracy that is immune to corruptibility (Waltz, 2000: 10), but, in addition to that, it can be seen as undesirable since the notion that all states must conform to the same universal ideal cancels out their freedom to act, to take moral responsibility and so on. The undesirability of a system that eradicates violence, borders and discrimination is further underlined by Waltz (1979: 111–114) in his discussion of the ‘virtues of anarchy’. Therein, he attacks the idea of transforming the international system into a world government. Not only would such a transformation ‘be an invitation to prepare for world civil war’ (Waltz, 1979: 112), but it would take away the constitutive violence at the heart of inter-state relations in the structure of anarchy. The constant possibility of war in the international system means that states will always be wary of provoking others in the search for security. As he puts it: The constant possibility that force will be used limits manipulations, moderates demands, and serves as an incentive for the settlement of disputes. One who knows that pressing too hard may lead to war has strong reason to consider whether possible gains are worth the risks entailed.… The possibility that conflicts among nations may lead to long and costly wars has … sobering effects. (Waltz, 1979: 113–114) In this way, the conditions of peace in the international system can be said to rest on the constant possibility of war. In making this point, Waltz argues against moral universalism. Hence, unwittingly or otherwise, he also opens up space for ethical negotiation by recognizing the finitude of the political subject, who is free to interact with others only on the condition that self and other do not have to conform to the ‘same’ universal ideal. The subject is thus able to take moral responsibility and ponder on how to make ethical decisions, which, without difference and alterity, would turn into a strictly formal procedure based on the ‘mechanical application of rules’ (Zehfuss, 2009: 146). Responsibility and ethical decisions are, thus, made possible precisely by the impossibility of predetermining what is the ‘right’ decision in any given context. As Derrida argues, irrespective of how thorough the decision-making procedure is, and regardless of how much knowledge is acquired before taking a decision: the instant of the decision, if there is to be a decision, must be heterogeneous to this accumulation of knowledge. Otherwise, there is no responsibility. In this sense only must the person taking the decision not know everything. Even if one knows everything, the decision, if there is one, must advance toward a future that is not known, that cannot be anticipated. (Derrida, 2002b: 231) The impossibility of anchoring the decision in rational calculation is, in this sense, what creates the chance for any decisions to be taken at all. The instant of the decision belongs, then, not to a fully present moment in which the subject calculates the future consequences of the decision, but to a future that is incalculable (see Derrida, 2002a). It is precisely this incalculability, and the uncertainty of the future, that Waltz’s conception of anarchy positively affirms. Rather than making the instant of the decision obsolete by transforming the decision into a mere application of rules, anarchy makes the ethical decision ‘possible’. Even if Waltz repeatedly claims that the desire to survive is a purely pragmatic assumption made strictly for the purpose of constructing an explanatory theory, it is not neutral or innocent. First and foremost, Waltzian neorealism expresses an ethics due to the way it affirms states’ desire to survive by stipulating the necessary conditions of their survival. More precisely, it affirms the uncertainty of international life by refusing to reduce the play of relations between states to a calculable formula or a regulative ideal, and that rather embraces chance and contingency as central features of the anarchic system — features that make states simultaneously free and insecure.16 In this light, the primary significance of Waltz’s theory is not as an explanatory theory, but as a theory that affirms the time of international life, defined by the uncertainty of the future and the logic of the erasable mortal trace.17 It is this notion of the future that makes it possible for states, as finite political subjects, not only to survive, but also to try to take moral responsibility and make ethical decisions. Why universal ethical ideals are both impossible and undesirable What are the implications of my reading of Waltzian neorealism as an ethics? First of all, it contributes to a new understanding of the difficulties inherent in any attempt to theorize what it might mean to replace the structure of anarchy with an international or world political order that is supposedly ‘more’ ethical. If ethics is inextricably interlinked with the structural conditions of survival, then any attempt to challenge neorealism from an ‘ethical’ perspective must do so by replacing one structure of survival with another, and there can be no guarantees that the new structure will be less violent. While this does not in any way prevent such attempts from being made, it does highlight the risky nature of trying to resolve problems of war and violence in international politics on ethical terms. For example, the idea of creating a new form of political community that transcends the exclusionary borders of states may seem naturally desirable (e.g. Linklater, 1982). Yet, regardless of how sophisticated theories become in terms of articulating the content and meaning of such a community, there can be no guarantees that attempts to actualize it will not result in even more violence. There are no guarantees, as John Mearsheimer (1994: 44) puts it, that ‘a fascist discourse far more violent than realism will not emerge as the new hegemonic discourse’. Moreover, it is important to point out that the value of a neorealist ethics is not that it provides a ‘coherent ethical theory’. One interesting attempt to create such a theory is found in Frost’s (2009) Global Ethics: Anarchy, Freedom and International Relations. For Frost, the point of developing a coherent ethical theory is to demonstrate how international relations can be grasped primarily in ethical terms, rather than as a struggle for power and survival. His assumption is that ‘to engage in international relations at all … is to make ethical claims for oneself and to recognize the ethical standing of others’ (Frost, 2009: 19). Frost links his theory partly to the diverse practices that shape international interactions, and partly to an ‘ethical background theory which justifies the whole set of rules which constitute the practice’ (Frost, 2009: 27). While the background theory is based on an English School-inspired notion of the anarchic system/society of states, the practices added to it have the potential to shape international relations in a direction that is ethically desirable. Arguing for and against the ethical standing of our interlocutors, ‘we construct and reconstruct the social practices within which international relations are conducted’ (Frost, 2009: 94). The main goal of these practices, according to Frost, should be nothing less than resolving the tensions within the current international system between citizen rights and global human rights (Frost, 2009: ch. 3). In contrast to cosmopolitan theories, however, he argues that this goal is attainable within the anarchic structure of the system, through the ethical adjustment of that system (Frost, 2009: 113). This adjustment involves renegotiating the relationship between citizen rights and human rights through practice. Frost (2009: 173) writes: ‘Participants in global civil society and the society of states need to take their own values seriously and need to attempt to make them real for everybody everywhere’. According to Frost, the segregating borders of states are thus meant to persist, while the violent forms of exclusion that these borders enable are to gradually fall away through the aspiration of a common goal that embraces everybody everywhere. From the perspective of my reading of a neorealist ethics, however, the notion of a common universal goal underpinning Frost’s ethical theory is not only impossible, but also undesirable. This is not because the ideal itself is ‘bad’. Rather, it is because it is precisely the absence of a common goal beyond segregating borders that makes ethical negotiation possible in the first place. As soon as such an ideal has been formulated, and the guidelines for how to attain it have been articulated, the incalculable future in which the encounter between self and other is allowed to play out is cancelled out. As previously noted, while this encounter might result in more or less violence, it is the uncertainty of the future that makes the encounter possible in the first place. Frost’s attempt to formulate a universal ethical ideal that embraces everyone everywhere while, at the same time, retaining the segregating borders of the international system is thus problematic. The primary reason for this, then, is that in articulating a universal ethical ideal, his theory works to undermine the conditions of international life. In brief, what Frost fails to recognize is that what makes international ethics possible is also what makes impossible the aspiration of a universal ethical ideal that is applicable to everybody everywhere — like that of a perfect alignment of citizen rights and human rights. Rather than seeking to resolve these tensions, the tensions should be kept alive. Only in this way can we, moreover, maintain a distinctly international ethics without reverting to a ‘global ethics’. For the latter to make any sense, it has to be based on ideals that transcend the borders of states, whether those ideals are linked to a specific goal or just to a general attitude of openness to political negotiation and contestation (Hutchings, 2010: 215). Irrespective of what precisely they are supposed to entail, the ideals associated with a global ethics become problematic as soon as the attempt is made to transform difference and the plurality of wills into one and the same will. It is problematic for the same reason that philosophical attempts to create a new metaphysics that is supposed to resolve the violence of metaphysics. Such attempts can only have as their aim the ultimate destruction of the very possibility of philosophical thought and writing, which, per definition, are metaphysical and therefore violent (see Derrida, 1978). The temporal horizon of neorealism To argue against the desirability of universal ethical ideals is, essentially, to recognize the importance of finitude for thinking about international ethics. Waltz’s neorealist conception of international anarchy and of the desire of states to survive therein offers one way of affirming this notion of international ethics. This is not to say, however, that international anarchy in Waltz’s theory should be seen as a perfect ideal that all politics and ethics must aspire to maintain. In order for my deconstructive approach to the ethics of neorealism to make any sense, the international must also be seen as something finite and deconstructible, rather than as an end in itself. To think of the finitude of the international, we do not have to look for something that ‘transcends’ or comes ‘after’ the international, like a world government or cosmopolitan community.18 We only have to focus on the principles that, according to Waltz, are meant to keep the international order alive: the structure of anarchy and states’ desire to survive. While these are mutually dependent, they also point to a situation in which the struggle to stay alive might threaten the system in which this struggle takes place. To illustrate this point, consider the issue of nuclear deterrence, which Waltz controversially saw as a possible method of creating a more peaceful international order (see Waltz, 1990b). For Waltz, only if nuclear catastrophe remains a real possibility will states need to actively deter the nuclear threat.19 Thus, nuclear deterrence ‘works’ only if nuclear war remains a constant possibility, hence only insofar as the problem of nuclear war is not permanently resolved (Waltz, 1990b: 743–744). What creates the possibility of nuclear war constitutes, in this sense, the conditions of international security and peace. What makes the prospect of nuclear war different from other wars is, of course, the planetary scale on which its effects are likely to be felt. As such, it poses a threat not only to individual states, but also to the entire system of states. On this point, there is another parallel to be drawn between Waltz and Derrida, for whom apocalyptic discourses on nuclear war are interesting because they highlight ‘the absolute effacement of any possible trace’ (Derrida, 1984c: 28). Hence, these discourses raise the stakes of survival even further by pointing to the finitude of everything that lives, as well as to all those attempts at keeping the apocalypse at bay, deferring it through deterrence and so on (Derrida, 1984d: 29). Understood as a global threat to the entire international order, nuclear war highlights the temporal horizon of the whole neorealist project as conceived by Waltz. This is the horizon of the horizon, or the structure of the structure, which gives meaning to the ‘international’ as a finite as opposed to infinite category shaping the behaviour of states. Rather than simply reaffirming a static world-view, which perpetually reproduces itself in a circular fashion, Waltz puts forward a notion of the international that is both finite and mortal. The international continues to live on in this sense, but only on the condition that it is exposed to the threat of coming to an end. Other examples of how the international system may come to an end relate to the increased impact of global capital and global warming. While these are often depicted as typical examples of transnational phenomena, they nevertheless emanate from a system in which states are free to make sovereign decisions, for example, on how to deregulate the emissions of pollutants and financial markets. Individual states are thus free to actively contribute to setting in motion processes that might put an end to the system that conditions their survival. In this way, there is a self-destructive potential built into the system, which threatens to make it collapse from within and on its own terms (see also Frost, 2009: 163–168). Crucially, the self-destructive potential of international politics does not contradict Waltz’s theory. After all, he argues that the system shapes, not determines, state behaviour. He recognizes that as long as states interact within an anarchic structure, they are simultaneously free and insecure. This freedom and insecurity mean that survival in international politics can never become a predictable science that is able to ‘remove the uncertainty of politics’ (Waltz, 1990a: 37). Sometimes, the struggle to survive does more harm than good to the ones seeking to survive. Sometimes, this struggle may even set in motion processes the effects of which will be felt on a planetary scale, provoking an irreversible decay of the entire system of sovereign states. Conclusion The ethics of neorealism, as argued in this article, stems from the mutual interaction of the two core themes of Waltz’s theory: the structure of anarchy and states’ desire to survive. Together, they affirm Derrida’s notion of the violent opening of ethics: the opening to a future that makes new life possible while exposing everything that lives to finitude and the threat of erasure. Ethics and violence are, thus, inextricably interlinked, which means that any attempt to immunize the former from the latter is untenable. Before any moral obligations, and before any normative commitments, the ethics of neorealism addresses the more fundamental problem of what it means for states to live and be free in a system that guarantees nothing. In this way, Waltzian neorealism articulates the basic conditions of international life, which all attempts to theorize international ethics, either by remaining ‘within’ the international system or by arguing in favour of its transcendence, must come to terms with. One of the main challenges that springs from my reading of the ethics of neorealism relates to how universal ethical ideals not only become impossible to achieve in the practical sense, but are also fundamentally undesirable. They are undesirable because the desire to fulfil them undermines the conditions that make international life possible in the first place. On this basis, a whole range of attempts to theorize the meaning and implications of international ethics, which in various ways hold on to the notion of ethical ideals beyond the violence of inter-state relations within an anarchic structure, become untenable. This even includes classical realism and the thought of Morgenthau, whose sharp distinction between ethical desirability and political possibility dissolves in light of the neorealist ethics presented in this article. According to this notion of ethics, then, the desirable cannot be placed beyond political possibility since it essentially is political possibility: the possibility of whatever happens in the interaction among states in the structure of anarchy. As was pointed out in the penultimate section of this article, there is also a temporal horizon of neorealism. This horizon is best illustrated by the threat of nuclear war and highlights the possible end of the entire international political system. The threat of nuclear war demonstrates why this system, just like the state, ought to be seen as a finite as opposed to infinite category. Stressing the finitude of the system means that there is no metaphysical truth, moral or otherwise, to which it either can or should conform. It also means that there is always space, and time, for an ongoing ethical-political negotiation. While the latter might very well include efforts to produce a ‘lesser violence’, its main force is that of a perpetual coming of the future. As long as this future is allowed to play out, there is, I believe, reason to be optimistic: optimistic not about the possible fulfilment of universal ethical ideals, but about the future itself, and whatever it holds for international life.

#### Balance-of-power concerns structure state behavior, even if they can’t explain everything states do. The aff can’t change the House of IR.

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The previous section documented how social variables might be taken as having the potential to transform international politics. This section now turns to an explanation of why it is so hard to fulfill such seeming transformational promise. Running throughout is the argument that while playing a particular social role or expressing a particular cultural identity are certainly state interests, they are necessarily subordinate to political survival (as a sovereign entity with control over its own foreign policy), “physiological” security (the safety from death and harm of the state’s population), and economic prosperity (a baseline level of which is necessary to ensure physiological security). Put simply, if a state and its population do not exist, it cannot achieve anything else—such as fulfilling a social role or expressing a cultural identity—either.36 And since survival, security, and prosperity all have a material base—as Wendt recognizes via his “rump materialism” (he simply does not think the material base yields determinate outcomes)—so too must states necessarily put the defense of such interests ahead of social role fulfillment if they want to be in a position to play any sort of role in future.37 That is not to suggest that states do not sometimes—or, indeed, often—make ideationally driven foreign policy choices that are detrimental to their other interests. It is simply a description of states’ incentive structure, which much of the time they end up following.

It is necessary at this point to defend the notion that there is, in fact, a material base independent of the social world and that characteristics of that material base can yield causal outcomes. After all, military technology does not descend as manna from heaven, but rather is created via human agency in response to perceived threats, and thus it necessarily contains a dose of military culture and broader social identity from the outset. The same goes for the overall share of national economic resources allocated to defense, and indeed, money itself is a socially constructed store of value, albeit one premised upon underlying materially underpinned wealth.38 Any assessment of strategic priorities is necessarily filtered through the strategic-cultural lens of the institution(s) doing the assessing; asking one’s navy for an analysis of the relative merits of sea denial versus power projection, for example, necessarily delivers an answer infused with that navy’s historical trajectory, its sense of its role in the nation and the world, its internal politics, and so forth. The broader question of whether the sea— like other geographical features—constitutes a strategic barrier or a highway similarly requires cultural interpretation.

Even technologies with such seemingly self-evident destructive power as nuclear weapons are not self-evidently “good” or “bad,” either morally or strategically, absent social interpretation. One might see them as “bad” because of the potential humanitarian consequences of their use (or because of the constraints they impose on conventional military options), or “good” because of the casualties in conventional war they prevent (and deterrence that they enable at low relative cost). Their political meaning is thus socially constructed, even if the physiological effects on human bodies of their detonation have only one possible outcome. If military technology and resources require a social component to be both developed and meaningfully deployed, then Wendt’s contention that there is indeed a “rump” material base but that it is simply indeterminate—in the absence of a friend/enemy distinction—as a cause of international outcomes becomes alluring.39

Crucially, however, each of these social choices involves a decisive material effect that is not open to interpretation. It may be debatable whether nuclear weapons are “good” or “bad,” but the effect that one will have on the city and its population of frail, carbon-based human animals over which it detonates represents a single, determinate outcome—and a state facing another state armed with them must therefore make certain necessary calculations based around that capability.40 In the same vein, while the strategic threat/opportunity constituted by geographical features, such as the oceanic moats enjoyed by the United States and United Kingdom, may be a matter of interpretation, the underlying material factor—humans’ inability to cross water without spending resources on capital (ships) that could otherwise have been spent on further ground forces—yields certain necessary outcomes. Indeed, the very foundation of relations between major powers after 1945—secure second-strike nuclear deterrence and its disincentivization of conventional aggression41—rests on a physical “fact”: the relative impenetrability of water to the electro-magnetic spectrum and the associated survivability that it provides to ballistic missile submarines.

The same goes for the decision over what share of national economic resources to allocate to defense. Choosing a proportion may indeed be a socially and ideationally informed political choice, but the underlying size of the resource pools—and the military potentiality that they underpin— rests on the total size of the state’s capital stock (both human and physical), which is not a matter of social interpretation. And while military technology is indeed developed in response to human agency, it is done so from within the technical bounds of the feasible. Such rebuttals apply more widely: while the balance of power, including resources and technology, is indeed necessarily interpreted through states’ social lenses, it nonetheless conditions the bounds of the possible even in the absence of social content. And when those possibilities include hostile use, certain behaviors are necessitated by prudent states seeking survival for their populations.

Realists should indeed be castigated if they infer predictions solely from the balance of currently existing military hardware—a thin and intellectually impoverished understanding of relative power—and critics are correct to point out that a large stock of materiel is not the same as being able to compel another to do that which they would not otherwise have done, in line with the behavioral output understanding of power commonly associated with Dahl (as distinct from the input understanding).42 But viewing total state power in terms of overall assets, defined as the state’s total stock of physical,43 financial,44 and human capital,45 does a better job of first encompassing all the relevant resources—equipment, stores of value, human bodies and brains—and, second, providing an effective measurable proxy for the underlying causes of behavioral power (given that the latter can only be observed ex post, and is therefore not an effective predictor of outcomes). None of this is to deny that there is a social element to the construction of all these power resources, or indeed that the “material” itself involves a large dose of social input, and this chapter is therefore not attempting to “settle” the debate over the precise nature of the relationship. It is simply to point out, rather, that states’ power resources and their effects are not wholly socially constructed and that the nonsocial element produces certain effects.

Turning to specific arguments over states’ pursuit of status, the notion that achieving a particular elevated status and thus fulfilling a certain international-social role might be a goal of states is relatively uncontentious.46 For instance, one insightful recent constructivist work on Britain’s pursuit of international status suggests at the outset that states’ social roles are not the same as their interests, ambitions, values, or capabilities.47 Yet the same work later asserts that social role actually produces national interests, thus implying that states cannot in fact have interests besides those constituted by identity.48 Such conceptual tensions are symptomatic of a theoretical dilemma: the more minimal former assertion is the harder to refute, yet the more ambitious latter claim is necessary if constructivists are to escape the realist retort that fulfilling a social role is merely an interest of states—and a subordinate one to materially underpinned survival at that—rather than the interest. Escaping this retort is in turn necessary if constructivists are to be able to claim that anarchy is indeed what states make of it socially, since transforming the prevailing culture of anarchy would require states to lower their guard against each other—and thus accept higher risk to their survival, at least while the hoped-for transformation was taking place—in pursuit of an international-social value.

The less contentious point—that playing a particular social role is one of multiple interests—opens the way to conceding that the most fundamental state interests remain “political” survival (of state territory and institutions), “biological” security (of the citizenry’s bodies), and preserving some baseline level of economic prosperity, since a state that cannot survive cannot achieve anything else. But if that is the case, then from these materially underpinned vital interests follows a need to be capable of defending them against potential foes—and that, if it comes to it, means accomplishing certain military missions.49 Such military capability is necessarily underpinned by material resources, even as it also has a socially constructed dimension. Such capability can be provided independently (internal balancing), via allies (external balancing), or through some combination of the two—prudent strategy, including eschewing avoidable confrontation and aligning with the preferences of powerful allies, is a key aspect of state success50—but either way, it rests on some friendly actor’s underlying resources. And reliance on external balancing brings its own dangers, as recently experienced by European NATO, when one’s allies turn coercive.51

In short, such an analysis—while conceding that social role and status are important to states, all else held equal, and that such concerns sometimes drive them to act in imprudent ways—nonetheless suggests that hedging against abandonment, coercion, or outright destruction via balance-of-power positioning is likely to remain pervasive. This is not to say that there will not be variation in the extent and severity of such competition. All manner of ideational variables might exacerbate or reduce tensions, as discussed above, and even in the absence of such social forces, overt, intensive competition may yield self-destructive outcomes if it increases another side’s insecurity and causes them to adopt a more offensively capable strategic posture in response.52 The point, rather, is simply that conflict will never be a wholly absent possibility and that that reality must condition states’ calculations—often to the point of some level of defensive hedging, if the state has the resources and technology to make that feasible—even in times of broadly cooperative relations.

A similar retort can be made against the claims that threat perception and military doctrine are both so fundamentally skewed by culture that they may be commonly and wholly disconnected from balance-of-power concerns, and which subsequently allow for an end to military balancing, mutual threat, and security competition. While this short chapter is clearly not the place for an extensive review, the success of many states— particularly resource-rich ones—in aping military technological and professional best practice would seem to suggest that much of the time states are able to achieve what Gray, borrowing from marketing theory, dubs “good enough” force postures in the face of strategic uncertainty.53 Similarly, when states do “die” in the face of foreign aggression—a rare occurrence in post-1945 international politics—it is more often as a consequence of their relative military weakness and geographical vulnerability than as a consequence of a failure to perceive a looming threat.54 Indeed, a key contribution of the neoclassical realist research program has been to demonstrate that while domestic-political variables may filter strategic behavior in multifarious and often nefarious ways, there are still underlying balance-of-power structural pressures at the international-systemic level that states usually respond to, even if they do so belatedly or imperfectly.55 In short, while Waltzian “socialization” toward accurately perceiving threats and formulating effective military doctrine may frequently be hindered—and sometimes terminally compromised—by cultural factors, as a description of the workings of the international system as a whole (as he intended his theory to be), realist predictions of enduring concern and possible competition over the distribution of material power are not undermined by this recognition.56 Tellingly, despite their strong ideational commitments toward democracy promotion and human rights enforcement under the banner of upholding international order, Western states have recently had the reprioritization of balancing against increasingly capable rivals forced upon them by developments in the balance of power, whether that be China’s rise in Asia for the United States or Russia’s (partial) resurgence in Europe for the rest of NATO.57

Finally, even national identity and the nationalism it engenders—the ideational “master variable” underpinning the nation-state system—is itself forged by the interaction of political group identity and the survival imperative under structural anarchy. To paraphrase Tilly, war makes the state, and the state makes war.58 Modern nation-states may have originated as political groups of individually weak human beings with some shared identity connection, but their choice to form states as protective war machines capable of generating the military power necessary to defend against similar political units, and the subsequent mutual reinforcement of national identity and state strength, is very much consistent with realism’s predictions of the consequences of international structural anarchy. Indeed, as noted earlier, Mearsheimer uses these grounds to argue that nationalism and realism are mutually supportive theories.59 In the post– Cold War world, moreover, mutually threatening political groups’ need to generate the military power necessary for security under anarchy—the security dilemma, in short—helps to explain the explosion of ferocious ethnonationalist and sectarian conflict within and between the new states emerging from the collapse of previously multiethnic communist federations, secular Middle Eastern autocracies, and so forth.60 Such conflict has in turn forged the identity of the states and state-like entities emerging from it. In short, while it is certainly not impossible for national identities to shift, as noted above, the process of their generation nonetheless suggests that they are endogenous to—rather than readily capable of exogenously shifting to transform—international systemic security competition and balance-of-power positioning, that they are as much a dependent variable as an independent variable.

Uncertainty and the Menacing Shadow of the Future

The previous section outlined why some of the otherwise most convincing constructivist variables at work in international politics nevertheless cannot promise to transform international politics away from a world of “realist,” security-motivated balance-of-power positioning. This section turns to discuss why this is something that social variables will continue to struggle with as long as there is an international system.

The principal barrier to states ever setting aside their inclination to guard against each other and instead embrace each other as “friends”—no matter how strong their leaders’ or citizens’ desire to transform the culture of international anarchy—is uncertainty over others’ intentions, particularly their future intentions.61 Following the logic of the prisoners’ dilemma, a state62 that trusts that another means it no harm while the other state concludes that it now has an opportunity to pursue advantage may be punished severely for its complacency, rendering such trust perilous, particularly in security affairs, where defection from cooperation could result in the end of the “game” for one party.63

The meaning and implications of this “uncertainty” assumption merit consideration, however. Human beings are constantly trying to impose certainty on a contingent world via cognitive heuristics and neural shortcuts, for the sake of their own mental well-being.64 Indeed, since humans derive meaning and value from the self-imposed certainty of ideational reinforcement, so too they can derive benefit from the entrenchment of both amity with and enmity against “others,” even when this creates other complications and dangers.65 As a result, much of international politics is influenced by habit, both the habit of friendship and the habit of animosity.66 “Uncertainty” also means different things to different people: for realists, it is a condition from which to infer fear about others’ possible behavior; for constructivists, by contrast, it may simply refer to the inherent indeterminacy of information until it is imbued with social content.67 It may be possible to build trust in others’ benign intent over time and thereby escape security competition, meanwhile, through their costly signaling: forgoing capabilities and policy options that a potential aggressor would not want to do without.68 States can also have the certain “friendship” of those with whom they are balancing against a third-party threat, and if that threat is long-lived, then so too may be the certainty of alliance.69

Illustrating this “uncertainty about uncertainty,”70 consider one of the highest profile oft-invoked security dilemmas: the Cold War escalation of U.S.-Soviet hostility, during which the most seminal security dilemma theorization took place.71 Robert Jervis—one of the concept’s foremost progenitors—subsequently questioned whether the Cold War can be understood as a security dilemma after all, understood as a tragic cycle of mutual threat between nonrevisionist security seekers driven by uncertainty over the other’s intentions. Neither side was “uncertain” over whether the other was an adversary. And as subsequent archival revelations document, each side did want to destroy the other, and correctly inferred as much of its opponent.72

Jervis’s “recantation” of the Cold War-as-security-dilemma is itself bounded, however, and this bounding sheds light on the ways in which varieties of uncertainty can still operate even between states with “certain” mutual intent. “Greedy” states versus “security-seeking” states are themselves binary ideal types that mask an underlying spectrum. Practically all states are greedy, in terms of wanting to improve their lot, if the costs are low enough.73 Conversely, few states are greedy to the point of total unconcern for security; not even Nazi Germany desired limitless global war. While there may not have been uncertainty over each side’s Cold War intent, therefore—enmity-driven desire to defeat and ultimately destroy the other—there was still uncertainty over underlying motivations. 74 A desire to exterminate an enemy population may entail quite different behavior than a desire for ideological supremacy, for example, and the two may therefore merit different policy responses, even though both fall within the domain of “hostile” intent. Such doubt over motivations—even within the cognitively “certain” domain of U.S.-Soviet enmity—still added up to a variety of security dilemma: the most salient question for Americans was not “is the Soviet Union an enemy?” but rather “what might Moscow do about situation X, in Y circumstances, at time Z?” The same is evident in major power politics today. Washington is not “uncertain” over whether or not China and Russia are its “adversaries,” defined in broad and obvious terms, but there is a high degree of uncertainty over what types of rivals they represent and their associated future strategic choices. Recognition of uncertainty’s nonbinary nature, in short, does not undermine the argument that states’ inability to know others’ future behavior with perfect reliability incentivizes them to worry about possible future dangers. Realists disagree over prospects for avoiding security competition through signaling motivations, of course,75 but all variants are united by recognizing the enduring significance of the balance of material power.76

On top of these qualifications to the uncertainty-over-intentions assumption come disagreements over the most appropriate response to such uncertainty. Conceding that we can never know another state’s future intentions with mathematical certainty, and therefore that the worst-case outcome—surprise attack by a concealed aggressor—will always remain a hypothetical possibility does not necessarily imply that security is maximized by treating such a scenario as likely. Provoking war for fear of possible future war is like committing suicide for fear of death, and given the balancing often generated by hostile behavior, provoking others into uniting against oneself through attempted power maximization can ultimately reduce one’s security.77 While worst-case contingencies always merit consideration, policy planning—particularly decisions over how much of the national resource base to devote to defense (“guns”) versus consumption and productive investment (“butter”)78—necessitates probabilistic calculations of the relative dangers of overarmament (provoking balancing alongside domestic economic immiseration) versus underarmament (attack by a better-armed adversary).79 Intense security competition can therefore be an irrational and self-defeating response to mere uncertainty over future intentions, in the absence of other threat data.80 Both “realist” and “constructivist” variables can feature among this threat data and therefore play a crucial part in determining the optimal strategic response to such intentions uncertainty, and that in turn conditions whether the potential threat posed by each side’s capabilities, be they latent or realized, manifests itself as a security dilemma. For many realists, the offense-defense balance of technology and geography determines whether uncertainty over others’ intentions merits military confrontation and determines the (in)stability of states’ strategic relations.81 For constructivists, the solidarity/enmity borne of sociocultural similarity/difference may be equally decisive.

But neither of these observations—that uncertainty neither carries a single meaning nor prescribes a single strategy—undermines the core claim that survival has a material base that necessitates continual security-motivated concern for one’s position in the balance of power. Survival may indeed be “multiply realizable,” with social/ideational variables informing the path taken, alongside various “realist” variables. But given all states’ need to safeguard a materially based hierarchy of interests without wholesale reliance on others’ politically contingent (and therefore capricious) benevolence—whether that be potential abandonment by erstwhile allies, potential attack by erstwhile neutrals, or potential coercion by either—their position in the balance of power will always remain relevant to their future security. And given that situation, the conditions for mutual threat and an associated security dilemma to re-emerge are unlikely to be permanently expunged, despite such a deterioration going unrealized indefinitely in many cases due to other overlying factors.82 Fear of future conflict—at least against some state, if not against any specific state—thus remains an endemic feature of international politics. And much of that is still down to the enduring concerns of structurally based realism: international-systemic anarchy, its absence of a reliable sovereign enforcer of global peace, and the associated dangers of offensively capable peers of unreliably benevolent intent.

Tellingly, while many contemporary states have achieved mutual “friendship,” they have rarely sustained it once the strategic factors holding them together—such as alliance against a mutual threat, shared membership of a great(er) power’s dependency network, or some other mutually beneficial exchange—have disappeared. This suggests that such “friendship” is as much a dependent variable (an outcome of realist balancing behavior) as an independent variable (a transformational force in international politics).83 Even within the zone of friendship that had come to characterize the European “community” by the late 1980s, for example—probably the deepest case of intersubjective recognition, cooperation, and sovereignty pooling to date—Britain and France still worried intensely about the potential power imbalances created by German reunification, and they were not content until reunified German power was subordinated via a restated US commitment to NATO.84 As noted previously, moreover, via both Trump and Brexit—ideationally motivated shifts in foreign policy orientation85—Euro-Atlantic security relations have recently displayed a dramatic backsliding, raising the specter of alliance breakdown and coercive confrontation. The relative power of all sides is critical to their ability to resist/dispense such coercion and safeguard future security even in the possible absence of alliance support. Even within the EU, the ability of members to resist or dispense coercion comes down to relative power: witness Greece’s experience at German hands in the context of the Eurozone crisis, and contrast it with the lack of sanction for Franco-German breaches of EU rules.86 And between NATO and Russia, a 1990s moment of optimism over developing friendship has retrenched to coercive confrontation as an outcome of each other’s choices.87 All these developments—which can be interpreted as negative movement along the spectrum between cooperation and conflict—illustrate the continuing centrality of relative power to safeguarding a hierarchy of national interests without dependence on the changeable commitments of others.

As a consequence, the base conditions for the security dilemma will always exist between sovereign states under anarchy, even if it lies wholly dormant for most states most of the time, thanks to overlying factors. Interstate friendship does not render deterioration to a security dilemma impossible, and neither does interstate animosity preclude stable and durable cooperation.88 So while identity—which in any case is “sticky” and slow to change—certainly matters to security relations, it is unlikely to trump some combination of power and informational variables.89 Of course, if international relations were transformed by the emergence of a single world-state, the system would no longer be anarchic and the units-formerly-known-asstates would not need to rely on relative power for their security, and thus such competition would end.90 That requirement, however, does not look likely to be fulfilled anytime soon.

Conclusion

Conflict and cooperation is not some binary “either/or” condition, but rather a spectrum. So too the security concerns borne of uncertainty over motivations are not some irreversible “on/off” switch, be that permanently severe or permanently solved. There is certainly far more peace in the world than the most pessimistic readings of realism would seem to imply,91 and ideational similarity and solidarity—as well as the power and informational variables beloved of realists—clearly have something to do with this. Interests within the parameters of continuing to survive are socially constituted, and even the route to survival itself represents an ideationally informed choice. But the need to safeguard a materially underpinned hierarchy of interests if states are to continue to exist—a necessary prerequisite to performing any kind of social role—still incentivizes them to value their position in the balance of power as a safeguard against future dangers. Of course, states can and do disregard certain incentive structures in favor of others.92 But until all states are known to have done so—a high bar indeed—the potential for security competition to re-emerge in the international system will continue to exist. And knowing that, states will continue to prize the capabilities to provide for their own security . . . and so on, creating enduring conditions for security dilemmas to one day reappear, even though they go overlain by other factors in most international relationships most of the time.

Both realists and constructivists therefore have work to do, in terms of both refining their paradigmatic cores and recognizing the necessity of analytically eclectic cross-pollination to explain many of the most pressing questions of real-world international politics. Realists must do more to incorporate identity as a variable that produces systemically significant variation in behavior rather than as some adjunct bolt-on, whether that be via the post-1990s boom of neoclassical theorization or attempts at microfoundationally elaborated structural realism.93 Porter’s work on the interaction of power and habit in determining US grand strategy is a good recent example, while—as noted earlier—Snyder’s Myths of Empire remains a key benchmark.94 Constructivists, for their part, must continue to investigate the relationship between states’ potentially infinite array of socially constituted interests, their materially underpinned hierarchy of core survival requirements, and the enduring concern for relative power that the latter generates. Along the way, both sides must be circumspect in their appeals to allegedly “smoking-gun” examples. For realists to claim that structure alone explains World War II or the Cold War, for example— missing the universalist ideologies of German Nazism, Soviet communism, or US liberalism—would be a stretch indeed. Equally, constructivists’ most beloved examples—amicable US-Canadian relations along an easily passable land border, the relative underarmament of Germany and Japan, greater American fear of a few North Korean atomic bombs than hundreds of British thermonuclear warheads, the rise of European Union, and so forth—can all be readily explained with reference to balances of capability and information. “Analytic eclecticism” is easy to profess, but the most pressing contemporary questions of world politics require that theorists practice it too.

For those not interested in resolving paradigm wars or “isms” debates, meanwhile, the intersection of material-structural pressures on state behavior with socially constituted foreign policy preferences provides ample scope for investigating crucial real-world questions of our time. Viewed in rationalist terms, this might involve investigating the role of social variables in informing leaders’ utility functions, and thus their preference orderings under the overall structural constraint of needing to ensure continued survival. Just how far could the United States meddle in the Middle East at the behest of domestic interests, for example, before it critically harmed its power position vis-à-vis China? Extending the previous point, has US unipolarity created unique space for a “crazy” foreign policy that disregards the balance of power—both by the United States itself and by close US allies—and will this change if or when unipolarity wanes?95 Relatedly, just how far can the likes of Germany and Japan sustain their pacifistic foreign policy orientations in the face of US relative decline or disengagement and the likely associated need for them to provide more for their own security? Changing tack, how does a small power like Sweden—say—make its trade-off between providing mobile forces for an EU Battlegroup (a cause it values), on the one hand, and maintaining large amounts of conscripts and armor on its eastern border to hedge against Russia (a threat that it cannot be rid of), on the other? Are UK efforts to rebrand as an “aid superpower” facilitated by a nuclear deterrent and the US alliance, say, providing leeway to follow an ideational foreign policy under the cover of a “good enough” military umbrella? In short, there is scope for any number of midlevel theories of foreign policy under the constraint of still recognizing that interstate balance-of-power considerations continue to structure the international system.

### Link — AT: Russia

#### Russia’s imperialism won’t stop in Ukraine. Beating Russia is the first step.

Rukh 22 [Sotsialnyi Rukh, (Ukr. ‘Social Movement’) a Ukrainian democratic-socialist left organization that fights against capitalism and xenophobia. Social Movement unites social activists and trade unions in the struggle to build a better world without the dictatorship of capital, patriarchy, and discrimination; The Russian Socialist Movement, a political organization whose vision of democratic socialism is based on communal ownership of property, political freedom and self-determination. They believe that only a mass movement—of socialists, unions, feminists, antifascists and environmental activists—armed with class-based solidarity and egalitarianism can end the rule of capital in Russia; 4-7-2022; "Against Russian Imperialism"; Lefteast; https://lefteast.org/against-russian-imperialism/; KL]

Although the majority of the left has condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the left camp’s unity is still lacking. We would like to address those on the left who still stick to “a plague on both houses” position that views the war as an inter-imperialist war.

It is high time the left woke up and carried out a “concrete analysis of the concrete situation” instead of reproducing worn-out frameworks from the Cold War. Overlooking Russian imperialism is a terrible mistake for the left. It is Putin, not NATO, who is waging war on Ukraine. That is why it is essential to shift our focus from Western imperialism to Putin’s aggressive imperialism, which has an ideological and political basis in addition to an economic one.

Russian imperialism consists of two elements. Firstly, it involves revisionist Russian nationalism. After 2012, Putin and his establishment moved from a civic concept of the nation (as rossiysky, “related to Russia”) to an exclusive, ethnically based concept of Russianness (as russkiy, “ethnically/culturally Russian”). His aggression in 2014 and in 2022 was legitimized by the return of “originally” Russian lands. Moreover, this concept of (ethnic) “Russianness” revives the nineteenth-century imperial concept of the Russian nation, which reduces Ukrainian and Belarusian identity to regional identities. According to this view, Russians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians are a single people. Employing this concept in official rhetoric implies the negation of independent Ukrainian statehood. That is why we cannot say with any degree of certainty that Putin only wants the recognition of Russian sovereignty over Crimea and the Donbas. Putin may desire to either annex or subdue the whole of Ukraine, threats which appear in his article “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians” and in his speech on February 21, 2022. Finally, the perspective of Ukraine-Russia peace talks look rather bleak, as Russia’s negotiation team is headed by former Minister of Culture Vladimir Medinsky, one of the most dedicated believers in the ideology of russkiy mir (the ethnic Russian world) — a world where, believe us, no one will be happy.

Secondly, even though Putin’s aggression is hard to explain rationally, current events have demonstrated that it may be reasonable enough, nevertheless, to take Russian imperialist rhetoric at face value. Russian imperialism is fueled by the desire to change the so-called “world order.” Thus, Putin’s demand for NATO’s withdrawal from Eastern Europe may signal that Russia may not stop with Ukraine, and Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia may be the next targets of Putin’s aggression. It is very naïve to demand to demilitarize Eastern Europe, because in the light of current circumstances, that will only be appeasing Putin and will make Eastern European countries vulnerable to Putin’s aggression. Discourse about NATO expansion obscures Putin’s desire to divide the spheres of influence in Europe between the US and Russia. Being in the Russian sphere of influence means a country’s political subordination to Russia and subjection to the expansion of Russian capital. The cases of Georgia and Ukraine demonstrate that Putin is ready to use force to influence the political affairs of countries which he believes wish to leave the Russian sphere of influence. It is important to understand that Putin’s understanding of key agents in the world order is basically limited to the US and China. He does not recognize other countries’ sovereignty, regarding them as satellites of one of these agents of the international order.

Putin and his establishment are very cynical. They use the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, American intervention in Afghanistan, and the invasion of Iraq as a shield for the bombing of Ukraine. In this context, the left must show consistency and say no to all imperialist aggression in the world. Today the imperialist aggressor is Russia, not NATO, and if Russia is not stopped in Ukraine, it will definitely continue its aggression.

Furthermore, we must have no illusions about Putin’s regime. It offers no alternative to Western capitalism. It is an authoritarian, oligarchic capitalism. The level of inequality in Russia has risen significantly during the 20 years of his leadership. Putin is not only an enemy of the working class, but also an enemy to all forms of democracy. Popular participation in politics and voluntary associations is treated with suspicion in Russia. Putin is essentially an anti-Communist and an enemy to everything the left fought for in the twentieth century and is fighting for in the twenty-first. In his worldview, the strong have a right to beat the weak, the rich have the right to exploit the poor, and strongmen in power have the right to make decisions on behalf of their disempowered population. This worldview must be dealt a severe blow in Ukraine. In order for political change to come about inside of Russia, the Russian army must be defeated in Ukraine.

We want to address a highly controversial demand, that of military aid to Ukraine. We understand the repercussions of militarization for the progressive left movement worldwide and the left’s resistance to NATO expansion or Western intervention. However, more context is needed to provide a fuller picture. First of all, NATO countries provided weapons to Russia despite the 2014 embargo (France, Germany, Italy, Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Slovakia, and Spain). Thus, the discussion about whether weapons sent to the region end up in the right or wrong hands sounds a bit belated. They are already in bad hands, and EU countries would only be righting their earlier wrongs by providing weapons to Ukraine. Moreover, the alternative security guarantees that the Ukrainian government has proposed require the involvement of a number of countries, and probably can be achieved only with their involvement, too. Secondly, as numerous articles have emphasized, the Azov regiment is a problem. However, unlike in 2014, the far right is not playing a prominent role in today’s war, which has become a people’s war — and our comrades on the anti-authoritarian left of Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus are fighting together against imperialism. As has become clear in the last few days, Russia is trying to compensate for its failure on the ground with air attacks. Air defense will not give Azov any additional power, but it will help Ukraine keep control of its territory and reduce civilian deaths even if negotiations fail.

In our opinion, the Left should demand:

* the immediate withdrawal of all Russian armed forces from Ukraine
* new targeted, personal sanctions on Putin and his multimillionaires. (It is important to understand that Putin and his establishment care only about their own private assets; they are oblivious to the state of the Russian economy overall. The left can also use this demand to expose the hypocrisy of those who sponsored Putin’s regime and army and even now continue selling weapons to Russia)
* the sanctioning of Russian oil and gas
* increased military support to Ukraine, in particular the provision of air defense systems
* the introduction of UN peacekeepers from non-NATO countries to protect civilians, including the protection of green corridors and the protection of nuclear power plants (Russia’s veto in the UN Security Council can be overcome at the General Assembly)

The left should also support those Ukrainian leftists who are resisting, giving them visibility, centering their voices, and supporting them financially. We recognize that it is the millions of Ukrainian essential workers and humanitarian aid volunteers who make further resistance possible.

A number of other demands — support for all refugees in Europe regardless of citizenship, the cancellation of Ukraine’s foreign debt, sanctions against Russian oligarchs, etc. — are broadly accepted on the left and, therefore, we do not discuss them here.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine sets a terrible precedent for the resolution of conflicts which involve the risk of nuclear war. This is why the Left must come up with our own vision of international relations and the architecture of international security which may include multilateral nuclear disarmament (which will be binding for all nuclear powers) and the institutionalization of international economic responses to any imperialist aggression in the world. The military defeat of Russia should be the first step towards the democratization of the global order and the formations of an international security system, and the international left must make a contribution to this cause.

#### Putin is an evil, entitled brat. His wet dream is to bring back imperial empire.

Hartnett 22 [Lynne Hartnett; associate professor of Russian history at Villanova University; 3-2-2022; "The long history of Russian imperialism shaping Putin’s war"; Washington Post; https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/03/02/long-history-russian-imperialism-shaping-putins-war/; KL]

The world is trying to make sense of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s violent invasion of Ukraine. But his attack is not rooted in any rational calculation of costs and benefits.

Instead, Putin is making an ill-conceived gambit to reclaim his nation’s stature as an imperial power and assert Russia’s prestige, authority and will on the world stage. Putin has positioned himself as a frustrated representative of an aggrieved fallen empire — for example, lamenting “the paralysis of power and will” that led to the complete “degradation and oblivion” of the Soviet Union in 1991. Though this grievance seems situated within what Putin has called the tragedy of the Soviet collapse, his imperial inspiration extends even deeper into the country’s past. As Putin described it in a 2012 speech, the revival of Russian national consciousness necessitates that Russians connect to their past and realize that they have “a common, continuous history spanning over 1,000 years.”

Putin understands the post-Soviet global order through the prism of Russia’s long history. And that history is inextricably tied to Russia’s dynamic imperial mission both in the past and today.

The first “Russian” state was established in present-day Kyiv in the 9th century. But Kievan Rus’ fell into ruin with the Mongol conquest of the 13th century, becoming a decentralized group of principalities that each owed fealty and tribute to the Mongol khans.

By the late 15th century, though, the principality of Moscow, led by Grand Prince Ivan III, turned the tables of fortune on the Mongols. Ivan, known to history as Ivan the Great, renounced his land’s subordination to the Mongols and declared the sovereignty of Russia. Ivan then subdued his neighbors, annexed their territory and centralized Moscow’s authority.

Ivan the Great came to power less than a decade after the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453. Cultivating his imperial standing with his marriage to the niece of the last Byzantine emperor, Ivan claimed Byzantium’s legacy for Muscovite Russia and adopted the title of czar for himself. As czar, he asserted Russia’s international influence and stature by establishing diplomatic relations with foreign powers and building the Kremlin to serve as an architectural manifestation of Russia’s new imperial power.

By the start of the 16th century, the Russian czars firmly conceived of their land as a great empire. For them, Moscow was the Third Rome — the heir to the Roman and Byzantine empires. Though their imperial predecessors’ empires had fallen, the Russian czars resolved to hold absolute power to ensure the dynamic and continued expansion of theirs.

In the 1550s, the czar known later as Ivan the Terrible extended his country’s territory along the southern Volga down to the Caspian Sea. Twenty-five years later, Ivan sponsored expeditions that initiated several decades of conquest and colonization of Siberia and large swaths of Central Asia.

By 1648, Russia had moved across a continent and reached the Pacific coast to become an enormous state with an unrivaled land mass. It was a full-fledged colonial enterprise.

In 1654, Czar Alexis seized the territory that lay between Russia and the Dnieper River. This included much of present-day Ukraine, including Kyiv. While the dominions around Moscow were known as Great Russia or simply Russia, much of what is present-day Ukraine was deemed Little Russia in a clear reflection of its peripheral, colonized status.

Alexis’s son Peter the Great took Russia’s imperialist mission to new heights. With a revamped army and newly founded navy, Peter the Great defeated Sweden and expanded his empire in every direction. In recognition of his military victories and territorial conquests, Peter in 1721 declared Russia to be an empire and he, its emperor.

Several decades later, another great, the Empress Catherine, pushed the empire’s boundaries farther west through the partitions of Poland. Catherine also took advantage of the weakening power of the Ottoman Empire to expand Russia southward and create the region of Novorossiya, which included the southern sections of present-day Ukraine. She then solidified Russia’s position on the Black Sea by annexing Crimea in 1783.

Many of Russia’s imperial conquests were hard-won. In 1818, when Russian forces attempted to conquer the Northern Caucasus, they encountered a population that refused to be subdued. In answer to the guerrilla warfare that the indigenous population unleashed against the invaders, Russia burned villages to the ground, incinerated forests and took civilians as hostages. Although by 1864 Russia had incorporated the region into its empire, ethnic and religious tensions percolated and would erupt in a new wave of violence over a century later with the Chechen Wars in the 1990s.

Convinced that Russia’s status as a global power depended on its expansive empire, Russian czars — safe and secure in their St. Petersburg palaces — expended vast sums of money and the lives of young Russian soldiers to maintain imperial glory. Territory was purchased with the lives of both conquering armies and their resisters while Russian rulers transformed the cities of the metropole with monuments erected to honor imperial victories and expansion.

When Russia erupted in revolution in 1917, the empire collapsed. Initially, the Bolsheviks expressed antipathy toward imperialism. Indeed, they contended that regions like Ukraine that declared their independence would be free from the weight of empire. But the dislocation that came with the end of World War I did not bring the worldwide socialist revolution that Vladimir Lenin expected. As a socialist island in a sea of global capitalism, the Russian Empire was resurrected by Lenin and the Bolsheviks within the federal structure of the Soviet Union. For the next 70 years, Russia’s traditional imperial mission became entangled with the expansionist aims of communism.

To meet the surging economic and military power of the United States, the Soviet Union in the late 1940s established satellite states throughout Eastern Europe, with communist governments overseen by Moscow. Using tanks, artillery and repression, the Soviets kept the communist bloc until the 1980s, when Mikhail Gorbachev could no longer use military force to retain power. The Soviets’ imperial project was in peril.

These liberatory impulses unleashed a ripple effect within the Soviet Union itself, with the Baltic States and the Caucasus calling for independence from Moscow. By the end of 1991, nationalist sentiments within the assortment of nations that the Soviet Union had inherited from the czarist imperialist state led to demands for autonomy and spelled the end of the U.S.S.R.

When Putin succeeded Boris Yeltsin as president of the Russian Federation in 1999, he claimed that his country was entitled to exert a privileged influence over the post-Soviet states. Yet many of these nations balked at the local cronyism and corruption that seemed to come with Moscow’s continued influence. In the early 2000s, popular uprisings in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan — collectively deemed the Color Revolutions — demonstrated these countries’ spirit of independence and, thereby, the limits of Russia’s and Putin’s control of the region.

For Putin, this equated to an inglorious lack of prestige and power. Ukraine’s Revolution of Dignity that overthrew Putin’s supporter, President Viktor Yanukovych, in 2014 only intensified this perception. The Russian president’s decision to move into eastern Ukraine and annex Crimea was the opening salvo to reclaim the power that imperial failure had eroded.

Beyond economic sanctions, Putin faced little consequence for this 2014 power play, and his geopolitical machinations surged. Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election and Donald Trump’s subsequent derision of NATO probably convinced Putin of his ability to extend Russia’s global sway without substantial obstacles.

Over the past several years, as Putin has increasingly constricted Russian civil society, limited his country’s independent media and news sources, and imprisoned domestic opposition leaders, he has enhanced his ability to pursue his aims unencumbered. Reviving the imperialist dreams of his czarist forebears, Putin moved to reclaim the empire that he believes was unjustly pilfered from Russia.

But the determined resistance of the Ukrainian people to Russian aggression has shown the folly of Putin’s vision of renewed imperial grandeur. Having found independence from Moscow in the years since 1991, Ukrainians have no desire to return to their previous colonial status. Despite Russia’s superior military might, the Ukrainian people have made a stand for their sovereignty and their freedom, earning support and respect around the world.

Conquest and glory have thus far eluded Putin and his forces. Instead of finding renewed prestige through the global order, Putin finds himself isolated and condemned, and his 21st-century version of Russian imperialism vilified and reviled rather than championed.

#### Prolif, war,

Strikethrough for ableist language

Brands 22 [Hal Brands; Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; 3-14-2022; "Why blaming NATO for Ukraine war is Vladimir Putin’s biggest lie"; ThePrint; https://theprint.in/opinion/why-blaming-nato-for-ukraine-war-is-vladimir-putins-biggest-lie/872350/; KL]

The great NATO enlargement debate never ends. In the 1990s, U.S. officials and academics argued about whether pushing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization into Eastern Europe was likely to sustain the post-Cold War peace or prematurely end it. More recently, critics have charged that Russia’s war in Ukraine is a natural response to the aggressive expansion of America’s most powerful alliance.

Now Russian officials, and even President Vladimir Putin himself, have echoed — and sometimes directly cited — American scholars such as political scientist John Mearsheimer, who argues that the current crisis “is the West’s fault.”

The “blame NATO” argument tells a story of hubris, arrogance and tragedy. It holds that there was a golden chance for lasting peace in Europe, but the U.S. threw it all away. Rather than conciliating a defeated rival, Washington repeatedly humiliated it by expanding a vast military alliance up to Russia’s borders and even into the former Soviet Union. This pursuit of American hegemony in a liberal-democratic guise eventually provoked a violent rebuke.

In this telling, Putin’s wars against Georgia and Ukraine are just the natural response of one great power whose vital interests are being heedlessly threatened by another.

The argument isn’t wholly wrong. Putin’s wars are indeed meant, in part, to push Western influence back from Russia’s frontiers. But the idea that NATO expansion is the root of today’s problems is morally and geopolitically bizarre.

Far from being a historic blunder, NATO expansion was one of the great American successes of the post-Cold War era. Far from being the act of a domineering superpower, it was part of a long tradition of vulnerable states begging to join America’s liberal empire. And far from posing a mortal threat to Moscow, NATO enlargement actually provided Russia with far greater security than it could have provided itself.

NATO’s big bang

NATO was founded in 1949 with 12 members in Western Europe and North America. It gradually added additional states — Turkey, Greece, West Germany, Spain — over the course of the Cold War. But the big bang of enlargement came once the superpower conflict ended. NATO incorporated the former East Germany into the alliance in 1990; it then added three Eastern European countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic) in 1999; then seven more, including the Baltic states, in 2004.

To understand why NATO grew so rapidly, we have to remember something that nearly everyone has now forgotten: There was no guarantee that Europe would be mostly stable, peaceful and democratic after the Cold War. In fact, many of the analysts who now view NATO expansion as a catastrophe once warned that a post-Cold War Europe could become a violent hellscape.

It wasn’t an outlandish scenario. A reunified Germany might once again try to dominate its neighbors; the old enmity between Moscow and Berlin could reignite. The collapse of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe could liberate those states to pursue long-suppressed territorial claims and nationalist agendas. Ethnic tensions and nuclear proliferation might explode as the Cold War order crumbled.

If the U.S. pulled back once the Soviet threat was gone, there would be no extra-European superpower to put out fires on a continent with lots of geopolitical kindling. “The prospect of major crises, even wars, in Europe is likely to increase dramatically,” Mearsheimer predicted in 1990.

NATO enlargement was the logical answer to these fears. Expansion was a way of binding a reunified Germany to the West and surrounding it with democratic allies. Joining NATO required new members to lay aside any revanchist designs, while allowing them to pursue economic and political reforms rather than investing heavily in military capabilities to defend their newly won autonomy.

NATO’s move to the east also ensured that Poland and other states that easily could have built nuclear weapons didn’t need to, because they had American protection. Most important, enlargement kept the U.S. firmly planted in Europe, by preventing the centerpiece of the transatlantic relationship from becoming obsolete.

No other initiative could have accomplished these objectives. Partnership for Peace — a series of loose security cooperation agreements with former Soviet-bloc states — didn’t offer the ironclad guarantees that came with NATO membership. (If you want to understand the difference between “security partner” and “NATO ally,” just look at what is happening today to Ukraine, one of the former.)

The idea of creating a pan-European security architecture (one that included Russia) had the same defect; plus, it would have given Moscow veto power over the security arrangements of the countries the Soviet Union had so recently dominated.

Only American power and promises could provide stability in Europe, and NATO was the continent’s critical link to the U.S. Since 1949, Washington had tamped down rivalries between old enemies such as France and Germany, while also protecting them from external threats. After 1991, NATO expansion took this zone of peace, prosperity and cooperation that had emerged in Western Europe and moved it into Eastern Europe as well.

The revolutionary nature of this achievement seemed obvious not so long ago. “Why has Europe been so peaceful since 1989?” Mearsheimer asked in 2010. The answer, he acknowledged, was because “America has continued to serve as Europe’s pacifier,” protecting the continent from dangers within and without.

Russia as the victim

Today, of course, the critics don’t buy this account. They argue that NATO expansion represented crude power politics, as the U.S. exploited the Soviet collapse to engorge its own empire. What resulted, pundits such as Thomas Friedman contend, was a sort of Weimar Russia — a country whose dignity was affronted, security imperiled and democracy undermined by a harsh, humiliating peace.

There is a kernel of truth here, too. Once Russian democracy began to wobble in 1993-94, officials in the Bill Clinton administration saw NATO expansion — in part — as a way of preventing a potentially resurgent, aggressive Russia from rebuilding the Soviet sphere of influence. Russian leaders of all stripes griped about NATO expansion from the early 1990s onward, warning that it could jeopardize the peace of the continent.

In hindsight, NATO expansion was one of several issues — including disputes over the Balkans and the collapse of the Russian economy in the late 1990s — that gradually soured Russia’s relationship with the West. Yet this story omits three vital facts.

First, all policies have costs. The price of NATO expansion was a certain alienation of Russian elites — although we often forget that Clinton softened the blow by continually courting Russian President Boris Yeltsin, bringing Russia into elite Western institutions such as the Group of Seven, and making Moscow a partner in the intervention in Bosnia in 1995-96. Yet the cost of not expanding NATO might have been forfeiting much of the stability that initiative provided. Trade-offs are inevitable in foreign policy: There was no magic middle path that would have provided all the benefits with none of the costs.

Second, if NATO expansion was a manifestation of American empire, it was a remarkably benign and consensual form of empire. When Clinton decided to pursue enlargement, he did so at the urging of the Poles, Czechs and Hungarians. The Baltic countries and others were soon banging at the door. The states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union were desperate to join America’s sphere of influence, because they were desperate to leave Moscow’s.

This, too, was part of an older pattern: The U.S. has often extended its influence by “invitation” rather than imposition. The creation of NATO in 1949 was mostly a European idea: Countries that were terrified of Moscow sought protection from Washington. One reason Putin’s wars to keep countries from escaping Moscow’s empire are so abhorrent to Americans is that the U.S. empire has trouble keeping members out.

Putin may not see it that way. All that matters to him is that the mightiest peacetime alliance in history has crept closer to Russian soil. But here a third fact becomes relevant: Russia was one of the biggest beneficiaries of NATO’s move east.

Making Russia safer

Open terrain has often left Russia vulnerable to invasion and instability emanating from Europe. Napoleonic France, Imperial Germany and Nazi Germany all swept through Eastern Europe to wreak havoc on Russian or Soviet territory. This is one reason why the great strategist George Kennan opposed NATO expansion — because it would surely re-activate this fear of encroachment from the west.

Yet this was a red herring, because NATO posed no military threat. The alliance committed, in 1997, not to permanently station foreign troops in Eastern Europe. After the Cold War, America steadily withdrew most of its troops and all of its heavy armor from the continent. U.S. allies engaged in a veritable race to disarm.

The prospect that NATO could invade Russia, even had it wanted to, was laughable. What the alliance could do was tame the perils that might otherwise have menaced the Russian state.

Germany could hardly threaten Russia: It was nestled snugly into an alliance that also served as a strategic straitjacket. NATO, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev had candidly said in 1990, could “play a containing role” vis-à-vis Berlin. Moscow didn’t have to worry about a nuclear Poland — Warsaw didn’t need nukes because it had the protection of the United States. Aside from the Balkan wars of the 1990s, Eastern Europe was comparatively free of the geopolitical intrigues and military quarrels that might have made Russia jumpy.

NATO expansion hadn’t just alleviated Europe’s security problems; it had protected Russia’s vital interests as well. Moscow might have lost an empire, but it had gained remarkable safety from external attack.

Putin’s easy excuse

So what went wrong? Why couldn’t Putin make his peace with a larger NATO?

Part of the answer is that NATO expansion wasn’t really the problem, in the sense that Russia didn’t need that pretext to seek renewed hegemony in its near-abroad. The Soviet Union, and the Russian empire before it, had traditionally sought to control countries along their frontiers and used brutal means to do it. To say that NATO expansion caused Russian belligerence is thus to make an extremely dubious assertion: that absent NATO expansion, Moscow would have been a satisfied, status quo power.

And this is exactly why a bigger NATO has posed a real problem for Putin. After all, safety from external attack isn’t the only thing that states and rulers want. They want glory, greatness and the privileges of empire. For 20 years, Putin has been publicly lusting after the sphere of influence that the Soviet Union once enjoyed. NATO expansion stood athwart that ambition, by giving Moscow’s former vassals the ability to resist its pressure.

NATO also threatened a certain type of Russian government — an autocracy that was never secure in its own rule. A democratic Russia wouldn’t so much have minded being neighbors with Western-leaning democracies, because political liberty in those countries wouldn’t have threatened to set a subversive example for anti-Putin Russians.

Yet, as Russia became more autocratic in the early 2000s, and as Putin’s popularity declined with the Russian economy after 2008, the imperative of preventing ideological spillover from a U.S.-backed democratic community loomed large.

So Putin began pushing back against NATO’s eastward march. In 2008, he invaded Georgia, a country that was moving — too slowly for its own safety — toward the West. Since 2014, he has been waging war against Ukraine, in hopes of rebuilding the Russian empire and halting Kiev’s westward drift. America’s vision of Europe has now run into Putin’s program of violent coercion.

West missed the danger signs

To be sure, U.S. officials made mistakes along the way. Because Russia was prostrate, militarily and economically, during the 1990s, Washington acquired a bad habit of issuing security guarantees without really considering how it would fulfill them in a crisis. The Pentagon has thus been scrambling, since 2014, to devise a credible defense of NATO’s eastern flank.

As Russia regained its strength, U.S. officials also failed to grasp the danger of provoking Putin without adequately deterring him. When, in 2008, NATO declined to endorse membership for Georgia and Ukraine but issued a vague statement saying that they would someday join the alliance, it created the worst of all worlds — giving Putin both the pretext and the time to pre-empt future expansion by tearing those two countries apart.

Yet there is a curious morality in accounts that blame the West, which sought to protect vulnerable states in Eastern Europe, for the current carnage, rather than blaming Putin, who has worked to dismember and intimidate those countries. It is sloppy thinking to tally up the costs of NATO expansion without considering the historic achievements of a policy that served American, European and even certain Russian interests remarkably well.

And if nothing else, NATO expansion pushed the dividing line between Moscow and the democratic world to the east after one Cold War — a factor of great significance now that a second cold war is underway.

The legacy of NATO expansion isn’t simply a matter of historical interest. Americans’ understanding of the past has always influenced their view of what policies to pursue in the future. During the 1920s and 1930s, the widespread, if inaccurate, belief that America had entered World War I to serve the interests of banks and arms manufacturers had a [crushing] ~~paralyzing~~ effect on U.S. policy amid the totalitarian aggression that set off World War II.

Today, the U.S. faces a long, nasty struggle to contain Putin’s imperial project and protect an endangered world order. Introspection is an admirable quality, but the last thing America needs is another bout of self-flagellation rooted in another misapprehension of the past. — Bloomberg

### Link — AT: Sinophobia

#### Rejecting the corrupt moves of the Chinese government isn’t inevitably Sinophobic or against Chinese citizens.

Zhao ’21 — Xiran Jay; they are a Chinese #1 New York Times bestselling author and YouTuber. March 22, 2021; “On Anti-Asian Hate Crimes — And How You Can Help”; *Youtube*; [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aYEf8K7cEtQ; //CYang](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aYEf8K7cEtQ;%20//CYang) **[\*\*NOTE\*\* — this is an edited version of the Youtube transcript that’s been edited for capitalization/spelling/mistakes in the voice recognition software — the full text of the transcript is inserted below for reference]**

i've been thinking a lot about the role media plays in egging these hate crimes on not just trump and his china blaming nonsense but also the daily legitimate reports about the terrible things the chinese government is doing like arbitrarily detaining two canadians to bully canada into releasing monzo committing genocide against the uyghurs and other ethnic minorities cracking down on hong kong's democracy pulling shady neo-colonious moves in southeast asia and africa and much much worse and we should criticize the chinese government international pressure is the only thing that can get them to back off but i'm wondering what this non-stop positioning of china as that ominous foreign boogeyman does to the perception of chinese people as a whole and other asians and pacific islanders by extension i used to not flinch when people would say china without information about kovid or china is playing the long game to world domination because i instinctively know that they're talking about the chinese government not ordinary citizens because i as someone who was born and raised in mainland china i'm well aware that the chinese government does not represent me but now i'm wondering if the average person who grew up in the west can conceptualize this if they're aware that the average chinese citizen has no political power or influence over whether these atrocities are happening you hear a lot about what the chinese government is doing but do you ever hear about what's happening in china for ordinary people do you have any idea what they're thinking whenever i speak up against white supremacy and the lingering impact of western colonialism there's always some guy in my comments who is like well china has a han supremacist problem and is colonizing africa right now yes and i criticize both the chinese and western governments but somehow just because of my name and face some people equate me to this ominous evil in their minds that it's china we can talk all day about how i don't even have chinese citizenship anymore i'm legally a canadian but i don't want to make it seem like it'd be okay to see all citizens of the people's republic of china as the enemy either if you want to know what it's like for an average chinese citizen imagine if trump and his goons appointed themselves your government leaders because of their connections and you had absolutely no option of voting them out imagine not even being able to criticize trump without worrying that the police might pay you a visit my family sees the stuff american comedians say about trump they see a selfie i took with justin trudeau and they are stunned in china politicians don't go on campaigns to win support they don't take selfies with random people they do what their higher ups tell them to do it's like ordinary citizens are base level employees at a massive company and civil servants are the managers we occasionally hear stuff about the top bosses like xi jinping but ultimately we have no influence on the direction they decide to take the company and in everything we see in public we have to maintain the position of oh yeah our company is the best however most mainland chinese people that i know are not blindly loyal to the ccp they've just been conditioned to not voice dissent out of fear of punishment but the grievances have their own way of slipping out there are endless sensitive terms that get automatically blocked on chinese social media but discussions still happen using all sorts of slang to bypass the filters the chinese people are always one step ahead of the censors we make jokes about getting invited to tea whenever we say something out of line we laugh at government propaganda we use vpns to go on youtube and twitter and facebook we mock the socialist values cj king loves to talk about because we're well aware that china has an attempted socialism in decades and it is in fact one of the most capitalist countries on earth if it were true that all mainland chinese people are brainwashed the government wouldn't need to crack down so hard on free speech i am chinese but i do not feel proud that the chinese government is getting so powerful it even makes me feel hopeless sometimes when i think about how other countries are too tangled up in their own messes and too economically dependent on china to seriously stand up to the ccp and chinese citizens themselves have too much to lose to rise up in a mass revolution it is so infuriating to see that a few hundred people up high in the ccp have their grip on that much power and there's currently no reliable force out there that we can depend on to take them down this is not what i want the future to look like i do not want the world to end up in a second world war that god forbid escalates beyond cold but at the same time that we're rightfully calling the ccp out for its atrocities

I've been thinking a lot about the role media plays in egging these hate crimes on. Not just Trump and his China blaming nonsense, but also the daily legitimate reports about the terrible things the Chinese government is doing like arbitrarily detaining two Canadians to bully Canada into releasing Monzo, committing genocide against the Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities, cracking down on Hong Kong's democracy, pulling shady neocolonial moves in Southeast Asia and Africa and much, much worse and we should criticize the Chinese government.

International pressure is the only thing that can get them to back off but I'm wondering what this non-stop positioning of China as that ominous foreign boogeyman does to the perception of Chinese people as a whole and other Asians and Pacific Islanders by extension. I used to not flinch when people would say China without information about COVID or China is playing the long game to world domination because I instinctively know that they're talking about the Chinese government not ordinary citizens because I as someone who was born and raised in mainland China.

I'm well aware that the Chinese government does not represent me but now I'm wondering if the average person who grew up in the West can conceptualize this if they're aware that the average Chinese citizen has no political power or influence over whether these atrocities are happening. You hear a lot about what the Chinese government is doing but do you ever hear about what's happening in China for ordinary people? Do you have any idea what they're thinking whenever I speak up against white supremacy and the lingering impact of Western Colonialism there's always some guy in my comments who is like well China has a Han supremacist problem and is colonizing Africa right now. Yes. I criticize both the Chinese and Western governments but somehow just because of my name and face some people equate me to this ominous evil in their minds. That it's China we can talk all day about.

I don't even have Chinese citizenship anymore. I'm legally a Canadian but I don't want to make it seem like it'd be okay to see all citizens of the People's Republic of China as the enemy either. If you want to know what it's like for an average Chinese citizen, imagine if Trump and his goons appointed themselves your government leaders because of their connections and you had absolutely no option of voting them out. Imagine not even being able to criticize Trump without worrying that the police might pay you a visit. My family sees the stuff American comedians say about Trump. They see a selfie I took with Justin Trudeau and they are stunned in China politicians don't go on campaigns to win support. They don't take selfies with random people they do what their higher ups tell them to do it's like ordinary citizens are base level employees at a massive company and civil servants are the managers we occasionally hear stuff about the top bosses like Xi Jinping but ultimately we have no influence on the direction they decide to take the company and in everything we see in public, we have to maintain the position of oh yeah our company is the best.

However, most mainland Chinese people that I know are not blindly loyal to the CCP, they've just been conditioned to not voice dissent out of fear of punishment, but the grievances have their own way of slipping out. There are endless sensitive terms that get automatically blocked on Chinese social media but discussions still happen using all sorts of slang to bypass the filters — the Chinese people are always one step ahead of the censors. We make jokes about getting invited to tea whenever we say something out of line. We laugh at government propaganda. We use VPNs to go on Youtube and Twitter and Facebook. We mock the socialist values Xi Jinping loves to talk about because we're well aware that China hasn’t attempted socialism in decades, and it is in fact one of the most capitalist countries on Earth. If it were true that all mainland Chinese people are brainwashed the government wouldn't need to crack down so hard on free speech. I am Chinese, but I do not feel proud that the Chinese government is getting so powerful. It even makes me feel hopeless sometimes when I think about how other countries are too tangled up in their own messes and too economically dependent on China to seriously stand up to the CCP and Chinese citizens themselves have too much to lose to rise up in a mass revolution it is so infuriating to see that a few hundred people up high in the CCP have their grip on that much power and there's currently no reliable force out there that we can depend on to take them down. This is not what I want the future to look like. I do not want the world to end up in a second World War that God forbid escalates beyond Cold, but at the same time that we're rightfully calling the CCP out for its atrocities.

### Link — AT: Space Col

#### Space col solves extinction---staying on the rock exacerbates polarization.

Kennedy 19, Dr. Fred Kennedy was the inaugural Director of the U. S. Department of Defense (DOD) Space Development Agency (SDA), established by Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick M. Shanahan on 12 March 2019. The SDA mission is to define and monitor the DOD’s future threat-driven space architecture and to accelerate the development and fielding of new military space capabilities necessary to ensure U.S. technological and military advantage in space for national defense., (Fred, “To Colonize Space Or Not To Colonize: That Is The Question (For All Of Us)”, Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/fredkennedy/2019/12/18/to-colonize-or-not-to-colonize--that-is-the-question-for-all-of-us/?sh=b3375652367f) //CHC-DS

Yet a wave of interest in pursuing solar system colonization is building, whether its initial focus is the Moon, Mars, or O’Neill-style space habitats. Jeff Bezos has argued eloquently for moving heavy industry off the home planet, preserving Earth as a nature reserve, and building the space-based infrastructure that will lower barriers and create opportunities for vast economic and cultural growth (similar to how the Internet and a revolution in microelectronics has allowed Amazon and numerous other companies to achieve spectacular wealth). Elon Musk and Stephen Hawking both suggested the need for a “hedge” population of humans on Mars to allow human civilization to reboot itself in the event of a catastrophe on Earth – an eggs-in-several-baskets approach which actually complements the arguments made by Bezos. And while both are valid reasons for pursuing colonization, there’s a stronger, overarching rationale that clinches it.

I’ll assert that a fundamental truth – repeatedly borne out by history – is that expanding, outwardly-focused civilizations are far less likely to turn on themselves, and far more likely to expend their fecundity on growing habitations, conducting important research and creating wealth for their citizens. A civilization that turns away from discovery and growth stagnates – a point made by NASA’s Chief Historian Steven Dick as well as Mars exploration advocate Robert Zubrin.

As a species, we have yet to resolve problems of extreme political polarization (both internal to nation states as well as among them), inequalities in wealth distribution, deficiencies in civil liberties, environmental depredations and war. Forgoing opportunities to expand our presence into the cosmos to achieve better outcomes here at home hasn’t eliminated these scourges.

What’s more, the “cabin fever” often decried by opponents of colonization (when applied to small, isolated outposts far from Earth) turns out to be a potential problem for our own planet. Without a relief valve for ideological pilgrims or staunch individualists who might just prefer to be on their own despite the inevitable hardships, we may well run the risk of exacerbating the polarization and internecine strife we strive so hard to quell. Focusing humanity’s attention and imagination on a grand project may well give us the running room we need to address these problems. But the decision cannot be made by one country, or one company, or one segment of the human population. If we do this, it will of necessity be a truly international endeavor, a cross-sector endeavor (with all commercial, civil, and defense interests engaged and cooperating).

The good news: Critical technologies such as propulsion and power generation systems will improve over time. Transit durations between celestial destinations will shorten (in the same way sailing vessels gave way to steam ships and then to airliners and perhaps, one day, to point-to-point ballistic reusable rockets). Methods for obtaining critical resources on other planets will be refined and enhanced. Genetic engineering may be used to better adapt humans, their crops and other biota to life in space or on other planetary surfaces – to withstand the effects of low or micro-gravity, radiation, and the psychological effects of long-duration spaceflight.

As nation after nation lands their inaugural exploratory vessels on our Earth’s moon, and as billionaire space enthusiasts race to launch passengers, satellites and other cargo into orbit, it’s clearly time for us to sit down as a species and debate whether our future will be one highlighted primarily by growth and discovery, opening the solar system to settlement and economic development, or one that eschews outward expansion for conservation and preservation. Doing so would allow us to focus our attentions on this planet, leaving the solar system in its natural state, a celestial Antarctica stretching beyond Neptune.

I vote for growth. But one person, or one company, one community, one nation, isn’t a plurality here. This debate - postponed for more than 50 years – is one worth having. Humanity’s future will be decided by its outcome.

#### Staying on the rock guarantees extinction---expansion and abundance of energy in space solve.

Futurism 13, a Recurrent Ventures media company based out of New York City, (“The Benefits of Colonizing Space: Space Habitats and The O'Neill Cylinder”, <https://futurism.com/space-habitats-and-the-oneill-cylinder>) //CHC-DS

Many argue that the world is in a state of crisis and that the human race is the cause. As a species, we are approaching an important turning point in our history, and if we make the wrong decisions we might be facing a future of deprivation, over population, hunger, and instability. Ultimately, many believe that we will eventually be forced to colonize space. Last year, the 100 Starship Symposium set on course a project to design and build an economical and practical spacecraft for interstellar travel.

But with the very immediate worries about over population, it might not be a good idea to wait for interstellar travel and the colonization of other worlds. Fortunately, there are also many suggestions in place for large space structures designed as places for people to live in their millions, much like a city is on Earth. Of course, building a space habitat comes with thousands of challenges, including: construction in space, recreating a livable atmosphere, recycling waste, producing artificial gravity, transporting food and materials to the habitat, and convincing people such a venture is worth it.

There's no strict definition for a 'space habitat', but it's generally agreed to be a permanent human living facility on a celestial body such as 'Mars One' (extra-terrestrial planets, moons, or in a spaceship orbiting the Earth). We may have no choice but to build one of these in the future, be it initiated as a matter of survival or an undeniable demand because of our desire to explore and gain new knowledge by expanding in space. Ultimately, there are a number of incentives to building such a habitat.

For governmental bodies and world leaders faced with a huge and unsustainable population, the concept of a space habitat would be attractive. Using the materials available in the Solar System, there is the potential to build enough surface area within space habitats to possibly house billions and even trillions of people. Populations would have the space to expand sustainably without destroying any current ecosystems, as well as relieving the pressure off Earth to provide resources. The planetary population could be stabilized and supported with the extra space to inhabit and develop agricultural plantations for food.

The expansion into space also offers up a wealth of privatized opportunities, such as access to energy and other interplanetary resources. On Earth, utilizing the Sun's energy via solar cells is a disappointingly inefficient process with unavoidable problems associated with the atmosphere and night. In space, solar panels would have access to nearly continuous light from the Sun, and in Earth's orbit this would give us 1400 watts of power per square meter (with 100% efficiency). This abundance of energy would mean that we could travel throughout much of the Solar System without a terribly significant drop in power.

Material resources would also be in abundance throughout the entire Solar System (especially if you include mining opportunities on Mars, Luna, and other moons). Asteroids contain almost all of the stable elements in the periodic table, and without gravity, extracting and transporting them for our uses could be done with ease. NASA is working on a project where one could manufacture fuel, building materials, water, and oxygen just from resources found the Moon. The shift from Earth based manufacturing and plantation to industries in space may not just become feasible, but incredibly economically beneficial.

#### Math says existential risk is significantly curtailed if we colonize space.

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In 2021, a new era of space exploration dawned with the first privately organized flights ferrying civilian passengers across the line that separates our planet from the rest of the universe. Much of the media coverage of the three flights launched by Virgin Galactic, Blue Origin and SpaceX has either been of the “isn’t this cool” variety or has characterized these endeavours as symbols of inequality. As such, the question of what the value of human spaceflight is has gone largely unanswered.

Supporters of space exploration sometimes suggest that sending robotic probes to the remote corners of the solar system and beyond can teach us what we need to know about the universe at less cost and risk than sending people. Yet, for the safety of our descendants and to reach humanity’s full potential, we must become a multiplanetary species.

Existential risk

Humans have a one in six chance of going extinct this century according to Oxford Philosopher Toby Ord. In his book, The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity, Dr Ord lays out a variety of long-tail risks that are both existential and very difficult to mitigate. These include nature-based risks like asteroids, large-scale volcanic eruptions and stellar explosions. Although we can track many of these phenomena, we do not have the technology (nor are we likely to develop it anytime soon) to prevent large eruptions or redirect large asteroids. Initial efforts to nudge space objects are just beginning. This is to say nothing of the human-created risks of nuclear war or bioweapons intentionally or unintentionally released on the public, a scenario made easier to imagine by the current pandemic.

As long as humanity is grouped together on a single planet there will always be a possibility that all of us can be killed at once. It is equivalent to having everyone in a single building: there is always a risk greater than zero of a collapse or fire that kills everyone. By establishing, at first, small outposts and eventually larger scale settlements on other planets, the risk of our species being destroyed is significantly curtailed.

Realizing humanity’s potential

On a more positive note, human habitation in a greater variety of settings will radically expedite science and commerce. While we currently have small-scale experimentation with manufacturing items in micro and zero gravity on the International Space Station, the potential for us to set up large-scale industry in different physics requires us to have a presence on other celestial locations.

Large-scale settlements of people are hubs of innovation and human flourishing. Just think of how many more discoveries and marvels could be created by 80 billion people in the future instead of today’s 8 billion. Our current planet has a limited carrying capacity but our solar system can accommodate many more people than any single planet can.

Just as cultural and geographic variety contributes to the richness of our current society, further expanding the diversity of human settings would continue to expand the creativity of our species. Space travel itself has already been an incredible inspiration to numerous scientists, engineers and artists with many people citing seeing the moon landing as one of the most formative events of their lives.

Hastening science and technology development

The technologies we develop on our way to becoming a multiplanetary species will also benefit us here on earth. Today, satellites are used to monitor carbon and other greenhouse gas emissions to give us a better picture of the causes of global warming and promote accountability. In her first speech devoted to space, US Vice-President Kalama Harris said: “I truly believe space activity is climate action.” In a recent report, the World Economic Forum's Global Future Council on Space laid out the many ways satellite data is being used to address climate change and suggests feeding data from space-based assets into an “Earth Operations Centre” to provide a real-time picture of activities and phenomena that contribute to warming.

Less well known are the many other technologies developed on our way to space but used in our daily lives. The CMOS sensor was first invented at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory in the 1990s. No one could have predicted that this technology would eventually be part of all our phones, enabling high-quality digital images and affecting everything from how we document human rights abuses to how we present ourselves to potential mates on dating apps.

### Link — AT: Ukraine

#### NATO assistance to Ukraine is anti-imperialist.

Achcar 22 [Gilbert Achcar; Professor of Development Studies and International Relations at the School of Oriental and African Studies, member of Anti\*Capitalist Resistance; 3-21-2022; "Six FAQs on Anti-Imperialism Today and the War in Ukraine"; International Viewpoint; https://internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article7571; KL]

Question 2: Wouldn’t Ukraine’s standing up against the Russian invasion benefit NATO?

The first thing to say is “so what?” Our support to peoples fighting imperialism shouldn’t depend on which imperialist side is backing them. Otherwise, by the same logic, justice should be sacrificed to the supreme battle against the “Western bloc,” as some argue in neo-campist pseudo-left circles. For my part, I wrote that a Russian success — an outcome that unfortunately still remains a real possibility — “would embolden US imperialism itself and its allies to continue their own aggressive behavior.” Indeed, the United States and its Western allies have already benefited enormously from Putin’s action. They should be warmly grateful to the Russian autocrat.

A successful Russian takeover of Ukraine would encourage the United States to return to the path of conquering the world by force in a context of exacerbation of the new colonial division of the world and worsening of global antagonisms, while a Russian failure — adding to the US failures in Iraq and Afghanistan — would reinforce what is called in Washington the “Vietnam syndrome.” Moreover, it seems quite obvious to me that a Russian victory would considerably strengthen warmongering and the push towards increased military spending in NATO countries, which has already gotten off to a flying start, while a Russian defeat would offer much better conditions for our battle for general disarmament and the dissolution of NATO.

If Ukraine were to succeed in rejecting the Russian yoke, it is more than likely that it would be vassalized to Western powers. But the point is that, if it fails to do so, it will be enserfed to Russia. And you don’t have to be a qualified medievalist to know that the condition of a vassal is incomparably preferable to that of a serf!

Question 3: How can we radical anti-imperialists support a resistance that is led by a rightwing bourgeois government?

Should we support a people that resists against an over-armed imperialist invasion only if its resistance is led by communists and not by a bourgeois government? This is a very old ultra-left position on the national question, which Lenin rightfully combatted in his time. A just struggle against national oppression, let alone foreign occupation, must be supported regardless of the nature of its leadership: if this fight is just, it implies that the population concerned actively participates in it and deserves support, regardless of the nature of its leadership.

It is certainly not the Ukrainian capitalists who are mobilizing en masse with the Ukrainian armed forces in the form of an improvised national guard and new-style “pétroleuses,” but the working people of Ukraine. And in their fight against Great Russian imperialism, led by an autocratic and oligarchic ultra-reactionary government in Moscow that presides over the destinies of one of the most unequal countries on the planet, the Ukrainian people deserve our full support. This certainly does not imply that we cannot criticize the Kyiv government.

Question 4: Isn’t the ongoing war an inter-imperialist war?

If any war where each side is supported by an imperialist rival were called an inter-imperialist war, then all the wars of our time would be inter-imperialist, since as a rule, it is enough for one of the rival imperialisms to support one side for the other to support the opposite side. An inter-imperialist war is not that. It is a direct war, and not one by proxy, between two powers, each of which seeks to invade the territorial and (neo)colonial domain of the other, as was very clearly the First World War. It is a “war of rapine” on both sides, as Lenin liked to call it.

To describe the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, in which the latter country has no ambition, let alone intention, of seizing Russian territory, and in which Russia has the stated intention of subjugating Ukraine and seizing much of its territory — to call this conflict inter-imperialist, rather than an imperialist war of invasion, is an extreme distortion of reality.

The primary, most immediate, function of the supply of arms to Ukraine is therefore that it helps it oppose its enserfment, even if, on the other hand, it wishes its vassalization in the belief that it is the only guarantee of its freedom. We must, of course, also oppose its vassalization, but for the time being, the most urgent need must be addressed.

Of course, the direct entry into war of the other imperialist camp would transform the current conflict into a true inter-imperialist war, in the correct sense of the concept, a type of war to which we are categorically hostile. For now, NATO members are declaring that they will not cross the red line of sending troops to fight the Russian armed forces on Ukrainian soil, or shooting down Russian planes in Ukrainian airspace — despite Volodymyr Zelensky’s exhortations. This is because they rightly fear a fatal spiral, skeptical, as they have become, about the rationality of Putin who did not hesitate to brandish the nuclear threat from the outset.

Question 5: Can we support Western arms deliveries to Ukraine?

Since the Ukrainians’ fight against the Russian invasion is just, it is quite right to help them defend themselves against an enemy far superior in numbers and armament. That is why we are without hesitation in favor of the delivery of defensive weapons to the Ukrainian resistance. But what does this mean?

An example: we are certainly in favor of delivering anti-aircraft missiles, portable and otherwise, to the Ukrainian resistance. To oppose it would be to say that Ukrainians only have to choose between, on the one hand, being massacred and seeing their cities destroyed by the Russian air force, without having the means they need to defend themselves, or, on the other hand, fleeing their country. At the same time, however, we must not only oppose the irresponsible idea of imposing a no-fly zone over Ukraine or part of its territory; we must also oppose the delivery of air fighters to Ukraine that Zelensky has been demanding. Fighters are not strictly defensive weaponry, and their supply to Ukraine would actually risk significantly aggravating Russian bombing.

In short, we are in favor of the supply to Ukraine of anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons, as well as all the armaments indispensable for the defense of a territory. To deny Ukraine these deliveries is simply to be guilty of failure to assist a people in danger! We have called for the delivery of such defensive weapons to the Syrian opposition in the past. The United States refused and even prevented its local allies from handing them over to the Syrians, in part because of the Israeli veto. We know what the consequences were.

#### Stop Westplaining Ukraine.

Zhong 22 [Sicheng Zhong; The Phoenix writer; 3-17-2022; “The Anti-War Left Should Stop Westplaining”; The Phoenix; <https://swarthmorephoenix.com/2022/03/17/the-anti-war-left-should-stop-westplaining/>; KL]

The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine has lasted nearly a month, killing over 3000 civilians and wounding more than 10000 of them. The humanitarian crisis has attracted much attention on campus, with students organizing vigils and fundraisers for disaster relief. Some progressives on campus, however, have adopted the Russian talking point, holding the West and NATO responsible for triggering the invasion. Curiously, their arguments, in line with realist scholars they usually despise like John Mearshimer and Stephen Waltz, mainly concern the security needs of the Russian state and the imperialist nature of NATO. They contend that the “imperialist,” U.S.-led NATO expansion, in violation of its promise to the Soviet Union before the unification of Germany, triggered heightened anxiety in Eastern Europe and pushed Russia to defend its sphere of influence via war. What’s more, being in the same camp as isolationists like Rand Paul, they also call for dialing down sanctions against “ordinary Russians,” and argue against any form of NATO intervention.

The seemingly innocent anti-war and anti-imperialist position taken by some progressives is harmful for Ukrainians and other oppressed peoples fighting against autocratic brutality for two reasons: 1) on the surface level, blaming NATO/the West denies any agency of Ukrainians and their legitimate wish to join NATO and embrace the West, and 2) in promoting their version of anti-imperialism, the anti-war left in fact embrace a form of U.S.-centrism that ignores atrocities committed by adversaries of the U.S., such as Russia, China, Cuba, Venezuela, and Iran.

Let’s take on the “Ukraine is the West’s fault” argument first. The problem of this proposition is that it assumes that without NATO expansion, Russia would behave differently. Both historical and contemporary empirical evidence suggests otherwise. Long before the establishment of NATO and since the reign of Ivan the Terrible I in the 16th century, Russia sought eastward expansion to secure its relatively weak geopolitical position that lacks strategic depth. As noted by renowned historian Stephen Kotkin, Russian foreign policy “has been characterized by soaring ambitions that have exceeded the country’s capabilities” for centuries. In a present day scenario, the best way for Russia to prevent the eastward expansion of NATO would be to station troops alongside the Russian-Ukrainian border without an invasion to achieve maximum deterrence effect and bargaining power. In fact, it was Russian aggression against Ukraine throughout the 21st century that accelerated Ukraine’s embrace of the EU and NATO. Public opinion polls suggest that immediately after the Cold War, only 37% of Ukrainians supported joining NATO. It was not until after the Orange Revolution, when Russia poisoned Yushchenko with neural toxins, that more than 50% of the Ukrainian public embraced the idea of a national referendum on joining NATO. After the Russian invasion of Crimea, the Ukrainian support for NATO reached a historical height, with more than 60% of Ukrainians embracing the idea. Breaking down Putin’s psyche, his rationale to attack Ukraine, and the puzzling optimistic evaluation before the war is a tall order. Historians are likely to debate causes of the war for decades, but it is clear that NATO expansion is not a major factor in Putin’s calculation to launch the war — he barely mentioned NATO in his war-declaration speech right before the invasion and declared Ukraine to be an imaginary state gifted by Lenin. If there is anything that can be learned from the ongoing war, however, it is that allowing Ukraine to join NATO in 2008 would likely have prevented the Russian invasion: the rock-solid peace and security in Poland and the Baltic states, countries that were traditionally in the Russian sphere of influence, are the best example of how NATO manages to protect member states from Russian aggression.

Contending with the uncomfortable idea that the vast majority of Ukrainians support NATO and that NATO could have protected Ukraine, the anti-war left, as represented by Marjorie Cohn who gave a talk at Swarthmore on March 2, 2022, often resorts to conspiracy theories backed by the Kremlin, claiming that the current pro-West administration was the result of the “illegimate neo-Nazi coup” of 2014 backed by the U.S. It is essentially a claim that not only contradicts with reality but also removes any agency vested in the Ukrainian people.

What is more disturbing than the flawed argument that ignores internal political dynamics and political agency of Ukraine is its moral implication: by identifying the U.S. as the only “bad guy” in the world, leftists ignore and indirectly whitewash the evils committed by autocrats around the world. Indeed, U.S. progressives are facing an intellectual dilemma between criticizing U.S. imperialism and addressing oversea authoritarianism today. They believe that criticizing autocracies in the global south would undermine their project of dismantling U.S. imperialism — an entirely false proposition, of course.

For years, they have focused primarily on wrongdoings of the U.S., in part because of this one-dimensional anti-imperialist project, but also because of the unconscious U.S.-centrism that inevitably results from solely focusing on U.S. behaviors. The anti-war left has criticized the U.S./the CIA, without concrete evidence, for offering support to pro-democracy protesters in Syria, Hong Kong, and Venezuela, and has been largely absent on issues such as the annexation of Crimea, Assad’s war crimes against civilians, Iran’s proxy wars in the Middle East, and China’s treatment of ethnic minorities and Hong Kong. Instead, they focused mostly on where they deemed U.S. policy to be wrong, like in regards to dealings with Yemen, Israel/Palestine, and Cuba. Why was this the case? The current generation of the anti-war left, born at the end of the Cold War, have never experienced real threats firsthand from other great powers. Instead, they grew up in an America-dominated world in which the power of the U.S. was largely unchecked. As such, their worldviews were shaped by events such as the invasion of Iraq, where an omnipotent U.S. failed to sustain its moral claim of establishing a democracy to replace the Saddam regime. Thus, those born in this generation spent their formative years criticizing the U.S. regime with a deep sense of guilt. This introspective guilt, coupled with continued unchallenged U.S. dominance, resulted in the millennial anti-war left supporting the very ideas they attempted to criticize: U.S. dominance and imperialism.

In adopting this viewpoint, the anti-war left ended up where they exactly did not want to be: U.S.-centric. As mentioned before, many progressives have ignored human rights violations and atrocities caused by many foreign powers — Russia in Syria; Iran in Yemen, Iraq, and Lebanon; and China in Hong Kong and Xinjiang — because these countries are adversaries of the U.S. and can potentially undermine U.S. dominance. Moreover, instead of helping activists within these authoritarian countries, anti-war progressives view them as agents of the U.S.’s imperialist interests and advocate for U.S. isolationism, even when real-life human rights atrocities were being committed against civilians. This is another mistake caused by their belief that only the U.S. is capable of wielding real power in a unipolar world and that critical events happening in other countries have their roots in an American-centric system.

This “anti-war” worldview, in part due to the breakdown of the moral legacy of the U.S.- led, pro-democracy, and pro-openness post-Cold War order after the Iraq War, not only takes agency away from other oppressed peoples living under and being threatened by autocrats in Russia, China, Iran, and etc., but also indirectly promotes another form of U.S.-centrism, in which only the U.S. is deemed to have any real power over the global events. Progressive millennials now face the intellectual challenge of refraining from ‘westplaining’ Ukraine and aligning their worldview with moral claims about freedom and self-determination both home and abroad. Facing growing challenges posed by autocratic and inherently imperialist powers like Russia and China, leftists in the U.S. should unequivocally stand on the side of democracy rather than apologize for autocrats and their expansionist aggression in the name of “anti-imperialism.”

### Link — AT: Western IR

#### The assumption of Eurocentric IR as fundamentally incompatible with the alternative paradoxically re-asserts its power --- the perm is preferable because it denies an ontological division between the ‘West’ and ‘The Rest’

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Ontologies of Otherness: Liberal–local relations, ‘hybridity’, ‘resistance’ and the ‘everyday’

Sensitive to the problem of such occlusion, a major strand of recent literature has emphasized the need to rethink the relations between the ‘liberal’ and the ‘local’ in intervention settings (Mac Ginty, 2011; Richmond, 2009, 2010, 2011), in what has been labelled a ‘fourth generation’ approach (Richmond, 2011). This writing has taken a much more proactive approach to research with and about the peoples targeted by intervention, aiming to correct the impression of smooth liberal transformation and the ‘romanticization’ of the local (Mac Ginty, 2011: 2–4). Yet, the paths it has taken have, quite unwillingly, reinforced a Eurocentric understanding of intervention, through the use of an ontology of ‘Otherness’ to frame the issues. Prominent among these accounts is Richmond’s (2009, 2010, 2011) recent work on ‘post-liberal peace’, which frames the key problems of intervention through an ontological distinction between the ‘liberal’ and the ‘local’. In earlier writing, the liberal peace is elaborated as genealogically endogenous to Western traditions of thought, reflecting Enlightenment, modern and post-Christian values (Richmond, 2005). In post-conflict settings, however, it is critiqued for exercising forms of hegemony that suppress pluralism, depoliticize peace, undermine the liberal social contract and exercise a colonial gaze in its treatment of local ‘recipients’ of the liberal peace. In view of these various aspects of failure, the liberal peace is characterized as ‘ethically bankrupt’ (Richmond, 2009: 558) and requiring re-evaluation. The ‘local’, on the other hand, is a space characterized by ‘context, custom, tradition and difference in its everyday setting’ (Richmond, 2010: 669), which is suppressed by liberal peace interventions. The very conception of the ‘post-liberal peace’ is thus about the ways in which two ontologically distinct elements – the ‘liberal’ and the ‘local’ – are ‘rescued and reunited’ via forms of hybridity and empathy, in which ‘everyday local agencies, rights, needs, custom and kinship are recognized as discursive “webs of meaning”’ (Richmond, 2010: 668). Mitchell (2011: 1628) has recently argued that Richmond’s conception of the ‘local’ is not ‘a reference to parochial, spatially, culturally or politically bounded places’ but ‘the potentialities of local agents to contest, reshape or resist within a local “space”’. Richmond (2011: 13–14) himself has also been concerned not to be understood as ‘essentializing’ the ‘local’, emphasizing that it contains a diversity of forms of political society. Indeed, in this more recent work, a more complex conception of the ‘everyday’ as a space of action, thought and potential resistance is elaborated. Despite these qualifications, however, there is much conflation, interchangeability and slippage between these conceptions of the ‘local’. Accordingly, the ontology of Otherness, understood as cultural distinctiveness and alterity, continuously surfaces throughout the narratives of liberal and post-liberal peace. Not only is the liberal peace closely linked to the intellectual trajectory of the ‘West’, but a conception of the ‘local’ as non-modern and non-Western often re-appears: This requires that local academies and policymakers beyond the already liberal international community are enabled to develop theoretical approaches to understanding their own predicaments and situations, without these being tainted by Western, liberal, and developed world orthodoxies and interests. In other words, to gain an understanding of the ‘indigenous’ and everyday factors for the overall project of building peace, liberal or otherwise, a via media needs to be developed between emergent local knowledge and the orthodoxy of international prescriptions and assumptions about peace. (Richmond, 2009: 571, emphasis added) There is a clear emphasis here on the need to engage with the ‘indigenous’ or ‘authentic’ traditions of non-Western life, which seems to reflect an underlying assumption of cultural difference as the primary division between these two parties. This reproduces the division between the liberal, rational, modern West and a culturally distinct space of the ‘local’. Indeed, the call for a post-liberal peace is often a call for peacebuilding to reflect a more ‘culturally appropriate form of politics’ (Richmond, 2011: 102) that is more empathetic and emancipatory. This emphasis on tradition and cultural norms as constitutive of the ‘local’ is carried through in recent research on interventions in Timor Leste and the Solomon Islands. These focus largely on the reinvigoration of ‘customary’ houses and institutions as a form of ‘critical agency’ in distinction to liberal institutions and the state (Richmond, 2011: 159–182). The point here is not simply that there is an account of alterity or cultural difference within the politics of intervention, but that the liberal/local distinction appears to be the central ontological fulcrum upon which the rest of the political and ethical problems sit (see also Chandler, 2010b: 153). Therefore, ‘local’ or ‘everyday’ ‘agency’ is seen to be best expressed to the extent that it reclaims ‘the customary’ and is not ‘co-opted’ by the internationals. It is understood as enhanced where codes of ‘customary law’ become part of the new constitutional settlement. A similar division can be seen in Mac Ginty’s (2011) framework, which sees the hybridities in peacebuilding as emerging at the intersection of the ‘international’ and ‘local’ agents and institutions. Again, this framework is built on an ontological distinction between the two that repeatedly splits the ‘Western’/‘international’ from the ‘non-Western’/‘local’. Even though this is well qualified, overall Mac Ginty (2011: 94) defends this distinction, arguing that if one were to abandon such potentially problematic labels then this would lead to an abandonment of research altogether. This can quite straightforwardly be read as a defence of the basic ontology of the project, which is an ontology of the distinction between the West and its Others, which meet through various forms of hybridization. While Mac Ginty does not pursue the ethics of the post-liberal peace in the same way as Richmond, the underlying intellectual framework also uses this distinction as the analytic pivot of the research. We earlier defined Eurocentrism as the belief in Western distinctiveness, and I have argued that this is philosophically fundamental to this strand of the critical literature that grapples with the relationship between the ‘liberal’ and the ‘local’. This strand has put substantial analytic weight on fundamental cultural differences between these two entities, even while disavowing any essentialism and making some substantive conceptual efforts to move away from this. Such difficulties are indicative of the deep hold that this particular avatar of Eurocentrism has on the critical imaginary. By contrast, the point made by a wide variety of other ‘postcolonial’ writers has precisely been against such an ontology of the international, pointing instead to the historically blurred, intertwined and mutually constituted character of global historical space and ‘culture’ (Bhabha, 2004; Bhambra, 2010).

#### Non-western IR essentializes cultural tropes of non-US peoples---turns the K, reifies imperialism and undermines any intellectual gains in their framework

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During the last decade, the field of International Relations (IR) has witnessed the emergence of ‘non-Western IR theory’. Acharya and Buzan’s seminal work titled Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and Beyond Asia (2009) marked a watershed for the discipline. Acharya and Buzan’s book contributed to a disciplinary self-reflection, which resulted in a wide range of academic publications aimed at turning the field of IR into a more pluralistic discipline that respects the subaltern voices that have been silenced by the imperial origins of IR. For this reason, the celebration of ‘cultural diversity’ as an ontological source has become the central focus of new theoretical endeavours. Both the projects of ‘Global IR’ (Acharya, 2016; Yong-Soo, 2019) led by the prestigious scholar Amitav Acharya and the various ‘national schools of International Relations’ (Cho, 2013; Qin, 2018; Shahi, 2019; Shih et al., 2019; Yan, 2019; Zhao, 2019) are prime examples of this new phenomena. Despite the welcoming efforts of promoting ‘cultural diversity’ (Acharya, 2016; Reus-Smit, 2018; Tickner and Blaney, 2012) to produce theoretical projects that seek to transcend both the ‘Western’ and ‘imperial’ origins of the discipline, the field of IR has fallen into a dangerous dynamic that stems from the very imperial origins of discipline: the reification of culture as an essentialist construction. In this sense, essentialism is ‘the view that cultures have fundamental or “essential” properties, among them their values and beliefs’ (Goodhart 2003, p.940). In the late 19th century, Western imperialism had to imagine essentialist cultural forms beyond the domains of the ‘West’ to rationalise its ‘civilising mission’ (Said, 2014). In a historical and disciplinary twist, both the celebration of ‘cultural diversity’ and the promotion of pluralism have allowed and legitimised the arrival of ‘essentialist’ theoretical projects by a disciplinary ‘back door’. Put it differently, in an act of disciplinary redemption, the field of IR has accepted forms of theorising that would have been disqualified some years ago due to their essentialist tendency. For instance, the celebrated ‘Chinese school of IR’ solely reactivates Confucianism as an ontological source, dismissing thus other political traditions that exist or have existed in China such as 1930’s revolutionary Chinese thought, Mao Zedong’s thought, Buddhism or even a ‘sinicised’ Islam. In this way, only Confucianism is equated with Chineseness. Regarding the project of ‘Global IR’, Hurrel (2016, p.150), wisely warned us about the dangers of Global IR as it ‘can also lead to a cultural and regional inwardness that may work to reproduce the very ethnocentricities that are being challenged’. This is perhaps one of the main paradoxes that exist in IR given the massive and recent disciplinary efforts to evade such ‘essentialist’ constructions. This is what I call the ‘trap of diversity’ in IR. It is worth mentioning that the production of ‘non-Western IR theory’ has manifested several degrees of ‘essentialism’. Although, there are some great contributions (Hurrel, 2016) that seek to transcend these dynamics. Nonetheless, I contend that such essentialism that informs the production of ‘non-Western IR theory’ is a result of the impact of the ‘dual legacy’ (Chibber, 2018) of Edward Said’s Orientalism in the discipline of IR. As Chibber (2018, p.37) argues ‘[Said’s] legacy is therefore a dual one – propelling the critique of imperialism into the very heart of the mainstream on the one hand, but also giving strength to intellectual fashions that have undermined the possibility of that very critique’. Specifically, in the field of ‘non-Western IR theory’, these academic trends have been crystallised in (neo)-Weberian and postmodern approaches and a problematic scholarly tendency to understand the production of international theory as an independent intellectual process that is completely disjointed from a specific form of political economy or material reality. In this light, the main challenge that the IR discipline has to address is the legacy of ‘Western cultural imperialism’, in an idealist fashion, rather than the specific social and geo-economic structure that both enabled and shaped the form in which ‘Western IR’ has been materialised since 1919. As a result of this idealist critique, it is widely recognised that ‘cultural representation’ (Acharya, 2014) is indeed the deep structural problem of the IR discipline rather than the material historical pillars and infrastructure that enabled its emergence. The logical consequence of this has been the mainstream approach that understands ‘non-Western IR thought’ as the theory produced in non-western societies, which are in opposition to the conventional geography of an eternal ‘West’. Hence the apparent importance of Confucianism, Hinduism or political Islam as ‘non-Western’ ontological sources in the new theoretical formulations. The activation of such cultural imaginaries as ontological foundations from ‘non-Western’ societies in the context of the production of ‘non-Western IR theory’ is conceived as the logical step towards a more pluralistic and ‘cultural’ egalitarian discipline. It is worth clarifying that I am not arguing against cultural diversity. Cultural diversity is the very foundation of humanity. On the contrary, I argue that it is important to critically engage with the very enterprise of ‘non-Western IR theory’ in its current disciplinary form. Despite the respectable efforts to turn the IR discipline into a more pluralistic field, critical scholars have taken for granted the essentialist notion of ‘non-Western IR theory’, uncritically assuming that such theory is only produced in non-Western societies in a binary contrast to that of conventional IR. This not only reifies ‘the West’ as an eternal and fixed entity but also orientalises the ‘non-West’. For this reason, this article seeks to answer the following question: what constitutes ‘non-Western IR theory’.

To properly analyse the production of ‘non-Western IR theory’, we first need to sketch out what we mean by ‘the West’ and its relationship with the emergence of the IR discipline. In the next section, following the work of Kees van der Pijl, I will define the ‘West’ as what he describes as the ‘Lockean Heartland’. The ‘Lockean heartland’ and the origins of the IR discipline In his work titled The Discipline of Western Supremacy. Modes of Foreign Relations and political economy, volume III, the critical scholar Kees van der Pijl (2014) attributed the origins of the IR discipline to the imperial pulses of what he describes as the ‘Lockean heartland’ (1998, 2006, 2007, 2014). According to Van der Pijl (2006, p.13), ‘the heartland is therefore best understood not as some massive central island but as a networked social and geo-economic structure comprising a number of (originally English speaking) states and a regulatory infrastructure. Expansion occurs on two dimensions: one of capital, to global proportions; and the other of the West, which by definition has a more limited reach. In their combined advance across the globe, the two progress in tandem was a way of live, a culture, and a politics, with their means of coercion complementing discipline’. Its Lockean nature stemmed from the specific legal culture which was epitomised by Locke’s Two Treatises of Government that took a transnational form after the immigration from the British Isles to North America and the settle colonialism that followed thereafter. Such state/complex was sealed in the British Isles after the Glorious Revolution in 1688. According to Van der Pijl (2006, p.8), ‘the Lockean state, governed by a constitutional monarch controlled by a parliament, is the true bourgeois political formation; a state that ‘serves’ a largely self-regulating, ‘civil’ society by protecting private property at home and abroad’. This last point is crucial because it was the main ontological source of the idealist IR theory produced in the ‘Lockean heartland’ at the beginning of the 20th century. In parallel, during the 17th century, the expansion of the heartland and the Protestant Reformation mounted geopolitical pressures on other contender states such as catholic France. To not be dispossessed and ‘resist peripheralization by the Lockean heartland’ (Van der Pijl 1998, p.78) and catch-up with it, France was forced to develop a strong state. The specific form of the new French state was described by Van der Pijl (1998, p.79) as the ‘prototype of the Hobbesian contender state’. Such Hobbesian state/complex was characterised by ‘the paramountcy of the state as the institution driving forward the social formation and pre-emptively shaping, by action, sometimes revolution from above, the social institutions which have evolved ‘organically, if not necessarily autonomously, in the heartland’ (Van der Pijl 1998, p.80). In such state/complex, society is completely confiscated in favour of the social and economic development of the state. As I will demonstrate later on, this point is crucial to understand the production of ‘non-Western IR theory’. As Van der Pijl (1998, p.83; 2006, p.1) argues, the structure of the ‘Lockean heartland’ vis-a-vis contender states has been the main structural divide of world politics since the European Enlightenment until the present. The evolution of international affairs has been characterised by the expansion of the ‘Lockean heartland’ and the (semi or full) integration of several contender states such as France, Prussia, Japan, the Soviet Union, China to its expansionist network. Against this backdrop, the origins of the IR discipline in 1919 was marked by the willingness of the Anglo-American ruling elites of the heartland via education institutions to produce academic knowledge to legitimise and guide their imperial expansion. For this reason, as Schmidt argues in (Van der Pijl 2014, p. viii) ‘the academic discipline is marked by British, and especially, American parochialism’. As we have seen since its origins, the evolution of IR has gone hand in hand with the imperial project of the Liberal West after the First World War. Due to the historical evolution of the ‘Lockean heartland’ and its dialectical relation with other contender states, the production of international thought in its core was crystallised in an idealist form. As Walker (1993, p.42) points out, ‘if it is necessary to identify a tradition of international relations theory, then the most appropriate candidate is not ‘realism’ but ‘idealism’. As Van der Pijl argues (2014, p.ix), ‘English-speaking social thought, which today dominates academic life the world over, remains locked into the antinomy between (materialist) empiricism and (religious-idealist) moral judgement. Contender states and ‘non-Western IR theory’ With this in mind, I argue that, paradoxically, the current production of mainstream ‘non-Western IR theory’ (Cho, 2013; Qin, 2018; Shahi, 2019; Shih et al., 2019; Yan, 2019; Zhao, 2019) has been informed by the antinomy between (materialist) empiricism and (religious-idealist) moral judgement, which is the main characteristic of the ‘English-speaking social thought’ and not that of other external societies to the Lockean heartland. In this vein, despite the influences of Daoism and Confucianism in their theoretical propositions, both Qin’s constructivist relational theory (2018) and Yan’s moral realism (2019) are a case in point. The existence of such persistent antinomy explains why the production of ‘non-Western IR theory’ has been materialised in its current form and its unable to transcend the logics imbued by the imperial origins of the discipline. On the contrary, to overcome the ‘trap of diversity’ in the field of IR, I propose an alternative path to conceive the development of ‘non-Western IR theory’. Against culturalist approaches, I argue that ‘non-Western IR thought’ should be better understood as the knowledge informed by the legacy of the structural experience of several historical contender states since the 18th century. Put it differently, the production of ‘non-Western IR thought’, rather than being a product of a reified and sealed cultural background, is the logical consequence of the knowledge that emerges from a specific structural position of a given society within the wider historical structure of the ‘Lockean heartland’ vis-a-vis contender states. In this vein, the distinctiveness of the production of international knowledge in the ‘non-West’ is not solely manifested by a cultural divergence but a structural one. In this light, the primacy of the state over society, which is one of the main characteristics of the contender states experience, is perhaps one of the fundamental ontological foundations that has shaped the production of ‘non-Western IR Theory’ since the 18th century. For this reason, in addition to the ‘Global IR’ and the ‘national schools of IR’, the international thought produced in contender states such as 18th century France, Prussia, imperial Japan or the Soviet Union could also be described as being produced in a non-Western setting. For instance, following my argument, ontologically speaking, Prussian political realism which is always regarded as the quintessential IR theory of the ‘universal’ West, has more in common with the Qin’s Confucian relational IR project (Qin, 2018) than with Anglo-Saxon liberalism. Both theoretical projects are shaped by the same ontological premise of the primacy of the state over society. For this reason, in the context of the production of IR theory in China, the reactivation of Confucianism as an ontological source to build the ‘Chinese school of IR’ is not a solely consequence of its eternal existence within the Chinese civilization but also due its political meaning within the wider structural position of China. Put it differently, Confucianism is indeed a political tradition that gives primacy of the state over society and can rationalize best the structural contender posture of contemporary China. This crucial structural ontological foundation that shapes the production of ‘non-Western IR theory’ is one of the elements that has been obscured by the dominant essentialist approaches that exist within the discipline of IR. During the past decade, the field has tended to emphasise the ontological value of ‘cultural otherness’ rather than the existence of universal structural elements that are reproduced in different cultural settings due to the geopolitical pressures of the ‘Lockean heartland’. The obscuration of this crucial point not only has to do with the internal evolution of the IR discipline in the Anglo-American academia and its postmodern drift, but also with the neoliberal forces that has shaped the discipline since the 1980s. Davenport (2019, p.535) argues that these ‘debates [the Third Debate] should be understood, in both its timing and its substance, as a phenomenon of neoliberal globalization: it was the reflection into disciplinary IR of the enormous transformations through with so many of the structures and hierarchies that had characterized the modern age were disintegrated’. It is worth mentioning that I am not dismissing the importance of culture in the process of production of IR theory. Cultural multiplicity plays a fundamental role in shaping theoretical knowledge and the diverse cosmovisions that enable communities to make sense of the world. Nonetheless, with the alternative path that I have outlined above, I attempt to denaturalise the deep-seated interpretation of the problematic dichotomy between ‘Western IR theory’ vs ‘non-Western IR theory’ which is reproduced in most of the mainstream literature on ‘non-Western IR theory’.

Conclusion

This article has argued that the uncritical engagement with ‘cultural diversity’ in the discipline of IR, which has been epitomised by the development of ‘non-Western IR theory’, has not succeeded in transcending the ‘imperial’ or ‘Western’ origins of the discipline. On the contrary, the interpretation of the production of non-Western International thought as the knowledge produced by societies beyond the territories of the West has reinforced new forms of essentialism. This is what I have described as ‘the trap of diversity’ in IR. For this reason, the form in which ‘non-Western IR theory’ has materialised should be understood as a form of disciplinary ‘identity politics’, a struggle for the representation of abstract and reified cultural entities, rather than as a real theoretical challenge to question its imperial foundations and the material infrastructure that enabled that specific production of knowledge. In other words, I maintain that these approaches are a disciplinary ‘dead-end’.

### ! — Extinction

#### Extinction outweighs.

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There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we — whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists — should all agree that we should try to save the world.

According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future — there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions.

There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view — according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people — the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives.

You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character.

What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize ~~her~~ [their] own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk — perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act).

To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility — suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk.

We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk — not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future — there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation).

### ! — Nuclear War

#### Reject preventable nuclear war — the risk is underestimated and only survivors will be the agents of destruction.

Scarry 19, PhD, Professor of English at Harvard (Elaine Scarry, 2019, Interview, Representations, 146.1) \*language edited — brackets

RA: At the Buffalo conference on pain, you gave a paper that built on some of the insights of your then most recent book, Thermonuclear Monarchy. 1 In the book, you demonstrate the incompatibility of democracy and nuclear arms at least in part on the grounds that, by the nature of their deployment, nuclear arms make it impossible for the populace to consent to their use. In your talk, you made a different but related claim that focused on the relative silence of the population regarding nuclear arms in the post-Cold War era. You were concerned, in particular, with the difficulties of imagining the consequences of nuclear war. I wonder if you could expand on this second point: why it is so hard to think about nuclear war. ES: The two points are deeply related. The architecture of nuclear arms requires that the population be eliminated from the decision about going to war. It also requires that Congress be eliminated from the decision about going to war—just because the nature of the technology requires a tiny number of people to do the launch. The result of that architecture is that people eventually, over seven decades, have internalized the fact that they’re worthless when it comes to the need to defend the country and to carry out acts of mutual aid toward one another. We now simply abandon the right of self-defense and the right of mutual aid and give unlimited injuring power to the executive branch of government and fall silent. RA: How much responsibility, how much blame, does one give to the population for remaining silent? ES: That has always been a question. Gandhi said, ‘‘You can wake a man who’s asleep, but you can’t wake a man who’s pretending to be asleep.’’ His statement marks a fork in the road. If the population has been anesthetized and is genuinely asleep, then they are morally innocent (even if infantilized and terribly reduced as moral agents). If instead the population is pretending to be asleep, we are morally culpable: the population is complicit with the genocide that’s standing in the wings waiting to happen. During my lecture and in many years of working on disarmament, I stressed the first path and tried to outline why waking up is difficult. In recent months, I’ve moved closer to the position that your question identifies, the responsibility of the population. I feel the force of Martin Luther King’s statement, ‘‘There comes a time when silence is betrayal.’’ I’m almost at the point of believing that there is a wanton refusal to [recognize] ~~see~~ the imminent peril, a refusal to understand not just that we have a responsibility to reverse it, to dismantle it, but that we have the ability to do so, and that if we don’t, it is going to happen. I don’t know if it’s going to happen this year. Or whether it’s going to happen this century. But it’s almost inconceivable that it isn’t going to happen. RA: Why is it that people have such a hard time understanding this? If you allow that people might honestly and ardently be trying to understand, what is it that is getting in the way? ES: Four or five answers come to mind. First, people often lack key pieces of information. If you ask someone in this country which nations have nuclear weapons, they are likely to say Iraq (which has none), Iran (which has none), or North Korea (which has fewer than 60; leading experts say fewer than 20). The United States has 6,500. The United States and Russia together own 93 percent of the world arsenal: the other 7 percent is owned by the other seven nuclear states—in order of numerical possession, France, China, the United Kingdom, Pakistan, India, Israel, and North Korea (see fig. 1). An equally profound misconception held by US citizens is the belief that our nuclear architecture is for ‘‘defense’’ and ‘‘retaliation.’’ In fact we have had a ‘‘presidential first-use’’ policy for the whole nuclear age. The profound obscenity of that arrangement, which has only begun to be glimpsed with the current president, has been an equally grave moral wrong from day one. Second, even when American ~~citizens~~ [denizens] and residents have this information, the outcome is derealized by its being future—that is, the unreality something has by having not yet happened is conflated with the unreality something might have by being merely imaginary. People, it’s true, are uninformed. But once they become informed, even then the flash of insight fades from their eyes after about ten minutes. RA: Why do you think that is? ES: Because they think ‘‘future’’ equals ‘‘unreal.’’ But we need to stop and understand what we mean by ‘‘future.’’ If it takes 10,000 steps to put a nuclear architecture into place, 9,999 steps have already been completed: we know how to split the atom; we know how to provide enriched uranium; we know how to deliver the bomb; we’ve completed not only the theoretical steps but the materialization steps: we’ve made the bombs; we’ve completed the delivery systems—Ohio-class submarines, the land-based ICBMs, and airdelivery B-2s and B-52s. Unlike in China and India, the weapons in the United States are already ‘‘mated’’ to the delivery systems; they are on alert; specific weapons have been assigned to specific cities in the countries of present enemies and, yes, even potential enemies. One step remains: the order to launch. So 9,999 steps are present and accounted for; one remains undone. While the 9,999 steps took vast amounts of time and resources, the last one is designed to be carried out in minutes. The word ‘‘future’’ does not apply to the 9,999 steps, only to the last one. When people decline to address the nuclear peril on the grounds that it is an ‘‘unreal’’ worry because ‘‘following the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki it hasn’t yet happened,’’ they are unknowingly allying themselves with the position that our own Department of State and Department of Defense took in 1995. At that time, seventy-eight countries asked the International Court of Justice to declare the possession, threat of use, and use of nuclear weapons illegal on the basis of the humanitarian and environmental instruments such as the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Geneva Protocols, the Declaration of Saint Petersburg, the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Poverty, and many others. Though the United States worked to invalidate the application of these protocols to our nuclear weapons one at a time, an argument they used over and over was that the firing of the weapons was ‘‘future,’’ hence ‘‘hypothetical,’’ hence ‘‘suppositional’’—this despite the billions of dollars that each year go into polishing and oiling the architecture of earth’s destruction to keep it in a present-tense state of constant readiness. RA: At the conference you also spoke about the problem of ‘‘statistical compassion.’’ ES: Let’s call that the third reason why the population is asleep. American indifference to our own genocidal nuclear architecture comes from the constraints on compassion when large numbers of people [become] ~~stand~~ to be injured. Public health physicians distinguish between narrative compassion (where one or two or three people are at risk) and statistical compassion (where thousands or millions are at risk).2 We’re fairly good at the first, and have many occasions to strengthen our capacity through daily acts of friendship and from reading literature. We’re terrible at the second, and have almost no training in strengthening our feeble abilities in this region. The nuclear peril of course entails the second: recent work on nuclear winter by Alan Robock and his colleagues shows that if even a small fraction of the current world arsenal is fired (one one-hundredth of one percent of the total available blast power), forty-four million people will be casualties on the first afternoon and one billion in the weeks following. The small shrug people make when the subject of nuclear weapons comes up—the little lift and fall of the shoulders—means they have just run a quick check on their interior brain-and-soul equipment and can report: nope, nothing in there in the way of statistical compassion. RA: Narrative compassion and statistical compassion seem to take place in widely separate spheres. How then do you see them coming into conflict with each other? ES: For me, a frightening example occurred in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, the wholly admirable body that sets the Doomsday Clock (now at two minutes to midnight) and that works round the clock to educate the people of the United States and the world about the hazards of nuclear weapons. Yet in commemorating the seventieth anniversary of the Nagasaki bombing in August of 2015, they published a historically factual narrative about the pilots of the plane delivering the atom bomb to Nagasaki, how many things went wrong and had to be repaired midflight. The lead-in read, ‘‘A typhoon was coming, the fuel pump failed, they had to switch planes, things were wired incorrectly, they missed their rendezvous, they couldn’t see the primary target, they ran out of gas on the way home, and they had to crash-land.’’ But the worst part was when ‘‘the Fat Man atomic bomb started to arm itself, mid-flight.’’3 The story, narrated in edge-ofyour-seat suspense, is an example of narrative compassion utterly preempting the possibility of statistical compassion: the crew might die, but if they had in fact died over the Pacific, tens of thousands of persons would not have been burned into nonexistence that day. RA: Your emphasis at the conference was on the nature of physical pain itself. ES: Yes, that was my central subject. In terms of our conversation now, we can say that a fourth and fifth reason for indifference arise from the difficulty of comprehending pain, whether it takes place in one person’s body or in the bodies of millions, and whether it occurs in the past, present, or future. (But if I were listing the reasons in the order of importance, these two would be near the top.) Once we exhaust a small handful of adjectives for physical pain, two (and almost only two) metaphors arise: the metaphor of the weapon (one may say it feels as though a knife is sticking in my shoulder blade even if it isn’t); and that of body damage (one may say it feels as though my elbow has snapped in two, even if it hasn’t). The Body in Pain concentrates on problems arising from the first; a later essay (‘‘Among Schoolchildren’’) concentrates on the second.4 Both metaphors, if carefully controlled, can help us understand the felt experience of another person’s pain; but both are highly volatile and can lead us far away from understanding. An example of the benign or genuinely expressive potential is provided by findings in neuroscience that we have mirror neurons that help us recognize another person’s physical pain. When you look at the actual experiments that were done, however, you see that the test subject is asked not to listen to a sufferer’s report of pain but to observe, for example, a pin being stuck into someone’s hand or the administration of a small electric shock. The experiments show not our comprehension of another person’s pain but our recognition of the aversivenes of being subjected to a weapon—often closely related to but by no means identical with physical pain. The very fact that a weapon can be separated from the site of the injury means that the attributes of pain can be lifted away from the sufferer and conferred on the agents inflicting the harm, so now it is not the pain that is world destroying but the inflictor of the pain. There are many examples of this in the case of nuclear weapons. For example, the mushroom cloud is often regarded as ‘‘awesome,’’ some even say ‘‘sublime.’’ But the hibakasha, the survivors in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, say, ‘‘We saw no mushroom cloud.’’ A mushroom cloud is what you see if you’re an observer far away, seated high in the sky in the airplane that dropped the weapon, or standing on the ground scores of miles beyond the radius of the harm. Like any sensible mortal, I admire J. Robert Oppenheimer, but his endlessly quoted statement following the Trinity test, ‘‘I remembered the line from the Hindu scripture ...I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds,’’ allows the scale of the injury to be transferred across the weapon and conferred on the agents, who now perceive themselves as magnificent, thrilling, almighty in their power. Oppenheimer even prefaces the quotation by saying that Vishnu here takes on a multi-armed form ‘‘to impress’’ the prince. The name he chose for the test, ‘‘Trinity,’’ shows this same fabrication of godlikeness. What if instead Oppenheimer had said, ‘‘I remembered the goddess Guanyin whose name means ‘The one who perceives the sounds of the world’ and the sounds I heard were excruciating cries, unbearable shrieks of tens of thousands scalded together in an instant of molten flesh.’’ The first statement is a fiction: Oppenheimer is neither a multi-armed god nor a three-personed god; the second statement (could we hear Guanyin) is accurate; if we could internalize and practice the second statement, we would disarm immediately. The image of the nuclear weapon, which might help make visible the pain and suffering it will bring about, instead captures the gigantic scale of the suffering, only to lift that ‘‘giganticism’’ away from the site of suffering altogether and confer it on the human agents—ordinary men, small in stature and in number, but who now appear gigantic. Insofar as any shred of ‘‘suffering’’ still remains visible, we believe it is the suffering of the nowgigantic human agent who is in mighty peril. Thus the nation spends billions of dollars on a presidential fallout shelter while convincing the public that fallout shelters for the population are ridiculous. In Thinking in an Emergency, and again in Thermonuclear Monarchy, I contrast the Swiss shelter system—Swiss law requires that every house have a fallout shelter;5 the law was reaffirmed in a 2003 referendum that had an 80 percent turnout at the polls—with the staggering constructions that have been made in the United States for... the people? no—for the president and those close to him, a shelter inside a mountain, with buildings and a lake that is, according to observers, large enough for waterskiing. One country, Switzerland, believes in what the Swiss call ‘‘equality of survival’’; the other country, the United States, believes that only the agents of nuclear [disaster] ~~holocaust~~ deserve the chance for survival. Much more detail on the multiple presidential fallout shelters is described by Garrett M. Graff in a recent book, Raven Rock: The Story of the U.S. Government’s Secret Plan to Save Itself—While the Rest of Us Die. The nuclear architecture requires that either the weapon be invisible (buried in a submarine or buried in a cornfield, like the 450 ICBMs) or, when it is visible, it must become the path across which the magnificent prowess of the human agent is seen—he’s so thrilling, so important, so vulnerable; here, please, take my tax money, use all of it to protect the man who will launch our nuclear missiles. What should bring us to our knees in sorrow and shame instead brings about a dutiful salute to the thermonuclear monarch. If one thinks fallout shelters for the population are ridiculous (ignoring the fact that the medically sophisticated Swiss have data showing otherwise), then it is informative to contrast the money lavished on our nuclear architecture with ordinary forms of safety structures for the population like bridges, dams, roads, levees. The American Society of Civil Engineers, in their 2017 report on infrastructure, gave our bridges a ‘‘Cþ’’ (56,000 are ‘‘structurally deficient’’), our dams a ‘‘D’’ (2000 have a ‘‘high-hazard potential’’), our levees a ‘‘D’’ ($80 billion is needed for structural repair), and our roads a ‘‘D’’ (one out of every five miles of highway pavement is ‘‘in poor condition’’).6 Might Americans be given a choice on whether they want their taxes spent on infrastructure or—as is currently the case—on nuclear weapons and presidential fallout shelters? Or has ‘‘no taxation without representation’’ disappeared along with all our other basic democratic principles?(112-118) RA: That all follows from the instability of the weapon; what about the second field of representation, body damage? ES: The phenomenon of body damage is like the image of the weapon but works in a much different way—almost the opposite. Whereas the problem of the weapon is its very separability from the body (and the way to make it benign is to retether it to its referent in the body), the problem of body damage is that it overlaps, overrides, and eclipses the personhood of the one underneath the damage. Either one looks away, or, if one looks, one recoils. Visual artists and writers—from Peter Paul Rubens and Andrea Mantegna in the Renaissance to fin de sie`cle artists Ka¨the Kollwitz, Aubrey Beardsley, Edvard Munch, Joris-Karl Huysmans, to twentieth-century Guatemalan writer Miguel Asturias—all solve this problem by finding a way to double the location, so that personhood remains intact in our perceptual field even if the human body is at that moment being obscenely shredded. 118 Representations If you visit the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum, you will probably find yourself, as I did, surrounded by young schoolchildren, who look with courage on the visages of those who were incompletely incinerated in the bombing of that city (see figs. 2, 3, and 4). In the United States, few adults face up to the faces of those harmed there. In February of 2016, the Central Square Library in Cambridge agreed to let me—and Joseph Gerson, an American Friends Service colleague—do a monthlong program on the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with weekly lectures and an exhibit of books, drawings, and photographs. The morning after we put up the exhibit, we found all the photographs of injuries had been removed. The effort to put on an exhibit about Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the Smithsonian Institution in 1994 led to such controversy that it had to be canceled—with one exception: the Enola Gay (the plane that delivered the bomb) was put on display. Here we circle back to the phenomenon of the weapon being perceptually severed from the site of the pain. It’s in part because of museums like those in Hiroshima and Nagasaki that so many people in the Japanese population are passionately in support of nuclear disarmament. In preparation for a disarmament demonstration in New York, Cambridge and Boston activists (I include myself) worked for months to bring supporters to the march: after endless work, approximately one hundred did so. But one thousand Japanese men and women arrived that morning in New York; they carried a petition signed by six million of their countrymen, who collectively paid for the travel costs of the thousand who came. RA: Can you provide any examples of authors who ‘‘double the location,’’ as you have just described, ‘‘so that personhood remains intact’’ while the ‘‘human body is being ...shredded’’? ES: Miguel A´ngel Asturias’s Men of Maize begins with a heroic Indian in Guatemala, who ordinarily protects his people no matter what; he is able to do so, in part, because he has a level of sensory acuity that approaches genius. He knows the scent of every flower; he can discern the whole recipe of scents present in the forest in any given moment. The European colonizers can commit a slaughter of his people only if they can divert this heroic leader; and the only way to divert him is to subject him to horrible, scalding, obscene pain. Asturias must convey to us the felt experience of pain, the turning of the body inside out, and he chooses to do this through the associated phenomenon of body damage; but in order to do so without eclipsing the personhood of Gaspar Il´om, he decouples the body damage from the hero. The book opens with a dog, which the invaders have used as a test case for their pain-inducing poison laced with glass. The dog, in excruciating pain, zooms hysterically through the village square, covered with open sores, his penis erect, howling in a way that is aversive to everyone who hears and sees. This horrible scene conveys the obscenity of pain, the obscenity of bodily damage. By obscenity, I mean interior substances in the body which come before us without our consent, come before us before we are mentally prepared to comprehend what we are seeing. But the story separates this bodily desecration from the person, for now, having seen the dog, we need only be told that Gaspar Il´om has drunk this glass-laced poison to understand why he abandons his post, submerges himself in the lake, drinks all its waters, and eventually comes out. He has survived. But during the moments when he disappeared below the surface of the water, his people have been slain. RA: I wonder how you think about the role of the visual in that context. Do you think of the visual as akin to a language? ES: In visual art one can see the same phenomenon taking place, as when Ka¨the Kollwitz refuses to let an injured victim be portrayed as what Shelley called ‘‘a monstrous lump of ruin.’’ In her 1900 etching and aquatint The Downtrodden, she pushes the wounds on the body just beyond the body’s edge onto a linen sheet on which the person is lying. These mouthlike, liplike structures of open wounds are there but are not permitted to compromise figure 4. Photographs of survivors of the atomic bomb in the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum. An Interview with Elaine Scarry 121 our recognition of the sufferer’s personhood. Even somebody like Aubrey Beardsley, in one of his posters, puts the wound in a tree rather than on the body of the woman. And yet the woman has attributes that make the viewer see the analogy, just like Marty South and the trees in your account of Hardy’s The Woodlanders [Scarry is referring to Rachel Ablow’s account in Victorian Pain]. Her posture, for example, is exaggeratedly erect and treelike. She wears a high-waisted skirt that is made to be a visual analogy with the tree. But our perception of her personhood remains uninterrupted. RA: One issue you have raised recently is the particular difficulty of thinking about the specific kinds of injuries caused by nuclear war, namely burns. There was a striking moment in your talk when you discussed the protocols used in burn units to help doctors and nurses in looking at burn victims. It seems so intuitively right that caretakers would have difficulty looking at these patients. It seems to suggest something about the limits on the imagination in terms of suffering. I’m wondering what it is about burns that makes it so hard to imagine the suffering they entail. Is it about the skin as the site of humanity? Is it about the face? ES: It is the visage. Without preparation and help, when we see the complete mutilation of the body, especially the face, we mistakenly feel we are seeing the mutilation of personhood. The ‘‘rule of nines’’ is devised to enable rescue workers to look at a gravely burned person and (instead of having their own minds shut down in sorrow and confusion and revulsion) to assess instantly the gravity of the injury, start appropriate treatment, and report the scale of the injury to the hospital awaiting the person’s arrival. Each part of the body is assigned an easy-to-remember number that is a multiple of nine (see fig. 5). Counting forms a key part in many forms of emergency rescue, and this is one instance. The numbers, once totaled, tell the rescuer the next step, such as whether to insert an IV for fluid resuscitation. The need to train the perceptions of those who hope to help those who are burned is also illustrated by a procedure called ‘‘staying.’’ During the years when I was part of a research group on suffering at the Hastings Center for Ethics, I heard a lecture by a physician-nurse who worked in a burn unit. She mentioned that because of the difficulty oflooking at a severely burned person, nurses assigned to burn units may begin to avert their eyes when speaking with a patient, decline to touch the patient, or stand at a greater distance each day, or request a transfer after a few days. To counteract these problems, caretakers can participate in a class on ‘‘staying’’ where they recognize the temptation to withdraw from the patient and practice trying to overcome that withdrawal. While the ‘‘rule of nines’’ and ‘‘staying’’ are brilliant inventions, we should recognize that in nuclear war there will be few rescue workers and nurses. A study in the Netherlands of what would happen if a terrorist brought into Rotterdam a very small 12 kg weapon (the size used in World War II) found that of those who had not immediately evaporated, four thousand persons would require burn beds.7 They noted that in all of the Netherlands there are only a hundred burn beds. A leading hospital in Boston, Mass General, has seven burn beds. The burn beds themselves—what few there are—will disappear in a nuclear strike. On the floor of the UK Parliament, the possession of four Trident submarines has repeatedly been justified by the potential need to bomb Moscow. In response, a Scottish study by John Ainslie looked at the scale of damage that would actually take place if a nuclear missile were launched against the Ministry of Defense building in Moscow: along with the Ministry of Defense, four major hospitals would be destroyed and four others subjected to fire and radiation that would make them inoperable. Thirty-one schools would also be destroyed with at least 700,000 children slain.8 If the missile is larger, so, too, will the disappearance of hospitals be larger. An article by Steven Starr, Lynn Eden, and Theodore A. Postol in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists shows that if an 800-kiloton weapon were detonated above Manhattan, the center of the blast would be four times the temperature of the sun, and, within ‘‘tens of minutes,’’ a firestorm will cover 90 to 150 square miles. figure 5. Pocket card showing ‘‘Rule of Nines for Adult and Child,’’ Northwest Healthcare Response Network, https:// nwhrn.org/wp-content/ uploads/2018/08/BurnPocket-Card.pdf. An Interview with Elaine Scarry 123 RA: Was the artistic strategy that you just described of doubling the location so as to protect personhood apparent in the real-world examples you were citing, the Nagasaki children, the ‘‘rule of nines,’’ ‘‘staying’’? ES: I think so. It is not accidental that the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum is itself physically beautiful in its architecture, or that as you enter you pass lavish cascades of paper cranes, inspired by the child Sadako Sasaki, like cherry blossoms in spring, or that you see an inscription about Nagasaki’s exceptional generosity to outsiders—its many centuries of open trade with foreign companies, a level of cosmopolitan hospitality not at that time found to the same degree in other regions of Japan; you see engraved inscriptions from Dwight D. Eisenhower and from the ‘‘United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Report (Pacific War), July 1946’’ saying unequivocally that the atom bomb was not needed to end the war. All these elements, and many others, keep the personhood of the city’s inhabitants in view, side-by-side with the excruciating vision of burnt faces. The ‘‘rule of nines’’ lets one reconstruct the body out of a beneficent invention, toylike in its simplicity. In ‘‘staying,’’ the very name of the procedure holds the injury within the frame of sympathetic personhood. RA: Let’s return to Ghandi’s forking path. You’ve sketched the reasons why the US population is innocently sleeping. But what if they’re feigning sleep? ES: I am sometimes floored by the discrepancy between the attention we give to injuries that have happened when we can’t do anything to change them and the attention we give to injuries that haven’t yet happened when by intervention we absolutely can prevent them. I don’t know how to explain this. I have always assumed that those acts of trying to talk about the pain of torture victims in the 1970s in my case, or the pain of people in World War II, the Holocaust, that those acts are meant to act as a warning to the future. What is our motive for thinking about the unchangeable injuries of the past if not to increase our ability to prevent such injuries in the future? Yet almost incomprehensible is the distance between the willingness to think about events from the past we can’t possibly change and the complete comfort with feeling that future massacres need not concern us. Or worse, that one is slightly superior to protesting a wrong: intellectually superior because the moral wrong is an obvious moral wrong, and we only like to address sophisticated, hard to discern moral wrongs. It might be embarrassing to have to stand on a street corner with a sign or attend a public meeting. Imagine, though, if we forgave the complicity with past acts of enslavement or genocide by saying, ‘‘People saw that it was wrong, but they considered it too intellectually obvious, too compromising of their dignity, to have to stand up and protest.’’ Or take the argument that the aspiration to dismantle nuclear weapons is now many decades old, and we must turn to fresh undertakings: imagine that someone tried to defend those who tolerated slavery in 1860 because they had been hearing antislavery sentiment since 1820 and now considered such sentiments ‘‘stale.’’ We would never give a ‘‘pass’’ to anyone in the past who excused their inattention to slavery or the ~~transfer of people to concentration camps~~ on either of those two grounds; yet we believe such arguments release us from addressing weapons whose outcome is instant genocide. There are historical periods in which people were dissuaded from protesting because dissidents were beaten (Charles Sumner on the floor of the Senate) or killed (Dietrich Bonhoeffer in Germany). No such beatings or death threats excuse our own silence today. RA: Staying with this point about the relative ease of imagining pain past as opposed to pain in the future, do you attribute that to sentimentality? It sounds so reprehensible put in those terms. I wonder how you account for it. ES: I think you are right to worry that our attention to the past begins to look like sentimentality. The argument is sometimes made by academics that sympathy is less about compassion or the desire to ameliorate pain than it is a kind of cultural signaling of our moral goodness. To me that thesis seems horrifying: it lets the many who ignore past pain excuse their own inattention on the grounds that the few who do attend to pain are only doing so to announce their own goodness. So I feel a strong aversion to that argument; it works to reduce still further the number of those who show any wish to help. However, if it turns out that we only speak about irremediable injuries from the past while a huge architecture of massacre [is] ~~stands~~ waiting to be used, then one has to ask oneself: why were we looking at injuries in the distant past? Is it just sentimentality? Is it just cultural signaling?9(124-5)

### ! — Cap Good

#### **Capitalism is good — any alternatives fail.**

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One reason to trust markets is that they are better at setting prices than people. If you set prices too high, many a socialist government has found, citizens will be needlessly deprived of goods. Set them too low, and there will be excessive demand and ensuing shortages. This is true for all goods, including health care and labor. And there is little reason to believe that the next batch of socialists in Washington or London would be any better at setting prices than their predecessors. In fact, government-run health care systems in Canada and European countries are plagued by long wait times. A 2018 Fraser Institute study cites a median wait time of 19.8 weeks to see a specialist physician in Canada. Socialists may argue that is a small price to pay for universal access, but a market-based approach can deliver both coverage and responsive service. A full government takeover isn’t the only option, nor is it the best one.

Beyond that, markets are also good at rationing risk. Fundamentally, socialists would like to reduce risk — protect workers from any personal or economywide shock. That is a noble goal, and some reduction through better functioning safety nets is desirable. But getting rid of all uncertainty — as state ownership of most industries would imply — is a bad idea. Risk is what fuels growth. People who take more chances tend to reap bigger rewards; that’s why the top nine names on the Forbes 400 list of the richest Americans are not heirs to family dynasties but are self-made entrepreneurs who took a leap to build new products and created many jobs in the process.

Some leftist economists like Mariana Mazzucato argue that governments might be able to step in and become laboratories for innovation. But that would be a historical anomaly; socialist-leaning governments have typically been less innovative than others. After all, bureaucrats and worker-corporate boards have little incentive to upset the status quo or compete to build a better widget. And even when government programs have spurred innovation — as in the case of the internet — it took the private sector to recognize the value and create a market.

And that brings us to a third reason to believe in markets: productivity. Some economists, such as Robert Gordon, have looked to today’s economic problems and suggested that productivity growth — the engine that fueled so much of the progress of the last several decades — is over. In this telling, the resources, products, and systems that underpin the world’s economy are all optimized, and little further progress is possible.

But that is hard to square with reality. Innovation helps economies do more with fewer resources — increasingly critical to addressing climate change, for example — which is a form of productivity growth. And likewise, many of the products and technologies people rely on every day did not exist a few years ago. These goods make inaccessible services more available and are changing the nature of work, often for the better. Such gains are made possible by capitalist systems that encourage invention and growing the pie, not by socialist systems that are more concerned with how the existing pie is cut. It is far too soon, in other words, to write off productivity.

### ! — Cap Good — Regulated

#### Regulated capitalism solves war, environment, and quality of life---alternatives increase degradation and poverty. Prefer empirical and measurable indicators.

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Discourse on food ethics often advocates the anti-capitalist idea that we need less capitalism, less growth, and less globalization if we want to make the world a better and more equitable place, with arguments focused on applications to food, globalization, and a just society. For example, arguments for this anti-capitalist view are at the core of some chapters in nearly every handbook and edited volume in the rapidly expanding subdiscipline of food ethics. None of these volumes (or any article published in this subdiscipline broadly construed) focuses on a defense of globalized capitalism.1

More generally, discourse on global ethics, environment, and political theory in much of academia—and in society—increasingly features this anti-capitalist idea as well.2 The idea is especially prominent in discourse surrounding the environment, climate, and global poverty, where we face a nexus of problems of which capitalism is a key driver, including climate change, air and water pollution, the challenge of feeding the world, ensuring sustainable development for the world's poorest, and other interrelated challenges.

It is therefore important to ask whether this anti-capitalist idea is justified by reason and evidence that is as strong as the degree of confidence placed in it by activists and many commentators on food ethics, global ethics, and political theory, more generally.

In fact, many experts argue that this anti-capitalist idea is not supported by reason and argument and is actually wrong. The main contribution of this essay is to explain the structure of the leading arguments against the anti-capitalist idea, and in favor of the opposite conclusion. I begin by focusing on the general argument in favor of well-regulated globalized capitalism as the key to a just, flourishing, and environmentally healthy world. This is the most important of all of the arguments in terms of its consequences for health, wellbeing, and justice, and it is endorsed by experts in the empirically minded disciplines best placed to analyze the issue, including experts in long-run global development, human health, wellbeing, economics, law, public policy, and other related disciplines. On the basis of the arguments outlined below, well-regulated capitalism has been endorsed by recent Democratic presidents of the United States such as Barack Obama, and by progressive Nobel laureates who have devoted their lives to human development and more equitable societies, as well as by a wide range of experts in government and leading nongovernmental organizations.

The goal of this essay is to make the structure and importance of these arguments clear, and thereby highlight that discourse on global ethics and political theory should engage carefully with them. The goal is not to endorse them as necessarily sound and correct. The essay will begin by examining general arguments for and against capitalism, and then turn to implications for food, the environment, climate change, and beyond.

Arguments for and against Forms of Capitalism

The Argument against Capitalism

Capitalism is often argued to be a key driver of many of society's ills: inequalities, pollution, land use changes, and incentives that cause people to live differently than in their ideal dreams. Capitalism can sometimes deepen injustices. These negative consequences are easy to see—resting, as they do, at the center of many of society's greatest challenges.3

And at the same time, it is often difficult to see the positive consequences of capitalism.4 What are the positive consequences of allowing private interests to clear-cut forests and plant crops, especially if those private interests are rich multinational corporations and the forests are in poor, developing countries whose citizens do not receive the profits from deforestation? Why give private companies the right to exploit resources at all, since exploitation almost always has some negative consequences such as those listed above? These are the right questions to ask, and they highlight genuine challenges to capitalism. And in light of these challenges, it is reasonable to consider the possibility that perhaps a different economic system altogether would be more equitable and beneficial to the global population.

The Argument for Well-Regulated Capitalism

However, things are more complicated than the arguments above would suggest, and the benefits of capitalism, especially for the world's poorest and most vulnerable people, are in fact myriad and significant. In addition, as we will see in this section, many experts argue that capitalism is not the fundamental cause of the previously described problems but rather an essential component of the best solutions to them and of the best methods for promoting our goals of health, well-being, and justice.

To see where the defenders of capitalism are coming from, consider an analogy involving a response to a pandemic: if a country administered a rushed and untested vaccine to its population that ended up killing people, we would not say that vaccines were the problem. Instead, the problem would be the flawed and sloppy policies of vaccine implementation. Vaccines might easily remain absolutely essential to the correct response to such a pandemic and could also be essential to promoting health and flourishing, more generally.

The argument is similar with capitalism according to the leading mainstream arguments in favor of it: Capitalism is an essential part of the best society we could have, just like vaccines are an essential part of the best response to a pandemic such as COVID-19. But of course both capitalism and vaccines can be implemented poorly, and can even do harm, especially when combined with other incorrect policy decisions. But that does not mean that we should turn against them—quite the opposite. Instead, we should embrace them as essential to the best and most just outcomes for society, and educate ourselves and others on their importance and on how they must be properly designed and implemented with other policies in order to best help us all. In fact, the argument in favor of capitalism is even more dramatic because it claims that much more is at stake than even what is at stake in response to a global pandemic—what is at stake with capitalism is nothing less than whether the world's poorest and most vulnerable billion people will remain in conditions of poverty and oppression, or if they will instead finally gain access to what is minimally necessary for basic health and wellbeing and become increasingly affluent and empowered. The argument in favor of capitalism proceeds as follows:

Premise 1. Development and the past. Over the course of recorded human history, the majority of historical increases in health, wellbeing, and justice have occurred in the last two centuries, largely as a result of societies adopting or moving toward capitalism. Capitalism is a relevant cause of these improvements, in the sense that they could not have happened to such a degree if it were not for capitalism and would not have happened to the same degree under any alternative noncapitalist approach to structuring society. The argument in support of this premise relies on observed relationships across societies and centuries between indicators of degree of capitalism, wealth, investments in public goods, and outcomes for health, wellbeing, and justice, together with econometric analysis in support of the conclusion that the best explanation of these correlations and the underlying mechanism is that large increases in health, wellbeing, and justice are largely driven by increasing investments in public goods. The scale of increased wealth necessary to maximize these investments requires capitalism. Thus, as capitalist societies have become dramatically wealthier over the past hundred years (and wealthier than societies with alternative systems), this has allowed larger investments in public goods, which simply has not been possible in a sustained way in societies without the greater wealth that capitalism makes possible. Important investments in public goods include investments in basic medical knowledge, in health and nutrition programs, and in the institutional capacity and know-how to regulate society and capitalism itself. As a result, capitalism is a primary driver of positive outcomes in health and wellbeing (such as increased life expectancy, lowered child and maternal mortality, adequate calories per day, minimized infectious disease rates, a lower percentage and number of people in poverty, and more reported happiness);5 and in justice (such as reduced deaths from war and homicide; higher rankings in human rights indices; the reduced prevalence of racist, sexist, homophobic opinions in surveys; and higher literacy rates).6 These quantifiable positive consequences of global capitalism dramatically outweigh the negative consequences (such as deaths from pollution in the course of development), with the result that the net benefits from capitalism in terms of health, wellbeing, and justice have been greater than they would have been under any known noncapitalist approach to structuring society.7

Premise 2. Economics, ethics, and policy. Although capitalism has often been ill-regulated and therefore failed to maximize net benefits for health, wellbeing, and justice, it can become well-regulated so that it maximizes these societal goals, by including mechanisms identified by economists and other policy experts that do the following:

* optimally8 regulate negative effects such as pollution and monopoly power, and invest in public goods such as education, basic healthcare, and fundamental research including biomedical knowledge (more generally, policies that correct the failures of free markets that economists have long recognized will arise from “externalities” in the absence of regulation);9
* ensure equity and distributive justice (for example, via wealth redistribution);10
* ensure basic rights, justice, and the rule of law independent of the market (for example, by an independent judiciary, bill of rights, property rights, and redistribution and other legislation to correct historical injustices due to colonialism, racism, and correct current and historical distortions that have prevented markets from being fair);11 and
* ensure that there is no alternative way of structuring society that is more efficient or better promotes the equity, justice, and fairness goals outlined above (by allowing free exchange given the regulations mentioned).12

To summarize the implication of the first two premises, well-regulated capitalism is essential to best achieving our ethical goals—which is true even though capitalism has certainly not always been well regulated historically. Society can still do much better and remove the large deficits in terms of health, wellbeing, and justice that exist under the current inferior and imperfect versions of capitalism.

Premise 3. Development and the future. If the global spread of capitalism is allowed to continue, desperate poverty can be essentially eliminated in our lifetimes. Furthermore, this can be accomplished faster and in a more just way via well-regulated global capitalism than by any alternatives. If we instead opt for less capitalism, less growth, and less globalization, then desperate poverty will continue to exist for a significant portion of the world's population into the further future, and the world will be a worse and less equitable place than it would have been with more capitalism. For example, in a world with less capitalism, there would be more overpopulation, food insecurity, air pollution, ill health, injustice, and other problems. In part, this is because of the factors identified by premise 1, which connect a turn away from capitalism with a turn away from continuing improvements in health, wellbeing, and justice, especially for the developing world. In addition, fertility declines are also a consequence of increased wealth, and the size of the population is a primary determinant of food demand and other environmental stressors.13 Finally, as discussed at length in the next section of the essay, capitalism can be naturally combined with optimal environmental regulations.14 Even bracketing anything like optimal regulation, it remains true that sufficiently wealthy nations reduce environmental degradation as they become wealthier, whereas developing nations that are nearing peak degradation will remain stuck at the worst levels of degradation if we stall growth, rather than allowing them to transition to less and less degradation in the future via capitalism and economic growth.15 In contrast, well-regulated capitalism is a key part of the best way of coping with these problems, as well as a key part of dealing with climate change, global food production, and other specific challenges, as argued at length in the next section. Here it is important to stress that we should favor well-regulated capitalism that includes correct investments in public goods over other capitalist systems such as the neoliberalism of the recent past that promoted inadequately regulated capitalism with inadequate concern for externalities, equity, and background distortions and injustices.16

Conclusion. Therefore, we should be in favor of capitalism over noncapitalism, and we should especially favor well-regulated capitalism, which is the ethically optimal economic system and is essential to any just basic structure for society.

This argument is impressive because, as stated earlier in the essay, it is based on evidence that is so striking that it leads a bipartisan range of open-minded thinkers and activists to endorse well-regulated capitalism, including many of those who were not initially attracted to the view because of a reasonable concern for the societal ills with which we began. To better understand why such a range of thinkers could agree that well-regulated capitalism is best, it may help to clarify some things that are not assumed or implied by the argument for it, which could be invoked by other bad arguments for capitalism.

One thing the argument above does not assume is that health, wellbeing, or justice are the same thing as wealth, because, in fact, they are not. Instead, the argument above relies on well-accepted, measurable indicators of health and wellbeing, such as increased lifespan; decreased early childhood mortality; adequate nutrition; and other empirically measurable leading indicators of health, wellbeing, and justice.17 Similarly, the argument that capitalism promotes justice, peace, freedom, human rights, and tolerance relies on empirical metrics for each of these.18

Furthermore, the argument does not assume that because these indicators of health, wellbeing, and justice are highly correlated with high degrees of capitalism, that therefore capitalism is the direct cause of these good outcomes. Rather, the analyses suggest instead that something other than capitalism is the direct cause of societal improvements (such as improvements in knowledge and technology, public infrastructure, and good governance), and that capitalism is simply a necessary condition for these improvements to happen.19 In other words, the richer a society is, the more it is able to invest in all of these and other things that are the direct causes of health, wellbeing, and justice. But, to maximize investment in these things societies need well-regulated capitalism.

As part of these analyses, it is often stressed that current forms of capitalism around the world are highly defective and must be reformed in the direction of well-regulated capitalism because they lack investments in public goods, such as basic knowledge, healthcare, nutrition, other safety nets, and good governance.20 In this way, an argument for a particular kind of progressive reformism is an essential part of the analyses that lead many to endorse the more general argument for well-regulated capitalism.

Although these analyses are nuanced, and appropriately so, it remains the case that the things that directly lead to health, wellbeing, and justice require resources, and the best path toward generating those resources is well-regulated capitalism. And on the flip side, according to the analyses behind premise 1 described above, an anti-capitalist system would not produce the resources that are needed, and would thus be a disaster, especially for the poorest billion people who are most desperately in need of the resources that capitalism can create and direct, to escape from extreme poverty.21

### ! — Cap Good — Space

#### Commercial space solves extinction

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We find ourselves still at the dawn of a new space century, mindful of the victories and setbacks of our past, eager to pass the torch to the next generation of space visionaries, scientists, engineers, and enthusiasts. We look to the future not just to see how much bigger, faster, or higher we can reach, but also how the United States, and specifically the U.S. space community, can again inspire the nations of the world to align with us, as it did in the 20th century.

The SmallSat Alliance is an alliance of companies developing, producing, and operating in all segments of the ‘next generation’ space economy; championing renewed U.S. leadership in the burgeoning commercial space economy, and advocating for the transformation of government-led space capabilities. We are experienced space professionals who have chosen to join with others leveraging our decades of hard-won experience, to develop smarter ways to explore space in the 21st century.

A wonderful outgrowth of the legacy space program is the commercial, entrepreneurial, and job-creating commercial space business that it bequeathed. These next-generation enterprises range from multi-million-dollar startups providing rideshare opportunities or components for small satellites to multi-billion-dollar space data-analytic platforms reinventing urban car service and agricultural production. The early returns of this economic revolution are already on our doorstep: space data capabilities are exponentially growing elements of the 21st century world economy.

Beginning with the dreams and funding by successful tech entrepreneurs, enormous venture investments are already delivering wondrous benefits to the world.

Commercial Space – Profit and Non-Profit

There are really two major categories in the commercial sector, the profit driven and the non-profit. The classic for-profit companies include not only those designing, building, launching, and operating satellites but also the tech sector that is turning that raw space data into gold through machine-learning analytics. Since for-profit companies are no longer dependent upon the revenues generated by the Cold War space race culture of a bygone era, this new generation of space companies is able to more efficiently capitalize on Moore’s Law, the nonstop exponential growth in chip density, and the associated networking technology co-evolving with it. This new generation is building profitable businesses helping to clean up our oceans of garbage and debris with satellite surveillance, reconnoitering to assist in enforcing laws that protect our oceans from illegal, unregulated, unlicensed fishing, something that is rapidly depleting the world’s most valuable and essential lifeforms. It’s leading in the innovative use of low-cost satellite constellations to produce ubiquitous remote-sensing data, enabling small business owners to be more profitable and less wasteful. For example, precise timing signals from space are already optimizing transportation of people, goods, and services, with even further gains anticipated with the introduction of artificial intelligence to assist drivers, perhaps even someday replacing them entirely.

The non-profit sector is the other side of commercial space, concerned more for the general welfare of society, but every bit as integral to this new space enterprise. Much like every century before it in human history, ours is not without its unique challenges, some of which have been a consequence of the last, and all of which the space data domain can be leveraged to help solve. Examples are endless, but one challenge that this new space community is uniquely well-adapted for is to further inform worldwide resource allocation for the 21st century and beyond. These two primary resources are sustainable water and the materials needed for adequate housing for an ever-increasing human population. As cities and urbanization continue to expand, governmental planning challenges such as transportation design optimization for goods and services are only the beginning. Additionally, through using inexpensive remote sensing technologies, some members are designing space data analytics to mitigate human suffering from plagues, contain outbreaks, and combating illegal poaching. Some are connecting with other non-profits to curtail human trafficking for the sex trade or forced labor for migrant debt repayment. Still others are helping non-governmental organizations in their work to expose the use of children as soldiers. Addressing these challenges has little to do with resuscitating dreams conceived by long deceased science-fiction writers and much more to do with turning “swords back into plowshares” to solve real threats to humanity.

Other non-profit initiatives include pursuing an even more foundational understanding of who we are and how to be the best custodians of our environment. Much as exploring and monitoring the world’s oceans has advanced civilization through a better understanding of human life and the planet, so too does exploring and monitoring from space. Low Earth orbit (LEO) provides a unique vantage point to look back on the planet and understand what is happening, anticipate what might happen and prepare for the future. In addition to better understanding Earth, responsible and rapid exploitation of the low Earth orbit domain will enhance the understanding of the solar system and the rest of the universe. Small satellites already offer low-cost platforms to study and explore what lies beyond the Earth. Other members are pioneering the use of zero-carbon, hydrogen-based reusable propulsion systems to ensure we don’t worsen our atmosphere using kerosene-fueled rockets for the coming tsunami of satellite launches. Finally, a mission ensuring the general welfare and planet survival for the next thousand years is finally confronting the existential threat that asteroids and comets pose to humanity. These extra-terrestrial, deep-space threats are passing dangerously close to our planet, and today we have no solar map of them and no defense.

#### Space resource extraction solves sustainability.

Whittington ’20 [Mark; November 22; writes frequently about space and politics, has published a political study of space exploration entitled Why is It So Hard to Go Back to the Moon and is published in the Wall Street Journal, Forbes, The Hill, USA Today, the LA Times, and the Washington Post, among other venues; The Hill, “How space exploration will help to address climate change,” https://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/527058-how-space-exploration-will-help-to-address-climate-change/]

The Biden approach to NASA seemed to be expressed best by Lori Garver, who served as NASA’s deputy administrator during the Obama administration. According to the Space Review, she said, “If we don’t put some really significant resources into allowing humanity to be sustained on this planet, we’re not going to have the time to leave it. You can’t really do one without the other.”

That last sentence is truer than, perhaps, Garver realizes. An article in Astronomy Magazine suggests that the ultimate solution to climate change will be to move resource extraction and heavy industry off the planet. The notion seems like science fiction, but some very serious people are looking at the idea of a space-based industrial revolution. Jeff Bezos, who made his billions from Amazon.com and now runs a space launch company called Blue Origin, suggests “zoning” Earth for residential areas and “light industries.” Mining and manufacturing, two of the biggest sources of environmental pollution, would move off the planet.

The moon and asteroids are the sources of untold mineral wealth. A single asteroid, 16 Psyche, is said to contain 10,000 quadrillion dollars’ worth of metals. The quoted figure is somewhat misleading. If one were to bring all the gold on 16 Psyche to Earth, its price would collapse, making it into a cheap, industrial metal.

The point, however, is that only by turning humankind into a space-faring civilization can we avoid environmental catastrophe while maintaining technological progress. The fact further suggests that the Artemis program has an environmental dimension that Team Biden would do well to recognize and to consider when formulating space policy for the incoming administration.

American law already recognizes the right of companies to extract resources from the moon and other celestial bodies, thanks to Title IV of the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act. The act was passed in 2015 on a bipartisan basis and signed into law by Obama.

Currently, NASA has been attempting to gain international recognition of Earth humans’ right to extract and own space resources as part of the Artemis Accords. The accords have been signed by nine nations, besides the United States, with more to follow.

The point of all of this, going back to what Garver said, is that climate change and space exploration are inseparably linked. She likely meant that Earth needs to be sustained so that humankind can expand into space. However, the opposite is also true. Humankind must expand into space so that the Earth, the pale blue dot that the late-Carl Sagan once celebrated, can be preserved.

#### Modeling with the most accurate biological and cosmological data and realistic probability distributions strongly disproves aliens

Stephen Johnson 18, St. Louis-based Writer Whose Work Has Appeared in U.S. News & World Report, The Huffington Post, Eleven Magazine, Cheapism, Vox Magazine, The Missourian and Other Publications, “Are We Alone In The Universe? New Drake Equation Suggests Yes”, Big Think, 6-25, https://bigthink.com/stephen-johnson/are-we-the-only-intelligent-life-in-the-universe-updated-drake-equation-suggests-yes [language modified]

At the Los Alamos National Laboratory in 1950, physicist Enrico Fermi famously posed to his colleagues a simple question borne of complex math: ‘Where are they?’ He was asking about aliens—intelligent ones, specifically. The Italian-American scientist was puzzled as to why [hu]mankind hasn’t detected any signs of intelligent life beyond our planet. He reasoned that even if life is extremely rare, you’d still expect there to be many alien civilizations given the sheer size of the universe. After all, some estimates indicate that there is one septillion, or 1,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000, stars in the universe, some of which are surrounded by planets that could probably support life. So, where are they, and why aren’t they talking to us? This is known as the Fermi paradox. It’s based on mathematical ideas like the Drake equation, which was devised to estimate the number of detectable civilizations in the Milky Way. Scientists use the equation by multiplying seven variables, as Elizabeth Howell outlined for Space: N = R\* • fp • ne • fl • fi • fc • L N = The number of civilizations in the Milky Way Galaxy whose electromagnetic emissions are detectable. R\* = The rate of formation of stars suitable for the development of intelligent life. fp = The fraction of those stars with planetary systems. ne = The number of planets, per solar system, with an environment suitable for life. fl = The fraction of suitable planets on which life actually appears. fi = The fraction of life bearing planets on which intelligent life emerges. fc = The fraction of civilizations that develop a technology that releases detectable signs of their existence into space. L = The length of time such civilizations release detectable signals into space. The Drake equation is incredibly speculative, or, as astronomer Jill Tarter once said, it’s “a wonderful way to organize our ignorance.” It remains a puzzling problem. However, a new paper from scientists at the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University provides an updated Drake equation, one that incorporates “realistic distributions of uncertainty” and “models of chemical and genetic transitions on paths to the origin of life.” By doing so, the researchers say they dissolve the Fermi paradox and provide even more reason to think we’re alone in the universe. The updated equation effectively takes each variable and combines many historical estimates that scientists have used to create an uncertainty range, one that highlights just how much scientists still don’t know, as study author Anders Sandberg told Universe Today: “Many parameters are very uncertain given current knowledge. While we have learned a lot more about the astrophysical ones since Drake and Sagan in the 1960s, we are still very uncertain about the probability of life and intelligence. When people discuss the equation it is not uncommon to hear them say something like: 'this parameter is uncertain, but let’s make a guess and remember that it is a guess', finally reaching a result that they admit is based on guesses. "But this result will be stated as single number, and that anchors us to an \*apparently\* exact estimate—when it should have a proper uncertainty range. This often leads to overconfidence, and worse, the Drake equation is very sensitive to bias: if you are hopeful a small nudge upwards in several uncertain estimates will give a hopeful result, and if you are a pessimist you can easily get a low result.” After Sandberg and his colleagues combined these uncertainties, the results showed a distribution pattern of the likelihood that humanity is alone in space. “We found that even using the guesstimates in the literature (we took them and randomly combined the parameter estimates) one can have a situation where the mean number of civilizations in the galaxy might be fairly high—say, a hundred—and yet the probability that we are alone in the galaxy is 30%! The reason is that there is a very skew distribution of likelihood. “If we instead try to review the scientific knowledge, things get even more extreme. This is because the probability of getting life and intelligence on a planet has an \*extreme\* uncertainty given what we know—we cannot rule out that it happens nearly everywhere there is the right conditions, but we cannot rule out that it is astronomically rare. This leads to an even stronger uncertainty about the number of civilizations, drawing us to conclude that there is a fairly high likelihood that we are alone. However, we \*also\* conclude that we shouldn’t be too surprised if we find intelligence!”

### ! — Cap Good — AT: Alt

#### Alt has zero chance of success---prefer quantitative studies that analyze one-thousand years of data---gradual reforms

Calnitsky ’21 [David; August 8; Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology at Western University; *Critical Sociology,* “The Policy Road to Socialism,” Sage Online]

David Calnitsky, Published August 8, 2021

I do not, however, think that the revolutionary road is implausible. Rather, it is impossible, at least inside the rich capitalist democracies. And between the implausible and the impossible the choice is clear.

Again, this can be framed as an empirical hypothesis: You do not see revolutions in developed capitalist democracies. As Przeworski and Limongi (1997) have written, there has never been a revolution in a moderately middle-class democracy (see also Przeworski, 2019). Drawing on a thousand years of data, cumulatively collected across 37 democratic countries, they show that not one had collapsed with a per-capita GDP higher than that of Argentina in 1976. Among countries with half that figure, collapse was exceedingly rare. Even a modest GDP brings with it an enormous amount of regime stability. These data in fact include any kind of regime collapse; narrowing the data to socialist revolution makes the empirical case against it even more impressive. Any case for revolution must begin by acknowledging rather than ignoring this evidence.

To look at this question in a different way, I draw on the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive, which contains information on revolutions (rather than government collapse) for over 200 countries since 1919. Their definition of revolution is very broad (see footnote 7) and includes “attempts” to overthrow government as well as “unsuccessful” rebellions. The data were compiled from newspaper sources and warrants caution, but nonetheless constitutes the most systematic evidence available for these questions. In Figure 9, I present the GNP per capita distribution of revolutions, from 1919, where GNP is first available, to the present. By considering only those country-years with revolutions I reduce the observation count from 17,520 to 184. Unlike Przeworski, I do not further restrict the data to democracies. The graph displays an extreme skew: The vast, overwhelming majority of cases of revolutionary threat occur in countries with a per capita GNP below $5,000 USD. For reference, the figure for the US in the data is about $65,850 in 2019. The hypothesis above—that we do not see revolutions in developed democracies—seems borne out by the evidence.

figure

Figure 9. Histogram of country-years with revolutions.

Source: Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive. Data drawn from 200 plus countries between 1919 and 2018 are then restricted to country-years (N = 184) in which there were “revolutions,” as well as a “major government crisis” and “anti-government protests.”

Why exactly is this true and what are the mechanisms to explain it? Why is the revolutionary strategy impossible for a country like the US? There are, at bottom, three reasons, each of which stands alone as a sufficient condition to snap the last threads of one’s revolutionary faith.23 The first two suggest that revolution is unachievable, and the last suggests that even if it is achievable, socialism by revolutionary means is unachievable. The revolutionary road is closed on the following grounds:

(1) Workers do not want it

(2) Capitalists would sooner grant reforms

(3) A smashed state is more likely to result in tyranny than deep democracy

Not only has there never been a successful revolution in a developed democracy, there has never been a working class that has wanted one (e.g. Erikson and Tedin, 2015; Sassoon, 1996).24 There are no clear cases where the dominant inclination of the working class in a developed democracy was revolutionary. Recall that the above graph also includes attempts and unsuccessful cases. It is self-evident that workers have not joined revolutionary groups en masse at any point in the context of a rich democracy. Nor were their aspirations to join such groups thwarted by violence or ideology. When gains inside a capitalist democracy are available—either individual or collective ones, and this has been true even through the neoliberal period, where median living standards have continued to (slowly) go up and not down—it is not worth risking everything for an uncertain future (Thewissen et al., 2015).25 More important than the dynamic point is the static one: When standards of living are moderately high, as shown in Figure 9, the modal worker has more to lose than her chains. This is not an argument against socialism; but to revise Werner Sombart, the life raft of revolution really was shipwrecked on shoals of roast beef and apple pie.

Therefore, the reasons workers are not revolutionary are materialist in character. Explaining their reformist politics does not require appeal to venal trade union leaders or false consciousness. Most people wish to minimize risk in their lives, and revolution involves taking on colossal risks. For example, home-ownership in the developed world hovers around 70%; this means that a lot of people have a lot to lose.

By contrast, the materialist case for revolution proposes that people favor it when their expected post-revolutionary standards of living are greater than their current standard (Roemer, 1985). But when we add moderate risk- and loss-aversion the calculation changes (Kahneman and Tversky, 1991). Say you have a low income, but own a few assets, maybe a house, a car, and perhaps you also have a child; what risk profile would you require to gamble your modest holdings for an uncertain future which might be better but might be worse? Even if you are certain that the probability of better is greater than the probability of worse, you have to envision workers as a class of inveterate gamblers to take the bet. Moderately cautious people who prefer a bird in the hand will still view the downside risk as too great. Equal gains and losses are not experienced equally. This is the loss aversion phenomenon. But the assumption of a population confident about improved standards of living—and a willingness to take risky strategies to achieve them—is itself unwarranted. This is the risk aversion phenomenon. The modal worker is of course correct to suspect that her post-revolutionary welfare is uncertain; socialists after all do not have satisfactory answers to the problems of coordination, motivation, and innovation under socialism (for attempted answers that are provocative and oftentimes brilliant, see Albert, 2004; Cottrell and Cockshott, 1992; Corneo, 2017; Roemer, 1994; and Wright and Hahnel, 2016). When one compares the status quo to a future where both heaven and hell are seemingly plausible, it is perfectly rational that people everywhere would abandon the barricades. And abandon them they did.

Now perhaps the revolutionaries have persuaded us that negative outcomes are far-fetched, that we are very confident that revolution will usher in, eventually, the land of milk and honey. It is still the case that in this model the promised land will only be reached after a social breakdown of unknown duration: A complete overhaul in the organization of production will lead to some middle period of deteriorating material welfare as capitalists rapidly exit the economy. This means chaos and uncertainty, but it could also mean war. The interregnum could last a year, but it might last two decades, and however optimistic we are about the end point, we cannot in advance know how long this interim phase will persist. In the meantime, revolutionary enthusiasm will wane, erstwhile supporters will decamp, a “stay-the-course” electoral strategy will be outflanked by competitor parties promising a return to normalcy, and the desire to consolidate gains will make the authoritarian impulse greater. From a materialist perspective, the uncertain passage through what Przeworski (1986) calls the “transition trough” makes the journey less appealing.26

To my mind, these factors explain why all working classes in all developed democracies have been decidedly reformist in orientation. The reason why revolutionary socialism has always been marginal in rich capitalist economies—and will always be outflanked by reform-oriented socialism—is that only the latter consistently deliver high (and usually increasing) standards of living and low (and usually decreasing) levels of risk. As long as the Mad Max world of catastrophic collapse can be avoided, reform-oriented parties will always better capture the enthusiasm of poor and working people.

Thus, when we try to explain the non-revolutionary attitudes of our working-class friends and family, we do not need to lean on the false consciousness account, for there is a more parsimonious materialist explanation. As such, any case for revolution must be non-materialist in character: You can be a materialist or a revolutionary, but not both.

This is the dilemma the revolutionaries must consider: Revolution is only possible when the forces of production are underdeveloped, but it can only be successful when they are sufficiently developed to make socialism (or communism) objectively viable.27 As Elster (1986) has argued, the circumstances under which revolutions spark and succeed never coincide.

What about the capitalists? Under these circumstances, it is reasonable to expect that they will fight far harder against a revolution than they would against reformist drives. Indeed, ignoring the response from capitalists violates Elster’s first law of political rationality: Never assume your opponent is less rational than you. If revolution were the alternative, employers would grant every imaginable reform, from far higher taxes to the rejiggering of power relations in the workplace. In a mugging, most people will surrender their wallet before their life.

Actors in the state ought to respond in more or less the same way—that is, as long as you admit your adversary the competence to read the situation as well as you. If our theory of the state suggests that it acts on behalf of the capitalist class, its apparatchiks would anticipate and preempt any revolutionary crusade with a cocktail of concession and repression. And while it will certainly contest reforms, it will devote all of its resources to break the revolution. Nonetheless, this means that revolutionaries can play a crucial role, even if it is not to foment revolution. Militancy is a powerful strategy to foment reform (for an argument about the history of social democracy along these lines, see Piketty, 2014).

Thus far, the main reason revolution is off the table is because no one wants it—not workers, nor employers, nor the state.

The third point above asks us to imagine the prospects for revolutionary success even if we ignore the wrinkle that workers have neither an interest nor capacity to make it. But let us pretend they did: Why then would we imagine that total social breakdown would prompt a deepening of democracy rather than authoritarian entrenchment? This happy outcome has never before emerged in the wake of social collapse, and there is little reason why the final showdown with the American military ought to produce fertile ground for deepening democracy in all spheres of life. In fact, evidence from the General Social Survey suggests that in response to recession and economic downturn people tend to become less altruistic and less concerned with questions of fairness.28 After situations of economic crisis, voters tend to shift to the right (Lindvall, 2014). The old union song cries out that “we can bring to birth a new world from the ashes of the old,” but life is not birthed on ash. None of the historical case studies track this narrative, and indeed everything we know about human psychology suggests that social devastation makes people more, not less, prone to demagoguery. This means that even if a revolution were achievable, it is probably undesirable.

The argument I have thus far laid out against revolution contends only that it is off the table in middle-class democracies. I have in mind social dynamics within developed capitalist democracies, countries “like the US,” but the premise no longer holds true if we imagine a society that has already suffered some sort of catastrophic societal disintegration—at that point all bets are off. We are of course now talking about a world we are not living in, but it is worth considering the thought experiment nonetheless.

It is possible that America, after some world-historic environmental or economic collapse, begins to look something more like Russian feudalism than contemporary developed capitalism. Revolution then might again be on the table, but the context of desperation and scarcity in this scenario gives little reason to expect it would incubate an egalitarian democratic society. The historical evidence is unambiguous: None of the communist revolutions of the 20th century ushered in deeply democratic egalitarian social structures. Not only are there no examples, but there are also no clear mechanisms on offer.

The fact that this scenario generates an interest in bringing about an egalitarian society by means of revolution does not mean there will be a capacity to do so. The theory is little more than “where there is a will there is a way.” But, as Elster (1980: 124) argues, the general interests of society do not secrete the conditions for their fulfillment. Interests and capacities need not overlap.

There is a final reason to be skeptical of non-evolutionary strategies: The highly dubious premise that the system we erect the morning after will actually work. A socialist economy, if plopped down tomorrow, would be so rife with unintended consequences and pathologies that it is easy to imagine a democracy voting its way back into capitalism. This is true even if we believe (mistakenly, in my view) that the socialist calculation debate is solvable in the age of big data (Morozov, 2019). Interlocutors in the calculation debate have had very little to say about the politics of transition. Indeed, it is hard to imagine success of any kind without a slow and incremental transformation, experimenting with bits and pieces along the way—as we have been doing for the past century. An experimental approach is likely the only way to avoid devastating blunders that undermine the whole project. Moments of institutional upheaval and big change may at times be necessary, but to be successful they will have to rest on a foundation of smaller changes that have been tested.

#### Sudden transition kills two-thirds of the world within two weeks---ONLY gradual transition via reformism is possible in the modern world---prefer ev from the world’s most famous living Marxist

Harvey ’20 [David; 2020; Distinguished Professor of Anthropology & Geography at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York; *The Anti-Capitalist Chronicles*, Pluto Press: London]

Global Unrest

There are many contradictions in the capitalist system, and some are more salient than others. The incredible class and social inequalities and collapsing environmental conditions are obvious priorities. But then comes the “too big to fail, too monstrous to survive” contradiction. Neither the social inequality nor environmental degradation issues can be addressed without taking on this underlying contradiction. A socialist and anti-capitalist program will have to negotiate a knife-edge path between preserving that which services the world’s population and which appears too big and foundational to fail while confronting the fact that it is becoming too monstrous to survive without sparking geopolitical conflicts that will likely turn the innumerable small wars and internal struggles already raging across the planet into a globaconflagration.

This is the core of the problem. In Marx’s time, if there was a sudden collapse of capitalism, most people in the world would still have been able to feed themselves and reproduce. They were reasonably self-sufficient in their local area procuring the kinds of things they needed to live and reproduce. People could put some sort of breakfast on their table irrespective of what was going on in the global economy and in global markets. Right now, that’s no longer the case in many parts of the world. Most people in the United States, in much of Europe, in Japan, and now increasingly in China, India, Indonesia, and in Latin America are depending more and more on the delivery of food through the circulation of capital. In Marx’s time, perhaps 10 percent of the global population was vulnerable to disruptions in the circulation of capital, as opposed to many more who were subject to famines, droughts, epidemics, and other environmental disruptions. The crisis of European capitalism in 1848 was part a product of harvest failures and part produced by a speculative crash focused on railroad finance. Since then, capital operating in the world market has largely eliminated the prospect of starvation due to supposedly natural causes. If there is famine the underlying causes (as opposed to the immediate triggers) can invariably be traced to failures in the social and political system of capitalist governance and distribution. Much of the world’s population is now dependent upon the circulation of capital to procure and ensure its food supply, access the fuels and the energy required to support daily life, and to maintain the elaborate structures and equipment of communication that facilitate the coordination of basic production requirements.

Capital, right now, may be too deeply implicated in the reproduction of daily life to fail. The economic consequences and social impacts and costs of a massive and prolonged failure in the continuity of capital circulation will be catastrophic and potentially lethal for a significant portion of the world’s population. To be sure, indigenous and peasant populations in the Andean highlands may survive quite well, but if the flow of capital shuts down for any prolonged period, then maybe two-thirds of the world’s population would within a few weeks be threatened with starvation, deprived of fuel and light, while being rendered immobile and deprived of almost all capacity to reproduce their conditions of existence effectively. We cannot now afford any kind of sustained and prolonged attack upon or disruption of capital circulation even if the more egregious forms of accumulation are strictly curbed. The kind of fantasy that revolutionaries might once have had – which was that capitalism could be destroyed and burned down overnight and that something different could immediately be built upon the ashes – is impossible today even supposing there ever was a time when such a revolutionary overthrow might have happened. Some form of the circulation of commodities and therefore of money capital has to be kept in motion for some considerable time lest most of us starve. It is in this sense that we might say that capital appears to be now too big to fail. We may aspire to make our own history, Marx observed, but this can never be done under conditions of our own choosing. These conditions dictate a politics that is about sustaining many existing commodity chains and flows while socializing and perhaps gradually modifying them to accommodate to human needs. As Marx noted in his commentary on the Paris Commune,

in order to work out their own emancipation, and along with it the higher form to which present society is irresistibly tending by its own economical agencies, they [the working classes] will have to pass through long struggles, through a series of historic processes, transforming circumstances and men. They have no ideals to realize, but to set free the elements of the new society with which old collapsing bourgeois society is pregnant.

The task is to identify that which lays latent in our existing society to find a peaceful transition to a more socialist alternative. Revolution is a long process not an event.

### ! — Cap Good — AT: Disease

#### No disease impact.

Adalja ’16 — Amesh; an infectious-disease physician at the University of Pittsburgh. He writes regularly at Tracking Zebra. June 17, 2016; “Why Hasn't Disease Wiped out the Human Race?”; *The Atlantic*; <https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/06/infectious-diseases-extinction/487514/>; //CYang

But when people ask me if I’m worried about infectious diseases, they’re often not asking about the threat to human lives; they’re asking about the threat to human life. With each outbreak of a headline-grabbing emerging infectious disease comes a fear of extinction itself. The fear envisions a large proportion of humans succumbing to infection, leaving no survivors or so few that the species can’t be sustained. I’m not afraid of this apocalyptic scenario, but I do understand the impulse. Worry about the end is a quintessentially human trait. Thankfully, so is our resilience.

For most of mankind’s history, infectious diseases were the existential threat to humanity—and for good reason. They were quite successful at killing people: The 6th century’s Plague of Justinian knocked out an estimated 17 percent of the world’s population; the 14th century Black Death decimated a third of Europe; the 1918 influenza pandemic killed 5 percent of the world; malaria is estimated to have killed half of all humans who have ever lived.

Any yet, of course, humanity continued to flourish. Our species’ recent explosion in lifespan is almost exclusively the result of the control of infectious diseases through sanitation, vaccination, and antimicrobial therapies. Only in the modern era, in which many infectious diseases have been tamed in the industrial world, do people have the luxury of death from cancer, heart disease, or stroke in the 8th decade of life. Childhoods are free from watching siblings and friends die from outbreaks of typhoid, scarlet fever, smallpox, measles, and the like.

So what would it take for a disease to wipe out humanity now?

In Michael Crichton’s The Andromeda Strain, the canonical book in the disease-outbreak genre, an alien microbe threatens the human race with extinction, and humanity’s best minds are marshaled to combat the enemy organism. Fortunately, outside of fiction, there’s no reason to expect alien pathogens to wage war on the human race any time soon, and my analysis suggests that any real-life domestic microbe reaching an extinction level of threat probably is just as unlikely.

When humans began to focus their minds on the problems posed by infectious disease, human life ceased being nasty, brutish, and short.

Any apocalyptic pathogen would need to possess a very special combination of two attributes. First, it would have to be so unfamiliar that no existing therapy or vaccine could be applied to it. Second, it would need to have a high and surreptitious transmissibility before symptoms occur. The first is essential because any microbe from a known class of pathogens would, by definition, have family members that could serve as models for containment and countermeasures. The second would allow the hypothetical disease to spread without being detected by even the most astute clinicians.

The three infectious diseases most likely to be considered extinction-level threats in the world today — influenza, HIV, and Ebola — don’t meet these two requirements. Influenza, for instance, despite its well-established ability to kill on a large scale, its contagiousness, and its unrivaled ability to shift and drift away from our vaccines, is still what I would call a “known unknown.” While there are many mysteries about how new flu strains emerge, from at least the time of Hippocrates, humans have been attuned to its risk. And in the modern era, a full-fledged industry of influenza preparedness exists, with effective vaccine strategies and antiviral therapies.

HIV, which has killed 39 million people over several decades, is similarly limited due to several factors. Most importantly, HIV’s dependency on blood and body fluid for transmission (similar to Ebola) requires intimate human-to-human contact, which limits contagion. Highly potent antiviral therapy allows most people to live normally with the disease, and a substantial group of the population has genetic mutations that render them impervious to infection in the first place. Lastly, simple prevention strategies such as needle exchange for injection drug users and barrier contraceptives — when available — can curtail transmission risk.

Ebola, for many of the same reasons as HIV as well as several others, also falls short of the mark. This is especially due to the fact that it spreads almost exclusively through people with easily recognizable symptoms, plus the taming of its once unfathomable 90 percent mortality rate by simple supportive care.

Beyond those three, every other known disease falls short of what seems required to wipe out humans — which is, of course, why we’re still here. And it’s not that diseases are ineffective. On the contrary, diseases’ failure to knock us out is a testament to just how resilient humans are. Part of our evolutionary heritage is our immune system, one of the most complex on the planet, even without the benefit of vaccines or the helping hand of antimicrobial drugs. This system, when viewed at a species level, can adapt to almost any enemy imaginable. Coupled to genetic variations amongst humans—which open up the possibility for a range of advantages, from imperviousness to infection to a tendency for mild symptoms — this adaptability ensures that almost any infectious disease onslaught will leave a large proportion of the population alive to rebuild, in contrast to the fictional Hollywood versions.

While the immune system’s role can never be understated, an even more powerful protector is the faculty of consciousness. Humans are not the most prolific, quickly evolving, or strongest organisms on the planet, but as Aristotle identified, humans are the rational animals—and it is this fundamental distinguishing characteristic that allows humans to form abstractions, think in principles, and plan long-range. These capacities, in turn, allow humans to modify, alter, and improve themselves and their environments. Consciousness equips us, at an individual and a species level, to make nature safe for the species through such technological marvels as antibiotics, antivirals, vaccines, and sanitation. When humans began to focus their minds on the problems posed by infectious disease, human life ceased being nasty, brutish, and short. In many ways, human consciousness became infectious diseases’ worthiest adversary.

### ! — Cap Good — AT: Environment

#### Capitalism solves the environment — prefer the Yale EPI and statistical indicators.

Zitelmann ’20 — Rainer; holds doctorates in history and sociology. He initially worked at the Central Institute for Social Science Research at the Free University of Berlin before taking up the position of editor-in-chief of Ullstein-Propyläen. July 13, 2020; "‘System Change Not Climate Change’: Capitalism And Environmental Destruction"; *Forbes*; <https://www.forbes.com/sites/rainerzitelmann/2020/07/13/system-change-not-climate-change-capitalism-and-environmental-destruction/?sh=7c423bcb6d72>; //CYang

The Price Of Growth — Destruction Of The Environment?

But isn’t there a price for this growth: environment devastation? Of course, nobody would deny that industrialization causes environmental problems. But the assertion that growth automatically leads to ever accelerating environmental degradation is simply false. Yale University’s Environmental Performance Index (EPI) uses 16 indicators to rank countries on environmental health, air quality, water, biodiversity, natural resources and pollution. These indicators have been selected to reflect both the current baseline and the dynamics of national ecosystems. One of the Index’s most striking findings is that there is a strong correlation between a state’s wealth and its environmental performance. Most developed capitalist countries achieve high environmental standards. Those countries with the worst EPI scores, such as Ethiopia, Mali, Mauritania, Chad and Niger, are all poor. They have both low investment capacity for infrastructure, including water and sanitation, and tend to have weak environmental regulatory authorities.

Contrary to prevailing perceptions, industrial development and technological advances have contributed significantly to relieving the burden on the environment. Both Indur Goklany in his book The Improving State of the World and Steven Pinker in chapter ten (“The Environment”) of his book Enlightenment Now demonstrate that we are not only living longer, healthier lives in unprecedented prosperity, but we are also doing so on a comparatively clean planet.

Researchers have confirmed that economic freedom — in other words, more capitalism — leads to higher, not lower, environmental quality.

Every year, the Heritage Foundation compiles its Index of Economic Freedom, which analyzes individual levels of economic freedom, and thus capitalism, in countries around the world. The Heritage Foundation’s researchers also measure the correlation between each country’s environmental performance and its economic freedom. The results couldn’t be clearer: the world’s most economically free countries achieve the highest environmental performance rankings with an average score of 76.1, followed by the countries that are “mostly free,” which score an average of 69.5. In stark contrast, the economically “repressed” and “mostly unfree” countries all score less than 50 for environmental performance.

Is Government The Best Solution To Environmental Problems?

Anti-capitalists frequently claim that central government is the best solution to environmental problems. And there is no doubt that state regulations to safeguard the environment are important. But state regulations, cited by anti-capitalists as a panacea for environmental issues, often achieve the opposite of what they were intended to do. Hardly any other country in the world touts its green credentials as much as Germany. According to even the most conservative estimates, Germany’s so-called “energy transition” is set to cost a total of almost €500 billion by 2025.

But the results of this massive investment is sobering, as an analysis by McKinsey reveals, “Germany is set to miss several key energy transition targets for the year 2020, and the country’s high power supply security is at risk unless new generation capacity and grid infrastructure are built in time for the coal and nuclear exit and electrification of transportation networks is accelerated.”

For decades, environmentalists in Germany focused on shutting down nuclear power plants. However, the phasing out of nuclear power has left Germany in a poor position in terms of CO2 emissions compared to other countries. It is not without good reason that Germany’s energy policy has been described as the dumbest in the world.

The latest generation of nuclear power plants are much safer than their predecessors. Despite what environmentalists might claim, impartial calculations have confirmed that it is impossible to meet the world’s energy needs from solar and wind power alone. Enlightened environmentalists are therefore now calling for nuclear power to be rightfully included in the fight against climate change. And yet, this is precisely what is being prevented in Germany by politicians — not capitalism. This example, just one of many, shows that government environmental policy is often ineffective. In some instances, it even achieves the opposite of what it was originally intended to, i.e. it exacerbates existing environmental problems.

It is also wrong to think that capitalism necessarily leads to ever greater waste of limited natural resources. Just take the smartphone for example, one of the most environmentally friendly of capitalism’s many achievements. With just one small device, a whole plethora of devices that used to consume resources in the past, such as the telephone, camera, calculator, navigation system, dictation machine, alarm clock, flashlight and many others, have been replaced. Smartphones also help to reduce the consumption of paper as many people choose not to take notes on paper and, for example, use their iPhone instead of a calendar to enter appointments.

Those who call for “system change” instead of “climate change” do not usually say which system they would prefer. All they are really sure of is that any new system should not be based on free market economics and that the state should play the decisive role. The simple fact is that socialism has failed in every country every time it has been tried — and socialism has damaged the environment more than any capitalist system. Murray Feshbach documents examples of the environmental destruction wrought by socialism in his book Ecological Disaster. Cleaning Up the Hidden Legacy of the Soviet Regime. As the book progresses through chapters such as “A Nuclear Plague,” “Dying Lakes, Rivers, and Inland Seas” and “Pollution of the Air and Land,” it becomes clear that this non-capitalist system was responsible for the greatest environmental destruction in history. Anti-capitalists may well reply that they do not want a system like the Soviet Union. And yet, they cannot name a single real-world system — at any time in the history of [humankind] ~~mankind~~ — that provides better environmental solutions than capitalism.

#### Climate doesn’t cause extinction.

Dr. Amber Kerr et al. 19, Energy and Resources PhD at the University of California-Berkeley, known agroecologist, former coordinator of the USDA California Climate Hub; Dr. Daniel Swain, Climate Science PhD at UCLA, climate scientist, a research fellow at the National Center for Atmospheric Research; Dr. Andrew King, Earth Sciences PhD, Climate Extremes Research Fellow at the University of Melbourne; Dr. Peter Kalmus, Physics PhD at the University of Colombia, climate scientist at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Lab; Professor Richard Betts, Chair in Climate Impacts at the University of Exeter, a lead author on the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in Working Group 1; Dr. William Huiskamp, Paleoclimatology PhD at the Climate Change Research Center, climate scientist at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research; 6/4/2019, “Claim that human civilization could end in 30 years is speculative, not supported with evidence,” <https://climatefeedback.org/evaluation/iflscience-story-on-speculative-report-provides-little-scientific-context-james-felton/>, Stras

There is no scientific basis to suggest that climate breakdown will “annihilate intelligent life” (by which I assume the report authors mean human extinction) by 2050.

However, climate breakdown does pose a grave threat to civilization as we know it, and the potential for mass suffering on a scale perhaps never before encountered by humankind. This should be enough reason for action without any need for exaggeration or misrepresentation!

A “Hothouse Earth” scenario plays out that sees Earth’s temperatures doomed to rise by a further 1°C (1.8°F) even if we stopped emissions immediately.

Peter Kalmus, Data Scientist, Jet Propulsion Laboratory:

This word choice perhaps reveals a bias on the part of the author of the article. A temperature can’t be doomed. And while I certainly do not encourage false optimism, assuming that humanity is doomed is lazy and counterproductive.

Fifty-five percent of the global population are subject to more than 20 days a year of lethal heat conditions beyond that which humans can survive

Richard Betts, Professor, Met Office Hadley Centre & University of Exeter:

This is clearly from Mora et al (2017) although the report does not include a citation of the paper as the source of that statement. The way it is written here (and in the report) is misleading because it gives the impression that everyone dies in those conditions. That is not actually how Mora et al define “deadly heat” — they merely looked for heatwaves when somebody died (not everybody) and then used that as the definition of a “deadly” heatwave.

North America suffers extreme weather events including wildfires, drought, and heatwaves. Monsoons in China fail, the great rivers of Asia virtually dry up, and rainfall in central America falls by half.

Andrew King, Research fellow, University of Melbourne:

Projections of extreme events such as these are very difficult to make and vary greatly between different climate models.

Deadly heat conditions across West Africa persist for over 100 days a year

Peter Kalmus, Data Scientist, Jet Propulsion Laboratory:

The deadly heat projections (this, and the one from the previous paragraph) come from Mora et al (2017)1.

It should be clarified that “deadly heat” here means heat and humidity beyond a two-dimension threshold where at least one person in the region subject to that heat and humidity dies (i.e., not everyone instantly dies). That said, in my opinion, the projections in Mora et al are conservative and the methods of Mora et al are sound. I did not check the claims in this report against Mora et al but I have no reason to think they are in error.

1- Mora et al (2017) Global risk of deadly heat, Nature Climate Change

The knock-on consequences affect national security, as the scale of the challenges involved, such as pandemic disease outbreaks, are overwhelming. Armed conflicts over resources may become a reality, and have the potential to escalate into nuclear war. In the worst case scenario, a scale of destruction the authors say is beyond their capacity to model, there is a ‘high likelihood of human civilization coming to an end’.

Willem Huiskamp, Postdoctoral research fellow, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research:

This is a highly questionable conclusion. The reference provided in the report is for the “Global Catastrophic Risks 2018” report from the “Global Challenges Foundation” and not peer-reviewed literature. (It is worth noting that this latter report also provides no peer-reviewed evidence to support this claim).

Furthermore, if it is apparently beyond our capability to model these impacts, how can they assign a ‘high likelihood’ to this outcome?

While it is true that warming of this magnitude would be catastrophic, making claims such as this without evidence serves only to undermine the trust the public will have in the science.

Daniel Swain, Researcher, UCLA, and Research Fellow, National Center for Atmospheric Research:

It seems that the eye-catching headline-level claims in the report stem almost entirely from these knock-on effects, which the authors themselves admit are “beyond their capacity to model.” Thus, from a scientific perspective, the purported “high likelihood of civilization coming to an end by 2050” is essentially personal speculation on the part of the report’s authors, rather than a clear conclusion drawn from rigorous assessment of the available evidence.

#### It’s a tail-end scenario in the far future.

Dr. Amber Kerr et al. 19, Energy and Resources PhD at the University of California-Berkeley, known agroecologist, former coordinator of the USDA California Climate Hub; Dr. Daniel Swain, Climate Science PhD at UCLA, climate scientist, a research fellow at the National Center for Atmospheric Research; Dr. Andrew King, Earth Sciences PhD, Climate Extremes Research Fellow at the University of Melbourne; Dr. Peter Kalmus, Physics PhD at the University of Colombia, climate scientist at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Lab; Professor Richard Betts, Chair in Climate Impacts at the University of Exeter, a lead author on the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in Working Group 1; Dr. William Huiskamp, Paleoclimatology PhD at the Climate Change Research Center, climate scientist at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research; 6/4/2019, “Claim that human civilization could end in 30 years is speculative, not supported with evidence,” <https://climatefeedback.org/evaluation/iflscience-story-on-speculative-report-provides-little-scientific-context-james-felton/>, Stras

The content of the IFLScience article is mostly an accurate representation of the contents of the Breakthrough report, but the article tends to gloss over important caveats and probabilities that are given in the report. The least accurate part of the IFLScience article is the headline, which is an outright misrepresentation of the report. The article title states that there is, overall, a “high probability” of human civilization coming to an end in 30 years. This is extremely misleading. What the Breakthrough report actually says is that, in the most unlikely, “long-tail” biophysical scenario where climate feedbacks are much more severe than we expect, THEN there is a high likelihood of human civilization coming to an end. But the report authors explicitly state that this “high-end scenario” is beyond their capacity to model or to quantitatively estimate.

Daniel Swain, Researcher, UCLA, and Research Fellow, National Center for Atmospheric Research:

The article uncritically reproduces claims from a recent report released by an Australian thinktank regarding the purported “end of human civilization” due to climate change over the next 30 years. While there is plenty of scientific evidence that climate change will pose increasingly existential threats to the most vulnerable individuals in society and to key global ecosystems, even these dire outcomes aren’t equivalent to the “annihilation of intelligent life,” as is claimed in the report.

Andrew King, Research fellow, University of Melbourne:

The report this article is based on describes a scenario which is unlikely, but several aspects of what is included in the report are likely to worsen in coming decades, such as the occurrence of deadly heatwaves. The conclusion of a high likelihood that human civilisation will end is false, although there is a great deal of evidence that there will be many damaging consequences to continued global warming over the coming decades.

Peter Kalmus, Data Scientist, Jet Propulsion Laboratory:

I don’t think it’s so easy to discount the essential warning of this report. However, it would have been stronger if the authors were more careful not to mention the unsupported concept of near-term human extinction, and the unsupported probabilistic claim that there is a “high likelihood” of their 2050 scenario which includes the collapse of civilization. I do not understand why non-scientist writers (neither report author is a scientist) feel a need to exaggerate sound scientific findings, when those findings are already quite alarming enough. I feel that humanity should undertake urgent climate action just as the report authors do, but I feel that misrepresenting the science is unhelpful and unnecessary.

Richard Betts, Professor, Met Office Hadley Centre & University of Exeter:

This is a classic case of a media article over-stating the conclusions and significance of a non-peer reviewed report that itself had already overstated (and indeed misrepresented) peer-reviewed science — some of which was already somewhat controversial. It appears that there was not a thorough independent check of the credibility of the message.

Notes:

[1] See the rating guidelines used for article evaluations.

[2] Each evaluation is independent. Scientists’ comments are all published at the same time.

ANNOTATIONS

The statements quoted below are from the article; comments are from the reviewers (and are lightly edited for clarity).

New Report Warns “High Likelihood Of Human Civilization Coming To An End” Within 30 Years

Richard Betts, Professor, Met Office Hadley Centre & University of Exeter:

The headline overstates the conclusions of the report (which is already overdoing things). The reports says it presents a scenario, and under that scenario and all the assumptions within it, the report claims that there is a “high likelihood of human civilization coming to and end” — but even then, the report itself does not give the end of civilisation within 30 years. The process supposedly leading ultimately to collapse begins around 2050 but takes a long time to take effect. Also the processes themselves are not well-grounded in science, as they over-interpret published work.

### ! — Cap Good — AT: Mineral Scarcity

#### No mineral scarcity.

Worstall ’17 — Adam; Fellow at the Adam Smith Institute in London. November 10, 2017; “No, We're Not Running Out of Minerals”; *FEE*; https://fee.org/articles/no-were-not-running-out-of-minerals/; //CYang

As I point out in that linked (and free!) book: we’re nowhere near any limit that need bother us. We’ve some 800,000 years of nickel left (assuming no recycling) and 34 million of cobalt — enough to be getting along with, given the average lifespan of a species is three million years.

So why the worrying that we are? Mainly, it’s because people misunderstand the technical jargon used in the industry. They talk about mineral reserves and mineral resources without realizing that these are not a fair indication of usable resource. No, not even a guide, not an estimation, there simply is no link at all.

A mineral reserve is something that we have drilled, tested, dug up a bit and processed, and we have now proven that we can extract this at current prices, using current technology, and make a profit doing so. This is an economic definition: roughly speaking, the stock at already existing mines.

A mineral resource is where we’re pretty sure all of that is true – we’ve just not proved it yet. And then there’s the stuff we’ve not got around to looking at – which is true of the bulk of the planet and the bulk of all minerals. This is like complaining that the food in the fridge is about to run out without referring to the supermarkets which exist to fill up our fridges again.

#### Their ev only accounts for current reserves.

Worstall ’17 — Adam; Fellow at the Adam Smith Institute in London. November 10, 2017; “No, We're Not Running Out of Minerals”; *FEE*; https://fee.org/articles/no-were-not-running-out-of-minerals/; //CYang

Just look at that famed Club of Rome report, Limits to Growth. They, entirely correctly, note that mineral reserves are going to last 30 – 50 years. They then, again entirely correctly, note that mineral resources can and will be converted into reserves by the application of time and money. Their prediction comes from their incorrect assumption that current reserves are an indication of the total amount available to us.

But they then simply assume that resources out there are only 10 times current reserves. Hmm, 10 x 30 – 50 years is 300 to 500, isn’t it? So it’s not all that much of a surprise that they tell us that society is doomed, doomed, in only a couple of centuries when they add a bit of exponential growth in usage. Their prediction comes from their assumption, that wholly incorrect one, that current reserves are an indication of the total amount available to us.

All too many predictions of this sort are based on entirely and totally wrong assumptions. The truth is we simply do not have a shortage of any mineral, over any human timescale, that we might want to use. Any policy based upon the assumption that we do is provably wrong. So we’d better revisit those policies based upon this incorrect assumption pretty sharpish, shouldn’t we?

### ! — Cap Good — AT: Red Innovation

#### ‘Red innovation’ causes global backlash and fails.

Tudoreanu **‘**20 [Mihnea; 9/23/20; doctoral candidate in economics at the University of Massachusetts Amherst; David M. Kotz; professor emeritus of economics at the University of Massachusetts Amherst; "Stable Jobs or iPhones? The Dilemma of Innovation in Socialism," Review of Radical Political Economics, Vol. 52, Vol. 4, p. 642-649]

**Note: DPS = Democratically Planned Socialism**

One of the advantages for innovation in DPS is that it can effectively take into account social and environmental costs, including the jobs lost or disrupted by the introduction of a new technology.8 But this can also be problematic, in that it is likely to make innovation slower in socialism than in capitalism. Democratic majorities are not immune to some of the same factors that caused Soviet managers to be technologically conservative.

On the one hand, DPS should not suffer from taut planning, unrealistic plan targets imposed from the top down, or an incentive structure that discourages risk-taking by trying out new technologies. But on the other hand, innovation is always disruptive in any kind of economic system. As old technologies are superseded, product lines become obsolete and production processes are changed, and as a result certain kinds of jobs are no longer needed. Even with an employment guarantee, the loss of one’s job may have to involve retraining, changing careers, or moving across the country. So, it is reasonable to expect that workers will resist new technologies.9 Yet at the same time, in their capacity as consumers, they will demand new and better products.

This is the “Stable jobs or iPhones?” dilemma. We can prioritize cutting-edge consumer products, or we can prioritize stable employment, but perhaps not both.10 In DPS, the people will be able to decide between one and the other, on a case-by-case basis, so that some innovations will be pursued, others will be scrapped because of their disruptive effects, and some will be introduced at a deliberately slow pace. Meanwhile, capitalism always comes down in favor of the iPhones despite the conflict with stable jobs. Since socialism will not always do this, it is likely that socialism will have more job security but fewer cutting-edge consumer products than capitalism.

If there is an international rivalry between socialism and capitalism, the citizens of the two kinds of societies will be able to compare their lifestyles with those in the other economic system. Workers living under capitalism may be attracted by the stable jobs, shorter working hours, democratic workplaces, and social benefits provided by socialism. However, those living under socialism will likely also be attracted by the rapid introduction of new consumer goods under capitalism. Moreover, as long as the speed of innovation in socialism is lower than that in capitalism, the “consumer gap” with capitalism would grow over time.

This may not be considered a problem for socialism if most of the population value stable jobs more than iPhones, but there would likely be a minority who do not. If the consumer gap is large enough, and/or that dissenting minority has an overriding preference for new consumer goods, then we have a category of people with a material interest in supporting capitalism, which values a new technology over job stability, even though they are part of the working class.

A common response to the flaws of Soviet socialism has been to propose other models of socialism that would not have those flaws. But the trade-off between job security and innovation is not one that can be easily eliminated within socialism. It is not due to the overly centralized or undemocratic nature of Soviet socialism.

Furthermore, there is a military aspect to the innovation problem. Innovations that aid the military are also likely to have a disruptive effect on employment, as in the case of consumer-oriented innovations. This is a problem because it might put DPS at a military disadvantage with respect to capitalism, which would hurt the socialist side in international relations even if no military conflict takes place. If one side knows it would lose any war that did take place, then that side will act timidly and avoid even nonviolent confrontation, so as to avoid provoking the other side into war. For both sides to stand a good chance of success in a peaceful rivalry, they must be more or less evenly matched militarily, so that neither feels that it can do whatever it wants with impunity or that it must tread lightly to avoid confrontation.

The Cold War was a multifaceted struggle between two different systems. Any future socialist economic order will most likely face capitalism in a somewhat similar struggle. Can such a struggle be won by socialism without matching capitalism’s rate of technological development? That is the question.

### ! — Cap Good — AT: Soft Left

#### Statistics are all aff — massive increases in quality of life occurred under capitalism.

Zitelmann ’20 — Rainer; holds doctorates in history and sociology. He initially worked at the Central Institute for Social Science Research at the Free University of Berlin before taking up the position of editor-in-chief of Ullstein-Propyläen. July 27, 2020; "Anyone Who Doesn’t Know The Following Facts About Capitalism Should Learn Them"; *Forbes*; [https://www.forbes.com/sites/rainerzitelmann/2020/07/27/anyone-who-doesnt-know-the-following-facts-about-capitalism-should-learn-them/?sh=4712d1863dc1; //CYang](https://www.forbes.com/sites/rainerzitelmann/2020/07/27/anyone-who-doesnt-know-the-following-facts-about-capitalism-should-learn-them/?sh=4712d1863dc1;%20//CYang)

In 1820, 94% of the world’s population was living in extreme poverty. By 1910, this figure had fallen to 82%, and by 1950 the rate had dropped yet further, to 72%. However, the largest and fastest decline occurred between 1981 (44.3%) and 2015 (9.6%). Reading these figures, which were compiled by Johan Norberg for his book Progress, is enough to make anyone rub their eyes in disbelief. For according to leftist anti-capitalists, these were the very decades in which so much went so wrong in the world. In his book Capital in the 21st Century, the left-wing French economist Thomas Piketty writes that it is precisely this period that is allegedly so problematic. He bemoans a widening of the gap between the rich and the poor in terms of income and wealth in the period from 1990 to 2010. But what is more important to these hundreds of millions of people — that they are no longer starving, or that the wealth of multi-millionaires and billionaires may have increased to an even greater extent than their own standard of living?

According to Norberg, 200 years ago, at the birth of capitalism, there were only about 60 million people in the world who were not living in extreme poverty. Today there are more than 6.5 billion people who are not living in extreme poverty. Between 1990 and 2015 alone (in Thomas Piketty’s view the devastating years in which social inequality rose so sharply), 1.25 billion people around the world escaped extreme poverty — 50 million per year and 138,000 every day.

Glorifying The “Good Old Days”

Johan Norberg himself used to be a left-winger and an anti-capitalist. In his book, he admits that he never thought about how people lived before the industrial revolution, when there was no medicine, no antibiotics, no clean water, nowhere near enough food, no electricity and no clean water. He confesses that he pretty much imagined this epoch of humanity as a trip to the countryside. But the reality of the past was quite different. In the early 19th century, poverty rates were higher even in the richest countries then than they are today in the world’s poorest countries. In the United States, Great Britain and France, between 40% and 50% percent of the population lived in conditions that we now describe as extreme poverty. Today, the only countries with such high poverty levels are all in sub-Saharan Africa. Across Scandinavia, Austria-Hungary, Germany and Spain, roughly 60% to 70% of the population lived in extreme poverty. And between 10% and 20% of Europeans and Americans were officially described as beggars and vagabonds.

It is estimated that 200 years ago some 20% of the inhabitants of England and France were unable to work at all. At most they had enough strength to walk slowly for a few hours each day, which condemned them to begging for the rest of their lives. Karl Marx foresaw the impoverishment of the proletariat, but when he died in 1883, the average Englishman was three times richer than in 1818, the year in which he was born.

Life expectancy

Progress over recent decades is particularly evident in terms of life expectancy gains. Life expectancy at birth has increased more than twice as much in the last century as in the 200,000 years before. The probability that a child born today will reach retirement age is higher than the probability of previous generations ever celebrating their fifth birthday. In 1900, the average life expectancy worldwide was 31 years; today it stands at 71 years. Of the roughly 8,000 generations of Homo sapiens since our species emerged approximately 200,000 years ago, only the last four have experienced massive declines in mortality rates.

Hunger

In the last 140 years there have been 106 major famines, each of which has cost more than 100,000 lives. The death toll has been particularly high in socialist countries such as the Soviet Union, China, Cambodia, Ethiopia and North Korea, killing tens of millions of people through the forced transfer of private means of production to public economies and the use of hunger as a weapon. The book The Power of Capitalism describes in painful detail the biggest socialist experiment in history, Mao’s “Great Leap Forward” at the end of the 1950s. About 45 million Chinese died at that time.

Travel And Hospitality Sectors Need To Reimagine Their Business Models

The annual number of deaths due to major famines fell to 1.4 million in the 1990s — not least as a result of the collapse of socialist systems worldwide and China’s move toward capitalism. As late as 1947, the United Nations stated that around half of the world’s population was chronically undernourished. By 1971, this had fallen to 29%, ten years later it was only 19%. By 2016, the proportion of people suffering from malnutrition worldwide had fallen to 11%.

### ! — Cap Good — AT: Sustainability

#### Err aff — their doomerism is empirically always wrong.

Zitelmann ’20 — Rainer; holds doctorates in history and sociology. He initially worked at the Central Institute for Social Science Research at the Free University of Berlin before taking up the position of editor-in-chief of Ullstein-Propyläen. July 27, 2020; "Anyone Who Doesn’t Know The Following Facts About Capitalism Should Learn Them"; *Forbes*; [https://www.forbes.com/sites/rainerzitelmann/2020/07/27/anyone-who-doesnt-know-the-following-facts-about-capitalism-should-learn-them/?sh=4712d1863dc1; //CYang](https://www.forbes.com/sites/rainerzitelmann/2020/07/27/anyone-who-doesnt-know-the-following-facts-about-capitalism-should-learn-them/?sh=4712d1863dc1;%20//CYang)

Prophets Of Doom Have Always Got It Wrong

If there is one thing we can learn from history, it is that doom-mongers have always been wrong. In 1968, a highly acclaimed book was published with the provocative title The Population Bomb. The book stated that the 1970s would see the world plagued by numerous famines, which would result in hundreds of millions of people starving to death. Another book, Famine 1975!, predicted that famine would reach catastrophic proportions within 15 years. While anti-capitalists frequently glorify the past, they always regard the future with a strong sense of doom and gloom. In 1972, for example, the highly influential Club of Rome warned that emissions of practically every pollutant now seemed to be rising exponentially. In fact, in the decades to come, pollution would not only stop growing, but actually decrease. And drastically so. Total emissions from the world’s six leading air polluters fell by more than two-thirds between 1980 and 2014.

The Environment

Norberg also confirms the extent to which environmental conditions have improved over the last few decades. While acknowledging the impact of climate change, he also points out that the amount of energy needed to produce one unit of prosperity in the Western world has decreased by 1% per year every year over the past 150 years. As he demonstrates, there are ways and means to cut CO2 emissions without reducing growth, trade and access to energy. These include more efficient production processes, less energy-intensive construction methods, new energy sources and fuels. As he also explains, scientists and companies are now working on fourth-generation nuclear power plants, all of which have passive safety systems, that can generate hundreds of times more energy from the same resources and do not have the same waste problems as their predecessors. Stephen Pinker, in his book Enlightenment Now!, also confirms that all manner of environmental problems have declined sharply in recent decades, despite the fact that most people believe they have actually increased. Pinker also sees nuclear energy as the most important means of combating climate change. In the past, according to Pinker, people’s innovative power to solve problems has repeatedly been underestimated — but a departure from progress and growth, he warns, will lead to the opposite of what environmental and climate protectors hope for.

Redistribution?

In his book, Norberg cites a seemingly endless array of facts that prove the benefits of economic progress. The weekly hours worked by the average American are now 25 hours less than they were in 1860. At the same time, people enter the world of work later in life, retire earlier and live longer after retirement. All of these positive developments are the result of technical progress and an economic system that made this progress possible in the first place. A study of 180 countries over four decades shows that the increase in income for the poorest in a society is primarily due to growth rather than redistribution: 77% of income growth for the poorest 40% of a population are directly linked to the average growth of a country. Capitalism is not the problem, as anti-capitalists tell us. In fact, it is capitalism that has very successfully solved many of the world’s most serious problems over the last two centuries.

### ! — Cap Good — Sustainability — T/L

#### Yes decoupling---best and most recent studies AND leakage is wrong.

Zeke Hausfather 21, Director, Climate and Energy at The Breakthrough Institute, "Absolute Decoupling of Economic Growth and Emissions in 32 Countries," Breakthrough Institute, 04/06/2021, https://thebreakthrough.org/issues/energy/absolute-decoupling-of-economic-growth-and-emissions-in-32-countries.

The past 30 years have seen immense progress in improving the quality of life for much of humanity. Extreme poverty — the number of people living on less than $1.90 per day — has fallen by nearly two-thirds, from 1.9 billion to around 650 million. Life expectancy has risen in most of the world, along with literacy and access to education, while infant mortality has fallen. Despite perceptions to the contrary, the average person born today is likely to have access to more opportunities and have a better quality of life than at any other point in human history. Much of this increase in human wellbeing has been propelled by rapid economic growth driven largely by state-led industrial policy, particularly in poor-to-middle income countries.

However, this growth has come at a cost: between 1990 and 2019, global emissions of CO2 increased by 56%. Historically, economic growth has been closely linked to increased energy consumption — and increased CO2 emissions in particular — leading some to argue that a more prosperous world is one that necessarily has more impacts on our natural environment and climate. There is a lively academic debate about our ability to “absolutely decouple” emissions and growth — that is, the extent to which the adoption of clean energy technology can allow emissions to decline while economic growth continues.

Over the past 15 years, however, something has begun to change. Rather than a 21st century dominated by coal that energy modelers foresaw, global coal use peaked in 2013 and is now in structural decline. We have succeeded in making clean energy cheap, with solar power and battery storage costs falling 10-fold since 2009. The world produced more electricity from clean energy — solar, wind, hydro, and nuclear — than from coal over the past two years. And, according to some major oil companies, peak oil is upon us — not because we have run out of cheap oil to produce, but because demand is falling and companies expect further decline as consumers increasingly shift to electric vehicles.

The world has long been experiencing a relative decoupling between economic growth and CO2 emissions, with the emissions per unit of GDP falling for the past 60 years. This is the case even in countries like India and China that have been undergoing rapid economic growth. But relative decoupling alone is inadequate in a world where global CO2 emissions need to peak and decline in the next decade to give us any chance at limiting warming to well below 2℃, in line with Paris Agreement targets.

Thankfully, there is increasing evidence that the world is on track to absolutely decouple CO2 emissions and economic growth — with global CO2 emissions potentially having peaked in 2019 and unlikely to increase substantially in the coming decade. While an emissions peak is just the first and easiest step towards eventually reaching the net-zero emissions required to stop the world from continuing to warm, it demonstrates that linkages between emissions and economic activity are not an immutable law, but rather simply a result of our current means of energy production.

In recent years we have seen more and more examples of absolute decoupling — economic growth accompanied by falling CO2 emissions. Since 2005, 32 countries with a population of at least one million people have absolutely decoupled emissions from economic growth, both for terrestrial emissions (those within national borders) and consumption emissions (emissions embodied in the goods consumed in a country). This includes the United States, Japan, Mexico, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Spain, Poland, Romania, Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, Sweden, Hungary, Belarus, Austria, Bulgaria, El Salvador, Singapore, Denmark, Finland, Slovakia, Norway, Ireland, New Zealand, Croatia, Jamaica, Lithuania, Slovenia, Latvia, Estonia, and Cyprus. Figure 1, below, shows the declines in territorial emissions (blue) and increases in GDP (red).

Chart, bar chart

Description automatically generated

To qualify as having experienced absolute decoupling, we require countries included in this analysis to pass four separate filters: a population of at least one million (to focus the analysis on more representative cases), declining territorial emissions over the 2005-2019 period (based on a linear regression), declining consumption emissions, and increasing real GDP (on a purchasing power parity basis, using constant 2017 international $USD). We chose not to include 2020 in this analysis because it is not particularly representative of longer-term trends, and consumption and territorial emissions estimates are not yet available for many countries.

There is a wide range of rates of economic growth between 2005-2019 among countries experiencing absolute decoupling. Somewhat counterintuitively, there is no significant relationship between the rate of economic growth and the magnitude of emissions reductions within the group. While it is unlikely that there is not at least some linkage between the two factors, there are plenty of examples of countries (e.g., Singapore, Romania, and Ireland) experiencing both extremely rapid economic growth and large reductions in CO2 emissions.

One of the primary criticisms of some prior analyses of absolute decoupling is that they ignore leakage. Specifically, the offshoring of manufacturing from high-income countries over the past three decades to countries like China has led to “illusory” drops in emissions, where the emissions associated with high-income country consumption are simply shipped overseas and no longer show up in territorial emissions accounting. There is some truth in this critique, as there was a large increase in emissions embodied in imports from developing countries between 1990 and 2005. After 2005, however, structural changes in China and a growing domestic market led to a reversal of these trends; the amount of emissions “exported” from developed countries to developing countries has actually declined over the past 15 years.

This means that, for many countries, both territorial emissions and consumption emissions (which include any emissions “exported” to other countries) have jointly declined. In fact, on average, consumption emissions have been declining slightly faster than territorial emissions since 2005 in the 32 countries we identify as experiencing absolute decoupling. Figure 2, below, shows the change in consumption emissions (teal) and GDP (red) between 2005 and 2019.

Chart, bar chart

Description automatically generated

There is a pretty wide variation in the extent to which these countries have reduced their territorial and consumption emissions since 2005. Some countries — such as the UK, Denmark, Finland, and Singapore – have seen territorial emissions fall faster than consumption emissions, while the US, Japan, Germany, and Spain (among others) have seen consumption emissions fall faster. Figure 3 shows reductions in consumption and territorial emissions for each country, with the size of the dot representing the size of the population in 2019.

[Chart omitted]

### ! — Cap Good — Sustainability — AT: AI

#### Literally *1984*.

Michael Bennett and Sean Welsh 22, Bennett, PhD student in AI; Welsh, PhD in Philosophy, 1-16-2022, "Will AI Spell the End of Capitalism?," https://quillette.com/2022/01/16/ai-and-the-end-of-capitalism/, jy

In 2018, the Washington Post published an opinion piece by Feng Xiang entitled “AI Will Spell the End of Capitalism.” Professor Feng teaches law at Tsinghua University and is one of China’s most prominent legal scholars. The core of his argument is set forth in the opening paragraphs:

If AI remains under the control of market forces, it will inexorably result in a super-rich oligopoly of data billionaires who reap the wealth created by robots that displace human labor, leaving massive unemployment in their wake.

But China’s socialist market economy could provide a solution to this. If AI rationally allocates resources through big data analysis, and if robust feedback loops can supplant the imperfections of “the invisible hand” while fairly sharing the vast wealth it creates, a planned economy that actually works could at last be achievable.

There are a couple of things wrong with this. First, there is the obvious point that Marxists have been prophesying the end of capitalism since 1848. Second, Der Spiegel has run covers prophesying massive unemployment due to robots since 1964. These predictions are yet to eventuate.

Feng hopes that state-owned AI will revive the long-dead idea of socialist central planning. He is probably wrong about this because he overestimates the capabilities of AI and what it is good for. His reference to “big data analysis” indicates that he is referring to the particular class of data-hungry machine learning (ML) models popular today. These algorithms require a lot of data because they rely on mimicry rather than understanding and independent reasoning. ML does not work like human learning. Human children do not need ten thousand tagged images to tell the difference between cats and dogs, but contemporary ML does.

Given a particular task, if the purpose is known, a human can seek to serve that purpose even if there are surprises, i.e., unanticipated changes in circumstance. The opposite is true for a digital mimic that knows nothing of the purpose it serves. This is why anything novel or out of the ordinary tends to break ML. For example, the error rate of systems looking to distinguish feral trees from native trees can increase dramatically if the live aerial photos start to differ from the photos used to train the model. Shifts in satellite orbit, the time of day pictures are taken and even modest moves in geography and vegetation can degrade model accuracy. Contemporary ML-based AI is very much a case of highly trained horses for very specific courses.

As is commonly said, artificial intelligence is brittle (but fast) whereas human intelligence is robust (but slow). If the task is to land a drone, provide song recommendations, or even predict protein folding, then mimicry can work well, given a sufficiently varied quantity of training data. If, on the other hand, rationality or the ability to provide nuanced reasoning for past decisions is required, mimicry flops. The ability to deal with the unexpected is one of the great strengths of Homo sapiens.

Feng’s claim is simply that AI oligarchs are bad and the only credible fix is a “socialist market economy” governed by a Marxist one-party state. This is a false dichotomy; our choice is not between these two extremes. We agree that AI oligarchs are an unattractive prospect. However, there are existing remedies for cartels, monopolies, and harmful AI products in the pluralist West. Targeted regulation is a better fix for capitalism’s defects than a revolution led by an alliance of workers and peasants. As a result of Frances Haugen’s testimony, many in the US Congress are looking to clip the wings of social media. The EU has led the world in regulating AI products, introducing rights to explanations, rights to be forgotten, and rights to data privacy. The Australian government has released draft legislation to expose anonymous trolls to defamation actions by removing the “platform” shield of social media and making them “publishers” accountable for the views their users post just like traditional media. The “wild west” days of the information age are over.

But Feng offers a typically Marxist “all or nothing” argument. To fix the problems of competitive capitalism, his solution is a Marxist political monopoly based on the revolutionary expropriation of the expropriators. His argument is unconvincing because it is based on a hopelessly dated caricature of capitalism. “Laissez-faire capitalism as we have known it,” he says, “can lead nowhere but to a dictatorship of AI oligarchs who gather rents because the intellectual property they own rules over the means of production.”

The obvious problem with this argument is that laissez-faire capitalism is extinct, long since abandoned in favour of regulation, anti-trust legislation, and redistribution through the welfare state. Feng overstates the market power of the AI oligarchs, most of whom make their money selling ads in a competitive market. He says nothing about the coercive power of a political monopoly, that can silence policy competition by throwing it into the gulag.

The most sinister aspect of current AI is what a one-party state can do with it. Silicon Valley has given China the technical tools to set up the world of 1984. Now the party telescreen can monitor the likes of Winston Smith 24/7. Instead of a screen on the wall, it’s the mobile phone in your pocket connected to the Internet that can be used to track you and monitor what you click on, who and what you message, and keep you and all your fellow citizens under constant surveillance for “counter-revolutionary” views. In China, the Internet and social media have evolved to be a tyrant’s dream. Comrade political officers in technology firms monitor online posts for “objectionable” material and have unlimited powers of “moderation.”

The Achilles heel of this political strategy is that it creates a culture in which people are afraid to think and speak freely. When you have to filter every word you say in case it offends the powers that be, you are strongly motivated to avoid risky creative thinking. In a society where the state can control everything and purge celebrity and wealth, talented people vote with their feet and migrate to places where they can get rich and famous and say what they think. Those that remain settle for the safety of government-approved groupthink. As a result of this systemic dampening of creativity, the economy stagnates in the long run.

Aspects of contemporary AI theory align with the intuitions of Karl Popper as expressed in The Open Society and Its Enemies. Driven mostly by reaction to the totalitarian horrors of fascism and communism in World War II, Popper intuited that social truth is best served by policy competition and piecemeal social engineering not policy monopoly. Contemporary AI, in the form of discussion of the exploration/exploitation tradeoff in reinforcement learning (a variant of ML), explains why.

Exploitation is a strategy whereby the AI takes a decision assumed to be optimal based on data observed to date. In essence, it is about trusting past data to be a reliable guide to the future, or at least today. Exploration, by contrast, is a strategy that consists of not taking the decision that seems to be optimal based on existing past data. The AI agent bets on the fact that observed data are not yet sufficient to correctly identify the best option. Obviously, exploitation works better in closed and well-understood systems, but exploration is a better bet in those that are open and poorly understood.

Even if decisions are made by the most generally intelligent AI possible, the optimal strategy for that AI is to subdivide tasks, duplicate itself, and specialize for local conditions. In other words, a swarm of individuals each making their own choices can learn from the best of what its population tries. If all individuals are constrained, then the ability of the swarm to learn and change is [destroyed] crippled. There are exceptions, particularly where the cost of an individual failing is so high it is comparable to the whole population failing (for instance, letting more people have access to a button that ends the world is worse than letting fewer people have access to this button). But, generally speaking, more distributed control consistently beats more centralised control. By employing many different, often contradictory policies at once, we constantly explore as we exploit. Applying this recent technical insight retrospectively to history, it explains the sustained stagnation of Marxist economies.

Presently, no functioning state has either completely central or distributed control. We are all somewhere in between. In the mid-19th century, when The Communist Manifesto was published, there was hardly any spending on social services. Income tax was three percent in the UK, there was no such thing as company tax, and the welfare state did not exist. What existed was the parish and the poorhouse. In the days of Gladstone and Disraeli, with property-based suffrage and a budget than went mostly on the Army, the Navy, and servicing debt incurred during the Crimean War, one could plausibly claim, as Marx and Engels did, that “the executive of the modern state was nothing but a committee for managing the common affairs of the bourgeoisie.” In the 19th century, spending by the UK government was less than a 10th of GDP. Today it is a third. Half the UK budget, one-sixth of GDP, goes on health, education, and welfare.

A degree of central planning is desirable to provide infrastructure, to support basic research, and to ensure that everyone has access to education and health services. Regulation is required to enforce contracts, to facilitate cooperation, to provide minimum standards for products and services, and to enforce rules on safety, pollution, and so on. However, as an overall policy, maximising individual autonomy within reason, erring towards computational efficiency and distributed control, will yield dramatically better outcomes than central control by the AI of a one-party state.

Central planning ignores what is arguably the greatest advantage of distributed control and local adaptation: error correction. It also ignores the fact that “fairness” is notoriously hard to define in AI terms, assuming resources are to be fairly allocated. A central planner might select what is best for an average human, but what is best is often far from obvious. Humans are quite dissimilar from one another. We share goals only in the most general sense (for example, we seek to avoid pain, find food, take shelter, and so forth). We rarely agree on what we want to do today or any other day, and our beliefs about how to achieve things are often inconsistent.

The best possible central planner, mathematically, is a pareto-optimal super-intelligence. This is a software agent that learns faster to predict more accurately than any other agent, on average across all possible tasks. This is the theoretical upper limit of intelligence (allowing for debate over the exact definition of intelligence itself). However, even this theoretical perfection will always be out-performed by those with a more specifically relevant inductive bias toward a given task (those who are less intelligent in general, but more suited to the task at hand). In other words, even the most intelligent being possible would make mistakes when compared with the possibilities presented by distributed control, localised adaptation, and selective evolution. The same goes not just for correcting mistakes, but for improving our lot in life. Every beneficial innovation in history was an instance of an individual breaking ranks to correct a perceived flaw in the norm, to adapt to the specific situation at hand. Innovation requires disobedience. To centralise control is to encourage stagnation.

The problem with state-run monopolies is that they are inherently inefficient because they lack the error correction provided by competition. Markets provide error correction in the form of people deciding products suck and buying elsewhere. In the realm of ideas, error correction occurs when people say a party’s policy does not work, but this option is removed when free speech is curtailed. In China, those who criticise government policy (or government officials) disappear and get silenced. Only a lucky few like Peng Shuai have global profiles high enough to get noticed. Notwithstanding their claims about “participatory” democracy, in the one-party state, dissidents and innovators are purged in darkness.

The history of the communist world is replete with economic disaster. Millions died as a result of famines caused by Stalin and Mao. Marxist doctrine underlies the economic underperformance of China compared to Taiwan. AI cannot save Marxism, but it can be used by Marxists to serve their agendas of surveillance and social control. AI can be used to bring about the death of democracy and enable the rule of a digital Big Brother.

Forced to choose between AI oligarchs who make fortunes selling ads, regulated by elected governments that the people can replace, or a society ruled by AI platforms staffed with political officers who repress all criticism of the party line, the former is preferable.

### ! — Cap Good — Sustainability — AT: Physics

#### Newton goes aff.

Oliver Waters 18, degrees in Science, Law, and Philosophy, 11-13-2018, "The Strange Necessity of Infinite Economic Growth," https://medium.com/@oliverwaters\_76079/the-strange-necessity-of-infinite-economic-growth-ebc2e505cdf1, jy

Since the Earth consists only of a finite amount of matter and energy, we clearly cannot indefinitely consume its contents without eventually drowning in waste or starving to death. But even this obvious insight contains a misconception. We never actually ‘consume’ matter and energy in the first place. We are forever bound by the first law of thermodynamics, which dictates that matter and energy are never created or destroyed, only transformed.

This brings us back to economic growth. Fundamentally, it is the process of human beings transforming matter and energy into more valuable forms via the development of theoretical and practical knowledge. It is ‘economic value’ which increases exponentially, measured (very)roughly by GDP. The crucial point is that while the extraction of finite physical resources cannot increase indefinitely on a finite planet, economic growth actually can.

Steven Pinker describes the infinite potential of economic growth eloquently in his book Enlightenment Now:

‘…it’s a fallacy to think that people “need resources” in the first place. They need ways of growing food, moving around, lighting their homes, displaying information, and other sources of well-being. They satisfy these needs with ideas: with recipes, formulas, techniques, blueprints, and algorithms for manipulating the physical world to give them what they want. The human mind, with its recursive combinatorial power, can explore an infinite space of ideas, and is not limited by the quantity of any particular kind of stuff in the ground.’

Of course, it’s abundantly clear from history that most civilisations have failed miserably to generate and implement the requisite knowledge to provide for the needs and desires of their citizens. This brings us to Hickel’s empirical claim: that our own current trajectory is leading us to disaster.

2. Prediction or prophesy?

One might reasonably suspect that the promise of infinite economic growth would only be plausible for a sufficiently advanced civilisation — particularly one that has managed to wean itself off fossil fuels. We should therefore ask if decoupling economic growth from resource use is likely to be feasible given our relatively primitive level of technological development.

On Hickel’s account, things are not looking good. He cites several studies which suggest there is no way to avoid running out of resources if we continue with our current rate of economic growth.

The main problem with these studies is that they tend to presume a certain fixed ‘biocapacity’ of the Earth. This concept and the corresponding notion of humanity’s ‘ecological footprint’ have many problems, the most fundamental of which is that they depend arbitrarily on our current level of scientific and technological development. This is because the maximum level of human consumption that our planet can support is not fixed by some natural law — it depends entirely on the sophistication of our technology to convert raw materials efficiently into life-supporting forms.

The very same lump of matter and energy has vastly different properties to us humans depending on the level of and quality of our knowledge. Major scientific breakthroughs therefore allow us to do dramatically more with less. One kilogram of uranium contains two to three million times more energy than the same amount of coal or oil, but this fact went completely unnoticed by everyone up until fundamental breakthroughs in physics in the 20th century.

Similarly, the invention of desalination techniques unlocked the effectively boundless supply of seawater. While the rest of the Middle East suffers water shortages, Israel has a surplus — thanks to advances that have reduced the costs of desalination by two-thirds since 1990.

One study mentioned by Hickel calculated that we’ll be using 95 billion metric tons of resources globally in 2050. But this figure is meaningless without a corresponding estimate of what fraction that is of the Earth’s total resources. And we can’t know what Earth’s total resources are because we cannot predict future fundamental technological advances.

At one point Hickel declares that the sustainable level of global resource use is about 50 billion metric tons a year, without citing any source or justification. The authors of the 2012 study he references cited this same figure as a possible upper limit on global resource extraction, being roughly the level of extraction there was in 1992. But why choose this year? Because that was the year of the first United Nations Conference on Environment and Development. In other words, it was picked out of a hat.

Even where these studies make allowances for future improvements in how efficiently we use resources, they only allow for greater efficiency in the use of resources we currently know about. If the future is anything like the past, we will discover whole new ways to build and power things, and replace whole classes of raw materials we currently depend upon.

Then there’s the fact that these studies’ predicted improvements in resource efficiency are themselves woefully pessimistic. The most optimistic prediction in the studies Hickel mentions is that resource efficiency will double by 2050. But almost any consumer product we use today requires far fewer resources to build and run than their equivalent 32 years ago. While it’s a somewhat trite example, take the iPhone. This one product has replaced landline push-button phones, pagers, cameras and camcorders, calendars, alarm clocks, audio-recorders, flashlights, maps, GPS, credit cards, and more. We should only expect this kind of dematerialization to accelerate over the next 32 years, given the rapid advances being made in nanotechnology and materials science.

This fundamental fallacy driving the pessimism of these studies was eloquently captured by David Deutsh in his book The Beginning of Infinity. In the chapter ‘Unsustainable’, Deutsch reflects on Paul Erlich warning his high school class in 1971 of the impending global ecological collapse, a tragedy which never came to pass:

‘Ehrlich thought that he was investigating a planet’s physical resources and predicting their rate of decline. In fact he was prophesying the content of future knowledge. And, by envisaging a future in which only the best knowledge of 1971 was deployed, he was implicitly assuming that only a small and rapidly dwindling set of problems would ever be solved again.’

It’s perfectly acceptable and prudent to make predictions about future resource scarcity, so long as you remember that such predictions are based on our current level of scientific knowledge. Such analyses play a crucial role in motivating us to invest more in advancing our knowledge, but Hickel mistakenly interprets their findings as fatalistic signs that we must cease economic growth altogether. And this, as I’ll show below, is simply not an option.

#### Never give socialists a math textbook.

David Schwartzman 8, former Professor Emiritus at the New School for Social Research, 2008, "The Limits to Entropy: the Continuing Misuse of Thermodynamics in Environmental and Marxist theory," http://www.redandgreen.org/Documents/Limits%20to%20entropy%20final.htm, jy

As discussed earlier, a common if not predominant use of Georgescu-Roegen’s theory of entropy since Rifkin’s popularization in the 1980s has been to create the illusionary appearance of a robust physical basis for neo-Malthusian and anti-development ideologies, not to support a Marxist critique of neo-classical economics. Hence Burkett’s embrace of Georgescu-Roegen’s theory is curious given Burkett’s own valuable critique of neo-Malthusian views (Burkett, 1998).

In Rifkin’s work, the entropy concept is extended to its apocryphal limits. Entropy appears as a pollutant, as an indicator of cosmic disorder, the inexorable outcome of all economic activity, the mother of ecocatastrophe. (Georgescu-Roegen enthusiastically endorses Rifkin’s treatment of the subject (Georgescu-Roegen, 1980). Rifkin, as noted, favors a pre-industrial global population of less than one billion people, and rejects the use of computers since they generate entropy (1989 edition, 190-191)! Should we wonder whether Rifkin’s more recent books were composed on a word processor rather than a less entropic typewriter?

Entropy is too abstract and coarse a concept to illuminate most issues in the environmental discourse unless the full context of its use is thought through—the “ascent from the abstract to the concrete” in Marxist epistemology (Ilyenkov, 1982). Its invocation in the environmental discourse commonly serves little purpose other than to avoid clarity while creating the illusion of rigor because a concept from theoretical physics is used. Is entropy a useful measure of unsustainability? A consideration of the physical entropic flux (roughly equivalent to the radiant energy flux) from the Earth’s surface should demonstrate that appealing to anthropogenic (man-made) entropy production as a measure of negative environmental impacts fails to recognize their real qualitative aspects.

This entropic flux is dominated by the natural heat production from both solar radiation interacting with the Earth’s surface and incoming radiation from the greenhouse effect. Any plausible anthropogenic contribution is trivial. The greatest potential anthropogenic contribution arises from global warming. Since to a good first approximation the entropic flux is equal to the incoming solar flux divided by the absolute temperature (Schwartzman, 1999, 2002, 162-163), a 5 deg C global rise in surface temperature will lower this flux by about 2%, which is derived from the ratio of absolute temperatures (288/293), the global incoming solar energy flux being the same (recall that the denominator of the entropy flux expression is always the absolute temperature). Whatever the change in entropic flux arising from changes in the Earth’s surface temperature, the entropic flux in itself will tell us nothing about actual impacts of global warming, which are both the linear and nonlinear outcomes of fossil fuel consumption and other sources of anthropogenic greenhouse gases. The concrete linkage of cause and effect must be worked out from application of the sciences of biogeochemistry, climatology, oceanography, ecology etc. Likewise, while the entropy of mixing gives some insight into general aspects of pollution it fails to capture the relevant qualitative aspects so critical to the health of humans and nature (Schwartzman, 1996).

On a cosmological scale, the increase in entropy in the universe is inevitable as expressed in the Second Law, but this very increase is the necessary requirement for the emergence and maintenance of self-organized systems. The debt of self-organizing systems to “chaos” is the environmental increase in entropy. As we shall see sustainable societal self-organization on the planet Earth is only limited by the low-entropy solar flux, a limit with no practical consequences far into the future, with the entropic debt paid as the heat flux to space, the ultimate heat sink. This future, I argue, is only achievable by the contingent outcome of global red-green struggle.

Given the mineral and fossil fuels reserves of the Earth’s crust, the "economic system is... doomed to "run down" as the low entropy material resources on earth are dissipated and become unavailable" (Burkett, 2005, 135, quoting Georgescu-Roegen). We do not need a fallacious fourth law to tell us this, the first and second laws provide sufficient explanation. Without the use of incoming solar radiation, this system will ultimately run out of available energy to do work. It is important to point out that even without the use of incoming solar radiation as a prime source of energy (aside from the low efficiency collection by photosynthesis, the basis of agriculture), this system is not isolated since waste heat is dissipated, ultimately radiated into space. Nuclear energy, even fusion power will only postpone this ultimate fate in a real economy limited to the terrestrial environment since this energy source utilizes the finite reserves of fissionable (or, in the future, fusionable) raw material. The solar fusion reactor 93 million miles away is the true sustainable alternative.

Thus the inescapable flaw of the fourth law is its neglect of the possible flow of energy into/out of the system which is defined as closed but not isolated. By converting low entropy, high temperature energy (solar radiation) to high entropy, low temperature heat, work can be produced to recycle indefinitely (footnote 2). A caveat: indefinitely does not mean "eternally" (even protons may have a finite half-life). To get concrete about this issue, the relevant time scale is hundreds, even millions of years, not eternity. Moreover, we should be considering the urgent prospect of solarizing and demilitarizing human society in the 21st century, not in the distant future, when humanity will plausibly expand outward in our solar system and even further into the galaxy if it survives the present epoch of destructive capital reproduction and future challenges.

Interestingly, in one text Georgescu-Roegen (1976, 8) incorrectly defines “closed” as entailing no exchange of matter or energy with [the] environment (recall that in thermodynamics this is defined as an “isolated” system, not a “closed” system); he still maintained that according to the second law matter along with energy is subject to irrevocable dissipation. This confusion may be linked to his pessimistic view on harnessing solar energy since the latter is the relevant energy flux to consider for the closed but not isolated system containing economic activity on the earth’s surface. Thus, immediately following his formulation of the fourth law in his 1980 text we find his argument that there is no immediate prospect of solar energy (high efficiency) going from feasible to viable, i.e., escaping from its perpetual status as a parasite on fossil fuels, the dominant contemporary energy source. Parenthetically, I found no evidence that Georgescu-Roegen ever explicitly corrected himself by acknowledging his definition of closed systems in this paper (Georgescu-Roegen 1976) was wrong.

But Burkett claims that the concept of unavailable matter, “the inevitability of friction, corrosion and decomposition” transcending energy reductionism is critical to Georgescu-Roegen’s insight. Therefore, Burkett argues that since the “earth is open to massive solar energy inflows but basically closed materially, it is not surprising that low-entropy matter, not energy, emerges most clearly as the ultimate constraint on human production” (Burkett, 2005, 119-120). I welcome Burkett’s implied rejection of Georgescu-Roegen’s views on solar viability. But his argument regarding the implications of “unavailable matter” is highly problematic, recognizing that it is a partial retreat from the strong version of the fourth law. On what time scale? What are the real and potential fluxes of low entropy solar energy that can reclaim this dissipated matter? Just what determines the “unavailability” of high entropy matter? Does this alleged constraint imply that near future migration to the moon or asteroid Belt is necessary? Is waste heat a critical concern with respect to the utilization of solar energy? And finally is this spectre of “unavailable matter” really relevant to a future solarized physical economy? My short answer to each of the previous three questions is: no.

What is the ultimate limit to global energy consumption? Presently the global anthropogenic (human-created) energy flux is equal to 0.03% of solar flux to land. Or, to put it another way, humanity currently uses an amount of energy, mostly from fossil fuels, equivalent to 0.03% of the solar energy reaching the land surface of earth. Hence tapping this solar flux has a huge potential as the energy basis of a solar utopia, with much smaller impacts on global ecology than the present unsustainable reliance on fossil fuels and nuclear power (Schwartzman, 1996). Thus, for a solar energy source, the waste heat flux back into space is to a very good first approximation not incremental to the natural infrared flux from the Earth’s surface, at least until such time as human energy demand increases many hundreds of times. This is precisely the same argument made by Kaberger and Mansson (2001) referenced but unfortunately not addressed in Burkett’s paper. Of course, I am not claiming that the first basis for human civilization, low efficiency biomass energy, can be the basis of this solarized economy. Only high-efficiency solar energy can do this. The conflation of the two is common in Neo-Malthusian treatment (e.g., Huesemann, 2001, 2003).

Recycling

Now, more specifically on the possibility of "complete" recycling in an open system, Burkett’s discussion of this issue (Burkett, 2005, 132) lacks sufficient concreteness with respect to a real physical economy on the earth’s surface, consistent with Georgescu-Roegen and Daly’s abstract treatment. In practical terms, 100% recycling efficiency is not required (see Kaberger and Mansson's (2001) illuminating discussion). Given the possibilities of a future dematerialized solar economy, with a lower throughput than now, and of course recognizing that current information technology is not really dematerialized under current capital reproduction, as Burkett rightfully argues, (2005,135), the huge solar flux is again the basis of any ultimate limit to practical recycling on the earth's surface, and not the entropic flux of waste heat. The latter would be dissipated anyway by the absorption of solar energy on a land surface (with an albedo, i.e., reflectivity, of about 0.3-0.4, with 0 being perfectly absorbing and 1 being perfectly reflecting (like an ideal white surface). Under these conditions, the "tremendous increase in the entropy of the environment' or the “adverse material effects of waste heat on eco-systems” resulting from recycling (Burkett, 2005,132-133) is an illusion for a solarized economy as Kaberger and Mansson (2001) show. Unfortunately, Burkett’s discussion of the case made for the plausibility of total recycling in an industrial society (citing Ayres, 1999) does not confront the qualitative difference between a solarized and a depletable-energy-based economy.

### ! — NATO Good

#### NATO is anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist. The critique’s ideology is reductionist.

Hudson 22 [Sam Hudson; undergraduate studying Natural Sciences at Cambridge; 3-29-2022; "The Progressive Case for NATO"; Areo; https://areomagazine.com/2022/03/29/the-progressive-case-for-nato/; KL]

Many will see the Young Labour Twitter account saga as yet another battle in the perpetual civil war between the left and the right of Labour, and as Young Labour—one of the last bastions of Corbynite socialist supremacy—attempting to undermine Keir Starmer’s leadership, which they see as a betrayal of Labour values. While Starmer’s moderation on economic policy, as seen in his attempts to reposition the Labour Party as business-friendly and his equivocations over tax policy, may be misplaced overreactions to Corbyn’s devastating loss in 2019, his return to foreign policy more in line with international norms certainly is not. Corbyn’s anti-American, “anti-imperialist” politics not only alienated much of the electorate (according to a 2020 poll, 65% of people in the UK support NATO), but were only dubiously progressive. The left was correct to call out America’s foreign policy blunders in Iraq and elsewhere—however, constructive criticism of American overreach has now been replaced by an overarching, hyper-reductive ideology that places America and neoliberalism at the centre of the world’s ills. Corbyn’s sympathy for Nicolás Maduro’s authoritarian regime in Venezuela and his flirtations with Hamas and Hezbollah are symptomatic of this outlook. And there is no clearer example of the manifestation of this ideology than in the supposedly left-wing criticisms of NATO, which Corbyn himself espouses.

Young Labour’s preposterous idea that it was “NATO aggression” that precipitated the Russian invasion betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of NATO’s function. NATO troops were deployed in Poland and the Baltic states in a defensive response to the largest military build-up since World War II. This was not escalatory brinkmanship by the US trying to impose its will on the world. Unlike the Russians in Belarus and in Russian-occupied Crimea, the US offered no shows of force and undertook no “military exercises,” as they are euphemistically called. This was NATO operating at its most fundamental level: as an alliance for mutual defence. Countries that still bear deep scars from centuries of Russian imperialism were understandably concerned at the potential of spillover from any conflict in Ukraine and so—quite reasonably—requested additional support from their larger NATO allies. It is rather ironic that the “anti-imperialist” contingent of the left would have quite happily abandoned the very defensive commitments that have prevented these sovereign nations from being preyed on by a revanchist, imperialist Russia.

Some of NATO’s left-wing critics argue that it is the organisation’s expansion into Eastern Europe that has forced Russia onto a paranoid warpath, but this argument does not hold water either. Countries join NATO by democratic consent—a fact that only the most absurd CIA conspiracy theories can explain away. Had Russia been a good neighbour to its Eastern European former client and satellite states, perhaps NATO would not have expanded beyond Germany. Instead, Russian leaders since Boris Yeltsin have viewed Russia’s former sphere as the country’s birth right, crushing nascent separatist movements within Russia’s own borders with horrific brutality, while supporting pro-Russian separatist movements in Moldova and Georgia. This cynical policy would have collapsed under the weight of its own contradictions had it not devolved into the blood-and-soil imperialism that we see playing out in the invasion of Ukraine. Yeltsin may be remembered through rose-tinted glasses as a cheery drunkard, but his desperation to maintain Russia’s status as a superpower set Russian foreign policy on course to where it is today. Putin has now simply taken that foreign policy to its logical conclusion. No wonder much of Eastern Europe wished to join NATO, the one alliance that could give these nations credible anti-imperialist protection.

NATO is too often viewed reductively, as an American sphere of influence, in much the same way as the Warsaw Pact countries comprised a Soviet sphere of influence. It is true that a degree of alignment with some American foreign policy goals and values is implicit in NATO membership, but this is in no way equivalent to the influence the Soviets exerted over their client states during the Cold War. NATO members are sovereign states and have acted against US interests in the past. For instance, Turkey recently (wrongly) invaded America’s Kurdish allies in Syria. Likewise, NATO (rightly) refused US requests for assistance during the invasion of Iraq. As these concrete actions demonstrate, NATO is far more than an American-led sphere and has remained grounded in the democratic principles upon which it was founded, even though the US is able to leverage more power than it did at NATO’s founding in 1949. The characterisation of NATO as a tool of American imperialism, then, is demonstrably false.

Criticism of NATO is not limited to the realm of geopolitical machinations. Many on the left see it as a vessel for American business interests and neoliberal capitalism. History has shown otherwise. It was Clement Attlee’s British Labour government that signed the North Atlantic Treaty in 1947, founding NATO. And while Article 2 of the treaty stipulates that signatories should “eliminate conflict in their international economic policies” and “encourage economic collaboration,” this did not prevent Attlee’s government from being one of the most transformative in British history: it established the modern welfare state and continues to be widely celebrated by the Labour left today. Norway and Denmark, both founding members of NATO, are flourishing social democracies where social democrats and democratic socialists have spent more time in power than in opposition since 1949.

Clearly, NATO has not impeded progressive political movements within its member states. In fact, the existence of NATO has had positive repercussions for the European left. The unification of Western Europe under a single military alliance forced member states to abandon the nationalist and revanchist grudges that had dogged European politics for centuries. The political moderation this encouraged has meant that—even in those European countries where social democrats have not had much political success—the right-wing opposition generally takes the form of Christian Democrats, who are far more moderate than the reactionary, nationalist conservative parties that were prominent prior to World War II. At the same time, the strength of NATO’s collective opposition to the Soviet Union prevented that brand of highly authoritarian and reactionary socialism from gaining traction in Europe. Instead, leftist movements have been largely characterised by a more liberal tradition, which opposes state-sponsored violence and emphasises human rights.

Far from propping up the military-industrial complex—as NATO is often accused of doing—mutual defence and the guarantee of peace have allowed defence spending to be dramatically decreased throughout Europe. Part of this decrease may be attributed to the end of the Cold War—but defence spending has been on the decline since the 1960s and this is at least partly due to the peace between Western European neighbours that NATO has assured. In fact, defence spending has arguably declined too much. Most nations in the alliance have still not met NATO’s defence spending target of 2% of GDP, leaving America to foot the remaining bill. While this has meant that many European nations have been able to develop their welfare states, this has been at the expense of Americans, who still face a particularly vicious brand of capitalism with limited safety nets.

As Germany’s overnight policy shift following the invasion of Ukraine has shown, committing to the 2% target is not a tall order. It would enable us to maintain our collective defence while allowing America a much-needed financial reprieve. It would also diminish America’s influence upon the alliance, allowing European nations more of a say on collective defence policy and procurement. Hopefully, this would encourage a shift away from the American military-industrial complex and toward a more competitive, less monopolised defence industry, which holds less sway over governments.

History is often viewed as an inexorable march of progress and development from the barbarism of war to enlightened peace. This seems to be the underlying thinking of NATO’s left-wing detractors. But just as Rome fell, peace and progress are never inevitable, nor should they ever be taken for granted. Francis Fukuyama’s argument that we have reached the end of history has been widely derided by many on the left who find the idea that humanity will not progress past neoliberal democracy absurd. I agree with them—but in looking only forward, they have failed to look back. The fact that they see capitalist liberal democracy as the archenemy of peace and progress is not only extraordinarily privileged but terrifyingly dangerous. The west’s terrible interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan have confirmed this narrative for many. This thinking explains Young Labour’s tweets: NATO is to blame for Putin’s invasion, since neoliberalism is the sole force of evil in the world. However, as the tanks rolled into Ukraine, history returned once more to remind us that there are far darker, more dangerous enemies of progress. It is these enemies that NATO continues to forestall and, in doing so, allow for the peace and progress of which we Europeans are beneficiaries today. While it is a tragedy that it has taken the whiplash of war for us to look back at history, I hope these events may foster newfound gratitude for NATO and the peace and progress that it has helped achieve. I look forward to the day when the progressive left—of which I am proud to be a part—will view NATO, alongside the NHS and the welfare state, as one of Labour’s greatest achievements.

#### NATO is good. Avoiding complex discussions in favor of monolithic criticisms of NATO *is* Western imperialism. It’s important to understand regional perspectives. Defending Russia aggression and ignoring authoritarian threats make NATO worse.

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In the wake of Russia’s war against Ukraine, demand for NATO membership has spiked once again, even in the historically neutral countries of Finland and Sweden. Further south, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are also desperately seeking a fast track to NATO membership.

Many in the West see NATO as a tool of U.S. imperialism and empire, and in important ways it is. NATO has afforded the United States the legitimacy to militaristically intervene abroad, most notably in the case of Libya in 2011. NATO is both a cause and effect of the United States’ global hegemony via its grand strategy of primacy, despite the end of Cold War rivalries.

In the post-Cold War era, however, NATO did not grow simply because the United States dictated it. On the contrary, foreign demands for security assurances have consistently spurred NATO’s enlargement long before Russia’s war in Ukraine.

NATO’s eastward enlargement is member-driven. Yet, both pro-NATO and anti-NATO Western commentators and analysts often ignore Eastern European regional voices. They reduce Eastern Europeans to objects without agency that the West may choose to act upon.

Unless scholars and policymakers delve into the regional complexities and the demand-side of NATO membership in earnest, they will miss important dynamics at play and make it harder to steer or predict future U.S. foreign policy trends. They will continue to understand world politics only through the preferences and choices of Western leaders.

A more complete picture of NATO’s trajectory in the twenty-first century emerges only when allowing room for the agency of other countries and citizens. Even a more restrained U.S. foreign policy requires an assessment of why there remains so much local demand for NATO, which is partially driven by the West’s complicity in spurring authoritarian regimes in Europe.

NATO Membership Was Popular in Eastern Europe

It is now clear to even casual observers why countries bordering Russia have sought NATO membership, often with high public support at every step of the way. These countries have been ringing the alarm on escalating Russian aggression for decades.

And still, prominent Western voices, from conservative libertarians and European leftists to American neorealists and Fox News’ Tucker Carlson, blame NATO’s eastward expansion for Russia’s aggression. They claim that Ukraine’s nonalignment is a core national interest for Russia. The Democratic Socialists of America even released a statement blaming Western imperialist expansion for stoking Russia’s legitimate fears. Of course, Russian foreign policy perpetuates this same narrative.

But as neo-realist John Mearsheimer has himself admitted, Ukraine presents a vital national interest to Russia because “Putin is a 19th Century man.” In other words, Ukraine’s NATO aspirations are only threats to Russian core interests when seen through the lens of its imperial past and renewed imperialistic ambitions. Also telling is Putin’s recent statement on Sweden and Finland’s pending NATO membership applications. He proclaimed that Russia “has no problem … these countries do not pose a direct threat to Russia.” Only Ukraine poses a problem. Yet, neither Ukraine nor NATO directly threatens Russia’s borders, sovereignty, or physical survival in any clear way. Moreover, until now, Ukraine had little chance of joining NATO in the coming years. Therefore, it is imperialism, not core interests or NATO enlargement, that drives Russian aggression in Ukraine.

These prominent voices do not consider that Russian aggression has been the primary reason Baltic and Eastern European countries have sought NATO’s protection. At its most basic iteration, Russia aims to halt NATO expansion to preserve a privileged sphere of influence and domination in Eastern Europe. In contrast, Eastern European countries seek NATO membership to ensure their survival as sovereign nation-states against a regional imperial power. NATO, with all its flaws, has been a guarantor of sovereignty for its European members.

It is not surprising that new members have shown strong public support for NATO prior to accession. As shown in the table below, ten out of eleven countries that joined NATO in the 2000s did so with public support over 50 percent, often even over 70 percent, prior to membership. The only country that bucked this trend was Montenegro, which at the time of polling in 2017 was divided between pro-Western and pro-Russian factions.

Public opinion data taken from the Pew Research Center in 2021 continues to show strong, consistent support for NATO among Eastern European and Balkan countries.

Graphical user interface

Description automatically generated with medium confidence

Note: Publicly-available poll sources hyperlinked within the table. Most recently available data prior to the accession of the country listed.

Therefore, it is misleading to use the language of NATO “expanding into” the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in 1999, the Baltic countries in 2004, and then the Balkan states in 2009 and onward. Furthermore, NATO is not a monolith. Member states disagree ardently at times, even against key U.S. demands as in the case of the 2003 intervention in Iraq, where NATO had no involvement given member objections.

In trying to condemn Western imperialism, such passive language perpetuates imperialist notions and withholds agency from non-Western citizens.

Eastern and Southern European countries actively sought membership in the alliance, prioritizing NATO accession in their foreign and domestic policies for decades. When these countries finally joined the alliance, many citizens cheered in relief.

Even countries that do not directly border Russia are enthusiastic about NATO membership, particularly in the Western Balkans. This is because the United States is not the only imperialist power afoot.

The Case for NATO in the Western Balkans

While Western imperialism should be condemned, so should the non-Western variety. In Eastern Europe, it was the Soviet Union that embodied the worst of imperialism. Today it is Russia, with its numerous military invasions and occupations in the region since 1999.

In the Western Balkans, the United States and NATO have not posed an existential threat to the citizens of Albania, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Greece, and Kosovo. Instead, these citizens worry about threats to their homelands stemming from regional hegemons and revisionist powers, including Russia, Serbia, and Turkey.

For instance, in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia, citizens and leaders fear the rise of a revisionist Serbia echoing the aspirations of a Serbian-led Yugoslavia, now called Serb World. The genocides and gruesome wars of the 1990s remain fresh and terrifying reminders of such existential fears, as mass graves of civilian victims, continue to be uncovered. For others, it is the rise of a revisionist Turkey, renewed land grabs, the suppression of minority rights in Greece, or fears of a Russian-backed coup in Montenegro that spark dread. The youngest state in the region, Kosovo, fears for its very survival as it vies for United Nations (UN) recognition against Serbia’s derecognition campaigns and hyper-nationalist mobilizations, as well as Russia’s opposition.

Balkan and Eastern European support for NATO membership originates from a history of oppression by regional powers, prompting strong demands for external protection. Any scholar or policymaker who does not acknowledge this local reality will reproduce incomplete perspectives or worse, promote accounts that hollow out local agency.

Even Anti-Imperialists Cite Imperialist Solutions

Discussing NATO enlargement within Eastern Europe and the Balkans without delving into the complexities of regional history and politics is an imperialist project. When Western actors explain NATO membership through the lens of Western machinations and blame European states for their NATO aspirations, they are really saying that Eastern European and Balkan countries should be content to serve as buffer states between empires and accept their lot as second-class nations.

Ironically, even when famous scholars such as Mearsheimer critique U.S. imperialism and militarism, they still manage to promote a world in which only the United States has agency and only the United States’ great power rivals matter.

The West can engage in self-criticism of its foreign policy without blaming the victims of other imperialist powers. In fact, the West can begin its moral reckoning by understanding and accepting how its accommodation of Russia and other local aggressors has inflamed regional fears and magnified demands for NATO enlargement.

For instance, by buying Russian energy on Russia’s terms and remaining ~~mute~~ or even legitimizing Russia’s invasions of its weaker neighbors, the United States and European Union have perpetuated corruption and authoritarianism in Russia and Europe. By propping up authoritarian “ethnocrat” leaders in the Western Balkans in the name of regional stability, the West has inflamed regional imperialists, encouraged separatist agendas, and exacerbated instability and tension. All of this only fuels regional demands for NATO protection.

Instead of blaming the victims of another imperialist power, the West should focus on its own complicity in enabling regional aggressors.

Other countries have agency in international relations; NATO membership proves it. Any account that portrays NATO’s eastward expansion only through the lens of Western politics dismisses Eastern European and Balkan countries as powerless pawns of empire.

#### NATO is an instrument, not a theology. They must prove the policy not the tool is bad.

Sweeney 20 [Mike Sweeney; non-resident fellow at Defense Priorities; 1-6-2020; "What Is NATO Good For?"; Strategy Bridge; https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2020/1/6/what-is-nato-good-for; KL]

Of course, NATO’s obituary has been written many times before. In the opening to Why NATO Endures, quietly one of the best books on the alliance, Wallace J. Thies wryly notes that Henry Kissinger owns the unique distinction of having declared the alliance to be in serious peril in each of the first six decades of NATO’s existence.[5] For the time being, better policies on how NATO is used should be the focus, rather than scrapping it altogether or withdrawing U.S. support. Key to this will be working to enhance strategic stability between the alliance and Russia.

DE-MYSTIFYING THE PAST

To some extent, NATO is a victim of its own myth-making. Support for the alliance is often couched in somber testaments to the wisdom of the founders and odes to the selfless nobility of collective defense. The reality is quite different.

Interestingly, the main strategic rationale for NATO that emerges in the pages of Thies’ book is as a complement to the Marshall Plan: just as funds from that initiative would allow the Europeans to rebuild their economies, NATO would remove the burden from the European allies of having to devote scarce money to their militaries. It would also provide psychological reinforcement to nations still traumatized by the Second World War, living in Stalin’s long shadow. Once the West European economies had stabilized and rebounded, they could—in theory—take on a greater share of their defense and the United States could recede.[6]

Thus, in the late 1940s, many U.S. officials didn’t expect to base American troops in Europe indefinitely.[7] Nor did they necessarily expect them to have to fight. While the Soviets might attempt mischief within their own sphere of influence—as seen in the 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia and the blockade of West Berlin—their ability and willingness to go beyond that was considered limited by key thinkers such as George Kennan, who believed the Soviet military and people too spent from the Second World War to threaten Western Europe.[8] Moreover, Stalin was seen as distinct from Hitler in terms of his willingness to pursue risk. While the Soviet leader might try to capitalize on existing chaos and weakness, he wasn’t disposed to the outright aggression that characterized the Nazi regime.[9]

But in a prescient prelude to the defensibility issues surrounding the admission of the Baltic states, not a great deal of thought was given to how Western Europe would actually be defended when the alliance was formed—at least in terms of conventional forces. Of course, in April 1949, America still had a nuclear monopoly.

The Soviet detonation of its own atomic device in August 1949 changed the U.S. calculus somewhat, but it was events around the world a year later that truly focused America’s mind on what it had signed up for in NATO. The conventional defeats suffered by the U.S. military in the opening stage of the Korean War ,  as much as any development, led to a realistic discussion of what collective defense would really look like in Europe—almost eighteen months after the alliance’s inception.[10] It was only then that planners on both sides of the Atlantic began to take seriously the practical questions of defensibility and to set up integrated military structures—such as the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, or SHAPE—to coordinate those efforts.[11] Subsequently, NATO’s role as an institution and U.S. force deployments in Europe would both take on permanence.

The ad hoc nature of this process is the point worth underscoring. NATO was not formed by strategic gods implementing their divine wisdom; it was the result of hardworking government officials and political leaders doing their best to deal with the security challenges of the day using the means at their disposal. That is all the alliance has ever been, and we exalt its past at the risk of its future.

NATO AS AN INSTRUMENT, NOT A THEOLOGY

Understanding that NATO outlasted its original purpose—to allow the Europeans to focus on rebuilding their economies in tandem with the Marshall Plan—well before the end of the Cold War illustrates that the alliance has always been an adaptable instrument. It is true that some twentieth-century luminaries such as Kennan and Dwight Eisenhower didn’t foresee NATO evolving into a permanent fixture in European security at its inception.[12] But should that have stopped the alliance from becoming an effective military bulwark against the Soviets as the Cold War developed and demands on the alliance evolved?

Just as it adapted and changed throughout its early history, NATO’s purpose now can be whatever is required. This doesn’t mean that NATO should do everything—or be everywhere. The past thirty years have shown that there are some things the alliance does better than others and also that there are questionable benefits to unending expansion of its membership. President George W. Bush’s support for Georgian and Ukrainian membership at the 2008 Bucharest Summit is the most prominent example of this and likely contributed to both the August War in Georgia and Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea.[13]

But here, too, perspective is needed. Because the alliance should consider ending expansion doesn’t mean previous rounds were inherently mistakes. Enlargement permanently settled the Polish Question—which provided grist for a century and a half of European wars—and also has on balance contributed to stability between Russia and the Baltic states. Likewise, being realistic about the failure of the Libya intervention doesn’t mean the 1995 operation to stop ethnic cleansing in Bosnia was also a mistake. The 1999 Kosovo intervention probably falls somewhere in the middle.[14]

NATO frankly does its best work when no one hears about it. Its strength lies in the day-to-day military cooperation it fosters and the general sense of deterrence and stability it promotes. These contributions are neither as dramatic as facing off against the Red Army at the height of the Cold War, nor as controversial as the Libyan intervention, but they would be glaring in their absence.

Why arbitrarily remove the structure that provides that stability—both with Russia and also among NATO’s many disparate members? Withdrawing NATO protection from the Baltic states or the smaller Balkan members, for example, will not preclude the possibility of their becoming involved in a war with Russia or Serbia; just the opposite, it could make it more likely. Once such a conflict begins, is it certain the United States will not be entangled or affected even if it is no longer actively participating in NATO?

Again, it is worth reiterating that NATO is an instrument. Many of the alliance’s opponents may actually be opposed to the way the United States and its partners have employed force since the end of the Cold War—especially in the case of operations falling under the rubric of regime change. The argument, implicit in Posen’s OpEd, for example, is that NATO needs to be taken away from reckless U.S. policymakers to prevent them from future adventures.

This argument is backwards. Yes, the consequences of three decades of continuous military operations should be examined. But increasing national restraint and making better strategic decisions seems like a smarter path than summarily scrapping an effective, tested tool that could play an essential role in a wiser foreign policy.

#### NATO brought peace to Europe. The critique misapprehends history.

Strikethrough for ableist language

Brands 22 [Hal Brands; Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; 3-14-2022; "Why blaming NATO for Ukraine war is Vladimir Putin’s biggest lie"; ThePrint; https://theprint.in/opinion/why-blaming-nato-for-ukraine-war-is-vladimir-putins-biggest-lie/872350/; KL]

The great NATO enlargement debate never ends. In the 1990s, U.S. officials and academics argued about whether pushing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization into Eastern Europe was likely to sustain the post-Cold War peace or prematurely end it. More recently, critics have charged that Russia’s war in Ukraine is a natural response to the aggressive expansion of America’s most powerful alliance.

Now Russian officials, and even President Vladimir Putin himself, have echoed — and sometimes directly cited — American scholars such as political scientist John Mearsheimer, who argues that the current crisis “is the West’s fault.”

The “blame NATO” argument tells a story of hubris, arrogance and tragedy. It holds that there was a golden chance for lasting peace in Europe, but the U.S. threw it all away. Rather than conciliating a defeated rival, Washington repeatedly humiliated it by expanding a vast military alliance up to Russia’s borders and even into the former Soviet Union. This pursuit of American hegemony in a liberal-democratic guise eventually provoked a violent rebuke.

In this telling, Putin’s wars against Georgia and Ukraine are just the natural response of one great power whose vital interests are being heedlessly threatened by another.

The argument isn’t wholly wrong. Putin’s wars are indeed meant, in part, to push Western influence back from Russia’s frontiers. But the idea that NATO expansion is the root of today’s problems is morally and geopolitically bizarre.

Far from being a historic blunder, NATO expansion was one of the great American successes of the post-Cold War era. Far from being the act of a domineering superpower, it was part of a long tradition of vulnerable states begging to join America’s liberal empire. And far from posing a mortal threat to Moscow, NATO enlargement actually provided Russia with far greater security than it could have provided itself.

NATO’s big bang

NATO was founded in 1949 with 12 members in Western Europe and North America. It gradually added additional states — Turkey, Greece, West Germany, Spain — over the course of the Cold War. But the big bang of enlargement came once the superpower conflict ended. NATO incorporated the former East Germany into the alliance in 1990; it then added three Eastern European countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic) in 1999; then seven more, including the Baltic states, in 2004.

To understand why NATO grew so rapidly, we have to remember something that nearly everyone has now forgotten: There was no guarantee that Europe would be mostly stable, peaceful and democratic after the Cold War. In fact, many of the analysts who now view NATO expansion as a catastrophe once warned that a post-Cold War Europe could become a violent hellscape.

It wasn’t an outlandish scenario. A reunified Germany might once again try to dominate its neighbors; the old enmity between Moscow and Berlin could reignite. The collapse of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe could liberate those states to pursue long-suppressed territorial claims and nationalist agendas. Ethnic tensions and nuclear proliferation might explode as the Cold War order crumbled.

If the U.S. pulled back once the Soviet threat was gone, there would be no extra-European superpower to put out fires on a continent with lots of geopolitical kindling. “The prospect of major crises, even wars, in Europe is likely to increase dramatically,” Mearsheimer predicted in 1990.

NATO enlargement was the logical answer to these fears. Expansion was a way of binding a reunified Germany to the West and surrounding it with democratic allies. Joining NATO required new members to lay aside any revanchist designs, while allowing them to pursue economic and political reforms rather than investing heavily in military capabilities to defend their newly won autonomy.

NATO’s move to the east also ensured that Poland and other states that easily could have built nuclear weapons didn’t need to, because they had American protection. Most important, enlargement kept the U.S. firmly planted in Europe, by preventing the centerpiece of the transatlantic relationship from becoming obsolete.

No other initiative could have accomplished these objectives. Partnership for Peace — a series of loose security cooperation agreements with former Soviet-bloc states — didn’t offer the ironclad guarantees that came with NATO membership. (If you want to understand the difference between “security partner” and “NATO ally,” just look at what is happening today to Ukraine, one of the former.)

The idea of creating a pan-European security architecture (one that included Russia) had the same defect; plus, it would have given Moscow veto power over the security arrangements of the countries the Soviet Union had so recently dominated.

Only American power and promises could provide stability in Europe, and NATO was the continent’s critical link to the U.S. Since 1949, Washington had tamped down rivalries between old enemies such as France and Germany, while also protecting them from external threats. After 1991, NATO expansion took this zone of peace, prosperity and cooperation that had emerged in Western Europe and moved it into Eastern Europe as well.

The revolutionary nature of this achievement seemed obvious not so long ago. “Why has Europe been so peaceful since 1989?” Mearsheimer asked in 2010. The answer, he acknowledged, was because “America has continued to serve as Europe’s pacifier,” protecting the continent from dangers within and without.

Russia as the victim

Today, of course, the critics don’t buy this account. They argue that NATO expansion represented crude power politics, as the U.S. exploited the Soviet collapse to engorge its own empire. What resulted, pundits such as Thomas Friedman contend, was a sort of Weimar Russia — a country whose dignity was affronted, security imperiled and democracy undermined by a harsh, humiliating peace.

There is a kernel of truth here, too. Once Russian democracy began to wobble in 1993-94, officials in the Bill Clinton administration saw NATO expansion — in part — as a way of preventing a potentially resurgent, aggressive Russia from rebuilding the Soviet sphere of influence. Russian leaders of all stripes griped about NATO expansion from the early 1990s onward, warning that it could jeopardize the peace of the continent.

In hindsight, NATO expansion was one of several issues — including disputes over the Balkans and the collapse of the Russian economy in the late 1990s — that gradually soured Russia’s relationship with the West. Yet this story omits three vital facts.

First, all policies have costs. The price of NATO expansion was a certain alienation of Russian elites — although we often forget that Clinton softened the blow by continually courting Russian President Boris Yeltsin, bringing Russia into elite Western institutions such as the Group of Seven, and making Moscow a partner in the intervention in Bosnia in 1995-96. Yet the cost of not expanding NATO might have been forfeiting much of the stability that initiative provided. Trade-offs are inevitable in foreign policy: There was no magic middle path that would have provided all the benefits with none of the costs.

Second, if NATO expansion was a manifestation of American empire, it was a remarkably benign and consensual form of empire. When Clinton decided to pursue enlargement, he did so at the urging of the Poles, Czechs and Hungarians. The Baltic countries and others were soon banging at the door. The states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union were desperate to join America’s sphere of influence, because they were desperate to leave Moscow’s.

This, too, was part of an older pattern: The U.S. has often extended its influence by “invitation” rather than imposition. The creation of NATO in 1949 was mostly a European idea: Countries that were terrified of Moscow sought protection from Washington. One reason Putin’s wars to keep countries from escaping Moscow’s empire are so abhorrent to Americans is that the U.S. empire has trouble keeping members out.

Putin may not see it that way. All that matters to him is that the mightiest peacetime alliance in history has crept closer to Russian soil. But here a third fact becomes relevant: Russia was one of the biggest beneficiaries of NATO’s move east.

Making Russia safer

Open terrain has often left Russia vulnerable to invasion and instability emanating from Europe. Napoleonic France, Imperial Germany and Nazi Germany all swept through Eastern Europe to wreak havoc on Russian or Soviet territory. This is one reason why the great strategist George Kennan opposed NATO expansion — because it would surely re-activate this fear of encroachment from the west.

Yet this was a red herring, because NATO posed no military threat. The alliance committed, in 1997, not to permanently station foreign troops in Eastern Europe. After the Cold War, America steadily withdrew most of its troops and all of its heavy armor from the continent. U.S. allies engaged in a veritable race to disarm.

The prospect that NATO could invade Russia, even had it wanted to, was laughable. What the alliance could do was tame the perils that might otherwise have menaced the Russian state.

Germany could hardly threaten Russia: It was nestled snugly into an alliance that also served as a strategic straitjacket. NATO, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev had candidly said in 1990, could “play a containing role” vis-à-vis Berlin. Moscow didn’t have to worry about a nuclear Poland — Warsaw didn’t need nukes because it had the protection of the United States. Aside from the Balkan wars of the 1990s, Eastern Europe was comparatively free of the geopolitical intrigues and military quarrels that might have made Russia jumpy.

NATO expansion hadn’t just alleviated Europe’s security problems; it had protected Russia’s vital interests as well. Moscow might have lost an empire, but it had gained remarkable safety from external attack.

Putin’s easy excuse

So what went wrong? Why couldn’t Putin make his peace with a larger NATO?

Part of the answer is that NATO expansion wasn’t really the problem, in the sense that Russia didn’t need that pretext to seek renewed hegemony in its near-abroad. The Soviet Union, and the Russian empire before it, had traditionally sought to control countries along their frontiers and used brutal means to do it. To say that NATO expansion caused Russian belligerence is thus to make an extremely dubious assertion: that absent NATO expansion, Moscow would have been a satisfied, status quo power.

And this is exactly why a bigger NATO has posed a real problem for Putin. After all, safety from external attack isn’t the only thing that states and rulers want. They want glory, greatness and the privileges of empire. For 20 years, Putin has been publicly lusting after the sphere of influence that the Soviet Union once enjoyed. NATO expansion stood athwart that ambition, by giving Moscow’s former vassals the ability to resist its pressure.

NATO also threatened a certain type of Russian government — an autocracy that was never secure in its own rule. A democratic Russia wouldn’t so much have minded being neighbors with Western-leaning democracies, because political liberty in those countries wouldn’t have threatened to set a subversive example for anti-Putin Russians.

Yet, as Russia became more autocratic in the early 2000s, and as Putin’s popularity declined with the Russian economy after 2008, the imperative of preventing ideological spillover from a U.S.-backed democratic community loomed large.

So Putin began pushing back against NATO’s eastward march. In 2008, he invaded Georgia, a country that was moving — too slowly for its own safety — toward the West. Since 2014, he has been waging war against Ukraine, in hopes of rebuilding the Russian empire and halting Kiev’s westward drift. America’s vision of Europe has now run into Putin’s program of violent coercion.

West missed the danger signs

To be sure, U.S. officials made mistakes along the way. Because Russia was prostrate, militarily and economically, during the 1990s, Washington acquired a bad habit of issuing security guarantees without really considering how it would fulfill them in a crisis. The Pentagon has thus been scrambling, since 2014, to devise a credible defense of NATO’s eastern flank.

As Russia regained its strength, U.S. officials also failed to grasp the danger of provoking Putin without adequately deterring him. When, in 2008, NATO declined to endorse membership for Georgia and Ukraine but issued a vague statement saying that they would someday join the alliance, it created the worst of all worlds — giving Putin both the pretext and the time to pre-empt future expansion by tearing those two countries apart.

Yet there is a curious morality in accounts that blame the West, which sought to protect vulnerable states in Eastern Europe, for the current carnage, rather than blaming Putin, who has worked to dismember and intimidate those countries. It is sloppy thinking to tally up the costs of NATO expansion without considering the historic achievements of a policy that served American, European and even certain Russian interests remarkably well.

And if nothing else, NATO expansion pushed the dividing line between Moscow and the democratic world to the east after one Cold War — a factor of great significance now that a second cold war is underway.

The legacy of NATO expansion isn’t simply a matter of historical interest. Americans’ understanding of the past has always influenced their view of what policies to pursue in the future. During the 1920s and 1930s, the widespread, if inaccurate, belief that America had entered World War I to serve the interests of banks and arms manufacturers had a [crushing] ~~paralyzing~~ effect on U.S. policy amid the totalitarian aggression that set off World War II.

Today, the U.S. faces a long, nasty struggle to contain Putin’s imperial project and protect an endangered world order. Introspection is an admirable quality, but the last thing America needs is another bout of self-flagellation rooted in another misapprehension of the past. – Bloomberg

### ! — NATO Good — AT: Environment

#### Realists care about the environment. The DoD is prioritizing it now.

Sofer 15 [Ken Sofer, a Senior Policy Advisor with the National Security and International Policy team at the Center for American Progress; 11-30-2015; "The Realist Case for Climate Change Cooperation"; Center for American Progress; https://www.americanprogress.org/article/the-realist-case-for-climate-change-cooperation/; KL]

Fighting climate change is often considered a valuable but secondary goal for many security-minded politicians who see it as a distraction from the real threats posed by terrorism in Syria, Russian aggression in Europe, and the potential of a nuclear Iran. But even a hard-nosed realist should support international cooperation on climate change. Due to climate change’s impact as a “threat multiplier,” the benefits of cooperation now outweigh the potential gap in relative gains between cooperating countries. When climate change is viewed as an external threat similar to a hostile state, realist theory concludes that the United States should ally with other threatened countries against it until the threat subsides.

Realism and the relative gains problem

Realism, one of the grand theories of international relations, is a worldview and set of assumptions about the way the world works that dates back to Thucydides of ancient Greece. Realism has long been the dominant strand of thinking in U.S. national security circles and undergirds much of U.S. foreign policy. Realist scholars, such as Kenneth Waltz, focus on the state as the primary actor in international politics; assume anarchy in the international system is the principal force shaping state action; and believe states are primarily concerned with their own power and security—often at the expense of mutually beneficial cooperation.

Realist scholars and practitioners have traditionally spent little time devoted to climate change compared with adherents of liberalism—the other grand theory of international relations. For realist theorists focused on hard power and interstate warfare, debates about peak carbon dioxide emissions and global temperature goals are ancillary at best to the primary challenges facing states. Furthermore, realists such as Joseph Grieco are skeptical of the potential for international cooperation on most issues, arguing that even when cooperation would be mutually beneficial to both parties, states often fail to cooperate because one state would gain more than the other.

This is known as the relative gains problem. Realists argue that states are not only concerned with maximizing their own absolute gains but they are also concerned with their gains relative to the gains of other states out of concern that they may end up relatively weaker even if they are stronger in absolute terms.

But the relative gains problem does not prevent all forms of cooperation, even when one state gains disproportionately. For realists, the main reason that a state would cooperate is if the gains of cooperation are so large that they overcome the relative gains problem—a threshold that is usually only met when states face an external security threat.

Climate change as an external security threat

For years, scientists have warned of the potential implications of the current wave of changes to the Earth’s climate. 2014 was the hottest year ever recorded and continued a trend of rising sea levels that threaten major coastal cities and even some island nations, as well as more intense and frequent severe weather events, increased desertification of vital arable land, and climate-driven migration, which has contributed to the European refugee crisis.

If the most pessimistic projections are realized without international action, the planet could warm by as much as 5 degrees Celsius by the end of this century. To put it another way, that is the same as the global temperature change that occurred during the last ice age but at 10 times the speed. Failure to limit climate change and better manage global resources will soon disrupt the physical and economic security of citizens across the planet.

Climate change does not fit the traditional realist image of a security threat, but as climate change intensifies existing conflicts and exacerbates instability, states are increasingly being forced to grapple with and defend against it, just as they would a hostile adversary. Whether through the extreme weather events that have killed 2.5 million people since 1980, the rising sea levels that threaten to swallow island nations such as the Maldives, or the droughts that doubled the price of wheat in the lead up to the 2011 Arab uprisings, climate change is threatening lives, destabilizing states, and disrupting economies in ways an adversarial state might using different means.

U.S. intelligence, military, and diplomatic agencies are already thinking through the security implications of a warming planet, an acidifying ocean, and an increase in extreme weather events. In 2008, the National Intelligence Council began a multiyear project analyzing the implications of climate change for U.S. national security interests between 2008 and 2030 and concluded that climate change would likely exacerbate political instability, migration crises, and intrastate warfare. The U.S. Department of Defense’s “2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report” identified climate change as one of the key issues that will shape the future security environment, affecting the U.S. military’s capabilities, missions, and operations. The U.S. Department of State’s 2015 “Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review” highlighted climate change as a “national and global security threat,” as well as one of the department’s four strategic priorities.

For U.S. security officials, climate change now meets the high threshold used by realists for international cooperation, regardless of a potential relative gains gap.

An alliance against climate change

Realists such as Stephen Walt argue that when faced with a hostile external threat, threatened states will band together, creating an alliance to counter the threat and to restore a balance of power in which no one actor can overpower the others. These alliances are usually narrow and short-lived, lasting until the threat—whether it be Napoleonic France or the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham—recedes. If the threat of climate change is now comparable to the threat of a hostile state, then the realist response would be to develop an international alliance against climate change.

President Barack Obama’s administration has largely adopted this approach, enlisting not only traditional European and Japanese allies in the effort but also nontraditional partners such as China, India, Brazil, and Indonesia. The direct and indirect threat posed by climate change has altered the calculus of countries such as China and India, which previously cited the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities as a reason for not fully contributing to a global effort to fight climate change. This is in part a relative gains argument that says unified action to combat climate change would disproportionately hurt economically developing and newly industrialized states in light of differing national circumstances. The diverse range of countries participating in the alliance against climate change reflects the new geopolitics of the issue, in which both developing and developed countries are affected by, contribute to, and thus are responsible for fighting the problem.

As with alliances against hostile states, the alliance against climate change should not be expected to remake the global order or resolve disagreements with partner countries on other issues. As history has shown, however, the United States can successfully work with nontraditional partners or even competitor states to combat a common threat, whether improving relations with China to counter the Soviet Union in the 1970s or leading a diverse coalition of nations to fight piracy off the Horn of Africa more recently.

### ! — NATO Good — AT: Entrapment/War

#### Models. Alliances deter, restrain, and bargain for peace.

Fang et al. 14 [Songying Fang, Associate Professor of Political Science at Rice University; Jesse C. Johnson, Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of Peace Studies at the University of Kentucky; Brett Ashley Leed, Professor of Political Science at Rice University; 8-22-2014; "To Concede or to Resist? The Restraining Effect of Military Alliances"; International Organization Journal; http://www.songyingfang.com/uploads/1/1/7/9/11792230/s0020818314000137a.pdf; KL]

Abstract Creating institutions that effectively manage interstate conflict is a priority for policy-makers. In this article we demonstrate that military allies are well positioned to influence the crisis-bargaining behavior of both challengers and targets in ways that often lead to peace. Through a three-player game-theoretic model, we demonstrate that a target’s alliances not only have an effect on the demand that the challenger makes, but also on the behavior of the target. When a target values an alliance highly, an ally’s recommendation for settlement can encourage the target to concede to demands without further escalation. Our statistical analysis provides evidence in support of the theoretical finding. Allies can both deter challengers and restrain partners, and as a result, can encourage peaceful behavior not only from adversaries, but from member states as well. Our study thus sheds new light on the role of military alliances as potential conflict management devices.

Interstate wars cost more than thirty million lives during the twentieth century, and nine new interstate wars have begun since the end of the Cold War.1 Finding ways to avoid interstate disputes and to manage those that arise short of war, therefore, is a major priority for policy-makers and for scholars of international relations. It is well recognized that military alliances play a role in conflict prevention by deterring attacks on their members, but less attention has been paid to the role of allies in conflict management. We argue that allies, as coercive actors with a stake in the dispute, are sometimes especially well positioned to help resolve disputes short of war.

We examine the influence of allies to a target state on crisis bargaining. Not only do allies have an interest in the outcome of crisis bargaining but they also may have the ability to make credible threats to both the challenger and the target that influence the bargaining stances of both disputants. A target’s ally can make it clear to the challenger that if the challenger demands too much, the ally will intervene in the war on behalf of the target. But a target’s ally may also be able to make a credible threat to the target—that if the target refuses to concede to a demand that the ally finds reasonable, the ally will not intervene in the war on the target’s behalf. The ally may therefore have a moderating effect not only on the challenger’s demand, but also on the target’s response, making peaceful settlement more likely. We refer to the former as the deterrence effect of alliances, and the latter as the restraining effect of alliances.

To study this process, we develop a three-player game-theoretic model. Most recent game-theoretic models of crisis bargaining assume that a challenger and a target bargain without influence from any outside states.2 Yet, allies who would be obligated to intervene in a war that develops between a challenger and target will often cast a shadow over crisis negotiations. Dyadic bargaining models that assume a challenger and a target bargain without influence from any outside states are inadequate for our understanding of conflict dynamics in such situations.

We derive a number of propositions about the relationships between such factors as the costs of war, the value of the stakes, and the value of an alliance and specific outcomes. The demands challengers make, the conditions under which targets concede demands without fighting, and the conditions under which targets resist demands militarily are all influenced by the presence of an ally. Given the richness of our formal results, we make no attempt to test all of the implications of the model. We do, however, discuss a few stylized cases that highlight different outcomes, and we provide a large-N empirical test of one proposition drawn from the model. We find support for the claim that when a target depends heavily on an alliance for security, that target is less likely to resist a challenge militarily.

Our research suggests that military alliances have an influence in international politics well beyond collaborative war fighting and deterrence. Alliances deter conflicts, which in itself is a force for peace, but even when challengers are not deterred from making demands, allies can facilitate peaceful settlement. Alliances can be important institutions for conflict management, not only among their members, but between their members and outside states as well. As such, alliances can be broad institutions for peace that play an important role in maintaining the stability of the international system.3

### ! — NATO Good — AT: Interventions

#### NATO peacekeeping mitigates war intensity.

PSO = peace support operations

PKO = peacekeeping operations

Sällström 21 [Robin Sällström, Bachelor Thesis, Peace and Conflict Studies C, Department of Peace and Conflict Studies, Uppsala University; 1-2021; "Keeping the peace?: The effect of NATO and UN peace operations on war intensity"; Uppsala University; https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1518905/FULLTEXT01.pdf; KL]

The purpose of this paper was to conduct a comparative case study analysing the effect of NATO PSOs and UN PKOs on war intensity, to help fill the existing gap concerning disaggregated research on non-UN peacekeeping operations. To do so, this paper focused on comparing NATO peace support operations and UN peacekeeping operations abilities to mitigate war intensity through a structured focused comparison and aspects of theory-testing process tracing. However, results of the analysis did not confirm the proposed theory that UN PKOs would mitigate war intensity to a greater degree than NATO PSOs, but rather seem to imply that some NATO PSO might reduce war intensity to a greater extent than UN PKOs. Furthermore, the results also imply that NATOs seemingly biased behaviour does not necessarily hamper their abilities to provide security guarantees, nor does it necessarily hinder NATO from using persuasion effectively.

Thus, some possible policy implication of this study is that Peacekeeping organisations can use force against warring parties in an armed conflict without hampering potential peacekeeping efforts, and that strict peacekeeper impartiality might hamper conflict mitigation. Furthermore, this paper also indicates that NATO peacekeepers are suitable alternative to UN peacekeepers when the UN is either unable or unwilling to send peacekeepers themselves, and that NATO PSOs can mitigate war intensity to a similar or even greater degree than UN PKOs.

#### Peacekeeping reduces violence. It’s the strongest empirical law in IR.

Walter et al. 20 [Barbara F. Walter, University of California San Diego; Lise Morje Howard, Georgetown University; V. Page Fortna, Columbia University; 11-24-2020; "The Extraordinary Relationship between Peacekeeping and Peace"; Cambridge Core; https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/british-journal-of-political-science/article/abs/extraordinary-relationship-between-peacekeeping-and-peace/D2D5D262B60315387B0B23D1D4F79CC9; KL]

Reality, however, tells a different story. Over the last twenty years, numerous empirical studies have examined the role of third-party peacekeeping in reducing violence around the world. The data overwhelmingly reveal that peacekeeping, especially UN peacekeeping, is surprisingly effective. Using different datasets and statistical models, leveraging different time periods and measuring peacekeeping in somewhat different ways, dozens of researchers at different universities, with diverse funding streams and different preferences, have all found that peacekeeping has a large, positive and statistically significant effect on reducing violence of all sorts. Despite the very real problems associated with UN peacekeeping, it is remarkably effective at bringing peace.

This review article has three goals. The first is to summarize the results of past empirical research to move the debate beyond the question of whether peacekeeping works to the more pressing questions of how, when and why it works. The second goal is to reveal the limitations of current quantitative studies in order to identify areas in which scholars can make big, new contributions to the field. The final goal is to propose a new research agenda that is heavily evaluative — one that informs policy makers about the specific practices, mission compositions, and mandates that work, and also identifies the local, regional, and international conditions that amplify or diminish peacekeeping’s success. This type of research could help reduce the costs of peacekeeping operations (PKOs), eliminate some of the negative consequences of interventions and potentially save even more lives.

What the Current Evidence Reveals

Numerous large-n statistical studies have explored the relationship between third-party peacekeeping and different forms of violence (Dorussen 2014; Gizelis, Dorussen and Petrova 2016); Di Salvatore and Ruggeri 2017; Sandler 2017). What is most striking about these studies is the consistency of their findings. Almost all of them find that peacekeeping is highly effective at preventing violence before it begins, reducing violence in the midst of war and preventing violence from recurring once it has ended. All else equal, countries and regions that receive peacekeeping missions experience less armed conflict, fewer civilian and combatant deaths, fewer mass killings, longer periods of post-conflict peace and fewer repeat wars than those that do not receive peacekeepers. This relationship — between peacekeeping and lower levels of violence — is so consistent across different large-n analyses that it has become one of the strongest findings in the international relations literature to date.

The power of peacekeeping is all the more striking given that the UN tends to intervene in the toughest cases. Multiple scholarly studies have found that the UN Security Council tends to send peacekeepers to countries with more violence, particularly bad governments and ongoing conflict (Beardsley and Schmidt 2012; Costalli 2013; de Jonge Oudraat 1996; Fortna 2004a; Fortna 2008a; Gilligan and Sergenti 2008; Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Hegre, Hultman and Nygard 2019 Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis 2017). The most recent study by Ruggeri, Dorussen and Gizelis (2018) found that UN peacekeepers are deployed to places experiencing active conflict. Using geographically and temporally disaggregated data on UN peacekeepers’ deployment in eight African countries between 1989 and 2006, they find that peacekeepers tend to be deployed to the dangerous frontlines of a conflict. Their research did reveal some problems with deployment. Peacekeepers tended to arrive late and be sent to conflict zones near urban areas, ignoring violence further afield. But the fact that peacekeepers often go to the most demanding places (even if late and disproportionately urban) suggests that academic studies have probably underestimated the effectiveness of peacekeeping at reducing violence.

These findings do not imply that peacekeeping works all the time, or as efficiently and successfully as it could. There are many well-known cases such as Bosnia and Rwanda where UN peacekeeping failed. There are also additional cases such as those in South Sudan and Malí where peacekeeping missions are not progressing well (Autesserre 2010; Autesserre 2014; Day 2019; Howard 2008; Van der Lijn 2019).1 Moreover, we understand that the data and analyses of even the best quantitative studies are imperfect. Analysis of peacekeeping and violence is constrained by the messy and sometimes unreliable nature of data on death rates, the potentially untenable assumptions made by scholars in employing statistical models in cross-national and cross-conflict analysis, and the hard constraints (both practical and ethical) on scholars’ ability to randomize treatments in ways that make airtight causal inferences possible. The findings in the quantitative literature can also appear mixed or contradictory on some topics, when in fact the disparity is due to different research designs and empirical strategies. This can be confusing and can also distract from the bigger and more important picture, which is that peacekeeping works amazingly well given its many challenges.

In what follows we present overwhelming evidence from more than two dozen studies that peacekeepers: (1) reduce civilian and military deaths, (2) prevent the spread of violence, (3) help belligerents achieve peace and (4) help countries maintain the post-conflict peace.2 We also provide an overview of the general problems related to peacekeeping that the qualitative literature explores.

#### Zero public support.

Carden 18 [James Carden; contributing writer for foreign affairs at The Nation. He served as a policy adviser to the Special Representative for Intergovernmental Affairs and the Office of Russia Affairs at the US State Department; 1-9-2018; "A New Poll Shows the Public Is Overwhelmingly Opposed to Endless US Military Interventions"; Nation; https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/new-poll-shows-public-overwhelmingly-opposed-to-endless-us-military-interventions/; KL]

Last week, the bipartisan Committee for a Responsible Foreign Policy—a bipartisan advocacy group calling for congressional oversight of America’s lengthy list of military interventions abroad—released the results of a survey that show broad public support for Congress to reclaim its constitutional prerogatives in the exercise of foreign policy (see Article 1, Section 8 of the US Constitution) and for fewer US military interventions generally. Undertaken last November by J. Wallin Opinion Research, the new survey revealed “a national voter population that is largely skeptical of the practicality or benefits of military intervention overseas, including both the physical involvement of the US military and also extending to military aid in the form of funds or equipment as well.”

Bill Dolbow, the spokesman for the Committee for a Responsible Foreign Policy, said, “We started this initiative to give a voice to the people and the people have spoken—Congress needs to enact more oversight before intervening in conflict abroad.”

The headline findings show, among other things, that 86.4 percent of those surveyed feel the American military should be used only as a last resort, while 57 percent feel that US military aid to foreign countries is counterproductive. The latter sentiment “increases significantly” when involving countries like Saudi Arabia, with 63.9 percent saying military aid—including money and weapons—should not be provided to such countries.

#### Interventions are at an all-time low.

Hirsh 21 [Michael Hirsh, senior correspondent at Foreign Policy; 7-1-2021; "Why U.S. Drone Strikes Are at an All-Time Low"; Foreign Policy; https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/07/01/us-drone-strikes-all-time-low-biden-forever-wars/; KL]

In August 2020, the man who is now U.S. President Joe Biden’s deputy national security advisor, Jonathan Finer, co-wrote a privately circulated memo titled “Ending the ‘Forever Wars.’” Written with two others who have since joined the Biden administration, Christine Abizaid and Brett Rosenberg, the memo laid out a detailed program for extricating the United States from the two-decade-long campaign dubbed the “war on terror” that began on 9/11.

Six months into Biden’s presidency, the administration has said little about its longer-term plans in dealing with Islamist terrorist groups around the world, apart from announcing the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan. And yet airstrikes by drones and other U.S. kinetic operations in trouble spots around the world, outside conventional battlefields, have dramatically dropped since Biden took office. The president imposed a partial moratorium as his team conducts an intensive review of every aspect of America’s global counterterrorism efforts, which have spread over two decades from Afghanistan post-9/11 to “Iraq, Yemen, Syria, Libya, Somalia, and parts of the Maghreb, Southeast Asia and West and Central Africa,” as the Finer memo notes.

This limited stand-down is happening in spite of rare exceptions like this week’s airstrikes by U.S. F-15s and F-16s on storage facilities used by Iran-backed militias in Iraq.

And while Finer’s 13-page memo has hardly become official administration policy, it’s notable that Biden’s senior team seems to be acting on some of its recommendations—and that Finer himself is one of the top officials working on a broad review of counterterrorism policy led by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan.

One of the recommendations enacted from the memo is to “[r]aise the threshold for use of force.” This includes eliminating “strikes against individuals whose specific identities are not known and who are not identified as tied to immediate [U.S.] force protection concerns or otherwise posing an imminent threat” to the United States, as the memo puts it.

According to the Finer memo, “Operations requiring force should be considered extraordinary, require approval at the highest levels, and pursued only when absolutely necessary, for instance, to avert a clear and present danger to U.S. persons.”

The Biden administration has since restricted field commanders from making independent decisions on strikes outside of conventional battlefield zones. Under the new rules the “military and the C.I.A. must now obtain White House permission to attack terrorism suspects in poorly governed places where there are scant American ground troops, like Somalia and Yemen,” the New York Times reported on March 3. A forthcoming directive is also being prepared by the Department of Defense laying out stricter guidelines for limiting civilian casualties in overseas attacks and setting new and higher thresholds for future U.S. attacks.

Already there has been a dramatic reduction of drone attacks and other types of airstrikes, which once reached thousands a year. “The [United States] appears to be in a holding pattern in most conflict theaters that it still has a presence in—with no reported strikes in Yemen, Libya, Pakistan, or Somalia since Biden took office. U.S. strikes are continuing in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria—though at historically low rates,” said Chris Woods of the London-based Airwars monitoring organization, considered perhaps the most reliable tracker of U.S. airstrikes around the world. “What the strategic plan here is, other than for Afghanistan, we don’t yet know.”

Until Biden took office, the U.S. military had often followed a pattern of secretly striking alleged terrorists from the air without any accountability or announcement: no casualty lists, no public after-action reports, and few follow-up investigations about collateral damage. “Cumulatively we’re talking tens of thousands of civilians conservatively who have died in America’s wars since 9/11”—almost all without acknowledgement, Woods said.

No truly reliable figures exist, especially for drones, since for most of its existence the drone program has been shrouded in secrecy. In his final year in office, President Barack Obama briefly opened the window, revealing that during his term drone strikes, conventional airstrikes, or cruise missiles used outside conventional war zones like Afghanistan had killed as many as 116 civilians. But other independent monitors put the figures much higher. Obama’s successor, Donald Trump, made the numbers classified again.

The cutback in drone strikes is one element of a much bigger rethink. One Biden administration official who has been involved in discussions said that while a policy isn’t yet set and it’s not clear when it will be, the upcoming 20th anniversary of 9/11 is an important target date in what is amounting to an exhaustive evaluation of the overseas terrorist threat. The Biden administration, he said, is now focused on demoting the Islamist terrorist threat on the priority list of U.S. strategic interests.

“Biden wants one of his major foreign policy accomplishments to be to end the forever wars,” said this official, who would speak about internal deliberations only on condition of anonymity. The president is expected to deliver a speech that will sketch out the broad outlines, including possibly setting new restrictive and transparent drone rules, announcing the shutdown of Guantánamo Bay (where only about 40 prisoners remain out of a total of nearly 800), and upgrading the focus on domestic violent extremists, away from al Qaeda and its affiliates.

“He wants to show we made the world safer, to say that we are taking a multilateral approach and returning to smart power, reducing our military footprint and increasing our diplomatic footprint, and adapting to new threats of today,” the official said.

The White House team is also seeking a broader reorientation toward what the president has called “the battles for the next 20 years, not the last 20,” including climate change, the threat from China, COVID-19-type pandemics, and America’s economic and social problems at home.

“At the Department of Defense but also in the U.S. intelligence community, counterterrorism has taken a back seat,” said Seth Jones, a senior vice president and counterterrorism expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “The focus of efforts is primarily on how to deal with China and to some degree Russia. And you don’t need drones to deal with either of them. It’s just not a priority, and that’s a big shift certainly from the Obama years and partly the Trump years.”

#### They’re down dramatically.

Keating 22 [Joshua Keating; Global Security Reporter; 2-2-2022; "What happened to the drone war?"; Grid News; https://www.grid.news/story/global/2022/02/02/what-happened-to-the-drone-war/; KL]

When it comes to fighting war without soldiers, the weaponized drone has been an essential tool — perhaps the most iconic weapon in the United States’ post-9/11 war on terrorism. Given Biden’s pledge that over-the-horizon counterterrorism operations would continue around the world, it would be reasonable to expect that drone use would have continued — or become even more common. In fact, the opposite has happened. The U.S. has stopped bombing Afghanistan entirely since the withdrawal, and strikes are down dramatically in other theaters as well. The long-standing practice of American drones regularly raining missiles on suspected terrorists and unfortunate civilians has ended — at least for now. One might suspect that this drop-off was the result of growing public criticism of the drone war and recent revelations about the civilian casualties it has caused. But the decline predates the revelations; it’s a trend that began several years ago.

What happened to the drone war? Why, in the new over-the-horizon era, are drones being used so rarely? And what are the implications of a world in which dozens of nations now have the deadly capability — and are using it more often, not less?

The drop-off

The United States’ first drone strike came on the first day of the U.S. war in Afghanistan — Oct. 7, 2001 — when a CIA Predator drone fired a Hellfire missile near Kandahar, narrowly missing Taliban leader Mullah Omar. The escalation that followed was swift and steep. In the two decades since, the U.S. has used weaponized drones thousands of times as part of air campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria and Yemen.

Since Biden took office, there have been just 39 declared U.S. strikes (including air, drone and ground operations) in Iraq and Syria. In Somalia, nine strikes have been carried out under Biden compared with 276 under Donald Trump. The Biden administration has ordered only two reported strikes in Yemen and none in Pakistan, once ground zero of the American drone war. (There were 122 strikes in 2010.)

Overall, U.S. airstrikes (including both drones and manned strikes) were down 42 percent in 2021 from the year before — falling from 1,459 to 852. That may still seem like a lot, but consider that there were nearly 13,000 strikes in 2016, when the war against ISIS was at its height.

To the extent this development has received any media coverage, observers have tended to credit the Biden administration. In fact, the decline began earlier. “The bulk of what’s being discussed is the result of trends began under the Trump administration, although I wouldn’t really frame it as the result of Trump’s specific policy decisions, as the way the wars are going,” David Sterman, a senior policy analyst at New America, told Grid.

According to the monitoring site Airwars, March 2019 was the last month when the U.S.-led coalition launched more than 100 air and artillery strikes in Iraq and Syria. (There were 389.) Not coincidentally, this was the month that the last remnants of ISIS’s “caliphate” fell. After that, the tempo of strikes fell dramatically; in all of 2020, there were only 201. Similarly, in Yemen, the number of airstrikes peaked at 131 in 2017, according to New America. In 2020, there were only four. In Pakistan, the steep drop-off in drone strikes began even earlier, in the second half of the Obama presidency.

Chart, bar chart

Description automatically generated

According to Sterman, “the one exception that I definitely would acknowledge and think is clearly something to do with Biden is Somalia, where there was a high pace of strikes under Trump. Biden just completely paused it.” The Biden administration did carry out at least four strikes against al-Shabaab militants in Somalia in the summer of 2021, but there’s been no sign of a return to the pace of strikes under Trump.

Bombing less — or less to bomb?

There are signs that while the drop-off predates his presidency, Biden is listening to the drone war’s critics.

Shortly after taking office, Biden quietly imposed limits on drone strikes and commando raids outside of declared war zones like Afghanistan and Syria. The CIA and military now must obtain White House permission for strikes in Yemen and Somalia, among other theaters of counterterror operations. (Under Trump, commanders had been allowed to make their own decisions on strikes in those countries.) Biden also ordered a review of U.S. targeting policy. Several analysts I spoke with suggested commanders may be reluctant to order strikes until the new guidelines are in place.

But the overall drop-off may be driven less by White House policy than by changes on the battlefield. In short, there may be fewer strikes because there are fewer targets.

The original al-Qaeda, the group that carried out the 9/11 attacks, is a shell of its former self and hasn’t been linked to an attack against the U.S. in years. ISIS at one point threatened to redraw the map of the Middle East, but since 2019, it has largely been driven underground. This isn’t to say that there still aren’t violent Islamist militant groups operating around the world — there are likely even more of them than there were in 2001 — but the vast majority are focused on local grievances and enemies rather than what Osama bin Laden once called the “far enemy”: the United States.

In the specific case of Afghanistan, Robert Grenier, former CIA head of counterterrorism and a Grid contributor, points out that drone strikes there and across the border in Pakistan were always less about counterterrorism per se than about preventing attacks against NATO and Afghan forces: “With the drawdown of U.S. and NATO troops, there was a commensurate drop in the number of attacks against them, and a similar drop in drone operations designed to protect them.”

Now that the U.S.-backed Afghan government has fallen to the Taliban, Grenier said “the current administration is focused on maintaining an over-the-horizon capability, rather than a pattern of actual over-the-horizon strikes. As of now, militants of various stripes in Afghanistan, to include those who are ISIS affiliated, do not appear to be much focused on Americans.”

#### Intervention is an ethical policy tool that reduces global violence.

Gritten 20 (William Gritten; Contributing Writer @ the Week; 3/2/20; "In defense of 'endless' wars"; *The Week*; https://theweek.com/articles/896649/defense-endless-wars)

As the two-decade-long U.S. war in Afghanistan comes to its technical end with a peace deal signed between the U.S. and the Taliban, both poles of the current political spectrum have concluded, along with most of the country, that the massive investment of resources and lives in this conflict was materially, not to mention morally, fruitless. Western confidence has been undermined, and the belief that prosperous democracies can project their power for good now seems anachronistic — naive to some, arrogant to others. There is a consensus: It is time to "end our endless wars."

However, it is dangerous to draw such an unqualified conclusion. Bill Clinton and Tony Blair learned from Kosovo — where intervention stopped a war — and Rwanda — where calls for intervention went unheeded and up to a million people were butchered — that inaction can in fact be shameful, and this fostered a categorical conviction in righteous humanitarian intervention that propelled them into the follies of this millennium's first decade in Iraq and Afghanistan. The belief that liberalism can be forced on societies at gunpoint was then handed a crusading energy by the shock of 9/11. But now, the received wisdom is intervention does not work, but what if this new conviction propels us into the next decade's disaster? Why must we swing between such unnuanced extremes?

It is important we understand that sometimes failing to intervene is the more costly decision, both morally and in terms of national self-interest.

When it comes to the Afghan war, the mistake was not in the intervention itself, rather in how it was managed. Soon after the initial invasion [defeated] ~~crippled~~ the Taliban and sent it into hiding, its leadership consistently asked to meet at the negotiating table, but were rebuffed. Understandably, Washington's blood was up after September 2001, and the Bush administration was categorical: "We do not negotiate with terrorists."

This was a mistake. Talks could have brought a reduction in NATO involvement under better terms than are being agreed now. The intervention could have been conducted with a pragmatism that acknowledged the impossibility of all-out military victory and brought the Taliban to the table early. The NATO presence could still have brought the country what it did: huge improvements in agriculture, infrastructure projects like the successful Dahla Dam rebuild, the social empowerment of women, and health initiatives like the one that vaccinated children nationwide.

Writing in The Atlantic, Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) is right to decry the "approach to foreign policy that relies on the U.S. military to achieve the impossible, instead of doing the hard work of statecraft." But this isn't, as she claims, an argument for ending the endless wars: We can, and should, ask the military to do the possible, while running intensive statecraft at the same time.

Many think the cost of military intervention is simply too high — but there are times when the cost of doing nothing is far greater. This is the case, for example, in Syria, where more than 1 million internal refugees face what the U.N. calls the "biggest humanitarian horror story of the 21st century."

Learning the wrong lessons from Western intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Obama administration chose not to provide the rebels who rose up in 2011's Arab Spring with the support necessary to topple Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. A stronger U.S. commitment early on could have prevented ISIS from rising in Syria — and prevented the huge, expensive war against ISIS that followed. It would also have helped stem the tide of refugees that continues to fuel de-democratizing forces across Europe. It could also have meant the end of the rapacious, vindictive Assad, who now terrorizes his people for daring to resist him. Intervening in Syria now would be a mistake, and this is another lesson: To be effective, intervention must be timely.

The U.S. did maintain a limited troop presence in Northeastern Syria, but, to President Trump, these troops were simply more Americans involved in an endless war. As far as he saw it, the generals and national security advisers who urged him to let them stay were just repeating the conventions that got the U.S. too deeply involved in the Middle East to begin with. So, Trump got the troops out — and all hell broke loose. Turkey and Assad moved to fill the vacuum, America's Kurdish allies were betrayed, ISIS fighters escaped captivity, and a million homeless Syrians now face devastation.

In Libya, another country whose civil war seems to be reaching a nightmarish crescendo after a botched Western intervention, the problem was not in the intervention per se, but in, as former President Obama himself diagnosed, "failing to plan for the day after." That failure, he contends, was his worst mistake as president. Obama shared Trump's instinct for retrenchment — most people agree with them both today — but here he directly admits that instinct was wrong: It was more investment, not less, that would have prevented today's Libyan hellscape. But why did Obama fail to commit fully after Moammar Gaddafi was toppled? Surely it was the mistakes made in Iraq and Afghanistan that drained, and continue to drain, Western governments of the confidence in their ability to do good through action.

There are many examples of effective intervention and long-term presence, and they're not obscure: Japan, Taiwan, and Eastern Europe have their own, complex, imperfect stories, but each is a relatively stable, prosperous beneficiary of many decades of political and military investment. The United Nations Command in South Korea maintains a presence amid a war that has technically never ended since its outbreak in 1950.

Another, lesser known example is the British-led United Nations involvement in Sierra Leone, in which military intervention ended a violent decade-long civil war. The Revolutionary United Front, whose leaders were convicted of war crimes in 2009, was bearing down on Freetown, the country's capital, but the British intervention stopped them short and brought peace. What's more, long-term engagement in the conflict's wake bolstered institutions and restored stability. Sierra Leone is still a country with problems, but it is no longer a country at war. It is no coincidence that this successful campaign began in 2000, at the height of Western confidence, before the tragedy of 9/11 turned intervention from something undertaken with discernment, strategy, and planning, into a solipsistic exercise in emotional therapy, craving glorious, impossible, all out victory.

"The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish ... the kind of war on which they are embarking," wrote the Prussian General Carl Von Clausewitz, in Vom Kriege (On War), 200 years ago, "neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature." Failing to heed this guidance led to mistakes in Iraq and Afghanistan, but heeding it, as Western governments could have done in Syria soon after the Arab Spring by giving decisive support to legitimate democratic forces, can lead to intervention that works.

After the Afghanistan chapter closes, the world will continue to present Western governments with stark and urgent decisions on whether they should intervene. If the horror currently developing in Idlib province were unfolding, instead, in 1999, then Washington, intoxicated with recent successes and moral certitude, would be working much harder to protect the refugees — and that would be the right thing to do. Caution is always appropriate, but the window of opportunity is invariably narrow, and closing fast.

As a broader geopolitical strategy, well-judged intervention plus its sometimes-necessary accompaniment — indefinite military effort — can help keep the forces of totalitarianism at bay; not everywhere, and never without diplomatic engagement. Rather than vacillating between opposite doctrines that say intervening is good or not, or realistic or not, democracies should be engaging their collective thought to get better at it. We must remember that the destructive force behind the Afghanistan conflict was the collapse of the Twin Towers, not the principle of intervention itself, or even that of endless war.

#### External humanitarian intervention is necessary---emphasis on ‘local solutions’ guarantees genocide and protracted conflict

Stockton 98 – former lecturer of sociology, Executive Director of the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (Nicholas, “In Defence of Humanitarianism,” Disasters, 22.4)

There are four major challenges to the humanitarian system that have caused great damage to its reputation. These can be summarised as: The demonisation of the 'undeserving' disaster victim and asylum seeker. The 'new pragmatism' that favours the resolution of 'local problems' by local actors. The growing hegemony of the theory of welfare dependency. The end of the 'age of innocence' in media relations with aid agencies. The `undeserving' disaster victim Perhaps the most insidious challenge to humanitarian values has been the widely reported claim that many disaster victims have no one but themselves to blame. Indeed, in the case of Rwanda it has become a commonplace that the 'extremist Hutu' leadership was able to sustain its political control over the refugee population by their astute manipulation of humanitarian aid. This story line was and is used by many, including African Rights, the US and Rwandan governments, to justify the forced repatriation of most of the refugees (or 'fugitive Hutu extremists' as they have been labelled), and the 'disappearance' of the remainder. This argument has also suited many official aid agencies who found in it an excellent reason to suspend humanitarian aid and to be 'pragmatic', i.e. to do nothing, irrespective of any further distress experienced by this group of pariah refugees. This argument is flawed in many places. First, by no means all refugees were guilty of genocide. Indeed some 750,000 of those forcibly repatriated or 'lost in Zaire' were children under five. Over 1.5 million were under 16 years of age. Of those who disappeared in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, some 50,000 were children under five, the majority of whom had never set foot in Rwanda. Second, withholding humanitarian assistance on the grounds that those in need may be criminals is like suggesting that the ambulance service should conduct triage on the basis of alleged criminality rather than upon the clinical urgency of each case. This is the arbitrary application of punishment before trial and it constitutes cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment on a massive scale. Such treatment is arguably a crime against humanity as the right to life applies to all people. This right is non-derogable and cannot be legally removed as an act of capricious vengeance. Third, rights are indivisible and inalienable. The withholding of humanitarian aid as a substitute for judicial action is ethically and morally indefensible. Finally, extra-judicial killings and deaths arbitrarily meted out through 'humanitarian sanctions' simply serve to reinforce fear, prejudice and to fuel the cycle of violence, revenge and retribution. The concept of the 'undeserving victim' is therefore morally and ethically untenable, and practically counter-productive. It represents an outright rejection of the principles of humanity, impartiality and universalism, fundamental tenets of human rights and humanitarian principles. When operationalised, the evidence from the Great Lakes and elsewhere is that the abandonment of humanitarian principles in fact reinforces the culture of impunity--it does not, as many had naively predicted, eradicate it. The `new pragmatists': local solutions for local problems As well as blaming the victims, many commentators have claimed that aid prolongs suffering as it obviates the need for local people to invent local solutions and that it undermines political accountability and the social contract between citizen and state. Warlords can tear countries to shreds in the full knowledge that the humanitarian system will clear up the mess afterwards, and in effect, subsidise the human costs of warfare. Furthermore, as humanitarian aid does not discriminate between just and unjust causes, it consequently acts as quartermaster to all parties to any conflict and thereby prolongs warfare, irrespective of any moral and ethical considerations. Humanitarian aid also diverts attention away from long-term political solutions and focuses solely upon treating symptoms. With no prospect of international humanitarian action, local leaders would be obliged to act more humanely and responsibly. This argument assumes that the 'root cause' of the problem is to be found and resolved locally. In other words, forget colonialism, imperialism and apartheid, forget structural adjustment, forget international debt, forget economic globalisation, forget the international arms trade and forget rapacious corporate behaviour. Forget covert superpower military and intelligence operations. While not going to the other extreme by claiming that external agency is to blame entirely for the post-Cold War increase in the numbers of internal conflicts, these external forces can surely not be completely absolved of all responsibility either. Available evidence suggests that international aid is a drop in the ocean compared to war economies. For example, total international aid to Afghanistan stands at about $120 million per annum. The UK street value of Afghanistan's annual production of narcotics is an estimated $15 billion. This is about 150 times more than is spent annually on international aid to Afghanistan and perhaps five times the amount spent on humanitarian aid globally in 1997. If only an estimated $45 million is paid to Afghan farmers, the remainder is presumably shared out between international drug dealers and Afghan 'warlords'. This would suggest that cutting humanitarian aid would have little or no impact upon the ability of the Afghans, and their foreign sponsors, to wage war, nor do many in Afghanistan believe that it would persuade the warlords to shoulder the burden of the humanitarian programme and spend less on waging war.(n5) Criminalised economies obviously thrive on lawlessness and the collapse of civil authority. Embargoes on humanitarian aid can however strengthen the hold that warlords and drugs barons have over already desperate people. Bad as well as good local solutions also exist and it is very hard to see how humanitarian assistance necessarily favours only bad, or conversely, only good local solutions. Were it not so tragic, it would be almost laughable to suggest that without humanitarian aid wars and natural disasters would stop. It is like saying that we can prevent traffic accidents and fires by abolishing ambulances and fire-engines. Confusing correlation with causation is a potentially deadly error in this policy environment. In the aftermath of the cessation of humanitarian aid to Rwandan refugees in 1996, the wars in the region have all heated up and tens of thousands have died. Some speak about the resumption of the genocide in Rwanda. This contrasts with a lull in political violence in the region during the height of the humanitarian programme in 1995 and 1996. Arguably, the Great Lakes was a more peaceful place with international humanitarian aid and protection than it has become without it. Yet humanitarian protection was quite deliberately suspended and tens of thousands of people were sacrificed on the altar of a convenient combination of political correctness and short-term financial expediency that seem to underpin the 'new pragmatists', 'do no harm' and 'local solutions' policies. Cutting humanitarian assistance as a punishment for waging war is now advocated by some as a global panacea for ending conflict. The only likely result is that the victims of war will have their sentences enhanced. Finally, and perhaps most crucially, those who are willing to trade lives and suffering today for political gains tomorrow should perhaps examine the reliability of economic, political and social forecasting. The demonstration of causation and attribution in a globalised environment is perhaps more difficult than ever. The application of 'do no harm' policies is tantamount to playing God--a deadly, perhaps totalitarian business to indulge in without the benefit of 20:20 future vision, a faculty which is conspicuous by its obvious absence. There is no firmly established relationship between the provision of humanitarian aid and the prolongation of war, either in quantitative or in qualitative terms. Aid policies, including the application of 'humanitarian' sanctions or embargoes, founded upon such arguments are built upon weak theory and anecdote only. Much of the 'new pragmatists' argument is been captured in the phrase 'humanitarianism should not be used as a substitute for political action' which most prominently surfaced from the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda (Borton et al., 1996). In co-opting this argument, the 'new pragmatists' have slightly modified the sentence, with a profound transformation in meaning and implication. For example, a British Foreign Office official writes that 'humanitarianism as a substitute for political action is unsatisfactory' (Evans, 1997). Does that mean that the UK will not provide humanitarian assistance if it is seen to be at odds with its political interests? Such an argument travesties the actual meaning of the Joint Evaluation's conclusion which might well have included a caveat to the effect that political action (or inaction) should not be used as a substitute for humanitarian action. This lesson very clearly emerges from the latest study of international assistance co-ordination in the Great Lakes (Lautze et al., 1998). The failure to mount coherent political and military interventions in 1994 allowed the genocide to happen. Again, in 1996/7, some blame for tens of thousands of predictable deaths in the Great Lakes region must be attributed to the failure (or subversion) of international political will to guarantee protective asylum or custody for those at risk (see, for example, Stockton, 1996). In this case 'local solutions' were applied, while international humanitarians mainly watched in frustrated impotence and exclusion. Does anyone now wish to claim this as a great success?

#### Even if humanitarianism has flaws, it is more effective than non-intervention---representing the harm is better than sweeping under the rug

Stockton 98 – former lecturer of sociology, Executive Director of the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (Nicholas, “In Defence of Humanitarianism,” Disasters, 22.4)

As many as 100 NGOs are said to have turned up to 'help' in Goma in 1994 (Borton et al., 1996). The place was awash with the modern symbols of international aid: T-shirts, car stickers and flags. Humanitarian 'heralds' were there, the NGO press officers, doggedly pursuing journalists, brandishing their new angles on the story, often relating to their own agency's courage, skill and impact. All clamoured for television coverage and made claims about what could be achieved, some of which were indeed outrageous. Many have subsequently argued that the relief system is now badly out of control, having become a self-perpetuating expatriate industry unscrupulously exploiting other people's misery. Where genuine compassion exists, it is all too often combined with a gross naivety and amateurism that produces unforeseen and damaging side-effects. Finally, the international agencies operate in a manner that grants their staff near complete impunity for professional incompetence. They can get away, literally, with murder. While there is doubtless some truth in all of this, it is important to establish how generalisable the picture is. There is very little empirical evidence that actual harm has been caused by increased numbers of agencies per se.(n9) In fact increased agency competition has certainly demanded more efficient and more professional approaches. It also offers the donors, both private and official, more choice of potential implementation partners. Indeed in the 'development' zone, many of the same critics of the humanitarian scene actually celebrate institutional proliferation as an indicator of the health of 'civil society'. It is surely right that humanitarian agencies pursue television and media coverage of major humanitarian calamities. Would it be better to ignore them or cover them up? The failure to engage much serious media attention to long-term suffering and structural poverty is hardly likely to be remedied through cleansing our screens of disaster stories. Surely it makes little sense to argue that because some ambulances leave the scene of some accidents 'empty-handed' that in future ambulances will be despatched one at a time, no matter what the scale and severity of the reported incident. If in Goma some agencies turned up unnecessarily, it is very important to consider carefully what might have happened if an insufficient number had turned up, before jumping to the conclusion that it is possible to define and plan for an optimal response. Of course the humanitarian agencies and their staff are not perfect. But compare their response after the disaster of the Great Lakes with that of governments. While France, the UK and the US variously denied responsibility and buck passed furiously, the NGOs got on with the Sphere project,(n10) People in Aid,(n11) and the Humanitarian Ombudsman (n12) project. These very complex exercises in inter-agency co-operation, involving hundreds of very diverse organisations, are laying down clear standards of ethical behaviour, minimum standards in service delivery, best practice standards in human resource management and methods of enhancing accountability to legitimate humanitarian claimants. It is of course easy to build up a portfolio of cases pointing to venality, inefficiency and ineptitude within the humanitarian system. However, as is often said in legal circles, bad cases do not necessarily make for good laws. Abolition of the health service as a whole is not a rational and justifiable response to the identification of bad practice in particular circumstances. Evidence for and against needs to be weighed carefully and the principle of proportionality reflected when reforming the system. Conclusion The remarkable resilience of Henri Dunant's concepts of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence are based very particularly upon his recognition in 1859 at the Battle of Solferino that humanitarian aid will only be politically possible and ethically justifiable so long as it favours neither warring party with military advantage. These humanitarian principles are as valid now as they were in 1859; in essence the right of non-combatants to protection from violence, inhumane or degrading treatment. The Geneva Conventions and other human rights and humanitarian treaties do therefore confer obligations upon humanitarian organisations and it is absolutely right that the humanitarian system should be held accountable to these norms. In this respect, Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief (1994) offers a powerful normative framework to judge the performance of the humanitarian system. In general, the humanitarian agencies are improving their performance in terms of quality, and their willingness to be held accountable to these principles and associated technical standards. This is well illustrated by the phenomenon of over 100 humanitarian agencies co-operating on the Sphere humanitarian standards project. However, growing evidence suggests that the humanitarian system is doing badly as humanitarian demand seems to be outstripping the supply of official and private compassion. But when contrasted with the failures of an international political culture that fails to get to grips with war-crime impunity, the illegal arms trade and those macro-economic processes that sustain the iceberg of poverty and inequality that lies below the surface of most violent conflicts, then the humanitarian system and its underlying values sometimes look like a warm, albeit beleaguered, beacon of hope. This must not be extinguished. A public engagement with the human tragedies of poverty and violence must be renewed, no matter how distant these may seem geographically or politically.

#### Leaving the Horn alone ensures widespread conflict---states are complicit

Wolf 12 – Tetra Tech ARD Project Manager (Lucas, “EAST AFRICA REGIONAL CONFLICT AND INSTABILITY ASSESSMENT,” Final Report)

Conflict and instability trends in East Africa—encompassing the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes, and the traditional East Africa region (Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania)—continue to make it one of the most unstable regions in the world.3 The region‘s chronic instability stands in sharp contrast to the notable successes in conflict management across most of the rest of Africa. Conflicts in South Sudan, southern Somalia, Darfur, and eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)—combined with heavily armed communal clashes in some other parts of the region—wreak havoc on local, state, and regional security. Transborder criminal networks seek refuge in remote and weakly governed borderlands. While parts of the region are relatively stable and peaceful today, significant portions of East Africa remain unable to break free of a brutal and prolonged history of armed conflicts, violent crime, extremism, communal violence, political instability, displacement, human rights abuses, and state failure. The inability of central governments to protect their citizens from this violence—in some cases, government complicity in the crises—has eroded communities‘ trust in the state. Most of East Africa‘s zones of armed conflict and instability today are concentrated near border areas and feature powerful crossborder drivers, interests, and actors. Crossborder spillover is thus a major problem in East Africa, and has the effect of tying the fates of relatively stable countries to their troubled neighbors. At its worst, spillover has produced new crises of armed violence that match or exceed the fatality levels of the original conflict, as the case of the 1994 Rwandan genocide and ensuing wars in eastern DRC illustrates. Under such circumstances, regional governments can ill-afford to ignore violent conflicts in neighboring countries, nor can they rest assured that containment strategies will adequately shield them. Few of the region‘s central governments have the capacity (or in some cases the political will) to police and patrol their remote, expansive border areas. As a result, much of what passes for transborder conflict management and prevention falls on the shoulders of regional organizations, local communities, and local government authorities, in partnership with often distant central governments. Their resilience and adaptability are critical factors in determining whether and to what extent crossborder conflict and instability issues are successfully managed.

#### These factors impede community-led efforts

Wolf 12 – Tetra Tech ARD Project Manager (Lucas, “EAST AFRICA REGIONAL CONFLICT AND INSTABILITY ASSESSMENT,” Final Report)

Even so, community efforts to manage crossborder violence and instability have faced significant problems. In Kenya, the formalization of PDCs has allowed for the model to be replicated across much of the country, but has an uneven record. Some PDCs have been used as political platforms for aspiring politicians; in the process, the PDCs have been politicized, and their neutrality damaged. In southern Somalia, community-based governance is well developed thanks to 21 years of state collapse, but in recent years has had to contend with the violent and intimidating presence of Al-Shabaab. Local civic leaders have been able to negotiate terms with Al-Shabaab, but at great risk, and as a result have been constrained by the threat of assassination from acting autonomously. In Ethiopia, the government‘s recent restrictive laws on civil society (the Charities and Societies Proclamation) has reduced formal roles for CSOs in peace building and conflict management in border areas, though civil society representatives are represented in LPCs. In some war-torn areas of East Africa, CSOs in remote border areas are weak or in disarray. Capacity and leadership quality are critical, and vary tremendously from place to place. Finally, in some conflict areas of East Africa, local community leadership is simply not committed to peace building. Years of clashes have hardened ethnic animosities and deepened distrust; competing narratives are jarringly at odds, and appear to offer only modest prospects for negotiation and mediation. Our research encountered this in the Turkana border area of Kenya and Ethiopia, where the Turkana and Dassenesh communities are locked in spiraling violence over land and the fisheries of the shrinking Lake Turkana. Border communities typically take on a broad portfolio of roles in maintaining peace. At their best, they serve as eyes and ears for early warning systems; create deterrence, by placing social pressure on would-be criminals and armed militia; mobilize the community for both conflict prevention and management; are a source of customary or religious law within their group; and serve as diplomats in managing tensions with neighboring groups. They also face serious constraints, and are especially limited in effectiveness when deprived of a strong partnership with local and national governments. Some of the factors constraining community peace building include ineffective or hostile local government in some locations, poor communication systems with crossborder groups, increasingly complex new conflict drivers and fatality levels which can overwhelm customary systems of justice and conflict management, powerful spoilers, and organizational challenges of keeping hybrid governance coalitions working together.

#### The existence of habeas petitions promoting human rights proves that an institution can be caught up in systems of whiteness while still combatting violence

Williams 90 - American lawyer who is a notable author and legal scholar in the field of federal Indian law, international law, indigenous peoples' rights, critical race and post-colonial theory (Robert, “Encounters on the Frontiers of International Human Rights Law: Redefining the Terms of Indigenous Peoples' Survival in the World”, Duke Law Journal, Vol. 4)

Not too long ago, it was fashionable for some legal academics in this country to assert that rights discourse—that is, talk and thought about rights—was actually harmful to the social movements of peoples of color and other oppressed groups.1 And as recent times have shown, legal academics of color can attract a great deal of attention and the sympathies of anonymous white colleagues by telling us that the sufferings and stories of peoples of color in this country possess no unique capacity to transform the law.2 These legal academic denials of the efficacy of rights discourse and storytelling for the social movements of peoples of color now seem disharmonious with the larger transformations occurring in the world. Why any legal academics would discount the usefulness of such proven, liberating forms of discourse in the particular society they serve from their positions of privilege is a curious and contentious question. The disaggregated narratives of human rights struggles on the nightly news apparently have not been sufficient for some legal academics. They want documented accounts demonstrating the efficacy of rights discourse and storytelling in the social movements of outsider groups. Empirical evidence of the traditions, histories, and lives of oppressed peoples actually transforming legal thought and doctrine about rights could then be used to cure skeptics of the critical race scholarly enterprise.3 "See here," the still unconverted in the faculty lounge can be told, "this stuff works, if applied and systematized correctly." Despite the attacks from society's dominant groups in the legal academic spectrum—both the left and right—the voices of legal scholars of color have sought to keep faith with the struggles and aspirations of oppressed peoples around the world. These emerging voices recognize that now is the time to intensify the struggle for human rights on all fronts— to heighten demands, engage in intense political rhetoric, and sharpen critical thinking about all aspects of legal thought and doctrine. The rapid emergence of indigenous peoples\* human rights as a subject of major concern and action in contemporary international law provides a unique opportunity to witness the application of rights discourse and storytelling in institutionalized, law-bound settings around the world.4 By telling their own stories in recognized and authoritative intcrnational human rights standard-setting bodies during the past decade, indigenous peoples have sought to redefine the terms of their right to survival under international law.5 Under present, Western-dominated conceptions of international law, indigenous peoples are regarded as subjects of the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of the settler state regimes that invaded their territories and established hegemony during prior colonial eras.6 At present, international law does not contest unilateral assertions of state sovereignty that limit, or completely deny the collective cultural rights of indigenous peoples.7 Contemporary international law also does not concern itself with protecting indigenous peoples' traditionally-occupied territories from uncompensated state appropriation, even when indigenous territories are secured through treaties with a state. According to contemporary international discourse, such treaties should be treated as legal nullities.8 Finally, modern international law refuses to recognize indigenous peoples as "peoples," entitled to rights of self-determination as specified in United Nations and other major international human rights legal instruments.9 Since the 1970s, in international human rights forums around the world, indigenous peoples have contested the international legal system's continued acquiescence to the assertions of exclusive state sovereignty and jurisdiction over the terms of their survival. Pushed to the brink of extinction by state-sanctioned policies of genocide and ethnocide, indigenous peoples have demanded heightened international concern and legal protection for their continued survival.10 The emergence of indigenous rights in contemporary international legal discourse is a direct response to the consciousness-raising efforts of indigenous peoples in international human rights forums. Specialized international and regional bodies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and advocacy groups are now devoting greater attention to indigenous human rights concerns." By far the most important of these specialized initiatives to emerge out of the indigenous human rights movement is the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations (Working Group). The Working Group is composed of five international legal experts drawn from the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. The Working Group was created by the Sub-Commission's parent body, the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 1982 and given a specific mandate to develop international legal standards for the protection of indigenous peoples' human rights.12

#### Civilian assistance is developed through consultation and promote African-led initiatives

Murphy 12 – East Coast Correspondent, Humanosphere.org (Tom, “USAID: Building Resiliency In the Horn of Africa,” Huff, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tom-murphy/usaid-building-resiliency\_b\_1163987.html)

Programming in the HoA seeks to give people living in the region the ability to adjust to the cyclical droughts that return every few years. Feed the Future is one USAID program that hopes to build the capacity to withstand weather challenges. Borne out of the 2007-8 food crisis and ensuing G8 Summit in L’Aquila, Italy, Feed the Future leveraged $3.5 billion in financial backing to rally support around the Rome Principles for Sustainable Global Food Security. The signatories agreed to: Invest in country-owned plans that support results-based programs and partnerships, so that assistance is tailored to the needs of individual countries through consultative processes and plans that are developed and led by country governments Strengthen strategic coordination to mobilize and align the resources of the diverse partners and stakeholders — including the private sector and civil society - that are needed to achieve our common objectives Ensure a comprehensive approach that accelerates inclusive agricultural-led growth and improves nutrition, while also bridging humanitarian relief and sustainable development efforts Leverage the benefits of multilateral institutions so that priorities and approaches are aligned, investments are coordinated, and financial and technical assistance gaps are filled Deliver on sustained and accountable commitments, phasing-in investments responsibly to ensure returns, using benchmarks and targets to measure progress toward shared goals, and holding ourselves and other stakeholders publicly accountable for achieving results.

#### Err aff — you’re biased to latch on to imagery of particular failures, filter those through the overwhelming statistical record of successful peacekeeping – increasing material support only makes it more effective

Paris 14, (founding director of the University of Ottawa's Centre for International Policy Studies and associate professor in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, Peacekeeping Works Better Than You May Think, politicalviolenceataglance.org/2014/08/12/peacekeeping-works-better-than-you-may-think/)

Does peacekeeping work? Janice Stein (University of Toronto) and I had a lively exchange on this subject on the CBC radio program “The House” last weekend. Have a listen. In the interview, I said that more than two dozen major peace operations have been deployed over the past 25 years in countries emerging from civil wars, and that although some have been terrible failures (e.g., Rwanda 1994), their overall record has been reasonably good at preventing a recurrence of fighting. Prof. Stein was unconvinced. Some studies, she said, “show that the majority [of peace operations] are failures and that there is a return to violence after 5 to 7 years. So I think the record is the reverse.” So, which is it? Does peacekeeping generally help to prevent a return to violence, or does it generally fail to do so? The answer to this question matters – quite a lot, actually. If peacekeeping is ineffective and if outsiders can do little to help post-conflict societies transition towards a more stable peace, as Prof. Stein suggests, then Western policymakers and other leaders would be foolish to consider contributing to, or even supporting, such efforts. If, on the other hand, peacekeeping has a reasonably positive record, it would seem foolish for the same policymakers not to support these efforts. Prof. Stein is a fine scholar and fluent analyst of international affairs, but she’s not correct about the peacekeeping record. Michael Doyle (Columbia University) and Nicholas Sambanis (Yale University) demonstrated in 2000 that the presence of a large peacekeeping operation in a country emerging from civil war significantly reduced the chances of that society slipping back into violence. They reached this conclusion by analyzing post-conflict countries that had, and had not, received peace missions, and by holding other factors constant, including the intensity of the preceding war, the type of conflict, etc. Their finding has been replicated, modified, and reconfirmed many times in the ensuing decade-and-a-half and is now widely accepted among international security scholars. One recent survey of this literature put it simply: “there is considerable evidence that [United Nations peacekeeping operations] are effective in maintaining peace.” In fact, most debates on this subject are now focusing not on whether peacekeeping reduces the risk of renewed fighting, but on how much it does so. Of course, this does not mean that every peacekeeping mission has succeeded or will succeed; rather, it indicates that “on average” peacekeeping works to reduce the risk of renewed conflict. It is a statistical relationship – and a very strong one, as other contributors to this literature, including Paul Collier (University of Oxford) and Page Fortna (Columbia University and contributor to this blog), have demonstrated. This finding may seem counter-intuitive at first, given lingering images of failed peacekeeping efforts in Rwanda and Somalia, for example. But it begins to make sense if you consider how many countries have navigated the war-to-peace transition with the assistance of international peacekeepers – including El Salvador, Nicaragua, Namibia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Cambodia, East Timor, Bosnia and Kosovo. Perhaps these cases have fallen from public view precisely because they are no longer at war. “Still no return to massive bloodshed in Bosnia” is very important news to the inhabitants of that country, but don’t count on seeing this headline in tomorrow’s paper. If it doesn’t bleed, it doesn’t lead. Nevertheless, the evidence is clear: *on balance*, peacekeeping works reasonably well at preventing conflicts from reigniting. I’ve included a list of studies at the end of this post in case you wish to read further, but I’ll leave the last word to Steven Pinker of Harvard University, who, in the video clip below, sums up the findings of this scholarship more eloquently than I can. In response to the question of whether peacekeeping works, Pinker says: The answer from the statistical studies is: absolutely, they work massively. A country is much less likely to fall back in civil war if they’ve got armed peacekeepers. And the better financed and armed the peacekeeping force, the more effective they are… The United Nations does a number of things badly, but it does a number of things well, and one of them is peacekeeping – on average, not 100 percent of the time. The headlines would never tell you that. Only a statistical study would.

#### Here’s another study.

Beardsley et al. 18 [Kyle Beardsley, Duke University; David E. Cunningham, University of Maryland & Peace Research Institute Oslo; Peter B. White, University of Maryland; 6-30-2018; "Mediation, Peacekeeping and the Severity of Civil War"; Journal of Conflict Resolution; https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0022002718817092; KL]

In this article, we argue that international actors can work to reduce the level of violence in ongoing civil wars. In particular, we argue that mediators can contribute to a reduction in violence by facilitating negotiated settlements and by creating lulls during which negotiations can occur. We also expect peacekeeping to reduce civil war violence, for reasons similar to the arguments of Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon (2014, hereafter HKS). Moreover, we argue that the mechanisms through which mediation and peacekeeping can help attenuate violence are both additive—the mediators help reduce violence in ways that peacekeeping operations alone cannot and vice versa—and interactive—mediation and peacekeeping reinforce one another and may even depend on one another.

We examine these expectations in an analysis of all intrastate conflict months in Africa from 1989 to 2008. Since mediated peace processes and peacekeeping deployments often occur in close temporal proximity, it is important to examine their distinct contributions to reductions in armed violence within the same empirical framework. We find, consistent with our expectations, that mediation leads to a dramatic decline in battlefield casualties. We also find, consistent with HKS, that peacekeeping reduces battlefield casualties. In addition to these independent effects, we find that mediation and peacekeeping have a conditional effect wherein the presence of both leads to a greater reduction in battlefield fatalities. We also find that this interaction is driven primarily by mediation and peacekeeping occurring simultaneously rather than by a sequencing in which mediation precedes peacekeepers. These results illustrate that mediation and peacekeeping can have important positive impacts on conflict beyond complete termination.

### ! — NATO Good — AT: Interventions — Libya

#### NATO’s involvement in Libya prevented massacres.

Hamid 16 [Shadi Hamid; senior fellow at the Project on US Relations with the Islamic World at the Brookings Institution’s Center for Middle East Policy; 4-5-2016; "Everyone says the Libya intervention was a failure. They’re wrong."; Vox; https://www.vox.com/2016/4/5/11363288/libya-intervention-success; KL]

Libya and the 2011 NATO intervention there have become synonymous with failure, disaster, and the Middle East being a "shit show" (to use President Obama’s colorful descriptor). It has perhaps never been more important to question this prevailing wisdom, because how we interpret Libya affects how we interpret Syria and, importantly, how we assess Obama’s foreign policy legacy.

Of course, Libya, as anyone can see, is a mess, and Americans are reasonably asking if the intervention was a mistake. But just because it’s reasonable doesn’t make it right.

Most criticisms of the intervention, even with the benefit of hindsight, fall short. It is certainly true that the intervention didn’t produce something resembling a stable democracy. This, however, was never the goal. The goal was to protect civilians and prevent a massacre.

Critics erroneously compare Libya today to any number of false ideals, but this is not the correct way to evaluate the success or failure of the intervention. To do that, we should compare Libya today to what Libya would have looked like if we hadn’t intervened. By that standard, the Libya intervention was successful: The country is better off today than it would have been had the international community allowed dictator Muammar Qaddafi to continue his rampage across the country.

Critics further assert that the intervention caused, created, or somehow led to civil war. In fact, the civil war had already started before the intervention began. As for today’s chaos, violence, and general instability, these are more plausibly tied not to the original intervention but to the international community’s failures after intervention.

The very fact that the Libya intervention and its legacy have been either distorted or misunderstood is itself evidence of a warped foreign policy discourse in the US, where anything short of success — in this case, Libya quickly becoming a stable, relatively democratic country — is viewed as a failure.

NATO intervened to protect civilians, not to set up a democracy

As stated in the UN Security Council resolution authorizing force in Libya, the goal of intervention was "to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack." And this is what was achieved.

In February 2011, anti-Qaddafi demonstrations spread across the country. The regime responded to the nascent protest movement with lethal force, killing more than 100 people in the first few days, effectively sparking an armed rebellion. The rebels quickly lost momentum, however.

I still remember how I felt in those last days and hours as Qaddafi’s forces marched toward Benghazi. In a quite literal sense, every moment mattered, and the longer we waited, the greater the cost.

It was frightening to watch. I didn’t want to live in an America where we would stand by silently as a brutal dictator — using that distinct language of genocidaires — announced rather clearly his intentions to kill. In one speech, Qaddafi called protesters "cockroaches" and vowed to cleanse Libya "inch by inch, house by house, home by home, alleyway by alleyway."

Already, on the eve of intervention, the death toll was estimated at somewhere between 1,000 and 2,000. (This was when the international community’s tolerance for Arab Spring–related mass killings was still fairly low.)

As Obama’s advisers saw it, there were two options for military action: a no-fly zone (which, on its own, wouldn’t do much to stop Qaddafi’s tanks) or a broader resolution that would allow the US and its allies to take further measures, including establishing what amounted to a floating no-drive zone around rebel forces. The president went with the latter option.

The NATO operation lasted about seven months, with an estimated death toll of around 8,000, apparently most of them combatants on both sides (although there is some lack of clarity on this, since the Libyan government doesn’t clearly define "revolutionaries" or "rebel supporters"). A Human Rights Watch investigation found that at least 72 civilians were killed as a result of the NATO air campaign, definitively contradicting speculative claims of mass casualties from the Qaddafi regime.

Claims of "mission creep" have become commonplace, most forcefully articulated by the Micah Zenko of the Council on Foreign Relations. Zenko may be right, but he asserts rather than explains why mission creep is always a bad thing. It may be that in some circumstances, the scope of a mission should be defined more broadly, rather than narrowly.

If anything, it was the Obama administration’s insistence of minimizing the mission — including the absurd claim that it would take "days, not weeks" — that was the problem from the very start. Zenko and others never make clear how civilians could have been protected as long as Qaddafi was waging war on them.

What Libya would look like today if NATO hadn’t intervened

It’s helpful to engage in a bit of counterfactual history here. As Niall Ferguson notes in his book Virtual Alternatives, “To understand how it actually was, we therefore need to understand how it actually wasn’t.”

Applied to the Libyan context, this means that we’re not comparing Libya, during or after the intervention, with some imagined ideal of stable, functioning democracy. Rather, we would compare it with what we judge, to the best of our ability, the most likely alternative outcome would have been had the US not intervened.

Here’s what we know: By March 19, 2011, when the NATO operation began, the death toll in Libya had risen rapidly to more than 1,000 in a relatively short amount of time, confirming Qaddafi’s longstanding reputation as someone who was willing to kill his countrymen (as well as others) in large numbers if that’s what his survival required.

There was no end in sight. After early rebel gains, Qaddafi had seized the advantage. Still, he was not in a position to deal a decisive blow to the opposition. (Nowhere in the Arab Spring era has one side in a military conflict been able to claim a clear victory, even with massive advantages in manpower, equipment, and regional backing.)

Any Libyan who had opted to take up arms was liable to be captured, arrested, or killed if Qaddafi “won,” so the incentives to accept defeat were nonexistent, to say nothing of the understandable desire to not live under the rule of a brutal and maniacal strongman.

The most likely outcome, then, was a Syria-like situation of indefinite, intensifying violence. Even President Obama, who today seems unsure about the decision to intervene, acknowledged in an August 2014 interview with Thomas Friedman that “had we not intervened, it’s likely that Libya would be Syria. … And so there would be more death, more disruption, more destruction.”

What caused the current Libyan civil war?

Critics charge that the NATO intervention was responsible for or somehow caused Libya’s current state of chaos and instability. For instance, after leaving the Obama administration, Philip Gordon, the most senior US official on the Middle East in 2013-'15, wrote: "In Iraq, the U.S. intervened and occupied, and the result was a costly disaster. In Libya, the U.S. intervened and did not occupy, and the result was a costly disaster. In Syria, the U.S. neither intervened nor occupied, and the result is a costly disaster."

The problem here is that US intervention did not, in fact, result in a costly disaster, unless we are using the word "result" to simply connote that one thing happened after a previous thing. The NATO operation ended in October 2011. The current civil war in Libya began in May 2014 — a full two and a half years later. The intervention and today’s violence are of course related, but this does not necessarily mean there is a causal relationship.

To argue that the current conflict in Libya is a result of the intervention, one would basically need to assume that the outbreak of civil war was inevitable, irrespective of anything that happened in the intervening 30 months.

#### The alternative was mass genocide and hundreds of thousands of deaths.

Debeuf 21 [Koert Debeuf; Senior Associate Researcher at Free University of Brussels, Visiting Research Fellow at Oxford University, and Director of the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy Europe; 2-17-2011; "Why Western military interventions remain necessary"; EUobserver; https://euobserver.com/world/152742; KL]

Since the Afghanistan debacle, more and more analysts have raised their voices against interventions by the West. According to some, the West should only intervene militarily when self-interest is at stake and if there is no alternative.

For example, many believe that the intervention in Libya was a mistake. That its late leader Muammar Gaddafi would still be in power would not matter to our interest. In other words, they believe that doing nothing is usually better than doing something.

Let me first zoom in on Libya. Following Tunisia and Egypt, Libyans took to the streets for the first time on 17 February 2011 to demand the end of the Gaddafi regime, which had been a reign of terror since 1969.

That happened first in Benghazi, the second largest city in Libya, which then had a population of about 630,000. In March 2011, Gaddafi's army marched with a huge force to Benghazi to, as the "Brotherly Leader and Guide" announced, nip all resistance in the bud, "from house to house, alley to alley".

No one doubted that tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands of people would be killed. A genocide 10, maybe 50 times bigger than Srebrenica was about to happen.

It was the Libyans themselves, especially the future prime minister Mahmoud Jibril, who first convinced the European Parliament, then French president Nicolas Sarkozy and finally US secretary of state Hillary Clinton to try to stop this massacre.

When the planes took off from France to Libya on 17 March, the Libyan army was literally already at the gates of Benghazi.

A massive massacre had been avoided, thanks to the Libyan opposition and Nato.

#### The mistake of Libya was not enough intervention.

Slate 18 [James Slate; Foreign Policy liberal; 1-16-2018; "Why America was right to Intervene in Libya, and what went wrong after"; Medium; https://jameslate.medium.com/why-america-was-right-to-intervene-in-libya-d31f87202c18; KL]

If the U.S. hadn’t intervened, the result might have been another Syria-like situation of a protracted civil war. I was in favor of intervening, but I also warned at the time that the U.S. needed to seriously prepare for a post-Gaddafi Libya, and that the only way to ward off chaos was to send an international peacekeeping force.

The Problem with Obama In Libya, was that he employed American airpower to topple Muammar Gaddafi but refused to sanction any follow-on peacekeeping forces to help a new, pro-Western government establish its authority. The predictable result: a vacuum of authority that allowed militias and terrorist groups to flourish. U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three of his colleagues paid with their lives for that failure.

The Obama administration’s mission while “leading from behind” over the skies of Libya was never regime change. “Of course, there is no question that Libya and the world would be better off with Qaddafi out of power,” Obama said in an address to the nation. “But broadening our military mission to include regime change would be a mistake.” In that address, the president noted that regime change in Iraq was not worth the cost in lives or dollars. That’s perhaps why the administration was ill-prepared for the crumbling of Gaddafi’s regime.

The Mistake of Libya was not enough Intervention

With the Arabian Revolt sweeping the Middle East in early 2011, Libya’s turn came on February 17. Throwing off decades of fear, and not bothering with peaceful demonstrations as Tunisia and Egypt had to free themselves of tyranny, nor the Syrians who tried peaceful demonstrations for six entire months, the Libyans went straight to armed rebellion, and soon the city of Benghazi had been pried from the regime’s grip and become the de facto capital of the revolution. The Libyans had no confidence in protests to alter the regime of Muammar el-Qaddafi. They were right. The demented Colonel responded with a brutality that included using fighter jetsagainst civilian areas. As the violence escalated, on March 17 the U.N. Security Council passed resolution 1973, which

Authorize[d] Member States …, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, … to take all necessary measures … to protect civilians.

Celebrations erupted in Libya at the news that deliverance was coming. For reasons unclear there was a 48-hour delay, which allowed Qaddafi’s forces to be right at the gates of Benghazi by the time the American intervention came on March 19 in the form of Operation ODYSSEY DAWN. Qaddafi’s rudimentary air defences were disabled and a no-fly zone instituted. President Obama then made the decision, on March 31, to hand the operation to NATO. This was the infamous “leading from behind“. Still, it was enough to bring down the regime. In late August, Qaddafi was driven from his capital, and on October 20, Qaddafi’s escape from his hometown of Sirte was cut off by French jets and he was pulled out of a drainage ditch and given to the crowd. They were not pretty those closing scenes in Sirte, but they were long overdue.

The Russians would protest that their abstention on the U.N. resolution was never meant to encompass regime-change, and the West, including the U.S. Defence Secretary and the British Chief of Defence, denied that this had been the intention. How they proposed to protect civilians without killing the despot giving the orders that endangered them was never explained. On Oct. 31, NATO’s Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR was ended, and that was more or less it for Western involvement, except for the victory lap of course.

In the elections that followed liberation in June 2012, the tribalists/nationalists would carry the day; the Islamists were trounced. But the problems had already begun. Between April and September 2012 there had been “at least five … attacks against foreign interests in Benghazi,” and this would culminate in the fiasco on Sept. 11, 2012, when the American ambassador and three other U.S. citizens were killed by al-Qaeda jihadists at the Consulate in that city. There were many democratic and pro-American people in Libya — protesters had expelled the Islamic militants who attacked the U.S. Consulate from their base in Benghazi after the attack — but a small group of violent fanatics can impose themselves if nobody else has the power to resist them. Lawlessness was allowed to overtake Libya, and the decent government that had come to office by elections was unable to enforce its writ. America had made one effort to send a training mission to Libya to buttress the forces of law and order but it was withdrawn in mid-2012 “until the security of U.S. personnel and equipment could be guaranteed“!

2013 did not shape up any better. The parliament passed laws at gun-point, a proposed NATO training mission went nowhere, and there were numerous kidnappings, including the Prime Minister. The east of Libya had always been fertile ground for the jihadists. Derna, for example, had contributed “far and away” the most holy warriors on a per capita basis to the jihad against constitutional government in Iraq. With no State to keep this at bay, and collapsing order around Libya, notably Mali, the jihadists converged on Libya for shelter and al-Qaeda and other Salafi-jihadists’ presence in the country became more pronounced.

Major cities in Libya, predominantly Tripoli in the west and Benghazi in the east

Elections in June 2014 had again defeated the Islamists but this time the zealots decided to take by force what they could not get by the ballot, and on Saturday, the situation unravelled completely when Tripoli fell to Islamic militants under the banner of Fajr Libya (Libyan Dawn). The Islamists set ablaze Tripoli International Airport, further destruction of the city was reported, and the remnants of the police and army, as well as militiamen loyal to the government, were being systematically rounded up by Dawn. In the east, fighting is ongoing between the Islamists and the supposedly-nationalist militias of Khalifa Haftar, a former General, a leftover of the old regime who has seemingly modelled himself on Abdel Fattah as-Sisi, a putschist and autocrat who claims he can keep the Islamists in check. Libya’s Parliament calledfor international intervention earlier this month and was rebuffed. This is the harvest.

But this wasn’t all. Regional dynamics soon intruded:

Twice in the last seven days, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates have secretly launched airstrikes against Islamist-allied militias battling for control of Tripoli … The United States, the officials said, was caught by surprise: Egypt and the Emirates, both close allies and military partners, acted without informing Washington, leaving the Obama administration on the sidelines. Egyptian officials explicitly denied to American diplomats that their military played any role in the operation … In recent months, the officials said, teams of “special forces” operating out of Egypt but possibly composed primarily of Emiratis had also successfully destroyed an Islamist camp near … Derna …

Several officials said in recent days that United States diplomats were fuming about the airstrikes, believing the intervention could further inflame the Libyan conflict as the United Nations and Western powers are seeking to broker a peaceful resolution.

Officials said the government of Qatar has already provided weapons and support to the Islamist-aligned forces inside Libya, so the new strikes represent a shift from a battle of proxies to direct involvement. …

“In every arena — in Syria, Iraq, Gaza, Libya, even what happened in Egypt — this regional polarization, with Saudi Arabia and the … U.A.E. on one side and Qatar and Turkey on the other, has proved to be a gigantic impediment to international efforts to resolve any of these crisis [sic],” said Michele Dunne, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a former Middle East specialist at the State Department.

A snapshot but a very dense one: The region’s actors, perhaps especially America’s allies, have taken to free-lancing because they have no confidence that the President will actually do anything; Qatar is playing as destructive a role as it can; the struggles within the Muslim world are the major front in the region (Israel is not even on the radar of these States); the Obama administration’s failure to intervene properly and stay to secure the aftermath has led to disaster in Libya, as it has in Iraq; and while bad actors are making real military gains, the administration worries that using force to stop them will only make it worse and tries to bring about a political solution in situations that have long-since passed the point of no return.

Credit where it is due: The United States had come to the rescue of Libya when nobody else would (Russia and China) or could (the Arab League). But the U.S. had not secured the aftermath, the one lesson all sides of the argument should surely have learned from Iraq.

It didn’t have to be this way. Consider an alternative history of the region over the last three years. If the intervention against Qaddafi had come sooner, in the first two weeks rather than after four, and if it had targeted him and his elite directly and unapologetically, the war would not have dragged out for eight months; there would have been much less destruction and the jihadists would have had much less time and space to set themselves up. If Special Forces, military advisers, and other help were made available to the elected government afterwards then order could have been restored, in no small part because it wouldn’t have broken down so badly. If fifteen or twenty thousand troops could have been left in Iraq it would have allowed a fighting chance of keeping peace between the sects, stopped Iran using Iraq as a transit point to support the Assad dictatorship, kept Syria’s furies largely out of Iraq, and ensured that the Islamic State didn’t get a chance to regenerate in Iraq.

If an early aerial intervention were mounted in Syria in late 2011 or early (or even mid-) 2012 it would have stopped the Zarqawi’ites metastasizing on Syrian soil, denying them the conditions they needed — including the complicity of the regime and Iran — and ensured a much better outcome by helping to power nationalists, who were overwhelmingly powerful early in this rebellion, breaking Iran’s power in the Mediterranean, and not incidentally preventing a great deal of killing and destruction. Project the worst you like for casualties from a NATO intervention in Syria and it’s not 220,000. (In Libya, 72 civilians were collateral damage in NATO’s entire campaign, less than one day’s work from Assad, and estimates of the total casualties are being revised down all the time.)

For those who worry that this is taking on too much, just remember: The West is going to get dragged in anyway. It will be on terms much less advantageous, the outcomes will be worse than they could have been with earlier intervention, and many more people will die, but these situations will eventually reach a point where they can no longer be ignored whether, as in Iraq and Syria, it is the rise of transnational terrorist groups or, as will soon be the case in Libya, the rise of transnational terrorist groups and a destabilising flood of refugees into Europe, some of whom will be agents of these terrorist groups. In Iraq and Libya, it would have been much easier to simply stay on and secure the gains the West had already achieved. As in so many other cases, what to do about Syria has not been made easier by letting it drag out.

The next question of the anti-interventionists tends to be on the “exit strategy,” but this is a fantasy on at least two counts. One is that it sets up a standard of prescience on interventionists that anti-interventionists never get held to. For example, Edward Miliband, having organised the defeat of the proposal in the British Parliament that said Bashar al-Assad should pay a military price for gassing children, now bears partial responsibility for everybody who has been killed in Syria by the regime since last August because he emboldened it by sending the message that chemical weapons use was cost-free.

But somehow the costs of inaction never seem to register in the same way. Second, an “exit strategy” can’t be known until it’s seen. The U.S. still has troops in Germany, Japan, South Korea, Bosnia, and Kosovo — and so much the better. Look how well they turned out as opposed to the American South, Somalia, Haiti, and Iraq where American troops were pulled out too soon. By being prepared to stay for as long as it takes, there’s every chance you won’t have to stay so long. If it is understood that you are determined to see it through, the local actors will make their long-term arrangements with you. If, like Obama in Afghanistan, you announce a commitment and simultaneously announce the end-date, the local actors make their arrangements instead with internal and external forces they know will be there forever.

In short, the lesson of Libya is not that the intervention in 2011 was a mistake. It is the lesson once articulated by Representative Charles Wilson of Texas, who was rather over-sold as having single-handedly driven the Red Army out of Afghanistan in the excellent film Charlie Wilson’s War. “These things happened. They were glorious and they changed the world,” said the Congressman. “And then we fucked up the endgame.”

Did the United States Violate its Nuclear Agreements with Libya?

To Quote Wikipedia:

In 1968, Libya became signatory of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), ratified the treaty in 1975, and concluded a safeguards agreement in 1980. The Libyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials were quoted “Libya had bought nuclear components from various black market dealers”, and provided the various designs of centrifuges to U.S. officials and gave the name of its suppliers.”

So right there, you have Libya admitting to violating the NPT.

Recognizing that his country was vulnerable to a similar fate as Iraq and wishing to have lifted the sanctions that had been in place since the 1980s, Gaddafi announced his intention to destroy his WMD and to allow inspectors to confirm this fact. The process began in December 2003 and was officially completed by February 2014.

“On 22 September 2011, near Sabha, Libya, toward the end of the Libyan Civil War, anti-Gaddafi forces discovered two warehouses containing thousands of blue barrels marked with tape reading “radioactive” and plastic bags of yellow powder sealed with the same tape. The IAEA stated, “We can confirm that there is yellowcake stored in drums at a site near Sabha … which Libya previously declared to the IAEA. … The IAEA has tentatively scheduled safeguards activities at this location once the situation in the country stabilises.””

So maybe he didn’t actually give up his WMD as promised?

At any rate, the US lifted its sanctions against Libya in 2004 as promised. (U.S. Lifts Remaining Economic Sanctions Against Libya)

SEVEN years later, the Libyan people decided to overthrow the Gaddafi regime. When he responded by indiscriminately bombing their cities, NATO enacted various “no fly zones” in order to minimize the civilian casualties. This air support from NATO allowed Libya rebel forces to topple Gaddafi’s regime and eventually kill him.

Conclusion:

The failure of Western policy in Libya was not the decision to intervene to prevent a massacre in Benghazi and to help the Libyans with their only viable defence against Qaddafi, namely toppling the dictator. The failure was in not committing what would have been really quite limited resources mostly military and intelligence trainers and advisers to stabilising the aftermath. Indeed none other than President Obama appears to agree with this assessment.

“Had we not intervened, it’s likely that Libya would be Syria,” said the President. His close adviser Ben Rhodes echoed this sentiment. So Obama agrees that the intervention per se even with a messy outcome — was better than no intervention. In Libya, 72 civilians were killed accidentally in NATO’s entire campaign, less than one day’s work from Assad, and estimates of the military casualties are being revised down all the time. In Syria, 300,000 people and more are dead and the chaos has opened the way to worse actors. (That Obama has elsewhere said the idea that intervening earlier in Syria to support the moderates would have resulted in a better outcome was “horseshit,” can be safely put down the political necessity of never admitting a mistake.)

On the other half of this argument that more needed to be done in the aftermath Obama also agrees but says he “underestimated the need to come in full force if you’re going to do this.” Obama ran for office against the Iraq invasion in no small part highlighting the incompetence of the Bush administration’s reconstruction. The need for a post-war plan is the most salient lesson of the Iraq experience. It seems unlikely this came to Obama after 2011: the 2012 Election, where the President ran on his record of extricating the U.S. from the Middle East, Iraq most notably, serves as a much better explanation for why Obama would not commit to Libya in a way that could be interpreted as “boots on the ground”.

Ultimately, the lesson of Libya is one that keeps being shown from Afghanistan to Iraq to Bosnia: by refusing the small, early intervention when allies would be easier to enlist, the U.S. ends up intervening at much greater cost later, almost alone, and achieving a far less desirable outcome.

The way we remember Libya suggests that the way we talk about America’s role in the world has changed, and not for the better. Americans are probably more likely to consider the Libya intervention a failure because the US was at the forefront of the NATO operation. So any subsequent descent into conflict, presumably, says something about our failure, which is something we’d rather not think about.

Outside of the foreign policy community, politicians are usually criticized for what they do abroad, rather than what they don’t do. As former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates put it, “[Qaddafi] was not a threat to us anywhere. He was a threat to his own people, and that was about it.” If the US had decided against intervention, Libya would have likely reverted to some noxious combination of dictatorship and insurgency. But we could have shirked responsibility (a sort of inverse “pottery barn” principle if you didn’t break it, you don’t have to fix it). We could have claimed to have “done no harm,” even though harm, of course, would have been done.

It’s easy for some to suggest that Western interventionism is the problem here, and the world would be better off if the cries of the civilians Gaddafi slaughtered went ignored. That’s only an argument that can be made from outside the Oval Office, but it is one that has a broad political constituency. To claim that Libya is a “neo-con” failure, however, is a willful misrepresentation of neo-conservatism. Libya is a disaster today as a result not of Western engagement but withdrawal. The worst lesson from the Libyan debacle is: half-measures will almost always produce suboptimal results.

There was a time when the United States seemed to have a perpetual bias toward action. The instinct of leaders, more often than not, was to act militarily even in relatively small conflicts that were remote from American national security interests. Our country’s tragic experience in Iraq changed that. Inaction came to be seen as a virtue. And, to be sure, inaction is sometimes virtuous. Libya, though, was not one of those times.

#### Libya was not an ad hoc, unilateral NATO invasion. The world called for action.

Slate 18 [James Slate; Foreign Policy liberal; 1-16-2018; "Why America was right to Intervene in Libya, and what went wrong after"; Medium; https://jameslate.medium.com/why-america-was-right-to-intervene-in-libya-d31f87202c18; KL]

With the Arabian Revolt sweeping the Middle East in early 2011, Libya’s turn came on February 17. Throwing off decades of fear, and not bothering with peaceful demonstrations as Tunisia and Egypt had to free themselves of tyranny, nor the Syrians who tried peaceful demonstrations for six entire months, the Libyans went straight to armed rebellion, and soon the city of Benghazi had been pried from the regime’s grip and become the de facto capital of the revolution. The Libyans had no confidence in protests to alter the regime of Muammar el-Qaddafi. They were right. The demented Colonel responded with a brutality that included using fighter jetsagainst civilian areas. As the violence escalated, on March 17 the U.N. Security Council passed resolution 1973, which

Authorize[d] Member States …, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, … to take all necessary measures … to protect civilians.

### ! — NATO Good — AT: Interventions — Iraq

#### NATO said no and wasn’t involved.

Al Jazeera 4 [Al Jazeera; 11-20-2004; "Nato members turn down Iraq mission"; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2004/11/20/nato-members-turn-down-iraq-mission; KL]

But the refusal of France, Germany, Spain, Belgium, Greece and Luxembourg to let their officers assigned to Nato’s command centres in Mons, Belgium, and Norfolk, Virginia, be part of that effort underscores that serious differences persist.

“Some of the countries have said they’re not going to allow their officers stationed in those Nato commands who come under the Nato structure itself to serve in Iraq. A number of us have been surprised by that,” said a senior US official.

#### Wars are bad but there was no better solution. Hussein’s reign was horrific. The problem was the US withdrew too fast.

French 19 [David French; senior editor at The Dispatch; 3-20-2019; "In Defense of the Iraq War"; National Review; https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/iraq-war-just-cause-saddam-hussein-threat-stability/; KL]

Today is the 16th anniversary of the invasion of Iraq, and Twitter is alive with condemnations of the conflict — countered by precious few defenses. Yet I believed the Iraq War was just and proper in 2003, and I still believe that today. When Donald Trump condemned the war during the 2015 primary campaign and claimed that if Saddam was still in power we “wouldn’t have the problems you have right now,“ I believed he was dead wrong. As I argued then, from the moment Hussein took power until he was deposed in 2003, there were few greater instruments of instability in the world than Saddam Hussein.

Before he was allegedly “contained” by constant, substantial American military deployments, he invaded his neighbors, gassed his people, harbored and supported terrorists, and was responsible for not one but two of the largest conventional military conflicts since World War II — the horrific Iran–Iraq war and Operation Desert Storm. Even after American containment efforts attempted to lock into place and limit his malign reach, he was a prime supporter of a deadly Palestinian suicide-bombing campaign that caused proportionately more Israeli civilian casualties than American civilians lost on 9/11, he tried to assassinate an American president — George H. W. Bush — and he routinely fired on American pilots enforcing lawful no-fly zones. He violated the Gulf War cease-fire accords, interfered with weapons inspections, and hid away chemical weapons by the thousands. No, his WMD program wasn’t nearly as extensive as we thought, but it is fiction to believe his weapons were entirely gone. Americans were injured by Saddam’s chemicals during the war.

Moreover, it’s easy to forget that before Barack Obama’s terrible decision to withdraw in 2011, the Iraq War had been won. Saddam was gone, the follow-on insurgency had been wiped-out — reduced to a few hundred fighters scattered in a vast country — and American and Iraqi forces were masters of the battlefield. Joe Biden asserted that Americans would look at Iraq as “one of the great achievements of this administration.” But Obama withdrew too soon. He squandered American gains, opened the door to unrestrained factionalism, and left the fragile Iraqi nation vulnerable to renewed jihadist assault.

And lest we think that non-intervention can’t also carry a terrible price, we can’t forget the Ba’athist dictator we left alone, Hafez al-Assad. His nation was caught up in the unrest and ferment of the Arab Spring — a movement that began far from the Iraq War. His nation has since become a charnel house, and not only did it spark a refugee crisis that has helped destabilize Europe, but it became the battleground where the remnants of al Qaeda in Iraq were reborn as ISIS, a genocidal force that invaded a weakened Iraq from Syria, ignited yet another phase of the Iraq War, and inspired a renewed wave of terror in the Europe (and deadly attacks in the United States). Non-intervention does not always bring peace, and the consequences can include death on a mass scale.

While I believe the war against Saddam represented the best of a series of bad options, there is no question that our intervention in Iraq was marred by two very costly mistakes. I’ve already mentioned one — Obama’s premature withdrawal. The first mistake belongs to George W. Bush and his commanders. It’s by now quite clear that we invaded with insufficient force to properly secure the country and then compounded that error with early blunders after Saddam was deposed. We not only failed to secure vast quantities of munitions, we disbanded the Iraqi Army and then pursued seriously flawed counterinsurgency tactics before righting the ship during the Surge. Bush’s mistakes made the war more costly. Obama’s mistakes gave room for the ISIS offensive and necessitated renewed American involvement in Iraq. Both men eventually corrected their errors. Bush reinforced American forces as his commanders changed tactics, and Obama put boots back on the ground to help save Iraq from potential collapse.

More than 4,400 Americans died during Operation Iraqi Freedom, including men I served with and loved like brothers. They died in a just cause fighting enemies of this country — a regime and an insurgency that in different ways threatened vital American interests and actively sought to kill Americans and our allies. War is horrible, and the Iraq War is no exception to that rule. Civilian casualties were terrible and often intentionally inflicted by our enemies to destabilize the country and inflame sectarian divisions. But I truly believe the choice our nation faced was to fight Saddam then, on our terms, or later, when he had recovered more of his nation’s strength and lethality. The United States is safer with him gone. It’s just a terrible shame that for a time we chose to throw away a victory bought with the blood of brave men.

#### Iraq’s doing way better now. The solution to incorrect justifications is to conduct careful analysis, not to reject all action.

Simon 17 [David M. Simon, lawyer in Chicago; 6-2-2017; "Important Objective Measures Show That The Iraq War Was A Success"; Forbes; https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2017/06/02/important-objective-measures-show-that-the-iraq-war-was-a-success/?sh=2121db6481de; KL]

As we consider further military action in Syria and elsewhere in the Middle East, we cannot avoid assessing the Iraq War.

The Iraq War was controversial and polarizing. Our sharply divisive debate about it can impair objective analysis. Many label the Iraq War a failure. They are wrong.

The key question in assessing the Iraq War is what kind of Iraqi state did the war produce? We have objective measures used to judge states around the world to answer this question. What are the state’s relations with other states? Does it repress its population? Is it a dictatorship or a democracy? What are its levels of prosperity, life expectancy and infant mortality? By each of these measures, the Iraq War was a success because the resulting Iraqi state is vastly better.

Peace with other states

In 1980, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq attacked Iran. In 1990, it attacked Kuwait. In 1991, it attacked Saudi Arabia and Israel. Between 1993 and 2001, it attacked patrolling American aircraft. Since the war and the overthrow of Hussein in 2003, Iraq has not attacked another state.

No more systematic military repression of most of the population

Hussein used Iraq’s military to violently and systematically repress Iraq’s Kurds and Shia Arabs, even using chemical weapons against civilians. Kurds are about 16% of Iraq’s population and Shia Arabs are about 49%. The war ended the systematic military repression of this combined 65% of Iraq’s population.

The freest system of government in the Arab world

The war transformed Iraq from one of the world’s most repressive states into a state with the freest system of government in the Arab world. The war began in 2003. Since 2004, Iraq has had seven major elections: the 2004 National Assembly Election; the 2005 Constitutional Referendum; the 2005, 2010 and 2014 Parliamentary Elections; and the 2009 and 2013 Provincial Council elections. All have been judged free and fair by international monitors. These seven elections are more free and fair elections than the rest of the Arab world has ever had. More than 11 million voted in both the 2010 and 2014 Parliamentary Elections. In 2014, 27 political parties won seats. No other Arab state has been remotely as democratic, during this period or over any other decade.

Higher income and life expectancy, and lower infant mortality

The other important objective measures used to assess states around the world show that life has improved for Iraqi citizens. More Iraqis are alive today than before the war.

World Bank data show that in 2002, the last year before the war, Iraq’s population was 24.94 million. In 2015, it was 36.42 million.

Iraqis are living longer. World Bank data show that in 2002, average life expectancy in Iraq was 68.94 years. By 2015, it was 69.59 years. The data show similar increases in life expectancy for both men and women.

Infant mortality has declined in Iraq. World Bank data show that in 2002, the infant mortality rate per 1,000 births was 34.6. By 2015, it was 26.5.

Iraqis are much more prosperous. CIA World Factbook data show that in 2002, per capita GDP, measured in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, was $2,400. By 2013, the last year of this PPP data series, it was $7,100. (Tradingeconomics.com data show a modest 3.4% decline since 2013.)

None of this excuses the intelligence failure about weapons of mass destruction. None of this suggests that the we should not use the most careful analysis before deciding whether to risk significant amounts of blood and treasure and invade or take other militarily action. None of this suggests that Iraq is an easy place to live. Iraq’s political and civic institutions need to take big steps to reach Western standards. Relations between Shia Arabs, Sunni Arabs and Kurds need significant improvement. Iraq must defeat the remaining Islamic State forces in the country and prevent other groups from committing similar violence. Iranian influence in Iraq is undesirable and unhelpful.

Decisions concerning military action in the Middle East are difficult and complex. In making these decisions, we should recognize that by important objective measures, the Iraq War was a success – a victory for America that resulted in a much better Iraq.

### ! — NATO Good — AT: Interventions — Afghanistan

#### NATO wasn’t eager to intervene; the UN got them involved.

Moller 22 [Sara Bjerg Moller, an assistant professor at Seton Hall University’s School of Diplomacy and International Relations; 9-5-2021; "Five Myths About NATO and Afghanistan"; Lawfare; https://www.lawfareblog.com/five-myths-about-nato-and-afghanistan; KL]

An additional concern arose over the precedent invoking Article V could set if U.S. authorities subsequently determined that the attack had originated from within the U.S. homeland and not from abroad. The Bush administration feared that the United States could then be asked to intervene against domestic terrorist attacks in NATO treaty states in the future. The Canadian chief of defense, who by happenstance found himself in the room when NATO ambassadors began debating whether or not to invoke Article V on Sept. 12, recalls the Americans “wanting to be absolutely sure that it was an attack from outside the U.S.[,]” and not a domestic terrorist act like the Oklahoma City bombing, before NATO authorized any follow-on action. After confirming that the attacks originated outside the United States, it then took “substantial work” on the part of U.S. Ambassador to NATO Nicholas Burns to convince other Bush administration officials that having the NATO alliance formally invoke the mutual defense clause was important. Consequently, it was not until Oct. 4, 2001, that the North Atlantic Council formally invoked Article V, paving the way for NATO allies to send Airborne Early Warning and Control Force aircraft (AWACs) to patrol U.S. skies and offer other assistance, such as intelligence sharing, to Washington.

Although some NATO allies, including Canada, Britain and Germany, chose early on to contribute special operations forces (SOF) and, later, other military assets to the U.S. combat mission in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom, which lasted from 2001 to 2014), they did so independent of NATO headquarters and command structures.

Nor did NATO play any part in the creation of the International Security Assistance Force, despite subsequently going on to lead it for more than a decade. When the security assistance force was announced at the Bonn Conference in December 2001, it was done so under the auspices of the U.N. Security Council, not the alliance. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1386 officially mandated ISAF to “assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas.” Responsibility for overseeing the original 5,000-person multinational force for the first six months was assigned to the United Kingdom. Thereafter, ISAF’s command rotated to a new lead nation every six months, first to Turkey (July 2002-January 2003) and then Germany (January 2003-August 2003).

By fall 2002, however, it was becoming increasingly clear to nations contributing forces to ISAF that the security force would benefit from having NATO’s military headquarters in Mons, Belgium, assume responsibility for the force generation process needed to sustain the Kabul-based operation. The difficulties ISAF’s lead countries experienced sourcing personnel to sustain the Kabul force, coupled with the Pentagon’s waning attention toward Afghanistan as it prepared to invade Iraq in spring 2003, led Washington and its NATO allies to conclude that the time had come for the alliance to take charge of ISAF. Accordingly, on Aug. 11, 2003, NATO assumed command of ISAF, marking the alliance’s official entree into Afghanistan.

Yet while NATO would remain in charge of ISAF until the security force was eventually stood down at the end of 2014, ISAF remained a NATO-led (as opposed to a purely NATO) force, owing to the large number of non-NATO countries—including Australia, Georgia, Jordan and the Republic of Korea, each operating under its own rules of engagement—that contributed personnel to the mission. Following the conclusion of ISAF’s operations in Afghanistan in December 2014, NATO stood up a new mission, Resolute Support, focused on building Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) sustainability. But, like its predecessor, Resolute Support was a NATO-led mission, comprising both NATO allies as well as non-NATO countries, and not an Article V collective defense mission by the alliance.

#### The Afghanistan intervention was good.

Byman and Wittes 22 [Daniel Byman, foreign policy editor of Lawfare. He is a senior fellow at the Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, where he focuses on counterterrorism and Middle East security. He is also a professor at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service; Benjamin Wittes, editor in chief of Lawfare and a Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution; 7-6-2022; "Remembering the Gains of the Afghanistan War"; Lawfare; https://www.lawfareblog.com/remembering-gains-afghanistan-war; KL]

The end of a war is a time to reflect. So is a milestone anniversary like the 20th anniversary of Sept. 11. Now, in September 2021, the two are bound up together—the end of the U.S. war in Afghanistan, not coincidentally, taking place in close proximity to the milestone anniversary.

For Lawfare, the two events are also intimately tied to the history of the site itself. Lawfare surely wouldn’t exist but for the Sept. 11 attacks and the war in Afghanistan. The early years of the site were far more concerned with issues arising out of that conflict than they were with cybersecurity, disinformation, authoritarian populism and the other issues that predominate on the site these days.

It is probably not possible to over-reflect on the withdrawal and the anniversary. But it is possible to draw the wrong conclusions from reflections on what went wrong in the Afghanistan war—which ended, as it began, with the Taliban in control of the country. And with Afghanistan today facially seeming like Afghanistan as it was on Sept. 11, it is possible to reflect one’s way to the conclusions that the invasion of Afghanistan was a mistake, that it accomplished nothing and that Americans died in vain. It is possible to conclude that any gains were ephemeral, that only the civilian casualties and the policy blunders had lasting consequences, that 20 years of keeping the Taliban at bay was worth nothing and that the destruction of al-Qaeda’s base of operations was all an exercise in squandered blood and treasure.

A great many sober, serious people have embraced these gloomy conclusions—in some cases selectively, in many cases as a morose, defeatist package. The instinct to evaluate the war in binary terms is understandable. People tend to think of wars as won or lost. And watching the chaotic evacuation from Kabul, it certainly didn’t look like a win. It didn’t even look like a stalemate. It looked like a rout.

The final scorecard looks bad too. The vicious gambler played by George C. Scott scoffs at the young pool shark played by Paul Newman in the movie “The Hustler,” for suggesting he had been way ahead in a game against the world’s best player before losing it all. “This game isn't like football. Nobody pays you for yardage,” the gambler says. “When you hustle you keep score real simple. The end of the game you count up your money. That’s how you find out who’s best. That’s the only way.” By this standard, certainly, the Taliban bested us. U.S. forces smashed them for years, but at the end of the game, they have Afghanistan—and the government the United States supported evaporated just like Paul Newman’s early lead.

Yet there is more to be said on behalf of America’s two-decade-long effort in Afghanistan than these crude analyses allow. We certainly don’t mean to suggest that the war was a complete success. It was not. Many Americans lost their lives fighting there (and far more Afghans died), and the United States spent trillions in a vain effort to build the Afghan state. Yet here it’s not just the end point that matters but the nature of the curve that led to that endpoint. And there’s a great deal of area under the curve of the Afghanistan war, area one shouldn’t throw away lightly.

The truth is that the war actually accomplished a good deal—even if its most ambitious objectives remained ever-elusive. Far from a mistake, the invasion of Afghanistan to topple the first Taliban regime was a necessity in the post-Sept. 11 environment. Indeed, it’s hard to imagine a successful counterterrorism campaign in the years that followed Sept. 11 without it. It played a decisive role in dismantling what had become a major and persistent threat to American lives. It provided for a long period of imperfect but nonmurderous government for many Afghans, particularly urban, minority and female Afghans. And it helped to facilitate a long period in which successful foreign-based terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland simply did not happen.

Whether one regards the war ultimately as a success or a failure, it is important to tally its costs and benefits accurately. As people currently seem to be tallying only its costs, we offer this post to remind people of the complexity of assessing the Afghanistan war.

The Afghanistan Sanctuary

With two decades of water under the bridge, people often treat the Sept. 11 attacks as a bolt out of the blue to which the country responded by reorganizing and militarizing its entire foreign policy and domestic politics. There’s some truth in this story, but lost in it is just how active and menacing al-Qaeda had become in the years leading up to Sept. 11. Jihadists with ties to Afghanistan had bombed the World Trade Center in 1993, killing six people and injuring over 1,000. In 1996, al-Qaeda moved to Afghanistan and, in 1998, attacked two U.S. embassies in East Africa—killing hundreds and wounding thousands. Two years later, it pulled off a bombing of a U.S. warship, the USS Cole. Sept. 11 was really a culmination of a mounting and increasingly deadly terrorism campaign that no reasonable government would have continued to tolerate.

It was a campaign run chiefly from Afghanistan, and it was possible because the Taliban allowed al-Qaeda a haven from which it could build a mini-army and launch attack after attack on its enemies.

So while the 20-year military intervention in Afghanistan may have been a mistake, it was important, indeed essential, that the United States remove the Taliban from power in 2001 and destroy al-Qaeda bases in Afghanistan and Pakistan in the years that followed.

Indeed, Afghanistan became an important base for al-Qaeda well before Sept. 11, and high-profile terrorist attacks were only one element of the danger posed as a result. As long as al-Qaeda enjoyed a base in Afghanistan, it could convene planning sessions and generate new plots: The United States was always playing defense.

To get a sense of how important Afghanistan, and nearby facilities in Pakistan, were to al-Qaeda, and the many facets that the Afghanistan base played in al-Qaeda’s overall operations and successes, it’s useful to examine the Sept. 11 plot in more detail:

Plotting began in earnest in late 1998 or early 1999, more than two years before the attack occurred. The plot’s mastermind, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, met with al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan to pitch his novel idea for an attack. He received approval, and, crucially from his point of view, gained the money and recruits that bin Laden had available. These leaders and others enjoyed a sanctuary in Afghanistan to oversee the operation with little interference. From there, they could confer with one another, communicate with operatives, and otherwise organize a broad movement even as they launched individual attacks.

The cell leader, Mohammed Atta, had originally sought to fight in Chechnya, and he ended up going to Afghanistan to train, along with three friends who also went on to play important roles in the plot. Once he arrived in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda leaders spotted Atta’s leadership abilities, discipline and fluency in English, redirecting him to the Sept. 11 operation. As Atta’s experience suggests, in Afghanistan al-Qaeda was able to screen and vet would-be members, choosing the most committed and skilled to join its own ranks while enabling others to become more capable.

Indoctrination and control were important parts of what made the camps so dangerous. Al-Qaeda was able to knit together a disparate array of groups and causes—anti-Israel, anti-Egypt, anti-Russia, pro-Taliban and so on—and make them a more unified movement. This was a tremendous achievement for a movement that often fought (and would fight) more within its ranks than against outsiders. In addition, it could take committed activists like Atta and redirect them against the leadership’s preferred targets.

Al-Qaeda leaders later selected other plot members, the so-called muscle, primarily from Saudi volunteers who had come to Afghanistan to join the jihad.

The hijackers were not alone: Other jihadists, between 10,000 and 20,000, according to CIA estimates, received a wide array of training in Afghanistan. Most volunteers learned basic weapons skills and had a boot-camp-like experience to weed out the uncommitted, enabling them to become more effective insurgents in various struggles around the Muslim world. These al-Qaeda recruits would also help the Taliban in its campaign to conquer all of Afghanistan. Indeed, during the invasion after Sept. 11, U.S. soldiers found that the Arab jihadists, not the Taliban, were the most ferocious and skilled fighters. A select few went to camps that offered more advanced training, such as counterintelligence, bomb-making and other skills useful for terrorism. The muscle hijackers, for example, received the basic training to determine their fitness and dedication and then received more advanced training on how to hijack airplanes, disarm air marshals and use explosives.

The training camps and Afghan experience proved instrumental for insurgencies around the Muslim world. Figures like Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who later founded al-Qaeda in Iraq, the forerunner of ISIS, went to Afghanistan in the late 1990s and ran a training camp there.

Taken together, these factors made the pre-Sept. 11 haven in Afghanistan devastatingly dangerous. Al-Qaeda could knit together a divided and far-flung movement, train operatives to a lethal degree of proficiency, and plan elaborate operations with little interference.

The Taliban sheltered al-Qaeda. Although the Taliban did not approve of al-Qaeda’s terrorism operations against the West, it did not stop them either. Nor would the Taliban surrender bin Laden or other terrorists, doubting the veracity of U.S. charges and being unwilling to lose face with Taliban members and supporters by handing over to the infidels a man they considered a good Muslim. Even today, Taliban officials deny bin Laden’s responsibility for Sept. 11.

The U.S. invasion quickly toppled the Taliban and proved devastating for al-Qaeda. Some of those captured included leaders or others in the movement who revealed ongoing plots, such as a plot to conduct multiple terrorist attacks in Israel that was well along in its planning. The movement lost its archipelago of training camps and with it the ability to provide a wide array of training to thousands of recruits. Nor could it indoctrinate as effectively, although advances in information technology would pose new challenges. The movement also lost much of its cadre fighting the U.S. invasion. Its leaders who survived found themselves under constant pressure. Finally, the apparent overthrow of the Taliban, which many jihadists deemed the one true Islamic government, made many jihadists question the wisdom of al-Qaeda’s strategy.

Post-Sept. 11 Operations

Despite these many advances, al-Qaeda’s terrorism threat didn’t end with the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001 and the establishment of a new government in Afghanistan. Key leaders, including bin Laden, dispersed to Pakistan, and from there, they directed numerous operations against the West and in the broader Middle East. Many of these involved individuals who were recruited and trained before Sept. 11, but the plans and operations continued in its aftermath with direction from Pakistan. Notable attacks and plots included the 2002 Bali bombing and 2004 Madrid and 2005 London transportation bombings, which killed 202, 193 and 52 people, respectively. Bin Laden financed the Bali bombing, and terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman noted in 2007 that “almost all major incidents” in Europe had ties to al-Qaeda, with key operatives being trained or based in Pakistan. In 2006, security officials disrupted a plan to smuggle liquid explosives aboard airplanes flying from Europe to the United States and Canada and detonate them midair, which would have killed around 1,500 people according to prosecutors—a plot that also had many of its origins in Pakistan.

Although the Pakistani government arrested many important al-Qaeda leaders, including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Afghanistan proved an important base for the U.S. in going after the al-Qaeda haven in remote parts of Pakistan, removing senior figures that Pakistan could not, or would not, take out. The United States conducted numerous strikes on al-Qaeda in the remote Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) along Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan. According to analyses from the New America Foundation, the first drone strike in Pakistan was conducted in 2004, and the dozens that occurred during the Bush administration would grow to hundreds under President Obama, peaking in 2010 before declining rapidly as the decade went on. The United States killed almost 100 leaders, as well as numerous lower-level cadre.

Many of these strikes were launched from bases in Afghanistan. To do persistent surveillance and regular strikes, as was being done a decade ago, bases in Afghanistan close to the FATA proved essential. In addition, the most famous counterterrorism operation in U.S. history, the killing of bin Laden, also depended on access to Afghanistan, the base from which operatives launched their cross-border operation.

Over time, the strikes hollowed out al-Qaeda. As New America’s David Sterman contends, “[T]hese drone strikes have knocked out the ability of Al Qaeda to plot from Pakistan.” In addition to the death of experienced commanders, if its leaders communicated in real time by phone or by using the internet, they risked being located and killed. Forced into hiding, the core was no longer able to orchestrate attacks in the West. And although the drone strikes caused significant civilian casualties, an analysis by Aqil Shah found that—contrary to common mythology—they did not increase terrorist recruitment.

In other words, Afghanistan was essential to al-Qaeda in the years before Sept. 11, and depriving al-Qaeda of the use of it was, consequently, a post-Sept. 11 necessity. Less well understood, Afghanistan became an important base of operations for ongoing U.S. counterterrorism activity in the decades that followed, particularly in the critical period in which U.S. forces were able to reduce the once-menacing organization to a husk of itself. These are both major successes of the Afghanistan operation. Few people imagined in the period immediately after Sept. 11 that the United States would go two decades without a second major homeland attack emanating from abroad. That accomplishment simply cannot be separated from the decision to go into Afghanistan and stay there a good long while. Whether it can be sustained in the absence of U.S. forces on the ground there remains to be seen.

The Edifice of American Counterterrorism

There’s a legal aspect to this point as well: The entire legal edifice of post-Sept. 11 U.S. counterterrorism policy was bound up with the war in Afghanistan. That is, because the enemy was in Afghanistan, U.S. administrations needed a legal framework that allowed U.S. forces to operate in Afghanistan. Because suspects were not reachable by traditional law enforcement means, the Bush, Obama and Trump administrations required an operating framework that engaged military authorities. That framework was the war in Afghanistan. And it’s a bit difficult to imagine, even in retrospect, what that framework might have looked like without the war.

It is, to be sure, perverse to suggest that the Afghanistan war was necessary so that the United States could have the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) and the rules and authorities that flowed from it. Laws authorize wars, after all, not the other way around. It is also not quite accurate. The AUMF did not, after all, require the invasion of Afghanistan; it merely authorized it. The statute’s broad operative language, which does not mention Afghanistan and operated worldwide, could have supported—and did, in fact, support—other military activity, or it could have supported no military activity at all, as some AUMFs historically have done. Yet it is safe to say that the AUMF, passed in the immediate wake of Sept. 11 with policymakers eyeing the Afghan sanctuary, presumed that the coming military action would take place in Afghanistan. It seems unlikely it would have been passed had the Bush administration not envisioned an attack on that country imminently on its passage.

So try to imagine, for a moment, that the Bush administration had not headed in that direction—as so many analysts, with the hindsight of two decades, now think would have been wiser. What would the combined strategic and legal framework for counterterrorism have looked like?

One possibility is that it might have looked very much as it did. Congress might have passed an AUMF like the one it did, in fact, pass; it just would have been used more sparingly, less ambitiously—for the occasional spree of air strikes, or special operations forces raids. American forces still would have the statutory authority to do all the things they did that were so effective in counterterrorism. They just would have done them without a long-term presence in Afghanistan. But this scenario raises a significant obstacle to the lethal force and detention aspects of post-Sept. 11 counterterrorism operations. Without the bona fide armed conflict in Afghanistan and elsewhere, the American invocation of law of armed conflict authorities would have depended (as they now, in fact, depend) solely on the claim that episodic violent engagements between the United States and al-Qaeda suffice to create a real armed conflict. That has always been a hotly disputed claim, even in the U.S. court system. So the no-invasion scenario would have made it significantly harder, in practice, to legally justify detention, military commissions and possibly even air strikes.

But there’s another possibility too. The rejection of “forever war” in Afghanistan is not, after all, an argument for more limited forever wars. It is an argument against protracted military commitments at all. If we project that Congress and the Bush administration in 2001 shared that skepticism, so in vogue today, we are left with the probability that there would have been no reason for them to pass a broad AUMF in the first place. If America was not going to invade Afghanistan to deal with the entrenched al-Qaeda presence there, it probably wouldn’t have bothered to deal with lesser presences such as jihadists in Somalia, Yemen or other countries. It therefore would have needed the legal architecture policymakers put in place—on either the military or covert sides of the ledger.

So one possibility when analysts retrospectively reject the war in Afghanistan is that they are actually proposing to throw out a large portion of the legal edifice of post-Sept. 11 counterterrorism policy. That has implications well beyond Afghanistan itself. Under the AUMF, remember, the United States conducted drone strikes in Yemen, crushed ISIS, and killed hundreds of al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan. It detained operatives around the world. It’s fair to ask those who casually now assert that the war was a mistake: Is the rejection of the war in Afghanistan a rejection of that entire military approach to counterterrorism, or is it merely a rejection of that approach coupled with an invasion and long-term presence in Afghanistan? The answer to this question is surely different from analyst to analyst. But those who mean the former should answer the question of what combined strategic-legal approach they imagine the Bush administration should have adopted in the war’s place. And those who mean the latter would do well to specify what kind of conflict they imagine having taken place in the absence of the underlying war in Afghanistan.

We are not suggesting there are no possible answers to these questions. One might imagine a more purely law-enforcement-based post-Sept. 11 response with limited uses of force under, say, a narrower AUMF. One could also imagine a legal approach similar to the one the U.S. took, only used less aggressively—or with a briefer stay in Afghanistan. Moreover, as is true today, alternatives to basing and access in Afghanistan did exist. The United States has launched drone attacks from bases in Pakistan in the past, but as relations soured the United States was expelled from these bases. As the United States left Kabul, it launched a drone strike from the United Arab Emirates against the ISIS branch in Afghanistan.

But these questions do require answers. It will not do to pocket the gains of the Afghanistan war as though they were given and tally only the costs. Giving up the war means giving up the gains as well.

And those gains were not all military, and they are not all counted in enemy fighters captured or killed. It has become an empty talking point to mention that millions of Afghan girls attended school after the Taliban’s ouster, and thousands of women went on to university and to jobs outside the home, that religious minorities like the Shiite Hazara population enjoyed greater rights, and that soccer stadiums were not used for public executions. It is certainly true that human rights gains in Afghanistan, however real, were not the purpose of the mission—and that they cannot ultimately be the metric by which the mission gets evaluated. Yet if one is counting the yardage of gains and loss, these human rights improvements are not negligible either. Such collateral improvements to the human rights and lives of millions of people are no more to be ignored than the collateral damage to individuals in errant military operations. It is simply a fact that over 20 years, the United States made itself safer by improving life for millions of Afghans.

### ! — NATO Good — AT: Middle East

#### No Middle East war or escalation.

Glaser ’17 — John; associate director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, Master of Arts in International Security at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University July 18, 2017; "Withdrawing from Overseas Bases: Why a Forward-Deployed Military Posture Is Unnecessary, Outdated, and Dangerous”; *Cato Institute*; <https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/withdrawing-overseas-bases-why-forward-deployed-military-posture>; //CYang

Regionally, the circumstances are similarly advantageous. According to Rovner, “the chance that a regional hegemon will emerge in the Persian Gulf during the next twenty years is slim to none. This is true even if the United States withdraws completely.” 134 There are only three potential major powers in the region: Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. None of them possesses the capabilities necessary to conquer neighboring territories or gain a controlling influence over Persian Gulf oil resources. In addition to being too weak to make a bid for regional dominance, all three are bogged down and distracted by internal problems. Overall, the region is in a state of defense dominance: the major states are too weak to project power beyond their borders, but they do have the capability to deter their neighbors. Deterrence works well in this environment because the costs of offensive action remain prohibitively high. 135 Some scholars argue that the decreased importance of Persian Gulf oil means the United States should completely phase out its military commitment to the region during the next 10 years. 136 But even if Washington rejects that position and continues to factor in military intervention to deal with supply disruptions and other contingencies, maintaining a peacetime military presence in the region is not necessary. The United States can rely on carrier-based airpower and long-range bombers if military intervention in a crisis becomes necessary. 137

### Alt — T/L

#### The alt can’t solve states going to war.

**Isacoff ’15** [Jonathan; 2015; Associate Professor of Political Science and the Chair of Environmental Studies at Gonzaga University; *Why IR Needs Deweyan Pragmatism*, “Perspectives on Political Science,” p. 26-33; GR]

I mean that what IR is or is not is not nearly as important as what it achieves. So the question should not be whether IR is scientific, but rather, how scientific does it need to be to get the job done? To this, there are many answers, but I suggest a line of reasoning: the scientific method in the most general sense is useful in helping to explain how and why, all else equal, causal processes work. Put differently, if we want to know how and why some states go to war and others do not, it would be more useful—in the sense of getting logically coherent, empirically verifiable answers—to analyze historical cases systematically than it would be to consult with a shaman or use a crystal ball to obtain an answer. This is not say that there is not an important role for textual interpretation in the process of studying war and other international phenomena. Indeed, I elsewhere argue that interpretation of historical texts is crucial to making valid claims about wars.47 But the main point here is that interpretation is a means toward an end, namely, the process of coping with the world via human experience. Toward that end, interpretation is necessary and useful, but it is not the end itself.

A second point is that there is clearly a pragmatic and justifiable need for certain types of quantitative methods, namely, statistics, though not necessarily formal models, in some segments of IR. Taking a simple example for illustrative purposes, if one wished to study the effect of speed limits on motor vehicle fatalities, the use of aggregate data statistically analyzed would be far superior to standing on the corner waiting for an accident to observe or reading several diary accounts of individual accidents. The key point here, however, is not that statistical methods are inherently better, or more “rigorous” than any other type of method. Rather, the use of statistically analyzed data to find answers to problems of highway fatalities creates knowledge that if properly applied, would alleviate “concrete human woes,” which is to say it would help to save lives. That is pragmatic political science.

48 What Is a Problem?

Many political scientists believe in the idea of having a “problem orientation” for the field. For example, Atul Kohli asserts that there is a strong consensus among leading experts “that comparative politics is very much a problem-driven field of study.” “What motivates the best comparative politics research are puzzles of real-world significance,” writes Kohli, in “The Role of Theory in Comparative Politics: A Symposium.”49 Similarly, Ian Shapiro, responding to the question of what would be a better alternative than RCT asks the question: “What is the phenomenon to be explained?… The formulation of alternative explanations, in other words, should be a problem-driven activity.”50 This is clearly consistent with Deweyan pragmatism; in fact, it is inherently pragmatist. “A Deweyan pragmatic approach to political inquiry,” writes Maurice Meilleur, “would transform political science from a discipline, based on a set of methods, into a profession, based on a set of problems.”51 But what, more specifically, is a “problem orientation?” First, it is clear that Kohli and his colleagues mean an empirically driven problem orientation. That is, the study of politics should be driven by empirical, not theoretical, or methodological problems. Careful not to push this point too far, a Deweyan pragmatist would suggest that theorization is an important activity, but it must not lose its link to problems of human experience, which is to say empirical problems. However, Kohli and others advocating an empirically driven problem orientation have little to say about how to identify and value problems. After all, there is a limitless supply of political problems only a fraction of which can be studied.

In response, I would argue that some problems are more significant to the detection and response to human suffering and thus more deserving of study, than others. This is itself a tricky ethical problem, for who is to say what is or is not a “real problem?” One reader of this manuscript suggested that “What is really going on here, when one scratches the analytical surface, is not that IR theorists aren't discussing problems; it's that they are discussing problems that the author does not feel are worthy of attention. But why should we accept that the author's “problems” are more important or privileged? Why does the author get to decide what a “real” problem is?” This is a good question but it is a misreading of the argument. Nowhere does Dewey or this author imply that any individual could or should decide or dictate which problems matter and which do not. To the contrary, the question of “who decides” is a public deliberation problem, a subject Dewey addressed exhaustively in his classic The Public and Its Problems.52 According to Dewey, problems are the direct outcome of a public's determination of its common good. A full analysis of how this works, or in some cases, fails to work in practice is beyond the scope of this article. But it is important to note that there is no argument here for the privileging of one private individual's notion of what constitutions “real problem” versus that of another. That is for the public to decide.

Human Woe and Issues That Matter

The final point to be made about reconstruction stems directly from the previous discussion: some problems matter more than others with regard to the alleviation of concrete human suffering. Which issues matter the most in our world? Ultimately, per Dewey's political philosophy touched on above, that is for the public to decide. Assuming that there ever could be a “common good,” we can hypothesize that people might choose to focus on issues that affect them daily, issues such as climate change, poverty, health care, education, racism, and sexism, as well as war and peace, all issues that are of grave importance to humanity. IR, especially in its American form, with its disproportionate emphasis on global security and great power war, has given scant attention to too many other issues, and when attention is given to the “lesser” topics, they are relegated to sub-sub-specializations within the discipline, “Gender and IR,” for instance. More problematic from the standpoint of pragmatism, the approach-driven wing of the discipline is more concerned with which paradigm has scored more points in the epic contest for paradigmatic supremacy than with the matter of how the world could or should respond to climate change or why hundreds of million of children lack basic nutrition and medical care. The interpretivist/linguistic wing, in contrast, is more concerned with how texts are interpreted in graduate seminars than with the fact that children in inner cities cannot even read a text at all.

53 Many IR scholars are still fighting over whether and to what extent “unit-level variables” should be taken into consideration in understanding international politics (and if so, whether one might still rightly be accepted in the club of realism).54 Others are trying to demonstrate that IR constructivism is really “liberalism in disguise.”55 This is not a stab at “why realism is (yet again) wrong.” It is a critique of the self-definitionally obsessed, paradigm-driven culture of academic IR. I would not go so far as to claim that there are no scholars who study everyday politics; many clearly do.56 Rather, the problem is that that the incentive structure to contribute to the “big debates” of the discipline, namely, those at the paradigmatic level, is a project that drifts ever afar from the problems of “concrete human woe” that affect the other millions of people who happen not to have graduate degrees in IR.

### Alt — AT: Material

#### Armed opposition to the state fails.

**DeBoer ’16** [Fredrik; March 15th; Ph.D. from Purdue University; Fredrikdeboer, “c’mon, guys,” http://fredrikdeboer.com/2016/03/15/cmon-guys/; GR]

I could be wrong about the short-term dangers, and the stakes are incredibly high. But in the end we’re left with the same old question: what tactics will actually work to secure a better world?

In a sharp, sober piece about the meaning of left-wing political violence in the 1970s, Tim Barker writes “If you can’t acknowledge radical violence, radicals are reduced to mere victims of repression, rather than political actors who made definite tactical choices under given political circumstances.” The problem, as Barker goes on to imply, is those tactical choices: in today’s America they will essentially never break on the side of armed opposition against the state. The government knows everything about you, I’m sorry to say, your movements and your associations and the books you read and the things you buy and what you’re saying to the people you communicate with. That’s simply on the level of information before we even get to the state’s incredible capacity to inflict violence.

Look, the world has changed. The relative military capacity of regular people compared to establishment governments has changed, especially in fully developed, technology-enabled countries like the United States. The Czar had his armies, yes, but the Czar’s armies depended on manpower above and beyond everything else. The fighting was still mostly different groups of people with rifles shooting at each other. If tomorrow you could rally as many people as the Bolsheviks had at their revolutionary peak, you’re still left in a world of F-15s, drones, and cluster bombs. And that’s to say nothing of the fact that establishment governments in the developed world can rely on the numbing agents of capitalist luxuries and the American dream to damper revolutionary enthusiasm even among the many millions who have been marginalized and impoverished. This just isn’t 1950s Cuba, guys. It’s just not. In a very real way, modern technology effectively lowers the odds of armed political revolution in a country like the United States to zero, and so much the worse for us.

This isn’t fatalism. It doesn’t mean there’s no hope. It means that there is little alternative to organization, to changing minds through committed political action and using the available nonviolent means to create change: a concert of grassroots organizing, labor tactics, and partisan politics. Those things aren’t exactly likely to work, either, but they’re a hell of a lot more plausible than us dweebs taking the Pentagon. Bernie Sanders isn’t really a socialist, but he’s a social democrat that moves the conversation to the left, and if people are dedicated and committed to organizing, the local, state, and national candidates he inspires will move it further to the left still. You got any better suggestions?

Listen, commie nerds. My people. I love you guys. I really do. And I want to build a better world. Not incrementally, either, but with the kind of sweeping and transformative change that is required to fix a world of such deep injustice. But seriously: none of us are ever going to take to the barricades. And it’s a good thing, too, because we’d probably find a way to shoot in the wrong direction. I can’t dribble a basketball without falling down. American socialism is largely made up of bookish dreamers. I love those people but they’re not for fighting. And even if you have a particular talent for combat, you’re looking at fighting the combined forces of Google, Goldman Sachs, and the defense industry. Violence is hard. Soldiering is hard. In an era of the NSA and military robots, it’s really, really hard. “Should we condone revolutionary violence?” is dorm room, pass-the-bong conversation fodder, of precisely the moral and intellectual weight of “should we torture a guy if we know there’s a bomb and we know he knows where it is and we know we can stop it if we do?” It’s built on absurd hypotheticals, propped up by the power of anxious machismo, and undertaken to no practical political end. It’s understandable. I get it, I really do. But it’s got nothing to do with us. The only way forward is the grubby, unsexy work of building coalitions and asking people to climb on board.

#### The military obliterates the alt.

**Flaherty ’5** [Kevin; 2005; B.A. in International Relations from the University of South California; Cryptogon, “Militant Electronic Piracy:  
Non-Violent Insurgency Tactics Against the American Corporate State,” <http://cryptogon.com/docs/pirate_insurgency.html/>; GR]

Any violent insurgency against the American Corporate State is sure to fail and will only serve to enhance the state's power. The major flaw of violent insurgencies, both cell based (Weathermen Underground, Black Panthers, Aryan Nations etc.) and leaderless (Earth Liberation Front, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, etc.) is that they are attempting to attack the system using the same tactics the American Corporate State has already mastered: terror and psychological operations. The American Corporate State attained primacy through the effective application of terror and psychological operations. Therefore, it has far more skill and experience in the use of these tactics than any upstart could ever hope to attain. This makes the American Corporate State impervious to traditional insurgency tactics.

- Political Activism and the ACS Counterinsurgency Apparatus

The American Corporate State employs a full-time counterinsurgency infrastructure with resources that are unimaginable to most would be insurgents. Quite simply, violent insurgents have no idea of just how powerful the foe actually is. Violent insurgents typically start out as peaceful, idealistic, political activists. Whether or not political activists know it, even with very mundane levels of political activity, they are engaging in low intensity conflict with the ACS.

The U.S. military classifies political activism as “low intensity conflict.” The scale of warfare (in terms of intensity) begins with individuals distributing anti-government handbills and public gatherings with anti-government/anti-corporate themes. In the middle of the conflict intensity scale are what the military refers to as Operations Other than War; an example would be the situation the U.S. is facing in Iraq. At the upper right hand side of the graph is global thermonuclear war. What is important to remember is that the military is concerned with ALL points along this scale because they represent different types of threats to the ACS.

Making distinctions between civilian law enforcement and military forces, and foreign and domestic intelligence services is no longer necessary. After September 11, 2001, all national security assets would be brought to bear against any U.S. insurgency movement. Additionally, the U.S. military established NORTHCOM which designated the U.S. as an active military operational area. Crimes involving the loss of corporate profits will increasingly be treated as acts of terrorism and could garner anything from a local law enforcement response to activation of regular military forces.

Most of what is commonly referred to as “political activism” is viewed by the corporate state's counterinsurgency apparatus as a useful and necessary component of political control.

Letters-to-the-editor...

Calls-to-elected-representatives...

Waving banners...

“Third” party political activities...

Taking beatings, rubber bullets and tear gas from riot police in free speech zones...

Political activism amounts to an utterly useless waste of time, in terms of tangible power, which is all the ACS understands. Political activism is a cruel guise that is sold to people who are dissatisfied, but who have no concept of the nature of tangible power. Counterinsurgency teams routinely monitor these activities, attend the meetings, join the groups and take on leadership roles in the organizations.

It's only a matter of time before some individuals determine that political activism is a honeypot that accomplishes nothing and wastes their time. The corporate state knows that some small percentage of the peaceful, idealistic, political activists will eventually figure out the game. At this point, the clued-in activists will probably do one of two things; drop out or move to escalate the struggle in other ways.

If the clued-in activist drops his or her political activities, the ACS wins.

But what if the clued-in activist refuses to give up the struggle? Feeling powerless, desperation could set in and these individuals might become increasingly radicalized. Because the corporate state's counterinsurgency operatives have infiltrated most political activism groups, the radicalized members will be easily identified, monitored and eventually compromised/turned, arrested or executed. The ACS wins again.

### Alt — AT: NATO Withdrawal

#### Even given the best-case scenario for NATO withdrawal, the alternative greenlights Russian aggression.

Meijer and Brooks 21 [Hugo Meijer, CNRS Research Fellow at Sciences Po, Center for International Studies, and the director of the European Initiative for Security Studies; Stephen G. Brooks, a professor of government at Dartmouth College; 4-20-2021; "Illusions of Autonomy: Why Europe Cannot Provide for Its Security If the United States Pulls Back"; MIT Press; https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/45/4/7/100571/Illusions-of-Autonomy-Why-Europe-Cannot-Provide; KL]

THE COUNTERFACTUAL: A COMPLETE U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM EUROPE

The counterfactual scenario examined in this article, the one favored by restraint scholars, is that the United States officially exits from NATO and fully withdraws its forces and military units from Europe, including the roughly 65,000 active-duty personnel under the U.S. European Command, 2,000 reservists, 16,350 Department of Defense civilian personnel, and around 930 personnel assigned to NATO’s Command Structure. The United States also would no longer continue its rotational presence of air, land, and sea forces throughout Europe as part of the European Deterrence Initiative (which includes a U.S. armored brigade combat team and a combat aviation brigade).33 In addition, the United States would remove all its European-based nuclear capabilities.

Although it is difficult to envision a full U.S. pullback from Europe in the short term, it is hardly implausible in the longer term in light of both domestic and international dynamics. Structural trends in the international system— most notably, the rise of China relative to the United States and the growing strategic centrality of the Asia-Pacific region—have caused the United States to downgrade the importance of Europe in its grand strategy.34 Moreover, the United States pursued an isolationist grand strategy for most of its history; leaving Europe would simply be a return to its traditional foreign policy baseline regarding the region. And significantly, there is every indication that Trump tapped into, rather than created, the political momentum for curtailing the United States’ security presence overseas. Prior to Trump becoming president, U.S. public opinion in favor of the United States disengaging from the world had already increased substantially.35 Reflecting these public attitudes, in the early 2010s, a number of Republican fiscal hawks and liberal Democrats ramped up their calls for eliminating the U.S. presence in Europe.36 Likewise, according to a 2011 poll, 65 percent of the U.S. public favored scaling back U.S. military commitments to reduce the country’s debt.37

A U.S. decision to actively withdraw from Europe is not the only means by which this outcome could occur; it could also unfold passively with Europe and the United States drifting further apart over many years, eventually reaching a point where NATO has been hollowed out and exists essentially in name only. In fact, because of rising doubts about the long-term credibility and robustness of the U.S. commitment, many prominent European policymakers and security analysts have concluded that Europe should rely less on the transatlantic partnership and bolster its capacity for autonomous action.38 As then President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker stated in 2016, “If Europe does not take care of its own security, nobody else will do it for us.”39 Yet, as we show in the next two sections, two overarching constraints jointly limit the capacity of Europeans to achieve strategic autonomy: Europe’s strategic cacophony and profound capability shortfalls that will take a long time to close.

Europe’s Strategic Cacophony

The first two decades after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union constituted an era of strategic exception, characterized by the absence of a major conventional security threat. During this period in which European states lacked any semblance of a unifying threat, wide discrepancies emerged in their national threat assessments. The threat perceptions of European defense policymakers shifted away from conventional state threats to nonconventional ones such as terrorism, instability in the Mediterranean area, migration, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and failed states.40

Russia’s invasion and annexation of Crimea in 2014 shattered the long-held assumption that the European territorial status quo would not be upset via the use of military force. Yet, far from bringing Europe together, Russia’s assertiveness only further deepened Europeans’ profound divergences of threat perceptions, with growing disagreements among Europeans about how to prioritize Russia versus other challenges.41

Below we provide a bottom-line assessment and systematic coding of national threat perceptions across twenty-nine European countries. We include all countries that are members of the EU or NATO, or both, except for Turkey and seven countries that have GDPs smaller than $25 billion: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Iceland, Liechtenstein, North Macedonia, and Montenegro. We identify where the threat assessment of each country falls across five categories: (1) Russia is unimportant or not a threat; (2) Russia is a threat, but other threats are more significant; (3) Russia and other threats have roughly equal significance; (4) Russia is the highest threat, but other threats also are significant; and (5) Russia is the dominant threat by far.

To produce these codings, we adopted a nested approach. First, we coded the threat evaluations of these countries made by eighteen experts who contributed to a recent comprehensive examination of European defense policies.42 To double-check our codings, we consulted all eighteen authors to ensure that our understanding of each country corresponded with theirs.43 Second, we looked at all available government reports that provide a national assessment of the regional threat environment and prioritize among different threats. In particular, we examined the national security/defense/military strategies, the intelligence threat assessments, the analyses of particular threats (e.g., cyberthreats and terrorism), and regional/geographic analyses of all twenty-nine European states in our study. In total, we examined eighty-seven official documents and reports. (Online appendix A provides a full list of these sources; they are referenced in the footnotes by document number as indicated in this appendix.)44

Table

Description automatically generated

For most states, the combination of these first two sources provided enough information to reliably code national threat assessments. But for others, they were insufficient because official threat assessments were somewhat ambiguous. For these countries, a third step was thus to interview senior foreign policy and defense officials to obtain additional information and gain further clarity into the national threat assessment.45 We conclude that Europe is characterized by strategic cacophony (see table 1). Whereas some states rank terrorism and instability in the Mediterranean region at the top of their threat assessments—with little, if any, threat perception vis-à-vis Russia—others identify Russia as their overarching security concern, while largely ignoring the diffuse threats on Europe’s southern shores. Between these two extremes, different countries and groups of countries exhibit varying perceptions of their core security challenges. Overall, the continent is marked by profoundly divergent threat assessments and ensuing strategic priorities.

The varied threat perceptions of European states have been shaped by a complex mix of history, politics, and geography, as well as by changes in the regional strategic environment. Details on our country codings are discussed below, according to category of threat prioritization.

RUSSIA IS UNINMPORTANT OR NOT A THREAT

Most smaller powers in Western and Southern Europe prioritize as their main sources of concern transnational terrorism, WMD proliferation, and instability across the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) and the resulting flows of migrants (see table 1).46 By contrast, ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was perceived as the overarching conventional and nuclear threat during the Cold War, Russia has little, if any, significance in their national threat assessments.47 Indeed, some of these countries, such as Italy or Spain, have long advocated for sustained engagement with Moscow.48

Likewise, two countries that do not share the same level of anxiety held by most Central and Eastern European countries vis-à-vis Russia are Hungary and Bulgaria. Considering the threat of conventional war to be minimal, and given their strong ties with Moscow, they instead prioritize terrorism, migration flows, WMD proliferation, and cyberattacks.49

RUSSIA IS A THREAT, BUT OTHER THREATS ARE MORE SIGNIFICANT

Other countries also prioritize transnational terrorism, regional turmoil around Europe and the MENA, cyberattacks, and illegal migration, but display higher threat perceptions of Russia than do states in the first category (see table 1). They perceive Russia as a threat, but nonetheless see other threats as relatively higher sources of concern.50

Croatia’s threat assessment, for instance, focuses largely on challenges such as terrorism, regional instability, migration, and the proliferation of WMD.51 Still, in a veiled yet clear reference to Russia’s influence in the Western Balkans, Croatian policymakers put greater emphasis than the first group of countries on threats such as “non-conventional, asymmetric, and cyber actions” that are “planned, permanent and systematic activities supported by state bodies.”52

France is the only major power in this group. Its threat perceptions revolve, foremost, around transnational terrorism and regional instability in Europe’s southern periphery. French policymakers consider jihadist terrorism as “the most immediate” threat,53 especially in light of the steep rise in the number of terrorist attacks on French soil since the mid-2010s.54 France is also concerned with the proliferation of conventional and WMD-related technology,55 as well as with regional instability in Northern Africa and the Middle East.56 The French government puts particular emphasis on sub-Saharan Africa, where, partly because of its postcolonial history, France retains “a direct security and economic interest” in the stability of the region.57 Accordingly, although France has displayed growing concerns vis-à-vis Russia’s assertiveness after the Ukrainian crisis,58 other threats remain more significant.

RUSSIA AND OTHER THREATS HAVE ROUGHLY EQUAL SIGNIFICANCE

The United Kingdom and Germany—together with less powerful Western European states (Belgium and the Netherlands) and Denmark—consider Russia and other security challenges to be equivalent threats (see table 1).

British policymakers include both Russia and terrorism in the UK’s “Tier One” category of risks (in terms of probability and impact).59 In light of Russia’s increasingly assertive behavior, they assess that the “risks from statebased threats have both grown and diversified,”60 which is why the UK “cannot rule out the possibility that [Moscow] may feel tempted to act aggressively against NATO Allies.”61 According to a UK former senior defense official, the main areas of concerns vis-à-vis Moscow are (1) Russia’s military modernization, including the development and deployment of weapon systems that can threaten the UK’s NATO allies; (2) Russia’s gray-zone activities (e.g., subversion, use of proxies, cyberattacks, use of military-grade nerve agents for targeted killings); and (3) Moscow’s activities outside Europe, such as in parts of Africa, but, most notably, in the Middle East.62

Yet, at the same time, the UK sees transnational terrorism as an equally substantial threat. British policymakers have perceived a rising threat from terrorism since at least the 2005 London bombings and the subsequent wave of terrorist attacks that swept across Europe and the UK in the 2010s.63 In their eyes, “ISIL [the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant], Al Qa’ida, and affiliates remain committed to attacking UK and Western targets” and continue to be “the most direct and immediate threat” to the UK’s “domestic security.”64 In 2015, the British government therefore decided to increase its counterterrorism spending by 30 percent, including £2 billion of new investment in the capabilities of UK special forces.65

Germany, too, considers terrorism and Russia to be threats of roughly equal significance. German policymakers view terrorist attacks as “the most immediate challenge” to their country’s domestic security.66 In 2018, Germany’s minister of interior stated that the security situation concerning terrorism continued to be “very threatening.”67 For Germany, transnational terrorism is tied closely to regional stability in the MENA and to the existence of failing states in which terrorist organizations can thrive.68 Accordingly, it seeks to bolster cooperation with partners in Africa and the Middle East to train their security forces so as “to create a bulwark against international terrorism.”69

At the same time, Germany sees Russia as “openly calling the European peace order into question with its willingness to use force to advance its own interests and to unilaterally redraw borders guaranteed under international law, as it has done in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.”70 According to the ministry of defense, “this has far-reaching implications for security in Europe and thus for the security of Germany.”71 A comparison of Germany’s 2006 White Paper and of the subsequent strategic documents (i.e., the 2011 Defense Policy Guidelines and the 2016 White Paper) highlights the enhanced focus of the German armed forces on territorial defense since the Russia-Georgia war and Moscow’s landgrab in Crimea.72

Interviews with current and former German officials reveal that the foreign affairs, interior, and defense ministries have different threat assessments. Whereas the first two consider terrorism to be Germany’s main security challenge, the latter prioritizes Russia as the main threat.73 Across the German government, terrorism and Russia ultimately emerge as being roughly equally significant threats.

Smaller Western European powers such as the Netherlands and Belgium similarly consider Russia and other threats to be largely equivalent.74 Likewise, in Northern Europe, Danish policymakers rank terrorism and regional instability in the MENA—which can provide fertile ground for terrorists— relatively higher than do their Nordic neighbors in their threat assessments.75 At the same time, Russia is seen as posing “a significant security challenge,”76 and its military buildup and increased military exercises in the region, as well as its use of gray-zone operations, are considered “a clear challenge” to Denmark.77 The Danish government thus sees Russia, terrorism, and regional instability in the MENA as equally signiªcant threats.

RUSSIA IS THE HIGHEST THREAT; OTHER THREATS ARE ALSO SIGNIFICANT

Several Northern and Eastern European states have displayed mounting threat perceptions of Russia—which they see as their major threat—especially since the Russo-Georgian War and, increasingly, the Ukrainian crisis (see table 1). Yet, they continue to share security concerns vis-à-vis terrorism, regional instability in the MENA, and illegal migration.

In Northern Europe, Norway and Sweden emphasize both the “long belt of instability” to the south of Europe and terrorism as signiªcant national security concerns.78 Yet, most notably since the 2010s, Russia has returned to the top of their national security concerns. In particular, they highlight the development of Russia’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities, its numerous military exercises in Northern Europe, and its activities in the Arctic as amplifying the risk of an accident or a crisis resulting in unintended escalation to war.79 The Norwegian government, for example, considers that “Russia’s overall military capacity is the most signiªcant security challenge for Norway and NATO.”80

Likewise, in Central and Eastern Europe, although the Czech Republic, Romania, and Slovakia also emphasize other security challenges (e.g., instability in the Southern Mediterranean and terrorism), their threat assessments prioritize Russia’s assertiveness.81 While refraining from ofªcially labeling Russia a threat, the Romanian government argues that Russia’s naval buildup— and the ensuing “destabilization of the security situation in the Black Sea Extended Region”—“represent the most important factor of military risk against national security.”82

RUSSIA IS THE DOMINANT THREAT BY FAR

The Baltic states, Finland, and Poland exhibit the highest threat perceptions of Russia in Europe. The former Soviet-controlled states in the Baltic region (i.e., Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) prioritize Russia’s conventional and grayzone military threats as their core national security concern.83 Likewise, given Finland’s geographical proximity to Russia and their shared border, policy makers in Helsinki have viewed Russia as their dominant national security threat throughout the post–Cold War period.84 Finland considers that the “use or threat of military force against Finland cannot be excluded.”85

Given its history of recurrent invasion by foreign powers, Poland has also consistently put Russia at the center of its security concerns since the end of the Cold War.86 Moscow’s “aggressive policy”—through which it aims to “destabilize the internal order of other states and to question their territorial integrity”—is seen as “a threat mainly for Poland and other countries in the region.”87

European Defense Capacity Shortfall

European national assessments thus diverge profoundly regarding the prioritization among different threats. Significantly, Europe’s strategic cacophony greatly exacerbates a second overarching constraint on Europe achieving strategic autonomy: severe military capacity gaps that cannot be closed anytime soon. Since the end of the Cold War, Europe’s defense capacity has markedly decreased.88 Operationally, the 2011 European military action in Libya revealed a severe shortage of key enablers for offensive military operations: the United States had to provide critical capabilities that the Europeans otherwise lacked, such as air-to-air refueling; suppression of enemy air defenses; and intelligence, target acquisition, and reconnaissance.89 Indeed, a recent systematic study by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and the German Council on Foreign Relations found that, because their capability shortfalls are so significant, Europeans would struggle to autonomously undertake operations even at the low end of the spectrum of conflict (such as peace enforcement missions).90 In this section, we focus on Europeans’ capacity for conventional warfare because it is indispensable for defense and deterrence vis-à-vis Russia and because this allows us to directly address the argument of restraint scholars who maintain that the Europeans could autonomously balance Russia with ease. We identify four major challenges that are likely to hinder the capacity of Europeans to develop an autonomous conventional defense capacity.

LACK OF WEAPON SYSTEMS FOR CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE

During the Cold War, Europeans invested heavily in the kind of conventional capabilities required for conventional deterrence and defense. But after the Cold War, European defense spending plummeted, and a great proportion of these limited resources were directed toward out-of-area operations.91 As a result, Europeans are lacking in even the most basic conventional deterrence and defense capabilities. A key reason for this situation is Europe’s strategic cacophony. The five economically largest European countries—the UK, France, Germany, Spain, and Italy—are all located in Western or Southern Europe, which collectively have greatly de-emphasized the territorial defense mission since the end of the Cold War. In contrast, states in Central and Northern Europe have tended to focus relatively more on territorial defense, especially after Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea; yet, these parts of Europe contain only small to medium-sized countries.92 Until now, there has been no long-term examination of the year-to-year shift across all of Europe of the kinds of core capabilities needed for conventional deterrence and defense. To address this gap, we systematically gathered data from the IISS Military Balance for the 1990–2020 period on three core military systems for conventional warfare: main battle tanks (MBTs), armored personnel carriers (APCs), and artillery. To be sure, conventional warfare requires more than simply land capabilities. Yet, Russia’s A2/AD capacity is aimed at eroding, or nullifying, NATO’s local control of its airspace, thus compelling NATO forces, in the case of confiict, to operate in an environment of land warfare with contested air support.93 In this context, land resistance—and thus

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land capabilities—become key, which is why we focus on these three specific systems (they constitute a sample of the needed land warfare capabilities). The data for MBTs of Europe’s major powers are displayed in ªgure 1.94 (Online appendix C shows the data on MBTs of medium and smaller European countries as well as the data for APCs and artillery for all European countries.)

These data underscore the marked decline of European conventional warfare capabilities in the past three decades. From 1990 to 2020, the combined European total number of MBTs plunged by 85 percent; APCs fell by 64 percent; and artillery declined by 56 percent. As Sven Biscop concludes, “Europe’s capability shortfalls are such that it can neither meet its NATO obligations for territorial defense, nor achieve strategic autonomy with regard to the protection of Europe.”95

In reality, the situation is even worse than these data indicate, because most European militaries have significant readiness deficiencies. For example, an analysis by the German Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces concluded in 2018 that the “readiness of the Bundeswehr’s major weapons systems is dramatically low in many areas,”96 noting that only 39 percent of Germany’s Leopard 2 battle tanks were available for use given a lack of spare parts; the operability of only a quarter of its PUMA infantry combat vehicles; the nonavailability of any of its six submarines; and the ability of less than half of its Eurofighters and Tornado combat aircraft to fly.97 Significantly, Europe’s readiness problems, such as the obsolescence of its MBTs, are projected to become even more challenging in the decades ahead.98

THE COMPLEXITY OF EMPLOYING MODERN WEAPONS SYSTEMS

As dramatic as these weapons shortfalls are, European defense spending—if allocated properly—could eventually secure the needed systems. Yet, not only is the efficient allocation of resources a major challenge because of Europe’s strategic cacophony (as detailed below), but securing the needed weapons systems would only be the first step.

The effective employment of modern weapons systems is far more challenging than in past eras for a variety of reasons. A key consideration is the immense premium put on command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR). C4ISR—often referred to as the “nervous system” of modern militaries—is crucial for gathering information about the combatants, for effectively processing that information, and for disseminating and using that information to develop and implement complex plans.99 NATO’s 2011 mission in Libya shows the heavy reliance of Europeans on the United States’ C4ISR capacity. Europeans would therefore need to develop their own C4ISR capacity to be able to autonomously balance Russia, which would not be an easy undertaking given that Russia is no Libya. They would need large amounts of new C4ISR systems (e.g., reconnaissance and communication satellites; early warning and control aircraft; sensor systems; air, naval, and land command and control platforms), the most complex of which have very long development times. Notably, the already significant difficulty of Europeans assembling the needed systems would be made even more acute if the UK’s exit from the EU ends up meaning that British capabilities also need to be replaced: at present, the UK detains, among other capabilities, 53 percent of the EU’s combat intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance heavy unmanned aerial vehicles (CISR UAVs), 42 percent of airborne early warning and control aircraft, and 38 percent of electronicintelligence aircraft.100

In addition, European countries lack the kind of specialized personnel needed to operate modern weapons systems effectively. Redressing this weakness would be a significant undertaking, as they have reduced their number of military personnel drastically since the end of the Cold War. As figure 2 shows, the size of the total active militaries of the large European powers declined by 57 percent during the 1990–2020 period.101 Furthermore, beyond the difficulty of securing the financial resources to pay the needed personnel, recruiting sufficient specialized personnel would be a major challenge, as demonstrated by the difficulties faced by many European militaries in attracting personnel for skilled positions.102 Notably, a recent study has shown that the employment of advanced weaponry calls for highly skilled and highly trained military personnel, which are now more difficult to recruit and retain in the military.103 Obtaining specialized military personnel to operate modern weaponry is only the beginning; they must also be trained to effectively use modern weapons, which is extremely challenging and time consuming, partially because these weapons need to be used as part of a cohesive package that places a premium not just on information gathering, but also on coordination and delegation.104 It has taken U.S. military personnel an extraordinarily long time to develop the skills required for effectively using today’s weapons systems: as Posen stresses, the United States’ “development of new weapons and tactics

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depends on decades of expensively accumulated technological and tactical experience.”105 It would likely take Europeans even longer to develop the needed skills, given differences across countries regarding operational cultures, levels of ambition, languages, and so on.106 Finally, the effective use of modern weaponry in the European theater depends on European forces being able to move quickly and securely over large distances within Europe. Yet, as a UK parliamentary report puts it, “NATO has difficulty moving large forces” across Europe.107 In recent years, the Europeans have sought to bolster military mobility through a variety of initiatives dispersed across different institutions (within both the EU and NATO).108 Yet, the movement and training of military personnel and assets in Europe remain severely hampered by a combination of capability shortfalls, legal/procedural hurdles, and infrastructural deficiencies that will not be easy to resolve.109

THE DIFFICULTY OF INSTITUTIONALIZED MILITARY COOPERATION

An additional challenge is institutional. Europe’s strategic cacophony has prevented Europeans from developing an autonomous, military-planning, command and control (C2) structure.110 Indeed, a report by the European Parliamentary Research Service explains that one of the greatest challenges of European defense is “the lack of integration of the military structures of the Member States.”111 Although an effective and autonomous European defense would require the creation of a permanent planning and C2 infrastructure, the question of developing an autonomous Operational Headquarters (OHQ) has proven highly divisive.112 An OHQ was never established because of conflicting national interests and priorities among Europeans, in particular France, Germany and the UK. Whereas Paris has long supported the establishment of a military OHQ to bolster the EU’s strategic and operational planning structures and its contingency planning and C2 capacity, London has strongly resisted, seeing it as a duplication of NATO’s assets. Germany has stood somewhat in between, though closer to the UK, favoring a focus on civilian-military planning and C2, not least to avoid duplicating structures already existing at NATO.113 As a result, the EU remains entirely dependent on NATO or national assets for the planning and conduct of major executive operations, for which it has no autonomous military structures.114

If the United States were to pull back from Europe, it remains to be seen whether the Europeans could rely on a “Europeanized” NATO, in which the integrated structures would stay in place but without the United States.115 Military planning and C2 require a clear chain of command. When NATO was created, Europeans agreed to be under U.S. military command, rather than attempting the far more difficult task of agreeing to be under the command of another European country or group of European states. More generally, as the hegemonic power in NATO, the United States has facilitated institutionalized cooperation among Europeans and helped partly contain Europe’s strategic cacophony.116 For decades, a U.S.-led NATO has been the overarching shaper of national defense policies and military transformation in Europe, helping overcome coordination and collective-action problems.117 In light of Europe’s deep-seated strategic divisions, a U.S. disengagement would amplify these coordination and collective action problems (assuming NATO survived) and would further hinder institutionalized, intra-European defense cooperation at all levels: strategies and doctrines; training; operational learning; interoperability; and joint capability development. Likewise, without the United States, the persistent and profound divergence of threat perceptions and strategic priorities among Europeans is likely to impede their capacity to agree on shared C2 structures for conducting operations, except for the lowest end of the spectrum of conºict (e.g., peace support operations).118

As a result of strategic cacophony, the EU has, in fact, struggled mightily to create even the most minimal C2 structure. As Luis Simón underscores, “It has taken nearly 20 years of allegedly significant steps for the European Union to establish a ‘Military Planning and Conduct Capability’ composed of up to 25 staffers, devoted to assisting with the planning and conduct of so-called non-executive (i.e., training and assistance) missions,” with an advisory role only.119 Ultimately, given Europe’s deep-seated divergences, there is no basis for optimism that Europeans will be able to agree being under the permanent command of another European country for deterrence and defense or to consistently undertake effective institutionalized military cooperation without the enabling role played by the United States within NATO.

THE FRAGMENTATION OF EUROPE’S DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE

If Europeans want to be strategically autonomous, they will have to produce the defense systems they need without being reliant on the United States. The entrenched fragmentation of Europe’ defense industrial base, however, would make this a daunting task.

On the demand side, European states have consistently privileged domestically procured defense equipment over European arms cooperation. According to data from the European Defense Agency, from 2006 to 2015, collaborative defense procurement in Europe accounted for less than one quarter of total procurement.120 For example, a mere 7 percent of the European surface vessels currently in use have been built through European armament cooperation.121 As for fighter aircraft—where the economic incentives for Europeanwide collaboration are especially powerful given the immense cost and complexity of these systems—there has been relatively limited defense cooperation: less than a third (32.6 percent) of combat aircraft used by EU militaries come from European collaborative production.122 Similarly, European states spend more than 80 percent of their military research-and-development budgets within national borders.123

On the supply side, these compartmentalized national markets for weapons systems have resulted in a fragmented and noncompetitive European defense and technological industrial base (EDTIB) characterized by duplication, inefficiencies, endemic overcapacity, and a lack of economies of scale.124 In 2017, 178 different weapons systems were in use in the EU, compared to 30 in the United States.125 As a result, the components that sustain the industrial capacity to deliver high-end to low-end capabilities are scattered across Europe.126 This is a significant problem given that today’s scale requirements are massive for many weapons systems, which also explains why Europe remains highly dependent on the import of key components and weapons systems from the United States.127

Europe has recognized the need for stronger defense production coordination for a long time, and the mechanisms for fostering European-wide collaboration in weapons production have been a topic of discussion for the past several decades. On the demand side, this coordination would require a uniform European procurement policy, with common requirements and with defense industrial cooperation among EU countries being prioritized over national procurement.128 And on the supply side, this would require an integrated defense and technological industrial base (e.g., with one or two major European prime contractors per sector) capable of sustaining military innovation and the development, production, and maintenance of arms at reasonable cost.

Yet, efforts to formulate the kinds of policies that would foster Europeanwide defense collaboration have been feeble. As Matthew Uttley explains, initiatives taken over the years to rationalize and bolster the EDTIB have had a “limited impact,” because governments see a strong national DTIB as a necessary prerequisite for national political sovereignty and, as a result, “national protectionist practices” remain “the dominant driving force in E.U. defense procurement.”129 A report by the European Parliament conªrms that a key reason for this lack of collaboration is Europe’s strategic cacophony, speciªcally, “the current fragmentation of the defense market in terms of demand, regulations, standards and supply.”130

Assessing the Counterargument: Can Europeans Balance Russia?

Together, Europe’s strategic cacophony and its defense capacity shortfalls feed and reinforce each other. For one thing, many of the needed steps to make up for Europe’s defense capacity shortfalls will require prolonged cooperation; Europeans would thus need to overcome their entrenched strategic cacophony not just for a short time, but over a very long period. Moreover, because diverging interests hamper defense industrial cooperation among Europeans, this—coupled with major capability shortfalls—deepens their technological dependency on the United States, further reinforcing the challenges to addressing Europe’s capability shortfalls.

Restraint scholars arguing for a U.S. pullout would undoubtedly respond that, even if Europe is currently split by strategic divisions and has severe defense capacity shortfalls, a U.S. withdrawal would result in heightened European threat perceptions of Russia and thereby lead Europeans to bolster their defense investments—thus prompting them to come together to balance Russia (through a balancing coalition or through the EU, or both). For restraint scholars, it is the U.S. presence in Europe that affords Europeans the luxury of low threat perceptions of Russia and thereby drives them to underinvest in defense. Below, we assess the validity and robustness of this counterargument.

EUROPEAN THREAT PERCEPTIONS AFTER A U.S. WITHDRAWAL

We now evaluate how European threat perceptions would likely evolve if the United States were to pull back, focusing first on Europe’s three major powers (France, the UK, and Germany) and then on its medium and lesser powers.

Given its geographical location, colonial past, and continued engagement in Africa, France tends to look south rather than east for the defense of its core strategic interests.131 Furthermore, France’s strategic outlook remains shaped partly by its Cold War, Gaullist foreign policy legacy, which was based on the willingness to carve out a “third way” between the Soviet-led and the U.S.-led blocs through some form of accommodation with Moscow while maintaining an independent nuclear force and a French area of influence in Africa.132

The UK, as an offshore seapower, has since the early Cold War concluded that the only way to deter the Soviet Union (and later Russia) is to use the United States as a counterweight.133 Accordingly, the “special relationship” with the United States, both bilaterally and through NATO, has been the center of gravity of the UK’s defense policy—as illustrated by its heavy reliance on U.S. military technology.134 Indeed, NATO has been the main vehicle through which Britain has sought to entrench U.S. power in Europe and deter external threats.135

Likewise, Germany, because of its history and location in the heart of the European continent, has strategic priorities different from those of France. The defeat and subsequent occupation of Germany in World War II, including by the Soviet Union, was followed by the division of the country in two, with one side under Soviet influence—thus making Germany the geostrategic epicenter of the Cold War. After its reunification and the end of the Cold War, as well as its self-imposed stringent parliamentary constraints on the use of military force, Germany has opted for a combination of economic and political integration with the EU and military reliance on NATO, with the United States as the ultimate guarantor for its security and the stability of the continent.136

Idiosyncratic historical legacies, geography, and distinctive local security environments have thus profoundly shaped the threat assessments of the three major European powers. To be sure, these differences existed during the Cold War, too, but they were muted by the overwhelming, common Soviet threat.137 By contrast, in light of the diversification of the post–Cold War threat environment, if the United States withdrew from the continent, the threat perceptions of these major powers would be unlikely to converge around Russia.138

In such a scenario, the UK and Germany would be prone to exhibit heightened threat perceptions vis-à-vis Russia. Given their historical reliance upon NATO as their ultimate security guarantee, if the United States were to remove its conventional and nuclear forces, the credibility of NATO’s deterrent vis-à-vis Russia would founder in the eyes of British and German policymakers. As a result, there is every reason to expect they would raise the significance of Russia and of territorial defense in their defense planning. At the same time, they would still have to reckon with other significant threats (e.g., transnational terrorism and regional stability in the MENA).

By contrast, France’s threat assessment would most likely remain unchanged if the United States withdrew. Although France might view Russia with greater concern, it would continue to prioritize terrorism and, crucially, threats on Europe’s southern periphery (i.e., regional instability in the greater Mediterranean area, in general, and in Africa, in particular). As a senior current French defense official put it in an interview, “If the United States withdrew, the risk represented by Russia would ostensibly be greater but, at the same time, it would be greater only if France considered that the threat posed by Russia to the Baltic states, Poland, etc. constitutes a threat to our vital interests, which is far from sure.” This is because threats to Europe’s southern periphery, such as “the destabilization of Africa or the Middle East are considered to be a much higher priority than Russia. . . . Our vital interests are not threatened by Russia.”139

In sum, in the case of a complete U.S. pullback from the continent, London and Berlin would likely move rightward into the second column from the right in table 1 (Russia is a higher threat, but other threats are also significant), while France would not shift from its current position. Given their differing threat prioritizations, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France would be very unlikely to reach agreement on a common position vis-à-vis Russia. Germany and the UK might lean more toward balancing and expand bilateral defense cooperation to that end. However, unlike countries that view Russia as the dominant threat by far (i.e., the Baltic states and Poland), they would face important trade-offs in their allocation of resources—between territorial defense and power projection capabilities, between Europe’s eastern and southern periphery, and so on—given that they would continue to grapple with other signiªcant threats. For its part, because France would likely continue to prioritize threats on Europe’s southern periphery, it would be unlikely to provide a substantial (if any) contribution to a balancing coalition. In fact, it might opt for accommodation with Russia to develop a sphere of inºuence in Western/ Southern Europe or, potentially, even see some strategic advantages to bandwagoning with Russia.

This predicament would be further compounded by fundamental divergences in threat perceptions among Europe’s medium and small powers. Except for lesser powers in Northern and Eastern Europe (i.e., the Baltic states and Poland), which would consistently see Russia as their overriding threat, the other medium and small European states would likely display profoundly different reactions to a U.S. pullback, depending on their geographic location, history, and strategic priorities. While some countries would undoubtedly perceive a higher threat from Russia and thus revise their threat assessments (moving one column to the right in table 1), others would likely maintain their existing threat hierarchization given the equivalent or higher priority they as sign to other threats or regions, or both. In fact, there is every indication that most medium and small European countries that currently perceive threats other than Russia to be more signiªcant or dominant would be highly unlikely to revise their threat assessment. Several of these countries might even become neutral or bandwagon with Moscow. It is therefore extremely implausible that all European states would move Russia up in their ranking of threats. And even if they did, the cacophony of threat perception would remain, with only a few lesser powers in Northern and Eastern Europe perceiving Russia as their dominant threat.

Restraint scholars might reply that the above discussion is excessively pessimistic about the chances for European defense coordination because it neglects the role the EU can play in bringing Europe together in the security realm if the United States leaves.140 The EU is not an effective institutional platform for overcoming Europe’s strategic divergence, however. There are many reasons for this, with the most notable being that the EU is a kaleidoscope of countries with diverging interests that operates on the basis of consensus in the ªeld of foreign and defense policy—thus making the Common Security and Defense Policy a “structurally limited undertaking.”141 If the United States were to pull back, rather than work to overcome European divisions, the EU would be prone to inaction because of such divisions. Thus, only an effective institutional structure could probably overcome, or at least mitigate, Europe’s divisions, but strategic cacophony would prevent the EU from being enabled to perform this function.

HOW EASILY CAN EUROPEANS BALANCE RUSSIA’S MILITARY STRENGTH?

A complete U.S. withdrawal would thus not mitigate Europe’s strategic cacophony and could exacerbate it. Restraint scholars might argue, however, that, even if threat perceptions did not converge across Europe, balancing Russia would not require much effort because it is so weak. Yet, Russia is a much tougher adversary to match than restraint scholars now assess it to be— both in the conventional and the nuclear realms.

CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE AND DETERRENCE. As Michael Kofman and Richard Connolly convincingly argue, “Russian military expenditure is considerably higher” than commonly estimated.142 Of key importance, they stress, is that Russia gets a lot for what it spends on its military: it pays its soldiers a pittance in rubles, and, even more important, it buys its weapons from its own defense contractors in rubles, not dollars. Moreover, the Russian government has squeezed profits in the defense sector, making the weapons it buys artificially cheap. Notably, Russia’s unusually high capacity to produce advanced weaponry using domestic resources is a legacy of the Soviet Union’s massive level of defense production during the Cold War. Ultimately, Kofman and Connolly maintain that, because Russia’s rubles can purchase so much military power so cheaply, it is inappropriate to use market exchange-based estimates of its military spending. Based upon purchasing power parity exchange rates, “Russia’s effective military expenditure actually ranged between $150 billion and $180 billion annually” (from 2015 to 2019), and “taking into account hidden or obfuscated military expenditure, Russia may well come in at around $200 billion.”143 Given this understanding, Russian military spending likely exceeds the combined levels of defense expenditures of the three major European powers (France, Germany, and the UK).

High levels of military spending have, in turn, spurred significant modernization and expansion of Russia’s military forces, particularly in the 2010s.144 The Russian Federation is the descendent state of the Soviet Union, which created a formidable military industrial base with a huge cadre of highly trained personnel, providing a strong foundation for Russia’s current military infrastructure. Although the Russian armed forces still display important weaknesses in areas such as surface shipbuilding, in the past decade Moscow has substantially “modernized its armed forces through a massive introduction of new and modernized weapons and infrastructure, accompanied by radical structural changes in the military organization, evolving modes of operation and a sharply increased number, scale and complexity of military training and exercise.”145 Of particular note, from 2015 to 2019, Russia’s army increased in size by almost 25 percent.146 (In online appendix D, we measure the military capabilities of Russia and four potential European balancing coalitions regarding two overall indicators of military personnel [total active and total reserves] and three core weapon systems for conventional warfare [main battle tanks, artillery, and armored personnel carriers]. Across all five of these measures, the data show that Russia possesses a very substantial military superiority as compared to all four potential European balancing coalitions.)

Additionally, Russia possesses substantial C4ISR capabilities for employing weapons systems in a coordinated manner and for managing military operations. These capabilities are the combined result of legacy Soviet systems and of the Kremlin’s ongoing military modernization effort.147 Especially in the past decade, Russia has developed a more modular, flexible force structure with an emphasis on joint forces through a large-scale military modernization.148

Military satellites are a useful indicator for understanding why Europeans would have difficulty building up the necessary C4ISR infrastructure for balancing Russia. For one, military satellites are critical, because they enable the rest of the C4ISR architecture to operate effectively by facilitating the flow of informational inputs. Specifically, military satellites are crucial for communications, navigation, early warning, attack assessment, and surveillance and reconnaissance—and thus are key for pooling and employing military power. Other C4ISR systems, such as ISR UAVs and airborne early warning and control systems constitute more specific components of a C4ISR architecture that play particular roles therein. Furthermore, whereas full comparison data are available for military satellites, existing databases do not list other C4ISR capabilities systematically. The profound gap between Russia and European countries in military satellites is shown in table 2.

To be sure, notwithstanding such quantitative preponderance in military satellites, one challenge faced by the Russian military in past decades has been the integration of highly interoperable systems for network-centric warfare.149 Yet, Russia has placed such systems (referred to as the Reconnaissance Strike Complex in Russian strategic parlance) at the “epicenter” of its military modernization in the 2010s, investing massively in C4ISR integration and electronic warfare and in modernizing infrastructure, while boosting and streamlining command and control, among other features.150

The net result is that, as stressed by a 2019 RAND report, the Kremlin has

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implemented “a modern, whole-of-government C4ISR infrastructure that will enable Russia to pursue its vision of net-centric or ‘non-contact warfare’”; these “advances in long-range strike, Russia’s command and control and information gathering systems are fundamental in their ability to compete directly with the West and dominate regional adversaries”151—an assessment shared by other studies.152 Significantly, the Russian military tried and tested its C4ISR capabilities during the Syrian conflict.153

The experience of European states during the 2011 Libyan conflict showed that they lack the technological infrastructure and personnel to autonomously use weapons systems in a coordinated manner: they would need to replace the United States’ C4ISR systems that they currently rely on; hire and train the personnel to operate them; and develop a permanent, effective command structure to conduct effective joint military operations in wartime. Likewise, in stark contrast to Russia’s unity of command, Europeans display an “enormous variation” in their C4ISR capacities, with “both technological and operational gaps within Europe.”154 In sum, Europe exhibits a cacophony of C4ISR capabilities.

A final and related consideration that restraint scholars do not sufficiently recognize is that Russia gains efficiencies—when compared to Europe— because it is a single actor, rather than a collective patchwork of countries. By contrast, as a 2018 European Parliament report concludes, “It is precisely because European defense is fragmented by the decisions of 27 political and military chiefs of staff, duplicates the same research, the same programs and the same capabilities and has no chain of command that it is, collectively, inefªcient.”155 The report notes further that “increasing the level of spending without ªrst addressing the coherence between the different national defense systems would only increase the amount of wastage.”156 Exactly how much efªciency is lost would depend on how many European countries would need to act together to balance Russia; but even two actors working together would result in less efªcacy and effectiveness as compared to a single, unitary actor of comparable size.157 If the United States pulled back, a single, centralized Russian actor would confront a group of potential European balancers with diverging threat perceptions that would face coordination challenges likely to hamper their capacity to devise a common strategy, to share the burdens of their defense investments, to rationalize Europe’s highly fragmented defense industrial base, to build integrated C2 structures, and to sustain the development and deployment of a C4ISR capacity. As a report of the French Senate states, “Compared to other European countries, Russia enjoys a considerable but not quantifiable advantage: unity of command. The Russian army has one commanding authority, one hierarchy, one language, and one equipment range. Obviously, at the operational level, these are very important assets.”158

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE. As a legacy of the Cold War, Russia maintains a formidable arsenal of approximately 6,400 nuclear weapons, which vastly overshadows the combined arsenals of France and the UK (290 and 195 nuclear weapons, respectively).159 In addition to Russia’s numerical preponderance, it matters greatly that this force is wielded by a single actor, not a collective one. In contrast, strategic divergences and technological constraints are highly likely to hamper the emergence of a European nuclear deterrent either through the Europeanization of the French and/or British nuclear deterrents and/or through a German nuclear deterrent.

As Ulrich Kühn and Tristan Volpe explain, Germany would have to surmount major technical, political, and security obstacles before acquiring a nuclear deterrent.160 Not only would it face the domestic and international pressures fueled by reviving fears of German hegemony, but it would have “to either repurpose its nuclear energy infrastructure for weapons production or sprint to the bomb from new military facilities,”161 a prospect made even more unlikely given that Germany plans to shut down its entire nuclear fleet by 2022.162 Accordingly, “Germany does not have the required wherewithal for even a rudimentary program.”163

In turn, the Europeanization of nuclear sharing (or Euro-deterrent) based on the nuclear capabilities of France and/or the United Kingdom independent of the United States would also “face high hurdles and immense costs that might well prove prohibitive.”164 French nuclear experts note that there is “near-zero appetite in France for transferring its nuclear assets to Europe.”165 Likewise, Barbara Kunz observes that analysts across Europe agree that the Europeanization of the French bomb, however defined, is “unlikely and hardly feasible.”166

The prospects of a Franco-British nuclear deterrent are even less likely. For one, it is highly improbable that French or British policymakers would be willing to sacriªce London or Paris for Tallinn or Riga. Second, the UK has left the EU, so France and the UK would have to overcome their previously discussed divergent strategic priorities to create an integrated Franco-British military structure for nuclear planning outside the EU. Finally, the heavy dependence of the UK’s nuclear deterrent on U.S. technology and on cooperation with the United States would further complicate such an endeavor.

Ultimately, the notion forwarded by restraint scholars that European countries can easily and quickly balance Russia is ungrounded. Balancing Russia would be extremely difficult, and such a buildup would necessarily take a very long time. Our interviews with European policymakers reveal that they clearly understand this problem. A former UK ministry of defense official stresses that the “temporal factor would be quite long. . . . These sort of capabilities take a long time to develop.”167 Likewise, as a former German official bluntly explains, “The whole defense and capability requirements would be so extreme that the upgrade that would be needed to fill the gap if the U.S. completely withdrew is totally off limits for the foreseeable future.”168

Conclusion

Europe is characterized by profound, continent-wide divergences across national defense policies, particularly threat perceptions, as well as by a fundamental defense capacity shortfall that cannot be closed anytime soon because of a series of overlapping challenges. Given the combination of strategic cacophony and capacity gaps, which are mutually reinforcing, Europeans are currently not in a position to autonomously mount a credible deterrent and defense against Russia. This situation would likely continue for a very long time, even if there were a complete U.S. withdrawal from the continent, and all the more so in the event of a partial U.S. withdrawal, a much more likely counterfactual. If a U.S. pullback were to occur, it would leave Europe increasingly vulnerable to Russian aggression and meddling, allowing Russia to exploit Europe’s centrifugal dynamics to augment its influence. A U.S. withdrawal would also likely make institutionalized intra-European defense cooperation appreciably harder. Accordingly, a U.S. pullback would have grave consequences for peace and stability on the continent.

These findings have major implications for both sides of the Atlantic. In Europe, scholars and policymakers need to be realistic. The strong desire for strategic autonomy is justified and understandable, but it is necessary to discern between distant hopes and present realities. Ultimately, the barriers to strategic autonomy are so substantial that the achievement of this goal would require a long-term, sustained and coordinated effort. Sound European defense policymaking needs to reflect this: working under an unrealistic assumption that Europeans can quickly achieve strategic autonomy is both unwarranted and unwise. Pursuing unrealistic goals can, in fact, undermine the achievement of realistic ones. Instead, European policymakers should focus on a manageable, affordable set of initiatives for augmenting military capacity in the short term that the United States would see as valuable—and thus would help consolidate the transatlantic alliance—but that would nevertheless also prove useful if the United States does someday pull back. Such an approach could gradually and cumulatively create the foundations for greater commonality and cooperation in the future and, over time, help mitigate the centrifugal dynamics at play in Europe. In the United States, restraint scholars—virtually all of whom are selfdescribed realists—also need to be realistic. Far from portraying the world as it is, their assessment of Europe is guided by an unfounded optimism that Europeans can easily balance Russia if the United States pulled out. Currently, Europe is presented by restraint scholars as the “easy” case for a U.S. withdrawal, with Asia being the “hard” case.169 Although China is rising fast and already has much more latent power than Russia, the latter is a greater threat to the United States’ European allies than the former based on the other three components of the balance of threat: geographic location, offensive military capabilities, and aggressive intentions.170 The assessment of restraint scholars that pulling back from Europe is an easy call ultimately rests on a wholly unsubstantiated assumption: that an effective European balancing coalition would emerge quickly if the United States pulled back. What our analysis shows is that Europeans would for a very long time be unable to effectively confront Russia on their own if the United States were to withdraw, and thus if America does want stability in Europe, it should retain a presence on the continent.

### Alt — AT: Relationalism

#### Grove disagrees. The alt can’t solve violence.

Grove 22 [Jairus Victor Grove; Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Hawai'i Research Center for Future Studies at the University of Hawai'i; 6-29-2022; "The President as Mascot: Relations All the Way Down"; *Uncertainty and Its Discontents: Worldviews in World Politics*, Part I - Substantialism and Relationalism, Chapter 4; https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/uncertainty-and-its-discontents/4F8C9A81F97824652654F3BEC6E1F889; KL]

While I follow a relational and primarily historical and interpretive approach, I do depart from many other adherents of relationalism in two significant ways.4 The first involves the assumption of an ethical or normative content to what Milja Kurki calls the “relational cosmology” of the “relational revolution” (Chapter 3, this volume). Kurki believes an ethical impulse is “baked into” a relational worldview. There are a number of examples of this in contemporary theory inside and outside of IR. Two variants are those following Judith Butler and her debt to Emmanuel Levinas and Hannah Arendt, who account for violence as an abrogation of relations and a possibility of nonviolence in relations themselves. Here, violence is in some sense the ignoring of a fundamental relationality among human beings that would, if recognized, create an understanding mutuality opposed to violence. From these accounts, consciousness-raising about the fact of relationality is a solution to global violence just as “realizing” and “experiencing” relationality makes us open or indebted to “the other,” to use Levinas’ terms. The second variant focuses more on the natural environment and violence against nonhuman others. From this perspective on relationality, environmental destruction and extreme cruelty toward nonhuman animals is, like the Levinasian/Arendtian account, the result of a loss of relationality often attributed to modernist accounts of mind/body and nature/culture dualisms, or, more generally, of anthropocentrism. Like normative relationalism, the environmental strand believes that an awareness of this fact, or a cultivation of an ethos of interdependence beyond the human species, will reduce violence and possibly may make planetary life more sustainable. It is not unusual to take as evidence of this position the confluence of environmental protections by indigenous peoples with relational cosmologies.

Both variants conflate the methodological insights of relationalism with a relational worldview. One is empirical while the other is aspirational. The risk, I believe, in this conflation is a confusion of expectations and a false sense that one has solved more philosophical questions than are possible to solve. It is enough to have an account of the world that integrates ideational and material forces into a single substance and ontology. We ought not expect that this, in addition, restores the world to some perfect order, or that striving for a more universal notion of the good escapes somehow the deep problems of competing interests, relativism, or incommensurable worldviews. Too often the appeal to relationalism’s debt to science or fundamental, ancient ontologies is used to depoliticize its normative commitments. However, the ambivalent relationship between relationalism’s cosmological and scientific origin stories ought to demand the inverse. Rather than seeing relationality as an ethical exit from particularity and the divisions in politics, it ought to insist upon both as the beginning of inquiry.

While an ethics can be built within a relational ontology, it does not necessarily follow from the ontological insights. After all, seals and great white sharks are deeply relational and aware of each other, and yet could not easily arrive at a common sense of the good. If any interspecies consensus could be reached between predator and prey, it would be minimal (maybe a consensus value on saving the ocean, for instance) and not as a mere result of their relationality, which is mostly characterized by teeth and blood. Could such a relationship be at least free of violence? Even that seems far-fetched given the findings of animal behaviorists that predators enjoy their hunt; killing for fun has been observed in orcas, dolphins, and cats.

In fact, rather than say that relationality and violence are opposed, I believe that the opposite claim can and should be made. If everything is relational — from our cells to our consciousness — then certainly violence is relational too. To go a step further, violence — a thoroughly human concept — only distinguishes itself from force or change because of the particular relationships of attention and intimacy which make cruelty possible. What makes an earthquake tragic — that is, unavoidable and indebted to no misanthropy or purposive end — is precisely what makes an act of war violent. Malice, sadism, cruelty, cultivated indifference — all of these extra characteristics are what change the ecological and political relations of actions such that they are violent as opposed to something else.

### Alt — AT: Quantum

#### Individualism is good. Quantum IR rejects freedom.

Nau 22 [Henry R. Nau; professor of political science and international affairs at Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University; 6-29-2022; "Weberian and Relationalist Worldviews: What Is at Stake?"; *Uncertainty and Its Discontents: Worldviews in World Politics*, Part II - Accountable Agents and Epistemic Engines, Chapter 6; https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/uncertainty-and-its-discontents/4F8C9A81F97824652654F3BEC6E1F889; KL]

This volume challenges us to stretch our imagination and rethink the world of international relations. It engages modern substantialist, Weberian approaches to social science with new postmodern, relationalist or quantum approaches and concludes that substantialist views which emphasize the individual are outdated. 1 This conclusion is premature. Stretching our imagination is one thing; tearing it up is another. As we proceed, we need a clear picture of what we are stretching and potentially tearing up; it could be the reasoning individual and the human capacity to imagine itself.

This chapter offers a full-throated (albeit limited) exposition and defense of the Enlightenment/Weberian worldview that underlines modern social science. The Enlightenment worldview gave form to the aspiration for individual freedom and choice. It rescued humanity from the stultifying clutches of mysticism (Nature) and religion (the Divine). It dethroned philosopher kings and papal elites and empowered ordinary, individual human beings, equipped with reason, spirit (emotion, faith), and education, to create, assess, debate, and pass judgment on alternative worldviews. Natural science exploded under Isaac Newton’s vision of an orderly universe fixed in time and space following predictable laws. And social science spawned a virtual cornucopia of modern worldviews, both individualistic and authoritarian. Liberalism (John Locke), capitalism (Adam Smith), humanism (Max Weber), communism (Karl Marx), and fascism (Friedrick Nietzsche), among others, competed (and fought) to organize and direct social and scientific life. 2 In the West, through struggle, humanist and capitalist worldviews prevailed, fueling material progress, the spread of republican institutions, and gnawing anguish about minorities left behind.

Now, postmodern worldviews of relationalism and hyper-humanism (unity of human beings and nature) challenge Enlightenment worldviews. They reject the individualistic ontology of human affairs in favor of a wholistic or cosmological one. Milja Kurki writes: “The relational perspective explored here suggests that the sciences – natural and social – are undergoing a ‘relational revolution,’ moving from Cartesian, Newtonian, and empiricist ways of knowing toward more relational ontologies and epistemologies in line with not only quantum science and relativity theory but also with ecological thought and decolonization of the sciences.” 3 Relationalist views envision a world of intense and entangled relationships deeply embedded in historical and cosmological context, in which substantialist things such as individuals and institutions do not exist or exist only in emergent form when they are investigated. In this holistic and processual universe, individual human beings have no location (position), no alternative (choice), and no escape (only one observed universe). The relationalist worldview draws from quantum science, in which reality is not fixed in time or space but appears simultaneously and unpredictably in multiple places and dissolves the distinction between the observer (individual) and the observed (universe).

These different worldviews not only reflect different ontologies, they prescribe different world politics. As Kurki infers, the relationalist turn entails a political agenda – a broadside assault on western rationality (reason), individuality (freedom), capitalism (growth), and colonialism (control/hierarchy). 4 In place of Enlightenment goals, relationalism advocates a future agenda of environmentalism that prioritizes climate change, hyper-humanism that relinquishes human control of nature, and egalitarianism that flattens material and moral differences. Much more is at stake than abstract intellectual discourse. The relationalist turn may imperil the very notion of free, reasoning individuals capable of self-conscious thought and choice in human affairs.

This chapter insists that individual human beings remain at the epicenter of social science inquiry. Quantum science does not mandate an epochal transformation of worldviews from rationality and individualism to relationality and cosmology. 5 Modeling the social sciences after the natural sciences is, in fact, a cardinal mistake. Relationalists highlight that mistake when they argue that Enlightenment science under Newton hijacked the social sciences and created a disenchanted modernity of atoms (individuals) and laws (causality) devoid of spirit and meaning. Now they make the same mistake by modeling the postmodern world after quantum science. But the Newtonian world was never just a billiard ball world of fixed entities, time and space. It was inspired and limited by Christian beliefs that the divine did not roll dice (a predictable world) and human beings were made equally worthy in the image of the divine. And the quantum worldview today is not just a mathematical model of entanglement and uncertainty; it is also a social vision to reimagine the political world as harmonious, contingent, and relationally or group-based (identity politics, multiculturalism, etc.), rather than as competitive, progressive, and individually based (markets, individual human rights, etc.).

The Enlightenment produced good and evil. This chapter does not claim otherwise. The Enlightenment’s crown jewel, however, was the emancipation, for better and worse, of the individual human being as a reasoning, responsible, and rights-seeking agent in society. On balance, this secular, individually driven humanist worldview was progressive, materially and socially. Despite all of its wars and warts, the Enlightenment era superintended unparalleled expansion of material prosperity, human longevity, public education, political freedom (yes, more democracies than ever before), and global equality (yes, half of the world’s population is now middle class). 6 Any post-Enlightenment worldview that challenges the individualist ontology of the Enlightenment has a high bar to meet.

The chapter proceeds in four parts. The first part explores the relationship between the individual and the whole, the timeworn conundrum of agency and structure. It contends that the individual remains primary over structure in several principal ways: as a source of endless diversity, a repository for the capability of reason, a portal of entry for human conversation, and the only species thus far that practices science and is capable of representing and studying itself. Individuals are not autonomous, but they have space in their embedded situation for choice and change. The main issue between this chapter and others in this volume is how much space they have and where that space resides. Relationalist accounts tend to discount agency at the individual level, Weberian accounts at the structural level. We risk a lot by disregarding either.

The second and third parts address the content and juxtaposition of competing worldviews. How do we compare and test them? This part holds fast to the notion of a universal capability of individual human beings to reason and a universal method of science to test alternative propositions (worldviews) by experiment against an outside physical and social world. To be sure, the content of reason and science is parochial and differs by culture. In some worldviews, rational and individualistic factors play the larger role, in others nonrational (e.g., emotion, intuition) and holistic factors. 7 If these multiple worldviews are incommensurable, however, we have no way to evaluate and test them. Worldviews become religious not scientific undertakings, adopted by faith not reason. On the other hand, if we retain science as a common method (mathematics, experimentation), we can compare and evaluate worldviews across different cultures. In this section I assume that all worldviews incorporate two elements: content, or their relative emphasis on rational vs. nonrational factors; and scale, or their relative emphasis on individualistic vs. structural levels of analysis. 8

The fourth part addresses the ethics of different worldviews. Worldviews have consequences – some horrific, such as the Holocaust. Who or what is accountable for these outcomes? If Weberian worldviews have moral shortcomings – and they do – relationalist worldviews do as well. Calling for openness and multiple worldviews (modernities), relationalist views are at times quite dogmatic. They pass judgment on worldviews as “right” or “wrong” not as “false” or “not false,” and speak of the pursuit of “truth” against which, they claim, resistance is futile. 9 They downplay individual agency and emphasize entangled relationships, conjuring up a “totalizing” worldview that marginalizes individual rights and privacy. They blur distinctions between science and religion and argue that worldviews “are inescapably normative.” 10 Yet, curiously, relationalists say little about the substance of relationalist norms. They pass over the question of how a relationalist world, in which all possibilities are welcomed, defends itself against the barbarity of an Adolf Hitler or a Joseph Stalin; they infer that other religions (Hinduism, Buddhism) are more in tune with nature than Christianity; they refrain from spirited criticism of worldviews that discriminate against women (Saudi Arabia, India) or Muslims (China); and they blame America and the Enlightenment for elevating European worldviews and marginalizing others. Weberian worldviews, by contrast, with their individualistic and disaggregated ontology, accommodate alternative worldviews as long as these worldviews submit to objective falsification and do not claim that their world is the only world which cannot be tested or resisted. 11

#### Quantum science disagrees with its application to IR.

Nau 22 [Henry R. Nau; professor of political science and international affairs at Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University; 6-29-2022; "Weberian and Relationalist Worldviews: What Is at Stake?"; *Uncertainty and Its Discontents: Worldviews in World Politics*, Part II - Accountable Agents and Epistemic Engines, Chapter 6; https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/uncertainty-and-its-discontents/4F8C9A81F97824652654F3BEC6E1F889; KL]

6.3 Worldviews and Science

To do this, however, we need standards. The Enlightenment gave us the standard of science as a universal method: mathematics, experimental practice. That method depends upon the assumption of a real “objective” world even if we can never know that world. We ask and test how that world works, based on the values we hold (e.g., world is predictable or uncertain), and the real world pushes back against our experimental inquiries and tells us which worldviews are consistent with it and which are not. Notice science as method tells us only which worldviews are not false (i.e., not inconsistent with reality); it never tells us which worldviews are true (i.e., the actual reality).

This is a crucial point, at least for me. Truth lies not in the universal method of science but in the multiple values that inform science as method. Newton’s Christian views led him to expect and practice a “predictable” science; Weber’s human-centric views led him to anticipate a “progressive” science; the values held by Weber’s critics led them to expect a “disenchanted” science; Hitler’s fascist and Stalin’s communist worldviews led them to promote “racist” and “pseudo” sciences (Mengele and Lysenko). Relationalists value conjunctive relationality (not individuals) and pursue a science of local not universal knowledge. Values inform all worldviews, but science as method tells us which worldviews fare best against an assumed objective world.

Strong relationalists reject science as a universal method of testing against an objective reality. They talk about “different sciences” 55 and argue that “science … is not defined by a ‘method’.” 56 Quoting Roberto Unger and Lee Smolin, Kurki concludes: “There is no scientific method, science is fundamentally defined as a collection of ethical communities.” 57 Here we come very close to worldviews as pure values (ethical communities) with methods being anything – scientific, magical, religious – that values dictate. Each community defines its own value and methods, and presumably the “real” world accommodates them all because there is no common method to determine which worldviews are not consistent with an assumed “real” (i.e., objective) world.

There are three layers of uncertainty involved in this issue of scientific objectivity (universality). Newtonian science studies the natural (nonhuman) world: objects such as planets and particles which cannot change their characteristics and which scientists neither like nor dislike. Laws are fixed and cannot be affected by the scientist. The human observer is also situated outside and independent of the natural world. In Newtonian science, the observer can be mostly objective even though scientists still operate in an intersubjective, ethical (social) community (for Newton, the Church of England) that defines what is or is not to be investigated and expected.

Weberian science studies not only the natural but also the social world in which human beings are involved and can change their minds. Laws are no longer fixed, and the observer, though still distinct, studies things it likes and dislikes, such as churches, trade unions, markets, political parties, etc. While Weberian scientists assume they can strip their social preferences from their scientific pursuits, they are human, not superhuman, and can succeed only up to a point. Objectivity is more elusive. 58

Quantum science adds a third level of uncertainty. 59 It assumes that the human observer is not only studying itself but is now inextricably entangled with the world it is studying. The observer, the observed, and the background exist only together (there is no separate individual, observation, or background), and emerge only when a particular question (measurement) is asked (made). Observation triggers or collapses the entangled quantum world and reveals the only world we can know. There is no world behind the observed one. Objectivity, in short, is now out of the question. The world depends entirely on the questions the observer asks.

Relationalism in general pushes us toward this quantum level of uncertainty. But a strong relationalism goes beyond quantum science in two ways: it drastically reduces (if not eliminates) the role of the observer (the individual investigator), and it gives up the universal method of experimental science in favor of a localized and diluted method of “trial and error.” 60 Quantum science does neither. In the case of the observer, it elevates, not eliminates, the significance of the observer (individual). Through the act of measuring, the observer now literally “creates” (“gives meaning to”) the world we observe, which is the only world we can know. 61 As Steven Weinberg muses, “Man may indeed be the measure of all things.” 62 That seems to reinforce the Weberian worldview that individuals are a significant location of agency. But in quantum physics the observer now has no way to test observations against an objective world because there is no objective world. The universal scientific method is no longer available, and we have to settle for a localized form of experimentation based on trial and error, yielding results which cannot be generalized. That point seems to reinforce the relationalist worldview.

But wait a minute. Some Newtonian (classical) physicists still contest the quantum proposition that there is no objective world. They argue that wave collapse is going on all the time objectively in a real but unknown world behind the observed world. They seek evidence of such “objective” wave collapse, independent of “subjective” measurement. 63 Interestingly, in these efforts, Newtonian and quantum scientists use the same methods of science, mathematics and experiments, but derive very different content from those methods. Neither, however, has given up on the idea of science as a universal method. Quantum science may still prevail, but if it does it won’t prevail forever, any more than Newtonian science did. Science advances from one falsified theory to another “not yet” falsified theory, not from false to true (at which point science ends). 64 And, since scientists tell us that we know only about 4 percent of the universe as we see it, the real world that we don’t see is likely to remain elusive for a very long time to come. Scientists therefore should not speak about “the reality” let alone “the truth” of their findings, only about a method that tells them which findings are not false or not yet false.

In the meantime, quantum science raises some harrowing ethical issues when applied to the human world: the potential of unhinged human observers playing the role of creator, and the absence of any common moral standard by which to hold varying worldviews accountable.

#### Absent analyzing the decisions of individual leaders and treating them culpable, genocide becomes inevitable.

Nau 22 [Henry R. Nau; professor of political science and international affairs at Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University; 6-29-2022; "Weberian and Relationalist Worldviews: What Is at Stake?"; *Uncertainty and Its Discontents: Worldviews in World Politics*, Part II - Accountable Agents and Epistemic Engines, Chapter 6; https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/uncertainty-and-its-discontents/4F8C9A81F97824652654F3BEC6E1F889; KL]

6.4 Worldviews and Ethics

Having downsized if not eliminated the role of the reasoning individual in shaping worldviews, and having adopted a quantum view that the world we see is the only one there is, relationalism in this volume has surprisingly little to say about ethical and moral responsibility, either individual or collective. This neglect follows from relationalist logic. Because the world is holistic and incorporates all possibilities, there is little or no choice, and hence little or no responsibility. We have removed practically all degrees of human freedom to act and change the world. What’s left are different values or religions and related methods of science which are compatible but not commensurable, harmonious but not integral, and equivalent but not competitive. Katzenstein writes:

both science and religion are variegated practices of different ways of knowing … Both inquire into the possibility that the world might be different than it appears. Both are instances of us living in multiple realities and thus are examples of the profound human capacity of meaning-making … Religious and scientific practices are rooted in the world of play. 65

Play is an interesting term, implying a game or imaginary reality. In that game, however, what are the rules, and who makes them? Maybe no rules are needed. Science and religion are drawing closer together: “the border between quantum mechanics and religion is porous.” 66 Religious values and scientific methods do not collide, they resonate. Multiple beliefs and realities cut or “smear” into one another like quantum waves. They blend, harmonize.

Such a harmonious concatenation of multiple worldviews expresses an aspiration that we all share. If relationalism is nothing more than an appeal for curiosity, openness, and tolerance, it is welcomed. But what if multiple worldviews do not harmonize? What if some worldviews condone slavery, deny individual human rights, justify genocide, discriminate against women (Islam in Saudi Arabia) or minorities (Uighurs in China), wage holy war against the infidel, and so on? In the flattened ontology that relationalists advocate, are all worldviews “true” or “moral”?

The issue here is not whether human beings are entangled but what the content of that entanglement is. The content of entanglement is what Haas and I try to get at with the concept of “ideological distance,” whether worldviews are converging or diverging. 67 According to relationalists, the quantum social world is cooperative; ideological distance is always at or near zero. Conversely, the Weberian world is conflictual; ideological distance is always positive and sometimes large. As Alexander Wendt explains:

If your starting premise for thinking about social life is atomistic, then conflict is the natural starting point for life – every organism is out for itself, they’re all selfish, it’s all about survival of the fittest. Cooperation is very difficult because we’re all separate and all trying to survive and do our own thing. On the other hand, if your starting point is holistic, where everything’s entangled, then cooperation may be much easier to achieve. It may even be the default situation, and conflict is the exception. So it turns upside down a lot of the foundational assumptions, I think, of mainstream social science. 68

Whether social life is atomistic or entangled, however, does not tell us much about outcomes. The master–slave relationship is entangled but not cooperative. The relationship between liberal states in the democratic peace is separate but not conflictual. No conflict in either case may mean no freedom to challenge slavery or democracy, and therefore no moral accountability – a totalitarian entanglement for which no one is responsible and which, apparently, no one can change.

Over time, of course, the content of social entanglement does change. Outright slavery is no longer acceptable. Communism, at least in the Soviet form, is gone. How does such change occur, and who is responsible for the original conflict and its eventual outcome? Katzenstein writes: “Divergent worldviews do not get resolved by appeals to logic and evidence but through individual experiences and social processes.” 69 So, how do “individual experience” and “social processes” accomplish this resolution? If logic and evidence are ruled out, what are the means of resolution – emotion, habit, intuition, etc.? Are these means peaceful or violent? Practically everyone agrees that Nazism had to be defeated by rationalist instruments (Grove might say assemblages) of power; Nazi ideology could not be blended or accommodated by relationalist effects of norms.

The relationalist worldview lacks any ethical standard for evaluating or resolving divergencies in the content of alternative worldviews. Everything is local and specific even though the world itself is holistic and entangled. And all events are uncertain even though the quantum model itself is certain and can’t be challenged. The combination of the loss of objectivity (no real world behind the observed one) and the multiplicity of incommensurable but equivalent worldviews leaves almost everything up for grabs. A flattened ontology leads to a flattened ethical landscape as well.

Kurki seeks a relational ethic of response-ability: an ability to respond sensitively, openly, and thoughtfully to human and nonhuman relationships. 70 It is an appealing insight. But in a world in which there are no things (individuals) or backgrounds (objective world), where exactly is this responsibility located, and what is its substance? Grove, for example, sees violence as relational but not easily overcome by consciousness-raising. 71 You can become aware of relations, he points out, without coming to a sense of the common good. Kurki ponders the same point about knowledge: science “is part of becoming … what this means is that we do not have clear criteria for good or bad knowledge.” 72 The substance of ethics or knowledge, what is good and what is bad, is hard to pin down. Even harder to pin down is the location of ethical responsibility. In Grove’s examination of presidential powers and nuclear weapons, he admits that the president is ultimately unaware of who or what is in control.” 73 And if no one is in control, no one has responsibility.

Responsibility is not merely the “ability to respond.” It’s the ability to respond “by someone or something” in a “substantive” way toward some moral “end.” Weber distinguished between an “ethic of responsibility,” which Kurki’s formulation might capture, and an “ethic of ultimate ends,” which Kurki does not consider. 74 Perhaps this is because an ethic of ultimate ends requires more than a relationship; it requires a direction, an arrow, not simply a flat surface or “fold.”

As noted earlier, Grove suggests that “the scale of the investigator … radically alters what appears as a part and what appears as a whole.” If that’s the case, the individual investigator, the individual, is back at the heart of a quantum-based social science model. 75 The Weberian commitment to the individual human being as the source of meaning and morality in a multiscalar world remains indispensable. That does not rule out agency at other levels. Relationalist factors are multiple, real, and often confining. But, to a meaningful extent, they form out of the interpretations and interactions of reasoning individuals, they change because of individual initiatives, and they dissolve because individuals leave and join other relationships. The only “authenticated” actors beyond the individual in a Weberian worldview, therefore, are those groups, institutions, classes, etc., that are chosen or affirmed voluntarily by the consent of individual human beings acting in a setting where they have a meaningful degree of choice. Holistic worldviews diminish that degree of choice and consent, however well-meaning they may be by embracing all possibilities.

The Weberian view judges and chooses. That is neither easy nor pleasant. No one wants to be accused of being judgmental. But we all do it. 76 Indeed, how does one avoid it? The Holocaust was a monstrous act of evil. How do we understand it in a world that blends religion and science? As Barnett (Chapter 5) shows, the Holocaust poses a wrenching question of existence, not just a vague smearing of relationships and “response-ability” to change or becoming. If such a question can be answered only in a specific situation (when the quantum wave function collapses), then we have abandoned both our humanity and our influence on world affairs.

Am I forcing everyone into a Weberian worldview? 77 Possibly, but I am not saying that the Weberian view is the only view. I am saying that I can find a location in the Weberian universe to host an alternative point of view (and do so when I compare the worldviews in this volume; see earlier in this chapter); I cannot find such a location in a relationalist universe. At the beginning, this project postulated a revolution in natural and social science thought rejecting Enlightenment and Newtonian worldviews. In later stages, Katzenstein emphasized complementarities among Newtonian and Post-Newtonian worldviews. 78 By complementarity, however, Katzenstein forces the Newtonian view into the relationalist universe where “the determinist or probability-inflected Newtonian world can be thought of as a special case that reveals itself when the quantum world of infinite possibilities and radical uncertainty collapses.” 79 Bottom line? There is no location in the relationist world for dissent. Alternatives either fit into the quantum world or are patently false.

Moreover, understanding another worldview does not mean accepting it or making it equivalent. Would the world be better off today if the Reformation and Enlightenment had not occurred, or if the Haitian lwa not the Weberian worldview had dominated world politics after 1600? 80 Best, you say, if neither dominated? OK, but spell out the global consequences of the Haitian worldview or the specific parameters of equal coexistence which makes all worldviews (fascism, communism) acceptable and worth learning from. Unless we specify “what” we learn from “which” worldview, we are simply treating worldviews like souvenirs, collecting and trivializing them. Worse, we are opening the floodgates to any worldview with no standard for judging good and bad. Maybe the relationalist turn pops open an irresistible, new window of a more harmonious world that we have missed because of the atomistic and competitive frame of western modernism. But maybe it doesn’t. And if it doesn’t, not only material progress but individual freedom is at stake.

Which leads to a final question: where do relationalist cosmologies place the divine? What lies behind the Big Bang? Relationalists are eager to unify the human and natural worlds and see a growing commonality between science and religion. The obstacle to unifying the human and natural worlds, however, is an understanding of consciousness which humans have and nonhumans do not. And the obstacle to uniting the scientific and religious (supranatural) worlds is an understanding of the soul, the human capacity to imagine the divine. 81 Separating these three worlds – nature, humanity, and the divine – has led to abuse: humanity masquerading as gods (the Church before the Enlightenment) or humanity “lifted up” to control nature (the critics’ view of the Enlightenment). But uniting them may lead to even worse abuse. What stands in the way of a science that poses as a religion or a nature that restrains prosperity? 82 By blurring the distinction between religion and science, nature and humanity, relationalism weakens Enlightenment institutions that separate state and church, markets and feudalism. It enables potentially powerful new gods of unchallenged expertise and science to take the stage (because, remember, there is no objective universe). We could wind up again in a pre-Enlightenment world wherein scientists and their authoritarian enablers usurp the power of privilege to suppress the rights of reasoning individuals. Resistance would be anti-science and futile, as it was anti-God and heresy in pre-Enlightenment times. As Timothy Byrnes writes, “if a relational cosmology is grounded in faith or in the pursuit of what is ‘really real,’ then the unknown itself is the basis of Truth and the human propensity to resistance is ultimately futile.” 83 And if the unknown is truth and cannot be resisted, the Dark Ages may be upon us once again.

6.5 Conclusion

I come back to the need, therefore, to maintain a Weberian worldview, whatever the debate in physics, if only to retain a “critical” perspective on the totalizing tendencies of the relationalist school of thought. As Mike Barnett concludes, “Without worldviews we would not know how to go on, and would be lost in the wilds until a charismatic leader arrived to provide guidance.” 84 In the barren “wilds” of relationalism (the jungle), that charismatic leader would probably be a totalizing ideology, one admitting of no alternatives – radical Islam under the Caliphate, Medieval Christianity under the Inquisition, totalitarian atheism under fascism and communism, or scientific elitism under a relationalist banner that substitutes expertise for politics and human choice. The Weberian worldview is still a necessary defense against that sort of evil.